

## Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center

Washington, D.C. <u>wrtac@dc.gov</u> 202-233-1500 202-233-1472 (Fax)



# Officer Safety & Criminal Intelligence Issues

EFFECTIVE DATE 15 March 2008 VOLUME: 2 ISSUE: 5

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

## **OFFICER SAFETY AWARENESS**



**RESIN KNIFE:** Fiberglass Resin Knives, billed as "Israeli Covert Forces Knives" are freely available for purchase at Cheaper Than Dirt, an online vendor. These knives may allow for easy passage through metal detectors, enabling individuals to smuggle a hand weapon into a courtroom, airplane or other sensitive area. The double-sided, serrated blades are sharp and consist of a set of two knives, one 7" and one 8" total length.

Source: Poquoson Police Department / Virginia Fusion Center Terrorism Brief 3 March 2008

**INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS INCORPORATED IN ILLEGAL DRUG PACKAGING:** Since 2006, there have been five incidents reported whereby officers encountered a suspicious substance contained within suspected drug packaging. One incident in particular occurred April 2006, when officers from the Roswell Police Department (RPD) were investigating shipments of marijuana from Texas to Marietta, Georgia. RPD Detectives intercepted two boxes containing marijuana bales wrapped in multiple layers of Saran TM wrap. While wearing Tyvek and gloves, detectives pierced one layer of wrapping at a time. Upon piercing the fourth layer, detectives heard a hissing noise and observed a chemical, light brown in color, with the consistency of shaving gel bubble out. Detectives were exposed to the reaction for less than 15 seconds. Officer symptoms included instantaneous skin irritation, elevated blood pressure, muscle tremors/pains, neuromotor issues, pleurisy, throat irritation and headaches. The following substances were also found during the investigation of shipments by officers:





- Clear/light blue liquid (laundry detergent/fabric softener)
- Runny yellow substance consistent with mustard
- Thick red gel with dark organic specks (grease/coffee)

<sup>2</sup> UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

- Yellow substance under pressure (chemical reaction occurred)
- Marijuana parts (stems, seeds and dust)

In three of the five incidents, officers or on site personnel reported observing a chemical reaction after puncturing one or more packaging layers. In the other two incidents, packages were unwrapped. The chemical reaction may be result of officers inadvertently combining incongruous materials through the action of "cutting into" bricks of material. The chemical reaction may also be the result of the inherent chemical/physical properties of the incorporated materials. In two incidents, officers were exposed and displayed symptoms.

Source: FBI Atlanta Division, Officer Safety Alert, via email March 3, 2008 / / Virginia Fusion Center Terrorism Brief 3 March 2008



#### TANNERITE: COMMERCIALLY AVALIABLE EXPOLOSIVE

**AGENT:** The purpose of this bulletin is to provide information to public safety personnel on Tannerite as a potential explosive agent. At this time, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) has no information that Tannerite is being used in criminal acts. Tannerite is marketed as an exploding target for riflemen, and can be purchased inexpensively over the Internet in half-pound or one-pound targets. It is created by mixing together an oxidizer and a catalyst, which are shipped

separately. The oxidizer consists of ammonium nitrate and ammonium perchlorate and has the appearance of white pellets. The catalyst is a dark powder consisting of aluminum powder and zirconium hydride. The resulting mixture, a 9:1 ratio by weight of oxidizer to catalyst, resembles grey pellets. The ready accessibility and explosive power of Tannerite has made it popular among gun and explosives enthusiasts. On 13 January 2008, a man in Red Wing, Minnesota detonated 100 pounds of Tannerite in a dump truck, scattering shrapnel nearly a quarter of a mile. The nearby Prairie Island nuclear plant went on high alert as a result. Smaller Tannerite explosions involving vehicles, portable toilets, household appliances, and wildlife have been reported in other states and can be seen on the popular website YouTube.com. Initial testing of Tannerite by FBI Los Angeles Special Agent Bomb Technicians and the San Bernardino Sheriff Bomb Squad indicated that it is detonated by kinetic energy, typically from a medium-caliber rifle, but also potentially from a blasting cap. The manufacturer recommends shooting the target with a minimum of a .223 caliber rifle at a 100 yard safety distance. Military time fuse did not detonate the Tannerite. Initial testing also suggested that Tannerite can sympathetic detonate high explosives such as dynamite, but cannot serve as a booster for an ammonium nitrate and fuel oil mixture (ANFO).

#### 3 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



13.5 Pounds of Tannerite Detonating Inside of a Car

Source: Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center/LA-RTTAC Intelligence Bulletin March 6, 2008

**PROTOTYPE 9MM FOLDING SUBMACHINE GUN:** The MagPul Industry Corporation has developed a prototype 9mm parabellum mini/micro-submachine gun that utilizes a Glock 17 slide and any factory Glock 9mm magazine. When closed, the FMG9is designed to look like a flashlight. With the handle and light detached it resembles a portable radio. The FMB9 utilizes a spring-loaded slide lever to open and unfold with little effort. There is a small forward grip, stock, light and laser when opened all the way. The laser is activated with small tabs on each side of the top cover.








#### 4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

WRTAC Comment: The manufacturer of this weapon was contacted and advised that this is strictly a <u>"prototype"</u> and has not been put into production nor has there been a date to start such production. The manufacturer is conducting a survey as to the demand for such a weapon and the cost related to mass production. This weapon if produced would require a special BATF license.

To view a full demonstration of the FMG9, go to this link: <u>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D99NHb6B03s</u>

Source: Peel Regional Police Daily Intelligence Briefing Notes 04 MAR 08

### LIVE AMMUNITION IN PACKAGES OF COMPRESSED MARIJUANA: The Drug



Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently received a multi-part exhibit of plant material, consisting of one intact, tape wrapped plastic package and 10 core samples, all suspected marijuana. The package and samples were selected from 21 such packages seized from within a truck tire by Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel in California. Upon opening the intact package, a live 7.62 millimeter rifle round was discovered within the plant material. The package was subsequently X-rayed, and three other live rounds were discovered, including another 7.62 millimeter rifle round and two 7.65 handgun rounds. Analysis of the plant material by microscopy, Duquenois-Levine and TLC confirmed marijuana. X-ray screening of the other 20 packages revealed an additional 12 rounds in those exhibits. This is the first instance of ammunition discovered within marijuana at the Southwest Laboratory.

Source: DEA Microgram Bulletin, Office of Forensic Sciences, February 2008. / Virginia Fusion Center Terrorism Brief 13 March 2008

**MASKED HOODED SWEATSHIRT:** The picture is of a hooded sweatshirt. Brand name: "LRG". This sweatshirt was worn by a "PERP" arrested for GLA in the confines of the 50th Precinct, NYPD. The hooded part of the sweatshirt does contain a mask which does cover the entire face. Officers should be aware of this item.



