


UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Security Force Assistance Introductory Guide



28 July 2011



Table of Contents

Commander's Preface	2
Chapter 1	3
Introduction	3
Historical Context	3
Policy Background	4
Chapter 2	5
Defining SFA	5
Security Force Assistance Strategy	6
Understanding Security Force Assistance Environment/Framework	6
Comparison of Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense	8
Chapter 3	10
Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Considerations	10
Chapter 4	13
Security Force Assistance Logic and Planning	13
Security Force Assistance Developmental Tasks	14
Chapter 5	15
Special Operations Forces	15
Conclusion	16
References	19
Annex A: Terms and Definitions	20

Commander's Preface

This document provides a common understanding of Security Force Assistance (SFA) across the joint special operations community. SFA is the Department of Defense (DoD) contribution to the U.S. Government's Security Sector Reform (SSR) program, and as such SFA is designed to improve Foreign Security Forces' (FSF) capability and capacity.

Derived from national policy and strategic level guidance, SFA provides a means to achieve national policy and military objectives. Its foundation lies within our strategic appreciation of today's complex security environment, and requisite solutions to address it. Among these solutions, SFA links developmental efforts of partner military and civilian security forces with other SSR activities to address security threats across the spectrum of conflict.

SFA is a top priority for both Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces and is an enduring theme that will demand sustained focus and innovative solutions to ensure effectiveness, while maintaining our strengths in other DoD-directed core competencies. SFA will posture the Force to succeed in an evolving and complex strategic environment, by focusing available tools and resources toward specific foreign security forces. While it does not replace traditional security cooperation activities, it shifts the primary focus from access and influence to developing the capacities and capability of FSF.

It remains essential that participants at all levels of SFA implementation comprehend the concept, that tactical actions can have strategic implications. Therefore, our men and women deserve proper training, equipment, and guidance to excel in the conduct of SFA activities around the world.



ERIC T. OLSON
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, USSOCOM

Chapter 1

Building the defense capacity of allies and partners and ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces are able to effectively train and operate with foreign militaries is a high-priority mission. As the emphasis on developing the capability of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects, conducting security force assistance (SFA) operations is an increasingly critical element of building partnership capacity.

(Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 2010)

Introduction

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of conducting security force assistance (SFA)-type activities. These activities were primarily focused on gaining access and influence to partner nations (PN). However, by 2005, the purpose of SFA-type activities had evolved. SFA would now enable and develop the sustainable capabilities of foreign security forces (FSF) to a sufficient capacity in order to provide regional stability. The primary purpose of SFA is the development of sustainable capabilities to allow PNs to defend themselves or contribute to operations elsewhere. This is a fundamental shift in how and why the DoD conducts SFA.

Although the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the DoD Lead for SFA Doctrine, Education, and Training, both Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) participate in SFA activities. The primary role of both SOF and CF in SFA is to assess, organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise PN military and paramilitary forces with tasks that require their unique capabilities. At times, this may require U.S. forces to temporarily assist the HN or FSF with these tasks until they can develop the requisite capability and capacity or until the current threat is reduced to a manageable level. Thus, SFA activities require the collective capabilities of SOF, CF, the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW), and contract personnel to execute the mission.

PNs may also need capabilities which are interoperable with the U.S. Government (USG). As a result, some SFA activities require interagency capabilities to execute the mission. Other USG agencies contribute their expertise in defense, law enforcement, government, infrastructure, and security capabilities to improve the PN ability to govern and defend against a common threat to security. A comprehensive assessment of an intended FSF mission, capability and sustainment requirements will determine the appropriate combination of U.S. forces needed to conduct SFA.

Historical Context


Developing capabilities of FSF is not new for the U.S. military. From operations during the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) to the recent Operations of ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and NEW DAWN, the U.S. military has a long history of employing military advisors.



The Montagnards, hilltribe people from Vietnam, were recruited by SF to serve as front-line fighters with the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War.

