OEA Team Threat Report

Taliban Insurgent Syndicate Intelligence Operations Oct 09

Taliban prepare for attack, Apr 2009 [1]

OEA Team Threat Report

Purpose

To inform deploying units, trainers and scenario writers of the Taliban Insurgent Syndicate's intelligence operations capabilities in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

This presentation has been developed from multiple sources and is intended for use as a training assistance product for Department of the Army organizations preparing to deploy. This briefing should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner.

TRISA

OEA TEAM

Taliban Insurgent Syndicate

Taliban Alliance [2]

Taliban AF

HIG

TTiP

Uzbek Jihadis [2]

IJU

IPT

Al-Qaeda [1]

Osama Bin Laden   **Zawahiri**

Other [2]
Uyghurs
Chechens
Europeans
Algerians
Somalis
Sudanese
Libyans

Pakistani & Kashmiri Jihadis [2]

LeT

HuM

JeM

LeJ -Sipah

Threat Lay Down

| Strength (Est.)	Initials	Group
15,000+	TB	Taliban Afghanistan (Includes Haqqani Network)
15,000	TTiP	Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan
Thousands	Various	Warlords, including Lashkar-i-Islami
5,000	TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Cleric Maulana Fazullah)
3,000	LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
3,000+	HuM	Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (Faction Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami-HUJI)
2,000	AQ	Al-Qaeda, aka. Qaeda al-Jihad
		Black Guard
		055 Brigade (Arab Legion of AQ)
		Libyan Islamic Jihad (The late al-Libi's group)
1,500	IPT/IMU	Islamic Party of Turkestan; formerly Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
300+/-	HIG	Hizb-i-Gullbudin
300	LeJ	Lashkar-e-Janghvi (Mil wing Sipah-e-Sahaba)
200	HIK	Hizb-i-Khalis
200	IJU	Islamic Jihad Union (Faction IPT)
200	JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
30	JAM	Jaish al Mahdi (under Taliban)[1]

Insurgent Syndicate Western Pakistan

OEA Team Threat Report
Historic & Recent Camps W Pakistan

See Notes Page for Legend [1]
Camps in Yellow Mapped by TRISA Analyst

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(CFAP.org, 2009) [1]

Taliban Insurgent Syndicate

- **Large umbrella organization**

- **Key leaders meet only a few times annually**

- **Islamic insurgent/terrorist 'umbrella' includes:**
  - **Nationalist insurgents (Afghan Taliban, TTiP)**
  - **Islamic jihadists (al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad Union and Chechen groups)**
  - **Separatist insurgents (Tehrik-e-Taliban in Baluchistan, Kashmiri groups)**

- **Syndicate lacks unity of command**

- **Syndicate lacks unity of effort**

- **Each individual group conducts independent intelligence operations**

- **Mullah Omar does not control all Taliban forces, but is recognized as its leader; Omar has disavowed connections to TTiP violence in Pakistan**

- **Mullah Omar is attempting to correct and unify the Afghan Taliban (e.g. media releases, New Taliban Code of Conduct pamphlet 2009)**

- **TTiP is likely the most fragmented force in the syndicate** [1]

Taliban Insurgent Syndicate

- **Syndicate is purely Sunni Muslim**

- **Afghan Taliban have a chain of command with a commander and key staff officers to include an intelligence staff**

- **Afghan Taliban commanders are also same commanders who fought the Soviets or are close relatives of anti-Soviet, Afghan veterans**

- **Afghan Taliban have maintained long held relationships with regional intelligence sources and services**

- **Shared headquarters--camps based in Western Pakistan and Baluchistan allow for shared information/intelligence and training**
  - **Often located near mosques (e.g. Haqqani Network-HQN)**
  - **Madrassas nearby**
  - **Mobile and fixed training camps**

- **Large, joint/combined syndicate operations such as witnessed in the raids on COP Wanat and Keating clearly indicate intelligence sharing between groups under the syndicate's umbrella**

- **Conducts 'Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield' prior to each mission** [1]

Afghan Taliban Insurgency

- **Former Taliban government-regime maintained intelligence organs in various ministries, such as defense and interior**

- **Under Mullah Omar, the Afghan Taliban continue to maintain similar organizational structures [1]**

Taliban Intelligence Capabilities

"No amount of U.S. troops could match the Taliban's superior intelligence capability, their knowledge of the countryside and their willingness to take casualties in pursuing their ends, and every Afghan security force would be filled with Taliban agents." [1]

