

BILDERBERG MEETINGS ✓

THE HAGUE, 31 October 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 1150 69

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE.

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
Dear Sir,

Enclosed you will find the Minutes of the two Steering Committee meetings at Soestdijk Palace on 21 and 22 October.

After completing the Minutes we received the news that Messrs. Kohnstamm and Janssen talked with Monsieur Fernand Spaak. He has agreed to write a paper on the first Agenda item. He will be available for the Steering Committee meeting of January 21st and of course for the Conference. Monsieur Spaak is quite prepared and anxious to contact his American colleague who will be chosen to write the other working paper on the first subject.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,



N. le Roy

RECEIVED
NOV 6 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

Bilderberg Meetings

October 1972

MINUTES
OF 2 MEETINGS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE

Soestdijk Palace
on 21 and 22 October 1972

Present:

H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands

Ernst H. van der Beugel

Joseph E. Johnson

Giovanni Agnelli

M. Nuri Birgi

Il Marchese Cittadini Cesi

Arthur H. Dean

Anthony G.S. Griffin

Daniel Janssen

Max Kohnstamm

Reginald Maudling

James A. Perkins

Baron Edmond de Rothschild

Shepard Stone

Terkel M. Terkelsen

Otto G. Tidemand

Marcus Wallenberg

Otto Wolff von Amerongen

Mr. Wallenberg was accompanied by Mr. Nils Svensson, who will handle the arrangements for the 1973 Saltsjöbaden Conference.

Bilderberg Meetings

Saturday afternoon session

Discussion on General Aspects of Bilderberg Meetings.

The discussion centered around the question whether the Bilderberg Meetings should now move beyond their original aim, namely "maintaining and deepening the dialogue between North America and Western Europe". This question was raised with particular reference to the problems presented by the emergence of Japan as a major world power.

After an extensive discussion in which different views were presented, a consensus was reached on the point that the present state of relations between North America and Europe fully justified the maintenance of the primary objectives of Bilderberg.

It was in this framework that the question of Japanese participants was discussed.

There was agreement that the question of finding qualified Japanese participants, which posed a problem a few years ago, was not an obstacle any more.

Considerable attention was given to the question whether an invitation to the Japanese to attend a Bilderberg Conference would necessarily imply extending an invitation for every conference, and even institutionalizing the arrangement by inviting them to the Steering Committee. Consensus was reached on the point that it should be possible and desirable to invite Japanese on an ad hoc basis for subjects in which they were particularly involved.

A necessary condition for this procedure would, however, be to explain to prospective Japanese participants the primary aims of Bilderberg as a forum for a North American-European dialogue. This opinion of the Steering Committee implies that the typical topics for the North American-European dialogue would continue to be discussed in a frank and unhibited manner among the countries directly concerned.

Bilderberg Meetings

There was general agreement that, in view of the topics decided upon, it would not be in order to invite Japanese to Saltsjöbaden.

It was decided that, in view of the importance of the issue and the fact that a few members of the Steering Committee were not present, the question of Japanese participants could again be on the Agenda of the Steering Committee in Saltsjöbaden.

There followed a substantive discussion about the composition of the Annual Conference.

There was agreement that a larger proportion of younger participants should be invited than in the past, with particular emphasis on seeking to find persons who appear to be potential leaders. It is important to include some who can be expected to challenge thoughtfully - or even reject - assumptions or beliefs often accepted in previous meetings. At the same time, every effort should be made to avoid inviting those whose views are so extreme or their manner so abrasive as to preclude constrictive dialogue.

Attention was drawn to the importance of having a better representation from a) the age group of 30-45, and b) trade unions, as well as maintaining a fair sampling of the academic world and the news media.

The participation of women should be continued.

The importance was stressed to invite as many people as possible who were effective in communicating the Bilderberg experience.

The Secretariat draw the attention to the fact that for the European countries and Canada it would not be possible to have a balanced representation on a national scale, the groups being too small for that. It was therefore decided that at the January meeting of the S.C. an effort should be made to make the European and Canadian group of participants balanced as a whole. In view of the size of U.S. participation, the Americans could balance their group more easily.

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Sunday morning session

Agenda and Working Papers.

While everybody agreed that it would be appropriate and important to discuss the energy situation and its impact on American-European relations, there was, at the same time, a strong desire of some members of the Steering Committee to discuss a subject which was directly related to the present state of relations between North America and Europe. A compromise was found in the adoption of the following two Agenda items:

- I The possibilities of the development of a European energy policy, and the consequences for European-North American relations. ✓
- II Conflicting expectations concerning the European Security Conference. ✓

It was decided that Mr. Kohnstamm and Mr. Janssen should approach Monsieur F. Spaak of E.E.C. to write the working paper on the first Agenda item.

Mr. Johnson will, in consultation with other American members of the Steering Committee, invite an American to write a paper from the American side. Among possible authors the names were mentioned of Mr. Robert Anderson, Mr. Glenn Seaborg, Mr. David Freeman and Mr. George Piercy.

A third paper would be prepared, setting forth the main facts of the energy situation.

Mr. Johnson will approach the Ford Foundation, and if this would prove to be difficult, there are many alternative sources.

It was further agreed that the two authors of the working papers should be in close contact with each other and the Secretariat, in order to coordinate their work, and to bring out a number of precise discussion points.

ilderberg Meetings

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Among these discussion points were mentioned the different European interests - the role of the oil companies - conflicts between energy requirements and ecological priorities - the consequences of developments in the energy situation on European-North American relations, and the balance of payments implications.

Mr. Tidemand will approach Mr. Stoltenberg, former Secretary of State in the Norwegian Government, to write a working paper in which the positive elements of the European Security Conference are stressed.

Mr. Johnson will approach an American to write a working paper in which the more sceptical point of view is presented.

The authors will be invited to the next Steering Committee meeting with the request to have an outline of their paper available at that moment.

The working paper itself should preferably not exceed 15 pages.

Participants

Belgium:	4	(including 2 members of the S.C.)
Canada:	4	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Denmark:	3	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Finland:	1	
France:	7	(including 2 members of the S.C.)
Germany:	7	(including 2 members of the S.C.)
Iceland:	1	
International:	4	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Italy:	6	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Netherlands:	3	
Norway:	4	(including 2 members of the S.C.)
Sweden:	6	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Switzerland:	2	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
Turkey:	2	(including 1 member of the S.C.)
U.K.:	7	(including 2 members of the S.C.)
U.S.A.:	18-20	(including 10 members of the S.C.)

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The European and Canadian members of the Steering Committee were requested to send in as soon as possible (but not later than the end of November) their suggestions for participants, but they were asked to send in more names than their quota. This will enable the Steering Committee and the Secretariat to aim at a balanced composition of the European and Canadian group, which was discussed on Saturday afternoon (see page 3).

This implies that with a few exceptions of active statesmen, no participant - other than paper writers - should already be approached before the Steering Committee meeting of January 1973.

The next Steering Committee meeting will take place at Soestdijk Palace on Sunday, 21 January, 1973 at 10.30 a.m..
The Chairman envisages a full day meeting.

Bilderberg Meetings

A G E N D A

STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING

SOESTDIJK PALACE

21 October 1972

5 p.m.

- 1) Opening;
- 2) Discussion of general aspects of Bilderberg Meetings.
(see notes of June 28th 1972 and September 28th and
letters from Mr. Culver and Mr. Johnson)

SOESTDIJK PALACE

22 October 1972

11 a.m.

- 1) Opening;
- 2) Place and date of the next Conference;
- 3) Agenda for the Conference and discussion on persons
who should be approached to write introductory papers;
- 4) Persons to be invited;
- 5) Place and date of the next meeting of the Steering
Committee;
- 6) Other business

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 28 September 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 11 00 60

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

From: Joseph E. Johnson
Ernst H. van der Beugel

To: The members of the
Steering Committee

Steering Committee meeting
October 21st and October 22nd.

- 1) This note should be read in conjunction with van der Beugel's "Note on Bilderberg Meetings" which was circulated on June 28th and is again enclosed herewith.
- 2) We suggest that we start our Saturday meeting by giving members of the Steering Committee an opportunity to give their comments on the note of June 28th. Some have already done so in writing and their reactions are circulated together with this note.
- 3) With respect to the possible participation of Australians and Japanese it will appear that the two cases are quite different. We suggest that Australians will not be considered as continuing members, but that Australians be invited ad hoc, in relation to their potential contribution to the agenda of a particular meeting.

As far as the Japanese are concerned it must be recognized that Japan is not only the sole non-communist industrialized country, that is not a regular participant of Bilderberg, but indeed the third most productive country in the world. Moreover, experience going back many years, suggests that the Japanese are highly sensitive about their relations with Canadians, Americans and Europeans. This sensitivity is such, that we must take it very much into account in our decisions. In this connection it seems quite clear that, as van der Beugel's memorandum on 28 June stated, once the Japanese are invited, they will probably have to be considered as permanent members with representation on the Steering Committee.

The fact that matters of interest to Japan are discussed at Bilderberg will undoubtedly become known to prominent Japanese, and as their concern about their relationship to the other industrialized countries grows, the fact that they are not invited to Bilderberg could also lead to sensitive reactions.

One strong argument in favour of the inclusion of the Japanese is that during the 1970's there is unlikely to be any question discussed at Bilderberg of significance, in which the Japanese are not involved or with respect to which they do not have views, and perhaps even responsibilities. Even though not a nuclear power they are now, as was made clear at Knokke, one of the "poles" of the East-Asian power quadrangle. Moreover, it is clear that questions of world trade will center for some time upon the role of Japan and the relationship to the other industrialized countries, most particularly those of Western Europe and the United States and Canada.

On the other hand it is a fact that some members of the Steering Committee have expressed the view that this does not necessarily mean that Japanese should participate in Bilderberg Meetings. Moreover, some members have doubts as to whether there are many Japanese who are both informed and sophisticated with respect to the issues to be discussed, and sufficiently at ease in a group of Westerners, to participate effectively in the discussions and without weakening the spirit of frankness and directness, that has characterized Bilderberg from the beginning.

We strongly urge that the decision be taken now as to whether Japanese should be invited to the Saltsjöbaden Meeting. If the decision is affirmative, we should consider now institutionalizing Japanese participation by inviting a Japanese to serve on the Steering Committee.

- 4) On Sunday morning we will discuss possible topics for the agenda of the Saltsjöbaden Meeting. A few suggestions have been made by Baron Snoy ("le conflit actuel du Moyen-Orient" and "l'organisation d'un système monétaire européen") and Tony Griffin ("the problem of urban development and government").

