



Tentative Manual For Partnering Operations

"Real partnering is messy and hard. It is not for the faint of heart, nor for those who seek the less arduous road. In particular, partnering requires respect for one another despite differences in size, skill, training, capability, or culture. The differences are often significant and sometimes highly frustrating. To be effective, each partner should recognize and accept those differences, but without allowing them to detract from the partnership or from the mission."

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F.O.U.O.

This handbook was developed to support Marines involved in and preparing for missions where they will partner. It identifies guidelines and practices that have worked. However, these guidelines have not weathered the test of time or multiple experiences.

Special thanks go out to all of the Marines and Soldiers that made this publication possible. Without your time and dedication, the rapid publication of this handbook would not have been possible.

Undoubtedly, there are areas in this manual that will need change or update. To identify these and reinforce the areas that are helpful requires the feedback from the larger population of those experienced in partnering. We encourage you to review and provide input for our next revision. We anticipate publishing a revised manual in November 2010.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G.J. Flynn', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

G.J. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
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FOREWORD

In warfighting and counterinsurgency operations, partnering is a command arrangement between a US security force and a host nation (HN) security force in which both forces operate together to achieve mission success and to build the capacity and capability of the HN force. Partnering is not an end, but a deliberate process, a means to an end. A near-term goal might be the standup and development of a HN force increasingly capable of independent operations and decreasingly dependent upon US partnered support. An intermediate objective might be the transition of lead security responsibility from US to HN force. But the ultimate goal is to become “un”-partnered, to enable the HN force to assume full responsibility for security and stability. In warfighting and counterinsurgency partnering, divorce is not a bad ending, it is the desired outcome.

Partnering should be a real union between the two partnered organizations, with a common purpose, in which the whole of the partnership becomes greater than the sum of its parts. Real partnering is total immersion. It cannot be done on occasion, when convenient, or as time permits. Nor should it be limited to periodic or occasional combined combat operations. Real partnering is instead a continuous, collective, and collaborative effort on tasks both large and small toward the common goal. It is full throttle engagement, warts and all.

Real partnering is messy and hard. It is not for the faint of heart, nor for those who seek the less arduous road. In particular, partnering requires respect for one another despite differences in size, skill, training, capability, or culture. The differences are often significant and sometimes highly frustrating. To be effective, each partner should recognize and accept those differences, but without allowing them to detract from the partnership or from the mission. Where the difference is a weakness, the US force should apply “tough love” and press the HN force to improve, pressing to the point of failure without allowing the HN force actually to fail.

Yet, the differences usually also comprise opportunity. In every partnership, each partner has relative strengths. US forces may be better at providing fires, air, or logistical support. HN forces may be better at communicating in local languages, identifying local people, estimating their intent, or sensing when something is culturally out of place. The

opportunity may be even greater if the partnership includes both HN Army and HN Police forces who, with US forces, form a partnering trinity. Effective partnering will exploit all those relative strengths, whatever they are, to make the whole of the partnership greater than the sum of its parts.

Leaders are key. Partnering requires flexible and forward thinking leaders at every level who inspire their forces to leverage each partner's capabilities. Partnering requires extra innovation and resourcefulness in dealing with situations that need to be fixed immediately, especially in a setting where the only help available in the near term may be from one another.

Finally, personal relationships are key. Counterinsurgency operations, in particular, are inherently about personal relations, those between the partnered forces, and those between the forces and the local population. Locals must see and appreciate the cooperation between the combined forces, and eventually must develop trust and respect for the HN force in order for the HN force to assume full responsibility for security and stability.

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Introduction

Provided by 2d MEB

From the beginning of the deployment of the 2D Marine Expeditionary Brigade (the MEB) into Helmand Province in the Spring of 2009, the Marines of the MEB and the Warriors of what became 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, Afghan National Army, began forming what evolved into a deep and enduring partnership that was to prove instrumental to prosecuting an effective counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. The MEB engaged the ANSF, as well as the Afghan people at large, as partners and equals in a shared effort to bring security and stability to southern part of their country. Eventually the MEB would conduct embedded partnering in its operations with every type of Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) assigned to the MEB's Area of Operation (AO) – Afghan National Army units of several types, Afghan National Police units with local and nationwide missions, and Afghan Border Police forces.

The concept that we employed was embedded partnering, which eventually became the policy of the US national and coalition military leadership in Afghanistan. In essence, Marines and Afghans embraced each other. American and Afghan units lived and operated together or side-by-side as one integrated force, forming an unbreakable bond of mutual trust, respect and admiration. We partnered with every component of our Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), especially the Ground Combat Element (GCE), but also the Air Combat Element (ACE), the Logistics Combat Element (LCE), and importantly the Command Element (CE). We did so at every level of command, from the Commanding General to the Fire Team. We did so in every staff functional area, even US Chaplains with Afghan Mullahs, and within every unit and every formation. We spent time not only on combined tactical and technical activities, but also devoted time to developing all-important personal relations as well.

As a result, Marines and ANSF forces eventually saw themselves as true partners and comrades. They developed a strong sense of loyalty to each other as brothers in arms. Both sides demonstrated this loyalty repeatedly both on and off the battlefield. For example, Afghans and Marines honored each others' fallen heroes by participating in each other's dignified transfer ceremonies, and Marines made the extra effort to ensure that Afghan heroes were treated with dignity in a manner consistent with their culture. That loyalty, in turn, reinforced the strength

and effectiveness of the partnership itself, thus creating an upward spiral of continuously strengthening relationship.

The effect of all this was far more than just an interesting cultural experience for our Marines and Afghan companions. The effect was the development of a combined force that was far more effective and better able to accomplish its mission. From Afghan Border Police and Light Armored Reconnaissance units patrolling the southern expanses of the AO together, to integrated Marine and Afghan rifle companies conducting major combat operations in Central Helmand, Marines and Afghans partnering and integrating across all of our operational and functional Lines of Operations formed a unified and powerful counterinsurgency force.

Partnering proved particularly valuable and effective in prosecuting a counterinsurgency mission, as it has in so many other such campaigns throughout American military history, where the objective was not to destroy people and property, but to provide security to the local population, give them confidence in their own government, and eventually transition lead security responsibility to their indigenous forces.

USMC and ANSF forces were especially well-suited to partner with one another because our interests were so aligned and our strengths and attributes were so complementary. The sum was greater than the parts. The ANSF could do some things better than the Marines: communicate in the local languages, of course, but also identify people, estimate their backgrounds and intent, know their customs, sense when something was culturally out place or out of order, to name a few. The Marines could do some things better than the Afghans: provide fire and air support, logistical movement, and helicopter diplomacy, to name a few. But we were aligned in our commitment to bring peace and security to Afghanistan, as well as in our cultural orientation toward enthusiastic and aggressive execution of small unit tactics. We leveraged these differences and similarities to mutual and common benefit. The ultimate impact was that we achieved operational objectives that we could never have achieved as easily on our own.

The partnering was never perfect. We might have benefitted from doing more of it in some units and on some operations than we did. And even where we partnered effectively, it was not all fair winds and following

seas. At times, it was deeply frustrating, for both sides. The partnerships were not developed overnight, but rather forged over time through the repeated expression of commanders' intent, command emphasis, hard work by all our forces, commitment to mutual respect, and enormous patience by both Marines and Afghans. Cultural differences, in particular, were sources of frustration. But having recognized all those challenges in advance, the most effective units did their best to recognize and accept the cultural differences without allowing them to interfere with partnering. From infantry units to combat support and aviation formations, flexible and forward thinking leaders at every level leveraged the capabilities and expertise that each partner possessed. In the face of all the inherent challenges, the honest and sincere efforts of these Marines to partner with their Afghan forces resulted in a truly synergetic security force that was the lynchpin to bringing greater security and stability to a troubled land.

The experiences of 2D MEB were unique, but the value of partnered military operations, especially in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign, is not unique. The cumulative experiences of American military units in partnered operations over the centuries lends itself to the creation of the current volume, a document whose objective is to consolidate into one place the essence of the best lessons learned, so that our military professionals of the future can benefit from and apply those lessons to future campaigns. It is our hope that our shared experience in partnered operations will comprise one contribution to this critical professional development.

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Chapter 1

Partnering

Overview

While there is some written material about advising and training of foreign forces, little has been written about *Partnering*. Partnering is not just a “Grunt only” responsibility; it is a concept that involves the entire MAGTF in building host nation capability and capacity At the battalion level, and below, including the LCE and the ACE, partnering takes on many forms and is tailored to the specific circumstances of the operational environment and Host Nation (HN) partner. The intent of this primer is not to tell commanders how to partner, but to provide some guiding principles and fundamentals for successful partnering. Some may be more applicable than others; but, like the *Fundamentals of Machine Gun Employment*, the more fundamentals that you can successfully employ, the more effective you will be.

Partnering has been a historic and integral element of the Marine Corps’ warfighting legacy from the Banana Wars through the recent conflicts in the Middle East. The *Small Wars Manual* makes clear references to the need for partnering. “Native troops, supported by [M]arines, are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government.” And, “[M]arines act as reserve in support of the native forces and are actively employed only in grave emergencies. The [M]arines are successively withdrawn to the larger centers, thus affording a better means for caring for the health, comfort, and recreation of the command” (SWM, 7).

Partnering Defined

a. Definition. In warfighting and counterinsurgency operations, partnering is a command arrangement between a US security force and a host nation (HN) security force in which both forces operate together to achieve mission success and to build the capacity and capability of the HN force. Partnering is not an end, but a deliberate process, a means to an end. The ultimate goal is to have the HN’s force assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability of their own country under the full cognizance of the HN government. When joined

as partners, two or more units will teach and learn from each other, and ultimately un-partner. Both organizations must recognize the mutual benefit of sustaining and growing the relationship. This “trust-based” relationship is built by living, training and conducting combined operations together. Partnering is a shared experience; while organizational integrity is maintained, all else is shared. This Handbook focuses on the areas depicted in Table 1, below.




