BARBIZON
CONFERENCE
March 18th-20th, 1955
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.

CHAIRMAN:
H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF THE NETHERLANDS

HONORARY SECRETARY:
J. H. Retinger

AMERICAN HONORARY SECRETARY:
Joseph E. Johnson

*) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.

André, Robert
*) Baillieu, The Lord
Ball, George W.
*) Becu, Omer
Brauer, Max
Camu, Louis
Christiansen, Hakon
Cibler, Walker L.
Coleman, John S.
Cool, Auguste
Dehousse, Fernand
Dupuy, Pierre
*) Fanfani, Amintore
Ferguson, John H.
*) Franks, The Rt. Hon. Sir Oliver

France
United Kingdom
United States
Belgium
Germany
Belgium
Denmark
United States
Belgium
Canada
Italy
United States
United Kingdom

* ) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.

**) Wallenberg, Marcus Wolf von Amerongen, Otto van Zeeland, Paul Zellerbach, J. D.

* * *

IN ATTENDANCE:


*) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.
GENERAL REPORT.

The Conference which was held at Barbizon on the 18th, 19th and 20th of March, 1955, was the second of its kind, the first having taken place at Bilderberg, in Holland, in May of the previous year. Both owe their origin to a group of men of good-will and international or national repute who voluntarily came together some three years ago to work for the removal of misunderstanding and possible suspicion between the countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A., in the face of the dangers which beset the world.

It is not the purpose of these conferences to attempt to make policy or to recommend action by governments. Their sole object is, by bringing together men of outstanding qualities and influence in circumstances where discussion can be frank and arguments not always used in public debate put forward, to reach a better understanding of prevailing differences between the Western European and North American peoples and to study those fields in which agreement may be sought.

This organisation was, and remains, entirely unofficial, the costs of its activities being defrayed by private subscription. Those invited to attend its conferences have been chosen from many different nations and from all fields of public activity. They include statesmen and politicians; diplomatists, business and professional men; intellectuals, leaders of labour organisations and leaders of public opinion. All, however, share a high purpose; a desire to work for others than themselves or their particular countries alone, and a sense of the urgency of the situation. The views which they express in their speeches or in discussion are their own and they do not in any way represent their countries, their political parties, or any association or organisation to which they may belong.

The Barbizon Conference, like its predecessor at Bilderberg, was called together by H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands, who presided over it. It was attended by participants coming from 13 different countries and met in an atmosphere of close friendship and mutual confidence.

The subjects discussed at Barbizon were:-

I. Survey of Western European–U.S.A. relations since the Bilderberg Conference.
II. Communist Infiltration in various Western Countries.

III. The Uncommitted Peoples:
   A. Political and Ideological Aspects
   B. Economic Aspects.

Discussion of Item III, which covered the Western European and American approach to communist propaganda, was based on four papers, two by Europeans and two by Americans. It was perhaps inevitable that discussion should reach beyond the limits of Western European–United States relations set out in the agenda, a development which not only served to stimulate it but which also provided a valuable stocktaking of the Western position vis-à-vis the East, against which the relations of the Western Allies could be studied in perspective.

In order to allow participants to speak with perfect frankness with the assurance that their words would not be read outside the Conference circle, the Chairman asked for the utmost discretion. The press was not admitted to the Conference and the speakers' names are not included in this document, which should be treated as strictly confidential and personal.

I. SURVEY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN – U.S.A. RELATIONS SINCE THE BILDERBERG CONFERENCE

A United Kingdom participant in the Conference surveyed the general trend of Western European–American relationship in the light of changes which had occurred during the past year. Whereas the Bilderberg Conference had taken place at a time when alarming fissures had seemed to be opening up in the Western Alliance, meeting now at Barbizon we could look back upon a year of achievement for the West, achievement and progress perhaps not fully appreciated in many countries. Europe had had one of the best years in the economic field, both as regards production and balance of payments, since the war. The Trieste problem, which had long divided Italy from Jugoslavia, had at last been resolved; the Balkan Pact had brought Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean closer into the framework of Western defence; the speed with which the Paris Agreements, coming after the rejection of the European Defence Community, had been accepted, and the prospect of their imminent ratification by France, was an astonishing phenomenon. There had also been extraordinary progress in the Middle East where the Persian and Suez problems had been solved and a new defence policy linking Turkey with Pakistan, through Iraq and soon possibly through Iran, was taking shape. In the Far East the running sore of Indo-China was at least staunched though there was still cause for misgivings as to the ultimate outcome. Above all, the Western European countries and the U.S.A. had moved closer to each other in their conceptions of Far Eastern policy. It was generally recognised that, in the particular differences which had divided us over the Formosa problem, the U.S.A. was making most serious efforts with the result that our positions were moving closer together. The decline in McCarthyism had been particularly refreshing and the replacement of “liberation” by the idea of “competitive co-existence” and of “massive” by “measured” retaliation had increased confidence among many Europeans. The speaker referred to recent changes in the Soviet Union which were not likely to have any profound effect on the nature of Soviet foreign policy. In his country it was believed, however, that these changes had more connection with Sino-Soviet relations than with those between the Soviet and Western Europe. It appeared that
China was demanding a very high level of capital investment from the Soviet Union over a long period.

In spite of the progress of the past year, there was need for caution in facing the future. In the speaker's view, relations between Western Europe and the U.S.A. contained four major problems. First there was the atomic stalemate. While people had not yet been able to decide whether it could reduce or increase the necessity for conventional forces, it was more likely than ever that we had to face a very long period of cold war and that measures to reduce conflicts of interest inside the Western community would gain ever greater importance. There was developing, moreover, a new division within this community between those who possessed atomic striking power and those who did not. The facts of atomic war imposed inter-continental interdependence in strategy and there had been very little progress so far towards a corresponding inter-continental inter-dependence in diplomacy. Secondly there remained the problem of co-ordinating our foreign economic problems more successfully and thereby achieving the general aims of the Western Alliance. Finally there were two problems concerning negotiation between the West and East during a period of co-existence. There was as yet no effective common policy within the Western Alliance on German reunification and, without such a common policy, the community of Western Europe which we hoped would emerge from the Paris Treaties would have great difficulty in consolidating itself. There remained the great problem of divergencies between the U.S.A. and some of the interested Western European powers over relations with the communist countries, notably China, in the Far East. Some 600 million uncommitted Asians were looking on to see which way the issue would be decided. We must try to understand more clearly how the Asian peoples themselves feel about this problem. Meanwhile it seemed that India had moved a little closer to the West from a position of total non-commitment whereas Japan had moved a little further away from the West from a position of total commitment.

In concluding, the speaker stressed the necessity of seeing communist propaganda in its relation to concrete situations in different countries since that propaganda was always cleverly adjusted to meet a variety of different situations. It was consequently more than ever important to ensure that, before any of our countries took a specific action, the reaction of its allies, in their differing circumstances, should be carefully considered. Actions counted far more than words in dealing with these situations.

The United States group believed that the degree of bipartisan co-operation which was developing from the present constitutional position in the U.S.A. could be added to the balance in favour of Western relations. The broad measure of support for his foreign policy upon which the President was now able to call, from perhaps two-thirds or three-quarters of the Republican Party and a considerable proportion of the Democratic Party, enabled many important questions to be dealt with in a mood of moderation and responsibility.

An American participant drew attention to the progress in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes which had occurred since the meeting at Bilderberg and which could have far-reaching effects on the social, political and economic stability of the various countries and consequently on their mutual relationship. There had been organised in the United States a group with the purpose of developing relationships on a non-governmental basis in the different countries concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy and there had been a very warm response. The speaker had visited fourteen different countries since Bilderberg and had had discussions with many important people in them, on the subject, which was one of great importance to our group.

It was also suggested that among the problems that we should have to face next year, and which could have a disruptive effect if not dealt with very carefully, was the review of the United Nations Charter. The first speaker believed that it would be dangerous to attempt any radical modification but there might be something to be said for finding out whether the Russians would agree to a code of behaviour on the veto, and particularly to make it no longer apply to the question of new members. He thought that feeling in his country would be against pressing for any change in the Charter which would be likely to come up against really determined opposition by the Soviet.

There was a very considerable body of opinion which felt that the assessment of progress, with which this discussion had been opened, was over-optimistic. The series of achievements outlined by the first speaker, with the exception perhaps of the improvements in the Middle East, were really successes obtained in the field of traditional diplomacy and were not founded on public opinion. The Trieste settlement, comforting as it was, could not, for example, have any profound effect on the dominating preoccupation of relations between East and West which had not thereby been modified. The set-back resulting from the non-ratification of the European Defence Community had been made good by a new policy but it was a policy which could not, in France at least, be grasped ideologically by public opinion. Events had opened new possibilities for the communists in France which we still could not meet with a positive idea since the European thesis had been weakened and could not in any way be revived by the Paris Pacts; ratification of the Paris Pacts was seen to be necessary in order to prevent the rupture of Atlantic solidarity but did not seem to offer new possibilities for the construction of Europe. What was
needed was a great effort to give again the hope, the expectation, the idea of European construction spectacular enough to be seized by public opinion. Only by inducing this hope of immediate construction could we build up the moral and ideological strength needed to treat satisfactorily with the East.

Germany was divided as never before and the iron curtain ran through the heart of the country. It was as though the United States were divided on the Mason-Dixon line. The German people were strong against communism and knew that their destiny was with the West but so far no progress towards the reunification of Germany was in sight.

An American speaker, while welcoming the confidence brought by recent successes, felt that we should not allow ourselves to become complacent over the solution of somewhat routine problems. There were others yet to be resolved, for example the Israeli problem, the Kashmir problem, the North African problem and many more which we could not yet see but which were being created. Americans were very much worried by what was happening in the Far East where the last year had been nothing short of disastrous. The world situation had not been improved simply because the centre of difficulties had been transferred from Europe to the Far East and today we faced a possibility of armed conflict which could broaden into world war, the greatest danger of the post-war period, with the possible exception of the Berlin blockade. There were two questions which should be looked at. One was that of communist China which had now developed as an independent motivating force with great and alarming prospects for the immediate future. The second was the possibility opened to us by the changes in Russia.

In the view of a Belgian participant the fundamental problem which dominated all our thoughts was the problem of relations between East and West. The question was whether ground had been gained or lost in the cold war. It did not seem that we had gained much ground and, at least in the psychological field, some had been lost. For this reason we must press on with a common approach in the Western world towards the problems of the cold war; a common approach between the U.S.A. and Western Europe. This brought us back to a tangible issue which we should examine at once to see whether anything constructive could be done. Relations between East and West could not be resolved if one did not deal first and at the centre with the German problem. To try to settle the other problems throughout the world, while leaving open the question of German reunification and participation in Western defence, in the heart of Europe, would mean constantly having to begin again.

In the field of atomic energy scientific discovery was continually overtaking itself, advancing more and more rapidly than had been foreseen by the most well-informed scientists. It now seemed dangerous to exclude any hypothesis in considering national defence and we found ourselves on shifting ground where it would be wise to plan even for the worst. It could not be excluded that the scientists would put the bomb into the hands of more and more people and soon "the atomic bomb would become the arm of the poor". The same applied to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, where we had almost to foresee the unforeseeable.

The first speaker, replying to the general discussion on his survey of progress during the preceding year, said that he still believed that progress had been made because public opinion had at last tended to settle down so that the policies of our various countries could be adjusted to realities by the diplomats. As an example of this, American public opinion had shown its unwillingness to become involved on the mainland of Asia; British public opinion had been clearly against greater commitments in the Middle East; and the French people had shown that they wanted to cut their losses in Indo-China. It appeared to him also that they had shown that they were not as a majority in favour of E.D.C. but would support a policy which would not involve quite so close a merger, though this was admittedly very controversial. In his opinion the necessary unity of action could be achieved by co-ordination; even this was difficult to achieve and he did not think more was possible. Britain's readiness to co-operate on the continent since the war had been conditioned largely by America's readiness to co-operate with Europe. Western European union was an essential pressure group inside NATO, but in no circumstances an alternative to it.

Another European participant assessed the balance of Western European relations as being, in spite of their ups and downs, better than they were eight or nine months ago. The field of mutual understanding between America and Western Europe had, he thought, broadened. We saw one another's point of view better and the overtones were less harsh. At the same time there had been some frightening indications of disunion between the two main components of the Western world when so much remained still to be done for that close understanding which alone could see us through the troubled times which we were traversing. What was more necessary than anything else was a better organisation of contacts between America and Western Europe at all levels where public opinion is made; government, parliaments and congress, and especially the press. Governments, he believed, were best equipped for this in the sense that they had two standing means of contact; diplomacy...
and the visits of statesmen. One witnessed too often the distressing spectacle of people shouting at each other across the ocean without any real contact and simply engaging in polemics which were a joy to the Soviet Union. This was distinctly disadvantageous to the unity of the Western world, unity sorely needed and the real purpose of this meeting. We had been very glad to see in Europe from time to time visiting groups from the House of Representatives and of the Senate. It would constitute a great advance if these visits could be more systematised and more frequent. We could not afford unnecessary divisions and a great deal more could be done about this than was being done at present.

From the discussion it appeared that there was a general feeling that the Western world had not, in spite of a number of successes in the diplomatic field, made any really appreciable advance in the cold war. Some ground had indeed been lost. It was necessary to oppose communist propaganda and infiltration with something more than mere co-ordination, more than a series of alliances and more than the routine successes of diplomatic technique. Public opinion was the vitally important factor and without it the treaties which had been discussed would be mere pieces of paper. The central problem of German reunification was most urgent and must first be attacked if a real policy towards the East was to be successful.

There emerged from the discussion as key problems the unification of Europe; the question of China; the adjustment of Western policies to meet the change of leadership in the U.S.S.R.; the measures which we should take to improve Western European-U.S.A. relations through the medium of better understanding and co-operation between parliamentary representatives and the very great need for improvement in press relations. Above all it was necessary to give to youth in the West a new and realisable hope for the future, an idea which it could grasp and which could fire its imagination. If this were not achieved the slow tide of communism would continue to eat away the Western defence and the cold war would be lost.

II. COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN VARIOUS WESTERN COUNTRIES

The extent and manner of communist infiltration of the West was surveyed by various participants who expressed the following views.

GREAT BRITAIN

Communist ideology had never appealed to the people either emotionally or politically and the party strength was relatively very small, amounting possibly to 40,000 or 50,000. As a result communists had had to work by means of infiltration towards the dominating position which they required. To this end they used constitutional processes and subversion to secure positions of influence and power in industrial life, both in the factories and in the great trades unions and had been successful to an alarming degree. Two British trades unions were already communist dominated and a third, the largest of all with over a million members, was now threatened. The leaders of the Communist Party in Great Britain were Russian agents and the situation was obviously, therefore, a very dangerous one. We had seen communist inspired strikers threaten the economic life of the country and we had seen communist influence inside the unions playing a political role. This influence was steadily growing. The speaker was himself associated with a small organisation called “Common Cause”, the avowed purpose of which was to combat communism openly and publicly. A careful study of communist methods had been made in an effort to meet them on their own ground, where they were most active, at their meetings; to provide public speakers against them and to print and distribute pamphlets, leaflets and handbills giving extracts from Stalin’s speeches and other communist material. Trades union leaders had already asked this organisation for help on special occasions. We must realise, however, that this was inadequate and we must convince our people that this threat of communism to England was an insidious one and must be met more vigorously. Unfortunately the general public was almost apathetic whereas the communists derived their strength from their set purpose, their well directed activity and their apparently adequate financial resources. There were no means of stopping propaganda material from reaching the country and Russian funds could reach private individuals without any difficulty.
GERMANY

Communist activities had increased in Germany after the Berlin and Geneva Conferences and during the talks and parliamentary debates about the Paris Agreements. Nevertheless, it remained a less severe danger than, apparently, in England and was confined largely to professionals.