We would like to add a few suggestions from our side for consideration:

- a) The Middle East. We could take the Middle East as a subject for the whole conference and split it up in a political approach and an economic subject, eventually linking it with the energy situation of the Western world.
- b) We could also take the energy situation as an economic subject without dealing with the political situation in the Middle East, but in that case we must choose another political subject.
- c) It occurs to us that the discussion about the Club of Rome's report and the M.I.T. report on the limits of growth is both of great importance and very controversial. We would therefore suggest as a possible choice an agenda item called "the limits of growth".
- d) We have not discussed our relations with the developing world since Wiesbaden (1966). We think that this topic would be too large, but it is quite possible to make a choice of a more limited character within the framework of our relation with the Third World.
- e) It is of course possible to take a subject which pertains more specifically to American-European relations. In that context the European Security Conference would be a possible subject.

As a general observation in relation to point e) in the above paragraph we would like to emphasize that American-European relations at present is a subject on the agenda of numerous other international groups, most certainly in 1973.

Therefore there is something to say for subjects in Saltsjöbaden which are not on too many other agenda's of international gatherings and at the same time can be constructively dealt with in a non-expert group.

Y
WB

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 28 June 1972
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 11 30 69
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

NOTE ON BILDERBERG MEETINGS

- 1) At the last Steering Committee meeting in Knokke we agreed that we would discuss in the afternoon of October 21st several substantive and procedural questions about the annual meetings, before we discuss the subject and the other relevant questions of the Saltsjöbaden Meeting.
- 2) I might try to list a few issues in connection with our annual meetings. It is, I think, useful to mention them not too long after our last meeting because the memories are still fresh. It might also cause you to formulate your own thoughts about eventual improvements or changes in our procedures.
- 3) First some general remarks.
 - a) Bilderberg is not a meeting of experts, but a place where people from different walks of life discuss topics of common interest with the general aim of strengthening the cohesion of the industrialized world and the particular aim of maintaining and deepening the dialogue between North America and Western Europe. In this Bilderberg is unique, and I think that this basic formula should be maintained.
 - b) It implies, however, that the meeting is a mixture of top-level experts and people who are just interested in the issue at stake. This creates a certain tension and certainly an uneven level of the interventions. Can this be cured or improved? I do not think so because every

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cure would mean abandoning our basic formula.

Restricting the discussion to the experts would kill the conference.

Spending part of the meeting in smaller groups would imply that we lose the basic advantage of everybody being present when the discussion takes place, and it would mean furthermore that we pretend to be a group of experts, which we are not.

I suggest therefore that we accept this other side of the medal and live with the disadvantage of our own formula.

- c) In judging the success of a particular meeting, members of the Steering Committee should bear in mind that only they can compare the meeting with many previous ones. Most of the participants only attend one or two meetings and for them the comparison does not exist. What really matters is not only the question whether the discussion was good or sometimes less than we should desire but the total impression of the meeting, including the numerous and in my opinion highly valuable social contacts outside the sessions. To simplify it: the fact that President X of corporation Y dines with Minister Z or journalist A or Professor B. This is essential for our formula, and I do think that this is another unique element in Bilderberg.

- 4) If we accept this general framework, there certainly is in my opinion a constant need for improvement and adjustment.

5) Belgium and Holland did their utmost to find a place where everybody could live in the same hotel. We have been unfortunately unsuccessful, but I think that in the future the "one hotel concept" should be maintained, even at the cost of the luxury. Somehow two hotels are a definite disadvantage for the ambiance of the conference.

6) Working papers and topics.

a) Working papers should be limited to 15 pages at the maximum.

b) If possible they should represent different and preferably opposite points of view.

The disadvantage of the Knokke papers was that all four represented approximately the same basic point of view.

c) Preferably we should have two items on the agenda. The agenda item in Knokke was too large (in spite of the fact that some participants complained in the meeting that we did not discuss also Vietnam, the Third World etc. etc.).

d) We should stress more than we did in the last few meetings that working papers should end by mentioning a few clear, concise points on which the discussion should be focussed and which should, if possible, be controversial.

If authors of the working papers are not willing to do this, the secretariat should before the meeting circulate a list of topics on which the discussion will be focussed.

7) Procedures at the meeting.

- a) Not only should the five minutes rule be strictly adhered to, but those who get more than five minutes should be clearly told that the upper limit is 15 minutes. The trouble is that some people simply refuse to keep the rules, as we had one case in Knokke where the speaker was warned that 15 minutes was the limit and went on for I think 40 minutes. For these cases there are no rules. Only God can intervene.
- b) We should insist that interventions be limited to the topics mentioned in the working papers or in a note of the secretariat. (see 6d)
- c) We should make it clear to participants that they will be given a chance to talk several times and therefore won't have to say everything when they first get the floor.
- d) We should tell participants that if they want to take on something that links or bridges several topics, they must clear this beforehand with the Chair.
- e) The "one minute rule" worked very well in Knokke and should be strongly encouraged.
- f) The meetings should not last too long. The "span of attention" is 1½ to 2 hours at the maximum.
I suggest that we announce in advance when the tea and coffeebreak will be, and when the sessions will be terminated.
- g) Sunday morning is a problem. On the one hand we need it because otherwise participants would leave on Saturday evening, while that evening is "socially" the most important one.

- f) The political stars. I think it is a feature of Bilderberg to invite a few active top government people. We should continue to do so. I should mention, however, that their overcrowded and unpredictable schedules make it highly uncertain whether they will really appear. (In Knokke this was the case with Helmut Schmidt, Reggy Maudling and Henry Kissinger who all three very much wanted to come.)
- g) I think that we should be careful in the balance between business and non-business among the participants. I had the feeling that in Knokke, and certainly in view of the subject we dealt with, business was slightly overrepresented.
- h) Last but not least, the question of the young. In Knokke we have not been completely successful in obtaining a fair participation of the younger non-establishment, but it is inevitable that this varies from year to year. In further consideration of this aspect of Bilderberg I think that, while it is very necessary to have a fair amount of younger people, the main point is that we invite people who differ in their basic assumptions about political and economic problems from the majority of traditional Bilderberg participants. This is something which has a certain relation to age, but not a total one. The main differences in the approach to Western societies and the order of priorities connected with these different approaches often run right through all different age-levels. It is more important to have these different views present at the meeting than cling to a certain percentage of "under thirties".

Furthermore, I think that quite apart from opinions the 30-45 age level is extremely important for the future of Bilderberg. It struck me that our North-American friends had more representatives of that group in Knokke than the Europeans.

- 9) I hope that these far from complete suggestions might contribute to our discussion of October 21st and 22nd.

MS 20/6

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

Suppose Oct 1
THE HAGUE, 28 June 1972
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 112060
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

To: The members of the
Steering Committee
From: E.H. van der Beugel

I enclose a note on the Bilderberg meetings which might
be used for our meetings on October 21st and 22nd.

It would of course be very helpful if you would enable
us to circulate your eventual comments before the
meetings.

Our Chairman is in agreement with the contents of this
note.

Gus

RECEIVED
JUL 6 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

14 January

OUTLINE OF WORKING PAPER OF THE HON. ALASTAIR BUCHAN

Unfortunately, Alastair Buchan was prevented to attend the meeting by a sudden influenza.

He gave me his thoughts about the paper by telephone, and therefore the following points are very sketchy indeed.

1) Characteristics of the sixties.

U.S. central pillar of system of alliances, not only in free developed world, but in developing world as well.

Contrast with the Soviet Union, which concentrated on relations with U.S. and Europe and evading policy of containment by developing its position in Middle East and South East Asia.

2) Characteristics of the seventies

a) Strategic parity of the Soviet Union and very active policy towards Europe.

b) Focus of balance of power may change from Western to Eastern hemisphere.

Having said this great many reservations. Soviet has not achieved anything significant by their strategic build up. It might, however, affect the way U.S. is able to act in a crisis.

Great power relations in the Far East may show some of the characteristics of nineteenth century balance of power in Europe, but there are great differences.

It is not entirely a military balance of power, but rather the interplay of four rather antagonistic cultures.

The change in power relations does not mean Soviet policy aiming at long range accommodation in Western Europe.

Soviet attitude will continue to be basically hostile, because of strength in Europe and European relations with U.S..

- 3) Role of Western Europe in force relations in the Far East will be limited.
Mainly trading relations, neither central for the interest of Europe, nor for situation in the Far East.
- 4) Western Europe is likely to concentrate on its own organization with possible focus on partial replacement of U.S. military strength in Europe and perhaps on role in Mediterranean and conceivably in Africa.

In elaborating these points, Alastair Buchan will concentrate on the situation in the Far East.

E.v.d.B.

OUTLINE OF WORKING PAPER BY MESSRS. KOHNSTAMM
AND VAN DER BEUGEL

1. European security is totally dependent on the closest possible relation between Europe and the United States.
A minimum amount of economic world order is totally dependent on joint management of this economic order by the United States, Japan and Europe.
2. Why does European security still necessitate this closest American-European relationship?
The answer comes from our views on the Soviet military and political posture. (will be elaborated)
3. From this analysis it becomes clear that American nuclear protection and a substantial presence of American conventional forces on the continent of Europe is essential both as a deterrent against war and as a condition preventing Europe from Finlandization. (credibility of nuclear deterrent is intimately linked with a certain conventional American force level; link with Ostpolitik; M.B.F.R.'s etc.)

In order to create a climate in which the continuation of the present American posture in Europe can be secured, the European countries must contribute and increase their military conventional elements in NATO.

4. Why can Europe not take over either the nuclear or the conventional military role of the United States in NATO? (will be elaborated).
In the unlikelihood of sharply increased European defence budgets the improvement of the contribution of European countries presupposes a minimum of certain forms of closer military co-operation. Obstacles and possibilities.
5. It is indispensable that at the European summit and before serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on European security a European option must be presented.
6. From this it should not be implied that the precondition for the American military presence in Europe only lies in the military field.

7. However, the maintenance of European-American defence co-operation depends also on the general political climate resulting from their economic relations.
8. From a purely economic point of view protectionist policies on both sides of the Atlantic may not be very harmful; the American economy is relatively little dependent on trade with Europe; taken together the ten members of the European Economic Community will be much less so than they were as individual states.
9. But new protectionist measures will have a profound impact on their political relations - open economic relations and a feeling of common material interests are a pre-condition to continued co-operation in defence matters.
10. European and American economic relations are at the cross-roads. For 25 years the free market world has lived in a relatively liberal and "one world" perspective. The system was led by the United States (Bretton, Woods, Dillon and Kennedy Rounds etc.), on the basis of the United States economic strength and its monetary reserves.
11. The following factors have profoundly changed the situation; Firstly the rising economic power of Japan and of the European Economic Community.
12. Secondly the increase in rapidity of movement of the factors of production with the exception of labour. This has led The Economist to declare David Ricardo dead and the law of comparative advantages for the birds.
13. Thirdly, a much greater emphasis in the industrialized countries on those factors called together quality of life (as opposed to increased efficiency in the production of goods).
14. The first factor rules out the possibility that America alone would continue to lead the system. The second and third taken together exclude that the system can be ruled by the automaticity of economic laws.
15. We will either move to a world in which in trade and monetary matters everyone will be on its own (with all the political and economic consequences) or the world economic system must be jointly managed.
16. Such joint management can only come from the major industrial powers: the United States, Japan and the European Economic Community. The latter is in an awkward position. Tariffs, quotas, trade and agriculture products depend on joint decisions of the Community's Institutions. In monetary matters the member-states remain independent. Furthermore the decision-making machinery in the first category is very cumbersome. It is easier for the Community to block action than to undertake it. Good management is the result of rapid decisions and discretionary action.