Current U.S. policy reflects an increased emphasis on SFA as a primary activity to achieve U.S. security objectives. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, government service civilians, and civilian contractor personnel conduct security force assistance alongside multinational partners to develop the capability and capacity of FSF to meet their nations' security requirements while supporting U.S. objectives.

In Georgia in 2002, the DoD launched the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) with specialized SOF personnel. The goal of the program was to enhance the security capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces, to improve interagency coordination between respective units, and to train military personnel. GTEP ended in 2004 with the graduation of the last group of Georgian soldiers; however, in 2008, the Georgian Ministry of Defense requested a renewed effort in the buildup of Georgian military units' capability and capacity to enable the Republic of Georgia to assist North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Coalition Force efforts in Afghanistan. These on-going global advisory efforts, gleaned from lessons learned from past operations, will continue to guide the DoD into the future.



“ A US Marine Advisor from Marine Corps Training Advisory Group brief Georgian soldiers prior to a training evolution in 2010 as part of the Georgian Training and Deployment Program that prepare the Georgian for duty in Helmand province with US Marine Forces.”

Policy Background

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stressed that building PN capacity is indispensable. This highlights the shift from unilateral capabilities to building PN capabilities. The 2009 Baseline Irregular Warfare Assessment and the 2010 QDR identified that the DoD lacked adequate SFA policy and understanding. The 2010 QDR spotlights SFA as a critical element in U.S. foreign policy. In response, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy published DoD Instruction 5000.68, which establishes policy and assigns responsibilities regarding the preparation of DoD personnel and operational planning for, as well as the conduct of, SFA across the departments. SFA focuses on a critical aspect of security, which underlies the whole-of-government approach to building partner capacity. SFA is DoD's fundamental approach for contributing to the broader USG security sector assistance effort. In collaboration with other U.S. departments and agencies, the DoD is institutionalizing SFA in strategies, plans, and capabilities at all levels.

Chapter 2

“Strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces would be required.”

(Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 2010)

Defining Security Force Assistance

U.S. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) for Security Force Assistance (27 October 2010) defines SFA as DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of FSF and their supporting institutions.

SFA supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of FSF, supporting institutions of host countries, and international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict during all phases of military operations. These efforts are conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces.

Further, SFA activities assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the DoD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country’s security forces or supporting institutions.

SFA must directly increase the capacity and/or capability of FSF and/or their supporting institutions. The term **directly** is context specific and serves to emphasize that the express intent of an SFA activity is the improvement of the capacity and/or capability of a foreign security force and/or its supporting institutions. SFA also contributes to DoD’s role in USG security sector reform (SSR) initiatives.

SFA is a subset of DOD’s overall security cooperation (SC) initiatives. Other SC activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities dedicated to the non-security sector, provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA.

Security assistance (SA) programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities, which contribute to a host country’s defense.

The portion of SFA oriented towards supporting a host country’s efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency is a subset of foreign internal defense (FID).

SFA activities are prioritized using factors such as U.S. interests in the region, the willingness and ability of PNs to absorb U.S. assistance, and the level of risk for PNs to achieve their goals without U.S. assistance.

The DoD develops and maintains capabilities for the following:

- Organize, train, equip, and advise foreign military forces.
- Support the development of the capability and capacity of host-country defense institutions and ministries.
- Conduct SFA across all domains -- air, land, maritime, and cyberspace -- in both permissive and contested environments under steady-state or surge conditions.

If required to support the development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions, and to the extent authorized by law, the DoD is prepared to apply the requisite task-organized capabilities to effect the following:

- Support and coordinate with other USG agencies leading USG efforts to support development of the capability and capacity of non-defense ministry security forces and their supporting institutions.

- Advise and support the training of foreign paramilitary security forces -- such as border and coastal control forces, counterterrorist forces, and paramilitary or special police forces -- at all levels, in conjunction with other USG agencies.
- Support the training of host-country civil police in individual and collective tasks in contested environments when other USG-agency trainers and advisors are unable to do so. Coordinate the transition of responsibilities for such training and advisory duties to other USG agencies as the security environment allows.

