
Inform and Influence Activities
Final Draft—Not for Implementation

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

Inform and Influence Activities

FINAL DRAFT—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Contents

		Page
	PREFACE	iii
	INTRODUCTION	iv
Chapter 1	CONSTRUCT OF INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES	1-1
	Inform and Influence Activities Defined.....	1-1
	Inform and Influence Activities Considerations	1-3
Chapter 2	ASPECTS OF INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES	2-1
	Integrating Activity	2-1
	Lines of Effort	2-2
	Information Environment	2-2
	Joint Information Operations and Strategic Communication.....	2-4
	Commander’s Means	2-5
	Offensive and Defensive Operations.....	2-5
Chapter 3	CAPABILITIES OF INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES	3-1
	Information-Related Capabilities	3-1
	Integrated and Synchronized Capabilities.....	3-5
Chapter 4	ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS	4-1
	Role of the Commander	4-1
	Role of the G-7 (S-7) Officer.....	4-1
	Role of the Staff.....	4-2
	Role of Others	4-3
Chapter 5	INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES INTEGRATION	5-1
	Inform and Influence Activities as an Integrating Function.....	5-1
	Inform and Influence Activities and the Military Decisionmaking Process	5-1
Chapter 6	SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT	6-1

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Contents

	Definition of Soldier and Leader Engagement	6-1
	Principles of Soldier and Leader Engagement	6-1
	Types of Soldier and Leader Engagement	6-3
	Role of the Commander in Soldier and Leader Engagement.....	6-4
	Role of the Staff in Soldier and Leader Engagement	6-6
Appendix A	WORKING GROUP	A-1
Appendix B	RUNNING ESTIMATE	B-1
Appendix C	ASSESSMENT	C-1
Appendix D	DELIBERATE ENGAGEMENT	D-1
	GLOSSARY	Glossary-1
	REFERENCES.....	References-1
	INDEX	Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. Integrating inform and influence activities	2-1
Figure 2-2. Information environment.....	2-3
Figure 5-1. The MDMP from an inform and influence activities perspective	5-2
Figure A-1. Potential members of inform and influence activities working group	A-1
Figure A-2. The Army targeting methodology	A-2
Figure A-3. Example of synchronization matrix	A-4
Figure B-1. Sample running estimate format for inform and influence activities	B-2
Figure C-1. Sample MOE and MOP development.....	C-2
Figure C-2. Assessment methodology for the information objective	C-4

Preface

Field manual (FM) 3-13 is one of the Army's supporting doctrinal publications. FM 3-13 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting inform and influence activities and the importance of the information environment to commanders and staffs. It constitutes the Army's view of how it supports information operations in all the domains. It develops the other principles, tactics, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrinal publications.

The manual does not address every information-related capability commanders can use to help shape their complex operational environment. It should, however, generate introspection and provide just enough guidance to facilitate flexibility and innovative approaches for the commander to execute the art and science of command in order to inform and influence, and for the staff to integrate and conduct inform and influence activities by bringing any and all capabilities to bear, as determined, to achieve the desired effects in support of the commander's objectives and intent.

FM 3-13 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-13 is the proponent publication (the authority) have an asterisk in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 3-13 is the proponent publication are in boldfaced text. These terms and their definitions will be in the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

The principal audience for FM 3-13 is commanders and staffs at all echelons of command. FM 3-13 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (FM 3-13), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

The shift from information operations concept, tactics, and definitions occurred when field manual (FM) 3-0, Change 1 unburdened information operations for the Army and established the new mission command warfighting function and concept. Mission command established both a commander's task to lead and a staff task to conduct inform and influence activities, along with a staff task to conduct cyber electromagnetic activities. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense and joint staff adapted the definition and construct of information operations and capabilities that support it. The result formed the information proponent office and the information as discussed in this field manual.

Information-related capabilities have replaced the components and enablers of inform and influence activities published as part of Change 1, FM 3-0 *Operations*. The Commanding General, Combined Arms Center approved this replacement to better align with joint doctrine.

Another change is responsibility for daily execution of several of the information-related capabilities. The FA30 information operations officer still primarily integrates the information-related capabilities for the commander. This integration shapes the information environment and supports the commander's objectives for the operational environment. However, the responsibility for daily execution of capabilities has now fallen on others, such as the protection cell for operations security and cyber electromagnetic activities section for electronic warfare. What has not changed is the G-7's, inform and influence activities section's, close relationship and coordination with both those and the other staff sections. Together they integrate, coordinate, and synchronize information-related capabilities into the commander's overarching operation plan.