17. Joint management of the world economy, however, puts heavy demands on the three main participants. Consultative machinery has to be built up for it.
The main challenge is a challenge to the European nations. Are they capable of building up the instruments that will enable them to be an active participant in management and not a blocking factor in it?
18. In addressing themselves to this question European nations must realize that from their response depends not only the functioning of the world economic order but also the maintenance of European and American military co-operation indispensable to their security.
19. What are the chances that Europe moves ahead in this direction?
Main obstacles; the internal policies of the European Community in the light of the above external imperative.
European-American action during the next years. (to be worked out)

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 17 January 1972
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 11 70 69
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE
AT SOESTDIJK PALACE ON JANUARY 15th 1972

Present

H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands

Mr. Ernst H. van der Beugel

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson

Mr. C. Frits Karsten

Mr. Giovanni Agnelli

Mr. Wilfrid S. Baumgartner

Mr. M. Nuri Birgi

Marchese Gian G. Cittadini Cesi

Mr. Arthur H. Dean

Mr. Anthony G.S. Griffin

Mr. Henry J. Heinz II

Mr. Leif Høegh

Mr. Daniel Janssen

Mr. Max Kohnstamm

Mr. Johannes Meynen

Sir Eric Roll

Mr. Otto G. Tidemand

Mr. Victor H. Umbricht

Mr. Marcus Wallenberg

Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen

- Chairman

- Honorary Secretary
General for Europe

- Honorary Secretary
General for the
United States

- Honorary Treasurer

In Attendance:

Mr. Charles W. Getchell Jr.

Mr. E. Vernède

I) Opening

The Prince mentioned that Mr. Terkelsen, who had the intention to attend the meeting, was prevented from doing so because of the death of King Frederik.

The Prince proposed that Mr. Meynen would, after having handed over his treasury function to Mr. Karsten, remain on the Steering Committee as an honorary member.

Ambassador Birgi, who will resign from his ambassadorial post, was invited to continue as member of the Steering Committee. Both proposals were unanimously welcomed.

II) Participants for the Knokke Meeting

The Prince introduced the subject by drawing the attention of members of the Steering Committee to the fact that hitherto not enough proposals for ladies (participants) were received.

AUSTRIA: Mr. Kraus will be invited.

BELGIUM: Messrs. Janssen, Solvay, Camu, Vandeputte, Cudell, Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers, Vicomte Davignon and Baron Lambert will be invited.

CANADA: Messrs. Griffin, Sharp, McLean, Raynauld and McLaren will be invited.

DENMARK: In the probable case that Mr. Terkelsen will be able to attend, Mr. Terkelsen, Mr. Haekkerup and Mr. Sørensen will be invited.

FRANCE: Messrs. Baumgartner, Nora, David-Weill, Sabouret, Tatu, Riboud and Baron de Rothschild will be invited. In the case Mr. Riboud is unable to attend, Mr. Baumgartner will approach Mr. Maisonrouge. Mr. Baumgartner will also approach Madame Françoise Giroud of "l'Express". Mr. Baumgartner will keep the Secretariat informed.

FINLAND: After his discussion with the President of Finland, Mr. Wallenberg will communicate the name of a Finnish candidate to the Secretariat.

GERMANY: Messrs. Wischniewski, Wolff von Amerongen, Birrenbach, Schmidt, Schröder, Countess Dönhoff and Mrs. Focke will be invited. Mr. Wolff von Amerongen will let the Secretariat know when the invitations can be sent out.

GREECE: Mr. Pasmazoglu will be invited.

ICELAND: Mr. Hallgrimsson will be invited.

INTERNATIONAL: Messrs. Kohnstamm, Dahrendorf, Deniau, Luns, Malfatti, McNamara, Schweitzer, Jonkheer van Lennep and Jonkheer Loudon will be invited. In the case of Mr. Malfatti being prevented from attending, the name of Ambassador Manzio was suggested. Mr. Schweitzer will be approached by Mr. Baumgartner and Mr. McNamara by Mr. Johnson. They will inform the Secretariat.

ITALY: Mr. Dino Del Bo, who was originally suggested, will be unable to attend. Mr. Agnelli will approach ISPI and Mr. Pirelli to consider another Italian participant instead of Mr. Del Bo, and will inform the Secretariat. Messrs. Agnelli, Umberto Colombo, Ducci, Levi, Maraini, Prince Colonna di Paliano and Marchese Cittadini Cesi will be invited.

NETHERLANDS: H.R.H. Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands, H.R.H. Prince Claus of the Netherlands, Messrs. Karsten, Meynen, Dijkgraaf, de Koster, Patijn, van Tijn, Wagner, Zijlstra and Mrs. 't Hooft will be invited.

NORWAY: Messrs. Høegh, Tidemand, Seip and Mrs. Schweigård Selmer will be invited to come.

PORTUGAL: Mr. Espirito Santo Silva and Mr. Nogueira will be invited.

SWEDEN: Mr. Wallenberg and Mr. Palme will be invited. In the case of Mr. Palme being prevented from attending, Mr. Wallenberg will approach another member of the Swedish Government. He will also consider an invitation to Mrs. Myrdall. Mr. Wallenberg will inform the Secretariat.

SWITZERLAND: Mr. Umbricht, Mr. Reverdin, Mr. Fleiner and Mr. Jolles (Head of the Federal Commerce Division) will be invited.

UNITED KINGDOM: Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir Eric Roll, The Hon. Alastair Buchan, Sir Alec Douglas-Home or Lord Carrington and Messrs. Lever, Browne and Evans will be invited. The Prince suggested two other participants, notably Mrs. Shirley Williams and Mr. Stuart Holland. Sir Eric Roll will approach both and will inform the Secretariat. As to AUSTRALIA, invitations will be sent to: Mr. Brown, Sir Alan Westerman and Mr. Hedley Bull (Australian expert on Far Eastern security matters).

UNITED STATES: The United States list was not yet finalized. An invitation will be sent to Messrs. Johnson, Ball, Collado, Dean, Hauge, Heinz, Moyers, Murphy, Perkins, Rockefeller, Stone and Blumenthal and through Mr. Johnson to: Admiral Zumwalt, Dr. Kissinger (in the case Dr. Kissinger is prevented from coming, to General Haig), Bayless Manning, Dean Rusk, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Fred Bergsten, John B. Connally and Mrs. Miriam Camps.

UNITED STATES

In the case of Secretary Connally being prevented from attending, Mr. Arthur Burns will be invited.

Other names mentioned were:

- a) Mr. John Cowles or Mr. Otis Chandler
- b) Mr. Harrison, Mr. Salisbury, Mr. Max Frankel, Mr. Cyrus Sulzberger and Mr. Abe Rosenthal
- c) Two out of the following: Mr. Cliff Wharton, Mr. Andrew Brimmer, Mr. Vernon Jordan, Mr. Benjamin Rayburn and Mr. Ron Davenport.
- d) Two from the following group: Mr. Amory Houghton, Mr. Gelb, Mr. Binger and Mr. Taylor.
- e) Two or three from the following group:
Senators: Mansfield, Tower, Mathias, Javits, Mondale and Dole.
- f) Among other names mentioned were: Mr. Patrick Moynihan, Professor Reischauer, Ambassador Robert Schaetzel, Mr. Malgren and Mr. Paul Warnecke.
- g) It was considered highly improbable that Congressmen would accept an invitation, because of the 1972 Election. Therefore consideration should be given to inviting one or two active Republican politicians.

THE SECRETARIAT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING
INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT EXACT NAMES,
FUNCTIONS AND ADDRESSES OF PARTICIPANTS.

III) Working papers

A rough outline of the working papers of Mr. Buchan and Messrs. Kohnstamm and van der Beugel jointly are enclosed.

Mr. Johnson communicated the outline of the papers of Mr. Ball and Mr. Blumenthal.

Mr. Ball will primarily focus on what he calls the trapezium or trapezoid in the Far East and the seeds of major potential conflicts in that area, e.g. between China and Japan. He will discuss the possibility of Japan turning more to the Soviet Union; he will predict that the U.S. and China will deal with each other at arms' length, and U.S.-Japan relations in danger of being increasingly under strain.

He will also deal with the changing situation in Europe, and the possible future role of Europe in the Far East, but rather "in the margin" of his main thesis.

Mr. Blumenthal will start with the main elements of the economic situation between industrialized countries over the two and a half post-war decades. He will then stress the importance of the events of August 1971, and will continue by considering the following three questions:

- 1) What are the changes in the international economic environment confronting the industrialized nations of the West in the 70's as against the preceding two decades?
- 2) What is the range of new problems arising from the new circumstances - and of old problems left over from the past - which require solution? What are possible courses of action with regard to some of these?
- 3) To what extent are existing institutions suited to dealing with the task of solving our current set of economic problems? What institutional changes and innovations should be considered?

He will give his answers to this set of questions and will deal with the required institutional changes to meet the new situation.

Messrs. Buchan, Kohnstamm and van der Beugel, promised to have their paper ready before February 15th, while Mr. Johnson was

convinced that the same was true for the two American papers, because they were already written in a draft form.

IV) Discussion at the Conference

It was decided that the Conference would discuss the Blumenthal and Kohnstamm-van der Beugel paper on the first day, and the Ball and Buchan paper on the second day.

The Sunday morning will be left flexible.

Mr.Griffin will invite either Mr.Sharp or Mr. Raynauld to open the discussion on the first day.

Mr.Deniau will be approached by Mr.Kohnstamm to open the discussion on the second day, and as an alternative possibility to invite Prince Colonna for the same purpose.

Attention was drawn to the fact that both the Blumenthal and the Kohnstamm-van der Beugel papers were not representative for the more eurocentric approach to the problems under consideration, an approach which was shared by an important element in European opinion.

It was left to the discussion between Mr.Kohnstamm and Mr.Deniau whether Mr.Deniau would wish to present his point of view orally or in a short written statement, which could be circulated before the Conference.

V) Other Business

A Steering Committee meeting will be held at the Hotel "La Réserve" at Knokke, on Thursday, April 20th at 9 p.m.
It was decided that the Meeting would start at 9.30 a.m. on Friday morning, April 21st.