The DoD conducts SFA activities with the appropriate combinations of SOF, CF, CEW personnel (in accordance with DoDD 1404.10), and contract personnel who are collectively capable of executing all missions and activities required under the following conditions:

- Politically sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a limited, overt U.S. presence is acceptable to the host-country government.
- Environments where a large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government.

Security Force Assistance Strategy

SFA requires a strategic perspective on the development of FSF, articulation of global objectives, linking of resources to overarching goals, and creation of operational roadmaps for persistent cooperation. This comprehensive, global approach to improving partner security capacity necessitates new concepts for manpower and organizational design and innovative strategies and authorities that provide lethal capability to FSF.

U.S. Armed Forces have an enduring requirement to protect the U.S. and its vital interests. In doing so, the DoD uses U.S. capabilities to aid other nations to prepare and/or conduct operations to mitigate threats relative to national, regional, or global security and

stability. SFA is an essential activity for improving the military capacity and capability of foreign partners security forces and their supporting institutions to prepare for and conduct a full spectrum of military, paramilitary, and security operations against regular and irregular adversaries.




Figure 2-1

SFA encompasses DoD efforts to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the FSFs and their supporting institutions as well as international and regional security organizations.

Understanding Security Force Assistance Environment/Framework

SFA is one component of a unified action across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) construct. SFA occurs across the range of military operations, takes place in any of the operational themes (peacetime military engagements, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, major combat operations), and may occur during offense, defense, and stability operations.




Figure 2-2

To effectively understand the SFA environment, one must be familiar with National Strategy and key terms that relate to DoD and SFA.

“Many adjustments to improve security sector assistance have been limited in scope, duration, and resources. As a result, the combatant commanders lack sufficient tools to support their theater campaign plans and their assigned mission to build partner capacity. These missions may require DoD to play a lead or supporting role, in coordination with relevant U.S. civilian agencies, and may range from the wholesale reconstitution of security forces within a major stability operation, to fulfilling urgent train-and-equip requirements for a partner confronting serious security challenges, to supporting civilian agencies in the rebuilding of a state’s capacity to deliver essential services to vulnerable populations and provide access to justice.”
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

Security Sector Reform (SSR). The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; or reduction of armed violence (DoS DoD USAID Handbook for SSR).

Stability Operations (STABOPS). An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

Security Cooperation (SC). Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Assistance (SA). A group of programs authorized by Title 22 USC, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation. (DoDD 5132.03)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The focus of USG FID efforts is to support HN internal defense and development (IDAD). FID can only occur when an HN that has asked for assistance.




Figure 2-3

The DoD’s primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum. (Providing Security Sector Assistance (SSA))



Counterinsurgency (COIN). Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances (JP 3-24). COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all HN, U.S., and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead U.S. efforts. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect the population, defeat the insurgents, reinforce HN legitimacy, and build HN capabilities.

FID-COIN Relationship. FID may or may not include countering an insurgency. When FID includes countering an insurgency, COIN is part of FID. COIN only refers to actions aimed at countering an insurgency whereas FID deals with subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, individually or combined. In most cases, the joint force conducts COIN as part of a larger FID program supporting the HN government. U.S. involvement in COIN operations that are not part of FID is an uncommon, transitory, situation wherein the U.S. and multinational partners should work to establish or reestablish HN sovereignty.

Unconventional Warfare (UW). Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 3-05) US-sponsored UW generally includes seven phases: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, employment, and transition. The tactical actions of the Advisor are to develop capability and capacity within the indigenous or surrogate forces, which may or may not transition to long term sustainable capabilities, dependent on USG strategic objectives.