Source: New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority Daily Intel Briefing, 11 March 2008

**SANDAL WITH HIDDEN COMPARTMENT:** Photos below are of a Sandal becoming increasingly popular in British Colombia. Produced and marketed by 'Reef', it is manufactured with this hidden compartment which is NOT an after market add-on, a perfect size for blades, drugs, or detonators. It is molded in such a way that even close inspection would not indicate a secret compartment. (Victoria International Airport / RCMP)



Source: Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) Daily Information Brief / Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center Daily Summary 12 March 2008-091

**TERROROIST RECOGNITION CARDS:** The Department of Defense, in coordination with other government agencies, has developed these Terrorist Recognition Cards in order to increase awareness and recognition among U.S. Forces of high-threat terrorists at large. The cards have images of terrorists and related biographic information. Included are terrorists from five different geographic regions:



For additional information refer to: http://www.dia.mil/site6\_images/cards/index.htm

Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency

**BOOBY TRAPS:** On 2-25-08 Cal-MMET detectives were called to a boxed lab in a dumpster in the area of Kitty Lane/Auburn Blvd. Further investigation led us to a residence where we found two other lab dump sites and a rigged booby trap, a little surprise we all hear about but rarely actually find. This was an eye-opener for all of us. The trap was constructed of archery arrows, nails, and 2X6 boards fastened to a standard fence gate latch. Pulling on a string or rigging the string to be tripped would activate the gate latch to release and swing down the spiked trap on an unsuspecting person at the door entrance. The photo to the right (below) is from the outside looking in the back door. This board with arrow tips/shanks was hinged (towards the door) with a standard gate latch (middle foreground). Note the string

running to the door. There is also a rusty bolt through the gate latch. If this had not been in place one of us would have been injured.




The photo to the left is from the inside looking out. The booby



trap was designed to work by either manually pulling the string from inside the house or by opening the door which would in turn, release the latch.

Source: Sacramento County Sherriff's Department Narcotics Investigation Division / Louisiana State Police Homeland defense Bulletin 7 March 2008

**BOOBY TRAPS:** District One Deputies discovered the above large size boards with numerous 4-inch nails protruding upward. This tactic is used to **target deputies and K-9's chasing fleeing subjects** running behind and between trailers. Some of the boards were partially concealed by dirt making them difficult to see, especially during low-light conditions.



Source: Palm Beach County, FL, Sheriff Office - Strategic Intelligence Unit


#### UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

**SUSPICIOUS VEST:** Screening officers at the Montréal Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport first observed on X-ray an item which they believed to be CO2 cartridges. Upon further examination of this luggage, they found a bullet proof vest which contained a series of metal containers placed inside pouches as shown. The passenger was interviewed and he stated that he used the vest in martial arts practices in order to reduce the impact of hits received. Although this observation was considered to be odd, the passenger once properly identified was permitted to board his flight, destination (CATSA SOC – March 12, 2008).



Source: Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Daily Information Brief

"PLASTIC KNUCKLES": A company called Knockout Knucks is marketing a new product called Lexan Knuckles. These \$35.00 knuckles are mode of the finest quality bulletproof glass and will not break under the most extreme conditions according to the company website. They are marketed as being as strong as brass and are lightweight. A video on Blutube shows that these knuckles will not be detected by a metal detector and according to the video they are not on the TSA banned item list.



Refer to the following link for the video: <u>http://blutube.policeone.com/Clip.aspx?key=23EAF938C51D7071</u>

Source: New York State Intelligence Center - Officer Safety Bulletin #08-09, 14 March 2008

#### 8 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

## **CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE**

NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SCAM INDUCES US PERSON TO NEGOTAITE HIGH QUALITY COUNTERFEIT \$100 BILLS: An officer of enforcement law agency another provided information about a Nigerian wire fraud scam and \$3,200 in extremely-high-quality samples of



counterfeit \$100 bills provided to an unidentified US person in Oklahoma. Claiming to reside in the United Kingdom, an unknown person, with whom the US person had communicated through instant messaging, chat rooms, and matchmaking sites on the Internet, contacted the US person by e-mail seeking assistance in sending money to Nigeria. The unknown person sent the US person the bills with instructions to keep \$500 and wire the balance via MoneyGram to an address in Nigeria. The counterfeit bills were printed on paper closely resembling that of newly-minted currency. The bills passed a standard counterfeit pen test, and each appeared to incorporate many of the security features found on real currency: a clearly visible watermark on the reverse side of the bill, multi-colored ink in the location where "100" appears in the lower right front, and a security strip reading "USA 100." The multi-colored ink, however, eventually smeared when rubbed several times by hand; the watermarks, being printed, were visible continuously, not only when held up to light; and the security strips, which were printed rather than embedded, did not fluoresce when held under a black light.

FBI Analyst Comment: The falsified security features would suffice to mislead an untrained individual; before learning the bills were counterfeit, the victim successfully passed some at local establishments. They were detected only when a Wal-Mart employee became suspicious of them and contacted local police after the US person presented them to purchase a Wal-Mart MoneyGram. Most cases involving West African scams involve counterfeit monetary instruments, such as money orders and checks. The FBI's Organized Crime Intelligence Unit is aware of no earlier such incident involving counterfeit currency.

Source: FBI Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for January 28, 2008 via FBI IIR 4 214 1964 08 (UNCLASSIFIED) and FBIHO - Criminal Intelligence Section

9 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

**CRIMINALS CUTTING OFF FINGERTIPS TO HIDE ID'S:** A growing number of criminals are cutting off their fingertips to conceal their identity, officials in

Lawrence Massachusetts said. Lawrence law officials said they recently had a case where a man tried unsuccessfully to hide his identity by removing his fingerprints. "His story was that somebody cut him with a knife and he was putting his hands up in defense and the individual happened to be precise enough to cut the



tip of every finger where the fingerprints are," Lawrence Police Chief John Romero said. "It is going to make it more difficult for law enforcement, but clearly that is a red flag when someone comes in and their fingerprints had been altered," Romero said.

**Source**: <u>http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/15478914/detail.html#</u> / South Carolina Information Exchange Bulletin # 043-08



**SODA BOTTLE HIDDEN COMPARTMENT: A** Pepsi Bottle was used to conceal Ecstasy. Over the last few years, there been more and more of these items confiscated. They come in a variety of objects and are easily available for purchase on the Internet. This one was shared by Law Enforcement in California. Law Enforcement and Security

Professionals should be mindful of items like these, since weapons can easily be concealed, placing officers at risk.