The Prince and Mr.Agnelli will arrange that a private plane will be available in London on Thursday, April 20th, to take to Knokke those American participants who are taking a day-flight from New York to London on that day.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 6 July 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 11 20 69

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE

7

Dear Sir,

With reference to Mr. van der Beugel's note of
June 28th I am sending you herewith:

a) Mr. Johnson's comments on Mr. van der Beugel's note
and on Mr. Culver's letter.

b) Mr. Culver's letter to the Prince.

The Prince answered Mr. Culver's letter directly,
but Messrs. Johnson and van der Beugel also gave
their reactions, copies of which I enclose.

Yours sincerely,

N. le Roy

N. le Roy

Bilderberg Secretariat

RECEIVED
JUL 11 1972
- ROBERT MURPHY

From a letter from Joseph E. Johnson to Ernst H. van der Beugel.

"The only really substantive comment that I had on the memorandum was the omission of any reference to a constant problem on our side and one that I think may be increasingly serious on your side. That is the difficulty of getting good people from organized labor and perhaps from some of those on the political non-Communist left with the one exception of Walter Reuther's attendance at -- I think -- Wiesbaden, we have never had a really good representative of American labor, and many people would say that he is not a typical one. Serious efforts on my part in the last couple of years, supported by members of the American Steering Committee, have not been successful. In each case good excuses were given but I have a feeling that labor leaders tend to shy off from something that has such strong "establishment" leadership. I think we might well get the question of representation from those segments of our societies before the Steering Committee meeting in October. There is also in my mind the question of whether, in view of the increasing importance that agricultural policies play in the relations among the European states and the U.S., we should not also think of agriculturally oriented persons.

Turning now to John Culver's letter to the Prince, it does seem to me that this letter and its implications should also be on the agenda of the meeting in October. I do not know whether Culver sent copies of that letter to all members of the Steering Committee but I am sure that he would not object if were to do so. I believe that all American members have in fact received it.

I know that Heinz, Hauge, and Murphy have. Perhaps we might want to raise the questions on the basis of a little paper from you or me, or preferably both of us, rather than on the basis of Culver's letter. In any case the issue should be specifically put before the Steering Committee. -----

I agree heartily with almost all of your long letter to Culver but I do not fully agree with what you said at the top of page 3. I think -----, and comments that I have heard from one or two others, indicate that Culver was not mistaken.

29 June 1972

J.E. JOHNSON

E. W. A. B.

June 9, 1972

Dear John:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 26 May to Prince Bernhard. You did not for me clarify what you had said at Knokke. I thought you had already said very clearly what your concern was and I certainly got the very strong impression -- which I believe you wished to convey -- that you were reporting a point of view that is widespread and that you were concerned that the failure to take that point of view into account might defeat the very purposes of those who are alarmed about the future of NATO. (Incidentally, in this connection I wonder if you have read Christoph Bertrand's "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe" in the IISS Adolphi Papers No. 84?)

with

The reason I have been trying to reach you on the phone was first to say some of what I have said above; secondly, to ask if you sent a copy to Ernst van der Beugel; and thirdly, to get a list of those to whom you sent the letter. All three points are now taken care of, the latter two by my conversation with Ms. Johnson yesterday morning.

With best regards,

Cordially yours,

The Honorable John S. Culver
U.S. House of Representatives
Room 107, Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 6 June 1972

SHIRSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 110000

TELEGRAMS BILDERBERGMEETINGS

Dear John,

I was very grateful to receive your letter with your comments about the last Bilderberg meeting, which you sent to Prince Bernhard on May 26th.

I know that you have received his reply, but I also would like to go into some of the things you have mentioned, because I think your comments were very effective and valuable.

Let me start by saying that I fully agree with your main observations and conclusions. I just would like to make a few comments.

After having been present at approximately 15 Bilderberg meetings, I am convinced of two things. One is that it is unavoidable that one conference is better or worse than the other. The second thing is that I am convinced that the Bilderberg formula is still the best for our group and remains valid. With our formula I mean that Bilderberg is not an expert conference; that it should be attended by people from completely different walks of life; that its proceedings should be informal and not aiming at a consensus; and last; that what takes place outside the meeting is at least as important as what takes place inside.

In this general framework there is always room for improvement and in every meeting something goes wrong and something goes well.

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What in my opinion went wrong in Knokke were three things. In the first place, the working papers were all written from approximately the same political point of view, and therefore not controversial between themselves. The second point is that the subject was too broad and the third that, purely by coincidence, we were less successful than in previous years in getting a stronger non-establishment point of view from the participants. Five or six years ago we analyzed the danger of Bilderberg becoming mainly the forum for what I should like to call "the establishment of the fifties". There is nothing wrong with this establishment (I would rather say the contrary), but they are not as representative for political and public opinion as was the case in the fifties, and even in the beginning of the sixties. They are still extremely valuable, not only because they represent a political and international concept which in my opinion is still highly valuable.

There is, however, no question that a constructive dialogue in a meeting like Bilderberg should not be "isolationist" in the sense you indicated on the first page of your letter. You, yourself attended the Bad Ragaz meeting and I am practically convinced that in that meeting the mix between the older and the newer schools of thought (if I may use this over-simplified generalization) was much better than in Knokke. If I think of our university discussion and our foreign policy discussion in Bad Ragaz, I hope that you will understand what I mean.

It will be our constant aim to pursue this goal of a dialogue between people who are in touch with what really is going on.

ERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, -3-
SMIDSVATER 1
TELEPHONE 11000
TELEGRAMS BILDERNMEETINGS

Were I think you are slightly mistaken, is the point you make about your feeling that you were misunderstood or misattributed in the sense of expressing heresies. I do not think for a moment that one single person present in Knokke was not fully aware of the validity of the things you said, or of the thoughts you expressed in your letter to the Prince.

If the reaction of the meeting was inadequate, the reason for it is definitely not that one was unaware of the problems. Nobody went home with the feeling that NATO and the American commitment to it is the same as even three or four years ago. The difference between today and a couple of years ago is that nobody can take anything for granted any more. What happened in Knokke was, that because of all kind of circumstances there was no adequate discussion of these very valid points.

Let me end by saying that your letter is a highly valuable contribution to our constant effort to improve our proceedings and adapt them to the new and often very confusing political environment of today.

*With warm regards,
yours
Ernst van der Beek*

The Honorable John S. Culver
House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 26, 1972

His Royal Highness
Bernhard
Prince of the Netherlands
Soestdijk Palace
Soestdijk, The Netherlands

Your Royal Highness:

I want very much to thank you for the opportunity to attend as well as for the effective yet gracious guidance you gave to the Bilderberg Conference, which I have now been privileged to attend twice. These gatherings offer a most welcome opportunity for direct exchange among those of us on both sides of the Atlantic in both public and private capacities who are concerned with common issues of public policy. I have both enjoyed and benefited from the opportunity on each occasion.

At the same time, I must confess that I have some misgivings about the tendency of a conference such as this one to self-insulation and a rather closed consensus which is too oblivious to currents of public opinion and the changing environment in which policy must now be shaped and pursued. I count myself as determined as "internationalist" as anyone who was present at Knokke. But it takes only a slight play on words to suggest that there may be something dangerously "isolationist" about our meetings if they neither take account of nor closely analyze the existence of strongly held contrary views outside our ranks.

Take NATO as an example, since it figured in the, I fear unwelcome and perhaps belated remarks that I advanced. You will remember that I raised a question about the fixed assumption of an automatic U.S. armed response to any and every NATO contingency. Of course I personally hope we would respond to a valid crisis, and I know that has been the pledge of each U.S. Administration since the Treaty was signed. But consider both the legal and political position. Under Article V of the Treaty, each party is obliged only to take such action as

it considers appropriate, which may or may not include the use of armed force, and even then its decision is to be taken only in accordance with its domestic constitutional processes. As a practical matter, the deterrent likelihood of an armed U.S. response has long been underwritten by the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater, and by the designation of a U.S. general officer as Supreme Allied Commander. But there have been at least two recent developments calling into some question the stability of these arrangements, which I believe we ignore at our peril.

The first is the emergence of intensive and protracted debate within the United States about the constitutional disposition, as between the executive and legislative branches of government, of authority to engage in armed conflict. Born of our Vietnam experience, which saw the commitment of more than half a million troops to combat without any real deliberative judgment being exercised by our Congress, this debate has now produced a "War Powers Resolution," which has received Senate approval and is currently pending before the House of Representatives. It would restrict the President's independent authority to commit armed forces to action to a period of 30 days, after which affirmative approval of the Congress would be required for further continuation of hostilities. It is conceivable that in the NATO context this might actually be helpful to our Allies, by making it clear that the U.S. could respond quickly and decisively within the critical early days of an armed confrontation -- which in the current climate of post-Vietnam U.S. opinion is anything but clear. It would have been very useful for us to have discussed and confronted this situation at the Bilderberg Conference, but unfortunately no one saw fit to pursue serious consideration of such matters. The dominant feeling seemed to be that the Congressional and public concerns were just wrong.

Second, there has been growing doubt in the United States about the immutability of arrangements for mutual defense established twenty and more years ago. Times surely have changed since the immediate post-War era, most notably in the strength and cohesiveness of Western Europe. Our policies in this regard have proven very successful, and our voters not unnaturally wonder why the U.S. cannot modify its overseas defense posture in the light of such success. Specifically, they question the need for maintaining the exact force level of 215,000 troops in place in Europe twenty years after they were first sent there, along with bases in Spain

and Greece that are said to be necessary to support our NATO presence. And these questions require more than the incantation of an inherited orthodoxy but rather a rigorous examination of whether there can be orderly redistribution of burdens and responsibilities within the defense arrangements for Europe.

There seemed to be much satisfaction that the ghost of the Mansfield Amendment, for example, had been exorcised, but it is worth recalling that a solid majority of Senators voted for at least one of the legislative embodiments this amendment took. And more than one candidate for Presidential nomination has asserted versions even stronger than Mr. Mansfield's.

No doubt life would be more comfortable if bothersome questions like these could be made to go away. But I would suggest that they are inescapably with us, and that if we do not deal with them in some rational fashion we may find our future options very drastically curtailed. A choice between NATO as we have known it and some modified and restructured form of continued U.S. - European defense collaboration -- which is open to us today -- seems to me far preferable to the possibility that our future choice may be posed in stark and irrevocable terms.

Nor does it seem to me any longer sufficient to comfort ourselves and override deep-seated public doubts with historical analogues to the Oxford oath and to pre-World War II pacifism among British university students, who when it came to actual hostilities did then acquit themselves most nobly for their "King and Country". There may be an element of validity in the reference, but it has also become an easy refrain which does not so much reveal truths as smother genuine debate.