SFA-FID-COIN-UW-STABOP Relationship. SFA is integral to successful FID and COIN operations. SFA includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising (OTERA) various components of security forces in support of a legitimate authority. The portion of SFA oriented towards supporting host-country efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency is a subset of FID. SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, unlike FID wherein the primary focus is to support the HN IDAD plan, the DoD may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to effectively defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and/or advise another country's security forces and/or supporting institutions. The organize, train, equip, and advise tasks conducted by SOF during UW operations may be part of, or become, SFA activities when supporting an indigenous or surrogate force in support of a legitimate authority. Legitimacy is determined by the USG. As illustrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, conducting security force assistance activities are an increasingly critical element of building partner capacity.

Comparison of SFA and FID. SFA supports the military instrument of FID, contributes to the legitimacy and eventual success in COIN, contributes to SSR/SSA, and is a subset of DoD security cooperation efforts. SFA is an element of USG building partner capability fully within the security sector. Still, the common misunderstanding about SFA is its similarities and differences to FID. In the conduct of FID, the military's primary role lies in the security sector across both the military and civilian lines of effort. Many of the tasks in support of FID across the security sector can also be classified as SFA, but many of the tasks in support of FID will fall outside the scope of SFA as they will not specifically address capability or capacity within the HN security forces. All actions taken by U.S. military to support an HN IDAD plan are considered tasks within FID, but only those tasks that directly develop capability and capacity of the HN security forces will be SFA. Understanding that all SFA activities done in support of FID are a subset of FID, SFA activities can also be conducted in support of a HN to enhance external defense, in support of a PN to assist in activities in a third country, or in support of regional security forces or even indigenous forces in support of an insurgency.

The left side of Figure 2.5 shows how FID addresses internal security, governance, and economic issues while the right side of Figure 2.5 shows how SFA addresses both internal and external security issues but does not address economic or governance issues.

“We will also help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.”... “It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security.”... “In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, building the capacity necessary for security, economic growth, and good governance is the only path to long term peace and security.”

2010 National Security Strategy




Figure 2-5



BAQUBA, Iraq (April 27, 2010) An Army Special Forces member holds on to Izra, a four-year-old German shepherd and member of the Multi-Purpose Canine Unit, during fast-rope insertion training aboard an HH-60H Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Red Wolves of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 84. Members of the U.S. Special Forces and HSC-84 provided fast-rope insertion training to members of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) at Forward Operating Base Gabe.

Operational considerations

SFA planning and employment focuses on resolving FSF organizational, operational, and institutional deficiencies, requiring regional geographic combatant command security cooperation campaign planners to assess the following:

- What resources a country has to sustain their FSF capabilities.
- How FSF executive-level leadership employ their resources.
- To what ends they deploy those resources.
- The conditions that the FSF must change to address their problems.
- What capabilities the FSF must have to accomplish those tasks.

Understanding the requirements of the FSF allows the GCC headquarters, in conjunction with the PN and American Embassy to assess, plan, and validate SFA requirements. This process will ensure the right capabilities to support FSF development. The operational headquarters, in conjunction with the PN, is responsible for conducting and maintaining the operational assessment of the FSF that supports understanding the FSF problem set. FSF problems may reside in the following three areas:

- **Executive Direction.** These activities develop national policy for FSF. This guidance forms, justifies, authorizes, and directs parameters for generating and employing FSF. An SFA activity at this level may involve USG advisement at Ministry of Defense or Security/Interior-level organization for assistance in policymaking.

- **Generate.** These functions include organizing, recruiting/manning, training, equipping, mobilizing, maintenance/service, and supplying. Fundamentally, these core functions require identification, resourcing, and resolution of capability gaps in the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education development, personnel, and facilities and Service and DoD-equivalent policies (DOTMLPF-P) of the security forces.

- **Employ.** Employ, or operate as it applies to military security forces, is the collective or individual training for and carrying out of the missions assigned to the unit. This includes the integration of operational

functions such as maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and command and control during actual operations. Employment, as it applies to police security forces, may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment.

All FSF require some level of executive direction, which directs and manages a generating and an employing or operating function. The U.S. provides these functions through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and elements of the Services for executive direction. The Services are also responsible for the majority of the generating function, and the combatant commands are responsible for employing operational forces. While the ability to employ resides primarily with operational forces, the expertise to generate resides in Service-run fixed facilities and installations.