The technique of propaganda was to emphasise not communism but reunification and mutual relations and was directed against foreign armies in Germany, against America and against Western influence in general. Although in the summer elections the communists had increased their vote they had not achieved the five per cent. minimum necessary to any party in order to obtain seats. They did better in shop-steward elections in the industrial field. This was probably because workers and employees felt they presented a less bureaucratic and more aggressive type of representation than the others and so could be relied upon to speak up to management in a crisis.

There is increasing contact between East and West Germany and visits were received from factory and university delegations, cities, and other groups. At all times the topic was reunification, the German future and freedom within the capitalist and communist worlds. As a rule the speakers from the East gave the impression of being better trained and more convincing in debate, since they had a positive concept and a force of conviction.

It was evident, also, that the visits of sporting teams from the communist countries and their success in the sporting field, had had a propaganda effect out of all proportion to their importance. The speaker would not make too optimistic a statement; at present people were living in a successful economic atmosphere which kept them from being gloomy about social and political developments. The main cause of communist successes was the lack of allegiance to a better cause. Ever since the first war it had been the issues of idealism which had interested people, and especially young people, in social and political life. There had been the breakdown of idealism in the national-socialist time, re-education and all the confusion which resulted therefrom. It had been said that the European idea created a substitute and possibly it consumed a great deal of idealism among the youth of Germany, offering a new social world and something to believe in. All this had been destroyed in public opinion and the shock still told on positive attitudes towards communism.

Communist action was one which preferred to outflanks rather than to march directly on its political objective. For example, its propaganda never spoke of the communist economic-political system. One got the impression that economics no longer existed in the sphere of communist propaganda whereas five or six years ago the communists voted above all for economic results.

Today they spoke only of communist pacifism; not neutralism but pacifism, in much the same way as in 1917 when the communists of those days preached pacifism above all: “Let us lay down our arms”. Communist propaganda did not create communists in Germany but it touched something psychological in the heart of every German who, though perhaps too late, was now thoroughly anti-militarist.

There were certain very elementary currents among the German working masses which have nothing to do with communism but which could be exploited by communist propaganda. This was the pacifist, anti-militarist current which is very characteristic of the spirit of the German working classes and not only of the working classes. Recently a Gallup poll had been held among the students of certain German universities; only 56% had favoured German rearmament and of that 56%, half applied to it conditions which appeared to be actually unrealisable and the rest were unconditionally against any form of rearmament. These were movements that must be taken into consideration and it would be a mistake to think that they would disappear tomorrow or the next day. They were fundamental.

Since the unions were now closed to them the communists worked by direct action on enterprise. Here, too, they did not talk of communism; not even of socialism. They spoke of such and such conditions of work in such and such a factory; that there were not enough flowers in the window-boxes, for example, or things of that kind; that holidays were not properly distributed. By these means they succeed in obtaining a certain credit for a certain number of individuals who in fact acted as communist officials.

A situation peculiar to Germany was that, up to date, there was no communist intelligentsia whereas in France, perhaps also in Great Britain and Italy, the great danger was that the intelligentsia, for very different reasons, inclined to the communist side. That is not the case in Germany.

But the party knew communist tactics by unhappy experience. If one did not resist from the beginning one always lost. A result of this attitude, he believed, was the revolt, one could even say revolution, of workers in East Berlin and in the Soviet Zone of 17th June 1953.

FRANCE

The speaker began by regretting that we always spoke of communist influence and communism and that we should have had that vocabulary imposed upon us. In reality not one Frenchman in 20,000 had read ten lines of Karl Marx, though that did not prevent all Frenchmen from having an opinion about Karl Marx, which was unfortunate in a country which considered itself the land of Descartes. It was probably the same in all other countries. There
was a risk, in France for example, that the idea of something communal, of community, something communist in itself, was not disagreeable if one did not know what is behind it. If, from the beginning, we had called them Bolsheviks, Leninists or Stalinists instead of communists we should have demonstrated much more clearly this obedience to Russia because their thesis had nothing to do with the text of communism.

In France there was a deep-seated tendency to assume that progress was to the Left and that progressives were on the Left. What the word “Left” meant was not very well understood but as soon as one took up one stood for progress. Moreover, from the fact that communism is so christened, the press always referred to communists as being of the extreme Left and there was nothing in that to frighten a large part of the population. On the contrary, there was much that could please those who, in accordance with an old French saying, recognised no enemies to the Left. It was M. Herriot who first said that, some twenty-five years ago: “No enemies to the Left”. Should we not one fine day all agree to say that communists were not communists and that they were neither to the Left nor to the Right, but to the East?

An essential theme of communist propaganda was that a Russian victory was inevitable and that Russian victory was victory for communism, thus for progress and for youth, and that seemed to open up an horizon. Youth was not very reasonable and would rather that we spoke to it of hope than of justification for the situation in which it is kept.

The anti-German feelings of a large proportion of the French people were exploited, as was everything else. Whereas we now find French and German friends working side by side for a Franco-German rapprochement, the communists do exactly the reverse. In France they exploit hatred for Germany, pretending at the same time to be the friends of those Germans who, on some particular point, appear to take a position comparable with their own.

Public opinion, as a recent election within the speaker’s Department had shown, did not follow the communists. They are, as his German colleague had just emphasised, followed by the intellectuals or, rather, those who took themselves for intellectuals, which was a lot of people. It was a fashion; one was a progressive, not a communist. In general, in the world of the intellectuals people were crypto-communist, fellow-travellers and neutralists. One could not be entirely communist because the communists were really too close to Russian policy; one could not be neutralist since that did not appear sufficiently revolutionary, so one was progressive on the theme of “No enemies to the Left” and, because our propaganda placed them on the extreme Left, a great number of intellectuals followed them.

The number of people who took out communist party cards had dropped more than 40% in two years. The readers of Humanité decreased daily according to the circulation figure which the newspapers were obliged to furnish. The number of C.G.T. cards had become grotesque, the audiences at communist party meetings had dwindled to ridiculous proportions. But nevertheless, if there were elections, the communists would lose few votes because people would vote for them as a means of expressing their discontent. On the other hand, at the political and parliamentary level they had gained influence; for the last year they had made and unmade governments.

Anti-German and a certain amount of anti-American sentiment has been worked upon in such a way as to exploit French nationalism. This has led to the appearance of representatives of the traditional French extreme right on the same platform as communist orators so that it was not surprising that some workers considered the communists to be sound representatives of French nationalism. The communists have a powerful press, almost unlimited funds, and a militant hard core which did not diminish.

But the five million communist votes cast at recent elections were made up not by the communists but by the discontented. The clearest way for an elector to express his discontent is to vote communist. In all there were not 500,000 real communists. There were 4,250,000 discontented and the moment that the reasons for this discontent were removed the French communist party would be in retreat. It is solely by making poverty disappear in France that we could strike a blow at the communist party and diminish its influence: above all, because it was a deep-rooted sentiment in the heart of every Frenchman, it was necessary to remove the sense of injustice.

BELGIUM

In Belgium the communists had little influence as regards Belgian workers in the political and trades union spheres, but the situation concerning the numerous foreign workers was different. There were many Italians and a fair number of refugee workers, including Poles and Yugoslavs. In Belgium, even among the union organisations, they were rarely equipped to deal with these workers and to understand their mentality, because of language difficulties. The communists worked on them and exploited such things as industrial accidents, even street accidents which had nothing to do with work, and organised dances “in aid of the victims of capitalism”.

Many of the Italian workers left their homes in Naples and Sicily because they could not find work and in consequence they were discontented and tended to be revolutionary in that they wanted to change the social economy of Europe. They were therefore an easy prey to the communists.

From time to time the governments of the countries from which these
workers came, among them Italy, sent delegates to help them. These dele-
gates are not always well chosen and, even when they came from countries
whose governments were by no means communist, they often had communist
tendencies and helped the communist parties to exploit them. Another point
was that these foreign workers were not worked upon by the Belgian communist
party but by foreigners in Belgium who were in touch with the communist
party in Belgium or were simply agents sent to Belgium from Moscow.
The attitude of the Belgian employers was fortunately very good and had
altered since the period before the war; but some of them tended too easily to
classify as communist all those who made claims on them but who were not
communists at all. Organised labour was well disciplined and the communist
danger came from the floating body of non-union workers, happily not very
large. Employers recognised this and, instead of coming into conflict with
the unions, preferred workers belonging to a central union to non-union men.

ITALY

About 50% of what had already been said about communism in France
could be said about it in Italy. Nevertheless, the problem was serious in Italy.
In the present parliament there were nearly 140 communist deputies; there
were some 2 million inscribed party members and the communist hold on the
C.G.T. was absolute, although there was no infiltration of the Christian,
Socialist and Republican unions. The communist vote was a little more than
5 millions and it increased slightly at the last elections as compared with pre-
vious ones. The increase in the total vote of the extreme left was due rather
to the socialist party than to the communist party. Any small increase in the
communist party vote could be explained by two reasons: the 1948 elections
took place under the shadow of the Prague coup which allowed government
propaganda to alarm certain neutral elements. Further, at that time Jugoslavia
was still cominformist so that in the Trieste affair the communists were obliged
to maintain an anti-national position whereas when Jugoslavia cut loose from
Moscow propaganda the communists in Italy were able to adopt an ultra-
nationalist attitude over Trieste. In general, however, foreign policy matters
were not so much exploited by the propaganda of the Italian Communist
Party as they were, for example, in France. They exploited questions concerning
peace and the atomic bomb, from the fear which it created, but perhaps took
into account the fact that the Italian working masses did not react to a subject
like Trieste, for example, so keenly as would be the case in France if the
German problem were high-lighted.

A most serious feature was that in Italy communism had not been isolated.
At the Constituant Assembly elections in 1946, contrary to all expectations,
we will find work for everyone." The decisive factor was to transfer hope from the side of communism to that of democracy.

The communist party disposed of enormous funds and it was calculated that they spent not less than 200 million dollars a year on propaganda in Italy, actually more than American aid. Their organisation was continuous and, whereas the Christian Democrats and other parties spent a maximum of three months in preparing for elections, the communists were constantly mobilised, constantly engaged in the electoral fight and had the means to keep their pre-election machine continually working.

SWITZERLAND

In Switzerland the communist party represented only 2.25% of the electoral body. That was about the normal proportion of discontented people in a country which was doing well. There was always an irreducible core. The Swiss communists did not come from infiltration; they were autochtones. For the most part they were workers and a certain proportion were students who were having what might be called their distemper.

The lack of influence of the Swiss communist party was connected with the political and social structure of the country, that was to say with the extreme dispersion of political responsibility and to the federalist formula of considerable communal and cantonal autonomy which cut the ground from under the feet of every ideological campaign.

If there was no communist infiltration in the sense of a communist party, there were all the same other communist infiltrations which came entirely from outside, through foreign diplomats. That was the real communist infiltration in Switzerland; the legations of countries of the East.

The Swiss were a neutral people but public opinion was unanimously against anything which represented Russian communism.

There was another form of communist infiltration in Switzerland which did not appear to be exclusively Swiss and that was infiltration by communist propaganda of the press. The communists had succeeded in gaining a certain amount of attention in the Western press and it was extremely important to transfer hope. The Swiss communists were having what might be called their distemper.

In conclusion, communism in Portugal was largely negative, but it was good to know that there was at least one country in the world where communism played no part.

PORTUGAL

In Portugal there were all the conditions of a fruitful soil for communism. The country was poor in resources and in its general economy. We had just been given the figure for Italy, but, according to the introduction of the five-year plan now in force in Portugal, the average income of the population was a little more than 3½ of the same categories in Italy. The existing conditions were what was required for communist infiltration but, strangely enough, there were almost no communists in Portugal.

There were several reasons for this. First, the population was extremely religious; the country had never had diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia; there was no Russian Embassy or Legation in Lisbon and no Consulate. In other words, there was no propaganda centre.

There were no funds for propaganda because the system of financial control was such that it is nearly impossible for sums of money to cross the frontier without the authorities knowing something about it. Then, the trades union system was part of the corporative organisation of the state. They were almost state organs. The right to strike did not exist. If there were differences between workers and management these differences were taken, obligatorily, before labour tribunals and were decided by these impartial organs. Finally, communism in so far as it did exist was very far from having that monopoly of hope which had been mentioned here in connection with other countries. On the contrary, it was the government that had the monopoly of hope in Portugal and to show that this hope was well founded there were figures which could be given, and solid reasons, because, for a quarter of a century this country of arch-poverty, in the most absolute destitution, had made very remarkable progress.

In conclusion, communism in Portugal was largely negative, but it was good to know that there was at least one country in the world where communism played no part.

NORWAY

About 90,000 people in Norway voted for the communists but of these it was probable that much less than half were real communists who put loyalty to the Soviet Union above their loyalty to Norway. Their strength had declined from some 10% of the electorate in 1945 to about 5% today. They had had few successes, had brought on only two or three political strikes and had been disappointed in their attempts to lead the People's Fronts. Nevertheless, they constituted a bigger problem than their 5% of the electorate. Communism was unequally distributed and in the North, in places where the country directly faces Soviet Russia, they might reach 30%. While these were local concentrations they presented a real problem, and their existence was probably due to the fact that they lived in what were really "forgotten roughs" where social and living conditions had been insufficiently developed. The present Labour Government was aware of this and had laid much emphasis on development in the North. The communists had no real influence in the
central trades union leadership but at local levels they sometimes had a controlling influence because they had been able to maintain the shop-stewards and the majority on the local union boards. This they had achieved not through ideological reasoning or propaganda, which would not have helped them, but through providing clever shop-stewards and clever trades unionists. When their leadership was challenged even the most level-headed men would say: “Why do you introduce politics into the trades union?” That had been a difficult problem with which the trades unions and the Labour Party had been able to deal in co-operation. The members had first to be persuaded that it was necessary to take it up and fight it. Thus there had been an agreeable house-cleaning in both Northern and Southern areas, although there were still places where success had not been achieved.

On the whole there was a characteristic lack of communist propaganda in Norway and their tactics, not very successful, had been to play the role of innocents pursued by the State using unlawful means.

SWEDEN

The communists reached their peak in 1946, when they gained 11% of the vote. Probably only a small percentage were real communists, the rest being discontented people. They had retained their strength rather longer in the trades unions but had gradually lost ground.

There were few communists in Southern Sweden but in Stockholm, Gothenberg and in the North they formed the traditionally Left party. Wages in the North were very high so that they were not poor and there was no correlation between poverty and communism in Sweden; if there was any correlation at all it was between the extreme religious movements and communism in remote districts and in large cities. This was a complicated problem but the important conclusion was that communism was not correlated with poverty.

The communists had pursued a persistent policy of placing their trusted officials and organisers at points of military importance such as the Bofors gun factory where they were always very strong in the trades union, and also in the Northern unions where the big power stations were located. They had organised a great deal of espionage and only a few days ago a new spy organisation was discovered.

As in Germany, the communists worked through the medium of sport and competitors were invited to Russia. They had intensified peace propaganda and were now trying to monopolise propaganda against the atomic bomb. They harmonised away perpetually at their theme: “Are you against the atomic bomb? Then you are with us.” This simple propaganda was effective. It would help Swedish propaganda against communism a great deal now, when all this talk was going on, if the position about control of atomic weapons were repeated over and over again.