I do not wish to belabor the point at excessive length. I personally can lay no claim to statesmanship or diplomatic expertise. It is quite possible that the open ventilation of such views could prove somewhat unsettling. But a popularly elected legislator in a democratic society does perhaps have some role to play, and some responsibility, as a messenger both to and from international conferences like Bilderberg. He can try as I did to convey some sense of the political climate that he knows as a professional at first hand, and he must be disappointed if the views he reports and the public and political currents he senses are misunderstood or misattributed as his own heresies. He can also hope to carry back with him some careful answers to the doubts and questions of those whom and with whom he serves, and he cannot but be dismayed at departing with such hopes unfulfilled.

I am convinced that now is the time when those of us who do possess shared beliefs, must in our own self interest, confront honestly the necessity to continuously examine the presumptions and assumptions, both foreign and domestic, upon which our strategy is based and above all insure that the rationale given this foreign policy is currently meaningful, credible and acceptable to the people for whom it was intended to serve and upon whose support it is dependent for its success.


The problem which has concerned me at the Bilderberg meetings has been the gulf between the general security policy views of conference participants, however valid, and the contemporary attitudes and perceptions of European and American public opinion, and the refusal of conference members generally to soberly address themselves to this critical issue.

It would be my hope that perhaps such elements of realism, debate, and widened perspective might be incorporated in your future meetings. I would certainly not suggest that the builders and animators of Bilderberg pass from the scene. It is certainly equally important that the views of men now in high official position or in former high position as well as men and women who play leading roles in business, communications, and other sectors of private life be clearly heard. All I would suggest with utmost respect is that a somewhat wider diversity of viewpoint be achieved and a more authentic canvas of relevant positions made. Unfortunately this is not an age of easy consensus either in my country or in several others from which you draw conferees. I am well aware that the introduction of women and more youthful representation in recent conferences is the kind of innovation which responds to this sensed need. In this period of our history we are much more likely to sustain our foreign policies if we take full account not only of old landmarks, and achieved successes, but also the less settled and more fluid contours of contemporary foreign policy. Finally, I am confident that those associated with you in Europe and America in the planning of these meetings could achieve such a balance without impairing the confidential and collegial character of these annual gatherings.

To my earlier gratitude I must now add my thanks for your patience with this elaboration of the sentiments I tried to voice at Knokke. With your indulgence, I am taking the liberty of sending copies to a few other conference participants.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,


JOHN C. CULVER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

October 10, 1972

Mrs. N. le Roy
Bilderberg Secretariat
The Hague
Smidswater 1, The Netherlands

Dear Mrs. le Roy:

Thank you for your letter of September 28, 1972. Unfortunately I shall be unable to attend the Bilderberg Steering Committee Meeting at Soestdijk Palace on October 21 and 22. I shall be meeting with the American group on October 11, here in New York

With warm regards.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy

RM:lb

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 28 September 1972
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 1120 00
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGEN

Dear Sir,

I have pleasure in reminding you that it was decided at the meeting of the Steering Committee in Knokke to hold the next meeting on Saturday, October 21st and Sunday, October 22nd.


The Saturday meeting will take place at Soestdijk Palace at 5 p.m., followed by a dinner at the Palace. The Sunday meeting will go on at Soestdijk Palace and will start at 11 a.m., followed by a luncheon at the Palace.

✓ You are kindly requested to inform the Secretariat as soon as possible whether you will attend the meeting of the Steering Committee.

It will probably be easier for members of the Steering Committee to spend the night of 21-22 October at Hotel Kasteel De Hooge Vuursche, Hilversumsestraatweg 14, Baarn, in the immediate neighborhood of Soestdijk Palace, for which we already have made the arrangements.

In case you wish this or any other hotel reservation and/or transport to and from the Palace, please inform the Secretariat before October 14th.

Sincerely yours,



RECEIVED

OCT 5 1972

ROBERT MURPHY

Mrs. N. le Roy
Bilderberg Secretariat

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 26, 1972

His Royal Highness
Bernhard
Prince of the Netherlands
Soestdijk Palace
Soestdijk, The Netherlands

Your Royal Highness:

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At the same time, I must confess that I have some misgivings about the tendency of a conference such as this one to self-insulation and a rather closed consensus which is too oblivious to currents of public opinion and the changing environment in which policy must now be shaped and pursued. I count myself as determined as "internationalist" as anyone who was present at Knokke. But it takes only a slight play on words to suggest that there may be something dangerously "isolationist" about our meetings if they neither take account of nor closely analyze the existence of strongly held contrary views outside our ranks.

Take NATO as an example, since it figured in the, I fear unwelcome and perhaps belated remarks that I advanced. You will remember that I raised a question about the fixed assumption of an automatic U.S. armed response to any and every NATO contingency. Of course I personally hope we would respond to a valid crisis, and I know that has been the pledge of each U.S. Administration since the Treaty was signed. But consider both the legal and political position. Under Article V of the Treaty, each party is obliged only to take such action as

it considers appropriate, which may or may not include the use of armed force, and even then its decision is to be taken only in accordance with its domestic constitutional processes. As a practical matter, the deterrent likelihood of an armed U.S. response has long been underwritten by the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater, and by the designation of a U.S. general officer as Supreme Allied Commander. But there have been at least two recent developments calling into some question the stability of these arrangements, which I believe we ignore at our peril.

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With warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,

John C. Culver
JOHN C. CULVER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

A. G. S. GRIFFIN
SUITE 1120
120 ADELAIDE STREET WEST
TORONTO 1

22nd June, 1972.


Dear Ernst,

No doubt we should all be thinking about next year's Bilderberg subjects and on this I believe the urban problem is both topical and pressing. I enclose a copy of my letter to you of May 25th, 1970, since this letter sums up my thinking on the matter.

There are one or two first-class experts on this subject from here - including Jane Jacobs who has a world reputation.

I wonder what other subjects are being contemplated at this rather early stage?

Yours ever,



As to the other item which would succeed this year's University subject as the "main" item, I would like to put up for consideration "the problem of urban development and government which would include the serious social and economic problems of the cities, the discontents, tensions and frustrations inherent in urban living and the whole range of urban planning relating to these questions."

Mr. E. H. van der Beugel,
Bilderberg Meetings,
Smidswater 1,
THE HAGUE,
Holland.

Encl.
AGSG/MDA.

11-08

Daniel Janssen

INGEKOMEN 17 JULI 197

Bruxelles 6. le July 11, 19
4. Chaussée de Charleroi

Mr. E.H. van der BEUGEL,
Smidswater, 1,
DEN HAAG.

Dear Ernst,

I thank you very much for your Note of June 28 on the Bilderberg Meetings.

I felt in agreement with most of your points and thought it could perhaps be helpful to give you some of my remarks which of course you may circulate to the Steering Committee, if you thought appropriate to do so.

I will not comment on the points I find to be in total agreement.

For what concerns the working papers and topics, I couldn't agree more with you when you insist on having working papers presenting different or opposite points of views and concluding on a few clear points for discussion. I would like to add that the authors should make a full presentation of their working papers during a speech of maximum 15 minutes ; this time should not be spent to talk on points they have not included in that paper, but on the contrary to summarize clearly their whole paper and, as a conclusion, to stress a few stimulating questions for discussion.

For what concerns procedures at the meeting, I would agree with you that to focus attention, it would be preferable to stick to a preestablished schedule, taking into account tea and coffeebreak as well as lunch and 6 p.m. relax ; for the Sunday morning it seems you are right to insist on keeping that half-a-day mtg and closing it only at 1 p.m.

Finally for what concerns the participants, I have, like you, the impression that "the question of the young" is not usually very well put. Although it can be useful to have, for certain topics, some "under 30", the main preoccupation for me would be to have more "30 to 45" age level, who are the people which can be pointed out as the future top top ; on several topics their point of view is somewhat different from that of the "more than 60" age group. Therefore their opinion could be valuable for our discussions as well as for the future of Bilderberg.

These were some of my own comments to your very good note, and I am preparing myself to discuss it during our October 21 and 22 meetings.

Very sincerely yours,

Daniel

PARKVEIEN 55

OSLO 2, August 2nd 1972

Professor Dr. E. H. van der Beugel
Bilderberg Meetings
The Hague

Dear Ernst,

Note on Bilderberg Meetings

Having been to every one of the Bilderberg Meetings except two I feel like coming forward with a few comments on your note, as I may not be present at the Meetings on the 21st and 22nd October.


The Bilderberg discussions were of course easier to handle in the beginning when the problems were more specific: "How to improve the relation between The United States and Western Europe." Since then we have taken on the whole world, which also makes the Steering Committee task of selecting the agenda more complex. But I think I can safely say that the handling of the Meetings on the part of the Chair and the Secretariate has constantly improved. The "One Minute Rule" has made the Meetings much more lively. That some - especially newcomers - talk longer than they should, is tiresome and works the other way, but also on this point there is some improvement.

The participants are generally well informed people, but often experts in some special field. When you say that a certain number of business men should be present, I think they should be business men with political and economic knowledge, alternatively financial. I do not consider Gabriel Hauge a business man, but an ideal participant on the business side. I am not sure I would call David a business man either, from a Bilderberg point of view.

Participants under 30 I do not think will be a success in future. That was an experiment which is now a bit out-of-date. People like Bill Moyers in that age are not easily found.

If you want non-establishment participants, one must get them somewhat older so that they are more definitely settled, or rather established, in what I in a previous letter to you called the "New Establishment". It is this New Establishment group which, in my part of the world anyway, has completely taken over and have succeeded in neutralising or rather have overpowered what some years ago was named "The Establishment". I think it safe to say that the "New Establishment" is generally not particularly good in discussion on economic matters.

Yours sincerely,



Leif Høegh

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE,
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 11 20 69
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

from a letter from Mr. Shepard Stone of August 16th 1972

Among people to be considered for the next major meeting:

Elisabeth Drew, Washington correspondent of the Atlantic Monthly, recently elected to the Board of Directors, Council on Foreign Relations;


Shirley Williams, Labor Shadow Minister.

She attended a meeting with me recently in London - brilliant and capable of being the UK's first woman Prime Minister;

Christopher Lasch, Professor of History - one of the young revisionist historians in the USA;

Senator Mondale of Minesota. An important man for the future.

As for the Japanese - if they come in as I hope -
Dr. Saburo Okita, President of the Japan Economic Research Council; President of the Japan Overseas Development Council. Saturo is a member of the International Association Board, very active, reliable, speaks excellent English, respected by Government and Opposition in Japan. He is also a member of the Aspen Institute Board. Age about 58.



International Council for Educational Development

522 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10036

212/TN 7-9450
Cable: INCEDEV

EWA/CEE

Office of the Chairman

August 16, 1972

Mr. Ernst H. van der Beugel
Smidswater 1
The Hague
Netherlands

Dear Ernst:

Thank you very much for your excellent note on the Bildeberg meetings. I have been in a continuous travel status since the first of July and I am, in fact, dictating a reply to your letter from the Adirondacks, where I am on a brief holiday.