By grouping employing and generating functions, units conducting SFA can plan and prepare to support the development of the required FSF capacity and capabilities. Units conducting SFA must consider their capabilities when assessing FSF requirements; specifically, they may have to look beyond the way they are doctrinally task organized and employ skills and experiences, which may not be visible on its manning document. The unit self assessment will show additional skills required and where risk may have to be assumed. Understanding the demands of SFA on the force allows commanders to mitigate shortages in generating expertise through training or augmentation.




Figure 3-2

Tactical considerations

At this level, SFA is focused on achieving measurable results. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners implement SFA to assist in the development of FSF capabilities and capacities as they relate to tasks which change the conditions that caused the FSF problem set. This occurs by developing and advising the employment of FSF capabilities.



Police Operations

Law Enforcement	Social Services	Maintain Order
<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Investigation Raids Forensics Participate in Task Force Apprehension Counter drugs Incarceration Counter terrorism</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Protect constitutional guarantees Exercise/demonstrate authority for use of force Resolve conflict</p>	<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Safety Public Relations Training Support emergency services</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Create a feeling of security Assist public needs/provide aid to public Provide other services as required</p>	<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Environment control (Traffic, Crowd, Events) Port of Entry (POE) Incident command Provide other order as required</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Reduce crime opportunities Facilitate movement of people/vehicles Promote and preserve civil order Maintain and restore social order</p>

Military

Offensive Operations	Defensive Operations	Stability & Civil
<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Movement to contact Attack Exploitation Pursuit</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Dislocate, Isolate, Disrupt, and Destroy Enemy Seize key terrain Deprive the enemy of resources Develop intelligence Deceive or divert the enemy</p>	<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Mobile Defense Area Defense Retrograde</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations Gain time or achieve economy of force Retain key terrain Protect populace, critical assets/infrastructure</p>	<p><u>Primary Tasks:</u></p> <p>Provide support in response to disaster Provide support in response to adversary attacks Support civil law enforcement Provide other support as required</p> <p><u>Purpose:</u></p> <p>Save lives Restore essential services Maintain or restore law and order Protect infrastructure/property Maintain or restore local government</p>




Figure 3-3

Chapter 4

SFA Logic and Planning Methodology

Understanding the concept of SFA is essential as it ties directly into the overall SFA logic and flows throughout the planning methodology process. The strategic goal of SFA is to support the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions as well as international and regional security organizations.

SFA Planning Methodology




Figure 4-1

Figure 4-1 illustrates the workflow that begins with identification of the FSF problem as it relates to its political context and shows the methodology for using SFA FSF assessment to derive specific objectives and tasks.

The Methodology

Ends, ways, and means methodology is a system to analyze problems and develop solutions.

Ends. Increase capacity/capability of FSF and/or supporting institution to defeat, deter, and preempt PN military and security threats.

Ways. Protracted regional, global, potentially indirect and/or unilateral approaches focuses on assisting a country's security against internal and external threats from state and non-state adversaries.

- Conduct collaborative joint assessments, analysis, planning, and coordination on PN military/security organizations, capabilities, and threats.
- Coordinate information operations activities.
- Obtain detailed knowledge and understanding about adversaries and their networks.
- Build on net-centric intelligence with timely and actionable intelligence products to the appropriate staffs/offices/organizations/personnel.
- Support or lead SFA activities that directly focus and contribute to increasing the capacity/capability of FSF and/or their institutions.
 - Secure population and resources.
 - Disrupt and destroy adversary means of engagement.
 - Isolate adversary physically and psychologically from the population and means of support

Means. Fully integrated U.S. and PN conventional and SOF capabilities. U.S. Forces should be prepared to conduct SFA activities to build sustainable capabilities of FSF as well as improve the quality of the relationship between the U.S. and its allies and partners. Each SFA effort is unique, dynamic, and must be analyzed and framed to accommodate both U.S. objectives and foreign partner concerns and constraints. In order to increase the effectiveness of SFA activities, one should conduct a thorough assessment and analysis. This will facilitate understanding of the political and social landscape, help identify the community of interest, and increase opportunities for mission success.