Source: Homeland Security Report No.183


**NARCO-TRAINING CENTER SEIZED IN TIJUANA:** Based on information obtained from ongoing intelligence operations Federal Police officers raided a house nominally belonging to an individual named Manuel Hernández H. located at Reforma #716 in the Colonia Independencia neighborhood of Tijuana which is located just a short distance from the international border with the United States. Authorities believe it was actually a training center utilized by the Arellano Félix Organization (AFO). The facility appeared to have been abandoned three days earlier and consequently no arrests were made. However, numerous

weapons, related equipment, ammunition and vehicles were seized:

- Twenty-four long arms, including three military machine guns
- Nineteen disassembled long arms
- 30,000 rounds of assorted ammunition •
- Approximately 200 weapons magazines (assorted calibers)
- Two totally armored 3.5 ton Chevrolet trucks
- Two Nissan stake trucks with hidden compartments
- One Chevrolet Cavalier

More importantly, the officers discovered a weapons repair facility in the patio area and a hidden underground indoor firing range with four firing positions in the basement of the building. A moveable hand basin in a small bathroom disguised the entrance to the range. When the basin was moved entry was gained by descending a ladder into a room measuring approximately 5 x 10 meters. A ventilation system had been installed to evacuate the gases generated by the firing of weapons. The noises generated by range activities were muffled by two layers of foam rubber and cardboard. Tires were positioned behind the targets to capture stray rounds. Authorities believed that it had been used to train AFO hit men for as many as three years.

Comment: As can be seen in the accompanying photos this was a sophisticated operation, the type of which has not been seen previously. Law enforcement personnel need to remember that their potential adversaries may have been trained in such a facility.



11 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



#### JIHAD WEBSITE SUPPLIES: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANTHRAX PRODUCTION: Much has been said about al-Qaeda's quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means of striking at the heart of their number one enemy, the United States. The latest example of these ongoing efforts to acquire WMD capabilities is a recent posting in a jihadi internet forum entitled: "Good News – Anthrax Production Technique" (al-ekhlaas.net, March 3). A forum



participant, nicknamed al-Faz, posted a detailed description of anthrax production techniques dedicated to jihadis everywhere: "Long awaited good news for you, God's soldiers. It's time to use biological weapons against God's enemies." Al-Faz commences his posting with an

#### 12 unclassified//for official use only//law enforcement sensitive

introduction to anthrax and the pathology of the disease, including symptoms, parts of human body infected when exposed to anthrax and fatality percentages. Al-Faz notes that anthrax bacteria can be found in Africa, Asia and in some parts of Europe where the soil contains 10 anthrax bacteria per gram. According to the jihadi forum, the following factors make anthrax the weapon of choice:

• Anthrax is powerful, lethal, cheap and easy to prepare.

• 50 grams of anthrax, when dispersed in a 2- kilometer line, forms a deadly cloud that can cover 20 kilometers.

- One kilogram of anthrax can be produced in a small laboratory in 96 hours.
- Anthrax bacteria spores are available worldwide and can be easily extracted.

• Production costs are low; one kilogram of anthrax bacteria costs about \$50 even though a lethal

dose can be as little as one millionth of a gram.

- Colorless and odorless anthrax is easily concealed.
- Anthrax is a stable and dry substance that can be easily transported and used.

Before proceeding to anthrax production, al-Faz includes in his posting a picture of one of the anthrax-contaminated letters used in the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks that killed five and infected 17 others. Undoubtedly included in an effort to encourage jihadis to try anthrax as a weapon, the letter reads: "You cannot stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now. Are you afraid? Death to America. Death to Israel. Allah is great." The photo of the letter in no way establishes a jihadi connection to the still unsolved anthrax attacks--it is one of several released by the FBI and is easily available on the internet. Nevertheless, anthrax continues to be a feared weapon-only last week an Albany, Oregon courthouse was closed and the National Guard called in to deal with threats of anthrax contamination, which later proved to be a hoax (Albany Democrat Herald, March 4). The second part of al-Faz's posting elaborates on two methods of anthrax production. Photos are included of the microscopic phases of the process, including the extraction of anthrax bacteria from a sample of dirt that contains the infected remains of dead goats or other grazing animals' remnants. A sample of a dead animal's blood or tissue can also be used by cultivating it in a blood agar substance containing 0.7% sodium bicarbonate. The attached pictures illustrate bacilli bacteria, spirochetes and bacteria clusters. The posting further includes precautionary instructions for the different phases of production. "Agar is a nutrient environment for cultivation that can be bought without drawing any suspicions from research centers for 70 Riyals or \$20 per one kilogram," says al-Faz. The second method of producing anthrax involves cultivating the anthrax in horse blood and bentonite clay for five hours. Bentonite clay, an absorbent form of clay with multiple industrial uses, can be found in Iraq and two other countries in the region. In conclusion, al-Faz says, "I wanted to contribute in the preparations against enemies of

#### 13 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

God. Consider me the servant of the mujahideen. I closely follow your news. May God reward you for your sacrifices. It would make me very happy to see you use biological weapons against God's enemies. Wait for my next detailed posting on how to build a Cessna 128 aircraft," which is an easily maintained agricultural aircraft designed to carry and spread a chemical load of 200 to 280 gallons. Although there is no tangible evidence to confirm that jihadis have produced or procured mass quantities of biological weapons, the use of anthrax spores in bioterrorism has been discussed by jihadis for some time now. In theory, at least, cultivating anthrax spores can be achieved with minimum know-how and equipment, suggesting it is only a matter of time until jihadis succeed in producing some kind of biological weapon. There are,however, many dangers involved in the process and the development of a weaponized aerosol version of the bacterium requires scientific skills and equipment unavailable to most jihadis.

Source: MTA-NY Police Department, Daily Intelligence briefing 03-12-08

### **TERRORIST DOCUMENT INDICATORS**

- Physically altered passports
- Passports with serial numbers that are watch-listed as lost or stolen
- Handwritten documents that are easily forged or altered
- Multiple passports used by the same person with variations in the spelling/structure of the name and of date of birth
- Ambiguous or contradictory information submitted to consular or border control officials
- Absence of supporting documents to corroborate passport information
- Passports with glued-in photographs
- Large gaps in travel history as reflected in stamps and visas



Ahmed Ressam, sentenced to 22 years in prison in 2005 for planning to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on 31 December 1999, acquired this ostensibly genuine Canadian passport by using a fraudulent baptismal certificate; note his use of a Western-sounding name

Source: MTA-NY Police Department, Daily Intelligence briefing 03-12-08

#### 14 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

### GANG TRENDS – GRAFFITI CHANGING LOOK OF

**LOUDON, VA:** As recent as a decade ago, the County of Loudon was almost free of graffiti. This cannot be said today as the jurisdiction has seen a rash of graffiti vandalism. Locations such as tot lots, school doors, community clubhouses, and bridges and overpasses have



been targets for this type of vandalism. According to officials, this increase in graffiti has coincided with the population increase, which in turn has increased the amount of gang activity. The report indicates Loudon had 16 cases of graffiti in 2003, 104 incidents in 2006 and 84 in 2007, the majority of which were gang related.