Now as to the substance of your note. First, paragraph 3(a) seems entirely clear to me. However, it does seem to me that the statement that "the particular aim" is to maintain and deepen the dialogue between North America and Western Europe has a direct relevance to paragraph 8(e), namely, the complicated problem of the Japanese. I would assume that if the Japanese are brought in as permanent members, the statement and purpose of 3(a) would have to be changed. This also applies, but in less vigorous form, to the inclusion of Australia.

My own view is that we should be extremely cautious about including any permanent members whose countries are not in either North America or Europe. This is not because the relations with the developing world or with Japan, Russia and China are not important; they may be decisively important. But it seems to me that the Bilderberg Conference has every capability of studying the relationships between the advantaged country in other parts of the world without having to include other countries in permanent membership. A business corporation or a university may surely study and express opinions about government policy without accepting the notion that the government becomes a part of the original discourse. So I think it is a trap, and an unnecessary one, to say that relations with Japan cannot be discussed unless the Japanese are permanent members of the Bilderberg group. But if they are, the central mission stated in 3(a) will have to be changed. Surely the Japanese cannot be invited to help "maintain and deepen the dialogue between America and Western Europe."

It may be that appropriate arrangements could be made with similar groups in the Far East, the Middle East or elsewhere for discussion for

/more

items on the Bilderberg agenda, but it just may be that there are other organizations that could handle such dialogue better without destroying the central geist and cohesion of Bildeberg.

Second, I thoroughly agree that the important matter is to get different points of view rather than different age groups but one way to accomplish the first is to assure the second. I do not mean that all young people are radicals and all older people are conservatives. But we can remember that those born at the end of the last world war are now 27 years old and those who have had any direct involvement in European affairs, both during and after the war, are now probably in their sixties. I believe that Willy Brandt considers this gap in U.S. experience the most dangerous gap of all. That it corresponds with the age gap is an historical fact. It seems to be imperative that young people in their late twenties, thirties and early forties be brought into the Bilderberg discussions, not only because they may have different points of view, but possibly because they have no point of view at all, since they have had little or no direct experience with Atlantic affairs.

I do hope that the Bilderberg conferences will always find room for discussions of the political values and social structure that has made the Western World powerful, dynamic and, at times, cohesive. Industrial growth based upon technology is surely a central feature of the Western experience, but there are many, of whom I am one, who believes that the human drive that has made this development possible would have been unthinkable without the view of the nature and destiny of man implicit in the Christian-Judiac tradition. It would follow that the erosion in our system of beliefs is bound to have an impact on our future growth as well as our position in the rest of the world. For the leaders of the Western nations not to be deeply concerned with this matter seems to me dangerous. I do not suggest that religion or more general concern for human values be discussed as such, but I am urging attention to considerations which clearly and demonstrably interconnect and, indeed, support the stance and style of the Western World.


This letter is already too long so I will make some comments about logistical details in the margins of the letter you sent. In general, I have nothing much to add except the hope that some way can be developed for avoiding the long list of speakers who ask to be recognized. To find yourself the eleventh person on the list means that when your time comes, the conversation may have wandered considerably from the point on which you wish to make a statement. The result is inevitably a series of set speeches that are not related to any other or the improvising of comments when your turn comes. May I suggest that a twenty to thirty minute period at the end of each discussion be available to speakers on a "hands up for recognition" basis, rather than on a list? I think it might make for a livelier discussion.

/more

You have asked for suggestions and of course suggestions inevitably promote notions for change and notions for change suggest that there might be a large dissatisfaction with the status quo. For this particular writer, I wish to reaffirm my sense of privilege at being included in these discussions -- the enormous pleasure I get from meeting people in the U.S., and particularly in Europe, whome I would not otherwise see, and particularly the privilege of coming away from a meeting with a renewed sense that many of our Western leaders have retained their toughness of mind and flexibility of thought in a period of dramatic and sometimes dangerous change.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,



James A. Perkins

JAP/jym

Enclosure

INGEKOMEN 13 SEP. 1972

Château de
BOIS-SEIGNEUR-ISAAC
1421 OPHAIN-B.S.I.

Bois-Seigneur-Isaac, le 11 septembre 1972.

Mon cher Ernest,

Je ne pourrai malheureusement pas assister à la réunion du Steering Committee qui est convoquée pour les 21 et 22 octobre.

Voudriez-vous exprimer mes respectueuses excuses au Prince Bernhard ? Je suis en effet à cette date en partance pour Rio de Janeiro où je vais assister au Congrès mondial de l'UNIAPAC. Je ne serai donc pas disponible.

En ce qui concerne les sujets qui pourraient retenir l'attention de notre conférence de 1973, je voudrais faire deux suggestions:

a) En ce qui concerne le sujet de nature politique, il me semble que le conflit actuel du Moyen-Orient devrait retenir davantage notre attention.

Les récents événements ont en effet démontré son caractère explosif et désespéré et nous savons, par la présence d'unités navales de camps opposés en Méditerranée, combien ce théâtre de conflit peut être dangereux. Il est certain que le statu quo qui dure miraculeusement depuis 1967 ne peut pas être éternel.

Il me semble par conséquent que ce problème politique, qui intéresse particulièrement l'Europe, ne peut pas rester inexploré par une institution comme le Bilderberg.

/s/ Buenos Aires

.../...

Monsieur le Professeur E. vander BEUGEL,
Bilderberg Meetings,
1, Smidswater,
LA HAYE.

b) En ce qui concerne un sujet économique, je crois que l'organisation d'un système monétaire européen est devenue d'une urgence considérable.

Il faudrait en définir les contours d'une manière concrète et précise, afin de pouvoir apporter une solution non seulement aux problèmes de la construction de l'Europe mais aussi à ceux de l'ordre monétaire mondial.

Voilà mes deux suggestions. Elles impliquent que nous revenions à la pratique d'un double sujet de discussion, ce qui, à l'expérience, me paraît sage. Qu'en pensez-vous ?

Je livre ces idées tout simplement à votre appréciation et vous prie de croire, mon cher Ernest, à l'assurance de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Très cordialement
Jean Chaux
Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON
345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

PRESIDENT EMERITUS
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

June 8, 1972

Mr. Amory Houghton Jr.
Amo: *Please return my*

RECEIVED

JUN 13 1972

AMORY HOUGHTON, JR.

Dear Bob:

Yes, in fact, I was aware of the point John Culver makes in his letter of 26 May. Indeed I have myself felt for some time that there has been a tendency on the part of some Bilderbergers to wish that, in Culver's phrase "bothersome questions like these could be made to go away." Indeed I tried to make somewhat the same point at St. Castin a few years ago and I think Allison was addressing himself at Bad Ragaz to the issue raised in the second paragraph of Culver's letter on page 4.

I think that it may be well for the American members of the Steering Committee to give some thought to these issues before the October meeting of the Steering Committee.

Since I have referred to the Culver letter, I thought you might like to have your copy back again.

With best regards,

Cordially yours,

Joe

P.S. I have made a note of Mr. Houghton's thoughtful suggestion of Corning as the locus for the next Bilderberg held in this country and will bring it to the attention of our colleagues at the appropriate time. ✓

The Honorable Robert D. Murphy
Corning Glass International
717 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022

RECEIVED
JUN 12 1972
ROBERT D. MURPHY

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and Greece that are said to be necessary to support our NATO presence. And these questions require more than the incantation of an inherited orthodoxy but rather a rigorous examination of whether there can be orderly redistribution of burdens and responsibilities within the defense arrangements for Europe.

There seemed to be much satisfaction that the ghost of the Mansfield Amendment, for example, had been exorcised, but it is worth recalling that a solid majority of Senators voted for at least one of the legislative embodiments this amendment took. And more than one candidate for Presidential nomination has asserted versions even stronger than Mr. Mansfield's.

No doubt life would be more comfortable if bothersome questions like these could be made to go away. But I would suggest that they are inescapably with us, and that if we do not deal with them in some rational fashion we may find our future options very drastically curtailed. A choice between NATO as we have known it and some modified and restructured form of continued U.S. - European defense collaboration -- which is open to us today -- seems to me far preferable to the possibility that our future choice may be posed in stark and irrevocable terms.

Nor does it seem to me any longer sufficient to comfort ourselves and override deep-seated public doubts with historical analogues to the Oxford oath and to pre-World War II pacifism among British university students, who when it came to actual hostilities did then acquit themselves most nobly for their "King and Country". There may be an element of validity in the reference, but it has also become an easy refrain which does not so much reveal truths as smother genuine debate.

I do not wish to belabor the point at excessive length. I personally can lay no claim to statesmanship or diplomatic expertise. It is quite possible that the open ventilation of such views could prove somewhat unsettling. But a popularly elected legislator in a democratic society does perhaps have some role to play, and some responsibility, as a messenger both to and from international conferences like Bilderberg. He can try as I did to convey some sense of the political climate that he knows as a professional at first hand, and he must be disappointed if the views he reports and the public and political currents he senses are misunderstood or misattributed as his own heresies. He can also hope to carry back with him some careful answers to the doubts and questions of those whom and with whom he serves, and he cannot but be dismayed at departing with such hopes unfulfilled.

I am convinced that now is the time when those of us who do possess shared beliefs, must in our own self interest, confront honestly the necessity to continuously examine the presumptions and assumptions, both foreign and domestic, upon which our strategy is based and above all insure that the rationale given this foreign policy is currently meaningful, credible and acceptable to the people for whom it was intended to serve and upon whose support it is dependent for its success.


The problem which has concerned me at the Bilderberg meetings has been the gulf between the general security policy views of conference participants, however valid, and the contemporary attitudes and perceptions of European and American public opinion, and the refusal of conference members generally to soberly address themselves to this critical issue.

It would be my hope that perhaps such elements of realism, debate, and widened perspective might be incorporated in your future meetings. I would certainly not suggest that the builders and animators of Bilderberg pass from the scene. It is certainly equally important that the views of men now in high official position or in former high position as well as men and women who play leading roles in business, communications, and other sectors of private life be clearly heard. All I would suggest with utmost respect is that a somewhat wider diversity of viewpoint be achieved and a more authentic canvas of relevant positions made. Unfortunately this is not an age of easy consensus either in my country or in several others from which you draw conferees. I am well aware that the introduction of women and more youthful representation in recent conferences is the kind of innovation which responds to this sensed need. In this period of our history we are much more likely to sustain our foreign policies if we take full account not only of old landmarks, and achieved successes, but also the less settled and more fluid contours of contemporary foreign policy. Finally, I am confident that those associated with you in Europe and America in the planning of these meetings could achieve such a balance without impairing the confidential and collegial character of these annual gatherings.