In Sweden, while the communists were few, there was a group called the “third stand pointers”. Very few intellectuals were communists but a considerable number, and some writers, were third pointers. These were not quite the same as fellow-travellers but were a very mild variety who say that the Americans and Russians were both extremes and that it was necessary to keep away from them; a kind of ideological neutrality, which was not the position of Swedish democracy. They used arguments such as that it is no easier for a Swede to get into the U.S.A than it is into the U.S.S.R.; they used the fact that the U.S.A. publishes the number of its unemployed in millions and not in percentages and a figure of three, four or five millions sounds a lot in Sweden with only seven million inhabitants. The best argument against the third pointers was freedom. The West, and particularly the U.S.A., had a high standard of freedom whereas in Russia there was a low standard and slave labour. It was essential to go on repeating the things which seemed so self-evident as to make repetition unnecessary; the fact that the West had reduced its armaments from 1945 to 1948 and that responsibility for the cold war rested with Russia and the Eastern bloc who continued to rearm; that all this explained why Russia had had some success in her foreign policy. It must be made very clear to ignorant people that, because Russia had not reduced her armaments when the Western powers did disarm, there had arisen the situation of today. Repetitio est mater studiorum.

THE NETHERLANDS

The situation in the Netherlands was contrary to that in many other countries in so far that there was a communist trades union, a very large social-democrat trades union and two Christian (one Catholic and one Protestant) trades unions. The communists, in spite of having their own union, which in many respects was fortunate for the country, had tried to infiltrate the other unions. Their tactics were to appeal to the worker in little things which were not communist in themselves. They would, for example, stage theatrical performances in which one seemingly non-communist worker would argue with another apparent non-communist on some subject which might be a source of discontent in the factory. Both men would be in their pay and would lead up to a conclusion coming close to the communist party line which thus seemed, to the average worker, to be confirmed by obvious non-communists. The same processes were used for getting shop-stewards elected.

The Catholic Trades Union had been the only one to try to meet them
effectively on their own ground, organising the same things, using the same weapons, and holding meetings in the breaks and during lunch time; trying to find out when the communist attack was coming and forestalling it. As in other countries, there was a task for the unions to undertake; to be awake to the facts and to work hard in preventing communist infiltration by the methods already described. The Unions could do this where the owners and management could not.

The communist strength in the Netherlands had dropped from 12% to 5%, where it was likely to stay. The 5%, however, were largely loyal communists whose party work was about equivalent to that of 15% in the other parties. As in other countries, also, they worked on the intelligentsia. Behind all this was the Soviet change of attitude with regard to sports and culture. When the West had seemed to be making headway towards a United Europe, the Soviets immediately started sending ballet dancers, musicians and sporting teams into Western Europe. They would show the world that they were part of Europe and thus not only gradually disrupt this idea of a Western European Community but, by getting the most conservative of our newspapers to describe the feats of individual sportsmen and ballet dancers, they gave the impression that there was something nice and charming about it all. All this was put on today, as it could be taken off tomorrow, as part of the same central plan and under the same central leadership, with the sole purpose of dividing us.

DENMARK

There was no danger of communism taking over Denmark or achieving real political influence in the country. The communist vote shrank from election to election. Their aim had therefore changed and they now tried to split the people on different political problems, working not through their own organisations but through peace and neutralist organisations and through people whom they could influence. They aimed at discrediting the Government and Parliament and most of Danish foreign policy. At the moment they were concentrating on the Paris Agreements, demanding a plebiscite and attacking defensive measures, the last in co-operation with the Socialist Party. This was dangerous because it gave the communists a sort of shield of democratic approval and was what they were working for in many countries. They worked especially among universities and intellectual groups. They had had little success but enough to get themselves accepted at their face value by people who did not see what they are aiming at.

They tried, not entirely without success, to persuade Danish youth that they stood for peace, comradeship and peaceful co-existence. It was of vital importance to counteract this insidious propaganda and to show youth in Europe what European culture can pass on to them, and above all to make them aware of the real difference between the communist and the democratic ideology.

THE U.S.A.

Most Americans would probably agree that communism, for them, was not a political movement but a conspiracy serving Soviet Russia as an effective instrument of Soviet policy. Americans were therefore inclined to look on communism in other countries in the same terms. In 1947 there had been generally a relaxed attitude in the U.S.A.; the Communists themselves supported the war effort after German intervention in Russia and Americans had respected the military effort of the Russians in the War. There was traditional confidence in the power of American political institutions to reject extreme ideology such as communism and its intrusion into American politics on any significant scale was not feared. There was also the view as late as 1947 that the iron curtain should be penetrated by a two-way exchange, that democratic institutions would prevail in an open and free exchange of views and that the communist system could not withstand infection by the virus of freedom. Only eight years ago Bedell Smith went to Moscow as Ambassador to urge the Soviet Government to accept the many proposals put to them by the United States regarding an interchange of scholars, artists, scientists, etc. At the beginning of 1948, however, things happened which created alarm in the U.S.A.; the loss of Czechoslovakia, the attack on Greece, the Berlin blockade; these events were accompanied by cases of espionage in the U.S.A. and the penetration of the Government itself by Communists or those in close touch with them. The Hiss case made a profound impression upon the political system. There was a strong reaction against domestic communists and systematic efforts to remove them from key positions and institutions, from government itself, both civilian and armed forces, from schools, colleges, and sensitive positions in industry and science. Security regulations were rigorously tightened, loyalty oaths began to appear in federal and state systems as a prerequisite for holding public jobs; communist leaders began to be prosecuted for conspiracy to overthrow the Government by force and violence. It should be pointed out that the effect of communism upon the political system was felt most strongly in the by-products of the fight itself rather than in direct engagements with Communists because the country seemed to become divided on the issue. There had, however, been increasing concern not to let the fight against communism destroy the unity of the country. McCarthy had been censured by the Senate, the American public was becoming bored with him, and there was a sense that McCarthyism was bad politics.

There were probably a few tens of thousands of real Communists in America
but there was a determination to prevent communist infiltration into sensitive institutions, Government, industry and labour. It would be a mistake to assume that the Government had gone into a rigid policy of legislation and police action to remove it from the country just for official reasons; there was also an unofficial and social rejection of communism. If in some quarters communism was fashionable, as had been said during the Conference, in America it was now very unfashionable.

The Communist effort directed towards the U.S.A. was partly intended to encourage espionage and subversion, but was particularly aimed at separating the country from its friends abroad and weakening the Western coalition.

It was important to remember that America's bilateral problems with the Soviet Union were few and tension between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was largely due to the fear of what the U.S.S.R. was going to do to other people, whether in Europe, the Middle East or Asia; to anti-communism and America's ingrained desire for peace in the international field. Many Americans felt a deep indignation that the type of world peace they had hoped to see probably be a mobilising and harnessing of American industrial energies, struggle against communism because of her common interest and purpose established at the end of the War had been frustrated by the obstinacy and communism could be put to rest. As a result of the experience of the last few years, world responsibility had become part of the American character. Thus those who were neutralists should recognise that America was in the number of other countries to their point of view.

There was a possibility that neutralism, not neutrality in either the Swedish or the Swiss sense, was a luxury only enjoyable beneath the umbrella of United States determination and power, especially with regard to nations in Asia. The American commitment to an active role in the international sphere was related to the fear that otherwise the Soviet Union might come to dominate a large part of the world and convert it into the kind of world in which Americans did not wish to live. A relaxation of concern about communism might therefore strengthen the forces of isolationism. At present the great debate about isolation had been largely won for international action by America's interest in building a world in which she can live.

Another American speaker considered that it would be a wrong assumption that the United States would tend to revert to earlier isolationism if the problem of relations with the Soviet Union and the problem of aggressive communism could be put to rest. As a result of the experience of the last few years, world responsibility had become part of the American character. In the last two decades American industry had learnt a great deal about its responsibilities and if the world were relieved of its tensions there would more probably be a mobilising and harnessing of American industrial energies, technical ability and capital to go far towards transforming the world into a place in which we all would like to live. A great challenge was presented by the possible application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the new era which this would bring about.

**Turkey**

The problem of communism in Turkey was like that in Portugal in that there is really no problem. In Turkey the matter had been handled within a democratic framework. As in Germany, most people had enough experience of the Russians to understand, dislike and fear them. They had lived next to the Russians for 700 years and for a large part of that time have been fighting them. Their opposition to communism had nothing to do with isolationism and Turkey had recently become enthusiastic about private enterprise. Although they had never been socialist there had always been a large degree of State intervention in economic affairs. They had no reservation regarding the Jugoslov, who did not try to export communism, and their antagonism to Soviet communism was because it is Russian. The Turkish attitude with regard to security was correct but absolutely firm where Turkish interests were concerned. No inflammatory statements about Russia were made and correctness was carried to the extent of being the only country outside the iron curtain to send a representative to Stalin's funeral. The Turks have a long tradition of sticking together and not many Turks would be found who would dissociate themselves with their Government, whether bad under the Sultans or good under democracy, as far as foreigners were concerned.

The Communist Party was illegal and the best estimate was that, including fellow-travellers, there were five to ten thousand out of twenty-one million people. The majority of these were probably university students, of which there were 20,000 in Turkey, mostly in Istanbul, people who became ideologically interested at a certain stage of their adolescence or post-adolescence. Religious extremists had also tended towards some susceptibility. Under the Ataturk régime these were disfranchised in many ways and priests, etc., resented it. Those particular elements, however, had been controlled by the Government since the attempted assassination of a newspaper editor two years ago. Trades Unions, which had not been greatly developed in Turkey, had about 100,000 members only and had not been penetrated. If Turkey were put under more pressure by Russia it was conceivable that small groups might succumb through cowardice but the history of Turkey in standing up to Russia makes this unlikely.
From the reviews which had been made of the situation in the various countries of the West certain common features, well known to those who study the problem, took shape. From one central office, which directed the line of approach towards the intelligentsia and the discontented, a working instruction was disseminated to people who were either prospective communists or non-communists destined to be used in the communist service. In support of this there were ample funds going into all our countries. On the basis that nobody believed foreign propaganda it was always given to nationals of each country to spread the word. These people, in every country, were not striving for the benefit of those upon whom they worked but were agents of Soviet Russian foreign policy. They exploited all the great political issues and succeeded in getting some co-operation from some of the most violently anti-communist elements. They used written propaganda and exploited the small things which caused discontent among non-communist workers in order to disrupt industrial life and thus they created the opportunity to get to work; lately they had worked effectively through sport and culture and finally, through the press which had in some cases been an extremely efficient and important instrument in their hands. They obtained, either as official, or much more usually unofficial communists, leading positions in trades unions, as shop-stewards and in leading newspapers, where they could do very great damage to public opinion.

Communist propaganda was speculating in short-term interests and gave voice to all forms of local or class discontent; it accepted all sorts of improbable alliances, whether with Church, Monarchy or Nationalism. Emphasis was placed on the inevitable success of Russia, whether in the military, economic or scientific field. Russian progress had always been presented in percentages, starting from a figure low enough to make the increase sound large. The verbal distortions were incredible and the false information that was given was simply appalling; peace was called war, compulsion called liberty and tyranny called democracy. The most difficult element in the whole problem seemed not to be the economic but the psychological.

During this discussion the point had constantly recurred that communism had two attractions, social equality or the possibility to get anywhere in the system, and the economic security it offered to the unambitious part of the population, which was the majority. It took advantage of a social pattern in Europe which was evidently not attractive to a large part of the population.

Wherever the agents of Soviet Russia were at work there seemed to be a relatively small central core, acting on Cominform instructions, operating as much as possible through democratic institutions, using the freedom which our system offered them, and making the utmost use of all those among the intellectuals, uninform youth and the discontented who did not clearly see the hand of Soviet foreign policy behind it all. There was a strong current of opinion that the West stood by while this went on, taking but very little imaginative and creative action to check it.
III. THE UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES

A. IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

The Conference discussed the struggle with communism for the uncommitted peoples of the world. The ideological and political aspects of this problem were introduced first by a European and then by an American rapporteur, on the basis of reports which they had prepared and circulated and from which the following considerations, inter alia, emerged:

The European rapporteur considered that the position of the Western world vis-a-vis the communist world could scarcely be considered satisfactory. The Western world was on the defensive. No war had ever been won by the defensive and the cold war could not be won in that way. The weakness of the Western world lay in the fact that it contained too many people who, deep in their hearts, doubted victory. Too many people thought, feared or hoped that the future was with Stalinism.

We had created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to oppose Stalinism in all its aspects but today that Organisation had a very difficult task. Set on foot to meet the possibility of an attaque brusquée it now found itself facing the long struggle of the cold war, perhaps to be prolonged through many decades to come.

Communist propaganda was fundamentally the same throughout, even if its tactics differed according to the special circumstances of the countries to which it was applied. If it was successful to any degree it meant that there was some defect in our system; we all recognised the skill of communist propaganda but even the most able propaganda could not flourish if it did not find favourable ground. Communist propaganda had the advantage of working back to a central organisation which directed it and distributed resources. It was debatable whether it would be possible or useful to oppose the Communist with some sort of democratic international which could take its role from it and counterbalance it, at least some sort of co-ordination. This had been proposed many times in the Atlantic Council but nothing had been done about it. Important as it was, however, it could not solve the whole problem.

Our Liberal-democratic society found itself, by the very fact of communism, faced by a challenge and it behoved it to demonstrate its vitality by transforming itself in a way that could meet that challenge. A vital society must be able to adapt itself to necessities. Stalin himself had recognised this principle when, in 1946, he wrote that their victory would come only on the day when the productivity of the worker of the communist régime surpassed that of the worker of the capitalist régime.

It was a weakness of Europeans that some of them still dreamt too much of a restoration of the world of before 1940, which was impossible, and at times we resembled the damned of Dante who walked forward with their heads turned backwards. The democratic régime was the best system which it had been possible to invent to enable society to be reformed, even radically, without revolution. If a political régime remained faithful to its origins and was the continual expression of a society, it could endure. If it considered itself standard and untouchable it was lost. At times we confused democracy with forms of democratic expression. Democracy was eternal but the forms of its expression could, and must change. The democratic and the communist systems had a common origin in the philosophy of the 18th century and the French Revolution. Democracy had arrived at an impasse because it had not perceived that political liberty does not necessarily involve economic liberty. Communism accentuated the necessity of social justice and opposed it to the idea of liberty pure and simple. The Stalinist régime envisaged not only the suppression of the class war but the extinction of the classes. The question was whether or not the democratic régime was to continue to stand by and look on at the differentiation between the classes.

All this was really the problem of co-existence which meant, if it had a meaning, the ability to live side by side with others, respecting at any rate their internal régime even if not approving it. Co-existence demanded tolerance and tolerance was not possible if one was convinced in advance, as were the Russian Government and the communist international, that only one possessed the absolute truth and represented both historical reality and the future. Stalinism was a doctrine for the elementary and Stalinists were endowed with neither the intelligence nor the critical capacity to doubt it. The Russian idea of co-existence was that communist society was the logical and biological end-result of human evolution and that different countries could not all achieve it at the same time. There was then a period in which the capitalist and communist systems must live side by side and during this transition period it was the duty of communist countries to do everything possible, externally and internally, to aid the evolution of capitalist towards
communist society. If the people of the Western world let this happen, they were good democrats; if they opposed it, no matter in what form, they were dirty fascists. The Russians talked of co-existence but they mentally added the word "temporary" which made the reality different.

It was not true, whatever they might say, that there were no internal contradictions in the Soviet régime. There were, but the régime took steps to suppress them and unfortunately, the totalitarian and police organisation of the Soviet state prevented the Western world from taking advantage of them to bring about changes which would make real co-existence possible. We had to wait for the time when the natural evolution of things and the errors of the Soviet Government would accomplish this work. On the other hand, the Stalinist world had every opportunity to exploit and accentuate our own internal differences. Liberty, by the opportunities which it offered to those who wished to suppress it, provided the means of its own downfall. The problem could not be solved by suppressing liberty; we must equip ourselves to overcome the risks and defects of liberty herself. She would not rally the masses for her defence; she confined herself to giving freedom for those who worked against her.