Afghan Taliban 'INT' Capabilities

- **HUMINT**
  - **Likely their strongest capability**
  - **Exploit Pashtun tribal connections**
  - **Wide spread, complex HUMINT networks exist in areas of control**
  - **Exploitation of hawala (traditional money transfer system) to move both <u>information</u> and money**

- **OSINT**
  - **Afghan Taliban have shown off their computer capabilities, specifically internet operations/video production/dissemination in their released videos**
  - **Likely do conduct open source collection as such information is readily available**

- **IMINT**
  - **Extent of capabilities is unknown**
  - **Commercial products are readily available**
  - **Sharing**

- **SIGINT**
  - **Extent of capabilities is unknown**
  - **Off-the-shelf equipment readily available**
  - **Sharing**
  - **Counter SIGINT—extensive use of messengers and internet [1]**

TTiP 'INT' Capabilities

- **Newer group**

- **Less developed intelligence organs and 'INT' capabilities**

- **Likely focused on HUMINT**

- **Dependent on other groups in the syndicate such as al-Qaeda and Kashmiri groups**

- **Dependent on local populace in Pakistan**

- **Dependent on key, sympathetic military leaders and soldiers**

- **Dependent on key, sympathetic government officials** [1]

The most powerful and influential TTP factions are: the (former) Baitullah Mehsud faction (South Waziristan), Mullah Nazir faction/Wana Taliban (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction (North Waziristan), Maulana Faqir Mohammed faction (Bajaur), Jaish-e-Islami/Waliur Rahman faction (Bajaur), Omar Khalid/Abdul Wali faction (Mohmand), Tehrik-e-Islami and Islami Taliban/Mohammad Tariq (Darra Adamkhel), Hakimullah Mahsud faction (Kurram, Orakzai and Khyber), Kamran Mustafa Hijrat/Mohammed Yahya Hijrat faction (Khyber agency) and the Mullah Fazlullah/Fazal Hayat faction (Swat) [2]

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Al-Qaeda Afghanistan-Pakistan 'INT' Capabilities

- **HUMINT**
    - **Likely their strongest capability—global support in Salafi-Wahhabi circles**
    - **Global HUMINT operations and networks**
    - **Share w/Taliban, wide spread, complex HUMINT networks that exist in areas of control**
    - **Use extensive tradecraft**
    - **Exploitation of hawala system to move both information and money**

- **OSINT**
    - **Strong capability**
    - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
    - **Extensive computer capabilities, specifically internet operations and video production and dissemination can be derived from their released videos and global information warfare campaign**
    - **Conduct open source collection as such information is readily available**

- **IMINT**
    - **Commercial products have been displayed in videos**
    - **Use commercial products for planning**
    - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
    - **Reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities; use live cameras to monitor targets**

AQ Staff Intelligence Officer Late Abu Jihad Masri [2]

- **SIGINT**
    - **Likely use off-the-shelf equipment**
    - **Likely focus on limited operations vicinity key targets prior to and post attack**
    - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
    - **Counter SIGINT—extensive use of messengers and internet [1]**

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Al-Qaeda 'International' 'INT' Capabilities

- **HUMINT**
  - **Likely their strongest capability**
  - **Global HUMINT operations and networks**
  - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
  - **Exploitation of hawala system to move both information and money**

- **OSINT**
  - **Strong capability**
  - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
  - **Extensive computer capabilities, as such information is readily available**

- **IMINT**
  - **Commercial products have been displayed in videos**
  - **Use commercial products for planning**
  - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**

- **SIGINT**
  - **Likely use off-the-shelf equipment must be assumed**
  - **Likely focus on limited operations vicinity key targets prior to and post attack**
  - **Global sharing; links with al-Qaeda groups and allied groups**
  - **Counter SIGINT—extensive use of messengers and internet** [1]

Al-Qaeda's Regional Links

Map of AQ's Regional Links [1]

Other Groups in the 'Syndicate'

- **More 'mature' Kashmiri, Uzbek and Chechen groups**

- **Likely focused on HUMINT**

- **Provide greater depth and range of knowledge**

- **Already have long-term, highly developed contacts in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Kashmir governments and militaries**

- **Provide depth to overall syndicate HUMINT operations**

- **Provide depth to overall syndicate OSINT operations**

- **Provide depth to overall syndicate IMINT operations**

- **Provide depth to overall syndicate SIGINT operations**

- **Provide depth to extent of syndicates' global contacts [1]**

Dependence on Local Populace

Locals provide:

- **Early warning, surveillance, reconnaissance**

- **Safe houses**

- **Local guides (Arab, Uzbek and Pakistani fighters may not know the area)**

- **Local interpreters (Arab, Uzbek and Pakistani fighters likely do not speak local language in Afghanistan)**

- **Local information expertise**

- **Identification of 'collaborators'**

- **Hawalandars (moving information and finances over long distances)** [1]

Recent Examples of Intelligence Sharing

- **Raid on COP Wanat 2008**

- **Raid on COP Keating 2009**

- **Movement of insurgent fighters between Iraqi, Afghan, Chechen, Uzbek, Baluchi, Yemen, Horn of Africa, Algerian and Kashmiri conflicts**

- **Thousands of Sunni and Shia jihadist, Islamist internet websites that sponsor the plethora of communiqués, videos and discussions from Sunni and Shia insurgent and terrorist groups involved in the above conflicts**

- **Intelligence sharing between Islamist groups involved in the 9-11 planning and attack**

- **London bombings**

- **Attacks in Spain [1]**

Sharing--AQ Video Library Website

أرشيف الجـهاد

Note this is only 1 site out of thousands

- Al-Qaeda has established its own video library on the internet and has named it "The Jihad Archive."

- This site is a video, photo, and communiqué library for a number of key terrorist and insurgent groups with which the US is currently at war, to include AQ (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Maghreb, Somalia and Iraq), Taliban, Chechen rebels, and other allied groups.

- The site holds several thousand videos and thousands of photos and current communiqués from these groups.

- Most importantly, this website has a "who's who" database of the top AQ leaders and spiritual advisors with photographs attached.

- See screen shots of the sites different pages on the slides to follow.[1]

Sharing--
This Site is very Popular

Articles Archive Jihad: 9,595

Number of members: 1,445

Total Views: 1,171,657

Available in the following languages: 中文 日本語 日本语, हिन्दी हिन्दी, Portuguese, Russian, Turkish, Bahasa, Indonesian, Albanian, Tagalog, German, Dutch, Spanish, French, English

As of 191423Aug2009 Central Daylight Time, it was last updated within the hour. [1]

Sharing--
Leaders & Scholars Folder Screen Shot

Sharing--
Archive (Communiqués) Folder Screen Shot

Library of Communiqués [1]

OEA Team Threat Report
Sharing–
Archive (Photos) Folder Screen Shot

Sharing--
Free Search Engine to Find Specific Media

Secure Communications Operations

Counter-SIGINT Operations:

- **Messenger (face-to-face)**

- **Internet couriers (used to upload, pass information via internet cafés and wireless accounts)**

- **Hawala (trusted, traditional methods)**

- **Encrypted internet email communications**

- **Unencrypted, dead drop email accounts (no messages ever sent; messages save in draft folder by account users)**

- **Encrypted satellite telephones**

- **One-time-use cell phones**

- **Coded, broadcasted or uploaded (to the internet) speeches and videos**

- **Surreptitious meetings of key leaders [1]**

POCs

TRISA Threat Analysts

913-684-7931 (COMM)
552-7931 (DSN)

TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
700 Scott Ave, Bldg 53
Ft Leavenworth, Ks 66027

Additional Resources

- **Paramilitary, Insurgent and Terrorist Groups OEF Aug 09**

- **Al-Qaeda Internet Couriers 09**

- **Al-Qaeda Video Library Website 09**

- **Islamic Emirate of YouTube Jul 09**

- **Taliban Media Center 09**

- **Al-Qaeda Mujahideen e-University 1st Semester Begins Jul09**

- **Taliban Raid on COP Wanat Jul 08**

- **Taliban Raid on COP Keating Oct 09**

- **Global Video Exploitation (GVEX) Video Library**

Our NIPRNet Homepages Online

- **BCKS**
  - **Home: https://bcks.army.mil/secure/default.aspx**
  - **Direct Link: https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx**

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Our NIPRNet Homepages Online

- **AKO: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp**

- **Intelink**
  - **Home: https://www.intelink.gov/sites/TRISA/default.aspx**
  - **Document Storage:**
    https://www.intelink.gov/inteldocs/browse.php?fFolderId=21435

Threat Products: AKO"Easy-Link"

Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

1. Login
2. "Click" Files
3. Search to:
   TRADOC G2
     TRISA-CTID
4. "Click" & Find !

Our SIPRNet Homepage Online

- **Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) "Training for War" page**
  - **Link under DCSINT/TRADOC**

- **Direct Link: http://tradoc-dcsint.leavenworth.army.smil.mil**