Table 1

b. Mission. The mission for both the partnering unit and the HN security force must be clearly defined and understood by both commanders in order to better understand the roles and responsibilities of the advisor, the partnered unit, and the partnering unit.

c. Tiers of Partnering.

1. It is important to understand the different forms that partnering may take. Partnering is not an end in and of itself, rather a means to an end. In “counterinsurgency, eventual success [will] depend on the indigenous government demonstrating its own sovereign power” (JFCOM Capstone Concept).
2. Critical to a partnering mission is the creation and active maintenance of goals by the commanders. Goals of each of the partnered units will effect the desired duration of the relationship. This allows commanders transiting through the process in any particular seven, nine, or twelve month period to gain a quick understanding of whether or not they are achieving the desired goal and meeting the operational commander’s expectations. At the tactical level, fully understanding and appreciating this point will help manage

expectations of success, development of the HN unit, and help define when “good is good enough.” Partnering occurs at various levels of maturity and will evolve over time. Partnering can be envisioned in 4 tiers – from the least mature to a fully developed and integrated partnership. See Table 2, below:

Capability/Capacity	
TIER 1	
<p>HN force is completely dependent on US support and all operations are US led</p> <p><i>'Least Mature' Partnership</i></p>	<p>This tier requires extensive training and advising of a HN force to build the capability and capacity necessary for partnering. During this period US forces may be conducting most, if not all, the foreign internal defense of a country until the HN military can be recruited trained and formed into units. The goal is to develop the HN force to a capacity that facilitates partnering. While the focus of this primer is not advising, it is vital to understand that if a US force is assigned an advising mission, the best opportunity for success lies in conjunction with partnering. If advisors are required, the partnered unit must provide their strongest, most proficient and capable personnel to the HN unit: the “provision of high quality advisors to indigenous forces” is the mechanism by which Marines “develop political legitimacy so that the local police and military forces are acting with the support of the local populace” (Joint Operating Environment)</p> <p>This relationship usually takes the following form: US unit plans, rehearses, trains and executes with HN observing. Our goal is to move from Tier 1 as soon as the partner is prepared. This is the least preferred degree of partnership as it fails to leverage the partner capabilities and exposes the coalition force to insurgent methods to discredit the host nation.</p>
POLITICAL DECISION REQUIRED FOR TRANSITION TO THE NEXT PHASE	
TIER 2	
<p>HN force can provide limited support to itself; however, will still require US support in order to accomplish certain mission sets or for sustained sustenance</p> <p><i>'Maturing Partnership'</i></p>	<p>In this tier, the HN forces have matured to a point where partnership is now possible and is moving toward a reciprocal relationship, where units partner as equals, drawing mutual benefit from each other. In this category the HN may be able to provide some security to the local populace, provide some emergency relief but is not yet fully capable to plan, train and execute combined arms missions.</p> <p>This reciprocal relationship may take 3 forms: 1) Marine unit plans, trains and executes with HN in support</p>

	2) HN unit partially plans and executes with Marine units in support 3) HN unit executes with Marine Corps enabling only
POLITICAL DECISION REQUIRED FOR TRANSITION TO THE NEXT PHASE	
TIER 3	
Host nation (HN) that fully supports itself (logistically and operationally). This is referred to as Coalition Warfare	<p>This tier can be defined as coalition action in pursuit of a common goal (often strategic) and is episodic in nature. Marine assistance may be required, but, other than some liaison officers (LNOs), the force is self sustaining and equipped. Also characterized by the fact that no formal alliance may exist, however, political and military agreements have been made in order to accomplish a specific mission.</p> <p>This relationship may take 2 forms: 1) HN unit plans, trains and executes with Marine Corps forces enabling only 2) HN plans, trains and executes independently with US/Coalition observation and LNOs</p> <p>End State: A HN force that is capable of conducting basic independent or combined operations IAW HN doctrine and able to perpetuate/sustain that capability to the next generation of HN security forces.</p>
MILITARY DECISION REQUIRED FOR TRANSITION TO THE NEXT PHASE	
TIER 4	
Fully Integrated w/ existing Treaties and standing Alliances to govern conduct and relationships	This is the most developed form of 'partnership'. It includes fully integrated combined operations. This level typically involves existing treaties and alliances that govern the conduct and specific roles and responsibilities of all parties. In this tier, it is possible to have another nation's military under Marine forces control and vice versa.

Table 2

3. While partnering in general may map to these four tiers, it is vital to understand that your unit may be inserted into any tier or may be called upon to conduct multiple tiers simultaneously. This Handbook limits its focus to operations conducted by the Marine Corps at the battalion level or below, normally focused on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 Partnerships in Table 2, i.e. in conjunction with a HN who is not part of a standing alliance.

4. One common method of partnering has been putting parallel and like units together. Optimally, partnering should be achieved by vertically establishing partnering relationships between the partnering

units, from the lowest tactical level to the highest levels of the national governments. Should there be gaps in partnering the HN civilian leadership structure with corresponding US government agencies, the effort of all below will be diluted. Partnering must be holistic and include the other entities involved in the operation. All organizations involved in re-stabilizing, reconstructing, or rebuilding the HN must work in harmony towards a common endstate and should be partnered at every level possible. It should include partnerships between the HN government and US government officials, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Designing an effective partnering scheme of maneuver will be discussed in detail later in Chapter 4.

d. Advisers. Embedded advisers are the crucial element to effective partnering, but in many circumstances it will not suffice to allow a HN security force to become independent. Where a more mature partnership exists (Tier 2, 3) embedded advisers provide access to US or coalition enablers. In immature partnerships a combination of advisers, trainers and partnered units is needed. As missions, HN capacity, organic capabilities, and capacity differ, it is critical that units conduct a thorough mission analysis prior to deployment. This will provide the necessary insight into the approach and capabilities that are required for partnering.

e. Trainers. In some cases HN partner units will come to you having gone through training programs conducted by U.S./Coalition forces. There may also be Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) that will come out to provide more focused training in such areas as; CIED, intelligence collection, command and control, and planning. Understand the training background of the unit you are partnering with and continue to provide build on previous training. Ensure that you have training packages ready to support your HN unit. Let the HN unit see your unit training as well, so they understand that training like camouflage is continuous even in a high tempo operational environment. You may also have to develop your own MTT to support units you are partnered with. Finally, you will also need to develop a "train the trainers" program.

Partnering Relationships

a. Supported vs. Supporting. Partnering relationships and roles can be thought of in terms of a supported force and a supporting force. In some

instances, Marines may initially be the supported force, in that they will lead the planning and conduct of operations. The ultimate goal of this relationship must change to a supporting relationship, where the HN forces will plan and conduct operations with the support of Marines. This support can be in the form of ground troops, tactical enablers, and/or logistical support. Responsibilities (ours and theirs) will vary based on the mission. As soon as the HN's forces are capable of conducting independent operations without support, the partnership effort has achieved its goal. Any future relationships between Marines and the HN will then be determined through political dialogue, which could present future training activities and liaison between militaries.

b. Patience, Trust and Respect. Successful partnering starts with relationships that are clearly built upon three very important traits: patience, trust and respect.

1. In order to truly partner effectively, both partners have to establish professional relationships built upon a common trust, respect, and goals. Strong personal relationships will develop from strong professional relationships and professional relationships are enriched through personal relationships. For example, if a partner can implicitly trust your professional opinion/guidance, they will establish a personal relationship based on mutual trust and shared backgrounds. .Whatever the decisions, actions, and/or operation(s) undertaken, they must serve the interests of both parties.
2. With some HN forces the first action to develop is a personal relationship based on personality and social trust. Personal relationships start with the commander, but are also the responsibility of every member of the HN force. As these personal relationships develop, trust and respect is the natural by-product. This trust and respect will increase efficiencies and productivity on both parties as their actions become more and more combined. Also understand that as friendships develop, there is a cultural expectation to exchange small gifts to demonstrate this friendship. Be prepared to establish guidelines for accepting gifts and Marines should be prepared to reciprocate with small tokens of appreciation.
3. Patience is required to establish and build a trusted relationship. Western cultures and their military forces are characterized with an expectation of immediate response. Our training emphasizes an ability to quickly process and respond to corrective instructions. We are time sensitive and time oriented. We must recognize and understand that

many partners are not as time oriented, so we need to be prepared to adjust and operate within this constraint remembering the long term goals of the partnership.

4. The ability of US forces to appreciate and understand the HN's religion and cultural requirements such as 'saving face' will facilitate building trust and respect –the importance of which cannot be overstated. Never make a promise to your partner you can't keep.

c. *Benefits of Partnerships.* There are inherent challenges to overcome in order to partner effectively. These challenges range from linguistic challenges, cultural differences, incompatible and different equipment, threats to operational security and force protection, as well as, undeclared national interests. However, while not always apparent, the benefits will often outweigh the challenges. US and HN forces operating in this environment will gain a great deal of legitimacy and appreciation in the eyes of the local population as they operate alongside their HN's security forces and allay any perception that may exist about US intentions. In a practical sense, HN forces provide a great deal of cultural and enemy intelligence, linguistic skill, and social acceptability. In a strategic sense, they reinforce government sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority. Effective partnering enable HN forces to reestablish contact and credibility with the local inhabitants.

d. *Endstate.* Commanders must continuously assess and critically examine how their partnering efforts are working towards their common goals. There is no single right solution. The mission must be carefully analyzed and reanalyzed, roles clearly defined and delineated, and an assessment made of both partners' strengths and weaknesses in order to determine how the partnership will be formed and developed. Building the capacity within the host nation force for independent warfighting and institutional functions IAW HN doctrine, policies and procedures is the goal. Further developing a HN force that (1) has a legitimate standing with the local populace and (2) operates with the support of the local populace will ensure success. It is not our objective to develop a force that can fight in "every clime and place" rather to operate in the environment they are facing. The focus needs to be on ensuring the unit is proficient with those core skills that are required by their nation and are effective in the environment they are facing.



Chapter 2

Partnering Guidelines

“You better get in there and eat... You eat that sheep in the bowl. Or you’ll be here next year, the year after that, and the year next. Your kids will be here.”

-GySgt Dober, Platoon Commander, 2D LAR

Be culturally aware but not overly-sensitive.

a. Help the HN understand our perspective, our culture, and our values. Our values will most likely not be theirs so do not impose your values upon their culture; however, do not jeopardize your own morals and beliefs by being overly sensitive to theirs. The key is to ensure that the HN has a basic understanding of our values, especially the delicate balance of honesty vs. saving face.

b. HN forces understand that there may be times when the cultural strain is too great to overcome “living amongst” their personnel, but we must promote the sharing of common areas (dining area, COCs (within classification parameters), etc.) and activities (meals, PT, weapons/vehicle maintenance) which will ultimately help bridge cultural differences without encroaching on each other.

c. It is extremely important that HN forces have the same or similar amenities (per their cultural beliefs) as your Marines – be prepared to go without until the HN force receives it. Bottom line: if the HN forces don’t have it, work with them to get it. Equity prevents envy and the perception of double standards.

d. Understand that the Marine Corps has a ‘Warrior Culture’ unto itself and this culture is widely respected. Do not be quick to sacrifice our Warrior Culture for ‘cultural sensitivity’ because it can be perceived as weakness. Setting the example is often the fastest and most effective way to convey new ideas and concepts.

e. Have a basic understanding of the HN religion since it will likely affect how HN officers make decisions.

f. Understand the additional social requirements placed on HN leadership, especially those ‘non-traditional’ paternal relationships that

may exist beyond what exists in the Marine Corps. Also understand any gender specific relationships – male/female.

g. Make every attempt to speak the language. Every Marine may not be fluent, but make every attempt to introduce language training early and often. Individual Marine language skills will improve as they operate alongside HN forces; the by-product of this effort helps to build trust quickly in counter-insurgencies.

Be sure that you have the ‘right’ interpreter. Here are a couple of simple rules of thumb for interpreters:

a. When possible ensure that the interpreter is from the same tribe/clan as the partnered unit. This may be impossible given ethnic diversity in the security force, but careful selection and training of and relationships with the interpreter are required.

b. If the HN unit does not trust or respect your interpreter, don’t try to force him on them. If the HN unit offers you an interpreter he will still need to be vetted.

c. In some cultures the age of the interpreter matters, especially when dealing with senior leadership. An older interpreter imparts not only language translation skills, but tacitly imparts credibility because many cultures place a high value on age and equate it to wisdom.

d. Take gender into consideration. In some cultures it is acceptable to have a female interpreter speak to males, in others, it is strictly taboo. It may be completely possible and advisable to have female interpreters working in office spaces so long as they do not accompany you into the field.

e. In sum, cultures will look at age and gender differently. Be conscious of the potential implications – i.e. not having the ‘right’ interpreter may severely degrade your credibility. Build a diverse core of interpreters as the situation permits. Odds are that you will need every one of them in order to be successful – but do not sacrifice quality for quantity.

f. An adviser or commander/leader who is working through an interpreter must establish a personal and professional relationship with the interpreter. An explanation of personality, beliefs, understanding and

familiarity with family will ensure that the interpreter understands the adviser/commander and enhance his ability to communicate effectively with the partnered commander/leader.

g. Ensure that the interpreter-translator is prepared to support the discussion about to take place and understands what the lead speaker's talking points are to mitigate the risk of miscommunication.

Do more than operate with HN – Living with HN forces is the only way

a. Build trust through shared experiences, hardships, and successes

b. Equity not Equality - Equity implies that there is a seat at the table. Although some partners may have access to more influence, power and resources, it is necessary that both partners have equal input in the discussions when it comes to working a solution. HN solutions should predominate.

c. Combine planning, training, operations, and duties. Establish a Battle Rhythm and stick to it. Formations, unit PT, inspections, weapons maintenance, etc. serve practical purposes and are vital aspects of a security force culture. If it does not exist within the HN forces, work with the leadership to establish.

d. Remember that force protection is vital to the success of the partnership. Be prepared to alter force protection to *protect the force*, but do not appear to be protecting yourself from your partner or inadvertently sending the message that you are frightened, especially in cultures that have a singular word for “coward” (i.e. Pashtunwali).

e. Give them credit for all success you achieve together, especially with their chain of command and within the local community

f. Be genuine and sincere in everything you do

Encourage HN forces to build relationships with the local leaders

a. Positive interaction with the people builds trust – build this trust above all else!

b. Encourage local recruiting for security forces, especially police. In the United States, local police have to live in the communities that they work in; yet, in many places, national police are moved throughout the country where they have no ties to the community and are often viewed as outsiders. This may be an expedient method to restore law and order, but it should only be used in the most extreme circumstances. Locally recruited forces will have the backing of that community – “their community” – and their training by Marines and HN military units serves to reinforce the ties among Marines, the HN forces, and the communities that they operate in. Until the police force is made up of ‘local sons’ there will be no real security or trust in an area.

c. Encourage the HN force to develop an information operations (IO) plan and effective methods to convey key messages to the people. HN forces should be the primary executers of information operations and they should be on hand to explain it to the people. Perception is important to the success of the partnership and its goals.

d. Encourage HN forces to help local leaders govern well.

e. Help shape and guide the local leadership to make good decisions. This includes assisting HN forces to be more locally involved and persistent in engaging from the tactical to the operational levels.

f. Empathize with the people’s problems and frustrations – help them translate problems and frustrations into workable and effective solutions that engender greater contentment.

g. Work through HN systems to reach consensus and provide a forum for the people to address their issues, such as local leadership meetings and/or city council/town hall meetings.

Do not solve HN logistics problems by performing these functions for them – work within HN systems and processes

a. Be comfortable with HN levels of acceptability for effectiveness and efficiency so long as they accomplish their missions and perform to standard. The key is to help the HN force implement their solutions, not simply execute yours. Remember, “good enough is good enough, so long as they do it.” Expectation management is the key. You are not

trying to make Marines, just an effective and sustainable organization that is as efficient as possible *within their established system*.

b. Make the HN process more efficient. Temper solutions by understanding the capacity of the HN logistical system. The less mature the operating environments, the more involved Marines need to be. HN units that are not paid, fed, allowed to call home, granted leave, etc. will quit. In these cases do not wait for the ‘acceptable’ HN system to work – have a solution readily available to prevent mutiny when/if the HN process fails.

c. Understand the difference between ‘empathy’ and ‘sympathy’ – do not become sympathetic.

1. *Empathy* - “Intellectual identification with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another person” (Random House Dictionary, 433).

2. *Sympathy* - “harmony of or agreement in feeling, as between persons or on the part of one person with respect to another” (Random House Dictionary, 1332).

Be prepared to perform both your and the HN unit’s administrative and logistic functions until the HN system becomes reliable enough to sustain their unit.

a. Once that occurs, the ‘de-coupling’ may commence. The key is to be able to wean the HN force off Marine support without letting it die of neglect. The old maxim, “don’t mess with a Marine’s pay, leave, or family” holds true for HN forces as well.

b. Self-sufficiency may involve the HN force subsisting off the local economy and markets, which is a good thing. It builds rapport with the locals, provides security to the population, and develops close ties to the community

c. Realize that your solutions, though tried and true for our units, may not work nor may they be the best solutions for the HN’s problems

Embrace the chaos of the environment

a. Do not allow frustration with the HN to show – do it in private away from the partnering force members – never display direct frustration in front of your partnered force.

b. Understanding the HN forces' frustrations (specifically focused on inefficiencies of their existing systems/processes that make simple tasks difficult) is critical; it is beneficial to the relationship for them to know you are aware of and understand their frustration. However, it also important that you avoid getting caught in an “us versus them” atmosphere, especially when it comes to dealing with the HN's higher headquarters.

c. Temper expectations –yours and your partners. Slow progress is still progress and your contribution is an important piece of the larger plan.

Partnering relationship is a two way street. Do not assume that the Marines are the only ones that will advise and train.

a. In order for this relationship to work effectively, a ‘reciprocal’ relationship must be in place. There should be a mutual benefit to both parties. Not only will this be extremely useful in certain areas where the HN force possesses expertise in local conditions – it will also help them ‘save face’/gain respect within the community.

b. In some circumstances, HN forces and leadership should and will advise and train Marines. Utilize the HN forces' vast knowledge of culture, terrain, and social dynamics. They are a force multiplier when employed correctly because, while HN forces may have different doctrine than Marines, it may better reflect the tactical and cultural situation better than ours.

c. Provide positive feedback to the HN unit when their advice has enhanced the capabilities of your unit.

Provide sufficient partnering and monitoring at all levels of HN forces

a. Through careful and constant monitoring, you will be able to apply subtle changes to TTPs and principles in order to achieve the ultimate goal of “de-coupling” from the HN force. Your ability to easily shift and adapt to changes in the command relationship with the HN force should be transparent, so long as this transition occurs when the HN force increases their capability to certain, established level. Depending on the partnership tier, an advisor or LNO Team may be able to provide timely and accurate information that allows for the slow and smooth de-couple process and enable the HN force to assume greater responsibility for their battlespace, tactical operations, and administrative control of the area. The decision to de-couple is often not the completion of a checklist or pre-determined criteria, rather an informed and logical assessment of the situation and the capability of the HN force.

b. Ensure commensurate rank and experience at all levels of the partnership. The rank and experience of the partner is significant to establishing good relationships.

c. Choose to do the ‘harder right’ of involving HN staffs in the planning process from the beginning. Make them do the work and although it lengthens the process, do not do it for them, do it “with” them. This effort is so much more than “advising” them.

Do not hesitate to deviate from doctrine when needed.

a. The intent here is to “be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound”. “A force engaged in small wars operations, irrespective of its size, is usually independent or semi-independent and, in such a campaign, assumes strategically, tactical, and territorial functions” (SWM 2-10, pg 11). “In short, the force must be prepared to exercise those functions of command, supply, and territorial control which are required of the supreme command or its major subdivisions in regular warfare...For these reason, it is obvious that a force undertaking a small wars campaign must be adequately staffed for independent operations even if the tables of organization do not specify a full staff complement” (SWM 2-11, pg 12).

b. Section 2, “The Staff in Small Wars,” from the Small Wars Manual provides suggestions for re-organizing existing staff functions in order to meet the demands of conducting small wars. Of particular interest is how to integrate existing staff functions with civilian leadership, HN

forces, and State Department personnel. In short, the existing staff structure may be inadequate to conduct small wars, so it is essential that necessary changes be made to account for the increased responsibilities found when operating on foreign soil with a HN force and the added requirement to assist in local governance. An assessment of required staff functions to fully partner with a HN force is required and may involve the addition of additional staff and/or the changing of existing billet descriptions.

Build a unified team with Marine and HN staffs - develop and refine daily

a. Respect how they do things – help them lead well.

b. Understand the capability of the host unit – and task within their capacity.

c. Guide them to make good decisions, but do not make decisions for them.

d. Support the HN commander’s decisions in accordance with the established rules of engagement (ROE) and the law of war (LOW). It is vital that the HN understand our ROE and the LOW and respect them.

e. Recognize the balance between tactical and operational goals/needs and HN morale.

f. Be aware of unit politics and the influence of tribal and ethnic ties.

g. Be prepared to (BPT) provide access to coalition and USMC fires, non-kinetic effects, and other support (i.e. artillery, mortars, CAS, IO, CasEvac, etc.)

Build your best team for the mission

a. The importance of attitude and temperament cannot be overstated. Embedded advisers must be selected.

b. Perform a comprehensive mission analysis and determine the skill sets, personality traits, and leadership abilities required for the mission. Marines gravitate toward what they know and are comfortable with.

This is not a popularity contest, not every Marine will possess these traits. Regardless whether they are the best Marine in the squadron, battalion, or group, they may not be suited for advising or mentoring of foreign, HN forces.

c. You must make staffing decisions (to the extent that you can control them) based on your knowledge of your Marines personalities and temperaments. Extroverted Marines suited for this mission will have more personal energy at the end of a day full of discussions and meetings than Marines who are introverted by nature. Unit/team leaders must manage unit/team member energy daily for ‘burn-out.’ Burnout is a very real issue when dealing with HN forces. It affects seasoned Marines who are used to doing things “their way,” but also exists amongst our younger and less mature Marines who have not yet developed strong leadership coping skills. As a Marine’s patience erodes, so potentially does the relationship with their counterpart. Guard against and always be aware this.

d. Experience.

1. The Marine must always be able to bring professional experience to the table. Do not short-change this. The long and lengthy education/training process for Marines does not equate to parity with a HN counterpart who may have been fighting his entire life.
2. Advisors and mentors are part of this team. Whether embedded or external augments, they will impact your level of success with a HN force. All activities must support each other and must be coordinated. When establishing any new policy that restricts or appears to restrict HN forces, the partnering unit must consult the advisors/mentors to discuss the potential impacts, before broaching the subject with the HN force commander.

Ensure that every Marine understands the importance of the mission and the implications of failure.

a. Pre-conceived notions based on previous deployments, rumors, and cultural misgivings will damage relations

b. If Marines understand the commander’s intent two levels up, they will understand where their unit fits into the larger picture and help them understand the ‘why.’

BPT graciously ‘take a back seat’ to HN forces as their capabilities increase

a. We should not be seen as leading, rather a transparent shepherd. Do not allow frustration with indecisiveness or inaction to supplant patience and understanding. Offer advice and options to the HN commander to consider. It is critical not to compromise the HN's commander's leadership position among the HN forces and/or other officials. Not doing so will relegate that commander's position to a puppet in the eyes of the populace. This is a tool which can and will be utilized by the insurgent's propaganda machine. However, it is also our responsibility to have a plan to step in and assist in accomplishing the mission if the HN forces are unable to complete it on their own; this plan should reflect assistance vice taking over.

b. Understand the nature of the ‘Supported’ and ‘Supporting’ relationship. Strive to be the *supporting* unit.

c. Be the HN force advocate to other US units and fight for their interests

Understand Risk

Don't be adverse to the risk, but mitigate it. The risk can be mitigated by the reciprocal trust obtained in the establishment of personal and professional relationships. You must accept that a greater security is obtained when fully partnered with HN forces.

a. When living amongst the HN unit, keep track of normal operating procedures and be wary of those that are outside the “norm”. Keep track of the movement and demeanor of individuals within the unit.

b. If you have a trusting relationship with the HN partner unit leader, identify your concerns with him. If not, identify your concerns with your HHQ.

c. Conduct initial operations that are HN supportable and desirable, well thought out, and allow for a high probability of success. Continue to build on this, to increase confidence and reduce risk.

d. Build a rapport and respect amongst each other that will allow for the HN partnered unit to take responsibility for keeping “track” of their personnel.

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Chapter 3

Designing the Partnership

Designing the Partnership Program

A partnering program must be comprehensive in its approach. Within the partnership, there must be a common vision and shared understanding of each partner's goals. The program must support open collaboration and free exchange of information within classification parameters in order to sustain development, maintain the initiative, and promote the HN force's role. Effective partnering exists at multiple levels from the lowest tactical unit to the political levels. It is important to understand the command and support arrangements for each partner. Seams or gaps at higher echelons may impact how your partner is able to operate. Examples that might assist in visualizing this idea are logistics support that may affect a partner's capability or capacity or pay procedures that affect morale.

a. Holistic partnering arrangements generated from the higher headquarters, HN Ministerial or Department level are essential. Tactical level partnering successes are "short lived" without successful partnering at all echelons. A tactically proficient partner battalion is for naught if proficiency is not also developed at the higher levels to support that battalion. Of equal importance is that the partnership be balanced. Gaps in echelons of the partnership created by dissimilar organizations must be accounted for. The uniqueness of the MAGTF may create a dissimilar relationship, which must be taken into account. For instance, in Afghanistan there is not a corresponding level of command and control below the ANA Brigade, so the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) do not have a partnered command which needs to be recognized and planned for.

b. The partnership scheme should describe command arrangements, plan for training and assessments, and plan for relief and transfer of authority. Constant assessment, information exchange, and adjustments regarding HN forces are to be expected and must be planned for. Some HN units will be better prepared than others, and in some cases there will be significant disparity between a unit's readiness level and the readiness level of its higher headquarters or sub-units. Knowing the HN's unit readiness level and how it relates up and down its chain of command is critical to partnering. Embrace the successes enjoyed by other partnered

units, socialize those successes with the HN force, and collaboratively evaluate and apply those lessons learned as applicable.

Understanding

Designing the partnership should include an understanding of the operating environment, partner capabilities and capacities, anticipated missions and tasks, and red lines or limits for a partner.

a. Partnerships take time to build and develop. They are principally built on mutual respect and open relationships. Developing a relationship takes time and is enhanced by shared experiences and successes-- appreciate that fact, embrace it, and plan for it. Developing a partnering scheme of maneuver based solely on a timeline will lead to frustration and failure.

b. Understanding the history, culture, region and challenges in that region is important. Sharing that understanding is more important as it promotes learning from each other. Understanding your capabilities and capacities as well as the HN force's capability and capacity must be made before determining the partnering scheme of maneuver. This assessment, made by both commanders, will guide the development of shared goals of the partnering scheme of maneuver.

c. Develop shared goals for the partnership that fall within HN limits. Do not set goals for the HN, rather help them establish goals for themselves and then to develop a plan to achieve them. Meet with the HN commander in order to determine his goals and objective. It is to *understand* why they are what they are. Trying to understand where he is coming from is the KEY factor before starting to work toward a shared goal. Underlying factors may not be readily apparent at first look, so failing to understand the *why* could be a grave error. Do not be fooled into believing that all motivations are clear or pure.

d. Define and understand shared 'Red Lines' (items neither side will compromise on). It will be necessary to establish the cultural framework of each partner that establishes those areas that are "red lines". 'Red lines' include such areas as; collateral damage, treatment of prisoners, the role of female personnel, respect of the civilian population, and application of Marine Corps enablers and effects. These must be

established up front in order to prevent friction points between Marines and the HN and prevent distrust and animosity.

Partnership Plan

a. Your partnering plan is based on findings from the initial assessment and the expected goals and objectives that may be required of the team. The terms of the partnership must be developed similar to a supporting-supported arrangement. In some cases, HN's units will simply require additional vehicles to conduct operation. In others they will require significant training to be able to accomplish required missions; some cases may require fully integrated operations. The terms of the partnership are similar to a contract describing responsibilities and authorities as well as what each partner has to contribute. The terms of the partnership will change over time but must always be understood. The initial assessment will also assist the Marine and HN commander's establishment of priorities.

b. Establish priorities that are nested within the HN commander's priorities. There may be cases where the Marine commander and HN's commander disagree about the order of priority. The HN commander may prioritize what he wants to 'fix' first and will depend entirely on his acceptance of risk. If this conflict cannot be mutually resolved, take the matter to the higher commander. Issues like these must be resolved or they continue to create problems for the entire chain of command; however, once the decision is made the discussion is over. One thing to keep in mind is that the partnering scheme of maneuver is not a rigid plan that cannot be changed. The scheme of maneuver will change during the deployment so pick your battles wisely.

c. Develop a scheme of maneuver to achieve the HN's goals. Partnership is a mindset. It is not something that comes easily. The scheme of maneuver may require completely integrated staffs or units to be moved and re-organized to better align to the mission requirements. Consider appointing USMC personnel to 'deputy' positions within the HN organization and vice versa. These positions may have some real authority or they may not, but it is a golden opportunity to share ideas, develop HN capabilities, truly understand the HN perspective, and deepen the relationship. Be flexible and expect to make changes to current staff organizations in order to be effective. Do not be afraid to

review the plan often and at scheduled intervals in order to make minor adjustments or completely shift priorities based on successes or failures.

d. Issuing the scheme of maneuver needs to be done in two parts. First, the scheme of maneuver should be formally briefed to Marine and HN higher headquarters through proper channels. Both tactical level, partner, commanders should be prepared to brief and defend their plan – together. Doing this allows the Marine and HN higher headquarters to understand what actions are occurring with their subordinates; provide an opportunity to make refinements to the plan; provides a context for future changes in command relationships and/or partnering plan; and ensures that all subordinate units are fulfilling their respective higher’s intent and partnering scheme of maneuver. Once the respective higher headquarters has approved the plan, the partnering scheme of maneuver must be issued to all subordinates - Marines and HN forces alike. Never underestimate the power of two commanders together issuing orders and guidance to their subordinates. This solidifies the “plan” for the partnered forces and strengthens the bonds and ties of the partnership. The key is to ensure that all subordinate units have clear understanding of the partnering mission – down to the last rifleman. Ensuring that they know and understand the plan and ensuring that that all of their actions are supporting the larger partnering effort is critical. This must include any and all advisors, liaisons, ANGLICO teams, and enabling or supporting units.

Assessments (Assess, Adjust, Re-assess, Re-adjust, Be Flexible, and Patient)

a. Assessment plans should include an established timeline for assessments, must be published to all parties, must be conducted as partners, and should strive for parity and equity in the assessment. It is expected that there will be successes and failures throughout the execution of a partnering operation since we should strive for “stretch” goals, and learning from mistakes often achieves more robust success.

b. Successes must be viewed from the perspective of the HN unit. Successful mission accomplishment must meet the shared goals of the partners and be seen as a success by the HN. Success in developing partner capabilities must be evaluated relative to the HN not the partnered Marine unit. It is not the intent to make a HN’s infantry

company equivalent to a Marine Corps rifle company, the intent is to develop its leaders and men to execute the missions required of them.

c. Be conscious of the fact that a unit operating in one region of the country will likely have different requirements than a unit operating in a completely different. Be prepared to tailor your approach to the specific needs of the unit, area of operations, HN commander's desires, or combinations thereof.

d. It is vital to understand the HN's abilities and how it has improved. Shortfalls in the HN abilities may not be fixed 'on your watch', the goal is building a sustainable capacity, so the HN unit can operate independently. The only way to do that is to take it slow. Conversely, the same is true for the HN. They may perceive any success as 'total success' and try to proceed faster and farther than they are capable. Wherever success can be found, look to make it more efficient, but do not dedicate too much time, effort, or resources to something that works, so long as it works "good enough."

e. Sometimes there is value in allowing the HN to suffer some short-term failures in order to achieve long-term success and achievements. This is a very difficult mindset shift for many Americans; however, sometimes more is learned from failure than success. This is usually not an issue at the battalion level and below, but becomes a larger problem at the higher headquarters.

f. Communication up and down the US chain of command is vital to building higher's situational awareness. Only by understanding *why* something failed, will higher be in a better position to support or reinforce decisions or prod their counterpart into fixing a discrepancy.

g. Understanding *why* requires constant attention and assessment. Only by truly understanding why, can both forces ensure that all efforts are unified. It also ensures Marines are assisting HN forces fix deficiencies, not doing it for them.

The Relief in Place (RIP) / Transfer of Authority (TOA) and Transfer of the Relationship

a. The initial plan should be built upon and continued by the next unit, not scrapped. A VERY DETAILED RIP must be conducted *at all levels*

in order to ensure continuity. The momentum must be maintained and the RIP must not be an opportunity for the HN unit to play one US unit against the other, nor is it a time to point fingers and say, “those guys didn’t get it, but we do.”

1. The RIP itself must be a partnership between the outgoing and incoming US forces so that the support relationship is maintained and the HN sees a seamless transition of support from one unit to another. It is irrelevant if one US unit likes the way that the last unit conducted business, the most important piece of the RIP is that the HN force continues in its development and the de-coupling still occurs slowly and in concert with a pre-established plan.

2. Failure to reach this common understanding from the outset will result in a re-coupling of HN force to US force that actually reverses previous success. In short, the RIP is not a time to start over; it is a time to build on successes. In order to ensure that this occurs, higher headquarters must be part of the RIP. Without higher headquarters’ ‘buy in’ and monitoring, units are doomed to repeat past failures (memory is only so good for so long) and provides opportunities for HN units to actually ‘re-attach’ themselves. With that said, the US unit must be a positive balancer to the entire evolution. The HN force commander must be able to voice his opinions and desires, but just because the HN force Commander wants something does not necessarily mean that he will get it. Common ground must be found to balance the difference. This is a ‘partnership’ not an all for one or the other.

b. Conducting the RIP. During the RIP, commanders must emphasize as much face-to-face or knee-to-knee turnover. This must include left seat/right seat activities with emphasis on individual Marines having the opportunity to increase their understanding. They must take advantage of this valuable time to refine their understanding of partner capabilities. During this time, when there are additional forces available, the commanders should conduct a partnered operation with outgoings, incoming, and HN units. This provides the incoming unit with a firsthand assessment, ensures new forces do not re-plow old ground, increases mutual operation awareness, and provides the opportunity to establish critical relationships in a controlled environment.

c. Transition from partnering to overwatch. The plan for this major phase of the partnering process is just as vital as all of the efforts made

up to this point. How and to what extent US force will support the HN forces is crucial to the next phase – the exit strategy. The transition from active partnering to overwatch still requires staff integration because it is at this level where effective planning and execution occurs. If completely removed from the equation, the HN loses the ability to lean on their partners for insight and advice, and US forces lose visibility and perspective on what the HN forces are doing. So long as the staffs remain partnered, then unity of effort is maintained and the HN forces continue seamlessly in their development and towards the final goal of self-sufficiency.

Indicators of Success

a. The partnership is doing what it is established to do. The agreed upon objectives of the partnering program are being met. These are best determined by a combination of the adviser's and the partnered unit's objectives as well as HQs assessment methods. The HN unit increases recruitment from within its operational area, and also developing non-kinetic skills in such areas as; civil-military operations, and IO.

b. The partnership is having a positive impact beyond the immediate partners. Tactical success does not equate to operational success. A HN battalion that is having tactical success, but does not receive proper support along the lines of operation from its higher headquarters, will not likely maintain its positive momentum. This reinforces the need to have a comprehensive partnering approach throughout the chain of command of the HN and the importance of tactical actions having operational and strategic impact.

c. The partnership is sustainable or self-manageable. As the partnership continues to grow, it will be maintained or adjusted so that the decoupling process begins where one partner reduces its direct involvement and provides more oversight rather than direct partnering. Raids that were conducted by US forces with the partner forces providing security are now being reversed. The raid is being conducted by the HN force, with the US forces providing security. Later, the HN partner unit does not require advisors, but effectively employs specific enablers, i.e. an ANGLICO detachment to provide fire support coordination.

d. The partnership has provided gains and benefits to the HN. The HN partner must see the benefits of the partnering. HN leaders may be initially skeptical but will need to understand and embrace it. The HN must see that the partnership is developing the capabilities and capacities that are in support of their objectives and not just those of the US or the coalition partners.

Indicators of Failure

a. Lack/Loss of Trust. It takes time to establish a relationship of trust, yet on the other hand it can be lost very quickly. In many cultures, once it is lost it is extremely difficult to regain. Promising support that is not delivered, not sharing relevant information, and cultural disrespect are just some of the major categories of perceived causes that have derailed successful partnering relationships. Understanding the basis of trust that have been developed between partners and its fragility are extremely important when rotating in new advisors, liaison officers, and partnering units. Subsequent units and personnel will have to continue to build and maintain the trust that was established by previous units. This reinforces the need to have a comprehensive rotation plan, which allows for overlap and a phased turnover approach.

b. Loss of Autonomy by the HN. As discussed earlier, successes will likely be followed by failures. The tendency of US partners is to look at a failure as a time for them to come in and take over, vice a time to sit down and discuss the lessons learned and steps the HN unit can take to correct mistakes. Stepping in to takeover after a failure should not be done rashly. Any such action must be well thought out and planned in order to ensure the HN unit understands and does not “lose face.”

c. Conflicts of Interest. Both partners, US and the HN forces, will run into conflicts of interest. At times both parties will feel pushed to accept an uncomfortable compromise. If viewed in the short term, and not the long term, this has the potential to be detrimental to the relationship. Some personnel are not well suited for partnering missions or will not be initially placed in the best position for this type of operations. It is an arduous task and requires planning, persistence, and patience. Leaders need to be aware of the uniqueness of the partnering mission and place the right people with the right skills within a partnering program.

d. Drain on Resources. From the US perspective, several of the lead indicators used in partnering programs are: what equipment is being provided, is there accountability, is the equipment being properly maintained, and how many people/units are putting toward this effort. If there is a continual drain on resources without a positive return on our investment, then the program needs to be reviewed and re-evaluated to ensure that we are not reinforcing failure.

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Chapter 4

Training for Partnering

a. In developing a partnering mission training plan it is essential to understand the assigned missions of the HN force. Specifically what does the HN Ministry of Defense (MOD) and/or Ministry of the Interior (MOI) define as desired capabilities? Understanding what missions the civilian government expects their force to fulfill lays out the initial left and right lateral limits for the partnering unit. This will affect training density, training focus, and may even assist in establishing an alternate task organization. Second, review the Advise, Train, and Assist (ATA) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual, the Cultural T&R Manual, and the Infantry T&R Manual. Finding common tasks will lead to training efficiency and provide commanders with potential area and opportunities for additional training.

b. Training typically falls into three categories - Advisor/mentor, partner, and individual/collective Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) skills. While not a complete and comprehensive list, the list below should help guide Marines in planning and conducting training for a partnering mission.

1. Advisor training includes, but is not limited to:

- Understanding the HN command and control hierarchy
- Staff planning functions, which includes the ability to teach staff planning at battalion level and how to integrate a HN staff.
- Learn and train police specific skills
- Immersive scenario and role player based training focused on key leadership engagement (KLE), and HN security force training, advising, and combat advising
- HN History which will greatly help in building rapport
- Understanding HN security force's processes and procedures across all functional lines
- Introduction to human questioning techniques
- Transition Readiness Assessment Tool (TRAT) and Area/Structures/ Capabilities/Organizations/People/Events (ASCOPE) assessment
- Classes on the HN doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures

- Individual train-the-trainer (T3) focusing on noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
- Integration of government organizations, and civil affairs (CA) elements. A relationship should also be developed with Non-Government Organization (NGOs) via a bridging organization such as a non-military government organization.
- Understanding the HN forces internal readiness assessment reporting

2. Partnering unit training includes, but is not limited to:

- IO development and implementation
- Logistics management in support of (ISO) distributed ops
- Negotiation skills and conflict resolution
Foreign weapons, communications, and vehicle training\
- Understanding the HN command and control hierarchy
- Staff planning functions, which includes the ability to teach staff planning at battalion level and below and how to effectively integrate a HN staff
- Learn and train police specific skills
- Immersive scenario and role player based training: focused on key leadership engagement (KLE) and HN security force training, advising, and combat advising
- HN History which will greatly help in building rapport
Understanding HN security force's processes and procedures across all functional line
- Introduction to human questioning techniques; intelligence collection and dissemination
- TRAT and ASCOPE assessment
- Classes on the HN doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures
- Individual Train The Trainer (T3) focusing on NCOs
- Integration of government organizations, and civil affairs (CA) elements. A relationship should also be developed with Non-Government Organization (NGOs) via a bridging organization such as a non-military government organization.
- Understanding the HN forces internal readiness assessments
- Commander's emergency response program (CERP) Funding
- Lessons learned and after action reports (AARs) from other units operating in the area

3. Additional Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP):

- Lessons learned and AARs from other units operating in the area
- CERP Funding
- Communications classes
- Convoy operations
- UAS employment
- Urban warfare training
- IO development and implementation
- Female engagement team (FET) integration
- Company level intelligence cell (CLIC) and non-kinetic targeting
- Distributed operations
- Escalation of force and use of force
- Sensitive site exploitation – theatre specific
- Improvised explosive device (IED) awareness and integration of IED dogs and route clearance
- Dedicated advisors, trainers, and liaison detachments may not be part of the partnering unit, but should be integrated into the pre-deployment training program as early as possible (where possible) to establish relationships prior to deploying, especially if, in some cases, they may be reporting to a separate chain of command.

c. What are the training tools and who do you go to for training assistance?

1. MEF

- a) Special Operations Training Group (SOTG)
- b) Advisor Training Cells (ATC) / Advisory Training Groups (ATG)
- c) Other MEF developed training programs and initiatives

2. SCETC - The Security Cooperation Education and Training Center coordinates service-level security assistance (SA), security cooperation (SC), civil-military operations (CMO), and humanitarian assistance (HA) for the Marine Corps.

- a) Security Assistance. SCETC's emphasis in SA includes providing mobile training teams in conjunction with foreign military sales (FMS), managing Marines attending partner nation training and education, and managing partner nation

students attending USMC training and education courses and schools.

- b) Security Cooperation. SCETC's focus in SC includes sourcing SC Teams from TECOM subordinate commands in support of regional Marine Forces Commands and the supported combatant commander, in order to build partner nation capacity in institutional and warfighting functions. SCETC also conducts a range of assessments supporting SC planning. SCETC provides expertise with regard to authorities and funding of SC activities and conducts the SC Planning Course. SCETC has developed and maintains cognizance on the Advise, Train, and Assist (ATA) Partner Nation Forces (PNF) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual (NAVMC 3500.59), which is useful for developing individual and collective skills for Marines and units engaged in partnering activities.
- c) Civil-Military Operations. SCETC conduct pre-deployment training for Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) and units assigned Civil Affairs missions. SCETC also conducts both the military occupational specialty (MOS) producing Civil Affairs Course and the Civil-Military Operations Planners Course.
- d) Formal Courses. Security Cooperation Planners Course; Civil Military Operations Planners Course; and Civil Affairs Course.

3. CAOCL - Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. The Marine Corps established the CAOCL as the central Marine Corps agency for operational culture and language training. CAOCL's mission is ensure Marines are equipped with regional, operational culture and language knowledge through training, education, research and mentorship in order to plan and operate effectively in the joint expeditionary environment. CAOCL is the Marine Corps' institution focused on culture and language and its impact on operations. CAOCL is a resource for operational culture and communications skills prior to and during deployment and for career long cultural regional learning. The goal of Marine Corps culture and language training and education programs is to develop a force of Marines that have the skills needed to quickly and accurately comprehend and then appropriately and effectively operate in any culturally complex environment to achieve the desired effects. It is imperative that units developing a PTP review

the Operational Culture and Language Training and Readiness manual (NAVMC 3500.65). Units should contact the appropriate CAOCL LNO listed below as soon as possible to begin coordinating and scheduling required CAOCL training events.

- a) Mobile Training Teams. CAOCL has personnel available for delivering classes & briefs at home station or underway
- b) Operational Culture Classes. (2 days/16 hours) - *Iraq and Afghanistan only*. These classes are designed to give the student the cultural knowledge and skills relevant across the spectrum of modern military operations in foreign environments. Operational culture, not “cultural sensitivity,” provides Marines the tools they need to navigate the cultural terrain in support of the mission.
- c) Operational culture briefs. (2-4 hours) provide familiarization with the aspects of a foreign culture that can influence the success of military operations in a foreign environment. Operational culture briefs for numerous countries are available.
- d) Operational language classes. (20-200 hours) provide familiarization of operationally-relevant terms and phrases. The core/basic-level class can be supplemented with three mission-specific categories of classes and material: civil affairs, military advisors, and detainee handling. The operational language classes provide students, at the minimum, the ability to use CAOCL language cards to communicate. There are complimentary self-study language materials, available through CAOCL (outlined below), that enable a motivated student to become proficient in communication of functional phrases without reference (e.g. common greetings, pleasantries, farewells, and commands). MTT operational language classes currently available: Iraqi Arabic, Pashto, Dari, French, and Spanish. CAOCL can arrange classes in other languages through the use of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, CA.
- e) Self-study culture and language resource. In order to provide an assortment of additional opportunities to Marines for operational culture and language self-study, CAOCL is currently providing access to a number of distributed learning, computer-based product

- f) The CL-150 Technology Matrix for Critical Languages: CL-150 is designed to support the learning of all languages determined by US government organizations to be of national security interest. The CL-150 suite of products provides a variety of culture and language learning and sustainment tools appropriate for all proficiency levels and all learning regimens: classroom, distance learning, remote mentoring, and self-study. The software operates on many of the hardware platforms now commonly available to Marines: laptops, desktops, Web, PDA, iPod, etc., (not all CL-150 software is compatible with NMCI computers).
- g) *Rosetta Stone*. All active duty and reserve Marines are able to access the Rosetta Stone® Language Learning Software via the MarineNet Distance Learning Portal:
www.marinenet.usmc.mil.
- h) Operational Language Training System (OLTS). currently provides language and culture training via four modules – Operational Iraqi, Operational Pashto, Operational Dari, and Operational Sub-Saharan Africa French.
- i) Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRCs). In an effort to meet home station training requirements, CAOCL is establishing Language Learning Resource Centers (LLRC) at all eight major Marine Corps Bases to facilitate culture and language training for all Marines. The LLRCs are computer labs equipped with culture and language study materials and software.
- j) Incidental language program. The incidental language program, per MARADMIN #0670/09 signed November 23, 2009, clearly states the four phases of the incidental language training for battalion and regimental commanders. Phase 1: (commanders focused training) for infantry battalion, light armed reconnaissance battalion, and regimental commanders conducting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) PTP, those deploying commanders in support of OEF will receive 40 hours of live instruction by CAOCL SMEs on key leader engagement in culture and language, other commanders and or officers that are slated for command will receive CDs and computer based training (CBTs). Phase 2: deploying commanders will be assigned culture mentors, where the non-deploying commanders will receive 40 hrs live instruction based on the affordability and

or funding. Phase 3: evaluation of the deploying commanders in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) at Twentynine Palms, CA during the mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) on their language and culture ability provided by CAOCL assessors in the field during the MRX. Phase four: deploying commanders may coordinate with CAOCL for sustainment using CAOCL MTTs. The 40 hours key leaders program consists of: 25.5 hours of the use of tactical language, 1.0 hour on how to communicate through an interpreter, 0.5 on non-verbal communication, and 2.0 hours on cross-cultural communication.

k) CAOCL Liaison Officers (LNOs). For advice and assistance in regards to culture & language training, please contact the appropriate LNO:

1. I MEF: Steve Taylor staylor@prosoll.com
2. II MEF: Jim Parran parranj@battelle.org
3. III MEF: Ron Williams rwilliams@prosoll.com
4. MARFORRES & Others: Naser Manasterli
NManasterli@prosoll.com

4. The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) conducts MRX, as well as Marine Expeditionary Force exercises (MEFEX) and Marine Expeditionary Brigade exercises (MEBEX). Participation in these exercises as a MAGTF staff allow for the opportunity to plan for partnered operations at the MEB and MEF level. During the conduct of the command post exercise portion of these exercises, the MAGTF staff is also afforded the opportunity to execute their plan using a simulation of the operating environment along with role players that simulate HN government officials and security forces.

5. The MAGTF-TC also offers many training/assessment venues for the Battalion Commander to utilize in preparing for deployment: MCTOG; MAWTS-1; MAGTF-TC ATG; TTECG; MCMWTC

“Soft Skills”

a. Conflict resolution – which includes learning how to arbitrate disagreements through a cultural lens.

b. Team building

c Organizational skills. The US military's organizational skills have been built over a long period of time. Trying to teach a HN US organizational skills will not work, so it will be necessary to be prepared to teach the basics.

d. Teaching skills. Training is not the same as teaching. The US training methods will not work in some places with very low literacy rates because US training methods are based on a 'base-line' educational level. Teaching and training is much more difficult when dealing with low literacy rates. Periods of instruction must be rewritten, more pictures must be used, and the language/instruction must be simplified as well. These things take time and are best done slowly in garrison before deploying.

e Listening skills. Listening is a key skill, and some Marines are better at than others. The ability to listen to people and understand what they are trying to say, both overtly and subtly, is not something that every Marine has, but it can be trained. This skill becomes particularly vital when conducting key partnering tasks like interviewing local nationals in order to collect information about the enemy, local leadership, etc.

f. Patience and Persistence. Sometimes the best thing to do is nothing. We have a tendency to see something wrong and want to go in and fix it right away. Partnering requires the ability to stand back at times and allow the HN unit to make mistakes and learn from them. Based on their background, those areas we see as problems maybe obvious to us, but not to them. It also requires persistent engagement, it can not be "drive by partnering", but constant working together to establish proficiency.

Chapter 5

HN Training and Support

a. Training. Training with HN forces is a challenge. This is especially true in states with very different cultures and capabilities. No one needs to guide Marines on how to train; it is what the Corps excels at. There are, however, factors that commanders should always consider when preparing for joint training in partnership environments:

1. Training of HN forces should be by invitation only and the parameters of that training thoroughly understood by all involved from battalion commander to rifleman of all participating partner elements.
2. Culture and local customs must always be taken into considerations. Degrading behavior and embarrassment of the less capable members of the partnership is a recipe for failure, especially in well-defined ancient cultures. What they may lack in *esprit de corps* as the US views it, they make up for in pride. Ensure all Marines selected to conduct training are of a rank commensurate to their counterparts, have sufficient maturity and expertise to enhance the partnership, and do not provide the insurgents with tales of American arrogance.
3. Train-the-Trainers. One of the goals of partnerships such as Afghanistan is capacity building. By developing local trainers, commanders assist in developing a professional cadre who will have far greater influence on developing a capable force much faster than coalition partners ever can by doing it for them.
4. Encourage HN leadership by teaching them to do it right and letting them garner all the success gained by the results of coalition force participation.
5. Develop a 'professional school' environment as much as possible and be prepared to alter training techniques based on literacy issues. This should include supporting presentation of awards and training certificates by HN commanders to enhance morale.

6. Suggest formalization of training to the HN commander in order to validate certification of the training by other levels of command so that the unit and student receive ‘credit’ regardless of where they may be assigned in the future.

b. Support

1. Support of HN commanders in partnership environments is challenging. Lack of infrastructure and mature support institutions coupled with a lack of literacy and fledgling military and/or police capabilities are temptations for commanders and their staff to want to help too much. Over-reliance on partner forces discourages the maturing of the partnered unit and creates a dependency, which is unlikely to foster the development of a stable democracy in which the population can place their trust. As a partnering commander, success is best achieved by being like a shadow on a cloudy day, always in the background and ready to guide, not to do it for your partners. Help them develop their capacity by populating teams with capable Marines who possess the patience and tolerance for ambiguity necessary to mentoring. Partnering Marines must possess detailed knowledge of:
 - a. Your partners’ institutional and structural centers of power and influence. Who is really in charge? What interdependent relationships exist, both formal and informal? Gain information from a variety of sources and learn to trust and work with interpreters to understand what right means.
 - b. Capabilities and limitations from both institutions and structures above such as a corps headquarters and the central government as well as adjacent such as the local village leadership.
 - c. What actions and behaviors should be synchronized between partnered and partnering units (TTPs, conducting SSE’s, etc).
 - d. Other actors in the area such as USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, etc, as they can be valuable sources of both historical and current trends.
 - e. Know HN and partnered unit logistical, medical, communications, and other support capabilities as well as choke points in advance. Partnering Marines should have the

requisite knowledge to assist, but the patience to let your partner fail in non-critical situations so they may learn from their mistakes and not become overly reliant.

2. Utilize HN local and national government support and assistance whenever possible. This assists in encouraging the development of capacity and building trust among the population. External support sources should also be investigated and their capabilities explored by:
 - a. Developing relationships with USG Agencies such as State, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Country Teams, FBI, DEA, DOA, Treasury, etc, to capitalize on their expertise and provide alternative sources of assistance for your partnered unit.
 - b. These agencies may also be used as “bridging” elements to communicate with the Non-Governmental Agencies (NGO) in the area as means to assess needs and problems. Contact with NGOs should be developed via a bridge so as to not place them in danger from insurgents.
 - c. Commanders should also develop relationships with coalition forces and friendly foreign government agencies in the area. This will better assist in HN capacity building through international cooperative efforts, especially for large projects which may be needed.

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Annex A

Reading List for Partnering

NAVMC 3500.59 Advise, Train & Assist Partner Nation Forces Training and Readiness Manual

MCRP 3-33.8A Advising, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces

FMFRP 12-25 The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him

Lawrence T.E. Seven pillars of Wisdom

The French Forces in America 1780-1783.

Punishment of Virtue

Afghanistan, A Short History...Martin Ewans

The bookseller of Kabal, Asne Seierstad

Tactics, the Bear Went over the Mountain

Afghan Constitution

Small Wars, CE Callwell

Small Wars Manual

SOF Advisors Handbook

Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Publication: Advising Foreign Forces (Sept 2009)

ALSA Website: <https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/default.aspx>

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Annex B

Vignette: Helmand Province

By the fall of 2009, 3d Platoon, Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion had conducted kinetic operations for three months in southern Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While maneuvering through the austere terrain and territory previously void of coalition forces, the platoon encountered multiple complex ambushes, indirect fire attacks, and improvised explosive devices. At the end of August, the Company Commander, Captain Christopher, instructed the 3d Platoon Commander that his Marines would assist engineers in designing and constructing a patrol base south of the Helmand River. Upon its completion, 2nd Lt John's platoon and attachments would be responsible for the security of the outpost and conducting operations in the surrounding areas. The ultimate goals of the patrol base were to influence the surrounding villages by providing security, disrupting the enemy's freedom of movement, and spreading the battalion's information campaign. In order to publicize and demonstrate the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the platoon would be partnered with 40 members of the Afghanistan National Border Police.

Three weeks after Patrol Base South Station had been completed; the platoon had already made significant advances in conducting census operations. The platoon had immediately identified the village elders and religious leaders and begun to regularly meet with them in order to address the Marines' goals, learn how the coalition forces could aid the villagers, and discuss the enemy's influence in the area. With less than two days of notice, the platoon was informed that the Border Policemen would be arriving to operate with the Marines. Although having heard the reasoning for partnership and the importance of bolstering the image of the local forces from the highest leadership levels, the Marines were wary of this new relationship for multiple reasons. The Marines knew that their schedule was about to become even more hectic and were already worn from securing South Station and conducting multiple patrols a day. Although training was going to be the main thrust of the initial few weeks of the partnership, the Marines were unnerved by the fact the Afghans would have weapons and ammunition and that soon they would be operating with the Border Policemen as a joint force. Some Marines also had previous negative experiences with coalition forces from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and they believed local forces to

be incompetent and corrupt. Another platoon had already partnered with ANBP north of the Helmand River and stories had been passed about their lack of hygiene, whining, and stubbornness. Knowing the personal hesitancy of the Marines, the platoon's leadership hammered the Noncommissioned Officers with the concrete benefits that the platoon would receive from developing a relationship with the ANBP. Once the NCOs viewed the relationship with the ANBP from the perspective of professional warfighters and put aside any personal reservations, the platoon had positioned itself for success with the ANBP. The Marines keeping sight of the positive cost benefit analysis of partnering with the local forces enabled the platoon to overcome the ANBP's growing pains and continue to work towards long term victory in southern Helmand.

Upon the ANBP's arrival, Captain Christopher dictated that the Border Policemen would receive two weeks of training before beginning operations. Although the ANBP platoon had worked with Marines before, their lack of fundamental infantry skills became evident immediately. However, because of pride and previous efforts with Marines, they were extremely resistant to training because they believed they had all the knowledge that they required for success. Once their leadership was convinced that they would also teach the Marines classes about their culture and military experiences, an intensive training schedule began. From individual weapons handling to patrolling, the Marines built a training schedule based on skills they believed necessary to succeed in the operating environment. The ANBP quickly grew tired of working in the mornings and evenings and disliked the regimented schedule the platoon had imposed on them, but the Marines insisted on continuing at the rapid pace. The training culminated in a live fire, in which the ANBP completed a modified Combat Marksmanship Program course of fire. The live fire provided the ANBP a much needed morale boost and continued to assuage the Marines fear of a friendly fire incident.

Integrating the ANBP into combat operations immediately improved the accessibility of the villagers. Although the village leadership claimed not to trust the ANBP, the commoners were much more willing to speak with coalition forces and have ANBP in the vicinity of their homes compared to when the Marines operated alone. During foot patrols, the ANBP would send a squad comprised of about 10 Policemen to accompany a section of scouts which was made up of 10 to 15 Marines. While conducting mounted operations, it was often difficult to

incorporate the ANBP's vehicles due to the terrain. The LAV-25's were able to negotiate much more terrain than the ANBP's Ford Rangers or 5-ton Truck. This was frustrating to the ANBP because they were forced to rely on us for rides or, if they had brought their vehicles, for multiple recovery efforts. The platoon was fortunate to have dedicated Military Policemen who acted as mentors during operations to the ANBP. The Marines would have been overwhelmed if team leaders had to correct and focus on controlling the ANBP through the use of an interpreter and lead their own subordinates. During operations, the Marines encouraged the ANBP to focus on the basic principle of the Cycle of the Infantryman. As they progressed in skill and proficiency, they became more competent in holding security while remaining covered, moving with dispersion, and paying attention for longer periods of time. A battalion operation at a large bazaar served as the largest scale mission with the platoon and ANBP working together. The mission placed a heavy emphasis on demonstrating the proficiency of Afghanistan's forces in order to bolster the information campaign. The ANBP searched over 500 shops by conducting mechanical breaches and discovered weapons, drugs, and illicit chemicals. They also helped hold security while over ten improvised explosive devices were neutralized as the enemy's rockets exploded around the bazaar. Although significantly aided and mentored by the Marines during the operation, the ANBP were extremely proud of their accomplishments and were praised by the battalion leadership and embedded press.

The ANBP were eager to fight and kill the enemy but their enthusiasm caused tension since they were not allowed to operate independently from the Marines. The ANBP did not desire to operate alone offensively but wanted to operate independently to obtain more Class I supplies. Their common request was to conduct resupply by convoying to their old district center which would have taken multiple hours through unsecured territory or leave the patrol base to purchase goods at the local bazaar. In response, they were confronted with the reasoning that our battalion controlled the battle space and would not risk an independent ANBP operation due to limited fire support, casualty evacuation platforms, and command and control. Often, this controversy would lead to the ANBP expressing that they felt like prisoners and were being treated like children. They believed that they were equals with the Marine platoon, although they were completely provided for by the Marines. Besides their pride, they believed in their equality because Captain Christopher had told the ANBP's platoon commander that Lt John was his right hand

and that the ANBP platoon commander was his left hand. This was an absolutely necessary step towards building the ANBP to become self sustaining eventually, but proved difficult when the Marines had to deny the ANBP their operational requests. Through all the arguments, regardless of frustrations, relying on the cost benefit analysis enabled the Marines to continue to nurture the ANBP.

Another cause of discontent with the ANBP was their lack of communication with their families and inability to give them money. The ANBP had been promised leave after a certain amount of time on station, but since they had transferred between Marine units their time had restarted. Since they could not go on leave and there was no banking system, they had no way to give money to their families. Also, they had no way to contact their families without satellite phones or a mail system. The Marines did their best to disguise when they received mail or packages from home or were able to use the one satellite phone the patrol base had available. However, the ANBP knew that the Marines were able to contact home and used it as ammunition in arguments over accommodations. The Marines knew that keeping the ANBP motivated was crucial to their operating capabilities so they always installed or repaired the heat, electricity, and any amenities that the patrol base had for the ANBP first. The platoon knew that their own discomfort was a short term issue and that by offering these gestures of good will, the ANBP would be better able to build a solid foundation for success.

Throughout the platoon's time partnering with the ANBP, there were moments of frustration, but they were far outweighed by the pride the Marines took in the bonds they had formed and progress they saw with the Border Policemen. The ANBP admired and respected the tenacity and hospitality of the Marines. The ANBP's transition process to work with the incoming Marine unit was painful for them. The ANBP had tearfully expressed how thankful they were for our service and how sorry they were that our men had been hurt by their country when the Marines had had to evacuate three urgent casualties during a joint patrol. The Marines had also shared many late night feasts with the ANBP, eating the native food, drinking tea, and laughing over translated jokes and cultural misunderstandings. Although the Marines who initially trained and mentored the ANBP have returned to their homes, the ANBP remain at South Station, continuing to fight for their country. The only way the Afghan forces will enforce stability in the region by themselves is if Marines down to the smallest unit level continue to think of long term

goals that are larger than their personal comforts and time on deployment, and continue to foster a relationship with the host national forces.

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Annex C

Friendly Force Information Requirements for Consideration in Partnering

1. Background and history of your HN partner.
 - a. How the HN is military organized? What are the HN names of these organizations?
 - b. What is the rank structure? How does it equate to your units rank structure?
 - c. Who are the key players of the unit I am partnering with?
 - d. What are their backgrounds, militarily, culturally, and linguistically?
 - e. What are the cultural norms of the unit? Which ones may cause issue with your unit?
 - f. What other language capabilities does the unit have outside the standard language of the area? English, French, German, Spanish?
 - g. What has been the units training? Individual and collective?
 - h. Who runs the training? What schools have they attended?
 - i. Are the soldiers' conscripts? Or enlistees? Or volunteers?
 - j. What are the skills of the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)?
 - k. What are the units' views on the role of NCO's?
 - l. Where do their officers come from? How to they get promoted? Experience/Expertise? Favoritism?
 - m. What is the pay scale for the unit? How do they get paid? Does the unit have an incentive program? Promotions, decorations, incentive pay?

- n. What is their liberty/leave policy? Will it affect your unit during time period you are partnering? Holy days? National Holidays?
- o. Does the unit have a combat history? Types of operations conducted?
- p. Has the unit partnered before and with who?
- q. What are units' strengths? What are units' weaknesses? What is there best operating level? Squad, Platoon, Company?
- r. Does unit have operational quirks? Won't patrol at night? Will not enter specific areas?
- s. What is the command relationship and personnel relationship of the unit with it higher headquarters?
- t. What is the units' relationship with the civilian population?
- u. What is the units' command and control capability? Is it compatible to your unit? How do they disseminate information? Verbal, Written orders, radio, cell phone?
- v. Does the unit have any Standard Operating Procedures?
- w. What ability does the unit possess in control fires? Air and Surface?
- x. What are the procedures for dealing with captured enemy?
- y. Has the unit trained to conduct heli-borne operations?
- z. What is the HN unit's capability to conduct day to day operations? Logistics, Admin, C2, Planning?
- aa. What intelligence capabilities does the HN possess? Analysts, HUMINT, Recon, scouts etc?
- bb. What type of Information Operations (IO) capability and understanding does the unit have?

- cc. Do they have a Civil Affairs like capability?
- dd. Do they have a PSYOP capability?
- ee. Does the unit have any Non-Lethal weapons capability?
- ff. What type of weapons do they have? Do they have maintenance program? Do they have armorers? How do they get additional weapons? How do they maintain accountability?
- gg. What night vision capabilities does the unit possess?
- hh. What mobility does the unit have? Trucks, pickups?
- ii. How is the units supported logistically?
- jj. What is the subsistence of the unit? What do they eat? Who provide their chow?
- kk. How does unit perform administrative functions? Personnel rosters? Platoon commander notebooks?
- ll. How does unit deal with KIA's and WIA's? Where are their CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures?
- mm. What has been the historical relationship with the HN forces and the local population? What is the current relationship?

2. Important information for Your Unit

- a. Where is the AO you are partnering in?
- b. What is the operational environment? What is its historical, cultural, and operational history?
- c. What history and cultural information should you share with your HN partner?
- d. What cultural challenges could impact your relationship?

- e. What capabilities do you have that will be in high demand?
- f. What do you need to effectively partner with the HN unit? Do you have the right expertise and personnel required?
- g. What are your gaps in capability?
- h. Are there advisors with the unit you are partnering with? What is the U.S/Coalition involvement in partnering throughout the chain of command? Training Teams, Liaison teams, advising teams, ANGLICO?
- i. Are there advisor teams that will be supporting your partnering unit that are not from your unit? Are they already in country? If not, and they deploying with you are you training with them?
- j. Will your unit fall in on advising teams that have been on deck for awhile, but will rotate in the middle of your deployment?
- k. What tasks do you want to ensure individuals and units are proficient to support the partnering mission?
- l. What are the language requirements? Do you have interpreters to train with, or will you fall in with them when you get to HN country?
- m. If units basic training being conducted by US or Coalition, what does the training program consist of?
- n. What is your chain of command in identifying requirements to support the HN unit you are partnering with?
- o. What support will your unit also be responsible for with the HN unit? Administration? Logistics? CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, initial triage? Holding prisoners? Mobility? Do you have the right personnel to support additional requirements or do you need augmentation?
- p. What assets can you make available to the HN unit? UAV's, CAS, helicopters?

- q. Are you providing advisor teams? If so, to what level?
- r. Do you have armorers who are trained to support partnering units weapons systems?
- s. Do you have communicators who understand HN units communications systems?
- t. What is your plan or what are the procedures for information sharing, especially classified information?
- u. What plan for execution or training do you have if required to support HN units in the areas of civil affairs, IO, PSYOP?
- v. What mirror image personnel are you going to dedicated to the HN Bn? Administrators, Logisticians, Communicators?
- w. What is your plan to work with developing the HN Bn staffs?
- x. What training program do you have developed in HN language to support continual training?
- y. What is your training program to develop familiarity with HN units weapons and equipment? Dummy cards? FamFires?
- z. Do you have access to food that HN unit will likely be subsisting on to provide to your unit prior to deployment?
- aa. Do you have ability to assist in developing products to support HN unit IO plan?
- bb. How will you unit be dispersed to support partnering? If extensive, to you have right C2 capability? What is plan for logistics support? Do you require additional support? ROWPU, Generators, additional radios?

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