For the Western world, therefore, co-existence must mean defence against external communist action and against the sapping of its internal defences. Victory in the cold war was the victory of the last quarter of an hour; it would go to him who could hold on until internal differences had thrown down his opponent.

If we organised ourselves simply to defend ourselves we risked losing the cold war. It is true that communism did not succeed in transforming the idea of liberty into ideology. The United States appeared to have succeeded. The European countries had not gone far enough and in any case not all to the same extent. It was also necessary to get over the class war and class antagonisms. This was the challenge posed by Stalinism: "Democratic society cannot succeed in resolving its internal contradictions and repairing its political, economic and social defects with its system of democratic liberties which is the code of the Western world. The road of the dictatorship of the proletariat is indispensable." It was up to us to show that we can solve this problem of internal contrasts without sacrificing the ideal of liberty. We must get rid of passive complacency in the bounty and perfection of our system. We must not simply think that liberty and liberty alone could solve everything but we must also free the uncommitted peoples of the kind of conviction and fear that final victory would be with the Eastern world.

The defects of democratic society were not the same in all countries and equally the remedies could not be the same, but by co-operation and mutual help it would be easier to apply the remedy. There are stronger and weaker countries, healthy and sick. The strong and healthy must help the weak and sick. It was a case for Atlantic solidarity and Western solidarity.

The American rapporteur then gave the views of his Group. By uncommitted peoples were meant not only the neutralists of Western Europe, described by one speaker as "minority" neutralists within countries, which had committed themselves to the Western camp, but the nationalists and anti-colonialists of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world outside the iron curtain who had not made full commitments to the ideas and ideals of the West.

The conditions which induce a climate favourable to communism were examined. Discussion of communism in different countries the previous day had already covered most of this subject. There were the forces of disruption let loose by the war; advancing technology and industrialisation resulting in the loosening of old social and political ties, setting people adrift in communities where they were not at home; the impact of Western ideas, particularly as it affected an intellectual elite coming from the under-developed countries but educated either in the U.S.A. or Europe; and what might be called the "Revolution of Expectations", the changing conception among people of the under-developed countries as to what they should demand of life after they had seen something of the kind of society existing in the Western world. There was the demoralising effect of corrupt, impotent or reactionary governments attempting to perpetuate outmoded economic or social advantages for the benefit of social minorities, and there was the pressure of economic distress.

There was no exact and inevitable relationship between economic success and communist infiltration but it would be mistaken to assume that there was no relationship. Economic instability could demoralise whole communities and discredit time-honoured societies. It might be that communism did not gain adherents so quickly under conditions of extreme economic distress as when individuals were either less well off than they used to be or climbing the economic ladder at a pace which they regarded as too slow. It was indisputable that the corrosive effects of unemployment, poverty and a static or deteriorating economy were effective conditions for communism.

Communism in theory held out illusive attractions. It had the appearance of a positive ideology, even if the Soviet Union did not always practise it, and, in certain conditions and parts of the world it could fill in the gap left by a discredited system in which the individual had lost faith. It told people that they were rational and free, offering them the comfortable fetters of authoritarian security; it put emphasis on group activity, creating a feeling of safety within the group for those whose family, tribal or community relation-
ships had been disrupted. The communists misrepresented themselves incessantly as the prophets of peace. They put much emphasis on propaganda against atomic weapons not only because it had an important appeal to people who were frightened by the existence of these weapons, but because it was to their advantage to restrict warfare to conventional weapons when they had an enormous preponderance in man-power and in the resources which they could mobilise. Finally, they exploited hatreds generated by systems which, in the past, sanctioned unfair class, racial or economic discriminations, promising power and fulfilment to those who felt themselves capable of leadership in the past, sanctioned unfair class, racial or economic discriminations, promising power and fulfilment to those who felt themselves capable of leadership but frustrated under existing systems.

Communism also offered to people, or even countries, engaged in a struggle the possibility of an illusive support. There was always a tendency among those engaged in a struggle for power towards the wishful thinking that they could accept temporary communist assistance without paying the price of permanent subjugation.

In addition to its attractions, communism also had its threats. The principal of these were the Red Army and Air Force and the satellite armies and they obviously had a very real relevance for those countries within striking distance. The attraction which the Western world had to offer must be examined in the light of the purposes which we seek to achieve regarding the uncommitted peoples. Neutralism in the West could be cured only by deeds and not by words; the cure lay in taking steps to give a new element of faith and a new desire to fight for the ideas of the West. This must come from the correction of the social, economic and political frustrations which create a climate suitable for neutralism. While neutralism in Europe and isolationism in the U.S.A. were to some extent opposite sides of the same coin there was the important difference that the isolationists were committed to anti-communism. It was necessary to bring about a full commitment of both to work together in facing our mutual problems.

Neutralism of under-developed countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East provided a problem distinct from that of a minority within a committed state. We cannot, and should not, expect or ask more of these countries for the time being than that they should not choose the side of Soviet Russia or communist China. In the case of India, for example, the West should ask no greater commitment than India had already expressed, that of independence of both East and West. India was going through a transitional period between the colonial régime and independence and at the same time experiencing social and industrial revolution. When America was transforming herself from thirteen colonies into an independent state she also had avoided entanglements and commitments with the European nations. We should not, therefore, be impatient with a neutralism which might be a psychological and political necessity. While recognising her independence we should assist her economically in a manner which would impose on her the least obligation. We should neither ask nor expect gratitude for economic assistance and we should encourage that kind of cross-fertilisation which results from exchange of students and visiting lecturers and from all the social intercourse which can be facilitated by the various instruments created for that purpose.

We must be aware of a problem presented by the opportunity for a kind of clinical comparison which could be made between India and China which people of the Far East and other peoples of the under-developed world are probably making today. There was reason to fear that Red China might be outstripping India in the speed of industrialisation and in the progress of the industrial and agricultural revolutions going on in each country. When these peoples compared what happened in a country which had been taken over by communism with what happened in a country which had remained free from it, we were presented with a great challenge. That challenge must be met quickly if the West were to succeed with the uncommitted peoples of the East.

There had grown up among the Western nations a diplomatic pattern of consultation as a prelude to discussions with representatives of Eastern nations. If this were done too openly it gave the impression of "ganging up" and drew unfortunate reactions from the Eastern countries. It was quite probable that the Bandung Conference was a kind of defensive reflex to this Western habit. While it was extremely important for the Western powers to follow a consistent policy in the large issues, this could be overdone in the small ones and in any case great care must be taken not to emphasise the difference between East and West.

The differences of view between Americans and Europeans on the subject of colonialism seemed to be largely one of timing. While Americans were more likely to stress the long-term benefits of bringing indigenous peoples to a state of autonomy, Europeans were more likely to emphasise the short-run dangers. In turning to the inducements and benefits which the West could offer we had first to ensure that our own house was in order. For example, racial discrimination in the U.S.A. had been an important weapon in the Soviet arsenal but happily great progress had been made during the last two decades towards eliminating it. Racial discrimination, however, was unfortunately not yet extinct in the Western world and this was deeply felt and resented by both Asians and Africans.

It was very probably a mistake for the West to try to sell its own ideology
in its entirety to the East in direct competition with communism. In the Middle East and extending from North Africa down to Pakistan and Indonesia the mentality of people was conditioned by Islam; in the Far East it had been shaped by the ideas of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. On the other hand, Western man, with his strongly rationalistic and secular character of thought derived from his religious and cultural development, believes in science, progress and in the individual as a fluid element in society, free to find a level commensurate with his ambitions and abilities. This might not, except in certain areas, be acceptable to Eastern peoples of quite different background and it might be unrealistic to attempt to persuade them to adopt it completely and to undertake fully the responsibilities of democratic government. The essential element in any democratic society is the informed individual and the informed electorate. This requires, at the very minimum, a considerable extension of means of communication and the possibility for information to penetrate to the community and the village from the world outside. While we should persuade people as far as possible to accept our ideas of democratic society, in which we have confidence and faith as being the only equitable solution to the problems of mankind, we should be very slow and very tolerant in our attempts to get it accepted in the precise political forms in which we knew it.

The same reasoning applied to the modified capitalism practised in the West, which might not be well fitted for export to areas where there were not always the conditions in which a capitalistic system could operate effectively; accumulated savings were meagre and poorly distributed; legal systems did not make it possible for property transfers to be easily effected and did not provide for the recognition of corporate organisms, or did not contain machinery permitting even land titles to be passed with certainty; manual labour was held in disdain and prestige indices of various occupations wholly different from our own. In such circumstances rapid material progress within a capitalistic system might be impossible. There also arose from this a caveat concerning the kind of propaganda and information programmes which could be adopted. A distinction had to be made between the requirements of, say, the people of East Germany, or even Russia, and those of Pakistan or Kenya. We could over-emphasise the importance of telling the peoples of the East that the worker in the West has an automobile, a television set and an electric dishwasher; his deeply felt wants were likely to be of a wholly different order.

Western democracy was based on individual responsibility and we had no product, therefore, which could compete directly with the communist merchandise of group action and group security. We had developed certain forms of group action which were almost entirely non-political in character but it might well be that such useful organisations as the Boy Scouts and the Y.M.C.A. could not always be suitable for export and organisations of a more autonomous character would be needed. A member of the German group had already suggested that it was the function of the state to provide liberty and opportunity for the ambitious but security for the unambitious. One of the problems of the West in dealing with the East was that it was the very essence of our own philosophy that individual responsibility was the important element.

It was clear that we cannot depend wholly on economic and political measures in dealing with the peoples of the under-developed areas. We must try to find, with them, areas of common interest and experience. The peoples outside the iron curtain were, with few exceptions, believers in some form of supernatural religion, whereas the communist peoples had adopted the faith of dialectical materialism. A movement founded on the common elements of belief in the great religions among the uncommitted peoples might perhaps be started with a programme for the whole non-communist world not unlike that of the 4-H Clubs in the U.S.A. and concentrated on teaching youth the theory and practice of agriculture, health, sanitation and sports. The idea, put forward tentatively, might provide a differentiation from communism and a rallying point for common action.

From the discussion of the two reports there emerged a number of points which participants clearly considered were of key importance and an attempt has been made to summarise the main arguments in the paragraphs which follow. On some of these subjects there was a very considerable measure of agreement; on others it was not possible to arrive at an agreed view, probably because the situation in the various countries from which the different speakers came differed, sometimes to an extent which would have made a policy applicable to one impossible or at least unwise in others.

1. The Defence of Democracy

It was evident, from the consideration of their ideological and political approach to the uncommitted peoples both in Europe and elsewhere, that the communists worked incessantly and effectively on youth and on the discontented. In the West there was, in most countries, a continual and dangerous sapping of our internal defences and the measures which we took to combat it were often quite inadequate. While democracy was bathing the communists had stolen its clothes by making use of such terms as “popular democracy”, “peaceful co-existence” and the equally false and continually reiterated statement that Russia wanted disarmament. The Soviet talked
loudly and endlessly of peace and at the same time encouraged local aggressions in Asia, waged a cold war and kept enormous military forces threateningly in the background, thereby saddling the West with an immense burden of defence expenditure which held back social progress. We all knew that the Soviet popular democracies were the reverse of democratic; that peaceful co-existence meant that the Soviet would not intervene by violence in the West but reserved for itself the use of all other forms of intervention, including the cold war, while denying to the West any possible approach to the communist dominated peoples; but we did nothing effective to explain this to the uncommitted peoples of West or East.

A number of suggestions were made for dealing with this situation. (a) There was general agreement that much could be done in the field of education. In many countries, and Benedetto Croce had said it of Italy for example, the intelligentsia had received a literary and artistic education but were ill-informed on economic, financial and industrial matters so that they were liable to swallow the Marxist explanation. There was here a definite task which governments could undertake. A French speaker believed, also, that there were too few civics courses in schools. People must also be told what really goes on in communist countries and that it had nothing whatever to do with what we know as socialism; for example that a new caste had been created and that, in the U.S.S.R., two million exploited 150 million people, and that less than 15% of students in Russian universities were unrelated to the communist ruling class. Several speakers held the view that the Church was in a position to dispel certain illusions, especially with regard to the false peace propaganda. Some considered that it would not suffice for religious authorities to give instructions, even if they were willing to do so. What was needed was for the young clergy to gain confidence that the West had hope to offer. Some emphasis was also given to the fact that the young clergy and teachers at schools and universities were far too ignorant about our way of life and our systems of government to be fitted to play an important role in counterbalancing Russian communist propaganda. (b) There was a body of opinion which recommended firmer and more positive measures. A Netherlands participant referred to the fears that had been expressed that the West could lose the cold war and believed that this was due to lack of effective measures. He recommended that there should be complete reciprocity and that we should allow people from the East, that is diplomats, scientists, sportsmen, cultural visitors, tourists, etc., into our countries strictly on the basis of the treatment which we received in communist countries. That would require a central organisation for the 15 countries of the West. It was also paradoxical to allow non-democratic parties to play a part in the democratic community on equal terms. In a cold war there were some of the characteristics of a civil war because one part of the population acted as foreign agents. Only a few countries had taken appropriate measures to deal with this situation, for example the U.S.A., Turkey and Portugal. In the Netherlands there was an old Dutch law of 1855 which allowed non-democratic parties to be forbidden. That was an approach which ought to be considered. The speaker thought that there should be some sort of unified direction of the cold war on our side, as there was on the other side, to deal with these matters. This could take the form of a co-ordinating organisation perhaps within NATO, where it was believed there already existed one which was not working. We should take the offensive if we wanted to win the cold war and we should insist on strict reciprocity.

A U.K. participant reminded the Conference that we were fighting a bitter, determined and invertere enemy who had avowedly said that he was going to destroy us. It had to be admitted that in the last two years Stalinism had made immense strides; one need only point to S.E. Asia and to almost successful attempts to separate Western Europe from the U.S.A. Where had Stalinism no existence? We had been told in America, Turkey and Portugal; because these governments had taken action to prevent it from spreading. One might offer reasoned arguments to these intellectuals and workers with perverted ideas but that was not sufficient to deal with the paid agents, paid intellectuals and paid workers. Obviously they would spread their doctrine and would not alter their tactics whatever we might write in our magazines. Communism had carefully disseminated a myth that if you drove it underground it would be difficult to control it. In fact the situation was the exact reverse; if you drove it underground you deprived it of almost all the means it had of expressing itself and getting recruits. It was simplicity itself to follow it when it was forced underground but impossible to deal with it, on the other hand, when an agent from the Russian Embassy could meet a British man in Hyde Park and give him fifty pounds without anyone being able to take action.

As regards reciprocity, we had the "Daily Worker", subsidised by Russian money, in Britain. But in Moscow there were "Pravda" or "Isvestia", but no British newspaper which could be sold on the streets for anybody to buy. We should allow nothing that is not allowed to us. It had also been said by another British speaker that the problem in the United Kingdom was not the capture of power by the communists, of which there was no danger, but of preventing them from getting information of value to Russia and therefore it was only a security problem, not a political one. But Stalinism had succeeded in obtaining serious influence in the British trade unions. Stalinism had
more influence in England in 1955 than it had in 1918 and early 1919, in which year it had succeeded in preventing the loading of arms to help Poland when she was struggling against a third Russian Bolshevik offensive.