VFC Analyst Note: While some graffiti is only tagging by street "artists", gang graffiti is typically used by groups to identify the territory they consider to be their own. This territory is violently defended and used by the members as their base of operations for illegal activity. An example of Latin Kings graffiti is displayed in this article and was found in Petersburg.

Source: Virginia Fusion Center Monthly Gang Brief, March 2008



**CANDY FLAVORED COCAINE:** Candy-flavored cocaine, worth more than a quarter-million dollars on the street was seized and three people were arrested in California. "Attempting to lure new, younger customers to a dangerous drug by adding candy 'flavors' is an unconscionable marketing technique" stated DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge Gordon Taylor. Court documents describe the "strawberry" flavored cocaine as

pink in color, the "cinnamon" flavor and off-white/tan color, while the "coconut" flavored cocaine appeared to be a fine white powdery substance with a coconut-like odor.

**SCIEx Comment:** SCIEx bulletin # 090-07 reported on designer methamphetamine called Strawberry Quik. Previous questions by some regarding the existence of flavored cocaine have now been answered. Community policing efforts involving school resource officers factor heavily into combating the continued extension of the illegal drug market to children.

Source: March 10, 2008 DEA News Release (http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/sanfran031008.html) and http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top\_News/2008/03/10/ dea\_seizes\_candy-flavored\_cocaine/7785/ / South Carolina Information Exchange Bulletin 048-08

US PERSON ESTABLISHES WHITE SUPREMACIST TRAINING FACILIITIES IN RUSSIA: In December 2007, an individual who traveled frequently to Moscow and was involved in the "White Power Movement," worked with individuals in Russia to establish boot camps. The purpose of the camps was to train young skinheads in combat tactics. Additionally, the individual organized demonstrations and protests and raised funds for skinheads throughout Russia. The individual also indicated Russian skinheads had considered bombing mosques as a means to encourage Muslims to leave Russia.



Comment: According to open source reporting, in November 2007, the individual addressed thousands of Russian nationalists, who responded by chanting the phrase "White Power," at a Moscow rally in celebration of National Unity Day.

Source: FBI IIR 4 201 3220 08; Virginia State Police Virginia Fusion Center Terrorism Intelligence Briefing 05 MAR 08


**COUNTERFEIT MEXICAN BIRTH CERTIFICATE:** The counterfeit blank birth certificate, purportedly from Oaxaca, Mexico, depicted here was part of a large seizure of documents and related printing equipment submitted to the FDL by an Indiana police department. In February 2003, the Mexican government began issuing birth certificates on a standardized form, commencing in the State of Oaxaca. Prior to this date, there were approximately 196 different types of forms used by civil registries throughout Mexico. The standardized form is printed on security paper and contains numerous security features both within the personalization and in the paper itself. Although this counterfeit blank certificate was of relatively poor quality, it may have easily passed a cursory examination by someone not familiar with the security features of the genuine. Several of the security features found on genuine forms may be used as points of detection:

- Genuine forms contain watermarks of intertwined cords. The counterfeit blank certificate lacked a watermark.
- Ultraviolet light reveals security fibers in the genuine forms that are not visible to the unaided eye, as well as printed designs of the Mexican national Coat of Arms, the corresponding state's Coat of Arms (in this case Oaxaca's) and the outline of the Mexican Republic. The counterfeit blank certificate contained no ultraviolet security features at all.

<sup>16</sup> UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

• In genuine forms the intricate border design is printed in intaglio print and depicts a feathered serpent. The counterfeit lacked the intaglio printing. Genuine forms also contain a latent image (not shown) and microline printing in several areas including vertically along the inside left margin which reads "REGISTROCIVILDELESTADOLIBREYSOBERANODEOAXACA". The forger was unable to replicate the clarity of the microline printing. The FDL has extensive information on these standardized forms. For more information please contact the Operations Section at the FDL.

	# >>>='9='9='9='9='9='9='9='9='9='9='9=	32
19	ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS	
리	EN NOMBRE DEL ESTADO LIBRE Y SOBERANO DE OAXACA	P. V
24	DEL REGISTIO CIVIL	
111	CENTIFICO Y HACO SAEER QUE A LA FOJA NUMERIC LIBRO NÚMERIO I DE NACIMUENTOS DOL REGISTRO CHIL	6
141	A MI CARGO SE ENCUENTRAN ASENTADOS LOS DATOS SUCUENTES	
1		
Q	DPCMUM No. 28 ACTA	
	NEOKAS REGENO	
3	LUGARDE REGISTRO	0
m	REGISTRADO	
-44	MARE	
14	HOWSE MICHENTO HOSE	TTT I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
	SUGANDE NACMENTO	
0	MESERADO BIXO DOMINARDO.	P
	PADRES	
6	NONE	0
H	NACONUCAD EDADARCS	
	KONFE TITLE TO THE TOTAL TO THE T	
6	NICONLOID EDID ACE	
	PERSONA DISTINTA DE LOS PADRES OLE PRESENTA AL RECISTINADO	
0	NONBRE MARENTERO FDAD AÑOS	0
M	ELORIGANE DE LA PRESENTE CERTIFICADON TIENE A MARGENLIAS DIGUENTES AVOTACIONES	
		6
1		
e		0
1		<b>a</b>
M		
-	been und an experience over the long tange archael	
12	200 B	
0		D.
	E DEL REGETED DAN, DON'TE DEL REGETED DAN, DON'TE	
	ARCHIVO CENTRAL	6
<b>H</b>	Martin Barriston	iir -
	Carlo exercise	
e,		111
	In expension water to be a second as a family of the second	<b>N</b>
0		6
Bil	i company on the	5
Ee		20
1.2		6997 T



**RATEMYCOP WEBSITE:** Recent emails have been circulating regarding a new website that allows individuals to post information on interactions with law enforcement officers. It is also a popular topic with bloggers. Contributors to the website can rate an officer's performance as poor, average, or good, as well as post comments related to their interaction with the officer. The website, <u>www.ratemycop.com</u>, which came online about a week ago, is reported to list 120,000 individual police officers from 450 departments across the United States. Officers' names were obtained by Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) requests. FOIA requests did not ask for personal identifiers or names of undercover officers. Only

names and "badge" numbers of officer working with the general public were request. Rebecca Costello, the website creator, said the site was created to build a form where the public and law enforcement can work together. Costello said, "If we see that anybody's threatening or putting up anything that shouldn't be put up, we're going to kick those comments out." Personnel are reminded to exercise caution when visiting websites. Many websites monitor IP addresses that access the site. Website operators can easily determine if computers with government IP addresses access the website.