SFA Developmental Tasks

SFA developmental tasks fall under the headings of organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA). SFA developmental tasks are conducted to develop specific FSF capabilities. Examples include advising FSF on how to control a border point of entry or train FSF on how to conduct a combined arms breach. SFA developmental tasks of OTERA are similar to joint capability areas. When the tasks are associated with developing specific FSF capabilities, then they can be written out as actual tasks. SFA developmental tasks are described as follows:

- **Organize.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit/organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting/manning.

- **Train.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

- **Equip.** All activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life-cycle management in a manner that is suitable for the PN. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.

- **Rebuild/Build.** All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

- **Advise.** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit/organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical, operational and strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.

Developmental Task Note: The advise task is the most critical of all the developmental tasks. Without establishing an effective relationship with the FSF, the unit conducting SFA will not be able to realize the full potential in the other developmental tasks. Given the criticality of this task, the SFA organization must arrange an advisor element and ensure that it plays a critical role within the SFA organization. This critical element serves as the key enabler for all SFA activities.




Figure 4-2

The term assist is commonly used in conjunction with advise, e.g., Advise and Assist. However, assist is not a developmental task; instead, assist is an enabling, supporting, and sustaining task. Assist consists of all activities to provide the FSF temporary access to U.S. or Coalition Force capabilities and capacities they otherwise may not have. In reference to SFA, units conduct assist to support the execution of the developmental tasks. To assist should not create a dependency on the provider or create an undesired effect in force development.

The execution of SFA OTERA tasks develops and enhances the ability of FSF to sustain and support institutions that can effectively generate, employ, and sustain their own force. These functions lead to attainment of FSF operational readiness.

Chapter 5

“The Operator is the ‘platform’ upon which all other systems must orient. The Operator is the core of U.S. Special Operations Forces. The future of USSOCOM remains the Operator—an expert in warfighting skills, executing the core activities, and understanding cultures around the world. Operators execute missions across the 3-D Construct of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development.”

(Admiral Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM Strategy 2010)



Special Operations Forces

One of the primary missions of SOF has been the training of foreign military forces. These missions have long taken advantage of SOF interpersonal skills and attributes, military skills, language proficiency, and ability to understand and influence people.

SOF select and train individuals to meet these requirements and have historically performed many of the advisory and foreign-training missions. SOF emphasizes

adaptability and persuasiveness in their training. SFA activities require forces that can operate with political sensitivity and cultural awareness as well as an ability to understand people. SOF are culturally proficient and experienced trainers who routinely advise foreign forces.

SOF personnel are selected, trained, and provided with career-long experience in advisor operations while training for UW, which requires the highest level of experienced advisor. The development of advanced advisory skills in SOF is a long-term process that starts with selecting personnel with the right aptitude and providing them with training and education in tactical skills, cultural awareness, regional orientation, adaptability, influence, and language. The process continues when SOF are assigned to experienced teams that provide mentorship and deploy into operational environments where they employ and refine their advisory abilities through persistent engagement.



An example of SFA, a Special Forces Soldier instructs Colombian FSF in close quarters combat.

Current examples of ongoing and sustained SOF SFA-type operations include OEF Trans Sahel, OEF Philippines, OEF Caribbean and Central America, and

operations in Colombia. In each of these cases, SOF depends on support from CF and other government agencies, especially in intelligence and logistic support and security operations. Support from U.S Embassies is paramount. Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that a unified approach in SFA activities is absolutely critical for developing a sustainable capability within selected FSF.

Since the Cold War, SOF has conducted SFA-type activities. These activities have often been augmented by CF, or SOF has supported a larger CF operation. In recent years, there has been a significant shift in the portion of CF employed in SFA and FID activities. As the role of CF in SFA will continue to grow, lessons learned from SOF SFA-type activities can enhance CF efforts.