To my earlier gratitude I must now add my thanks for your patience with this elaboration of the sentiments I tried to voice at Knokke. With your indulgence, I am taking the liberty of sending copies to a few other conference participants.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,


JOHN C. CULVER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

FROM

ROBERT MURPHY

TO Mr. Joseph Johnson DATE 6/5

Joe

I must say that

I was not aware of the
point Congressman Culver
makes. As you see it,
has there been an unwillingness
to discuss this? Bob

insulation and a rather casual
ous to currents of public opinion and the changing environment
in which policy must now be shaped and pursued. I count myself
as determined as "internationalist" as anyone who was present
at Knokke. But it takes only a slight play on words to suggest
that there may be something dangerously "isolationist" about
our meetings if they neither take account of nor closely analyze
the existence of strongly held contrary views outside our ranks.

Take NATO as an example, since it figured in the, I fear un-
welcome and perhaps belated remarks that I advanced. You will
remember that I raised a question about the fixed assumption of
an automatic U.S. armed response to any and every NATO contin-
gency. Of course I personally hope we would respond to a
valid crisis, and I know that has been the pledge of each U.S.
Administration since the Treaty was signed. But consider
both the legal and political position. Under Article V of the
Treaty, each party is obliged only to take such action as

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 26, 1972

His Royal Highness
Bernhard
Prince of the Netherlands
Soestdijk Palace
Soestdijk, The Netherlands

RECEIVED
JUN 5 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

Your Royal Highness:

I want very much to thank you for the opportunity to attend as well as for the effective yet gracious guidance you gave to the Bilderberg Conference, which I have now been privileged to attend twice. These gatherings offer a most welcome opportunity for direct exchange among those of us on both sides of the Atlantic in both public and private capacities who are concerned with common issues of public policy. I have both enjoyed and benefited from the opportunity on each occasion.

At the same time, I must confess that I have some misgivings about the tendency of a conference such as this one to self-insulation and a rather closed consensus which is too oblivious to currents of public opinion and the changing environment in which policy must now be shaped and pursued. I count myself as determined as "internationalist" as anyone who was present at Knokke. But it takes only a slight play on words to suggest that there may be something dangerously "isolationist" about our meetings if they neither take account of nor closely analyze the existence of strongly held contrary views outside our ranks.

Take NATO as an example, since it figured in the, I fear unwelcome and perhaps belated remarks that I advanced. You will remember that I raised a question about the fixed assumption of an automatic U.S. armed response to any and every NATO contingency. Of course I personally hope we would respond to a valid crisis, and I know that has been the pledge of each U.S. Administration since the Treaty was signed. But consider both the legal and political position. Under Article V of the Treaty, each party is obliged only to take such action as

it considers appropriate, which may or may not include the use of armed force, and even then its decision is to be taken only in accordance with its domestic constitutional processes. As a practical matter, the deterrent likelihood of an armed U.S. response has long been underwritten by the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater, and by the designation of a U.S. general officer as Supreme Allied Commander. But there have been at least two recent developments calling into some question the stability of these arrangements, which I believe we ignore at our peril.

The first is the emergence of intensive and protracted debate within the United States about the constitutional disposition, as between the executive and legislative branches of government, of authority to engage in armed conflict. Born of our Vietnam experience, which saw the commitment of more than half a million troops to combat without any real deliberative judgment being exercised by our Congress, this debate has now produced a "War Powers Resolution," which has received Senate approval and is currently pending before the House of Representatives. It would restrict the President's independent authority to commit armed forces to action to a period of 30 days, after which affirmative approval of the Congress would be required for further continuation of hostilities. It is conceivable that in the NATO context this might actually be helpful to our Allies, by making it clear that the U.S. could respond quickly and decisively within the critical early days of an armed confrontation -- which in the current climate of post-Vietnam U.S. opinion is anything but clear. It would have been very useful for us to have discussed and confronted this situation at the Bilderberg Conference, but unfortunately no one saw fit to pursue serious consideration of such matters. The dominant feeling seemed to be that the Congressional and public concerns were just wrong.

Second, there has been growing doubt in the United States about the immutability of arrangements for mutual defense established twenty and more years ago. Times surely have changed since the immediate post-War era, most notably in the strength and cohesiveness of Western Europe. Our policies in this regard have proven very successful, and our voters not unnaturally wonder why the U.S. cannot modify its overseas defense posture in the light of such success. Specifically, they question the need for maintaining the exact force level of 215,000 troops in place in Europe twenty years after they were first sent there, along with bases in Spain

and Greece that are said to be necessary to support our NATO presence. And these questions require more than the incantation of an inherited orthodoxy but rather a rigorous examination of whether there can be orderly redistribution of burdens and responsibilities within the defense arrangements for Europe.

There seemed to be much satisfaction that the ghost of the Mansfield Amendment, for example, had been exorcised, but it is worth recalling that a solid majority of Senators voted for at least one of the legislative embodiments this amendment took. And more than one candidate for Presidential nomination has asserted versions even stronger than Mr. Mansfield's.

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I do not wish to belabor the point at excessive length. I personally can lay no claim to statesmanship or diplomatic expertise. It is quite possible that the open ventilation of such views could prove somewhat unsettling. But a popularly elected legislator in a democratic society does perhaps have some role to play, and some responsibility, as a messenger both to and from international conferences like Bilderberg. He can try as I did to convey some sense of the political climate that he knows as a professional at first hand, and he must be disappointed if the views he reports and the public and political currents he senses are misunderstood or misattributed as his own heresies. He can also hope to carry back with him some careful answers to the doubts and questions of those whom and with whom he serves, and he cannot but be dismayed at departing with such hopes unfulfilled.

I am convinced that now is the time when those of us who do possess shared beliefs, must in our own self interest, confront honestly the necessity to continuously examine the presumptions and assumptions, both foreign and domestic, upon which our strategy is based and above all insure that the rationale given this foreign policy is currently meaningful, credible and acceptable to the people for whom it was intended to serve and upon whose support it is dependent for its success.


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To my earlier gratitude I must now add my thanks for your patience with this elaboration of the sentiments I tried to voice at Knokke. With your indulgence, I am taking the liberty of sending copies to a few other conference participants.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,


JOHN C. CULVER
MEMBER OF CONGRESS

Mr. Amory Houghton Jr.
Amory

Yes, I think so.
In fact Corning in many
ways is ideally situated
the arrangements could
be easily made there.
Let's mention it to
Hanson. my

To: The Honorable R. D. Murphy

From: Amory Houghton, Jr.

May 12, 1972

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Would it be interesting some time to think of having the
Bilderberg Conference here in Corning? Would it be worthy of
suggestion?

AHJr:mp

RECEIVED
MAY 16 1972
- ROBERT MURPHY

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 2 May 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 113069

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS


7

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed the Minutes of the two meetings of the Steering Committee at the Knokke Conference.

Because of your absence at the Steering Committee meeting of Sunday, April 23rd, I would like to draw your special attention to the last part of these Minutes.

Yours sincerely,



N. le Roy

RECEIVED
MAY 8 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

Prince expressed his gratitude to Mr. Wallenberg for his invitation.

- b) There was general agreement that it would be useful to discuss at the next meeting of the Steering Committee not only the Agenda and the list of participants for the Saltsjöbaden meeting, but to spend some time on several substantive and procedural questions about the annual meeting (composition, size, Japanese participants, subjects, etc.).

It was therefore decided that the next meeting of the Steering Committee would be divided in two. One half would be spent on these general questions, the other half as usual on the problems of the next annual meeting.

MINUTES OF 2 MEETINGS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE
ON APRIL 20th AND APRIL 23rd AT KNOCKE

- 1) At the meeting of April 20th the order of discussion for the Conference was discussed.
- 2) At the meeting of Sunday morning, April 23rd the following points were discussed:
 - a) Mr. Wallenberg extended an invitation to hold the next annual meeting at Saltsjöbaden, Sweden on 11, 12 and 13 May 1973 (arrival 10 May).
On behalf of the members of the Steering Committee the Prince expressed his gratitude to Mr. Wallenberg for his invitation.
 - b) There was general agreement that it would be useful to discuss at the next meeting of the Steering Committee not only the Agenda and the list of participants for the Saltsjöbaden meeting, but to spend some time on several substantive and procedural questions about the annual meeting (composition, size, Japanese participants, subjects, etc.).

It was therefore decided that the next meeting of the Steering Committee would be divided in two. One half would be spent on these general questions, the other half as usual on the problems of the next annual meeting.

DERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, -2-

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 11 20 69

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGEN

The first half will start at 5 p.m. at Soestdijk Palace on Saturday, October 21st. The members will then dine together and will meet again on Sunday morning, October 22nd at Soestdijk Palace at 11 a.m.

In these circumstances, it will probably be easier for members of the Steering Committee to spend the night of 21-22 October in a hotel in the immediate neighbourhood of Soestdijk Palace.

The Secretariat will be glad to make the necessary reservations.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

KNOKKE CONFERENCE

21, 22 and 23 April 1972
(arrival 20 April)

7

FINAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

H.R.H. the Prince of the NETHERLANDS
Chairman

Ernst H. van der BEUGEL
Professor International Relations, Leiden University
Honorary Secretary General for Europe

Joseph E. JOHNSON
President Emeritus, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Honorary Secretary General for the United States

C. Frits KARSTEN
Managing Director, AMRO Bank N.V.
Honorary Treasurer

AUSTRALIA

BROWN, Neil A.
Member of Parliament

WESTERMAN, Sir Alan
Chairman of the Board of Directors, The Australian Industry
Development Corporation

BELGIUM

JANSSEN, Daniel
Director-Deputy General Manager, UCB S.A.
Lecturer, Brussels University

JANSSEN, Paul
Director-Member of the Management Committee,
Société Générale de Banque

CAMU, Louis
Chairman, Banque de Bruxelles S.A.

DAVIGNON, Vicomte
Director General Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(BELGIUM)

LAMBERT, Baron

Chairman, Banque Lambert S.A.

SNOY et d'OPPUERS, Baron

Managing Director, Compagnie Lambert pour l'Industrie et
la Finance

SOLVAY, Jacques

Chairman, Solvay & Cie. S.A.

VANDEPUTTE, Robert

Governor, National Bank of Belgium

CANADA

GRIFFIN, Anthony G.S.

President, Triarch Corporation Ltd.

MacLAREN, Roy

Director, Public Relations-Corporate, Massey-Ferguson Ltd.

McLEAN, William F.

President, Canada Packers Ltd.

RAYNAULD, André

Chairman, Economic Council of Canada

WARREN, Jack H.

High Commissioner for Canada in the U.K.

DENMARK

NØRLUND, Niels

Editor, "Berlingske Tidende"

SØRENSEN, Svend O.

General Manager, Den Danske Landmandsbank

TEPKELSEN, Terkel M.

Editor-in-Chief, "Berlingske Tidende"

FINLAND

NYKOPP, Johan A.

President, Oy Tampella Ab

FRANCE

BAUMGARTNER, Wilfrid S.