**DRUG CONCEALMENT:** On February 19, 2008, members of NYDETF Group T-31 arrested a h/m subject following an undercover investigation. A search of the subject's residence and the subject's 1999 Toyota Camry resulted in the discovery of two unusual traps used for the concealment of drugs and money. The electronic and hydraulic trap located beneath the center console/parking break in the car contained 2 kilos of cocaine. A second trap was found inside a wood side table in the residence. This trap had magnetic locks and was released by rubbing a magnet over the surface of the table. The trap contained 1.5 kilos of cocaine, 14 grams of crack and U.S. currency.



Source: NYC Drug enforcement Task Force Group T-31

#### 18 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

## **ITEMS OF INTEREST**

#### MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM THREAT ASSESSMENT



At this time, there is no credible intelligence regarding specific plans by any extremist groups or individuals to perpetrate an act of terrorism against the U.S. mass transit system. Extremists, however, remain intent on targeting the U.S. homeland. The volume of previous attacks and recent plotting against mass transit systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist interest in targeting this sector.

Previous rail attacks in Madrid (March 2004), London (July 2005), and Mumbai (July 2006) could inspire terrorists to conduct similar attacks in the United States.

#### **Key Findings**

- The U.S. mass transit and passenger rail systems are vulnerable to terrorist attacks because they are accessible to large numbers of the public and are notoriously difficult to secure.
- Al-Qa'ida and affiliated extremists pose the greatest threat to the U.S. mass transit and passenger rail system. The threat to heavy and commuter rail in the Homeland is greater than the threat to buses and light rail. Attacks on buses overseas tend to be small-scale and are carried out mainly by smaller separatist groups within their own countries.
- Multiple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) are the most common means of attacking mass transit targets. Although homemade explosives are more likely to be used, chemical and biological attacks are also possible agents for terrorism.
- Based on assessments of previous al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida-inspired attacks, future attack plotting against mass transit would likely involve small groups of operatives exploding multiple IEDs on rail during rush hour in a major U.S. city.

• While there have been a number of reported suspicious incidents connected to mass transit, there is no evidence to date linking them to terrorism. Suspicious activity, however, can help law enforcement and security officials identify unusual behavior, trends, patterns, and possible criminal acts.

#### **Threat Overview**

Previous attacks and current reporting indicate that al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups remain the greatest threat to the U.S. mass transit system. Mass transit operates on an advertised schedule and has less physical security than aviation or other hard-target infrastructure, making it easier for terrorists to both plan and carry out attacks. TSA-OI assesses that the threat to heavy and commuter rail in the Homeland is higher than the threat to buses and light rail. Attacks on buses overseas tend to be small-scale and are carried out mainly by smaller separatist groups within their own countries.

**Multiple, simultaneous attacks against rail could cause significant economic disruption and psychological impact.** Al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups have attacked heavy and passenger rail systems overseas with a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). These devices are especially effective against subway and passenger rail targets because stations and trains are highly accessible and concentrate large numbers of people in confined spaces. The closed nature of trains, stations, and subway tunnels enhances the blast effect of explosives.

Following the March 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, extremists expressed a strong interest in attacking passenger trains in the United States. Terrorists were specifically interested in striking an above-ground passenger train traveling between two major cities, and considered New York City and Washington, D.C. as possible targets.

#### **Most Likely Actors**

#### • Transnational Organizations

The Intelligence Community (IC) assesses that the United States will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. Al-Qa'ida, its affiliated groups, and its sympathizers pose the greatest threat to the U.S. mass transit system. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, al-Qa'ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland. Although the group sustained losses from 2001-2004, it regained strength and has recouped much of its core operational capabilities in Pakistan. It is likely to continue to focus on prominent infrastructure targets, including transportation.

20 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

Lebanese Hizballah, which has supporters inside the United States, is less likely to attack U.S. domestic interests unless it perceives the United States has become a direct threat to its leadership, its armed capabilities, or to Iran.

#### • Industry Insiders

The insider poses a significant threat to transportation security. Intelligence indicates the desire of terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida to use individuals with insider knowledge of transportation sectors to help facilitate an attack against the United States.

Asmin Amin Tariq, a security guard at Heathrow International Airport (LHR), was one of 24 people arrested in connection with the plan to blow up aircraft in the 2006 UK-U.S. transatlantic plot. Tariq helped Islamic extremists pose as airport employees so they could conduct surveillance of security procedures at Heathrow. Tariq allegedly provided information about airport security procedures to the would-be bombers.

**Turkish citizen Adem Yilmaz**, reportedly a member of the **Islamic Jihad Union** cell targeting Germany, was arrested in September 2007. **Yilmaz was employed in the security division of rail operator Deutsche Bahn from 1997 until 2002.** During that time he worked in the railway station of Frankfurt airport. The airport was one of several targets his cell that allegedly considered.

#### • Domestic Extremism

Although TSA-OI assesses that international terrorist groups pose the greatest threat to U.S. mass transit, it is possible that domestic terrorists could also carry out an attack against this sector. Domestic groups and individuals include, but are not limited to, right-wing militia, animal and environmental activists, disgruntled employees, and lone individuals. There have been numerous examples of domestic terrorism by lone individuals (lone wolves), such as the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing.

#### **Significant Transnational Mass Transit Attacks**

Although extremists have yet to mount an attack against U.S. mass transit, a series of significant attacks overseas highlights continuing terrorist interest in attacking these systems. The examples below summarize major terrorist plots:

• Spain, January 2008: Spanish authorities arrested 14 suspected terrorists in Barcelona who were allegedly connected to a plot to conduct terrorist attacks in Spain, Portugal, Germany, and the United Kingdom. According to open source reporting, the target of

the attacks was the Barcelona metro. Two pairs of suicide bombers were allegedly to attack in separate metro stations. The bombs were supposed to be hidden in backpacks or bags that other cell members would detonate by remote control.