“Units that conduct these types of operations invest a great deal of time and energy in language proficiency, cultural awareness, and regional orientation. It often takes years of study, in the actual area of operations, to develop the kind of understanding required to work with forces where the SOF Operator has no command authority but must accomplish the mission through cooperation and mutual understanding.”

(USCINCSOC Congressional Testimony 27 March 1995)

SOF Lessons Learned for SFA like activities

Through analysis of SOF experience in Vietnam, Colombia, and contemporary operations, several common threads can take SFA forward as it develops: unity of effort (lessons learned), whole-of-government approach (procedure), civil information management (system), and the Embassy Country Team (lessons learned and procedure). Each of these ideas supports and builds the comprehensive focus that SFA seeks to provide in accomplishing the mission. A refined concept of SFA will improve capabilities, eliminate redundant execution, and broadly expand effectiveness of DoD SFA activities.

Training and educating officer and non-commissioned officer leadership on SFA activities and requirements is paramount for successful operations. Detailed and

continuous assessment in conjunction with the country team to determine requirements (SOF, CF, or a combination) for future SFA activities is critical for mission success.

Effective SFA also requires initial and continuous assessment of HN security forces and conditions, ensuring that the right capabilities are developed and sustained. The U.S. military organization in country must be able to conduct these assessments and coordinate for external support when necessary.

Conclusion

The transformation of U.S. SFA activities must not mitigate the capacity and capability of the U.S. to serve as a preeminent global power or detract from the ability to project direct combat power whenever and wherever needed. Thus, FSF assistance modernization must be guided by comprehensible policy and authority for Services and the geographic combatant commands to efficiently develop and execute force management and operational requirements.



The 6th SOS is the Air Force's only combat aviation advisory organization. The squadron mission includes assessing, training, advising, and assisting foreign aviation combat and combat support units in aircraft maintenance, logistics, air base ground defense, command and control, aeromedical support, personal survival, personal recovery, and other functions supporting combat air operations.

The U.S., its allies, and partners will continue to be threatened by state and non-state actors who employ a mix of conventional, irregular, criminal, or hybrid ways and means. SFA is a tool that enables the U.S. to assist our allies and partners to defend themselves against these types of threats or support expeditionary operations that support U.S. interests.

“Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizen’s basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economical deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners, we will work to... undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

(National Security Strategy 2011)

“As a result, our strategy seeks to build the capacity of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons.”

2010 National Defense Strategy

SFA end state: The desired end state of SFA is the enhanced security of the United States and its allies and partners. This is achieved by enhancing regional security and stability through increasing our partner’s capability to defend themselves and contribute to regional efforts.

The SFA developmental activities, OTERA, are the tools used to increase our partner’s FSF capability and capacity, directly contributing to, and an essential part of, the U.S. National security strategy.

Additionally, successful SFA will be measured by the FSF ability to sustain its security force capability and capacity in order to effectively accomplish missions as determined by their legitimate authority. This capability and capacity should be developed across all levels, from ministerial down to the individual soldier or law enforcement officer.



In closing this introductory guide was drafted to assist you in understanding Security Force Assistance and the purpose for conducting SFA activities. This guide is a primer, and as such, to assist you to effectively conduct SFA activities, we direct you to several other useful publications.

The first recommendation is the SOF SFA Planner's Guide which will provide you with the framework to understand the requirements for planning SFA activities and provide the framework for execution of tasks in support of Foreign Security Force development.

Secondly, you must utilize the appropriate doctrine for the mission being conducted, whether it is a JP for FID or a tactics, techniques, and procedures manual for COIN.

Third, many useful SFA publications and tools have been, and are being developed through collaboration among SFA subject matter experts and practitioners alike. Several of these useful publications are listed in the reference section of this guide and for a more detailed list of publications and tools please refer to the SFA Reference Guide.