There was in Moscow a central organisation consisting of many country sections and at the head of each section was a man charged with the disruption of each of our countries. He was aware of the movements in these countries and received reports from them; he sent instructions and men and money; he recruited new men. There was a man quietly working to destroy us. If we continued just to sit and allow that to go on we should, as had been said at our last meeting, be choosing to go to a nice gentle death and that was certain to come unless we took vigorous, definite and effective action and were not afraid.

While no agreement was reached on this important subject, there was a strong current of opinion among those who spoke that there was a need for more positive measures to deal with communism when it amounted to treachery, according to the situation in the various countries. In America it had been made impossible for a member of the Communist Party to become an official of the government. He had to sign a statement and if he lied he was certain to come unless we took vigorous, definite and effective action and were not afraid.

While no agreement was reached on this important subject, there was a strong current of opinion among those who spoke that there was a need for more positive measures to deal with communism when it amounted to treachery, according to the situation in the various countries. In America it had been made impossible for a member of the Communist Party to become an official of the government. He had to sign a statement and if he lied he was subject to perjury proceedings. The democracies should learn to protect themselves from the traitors within.

(c) Other speakers were not prepared to go as far as this for political as well as legal reasons. Where many would agree that there should be prosecution for treason they were strongly against prosecution for communism. There would be great difficulty in Italy, for example, where some 5 million people, many of them good but misguided citizens, had voted communist and where action against officials was an extremely delicate business since the repeal of the Fascist law. Another European speaker believed that the intellectuals, who in any case did not like a fighting approach to communism, would be given more objective information as to the degree to which the communist system denied the very basis of their life from all over the world should sign an appeal which outlined the danger of communism and explained the aims and essential philosophy of democracy. Such an appeal would show that there was strong backing for democracy.

2. Neutralism

A number of views were given on the phenomenon of neutralism. It was suggested that this was represented by a feeling that it did not matter to an individual or to his country which side won, assuming that one side was dominated by the U.S.A. and the other by Russia; that neutralism was a form of nationalism with an inferiority complex. It was important therefore that we should conduct our policies in such a way that people in the smaller countries should not feel that their nation was not going to influence events and it did not much matter what they did, or they might say: "All right, count me out. Ohne mich!". There appeared to be no general prescription for this; it was simply a question of finding out which were the sore points and treating them with extraordinary delicacy. There had, for example, been very impressive speeches from the German participants pointing out that the feeling was becoming strong in their country that the Western powers had absolutely no interest whatsoever in German reunification. Unless we could work out with our German friends a common policy we should risk the spread of neutralism in Germany to an extent which would wreck the Paris Treaties. The view was also expressed that neutralism signified more than indifference and, at the bottom, neutralists were really on the Russian side.

There was the problem of the neutral governments of Asia. What concerned us was that their countries should be prepared to defend themselves if they were likely to be attacked. It was not reasonable to expect those countries who had just gained their independence to give it up for the sake of building an international community in which the centre of gravity lay in the white world. We had to conduct our policy in Asia so that if there was an act of aggression it appeared as much to the Asians themselves and not as a reaction to Western provocation. At all costs we must avoid treating Asia as part of the Western Front.

3. Anti-Colonialism

A European speaker discussed the important psychological aspect of the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa, and a number of Latin Americans. He had been very much struck during the last General Assembly of the
United Nations by the fact that so much jealousy and resentment was pent up beneath the mostly polished exteriors of representatives of these countries. This was particularly so with the Asians and to a lesser degree there was something of the kind at work in the minds of quite a few South Americans. That state of mind made all those nations particularly inaccessible to co-operation with the West and by the same token vulnerable to communist propaganda. There was also the apparent paradox that whilst, emotionally at least, Americans were often the champions of nations wanting emancipation from foreign rule, those same nations showed, once they were emancipated, much the same resentment to Americans as they show to European ex-ruling states or peoples. More extraordinary still, in India there was the same general aversion to the U.S.S.R. as there was to the Western countries, not excluding the U.S.A. Thus the party which first succeeded in breaking down this aversion had the best chance of winning these countries to its side.

These contradictory situations required an answer. All these pent up feelings, conscious or unconscious, but in any case very real, of actual or imagined inferiority or of rancour, came to the surface in the form known as anti-colonialism. The name explained itself but was only a superficial symptom. The roots of these tensions and stresses lay deep in the minds and souls of those whose outlook and objectivity they distorted. With colonialism in the sense of selfish exploitation of the area concerned by another country it had very little to do. There never had been, in nine cases out of ten and in the course of the present century, any such exploitation. Economically many of those countries were better off under Allied rule than now that they were free. Besides, countries like Afghanistan, Iran and Liberia never were under Allied rule and yet they, too, were afflicted. If this unhealthy condition (unhealthy only because it resulted in a distorted view of realities) were no more than an affliction of a number of individuals it would be bad enough; but the actual situation was far worse because the affliction had attacked a very considerable proportion of the intelligentsia of those Asian and African countries who thereby were unable to give the kind of leadership that was in conformity with the general facts of the situation of the international community.

It would have been regrettable enough if it had no undesirable practical consequences, but unfortunately it had. These countries did not opt for the West in its struggle with communism. That might in part be attributable to the general Asian trait of not taking sides until you saw who was going to win but it seemed to a considerable extent to be due to feelings of resentment and jealousy. It was therefore in the interests of the West to analyse them more closely and see if anything could be done; if we could pull down some of these invisible barriers which unfortunately exist, by all means let us do so.

The Conference to be held at Bandung next month showed that an effort was long overdue. We simply could not afford to leave anything undone which might secure us more allies and prevent the communists from getting them.

Many of these free nations had civilisations which might be different from ours but we were nevertheless true civilisations, in many respects older and deeper than our own. That we were more technically advanced did not make any difference. Civilised in the spiritual sense, as most of them were, their present jealousies and resentments vis-à-vis the West had nothing to do with civilisation. It was probably to be found in an instinctive insurgence against the material preponderance of the West against which spiritual and cultural forces of the West and by the same token vulnerable to communist propaganda. The Jews were of little avail and which therefore struck them as brute force. The fact that it sometimes took on a sanctimonious air deceived no-one and only made matters worse.

Having won or strengthened their political independence these nations suddenly realised that it had not brought them the blissful state of which they had dreamt. They were still poor, or incompetent, or both; like ourselves they were far from remembering that human existence was never a state of unadulterated bliss but a vale with a large quantity of tears; they also forgot, or did not realise, that those who carried through great revolutions were very rarely allowed to see them come to full fruition, just as Moses, having led the Jews out of bondage, was not allowed to enter the promised land. In short, they had no eye for the tragic element inherent in Time, endless and eternal, as against ephemeral and therefore impatient mortal man. The Asian and African wanted to reap the harvest and reap it quickly. If he was denied this, as he was in practice, he did not look inward to his own limitations, because he intuitively shrank from anything so unpleasant. He looked outward for scapegoats for the disillusionment and disappointment which he did not understand and which made him angry, resentful and, in some cases, aggressive. There was no more natural scapegoat than the political overlord or the rich country which wanted to do business with him on the basis of factual inequality. The image, well known in psychoanalysis, of the rejected father and those associated with him undoubtedly played an important part here. The “whites”, the “westerners”, the technocratic brutes against whom they felt powerless, in spite of their independence, and for whom at the same time they still felt a sort of intolerable respect, creating violent inner tensions were the object of their resentment. We must try to devise ways of curing an illness which, politically and militarily speaking, might lose Africa and Asia to communism if left unchecked. It would call for great tact and forbearance. “Thou shalt not live by bread alone”! financial help was undoubtedly necessary and indispensable but it was not enough to be convinced of that
intervene in colonial situations where there seemed to be clear consent and acceptance of colonial status.

There were Asians who, being ardent nationalists and in many cases instrumental in forging the independence of their countries, nevertheless understood the West and all it had to offer to Asia and Africa well enough to interpret it. Names of men like General Romulo sprang to mind, or Sir John Kotelawala.

The Conference was strongly in agreement with these views and there was under consideration in some quarters a related suggestion that a conference between some of the great thinkers of the East and West should be called together. Such a conference should be a non-political one comprising a philosophical discussion.

During further discussion of the problem of colonialism the question was asked whether it was really reasonable, in a world which already suffered so much from nationalism, to open up new customs barriers and to go on advocating, as the ultimate end of all political wisdom, the old and out-moded liberal formula of independence. Perhaps a solution of the problem of relations between colonial and metropolitan countries should be sought within the framework of federalism. In some cases an abrupt rupture with the colonies could have extremely serious consequences. In Belgium the three great political parties were in agreement on this point. It was incontestable which had hitherto remained economically healthy, into an extremely difficult situation. There was a dangerous tendency on the part of United Nations commissions, after short visits to territories under European tutelage, to recommend periods after which independence should be given. 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peoples of the East only the products of culture without explaining what was the creating and ordaining genius of these inventions and productions. We should arrive at a series of conferences between the different cultures which shared the world today, between general Western culture and that of Islam, between Western culture and that of Southern Asia, and so on. In this connection the speaker associated himself with the views already expressed on the subject of anti-colonialism and with the proposals which had followed.

One of the reports had spoken of the possibility of a sort of synthesis of the religious tradition of the different continents and cultures and of a lowest common denominator of our respective creeds. The speaker did not believe in the fertility of research for a lowest, or even a highest common denominator in our different religions. That would amount to a kind of deism and neither Christians nor Buddhists, nor Hindus had ever been deists. A second reason was that the Christian faith was drawn not from belief in a kind of Supreme Being as postulated by the French Revolution but drew the force of its conviction from faith in Christ Incarnate.

The speaker had long experience of discussions between the different confessions of the Christian religion. He had always observed in their discussions, which embraced Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant, that the greatest mutual understanding was to be found, paradoxically, between the most orthodox of each creed and never among the more liberal. The most fruitful discussions between East and West had been between the very orthodox Hinduism of the Sankara tradition and Western Thomist theology, that is, between two orthodoxies recognising all sorts of affinities and never between the diluted versions. If East and West gave way in what made up the vital interests of our creeds, we should both lose our reasons for living by trying to live together. The solution seemed to be a form of open and very frank discussion between representatives of the different religions of the world, each one explaining his pure conviction. What were the possibilities of discussion of this kind between our different cultures? We had here an example of discussion between Americans and Europeans and in America there had been developed a culture quite different from that of Europe. The speaker had in mind the setting up of a number of intercultural discussions; America–Europe; Europe–S.E. Asia; Europe–Islam, on a strictly intellectual and spiritual plane and not in any way political. All that would come later and the ground had to be prepared for what would follow. The participants should be chosen with the greatest care, as the most representative and most orthodox of each persuasion, mixed with those who had led their lives within the framework of these cultures, so that it should not be purely academic. Another essential point was that, in these discussions, Europe should be presented as a cultural whole, and not as the sum of a number of nations.

In Europe we had invented nationalism and we had infected the East with it. As often happened, maladies which are common in a certain part of the world find a sort of biological equilibrium. As an example, for us a cold in the head was not very dangerous, but cases had been recorded where a cold in the head, given to Polynesians, had brought about their death in a few hours because they had not the same means of resistance to that form of illness. That was what threatened to happen in the world today with nationalism which was counterbalanced, in Europe, by a number of other forces and which suddenly developed in other countries into which it had been injected because there was nothing to resist it. One of Europe's greatest responsibilities today was to find new formulae for getting over nationalism and in that the speaker agreed with the views of a participant who had suggested that some sort of federation might be the solution. We must find some form, whether it was of federation or of any other juridical term which one might give it, which would be a European-invented by-pass for European-created nationalism.

The speaker's American friends would excuse him if he suggested that Europe seemed to him to be better prepared than the U.S.A. to enter into this discussion between the East and West and that she was historically and even economically predestined to serve as an intermediary between the West, as a whole, and Asia; free Asia and not that part of it on the other side of the iron curtain. On the condition, again, that Europe presented herself as a whole and not as a number of nations and that she presented herself first as a culture, the speaker was convinced, after a very great number of conversations with Hindus, Indonesians, Malays, Burmese and Japanese, that this was the only method, cultural at first, capable of preparing the understanding which must in the end become political and economic.
III. THE UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES (CONTINUED)

B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The Conference considered papers prepared by a European and an American participant, both of which provoked an extremely stimulating and valuable exchange of views.

The European rapporteur on this subject examined the role of economy in winning the allegiance of the non-committed people to Western ideology. As far as the European situation is concerned, there had been assistance through Marshall Aid followed by off-shore procurement orders and through private European and American capital. The suggestion that the I.B.R.D. should, through a special European department, act as a prospector, guarantor and supervisor of public loans for basic economic development was examined. Attention was drawn to the paramount need to ensure that assistance should improve social conditions and not disrupt the social structure. There was a need for Trades Unions to take much more active measures to counter communist tactics aimed at disrupting industry. European economic integration would raise the general standard of living and it was suggested that its speeding up needed further study.

In the under-developed countries outside Europe assistance up to date has been through bilateral agreements, through the United Nations, by the I.B.R.D. and through schemes such as the Colombo Plan. Since there was need for assistance on a much larger scale the question of whether existing channels should be enlarged or new ones set up, required examination. It seemed inadvisable to create new agencies. It was suggested that countries which needed assistance should themselves make the plans. Here again psychological and sociological research was urgently needed if we were to avoid disrupting social structures in areas where standards of living had been very low.

Assistance given by the various public agencies could never cover the whole needs and pointed to the necessity of raising private capital on a large scale. Two propositions, applying both to Europe and the under-developed countries, were examined. Capital exporting countries might enter into multilateral agreements with capital importing countries to facilitate export and import of private capital investments, with the importing country's guarantee that facilities would be given for the import of capital, the transfer of dividends and eventual retraction of capital, together with the promise not to nationalise the industry concerned unilaterally. To cover the last-mentioned risk it had been suggested that the governments concerned should create an insurance fund to cover losses by unilateral action. The second proposition was one in which capital exporting countries might come to a multilateral agreement for forming international companies for specific, costly and large-scale development schemes which would pay dividends in the very distant future. In order to attract the necessary capital these companies would have to be created through special tax facilities, including, for the time being, tax facilities for the companies themselves which would have very special status.

According to the American rapporteur there were two dangerous misconceptions which must be disposed of; first that Western interest in the economic development of Asia and the Near East was dictated by the pressure of our own internal economic needs and, secondly, that there was reluctance in the West to assist the industrialisation of the under-developed countries and only a desire to extract raw materials and sell manufactured goods. On the contrary, there was now an awareness that balanced development, including the growth of manufacturing facilities in these areas, is entirely consistent with the enlightened economic self-interest of the West. The steady growth of these economies, investment and exchange of services and skills is recognised as being of mutual advantage.

The United States attitude was examined in the light of the fact that, although there is as yet no spontaneous public concern for the importance of the issue, Asia Aid was an important subject under consideration by the Administration and in opinion-making circles. Here it was realised that it is in the interests of the United States that the countries under consideration should be kept both militarily and economically strong; that more rapid development required capital from government appropriations as well as private investments and that amounts of money directed to this area should be significantly increased; that the United States should work wherever possible with the Colombo powers; and the hope had been expressed that the Asian countries would form an Asian Development Corporation and work out devices for facilitating trade and payments within the area.