- India, February 2007: Kashmiri extremists placed six suitcase IIDs in three cars of the "Friendship Express" passenger train traveling to Pakistan from India. Four of the six IIDs ignited and caused fires in two passenger cars, killing 68 and injuring 13.
- India, July 2006: Seven bombs exploded over a span of 15 minutes on the Mumbai Suburban Railway system, killing 187 and injuring more than 700. The railway system is one of the busiest in the world, transporting more than six million commuters per day. The city of Mumbai is a major financial hub and home to the Indian film industry.
- United Kingdom, July 2005: Four suicide bombers attacked the London underground subway systems and a double-decker bus during morning rush hour on 7 July. A total of 52 persons were killed and more than 700 injured. Three suicide bombers exploded IEDs within a few minutes of each other on the London underground transit system, and less than an hour later, one bomber exploded an IED on a double-decker bus.8 Two weeks later, on 21 July, during the noon hour, four young Islamic extremists in London attempted to conduct bombings similar to the 7 July attacks using backpacks containing IEDs made from peroxide-based explosives. The bombings failed when only the detonator caps themselves exploded. This may have been due to the low quality of the hydrogen peroxide used. The failed attempts occurred on subway trains at three different stations and on a double-decker bus in East London.9
- Spain, March 2004: Near-simultaneous explosions on four Madrid commuter trains during the morning rush hour killed 191 passengers and injured more than 1,800. Ten of 13 "bag bomb" IEDs exploded on the four trains—all within three minutes. Groups linked to al-Qa'ida claimed responsibility for the attack. Some speculate the attacks were timed deliberately to sway public opinion during the elections. The Popular Party, who had previously enjoyed a comfortable advantage in the polls, ultimately lost the elections to the Socialist Party on 14 March, and Spain withdrew its 1,300 troops from Iraq.10
- Russia, December 2003: An explosion aboard a commuter train near Yessentuki, northwest of Chechnya, killed 41 people and injured more than 150. Russian officials blamed a Chechen suicide bomber for the attack. The Chechen resistance has been responsible for several train attacks, including a 2003 explosion that killed 46 people

<sup>22</sup> UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

aboard a commuter train. The Chechen resistance also attacked the Moscow subway three times between 1996 and 2004. The 2004 explosion killed 39 and injured 110.11

#### **Capabilities and Tactics**

#### • Improvised Explosive Devices

IEDs were used in the majority of recent events against mass transit systems and will likely remain the most common method of attack for the foreseeable future. IEDs can be constructed from common materials, can be contained in inconspicuous bags or packages, and can be placed without attracting attention. Suicide operatives carrying IEDs could easily come aboard undetected, especially at a busy time of day when ridership is high.

According to an October 2007 Joint FBI-DHS report, terrorist interest in peroxide-based explosives is growing. Terrorists in the 7 July 2005 London bombings and the subsequent attempted bombings on 21 July 2005 used peroxide-based explosives, which included triacetonetriperoixde (TATP) and hexamethylenetriperoxidediamine (HMTD). The members of the Germany-based Islamic Jihad Union cell were in the process of purchasing large quantities of high-concentrate hydrogen peroxide when they were arrested in October 2007. Hydrogen peroxide is commercially available and easy to purchase, making it ideal for use in homemade explosives.

#### • Improvised Incendiary Devices

IIDs are designed to cause fires or secondary explosions. Terrorists are aware that attacks with incendiary devices in subway systems cause passengers caught in narrow confines with smoke and fire to panic, causing additional injuries and obstructing rescue attempts. Such an attack would also draw in first responders, who could be the targets of a second-phase attack.

#### • Standoff Weapons and Small Arms

Rocket-propelled grenades, light anti-tank weapons, and small arms could be used to attack mass transit. An example is the 1993 incident in which a lone gunman opened fire with a 9mm pistol in a crowded Long Island Railroad commuter railcar.


#### • Chemical Dispersion

Terrorists continue to have an interest in developing chemical and biological dispersion devices. Many of the necessary materials are relatively easy to acquire, and some delivery systems can be simple to build. The 1995 chemical attack on the Tokyo

<sup>23</sup> UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

subway system was accomplished simply by piercing, with the tip of an umbrella, plastic bags containing sarin, which had been left on subway car floors.

Al-Qa'ida is reportedly interested in producing compact chemical dispersal devices. The group developed a small device called a mubtakar for disseminating cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide. The device is considered efficient in enclosed spaces and could be effective if used in subway cars and underground rail stations.



#### • Biological Contamination

The 2001 anthrax attacks in the Washington, D.C., area that affected post offices and office buildings demonstrate that even small amounts of anthrax spores in several transit stations and tunnels would cause a system to be shut down. Al-Qa'ida has expressed a desire to acquire anthrax and other biological weapons, but the intelligence Community assesses that the group has yet to develop a robust biological weapons program and currently lacks the necessary capabilities to carry out an attack using these methods.

#### • Sabotage

Technologically-capable terrorists could sabotage the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used for controlling and monitoring mass transit systems. Although there is no evidence of a specific terrorist threat to mass transit SCADA systems, intelligence reporting indicates al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups have a sustained interest in launching operations against computer networks.

<sup>24</sup> UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTION: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for law enforcement officers, security personnel, antiterrorism officers and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of law enforcement. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552).

**Rail Fans** - Train spotters (UK) and rail fans (U.S.) are avid fans and hobbyists of railroads and the railroad industry. There are tens of thousands of rail fans worldwide, collecting photographs and documents about trains, engines, rail stations, bridges, and rail yards, which they often disseminate on the Internet. There is no reporting, however, indicating al-Qa'ida or any other threat group is aware of or utilizing rail fan resources. Rail fan websites may contain sensitive information, such as railway office locations, radio operating frequencies, schedules, and pictures of railroad operations. In addition, rail fans in the United States have tracked nuclear waste shipments via rail here and posted this information to Internet websites.

#### **Suspicious Incidents and Activity**

*There is no evidence to date linking suspicious mass transit incidents to terrorism;* however, suspicious activity enables law enforcement and security officials to identify unusual behavior, trends, patterns, and possible criminal acts. There were 171 suspicious mass transit incidents reported to TSA-OI during 2007. Twenty-nine involved Amtrak trains, 45 were related to heavy rail, and 97 involved intercity buses. A review of all-source reporting revealed that approximately 123 actual or possible threats to the U.S. passenger rail system were reported since January 2004. None of these threats or incidents preceded an actual attack.

Suspicious incidents involving mass transit systems encompass a wide variety of activities, from individuals who may appear to be acting suspiciously or asking suspicious questions to incidents involving suspicious packages. Possible surveillance includes photographing and videotaping trains and/or train stations. People involved in these activities are often rail fans or tourists taking photographs or video of trains or train stations. On other occasions, criminal activity not connected to terrorism is taking place. There are also instances when railroad employees make mistakes that cause equipment malfunctions or failures, making it appear as though sabotage has occurred.