President, Rhône-Poulenc S.A.
Honorary Governor, Banque de France

DAVID-WEILL, Michel

Partner, Lazard Frères & Cie.

GIPOUD, Françoise

Director and Editor-in-Chief of "l'Express"

NORA, Simon

Director General, Librairie Hachette

RIBOUD, Jean

President, Schlumberger Ltd.

ROTHSCHILD, Baron Edmond de

Director of Companies

SABOURET, Yves

Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Labour

TATU, Michel

Chief of the Foreign Section of "Le Monde"

GERMANY

ARNOLD, Hans

Ambassador of the Federal German Republic to the Netherlands

BIRPENBACH, Kurt

Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Board, August Thyssen-Hütte A.G.

CORTIER, Peter

Member of Parliament

DÖNHOFF, Marion Gräfin

Chief Editor "Die Zeit"

FOCKE, Katharina

State Secretary for European Affairs

MONSEN, Ernst W.

Secretary of State for Defence

SCHRÖDER, Gerhard

Member of Parliament
Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Bundestag

WOLFF von AMERONGEN, Otto

Chairman of the Board, Otto Wolff A.G.

ICELAND

HALLGRIMSSON, Geir

Mayor of Reykjavik,
Member of Parliament

INTERNATIONAL

DAHRENDORF, Ralf

Member of the European Economic Commission

DENIAU, Jean-François

Member of the Commission of the European Communities

KOHNSTAMM, Max

President of the European Community Institute for
University Studies

LENNEP, Jonkheer Friis van

Secretary General, O.E.C.D.

LOUDON, Jonkheer John H.

President, The Atlantic Institute

LUNS, Joseph M.A.H.

Secretary General N.A.T.O.

ITALY

AGNELLI, Giovanni

President, FIAT S.p.A.

CITTADINI CESI, Il Marchese

Association pour l'Etude des Problèmes de l'Europe

COLONBO, Umberto

Director, Strategic Planning, Montedison S.p.A.

COLONNA di PALIANO, Prince Guido

President, La Rinascente S.p.A.

DUCCI, Roberto

Director General Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

LEVI, Arrigo

Journalist, "La Stampa"

NETHERLANDS

DIJKGRAAF, Anton F.J.

Member of the Presidium of Algemene Bank Nederland

't HOOFT, Maria J.

Professor at the Rotterdam School of Economics
Director of the Economic Institute of the Free University

KOSTER, Henri J. de

Minister of Defence

MEYNEN, Johannes

Former Deputy Chairman, AKZO N.V.

NETHERLANDS, H.R.H. Princess Beatrix of the

NETHERLANDS, H.R.H. Prince Claus of the

PATIJN, Schelto

Director, "Europa Instituut" of Leiden University

WAGNER, Gerrit A.

President, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company

ZIJLSTRA, Jelle

President, De Nederlandse Bank

NORWAY

HØEGH, Leif

Shipowner

SFIP, Helge

Member of Parliament

TIDEMAND, Otto G.

Shipowner

PORTUGAL

ESPIRITO SANTO SILVA, Manuel R.

Chairman, Banco Espirito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa

NOGUEIRA, Alberto F.

Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission, National Assembly

SWEDEN

WALLENBERG, Marcus

Chairman, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken

SWITZERLAND

FLEINER, Thomas

Professor for Law and International Relations,
University of Fribourg

JOLLES, Paul

Director of the Federal Division of Commerce

REVERDIN, Olivier

Member of the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament
Chairman of the Council of Europe

UMBRICHT, Victor H.

Member of the Board of Directors, CIBA-GEIGY Limited

TURKEY

BEYAZIT, Selahattin

Director of Companies

BIRGI, M. Nuri

Former Ambassador to N.A.T.O.

UNITED KINGDOM

BENNETT, Sir Frederic

Member of Parliament

BROWNE, John

Chairman, Butterfield & Swire Ltd., Hong Kong

BUCHAN, The Hon. Alastair

Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

KEARTON, The Lord

Chairman, Courtaulds Limited

LEVER, Harold,

Member of Parliament

MAUDLING, Reginald

Member of Parliament
Secretary of State for Home Affairs

REES-MOGG, William

Editor, "The Times"

ROLL, Sir Eric

Deputy Chairman, S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd.

(UNITED KINGDOM)

SUMMERSKILL, Shirley
Member of Parliament

UNITED STATES

BALL, George W.
Senior Managing Director, Lehman Brothers Incorporated

BERGSTEN, C. Fred
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

BLUMENTHAL, Michael
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Bendix Corporation

BRIMMER, Andrew
Member of the Federal Reserve Board

BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew
Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs.
Columbia University

CAMPS, Miriam
Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

COLLADO, Emilio G.
Executive Vice-President, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)

CULVER, John S.
Member of Congress

DEAN, Arthur H.
Senior Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell

HAUGE, Gabriel
Chairman of the Board, Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company

HEINZ II, Henry J.
Chairman of the Board, H.J. Heinz Company

HOUGHTON Jr., Amory
Chairman of the Board, Corning Glass

HUGHES, Thomas,
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

ANNING, Bayless
President, Council on Foreign Relations

MATHIAS, Charles McC.
U.S. Senator

MURPHY, Robert D.
Honorary Chairman of the Board, Corning Glass International

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 1 March 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 1120 69

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

To: The members of the
Steering Committee


From: Ernst H. van der Beugel

We agreed at the last meeting of the Steering Committee that the two papers of Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Kohnstamm and myself will be discussed on the first day (Friday) of the Knokke Conference.

In the meantime, Mr. Deniau (member of the Commission of the European Communities) has been approached and is willing to open the discussion with a statement which, as usual, will take longer than five minutes.

We also agreed that a Canadian participant will open the discussion on the second day when the papers of Mr. Ball and The Hon. Alastair Buchan will be discussed.

As soon as we know whether this is acceptable to one of the Canadian participants, I will inform you.



H. J. HEINZ II
PITTSBURGH

November 16, 1971

Dear Bob:

Enclosed is a report of where we stand on our next year's Bilderberg budget.

We have pledges of \$10,000 and while I have never called on you before, do you think it would be possible for you to contribute something to help? As you know, we are only a handful of regulars.

Next year, Joe Johnson will be working on some other friendly foundations for support comparable to the FF.

Sincerely,

The Hon. Robert Murphy
Corning Glass International
717 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022

7
r 16, 1971

, the Ford Foundation's
30, 1971.

enditures for last year

\$55,547.77

\$9,000.00

1,497.60

558.00

Travel, participants 10,996.88
Lodging, meeting facilities 16,996.88
Interpreters, secretarial services 3,418.65
Supplies, equipment 6,219.98
Insurance 350.00

37,983.72

Telephone, telegraph, postage

695.21

Miscellaneous expenses

112.20

49,846.73

Balance -----

5,701.04

HENRY J. HEINZ II
P. O. BOX 57
PITTSBURGH, PA. 15230

November 16, 1971

Mr. David Rockefeller
The Hon. George Ball
Mr. Arthur Dean
Mr. Emilio Collado

Gentlemen:

Re: Bilderberg

As you probably are aware, our major supporter, the Ford Foundation's second 3-year grant of \$50,000 terminated June 30, 1971.

For your interest, I present our income and expenditures for last year --July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971:-

<u>INCOME</u> (including \$26,000 from FF)	-	\$55,547.77
<u>EXPENDITURES</u>		
Contribution towards expenses of Hague Secretariat	\$9,000.00	
Steering Com. Meetings (2)	1,497.60	
Bad Ragaz Meeting		
Travel expenses	\$158.00	
Background paper	<u>400.00</u>	558.00
Woodstock Meeting		
Travel, participants	10,998.21	
Lodging, meeting facilities	16,996.88	
Interpreters, secretarial services	3,418.65	
Supplies, equipment	6,219.98	
Insurance	<u>350.00</u>	37,983.72
Telephone, telegraph, postage	695.21	
Miscellaneous expenses	<u>112.20</u>	49,846.73
Balance -----		5,701.04

Requirements for July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972:-

European Secretariat	\$9,000
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Support of U. S. participation

Secretarial assistance (part time)	4,500
Travel to Steering Committee Mtg.	2,500
Travel of participants to Knokke (Belgium)	7,000
Background papers	800
Stationary, postage, telephone, telegraph	800
	<hr/>
	\$24,600

Unexpended balance	-	<hr/>	5,700
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Net	-		18,900
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Sincerely,

Jack

HJH II/mjn

Copies: Dr. Gabriel Hauge
✓ The Hon. Robert Murphy

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 29 December 1971

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 1150 69

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGEN

SUGGESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS
FROM THE U.K.

Sir Alec DOUGLAS-HOME

Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Lord CARRINGTON

or

Secretary of State for Defence

Harold LEVER

Member of Parliament (Labour)

John BROWNE

Chairman of Cathay Pacific

With respect to an eventual Australian participation , Sir Frederic
Bennett made the following suggestion:

Neil BROWN

Member of Parliament

We are expecting one further suggestion for a participant from
the U.K.

RECEIVED
JAN 7 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 3 January 1972

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 113000

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE

7

Dear Sir,

Further to the list with suggested Netherlands participants of November 22nd, I am sending you herewith two more suggestions for this list.

Mrs. Prof. Dr. H.J.'t Hooft-Welvaars
Professor of Economics, Rotterdam University

J. van Tijn
Journalist, "Vrij Nederland"

RECEIVED
JAN 7 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

Sincerely yours,

N. le Roy
N.le Roy

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE, 30 December 1971

SMIDSWATER 1

TELEPHONE 113000

TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE

Dear Sir,


I am sending you herewith two more lists with suggestions for participants for the Knokke Conference.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

RECEIVED
JAN 7 1972
ROBERT MURPHY

N. le Roy
N.le Roy



Direzione Relazioni Esterne
Il Direttore

Turin, December 21st, 1971


Prof. Ernst H. van der Beugel
Honorary Secretary General
for Europe
Bilderberg Meetings
Smidswater 1
The Hague

Dear Prof. van der Beugel,

With reference to your letter of November 30th, I am glad to enclose the list of Italian representatives to whom Mr. Agnelli would suggest to extend the invitation for the annual Conference.

However, at this stage, I cannot say which of them will be able to participate to it. Anyway, I will not fail to let you know as soon as I get their final confirmation to this end.

Best regards,

Sincerely yours,

(Vittorino Chiusano)

Encl.

Prof. Umberto COLOMBO
Direttore
Istituto Donegani
Largo Donegani, 1/2
20121 - Milano

Prof. Dino DEL BO
Presidente ISPI
Via Clerici, 5
20121 - Milano

Amb. Roberto DUCCI
Direttore Generale
degli Affari Politici
Ministero degli Affari Esteri
00100 - Roma

Dr. Arrigo LEVI
Via Guattani, 14a int. 8
00161 - Roma

Dr. Fosco MARAINI
Via Magalotti, 6
50122 - Firenze