Some basic questions must be answered before American public opinion could be persuaded that a new aid programme is politically essential. Is economic development really likely to result in a pro-Western pattern of society? Political, social, psychological and cultural factors are involved but the absence of an aid programme guided by the West left the totalitarian path
open. What is the proper role of private enterprise and should any new pro-
gramme, whether American or international, be on a regional basis? What
should be the pattern of any international approach? Would economic
development receive European support with proportionate contributions?
Then there was the question whether the West could avoid being accused
of intervention. In spite of suspicion bred of centuries of inferiority and im-
potence it is nevertheless clear that the greatest intervention of all is the kind
exercised by the Soviets. Success would be dependent in high degree not on
the logic but on the psychology of the approach and the highly individual
attitude of each country required careful consideration.
Whatever the unanswered questions, doubts or apprehensions, the newly
emergent and under-developed countries were all of them committed to de-
velopment at an accelerated pace, either by pressure from below or by national
desires and expectations, and they were not yet fully committed as to the manner
in which that development should be carried out. Asia is choosing its path
and will emerge more closely aligned with the West or with the U.S.S.R. and
China. Here was an opportunity which the West should weigh profoundly.
Some points from the discussion on these papers are summarised below.
Two especially important statements are presented in Appendices B and C.

1. The Moral and Obligatory Level of our Debt

There was general agreement that the problem was an urgent political one.
It was pointed out that untold sums would be needed to raise the standard of
living in the so-called under-developed countries to a new and acceptable
status, and the task would be endless. But it must be done.

A European speaker drew the conclusion from the discussions of the last
few days that the synthesis of nationalism and Marxism was the great mis-
fortune of our century. If such a combination of ideas came to dominate
the under-developed countries, then the outlook for democracy in the world
was indeed gloomy.

The view was expressed that the cold war might be won or lost before
substantial economic advance could be made, but the important point was
that the decision by the peoples of the uncommitted countries must not be
made in a condition of stagnant or declining economic activity.

As far as the Western countries were concerned, moreover, it was felt that,
although large-scale action might be an economic burden in the short run,
it might constitute an advantage in the long run, besides being a political
necessity. The general view of the Conference on this point was expressed
by a participant who urged that we should approach the leaders of these
under-developed countries with all the frankness to which they were entitled.

We should tell them that we were full of good-will, because that was true, and
we should give them to understand that we had a duty to fulfil, because that,
too, was true. Above all, they must be convinced that if they will work with
us they will succeed in working at the level of real association in which their
interests and ours meet. We should tell them that, with the resources which
were at our disposal, we could not work miracles and that by tomorrow their
situation could not be completely changed as by the stroke of a magic wand.
We must bring them to understand that, in this re-education of their peoples,
in this investment of new capital and in this great adventure which should
in a very short time bring their peoples to a point at which we had taken
decades and sometimes centuries to arrive, our part was to be their associates,
partners and friends.

2. The Pressure of Populations

The problem of over-population was raised. All the efforts put into economic
development recently in the areas under review had just about enabled
standards of production to keep pace with the expansion of population and
had it not been for the effort which had already been made the situation must
by now have been very serious indeed. The example of India and Pakistan
was cited, where there had been an increase of 150 million in a generation,
from 1920 to 1950. If China doubled her population towards the end of this
century, for instance, and there were 1,000 million Chinese and 700 million
Indians, not including Pakistan, it was questionable whether starvation or
at least extreme poverty could be prevented. In contrast there was a satisfac-
tory increase in standards taking place in the West, especially in America.

There was a real danger that the under-developed countries would blame
the West for their poverty and Russia would certainly exploit the contrast.
The prospects for democratic government in the under-developed countries
would depend to a great extent on some rise in the standard of living and on
some hope that that standard would go on rising. An American speaker
concluded that, in the light of this population pressure, it might be very optimis-
tic to put as even a long-term objective, a per capita improvement of more
than one per cent. per annum in that part of the world. The communists
could outpromise our performance in the field of economics, and perhaps
our objective should be to outperform their promises when they are called
upon to produce.

3. Forms in which aid should be given

A great deal of reference was made from many quarters to the form which
aid to the under-developed countries might take. There was agreement that
there were three sources of development of finance: private, semi-public and governmental. Private investment should be encouraged to the maximum extent. The need for guarantees was discussed in view of the possibility, almost the promise in some cases, of expropriation. It was considered that the question of guarantees against unilateral nationalisation needed working out in more detail. The same speaker drew attention to the unsatisfactory development of protective tariffs or import restrictions which took place on the establishment of a new industry. If it were found that the risks were too great to favour private capital investment, or that it proved to be offensive in the light of increasing nationalism, then it might be replaced by medium or long-dated credits given by firms executing deliveries. There were therefore advantages if private capital were associated with an organisation such as the International Bank. In any case the essential point was certainty of being able to get the dividends, if any, and if desired the capital back again, if we were to help the flow of private investment. It was agreed that organisations such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, when it was set up, would offer most suitable channels for quasi-government contributions. By using the I.F.C. as a means of investment we could much simplify and reduce the hazards of unfavourable reactions.

A United Kingdom speaker referred to the Colombo Plan as a good example of how Western capital-providing and Eastern developing countries could work together in harmony and with considerable success. The real secret of the Colombo Plan was that there was no blue print at all. The countries concerned pooled their development ideas, studying possibilities of mutual aid and enabling countries which were going to give aid to decide how best they could do so. The development and the character of the plans remained the responsibility of the national governments themselves and there was no suggestion that ideas were being imposed upon them. The Colombo Plan had the advantage of being flexible in an area where government and development possibilities varied so widely as they did in Asia. Another advantage was that the development capital, be it loan or forms of aid to development, flowed bilaterally from the country providing the money to the country receiving it. Whereas the Marshall Plan had been a great success in Europe, any attempt to divide up a common pool of development plans between India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Siam and Burma would be liable to cause enormous trouble for the Western countries concerned. Any idea of a common pool of money to be divided by either the recipients or the donors would be bound to lead to trouble.

In general the Conference agreed that there was no need for any new multilateral banking or credit institution to be set up other than the International Finance Corporation which all appeared to favour.

The importance of technical assistance was emphasised by many speakers and the psychological dangers involved in having a number of foreign technicians for a long time in a country was pointed out. There would be benefits if technicians came not from a country but from an international organisation. By using the international agencies such as the Bank, International Finance Corporation, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, all possible skills could be called in, not necessarily European or American.

Much emphasis was laid on the psychological element and the extreme need for a careful approach, especially to the ex-colonial peoples. The Western desire to invest in these countries would doubtless be suspect. There was a psychological question "What do the Asians and Africans feel about it?" which had not been answered and which needed further study.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It was proposed that action should be taken on the following subjects which arose out of the discussions at the Conference.

1. Participants in the Bilderberg and Barbizon Conferences would use, as much as possible, the various meetings and conferences which they attend in order to put forward ideas and suggestions made at Bilderberg and Barbizon. It was hoped that particular use would be made of the press by all concerned for this purpose.

2. An interchange of information among participants in the conferences would be organised with regard to books and publications published in the various countries, and relating to subjects discussed at the conferences.

3. The need to develop thorough education, with respect to our way of living, especially of teachers and clergy, as a means of checking the spread of communism in European countries and particularly in Italy and France, must be taken up.

4. It was hoped that the trades unions would be able to be more active in their fight against communist infiltration and propaganda. It was agreed that trades union associates and perhaps one or two other trades union leaders, should be invited by leading personalities to discuss this question.

5. Arrangements would be made to keep fully informed participants in any of the Bilderberg series of conferences with regard to proceedings of such meetings as they were unable to attend. This document also contains, in its appendices, reports of certain speeches which are considered to have a particularly important value as background to the discussions.

6. It was proposed that a vast signed petition should be organised in Europe to show that democracy too has its strong backing. The proposer was asked to prepare a memorandum on this subject with recommendations as to how this petition might be organised.

7. It was agreed that a United States participant would supply a paper on legal measures taken by the U.S.A. to deal with organisations working for the overthrow of the constitution by violent means.

8. An American participant was invited to put down his views concerning the peaceful development of atomic energy in its relation to the purpose of the Bilderberg-Barbizon Conferences for the benefit of members of the Group.

9. It was unanimously decided to stimulate the organisation of a meeting between Western and Eastern thinkers and spiritual leaders and proposals for the organisation of such a meeting were entrusted to one of the participants who would be helped later by appropriate colleagues. It was felt that the Bandung Conference might be a sort of Asian reply to Western "ganging up" and that it emphasised the need for the West to get on to terms of understanding with the East.

Proposals made by American participants concerning the encouragement of links between the West and the countries of Asia through emphasis on the many common religious and spiritual values, would be further developed in a paper by an American participant.

10. Conclusions regarding Economic Aid

There was general agreement that:

(a) An accelerated rate of development within a democratic framework of under-developed areas, in response to the rising expectations of their people, is completely consistent with the enlightened self-interest of the West.

(b) Balanced development, including the stimulation of industrialisation, is equally and generally beneficial to trade and investment and to an exchange of services and skills, in an equally advantageous manner.

(c) The under-developed countries must make their own plans for help and development and these plans should be checked by the helping countries which must offer all possible technical assistance in making them.

(d) We have available facilities both public and private for consultation and expert advice, where it may be wanted, on a full range of financial, economic and technical matters and we can give these in the right way.
11. The need was felt that we should know more about the feelings of the Asians regarding the correct approach to them in order that we should really make them our friends and partners.

12. The dates suggested for the next Conference were the 23rd to the 25th September 1955, and the Conference would take place in Germany. It was agreed that the agenda would be as outlined below:

(1) Review of developments in current issues since the Barbizon Conference.

(2) Some important aspects in the political field:
   (a) NATO
   (b) The Unification of Germany
   (c) The Unification of Europe
   (d) East-West relations.

(3) Some important economic aspects:
   (a) The Expansion of International Trade
   (b) Convertibility.

(4) Nuclear Development:
   (a) Political and strategic Aspects
   (b) Peaceful Purposes.

All reports for this Conference should be handed over to the organisers not later than the 1st July 1955. They would then be examined by the members of the Group and suggestions would be communicated back to the rapporteurs who could modify their papers accordingly and also as might be required by changes in the international situation. This should allow, in particular, the preparations for the Conference to be concluded at an earlier stage than heretofore.

APPENDICES

A. Extracts from a speech dealing with the difficulties of consultation between the U.S.A. and her allies, by a United States Participant.

B. Speech on the Economic Aspects of the Problem of the Uncommitted Peoples, by a United Kingdom Participant.


D. Speech by a French Participant: Some Reflections on the present French Political Situation.
EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH DEALING WITH
THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONSULTATION
BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND HER ALLIES

by a United States Participant

The problem of consultation entered the discussions on several occasions. The United States had had a very large obligation to consult and take into account the interests and attitudes of other governments in the formulation of its own policies. But behind the scenes it could be seen that there were complications from the American point of view. There was the constitutional system where public power was, by the Constitution, distributed between the executive and the legislative bodies and between the federal and the state governments. The process by which an idea became a policy was very complex and involved great toil on the part of those responsible for policy formulation. First there was the inter-departmental problem by which the President was given advice by the principal departments of the government. Under that process of inter-departmental negotiation the widespread interests of the United States in all parts of the world made the American policy-making process a sort of microcosm of international negotiation itself and involved all the complexity of the world scene. There was also the relation between the executive and the legislature. Legislative leaders expected to be consulted in major policy developments. Mr. John Foster Dulles had, in the first ten months of his tenure as Secretary of State, met 70 times with congressional committees or sub-committees. This illustrated the fact that 80% of the conduct of U.S. foreign relations was in domestic management rather than in dealing with foreigners. On crucial occasions touch must be maintained with key leadership in the formulation of public opinion. Before the process of policy formulation was completed at home Americans were not always clear as to what they should say in consultation. After the long laborious process had been completed the American position tended to become rigid, because an harassed official, when he went to see another government and asked for their judgement, might very well get suggestions which were entirely reasonable, entirely constructive, but which would force the repetition of the long and difficult process on the government.

Moreover, the way to consult was to consult and the initiative had to be carried, to a considerable extent, by the other governments. Matters before the U.S. government were often in the public press and few major items were kept secret until the final stages of negotiation. Perhaps foreign governments did not always take as much initiative as they could in order to put their views before the government of the United States at a time when they could be taken into account more easily. A skilful ambassador, for example, could follow the process as with a Geiger counter and determine the point at which to get into touch with it. There was also probably very little agreement among other governments as to how and when and in what order such consultations should take place. Some of the problems of consultation were really differences between the friends of the U.S.A. Some governments expected to be consulted first, others at least as quickly as the first government, others to be first about a particular area; others do not like that and some would not like all governments to be consulted simultaneously.

Then there is the complaint that the U.S.A. does not accept views which have been obtained through consultation. American foreign policy could hardly be run on the basis of the lowest common denominator of consultation and the U.S. cannot be bound by the vetoes of its friends.

There were occasions where governments appeared not to want to be consulted. On many questions where all the alternatives were disagreeable consultations involved responsibility and governments varied in terms of the extent of responsibility which they wished to have in the decision which was finally reached. Consultation was therefore a very complex problem involving a great deal of energy and toil.
APPENDIX B

SPEECH ON THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES

by a United Kingdom Participant

What surprises me always is that we have had as yet from the Russians no aggression in economic warfare. I never understand why. They have very large production of certain commodities and with their enormous domestic consumption a little tightening up at home could provide them with surpluses from time to time which they could use. But so far they do not seem to have made any attempt to disrupt the economy of the free world by the use of their own economic powers. They have made attempts to cause trouble; it has been more political trouble such as the sale of oil to countries where the distribution facilities are in Western hands, or as in the matter of the two tankers. They seem to be seeking political ends. But I wonder if we may not expect a change.

I have been particularly struck by the Russian offer of a big steel plant to India; that is in direct competition with some plans that we have been putting forward, and the Russians are offering the Indians this steel plant on financial terms which bear no relation at all to the normal commercial rates. It is subsidised competition of a significant kind, and if it should spread it would mean something which we should all of us have to take very seriously.

So far as expenditure on economic developments is concerned - and particularly, I think, we are referring to Asia, the Middle East and those countries - I do agree with those who say that mere expenditure on economic development does not necessarily convert people from communism. In fact, I think it is our experience - and I believe this is true of Italy as well - that very often the dynamics of communism come not from the people on the lowest level of income, but people who have got a little way up the ladder, just far enough to see how much further they have got to go. But what is true, I am sure, is that while we must fight communism with political and social weapons, we cannot conduct that fight efficiently in an atmosphere of stagnant or declining economic conditions.

So far as the great South East Asian area is concerned, I am sure the most important point is what has been said about population growth. So far as I can see, all the efforts put into economic development recently in that area have just about enabled standards of production to keep pace with the expansion of population. If there had not been this big development effort, things would, in fact, have gone down hill and that would have been very serious indeed. I would say frankly that when we talk of technical assistance, which is immensely important in that part of the world (possibly in some ways more important than the provision of money is the provision of manpower, because it is the shortage of manpower rather than the shortage of money that holds up development) there is no greater assistance than technical assistance in the methods of birth control. Unless something is done to limit population growth we cannot keep pace with the requirements of development.

Now the sources of development finance for these areas, I would suggest, are threefold: private sources, semi-public (like the World Bank) and government. I would like to say a word or two about each, if I may: I think they all have their part to play.

When we think of private sources of finance, we tend to be a little depressed, because the amount of direct private investment in these countries is really very small. For example, American private investment is a positive figure which is not very large; it goes almost entirely, I think, to oil production and to Canada and the Western hemisphere. But in addition to direct private investment there is a private commercial credit which, I think, plays a much bigger part than some of us realise in the development in these countries.

Secondly, there are the private savings which are channelled through the World Bank. My own belief is that we should be very optimistic if we expected any substantial increase in the rate of direct private investment flowing from the large capital producing countries, particularly America, to the under-developed areas, principally because the risk of capital loss in those areas is so great that the additional yield required by capital must be quite impossible in many instances.

The other fact, of course, is that within the North American continent there are such excellent investment prospects already that I can see no reason why American private capital should leave America. It has been said that America is the most under-developed country in the world.

If we are going to help with the flow of private capital for investment, I think the essential is certainty of capital investment, certainty of being able to get the capital back again. Here we come to the question of guarantees. I must say, speaking as an Englishman, I could not help feeling a little sad when I heard references to the guarantees provided to foreign capital in South American companies, because it has not always been my experience that the capital invested in some of those countries comes back again - rather the contrary.
I must say, in agreement with the suggestion about a mutual assurance club, I did hear a similar suggestion put forward at a World Bank meeting in Washington in 1953, when there was a symposium of bankers. It is rather like settling down with a man on your property and sharing the cost of insurance premiums against his acts of misappropriation. The man is paying a premium to ensure against us losing as a result of his act of theft, which is what it amounts to. I shall pay a premium as well against him stealing my property. I hope I do not sound frivolous. I think its objective is essential, but I have some doubts about the method.

What I do feel is a really fruitful course of additional guarantee of private capital is collaboration with the World Bank. Here I think the World Bank is being extremely wise, because I am sure private investors will feel that if the World Bank is in a particular project in, say, India the risk of appropriation is much less.

This leads me to the second course of development of capital, international institutions of which the World Bank, I think, is the outstanding example. That has surely been a tremendous success as an institution. I believe there are two reasons why it has been such a success: the first reason is Jean Black himself who is extraordinarily competent and is trusted everywhere; the second reason is that the World Bank has functioned as a bank, has only lent money for bankable projects and has only lent money where it is satisfied with the credit-worthiness of the people borrowing the money. I am sure it would be a mistake to depart from those principles in the World Bank.

The I.F.C., I believe, is designed to enable the World Bank money to flow to non-governmental, non-guaranteed investments. I do not get the impression myself that there is to be any investment in equities by the International Finance Corporation. I think there might be some questions in the British Parliament if there were, incidentally; but that is another matter.

Finally, government sources of finance: up till now the main source of finance for development from governments has surely been from the United States Government, and continues to be so. The other main source seems to me to be through the Colombo Plan, about which I would like to say just a word or two.

However, before I do that, could I comment on SUNFED, of which we have heard a certain amount? My own impression was that SUNFED was only designed as an institution, to come effectively into being when some measure of reduction of armaments expenditure is possible in the West. Certainly, I do not believe myself that we can expect any large contributions from the United States or the United Kingdom or other Western governments to any such fund and SUNFED until the happy day comes when we can save something from armaments from which to find the wherewithal.

I want to refer to the Colombo Plan because I think here we have a very good example of how Western capital-providing countries and Eastern developing countries can work together in very great harmony and with considerable success. The real secret of the Colombo Plan is that there is, in fact, no such Plan. There is no blueprint at all. What the Colombo Plan amounts to is that the various countries – South East Asia, Japan and other countries in that part of the world – getting together and pooling their own development ideas, studying possibilities of mutual aid and enabling the countries who are going to give their help to decide how best they can do so. That means that the development of the plans and the character and nature of the plans remains the responsibility of the national governments themselves and there is no suggestion that ideas are being imposed upon them by people outside, which I think is most important if our efforts are going to be successful.

Secondly, I think the other advantage about the Colombo Plan is that it is flexible, it does not try and impose a rigid pattern on an area of the world where the possibilities of government and the possibilities of development vary so enormously as they do in Asia.

Finally, I think another advantage of the Colombo Plan is that development capital, be it loan or grant or forms of aid to development, flows on a bilateral basis from the country providing the money to the country receiving the money.

Now, with the Marshall Plan in Europe, which was surely a tremendous success, it was possible for Europe to divide up by agreement the help coming from America. I cannot believe that any such thing would be possible in Asia; I do not think the government could do it. On the other hand, if it were left to the Western countries collectively to divide up a common pool of development plans between India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Siam and Burma and the rest of them, the possibility of trouble for the Western countries concerned would be enormous. So I feel that any idea of a common pool of money to be divided by the recipients or the donors is bound to lead to trouble. The more we can develop the flow of capital to that part of the world through some sort of Colombo Plan system, the more we shall get our real objective of encouraging development on the responsibility of the countries who are themselves developing; that I think is extremely important.

I must apologise for taking so long, but I hope I have covered most of the questions in the course of what I have said. I do think that the existing organisations are working extremely well; we must be careful and try not to start new organisations for the sake of having new organisations. What we really want to do is to continue to see that development plans are forthcoming from all available sources on the practical basis on which they are coming at the present moment.
APPENDIX C

SPEECH ON THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES

by a United States Participant holding an official position

The role of economics in the cold war is, to an economist, intriguing both for its possibilities and for its limitations. I speak at the seventh or eighth inning in this game and consequently much of what I had in mind has already been said. I can merely underscore it. Certainly I want to say that I subscribe to the citation of a former speaker, “Man does not live by bread alone”. We economists, of course, are in the bread business and we are very concerned about that part of life. But certainly those of us who, as have also been thrown into governmental responsibilities, realise the truth of that quotation.

Maynard Keynes wrote a provocative essay some years back in which he tried to define what economics is all about. He ended up by saying that after we had solved the unimportant things in life such as satisfying the physical and material needs of the human animal, then we should get on to the really important things such as art, religion, poetry.

This economic problem is one of meeting the unlimited needs of human beings with limited resources. I suppose the economic history of each society, as we have gone down through history, is the record of how it has organised its efforts in one way or another to try to provide the answer to the economic problem. You in your countries and we in our country, we drawing upon you, have developed certain approaches to that problem.

The Western world’s approach to meeting the economic problem is now under serious attack from the Communist world. We have been the object of a great deal of propaganda seeking to convey the impression that our economic system, and yours, too, of course, is destined to collapse, not in some era long in the future, but in this time-space sequence in which our generation is living.

The economic recession of 1948 and 1949 in my country, and the recession, or adjustment, or whatever people called it in late 1953 and 1954, were followed very hopefully by the economic analysts of Russia. However, I think we in my country and now you with your very heartening economic strength and recovery are demonstrating that our system of maximising economic freedom and releasing human beings to do what they can do, within the regulations and rules and the sustaining forces that the government provides, can undergo those minor fluctuations, which any free economic system inherently is going to experience, without ending up in a cumulative, debilitating, criminally stupid, black depression. I think this bit of history is important not only for what it shows our critics, but also for what it tells us. There has been a debilitating lack of faith among some of our own people in the ability of a free economy to grow in a stable way and to meet the needs and the justifiable expectations of our people.

Two economic systems are on display before the uncommitted peoples of the world. The directed system of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries has been able to exhibit certain impressive percentages from dismally low levels. That is agriculture. This area is the one in which Malenkov, as you know, publicly had to declaim his failure. Perhaps we can look upon that experience with a little sympathetic understanding, because we all struggle in our own countries with agricultural problems of one kind or another. This is a unique area and I would myself expect, despite the fact that Kruschev and company are ploughing up millions of acres out in the vastnesses of Russia, that they are probably still going to have difficulty with agricultural production. I wish them well in their trouble.

As far as our own country is concerned, we are seeking to demonstrate that our kind of economic system, to which all of us here are generally dedicated, can work. It is, to paraphrase one of my colleagues, an attempt to devise a fluid economy with a fair chance. It is an attempt to show that we can have an economic system in which my mere need not be your loss, thereby helping to cut the ground out from a great deal of the Communist propaganda that faces us.

In seeking to achieve this objective in our country, we are trying to introduce the maximum amount of freedom-to-change in our economic system. Growth comes through change and causes change. But one thing I think, more than anything else, threatens the growth of the economies of the free world. It is an insidious desire on the part of groups of people – and I think it really is insidious – to band themselves together to seek to employ the apparatus of government in order to freeze the status quo economically. The status quo is never our best. To seek to impose it on an economy through various governmental processes would therefore be to prevent change or to reduce the rate of change, and hence of growth, to a very, very small percentage. And our free economies must grow, and grow in a stable way, if we are to meet the fact of growth in the economies of the slave world.
Mr. Chairman, I have looked back a bit before looking forward to the problem immediately before us because it seems to me, as the prospect improves of hearing less gunfire and seeing less blood flow in our own generation, that doing well on this economic salient of the whole front against the communist menace becomes increasingly important and significant.

What about the general aspect of this problem of the under-developed countries, the under-developed areas? Definitional problems have been adverted to here in both a serious and light-hearted vein and I share both approaches. Definitions are not simple in these matters. Certainly in my own country, to which my friend from the United Kingdom adverted, we have a tremendous opportunity for development. One of the problems that interests me currently is, for example, that share of our agricultural population which we consider to be sub-marginal in terms of the income produced and earned. A special governmental enquiry is now exploring our country's responsibility towards this under-developed segment of our population.

Yes, we Americans have under-developed areas in our own country, but when I think of Europe, when I think of the revolution in consumption that lies ahead in Europe, it staggers me. When I listened here to remarks about the southern part of Italy, when I hear about the enquiry of the O.E.E.C. with respect to what it can do here in Europe to foster the development of income in the less developed areas, when I think back on what I heard at the Rio Conference in November about South America, when I hear about the Middle East, about Asia - then I come to the conclusion that the whole world is an under-developed territory, an under-developed area. It is the majority talking about the majority. And yet I think it is proper, it is right to discuss the economic development problems of other than our own areas.

Unless those of us who have the strength and have the will to think about problems other than those that preoccupy us at home, we shall not have discharged our duty and have followed our own enlightened self-interest. We have in our country an expression which was common in the early days of the development of the western states when our population moved across and possessed our vast continent. That expression ran something like this: The ranchers who have the guns have the responsibility to keep order on the frontier.

Now I think that sentiment has an economic variant. I think those of us who have the strength and the will to be preoccupied with something other than our own troubles have the responsibility to think and to seek to act, as we are doing here, about the economic development of other parts of the world.

In the United States, as we look at this problem, we see that there are various approaches to be worked on, some that one might call ordinary and others that one might call extraordinary. The solution to a particular problem requires not only the extra effort and study and dedication directed to that particular situation, but it also requires doing everything else we are doing and doing it very well.

First, it is in the interest of any under-developed country that my country pursue policies that will foster high production, high income and a steady expansion of the American economy. I think that the people of the United States and their political leaders are one in this resolve. We have some disagreements at home as to how we should do it, as every democratic country does. The Employment Act of 1946, which was adopted by an overwhelming bipartisan Congressional majority, is an expression of the will and determination of the American people never again to contribute to its own demoralization, and to black depression like that of 1929 and 1933 from which we did not really emerge until the war came along a decade later. We can make a great contribution to the future of the under-developed countries by a stable, expanding economy and we are determined to do all within our power to achieve that end.

Second, in the general field of foreign economic policy, we are now in the midst of a debate in our own country, led on one side by the President of the United States. I think it is historic. HR 1 (the trade agreements bill) will pass, but what is important is not that HR 1 will become law, but that a Republican President has proposed this action, and that it will be passed by a Democrat congress with majority support from both parties in our country. The importance of this fact should not be lost upon our friends over here.

In my country the party to which I happen to belong - it has of course divisions within it and I happen to belong to the division which shares the broadest international point of view - traditionally had regarded protectionism in the field of trade policy as nothing to be apologized for, but rather as an admirable faith to be preached and to be advocated. I think people who advocate that policy within my party are definitely on the defensive. It is my belief, however, that this subject is gradually being lifted out of the partisan area and is becoming now a matter to be decided, along with foreign affairs and defense policies, on a non-partisan basis. We will continue to have local differences and local intricacies about trade policy, but I think we are taking immense steps forward.

We are also determined to get action in this session of the Congress on those parts of the President's programme which relate to encouraging investment overseas through favorable tax treatment and to further progress in customs simplification. We are going to present to Congress in this session the organizational provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This last
will be a bloody battle, because it involves constitutional questions as well as aspects of the protectionist-free trade debate. But we are going ahead with it.

The President has liberalized Buy American policies. The President has directed that, in the disposition of agricultural surpluses, there should be a keen sensibility to the interests of our friends – their existing markets and their own supplies. In all of these areas it is our hope that in this year we shall continue to make added progress which will contribute to the solution of the problem before us.

As to the extraordinary side of this problem, we in our country have had a brief but exceedingly intense experience with special assistance programs. The experience includes the emergency postwar loans, the Greece-Turkey program, emergency aid in the Far East and the special situation in South American people also, I feel, regret that it was not possible, as part of that people, by and large, feel that that vast program was a good thing; but the American people also, I feel regret that it was not possible, as part of that effort, to do something more to seriously cripple, if not destroy, the Communist apparatus where it remained vigorous.

In connection with the Marshall Plan, of course, the problem was different from the one we face today. It was an attempt to help rebuild existing but damaged industrial economies. The problem we face ahead is one of building rather than rebuilding.

The experience of recent years has left us, I think, with a feeling that this effort which America made for certainly a variety of reasons was, on the whole, a good thing. Enlightened self-interest must be the basis for the efforts of any one of us, or these efforts are going to be built on sand. And that is not to derogate it to a low level of incentive or motivation.

With regard to the motivation for the kind of assistance that the United States might give to the problem that we are now considering, there are those, of course, who might suggest a purely humanitarian basis. I think as a people we respond to that, although it is certainly no basis for a national policy. “Fight Communism” – that appeals to the American people. As one of my colleagues said earlier, the American people have been responsive to these great demands upon their taxes in the last several years because of what they regarded as an imminent threat from the Communists to our own enlightened self-interest.

It seems to me, however, that any further American assistance in development programs can be motivated by a very simple and straightforward concept – that it is in our interest to have expanding economic relations with these under-developed areas. Expanding trade and investment themselves provide an adequate motivation.

Certainly it would be a desirable thing, hard as it will be to accomplish, if there could be a complete detachment of cold war considerations from these assistance programs. Then the kind of dispatch I read in the London Observer a few weeks back might not appear. That dispatch from Singapore was a comment on the report of the activities of our Foreign Operations Administration for the second half of 1954. In the course of that report the Director of Foreign Operations pointed out the share of the funds that had been spent in the United States. This, of course, he did with an eye to his audience, which was the Congress of the United States, whose members have in their districts manufacturers who sell goods that can be used abroad. But the impression conveyed by this part of his report, as indicated by the Observer article, was simply that the whole aid program was designed solely to provide markets for the manufacturers of American earth-moving equipment, and so on and so on and that it was not very closely related to the direct interests of the people whom the program was seeking to benefit. That is the sort of problem we face.

I might summarize the salients of this front we are discussing in five short words: political, economic, military, psychological and counter-subversive. These, it seems to me, are the five areas in which we could group the varieties of offenses that we need. And they are each important.

As to economics, the gentleman from the United Kingdom spoke about the population problem and how difficult it is to get a per capita increase in real income. I share that view and it might be very optimistic, as even a long-term objective over a matter of decades, to seek a per capita improvement of more than one per cent, per annum in the under-developed parts of the world. Certainly the Communists can out-promise our performance in this field of economics, but perhaps our objective should be to out-perform their promises when they are called upon to make good on them.