#### (U) Predictive Analysis of Possible Future Attacks

(U//FOUO) Based on analysis of available data on previous al-Qa'ida/al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorist attacks on mass transit overseas, TSA-OI assesses that a terrorist attack on U.S. mass transit systems would most likely involve:

- What: Terrorists would target mass transit rail systems with multiple IEDs or IIDs.
  Who: The cell would be comprised of small groups of males between the ages of 18 and 33. They would likely be either al-Qa'ida members or inspired by al-Qa'ida. Although the cell members may have attended training camp in Pakistan, they may have used false documents for travel to make it more difficult to track their movements.
  When: The attack would occur during the rush hour.
- When: The attack would occur during the rush hour.
  Where, The perthaset corrider of the United States is li
- Where: The northeast corridor of the United States is likely to be a target because it contains a significant amount of rail infrastructure relative to the rest of the United States and has a higher concentration of U.S. cities that might be considered symbolic targets, like New York City and Washington, D.C.
- Why: Attacking Americans on their home soil has the greatest psychological impact. Groups would likely consider an attack on New York City because it represents material success, or Washington, D.C., because it is the seat of the U.S. government. New York also has the most extensive transit system in the country, increasing its odds of being targeted from a purely statistical standpoint. One-in-three users of mass transit in the United States and two-thirds of the nation's rail riders live in New York City

#### 25

#### UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE


#### Conclusion

Law enforcement agencies continue to investigate suspicious activities and threats related to the mass transit system. Suspicious activity may be indicative of pre-operational reconnaissance, but the increase in reported incidents could also be the result of an elevated public awareness and more stringent security procedures.

TSA-OI has no credible information regarding any specific terrorist plot to attack U.S. mass transit systems; however, previous overseas attacks against mass transit systems demonstrate the intent and capability of al-Qa'ida, its affiliated groups, and its sympathizers to do so.

Source: Transportation Security Administration - Office of Intelligence 29 February 2008

STUDY SUGGESTS **UNEXPECTED VULNERABILITY TO BIOTERRORISM:** A University of Arizona researcher has created a new system to dramatically show American cities their relative level of vulnerability to bioterrorism. Walter W. Piegorsch [formerly of the University of South Carolina], an expert on environmental risk, has placed 132 major cities -from Albany, N.Y., to Youngstown, Ohio -- on a color-coded map that identifies their level of risk based on factors including critical industries,




ports, railroads, population, natural environment and other factors. The map marks high-risk areas as red (for example, Houston and, surprisingly, Boise, ID), midrange risk as yellow (San Francisco) and lower risk as green (Tucson). The map shows a wide swath of highestrisk urban areas running from New York down through the Southeast and into Texas. Boise is the only high-risk urban area that lies outside the swath. The model employs what risk experts call a benchmark vulnerability metric, which shows risk managers each city's level of risk for urban terrorism. Piegorsch says terrorism vulnerability involves three dimensions of risk -- social aspects, natural hazards and construction of the city and its infrastructure.

Source: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03/080304092842.htm / South Carolina Information Exchange Bulletin # 044-08

26 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

#### FOREIGN MISSION LICENSE PLATES COUNTRY CODES





Bureau of Diplomatic Security, June 20, 2007

### 27 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

#### Α

AA--Congo AC--Cote d'Ivoire AE--Uzbekistan AF--Japan AH--Madagascar AJ--Panama AK--Cape Verde AQ--Syria AU--Uganda AV--Israel **AX--Marshall Islands** 

#### B

**BL--South Africa BV--Solomon Islands BW--World Bank** 

#### С

CB--Cambodia CC--Ethiopia CG--Marshal Islands CK--Namibia **CM--**Micronesia **CN--International Organization** CS--Afghanistan CT--Bhutan CU--Botswana CV--Myanmar (Burma) CW--Cameroon CX--Burundi CY--People's Republic of China

#### D

DA--Colombia **DB--Costa Rica** DC--Cuba (NYC only) **DD--Cyprus DF--Dominican Republic** DG--Ecuador DH--Cote d'Ivoire **DI--South Africa DJ--France DK--Greece** DL--India DM--Iran (UN only) DN--Denmark **DP--Bangladesh** DR--Slovakia

#### Μ

MF--International Monetary Fund MG--Unassigned Code MK--Djibouti ML--Unassigned Code MM---Unassigned Code **MN--Comoros** MP--Bahamas MQ--Unassigned Code **MW--Maldives** 

#### Ν

NA--Oman NB--Papua New Guinea NC--Paraguay ND--Romania NM--Unassigned Code NQ--Angola NX--Malaysia

#### Р

PA--Austria **PB--Barbados PC--Belize PD--United Kingdom PF--Bolivia PG--Belarus PK--Norway** PL--Chile PM--Brunei PR--Argentina PS--Zimbabwe **PV--Zaire** 

#### 0

**OD--Burkina** Faso OL--St. Kitts & Nevis QM--Bulgaria **ON--**Laos QP--Latvia **QQ--Lesotho QR--Malawi** QS--Mozambique **OT--New Zealand** QU--Nicaragua QV--Niger **QW--Poland QX--Pakistan** 

## $\begin{array}{c} 28\\ \text{unclassified//for official use only//law enforcement sensitive} \end{array}$

DZ--Palau

#### F

FF--Antigua & Barbuda FG--Central African Republic FH--Ireland FJ--Lebanon FK--Kenya FL--Liberia FM--Libya FN--Malta FP--Morocco **FR--Philippines** FS--Netherlands FT--Oatar FV--Sri Lanka FW--Holy See FX--Sierra Leone FZ--Suriname

#### G

GC--Sweden GD--Ukraine GG--Zambia GN--Turkey GP--Albania GQ--North Korea GX--Vanuatu GY--Chile

#### H

HB--Tonga HD--Argentina HL--Saint Lucia HM--Andorra HN--Mongolia HP--Handicap HV--Belgium HW--Guatemala HX--Benin HY--Guinea Bissau HZ--Haiti

#### J

JB--Honduras JC--Kuwait JD--Mauritius JF--Nigeria JG--Portugal QX--Iran (DC only) QY--Yemen QZ--Indonesia

#### R

RB--Rwanda RC--St. Vincent RD--Senegal RL--Uruguay RM--Unassigned Code RN--Unassigned Code RV--San Marino

#### S

SF--Czech SG--Israel ST--Dominica

#### Т

TF--Algeria TF--Iraq (DC only) TG--Canada TH--Egypt **TK--Liechtenstein** TL--El Salvador TM--Iceland TN--Nepal **TP--Mauritania** TQ--Mali TR--Italy TS--Iraq (UN only) TT--Guyana TU--Guinea TV--Ghana TW--Gambia TX--Finland TY--Grenada TZ--Peru **T**--**T**railer Plates