After reading this document, We hope you have gained a better and more thorough understanding of SFA and SFA activities. Our Team encourages comments and feedback to enable them to continue to update and revise this guide for you, the SFA practitioner.



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Annex A: Terms and Definitions

Advisor/Advisor Team (AT): The term advisor and advisor team are defined as an individual or team tasked to teach, coach, and advise foreign security forces (FSF) in order to develop their professional skills. (ALSA MTTP Advising)

Assessment: Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. (JP 3.05)

Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW): Civilian members of DoD workforce organized, trained, cleared, equipped and ready to deploy in support of combat operations by the military; contingencies; emergency operations; humanitarian missions; disaster relief; restoration of order; drug interdiction; and stability operations of the DoD IAW DoDD 3000.05. (DoDD 1404.10)

Civil-Military Operations (CMO): The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. (JP 3-57)

Counterinsurgency (COIN): Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 3-24)

Civilian Response Corps (CRC): CRC is a group of civilian federal employees who are specially training and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide conflict prevention and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict. The Corps include members from nine federal departments and agencies, leveraging a diverse range of expertise for conflict prevention and stabilization. (www.civilianresponscorps.gov)

Defense Institutional Reconstruction Initiative (DIRI): Is designed to help partners develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ their forces and the capabilities developed through U.S. security cooperation programs. (DSCA)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 1-02)

Foreign Security Forces (FSF): FSF include but are not limited to military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and intelligence services; forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; and the government ministries or departments responsible for the above services. (JP 3-05 19 APR 2011)

Host Nation (HN): A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 3-57)

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HA): Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 3-57)

Internal defense and development (IDAD): The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 3-07.1)

Interagency (IA): United States Government agencies and departments, including the DoD. See also interagency coordination. (JP 3-08)

Ministry of Defense Advisory Program (MoDA): Is designed to forge long-term relationships that strengthen a partner states defense ministry. The program matches senior DoD civilians with partner-identified requirements and provides backfill funding to the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. While deployed, the advisors exchange expertise with foreign counterparts in similar defense specialties. (www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0211_moda/)

Mobile Training Team (MTT): A team consisting of one or more US military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests (JP 1-02). Advisors may be part of an MTT.

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO): A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 3-08)

Security Assistance (SA): A group of programs authorized by Title 22, USC, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives. The Department of Defense does not administer all security assistance programs. Those security assistance programs that are administered by the Department are a subset of security cooperation. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Sector Reform (SSR): The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-24)

Security Sector Assistance (SSA): A collection of the activities that a donor country takes ISO SSR aimed to ensure that all security forces operate within the bounds of domestic and international law, and that they support wide-ranging efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. (Security Sector Reform paper, USAID/DoD/DOS, Feb 2009)

Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO). Those DoD organizations permanently located in a foreign country and assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation management functions under section 515 of Title 22 USC and under Joint Publication 1-02, regardless of the actual name given to such DoD Component. SCOs include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and DATT personnel designated to perform security cooperation functions. The term “SCO” does not include units, formations, or other ad hoc organizations that conduct security cooperation activities such as mobile training teams, mobile education teams, or operational units conducting security cooperation activities. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Cooperation (SC): Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. (DoDD 5132.03)

Security Cooperation Activity (SCA): Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (TSCP) (JP 3-0)

Security Cooperation Planning (SCP): The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the DoD’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy (JP 5-0). Each theater is required to write a TCP which is supposed to link and coordinate all DoD activity within the theater with national and theater strategic and operational objectives. Every training or advising mission should support the TCP.

Security Force Assistance (SFA): The DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 1-02)

Stability Operations (STABOPS): An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-07)



CHINHAE NAVY BASE, Korea — SEALs from both the Republic of Korea Naval Special Warfare Brigade and U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command recently conducted combined training here as part of exercise FOAL EAGLE 2011. The focus of training was to enhance interoperability between the SEAL elements and to enhance the alliance’s maritime Special Operations capabilities.



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