My friend from the United Kingdom spoke of the steel mill item in India. I looked into that recently and I came upon something exceedingly interesting. The Russians tried to pawn off on the Indians an old steel mill that they could not even pawn off on the Red Chinese. The Indians turned it down flat. Then the Russians located an old steel mill in Czechoslovakia; they were going to try to pawn that one off on them in fulfillment of the agreement, but the Indians would have nothing to do with it. My understanding is now that the Russians, faced with a rather sharp Indian insistence upon full compliance with the contract, are going to have to get a first-class steel mill built in Eastern Germany and it is going to cost them a lot of money. My informant, who recently came back from India, stated that nothing has done the Western world more good than this current experience that the Indians
As far as economics is concerned, I have a haunting suspicion that the cold war in that part of the world may be probably won or lost before a significant economic advance can be made. But I find an acceptable position on this point in what the United Kingdom representative said: this decision must not be made by any of these people in a condition of economic stagnation or declining activity. As in the field of trade policy, often one has to keep on the offensive in order to stay where one is. As we address ourselves to this economic aspect of the matter, we must realize its limitations. For example, in our hemisphere Communism is making some of its greatest gains in areas where there has been real improvement in standards of life. In the United Fruit Company camps in Guatemala, for example, where conditions have been very satisfactory, there were considerable Communist gains. In Brazil, in the cities of Rio, Sao Paulo and Santos the progress of the Communists has been very good compared to the interior cities, and the reason, of course, goes back to the control of labor unions and to the immature leadership of those unions.

However, economics has a vital part to play. It may not be a sufficient but it is a necessary condition. I think we can concentrate on this one part of the front in our discussions today without losing sight of the other.

With respect to the approach that many people in my country take, it has been outlined well in the memorandum that an American participant has set forth. Since I had absolutely nothing to do with that memorandum I should like to join in the expressions around the table by saying I think it sets forth this approach very well, and represents much official as well as unofficial thinking generally in these matters.

In America we are capable of great enthusiasms. We probably are tempted to think that we ought to remake every place in the image of Detroit. But here we would start, as some of you have already indicated, by trying to answer the question, what do these people want? Whether a full rice bowl and human dignity are enough for Asians is a question that men debate, but certainly they are essential. We want to find out what the people want. We want to make sure that there are adequate facilities for economic surveys (and I think that subject might be discussed here). We want to see if this program cannot be put on a specific project basis. We do not think the Marshall Plan overall approach will do here at all. We will want to evaluate very carefully the nature of the economic appeal to them. I think we ought to look very carefully, as a wise friend of mine said back in the United States a couple of weeks ago, at what is the nature of the appeal of a bath tub in every house to many people in that part of the world as against the appeal of cutting off the heads of the landlords and merchants. We can, I think, make a certain appeal, but it must be based on specific projects and on an evaluation of what the people themselves want.

We must also, I believe, try to find an answer to the question raised by a previous speaker. Perhaps many of these underdeveloped areas are pleased to have the fruits of Western industrial progress, but are they willing to take also the root that sometimes is bitter—by that I mean their willingness to undertake the obligations that go along with the contract and property concepts of Western civilization.

The report from India the other day of Nehru’s speech in the Indian Parliament in connection with confiscation poses the issue. He is reported to have said that if we are to provide full compensation under confiscation, then the “have-nots” will always be the ‘have-nots’ and the ‘haves’ will always be the “haves”. Other Ministers had to rush forward and say, “That is not what we mean.” But there you are. Are they willing to take, along with the branch and the fruit, the root to which our financial and economic system is attached?

In our general approach to the under-developed nation problem in the Far East, we believe that each country must be approached as a separate problem and within that context Japan, for us, has a very special importance. We believe that the responsibility for economic development falls, of course, primarily upon the individual country and its own government.

We believe that private enterprise and private agencies should be encouraged to the maximum extent. We believe that both domestic and external private capital should be given every opportunity. That does not mean that we are blind to what has been said about the necessity that the State provide a considerable part of the savings in these areas but we believe that if we are to have a system that is to be effective in these parts of the world, the greatest possible use must be made of these private facilities.

We are interested in as wide a group of interested nations joining in this project as possible. We believe that it should be unqualifiedly multilateral in interest and in commitment. Organizationally I think perhaps we would share the views stated in the American memorandum, and I believe underscored by a speaker from the United Kingdom, that the burden perhaps is on those who want some new organization, those who favor regional organization. We think perhaps there is a great deal of promise in the Colombo Plan approach, but we also think we have to be careful of what we load upon that structure lest in its turn it be diverted from the essential purpose it is now serving. Institutionally we have the I.B.D.R., and in our country the Export-Import Bank, which is being given an increasingly wide importance.
We are hopeful about the International Finance Corporation. Eugene Black, I think, is going to get that through his Board of Governors so that we can present it to this session of our Congress and I think we shall be able to get it through without any difficulty.

Also, I think that a very hopeful development organizationally is the staff college which the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is organizing this year. It seeks to bring government officials in from these areas and to be helpful in developing approaches to essential planning activities. This project illustrates the fact that an important part of our job is in the exchange-of-persons field.

With respect to the United States' approach to the size of the program, I was interested in what a Dutch participant said. I think our belief would be that you cannot put a price tag on this program, as in the case of the Marshall Plan. This should be an "open-end" proposition because it must be a program of long duration. This will not need a four, or a five, or even a ten-year program. It is a program that will extend as far into the future as most of us can see. In my own country, in the current Federal budget there is allocated the sum of almost 600 million dollars for various sorts of economic assistance in the Far Eastern area. This is being stepped up considerably in the projected program for authorizations to be made in the budget for 1954, an increase of more than 50 per cent. There will be an enlarged sum to be divided among various types of programs of development, defense support and budgetary assistance.

So far as the administration of such a program on our side is concerned, the United States government, I think – and I am now speaking personally – would be very much interested in determining the uses to which the dollars are put.

So far as developmental money is concerned, the general principle probably would be that it would be made available on a repayment basis from which principle departures would be made in special cases. Repayment could be made in local currencies where that was appropriate or useful, with full consultation as to the use of those currencies with the countries concerned. We would not be disposed to favor some new multilateral banking or credit institution. We would be disposed to support membership in the G.A.T.T. for some of these nations; and we would be disposed to consider on a case-by-case basis, the requests of these nations for protectionist measures in their foreign trade, in order to assist them in their development projects. That matter came up at the Rio Conference in a very sharp form.

The types of assistance that have been discussed in our country would be largely a continuation of those existing now – direct support and, in extreme cases, budgetary support, but mainly developmental support, principally on a reimbursable basis in some form.

Finally, there is the technical assistance program, which is very popular in our country and which gets good support from our Congress. We had a little trouble in Congress with the part of it carried on by the United Nations but I think that is going to be worked out. I believe this technical assistance program is going to have as much money available for it as can properly be spent.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for the length of these remarks. I do want to say that I think this Group has been called together by a high purpose and a pressing need; and I have sensed here, as I have sat and listened to this discussion, a willingness to be concerned with concerns other than our own and to go about the problem with intelligence and determination. Surely the seeds of interest and goodwill that are planted here cannot but germinate to the benefit of ourselves and of the people of the under-developed countries, and to the disadvantage, I would hope, of those who are trying to cause trouble in the world.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT FRENCH POLITICAL SITUATION

by a French Participant

Several of you have told me that you wish to take advantage of your stay in France to learn something, from one of the Frenchmen at this Conference, of how our political system works, or does not work.

I am well aware that at the present time the question is often asked: "But what does France really want? Where is France going? Of what value are France's engagements?" I confess that those among us who find themselves brought into regular contact, as in my case at the Council of Europe, with foreign friends on the subject of France, it is terribly painful. Explanations are often given which I do not consider are valid.

One often tries to say to our friends from abroad: "Nevertheless France has pursued a foreign policy; the same Ministers of Foreign Affairs always return to office." I do not believe that that can convince our foreign friends very seriously when they see M. Robert Schuman at the Ministry of Justice; they must have difficulty in explaining how he is perpetuating the foreign policy of previous French Governments.

We are, in fact, passing through a period of difficulty in France. We suffered much from the aftermath of the war. We have our own responsibilities, and they are big ones. Certain of our Allies have them also, and reading very recently what was done at Yalta does not make me alter my opinion; quite to the contrary. There was not much confidence in France and she was very recently what was done at Yalta does not make me alter my opinion; it is frightening that this country, which calls itself revolutionary, is conservative from the electoral point of view. Men vote almost always for the same parties, only there is the phenomenon, of which I spoke this morning, of the Communist Party of which the electors are socially progressives and of the Left, led by people who have gone over to the East. So unfortunately we have the following situation.

An important part of the French Right (the analysis which I am making engages only me personally and I am saying just what I think) has seen egoistically the profit which it can draw from this situation and it fashions its politics from this division of the left. Worse that that, it often obliges the authentic parties of the Left, the socialist party, the left wing of the M.R.P., and the radical party, to associate itself with governments which are concerned with preserving institutions, but which are not able to do anything in the social field because they need the support of part of the French Right. Thus this fraction of the authentic Left compromises itself in the eyes of a proportion of the workers, giving them the impression that when it is in power it does nothing more than would the Right. The result is that the Communists, certainly up to these last few years, have made progress within the bulk of the Left.

The Chamber is composed, approximately, in the following six main divisions:

(i) A total of a hundred communists of which the electors are of the Left and the elected of the East. Fundamentally against all European-Atlantic solutions, it is unnecessary to say, and not wanting social progress because the atmosphere of poverty provides them with suitable ground for picking up new recruits.

(ii) One hundred and five socialists, electors of the Left, elected from the Left; Social, Atlantic and European in outlook.

methods of election. They had decided that a union of five members should have the same powers as a union of 500,000 members.

It is probable that we were not energetic enough and that we deserve a great part of the blame. That, I accept, but I ask for a little justice in the judgement which is passed on us for that.

Where are we now? The present situation is as follows. We have a Chamber which does not correspond, in my opinion, with the actual situation in the country. That situation has not varied in France for some thirty years. There is a mass on the Left, in the sense of social progress, a mass on the Right which counterbalances it, and the large electoral movements disposing of some hundreds of thousands of votes. The displacement of votes from one election to another is never more than a few hundreds thousand. It is frightening that this country, which calls itself revolutionary, is conservative from the electoral point of view. Men vote almost always for the same parties, only there is the phenomenon, of which I spoke this morning, of the Communist Party of which the electors are socially progressives and of the Left, led by people who have gone over to the East. So unfortunately we have the following situation.

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(ii) One hundred and five socialists, electors of the Left, elected from the Left; Social, Atlantic and European in outlook.
(iii) About one hundred radicals, radical-socialists, R.G.R., republicans of the Left and U.D.S.R. (Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance). A general tendency to the Left; a large part of them Liberal and another part divided into two on international problems, half European and Atlantic and the other half fairly favourable to a rapprochement with the East; but I will return to that in speaking about the R.P.F. because they have the same attitude.

(iv) The fourth group of a hundred, because all the groups are about a hundred, are M.R.P., Overseas Independents, (these are allied to the M.R.P.). This is a confessional, Catholic party; in the social field a large number of these should be classified as Left, in fact nearly all of them. In the Atlantic and European field they take up the same position as the socialists; a small part of them, however, are on the Right. There is a Right Wing, but it is a confessional element and you will see how important that is in the internal life of France.

(v) A group of one hundred Independents and Farmers. On the whole this is a conservative party with a confessional tendency. The majority are European and clearly not progressive in the social field.

(vi) Finally a group of one hundred and twenty elected as R.P.F. and divided. It is much more difficult to define this group because it is absolutely heterogeneous. It comprises completely different people who have nothing in common but the name and prestige of General de Gaulle. A very great majority are pre-occupied with, or make use of, the confessional problem. In foreign policy they are very careful to follow General de Gaulle, whose average theme can be summed up thus: “France has a great part to play in the world if she remains alone.” Personally, I find this conception improbable, but it is certainly his, the conception of France as the bar of the balance between East and West susceptible of leaning on one side or the other and of remaking her greatness by being the one which influences either side.

We have then these six groups which give approximately the following position. Out of 640 votes about 320 have to be found in order to administer the country and they are always found. Only with the proviso that these 320 must be found after having eliminated the 100 communists, so that 320 votes have really to be found not out of 640 but out of 540. In the French Chamber we therefore do not have an absolute majority but a majority of the two-thirds, because the 100 communists always have to be subtracted and the majority found from the rest, except when it is a question of voting against a motion; then you have no difficulty because you will have the communists with you, but when it is a question of a positive proposition you will always have to get your 320 out of 540.

The majorities differ according to the problems. If it is an Atlantic problem then you will find five groups of a hundred, in fact all except the communists. If it is a European problem there are 400 members in the French Assembly absolutely decided on European matters. There I would correct the judgement passed by my British friend on the subject of the rejection of the European Defence Community at the National Assembly. It was never rejected; it never came up for discussion. A method was found by an artifice of procedure to make up a total of all the oppositions, adding certainly, the hundred communists and the 40 or 50 who are anti-federalists or who have become such even though they were once held up as champion federalists. I can think of some very definite names.

A large number of Frenchmen, parliamentary and others, although here I am speaking of parliamentarians, have suffered much from British opposition. Perhaps our British friends will appreciate one day what I believe to be a great political error in their attitude of recent years. I believe that, in failing to recognise the need for their place in Europe, they also bear a responsibility; we have ours and I take account of it always and try to establish the responsibility of others. There was to be found an immense bulk of French parliamentarians after that who cherished the hope that German re-armament could be avoided in whatever form it might take.

I ask you to consider how difficult it was for French parliamentarians, in 1955, ten years after the last world war, to have envisaged German re-armament. Those who think of the organisation of a united Europe, those who for years past have dreamed of it as the one rare means of solving problems which can no longer be solved on a national scale, have suffered terribly from the military approach to the problem of European integration. This was tragic for us. I can speak more freely because you all, without exception, know how much I have fought over this ground and with some merit because I was never a believer in German re-armament in the form presented by the Paris and Londen Pacts. It was tragic for us to see the European problem approached so badly; but be assured, my foreign friends, that the day when you put to us the European economic problem; transport, agriculture, atomic energy pool, or just pool of all energy, you will find 450 votes in the French Chamber. They are there and they are assured. You will only lack the communist votes and about 50 from the original R.P.F.

If you raise social, instead of European, problems, then the 500 will be much split up. There will in fact be the R.P.F., the Independents, half the Radicals and a small part of the M.R.P.; that makes 300 and a few votes, not very
favourable to social progress. The majority of the Left are divided because of the 100 communists who vote for the East.

We have, then, a scene which I realise must appear very unreal to everyone. One of the big questions for France, for which we doubtless have our responsibilities, is that in 1955, half way through the 20th century when the countries of the world are facing that problem about which we are meeting here, the problem of the survival of our civilisation, of humanism, of the rights of all the religions, of free thought, France is again split on the confessional problem. This is confusing; in 1955 we are taken back to the problems of 1904 and 1905 and France is divided again on the educational question. The partisans of liberty are dividing among themselves for the great benefit of the opponents of liberty; every time that one is on the point of getting a majority which is at once European, Atlantic, democratic and social you always find, whether among the communists, or, more serious, in the R.P.F. at the extreme right, someone who throws the confessional question at you. Further, there is a comfortable majority in the present Assembly, on the confessional question, of 350 votes which inevitably imposes its solutions and prevents the necessary grouping.

Here again I appear pessimistic to you, but that is because I prefer to see the difficulties in order to face up to them. There are solutions but in spite of all you read, I do not believe that the reform of the constitution is one of them. There must be such reform but that is not the problem. It does not even lie in electoral reforms; there must be electoral reforms but that again is not the problem. The only solution is to be found in the establishment of a programme acceptable and accepted in common by the partisans of democracy, each one making some concessions; a programme on which it will then be easy to make up a majority, an electoral law and a constitution permitting them to exist. But if you have a new constitution, a new electoral law which will not lead to a majority on a programme, it will do no good. One can work without a constitution, like our British friends, who make it work and have made progress since 1815. But it is no use having a good constitution if there is not a good majority to animate it, because it will not work.

I say it can be done and in this I am even optimistic. We must fight for it very hard. But whether we shall succeed, that is the question.