#### U

UA--Bahrain UF--Estonia UH--Spain UX--Trinidad & Tobago

#### V

VF--Thailand VG--Tanzania

#### 29 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

JH--Somalia JJ--Chad JK--Turkey JM--Yugoslavia JP--Tunisia JQ--Togo JS--Slovenia JT--Croatia JY--Cyprus

#### K

KB--Monaco **KD**--Eritrea KG--Equatorial Guinea KH--Hungary KJ--Lithuania KK-Fiji KL--Jordan KM--Jamaica KN--Gabon **KP--Luxembourg KR--Malaysia KS--Mexico** KT--Unassigned Code KU--Sao Tome & Principe KV--Saudi Arabia **KW--Seychelles** KX--Sudan

#### L

LC--Venezuela LD--Vietnam LG--Turkey LH--Israel LJ--Israel LK--European Economic Communities LM--Macedonia LN--Unassigned Code LR--Bosnia-Herzegovina LW--Germany LX--Unassigned Code VH--Switzerland/Cuba VJ--Brazil VK--Singapore VL--Swaziland VM--Nauru

#### W

WB--United Arab Emirates WD--South Korea WM--Western Samoa WZ--United Kingdom

#### Х

XA--Bangladesh XB--Unassigned Code XC--Fiji XD--Myanmar XE--Ghana XF--Turkey XG--Norway XZ--Australia

#### Y

YA--Armenia YG--Georgia YJ--Tajikistan YK--Kazakhstan YM--Moldova YR--Russia YT--Turkmenistan YY--Kyrgyzstan YZ--Azerbaijan

#### Ζ

ZP--Unassigned Code Z--Temporary Tag

#### 30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

#### DOMESTIC TERROR GROUPS IN DISARRAY AFTER

**SEPTEMBER 11:** Though violent extremist groups have been around in America for decades, they surged in the 1990s, a decade of spectacular domestic mayhem -- at a cabin in Ruby Ridge, Idaho; on a compound outside Waco, Texas; in downtown Oklahoma City. Their heroes were men like Timothy McVeigh, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph. Today the groups are shadows of themselves, with many of their leaders dead, imprisoned, disillusioned or just inept. Many observers attribute that to September 11, for diverting the rage of disaffected Americans away from the U .S. government and toward foreigners, and for fueling the subsequent Patriot Act-driven crackdown. Others say the movement began to crumble earlier, when the Y2K disaster, a favorite prediction of conspiracy theorists, failed to materialize. In contrast to the 1990s, this decade has seen only a smattering of arrests of isolated plotters, caught before they could act. Syracuse University tracked domestic terrorism prosecutions over the last five years and found them down by 47%. California and Oregon were the leading states for prosecutions in 2006, with eight each. In







some cases those hate have directed their vitriol at immigration across the Mexican border. There also are environmental and animal-rights extremists, and in the first months after Sept. 11 there was a spike in racial attacks against Muslims. The Department of Justice recently compiled a summary on foreign and domestic terrorism for 2002 through 2005. They found that 23 of the 24 attacks committed by domestic groups were perpetrated by "special-interest extremists active in the animal-rights and environmental movements"; the other was a white supremacist's firebombing of a synagogue in Oklahoma City. None was carried out by the traditional antigovernment elements popular in the 1990s. The FBI remains vigilant, said Assistant Director John J. Miller, against terrorists of all stripes. "Not every terrorist needs to be linked to an organized group like Al Qaeda to kill the innocent." The aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks also brought stronger law enforcement tools, most notably the Patriot Act, and reinforced FBI field offices with Joint Task Forces to seek and destroy unfolding terrorist plots.

**SCIEx Comment**: Though attacks by domestic terrorist groups haven't been as prevalent in recent years as they were in the '90s, this does not mean they are not a continuing threat. As the article states, environmental or animal rights extremists have been active, and have conducted most of the recent attacks in the country. Officers should also be aware of emerging trends of extremist groups possibly targeting illegal immigrants and Muslim targets such as mosques.

**Source**: <u>http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-terror11mar11,0,6228604.story?page=1</u> / South Carolina Information Exchange Bulletin # 048-08

**AUTOEROTIC ASPHYXIATION – THE "CHOKING GAME":** At least 82 youths have died from the so-called "choking game," according to the first government count of fatalities from the tragic fad. In the game, children use dog leashes, bungee cords wrapped around their necks or other means to temporarily cut blood flow to their head. The goal is a dreamlike, floating-in-space feeling when blood rushes back into the brain. As many as 20 percent of teens and preteens play the game, sometimes in groups, according to some estimates based on a few local studies. But nearly all the deaths were youths who played alone, according to the count complied by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC started the research after receiving a letter last year from a Tacoma, Wash., physician who said her 13-year-old son died from playing the game in 2005. "At the time, I had never heard of this," said Dr. Patricia Russell, whose son was found hanging in his closet, but later learned he had talked to a friend about it.

The CDC counted reports from media and advocacy organizations in the years 1995 through 2007, totaling 82 fatalities of children ages 6 to 19. They did not include deaths in which it was unclear if the death was from the choking game or if it was a suicide. They also did not include deaths that involved autoerotic asphyxiation, which is self-strangulation during masturbation and is said to be mainly done by male adults. The 82 deaths were spread across the country. Nearly 90 percent were boys, at an average age of about 13. The report is being published this week in a CDC publication, *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*.

CDC officials urged parents to be aware the fad exists, and to watch for possible warning signs such as bloodshot eyes, marks on the neck, frequent and severe headaches, disorientation after spending time alone; ropes, scarves and belts tied to bedroom furniture or doorknobs or found knotted on the floor; unexplained presence of things like dog leashes, choke collars and bungee cords.

For more information visit the CDC website at <u>www.cdc.gov/Features/ChokingGame</u>.

Source: Suffolk County, NY Police Department Alert Network Bulletin 10 March 2008

Return to: Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center Washington, D.C. 202-233-1472 (Fax)

Dear Customer.

Please take a moment to complete this survey and help evaluate the quality and value of WRTAC products. Your response will help us serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Thank you for your cooperation and assistance.

Instructions: Circle the appropriate response according to the following scale.

- Strongly
- **1** Disagree
- 2 Disagree No
- **3** Opinion
- 4 Agree
- 5 Strongly Agree

#### N/A Not Applicable

Product

Title/Date:

Customer:

Quality:							
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product was delivered in a timely manner.	
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product was relevant to your duties and needs.	
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product was clear and easy to comprehend.	
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product resulted in a change in investigative or intelligence priorities.	
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product resulted in more informed decisions concerning officers' defensive posture and vigilance.	
1	2	3	4	5	N/A	This product identified new information on pending matters or offered insights that could change a working premise.	

**Comments:** 

34 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE