



MARITIME HOMELAND THREAT ANALYSIS BRANCH

MARITIME THREAT SUMMARY

USCG INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) SCOPE

(U) The Maritime Threat Summary is a monthly product the Maritime Homeland Threat Analysis Branch (MHTAB) of the US Coast Guard (USCG) Intelligence Coordination Center produces for USCG Homeport.^A It highlights suspicious maritime activities and security incidents associated with the US Maritime Transportation System (MTS).

(U) CURRENT TERRORISM THREAT SUMMARY

(U//FOUO) No credible intelligence suggests al-Qa'ida or other transnational terrorist groups are actively plotting attacks against the US MTS; however, they remain the greatest threat. The illicit entry of people and materials into the United States via the maritime domain remains a vulnerability that can be exploited by terrorists.^B

(U) MARITIME THREAT SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS

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^A (U) HOMEPORT is a publicly accessible Internet portal providing all users with current maritime security information. It is available on NIPRNET at: <https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/home.do>.

^B (U) Risk mitigation is a continuous process involving all stakeholders. This threat summary assumes that, if an adversary develops or transfers an attack capability against a target within the Sector, an attack could potentially occur with little or no time for law enforcement to detect, interdict, or disrupt the evolving plot. Therefore, it is incumbent on local port officials to continue their efforts to identify and address potential vulnerabilities, as well as actions to lessen disruptions, losses, or other attack consequences, regardless of the absence of a specific, tenable threat.

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(U//FOUO) *Greenpeace Activity Observed at Sandy Point State Park, MD, Pg. 11*

(U//FOUO) *Lif jackets Used to Smuggle Ecstasy From Canada to the United States, Pg. 12*

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(U) INCIDENTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CONCERN


(U//FOUO) *GAO Investigators Used Fraudulent TWIC Cards to Access US Seaports*

Figure 1: (U) Port of Los Angeles–Long Beach, Long Beach, CA.^c

(U//FOUO) According to a May 2011 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), undercover GAO investigators conducted security tests in 2009 at nine of the largest commercial ports in the United States which revealed serious security breaches. GAO investigators accessed the ports using counterfeit Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) cards, authentic cards acquired through fraudulent means, and by stating false reasons for needing facility access. Port security allowed undercover investigators, who posed as port personnel and drove vehicles containing simulated explosives, to enter secure port areas.

^c (U) Image of Port of Los Angeles–Long Beach: www.latimes.com/news/la-fi-port-smuggling-201110408.0.4299005.full.story

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(U) Poaching Nets Discovered in the Chesapeake Bay off Tillman Island, MD

Figure 2: (U) Illegal Net Filled With 3 Tons of Rockfish, Tillman Island, MD^D

(U) According to an NBC Washington report, on 3 May 2011, Maryland Natural Resources Police (NRP) officers discovered a mile-long net in the Chesapeake Bay that snagged 3.3 tons of striped bass, commonly known as rockfish. Maryland environmental authorities said it took several hours to remove the net, which poachers illegally deployed off Tillman Island. The net had likely been in the water since the beginning of the year, a local fisherman found it when a line became entangled in the mesh. The 450 rockfish inside the gill netting died, and authorities sent them to a local landfill for disposal. In 2011, NRP has located 10 poaching nets in the Chesapeake's waters for a total of 16 tons of illegal catch. Authorities subtract illegal tonnage from the total yearly allowance for commercial fishermen. State officials closed the commercial season in early February 2011 after discovering poaching nets containing 12 tons of fish. The commercial season will resume on 1 December 2011.

^D (U) Image of Rockfish: http://cdn.stripersonline.com/5/55/555eff4f_vbattach465416.jpg

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
(U//FOUO) *Suspicious Activity at Blount Island Marine Terminal, Jacksonville, FL*

Figure 3: (U) Blount Island Marine Terminal, Jacksonville, FL^E

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville report, on 18 April 2011, a credible source reported details of suspicious TWIC card activity in the Port of Jacksonville to the Coast Guard Intelligence Service (CGIS). Reporting suggests a "cottage industry," a special local escort service for the port, has developed as a result of the requirement that persons must hold a TWIC badge to access controlled areas in and around Florida's seaports. The current price in Jacksonville is \$35 USD per hour to escort a driver with no TWIC card. The source is aware of businesses that have full-time employees who do nothing but escort persons who require access to the port, but do not hold a TWIC card. Some escorts wait near the fence outside of the port, waiting in line to make money. Ports America, a local tenet at the port, is allegedly involved in illegal activities such as vehicle theft for shipment to Africa and ghosting payroll. It reportedly published a list of approved escorts who have access to its controlled spaces. This affords Ports America the ability to prohibit escorts from its controlled areas, but not the entire port.

^E (U) Image of Blount Island Marine Terminal: http://images.marinas.com/med_res_id/47745

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

(U//FOUO) *Security Breach at the SSA Marine Terminal, Long Beach, CA*

Figure 4: (U) The SSA Marine Terminal, Long Beach, CA^F

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach report, on 27 April 2011, Long Beach Police officers responded to a report from the SSA Marine Terminal where a company security guard had stopped an unauthorized person who did not possess a TWIC card in the terminal container yard. As the security officer was questioning the person, he ran up the gangway of the docked vessel M/V PACIFIC LINK and attempted to board it. The vessel's crew refused the person entry, and authorities took him into custody. The police interviewed and arrested the man for trespassing. He claimed he wanted to go to China because his family was trafficking drugs.

^F (U) Image of the SSA Marine Terminal: <http://www.ssamarine.com/locations/pacificSW/TerminalA.pdf>

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
(U//FOUO) *Illegal Panga Landing at Crystal Cove, Laguna Beach, CA***Figure 5: (U) Crystal Cove Beach, CA^G**

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach report, on 7 April 2011, members of the California National Guard detected a panga with 14 persons on board as it attempted to enter Crystal Cove Beach. Twelve unidentified persons exited the panga, climbed a nearby cliff, and waited just west of the Pacific Coast Highway. Two subjects remained in the panga and headed back out to sea. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel deployed air and marine assets. CBP agents arrested the 12 subjects who hid along the cliff side of Crystal Cove and transported them to the San Clemente CBP station. A US Navy helicopter spotted the panga 10 nautical miles east of Catalina Island. After an extended chase, the USCGC BLACKTIP apprehended the panga and towed it to Dana Point Harbor where CBP agents took the two subjects into custody.

^G (U) Google Earth: Crystal Cove Beach, CA

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
(U//FOUO) *Maritime Smuggling Event at Imperial Beach, CA*Figure 6: (U) Imperial Beach, CA^H

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector San Diego report, on 30 April 2011, CBP agents operating near the Imperial Beach area apprehended a suspected undocumented migrant exiting the water dressed in a black wet suit. During the apprehension, agents noticed a Jet Ski sitting dead in the water between the south end of Seacoast Drive and the mouth of the Tijuana River. USCG small boats were unable to locate the Jet Ski. After the suspected migrant was transported to the Imperial Beach CBP station and interviewed, agents determined he was a Mexican national who was in the United States illegally.

^H (U) Google Maps: Imperial Beach, CA

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(U//FOUO) Crewmember Deserted From the M/V NORWEGIAN PEARL, San Francisco, CA**Figure 7: (U) M/V NORWEGIAN PEARL¹**

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector San Francisco report, on 3 May 2011, local law enforcement officials notified CBP agents that an assistant cook from the M/V NORWEGIAN PEARL failed to return to the cruise ship before the designated curfew of 1600. The crewmember remained unaccounted for when the vessel was scheduled to get underway. The subject last swiped his identification card at the gangway at 1042 on 3 May. A search of the person's cabin revealed that all of his personal belongings were still onboard. The subject was last seen wearing regular clothes and had received a salary of \$740 USD on 30 April. Ship personnel stated the crewmember met with relatives while ashore and is considered a deserter.

¹ (U) Image of the CS Norwegian Pearl:

http://www.allaboutcruisesnc.net/Images/Cruise_Lines/Norwegian/Peral/perarl_ship1_web.jpg

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(U//FOUO) *Abandoned Pleasure Craft Used in Smuggling Event in Ventura Cove Park, CA*





Figure 8: (U) Ventura Cove Park, CA^J

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector San Diego report, on 30 April 2011, San Diego Lifeguard services personnel notified CBP agents of an abandoned pleasure craft (model-Bayliner, hull no. WN8835 LG) located in Ventura Cove Park. Border Patrol agents arrived on the scene and observed the Bayliner adrift in Ventura Cove with no lines mooring it to shore, and three life preservers scattered throughout the southernmost rock jetty of the park. Agents found foot tracks in the sand indicating that multiple individuals travelled from the west edge of the rock jetty to the Bahia Hotel parking lot. Agents determined the Bayliner was used for maritime smuggling, and approximately nine individuals were on board.

^J (U) Google Maps: Ventura Cove Park, CA

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
(U//FOUO) *Greenpeace Activity Observed at Sandy Point State Park, MD***Figure 9: (U) Sandy Point State Park, MD^K**

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector Baltimore report, on 1 May 2011, an NRP officer observed Greenpeace personnel at Sandy Point State Park near Annapolis, MD. Greenpeace personnel arrived in two vehicles, each towing one zodiac-style vessel. They launched each vessel with four occupants and performed maneuvers such as blocking and boarding tactics. Reportedly, one of the vehicles was a Ford box truck with a Maryland registration. In the past, the Greenpeace vehicles have been plain white vans or box trucks. The Ford box truck was dark green with “Climate Emergency Response” painted on the side and “Greenpeace” painted on both doors and both rear quarter panels of the vehicle. USCG received previous notifications of Greenpeace performing drills near Sandy Point State Park. It has conducted such training near Mezick Pond near the Sandy Point Park boat ramp.

^K (U) Google Maps: Sandy Point State Park, MD

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(U//FOUO) Lifejackets Used to Smuggle Ecstasy From Canada to the United States**Figure 10: (U) Detroit, Michigan - Canadian & US Board^L**

(U//FOUO) According to a Coast Guard Sector Detroit report, on 15 April 2011, CBP agents provided a briefing on the use of lifejackets as a concealment method to smuggle small amounts of ecstasy from Canada to the United States. Recreational vessel operators, mostly riding a Jet Ski or Sea Doo conveyance, would depart the United States travelling to the Canadian shoreline. Once there, the operator would exchange his or her regular lifejacket for one containing ecstasy tabs with an individual on shore, then return to the United States. The ecstasy would be hidden within the jacket itself, not simply placed in a pocket, making detection more difficult.

^L (U) Google Maps: Detroit, MI

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(U//FOUO) Product Information

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(U) PRODUCT FEEDBACK

(U) This report is provided by the MHTAB. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Branch Chief, MHTAB, (301) 669-4058 or e-mail MHTAD@uscg.smil.mil.