Based on current doctrinal changes, the following terms have been added, modified, or rescinded for purposed of this manual:

Term	Definition	Action
computer network exploitation	Enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.	RESCIND – is FM 3-XX new proponent (This definition is consistent with joint initiatives and is being staffed as a possible joint definition.)
computer network operations	Computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations.	RESCIND –FM 3-XX new proponent (This definition is consistent with joint initiatives and is being staffed as a possible joint definition.)
critical asset list	A list of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements, and elements of the command's command and control system, whose loss or functional disruption would jeopardize mission accomplishment.	RESCIND
deceive	To cause a person to believe what is not true.	MODIFY
deception working group	A group tailored to bring together the special technical skills required to conduct a specific military deception operation.	RESCIND
defense in depth	In information operations, the integration of the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multi-layer, multidimension protection.	RESCIND

degrade	To use nonlethal or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of targeted information system and information collection efforts or means.	MODIFY
deny	To withhold information about friendly forces, operations, or situations that can be used by the adversary and enemy.	MODIFY
destroy	To use lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.	MODIFY
detect	To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.	KEEP
disinformation	Information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information, or deceive or influence United States decisionmakers, United States forces, coalition allies, key actors, or individuals by indirect or unconventional means.	RESCIND
disrupt	To break or interrupt the flow of information between selected command nodes and control nodes.	MODIFY
exploit	To gain access to targeted information networks to collect information or to insert false or misleading information.	MODIFY
feedback	Information that reveals how the deception target is responding to the deception story and if the military deception plan is working.	RESCIND
field support team	A mission-tailored team of subject matter experts that provides direct support for information operations or inform and influence activities to the ARFORs and joint task forces of land components of combatant commands, and corps and divisions as requested.	ADD
forms of uncertainty	In military deception, means of shaping the deception target's perceptions. Increasing uncertainty aims to confuse the deception target. Reducing uncertainty aims to reinforce the deception target's predispositions.	RESCIND
indicator feedback	Information that indicates whether and how the deception story is reaching the deception target.	RESCIND
influence	To cause audiences to think or behave in a manner favorable to the commander's objectives.	MODIFY
inform and influence activities	The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking.	ADD
information fratricide	The result of employing information-related capabilities operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.	MODIFY
information operations assets	Organic, assigned and attached units with information operations capabilities.	RESCIND

information operations capabilities	Units or systems that support the accomplishment of information operations tasks.	RESCIND
information operations cell	A grouping of staff officers to synchronize information operations throughout the operations process.	RESCIND
information operations concept of support	A clear, concise statement of where, when, and how the commander intends to focus the information element of combat power to accomplish the mission.	RESCIND
information operations mission statement	A short paragraph or sentence describing what the commander wants information operations to accomplish and the purpose for accomplishing it.	RESCIND
information operations objectives	Clearly defined, obtainable aims that the commander intends to achieve using information operations elements/related activities.	RESCIND
information operations resources	Information-operations-capable units not assigned or attached to the command, but whose capabilities are available to conduct information operations	RESCIND
information operations tasks	Tasks developed to support accomplishment of one or more information operations objectives.	RESCIND
information operations vulnerabilities	Deficiencies in protective measures that may allow an adversary to use information operations capabilities against friendly information systems or command and control systems.	RESCIND
information operations vulnerability assessment team	A team designed to enhance army force protection through the Army commander's ability to incorporate defensive information operations into peacetime operations, operational and contingency missions, training and exercises.	RESCIND
misinformation	Incorrect information from any source that is released for unknown reasons or to solicit a response or interest from a nonpolitical or nonmilitary target.	RESCIND
operations security	(Army) A process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and subsequent analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.	RESCIND Army definition. JP 3-13.3 proponent for joint definition which suffices
opposing information	Intentional or unintentional truth-based information from any source that represents an opposing view.	RESCIND
operations security indicator	(Army) Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be intercepted or pieced together by an adversary to derive essential elements of friendly information.	RESCIND
operations security measures	Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about essential elements of friendly information.	RESCIND

operations security planning guidance	(Army) The blueprint for operations security planning. It defines the essential elements of friendly information, taking into account friendly and adversary goals, probable adversary knowledge, friendly deception objectives, and adversary collection capabilities. It also should outline provisional operations security measures.	RESCIND
perception feedback	Information that indicates whether the deception target is responding to the deception story.	RESCIND
physical destruction	The application of combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of information, command and control systems, and installations. It includes direct and indirect fires from ground, sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations forces.	RESCIND
protect	All actions taken to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information.	RESCIND
respond	In information operations is to act positively to an adversary's information operations attack or intrusion.	RESCIND
restore	To bring information systems back to their original state.	RESCIND
subordinate deception objective	A restatement of the deception objective in terms that reflect the deception target's point of view.	RESCIND
supporting perceptions	Mental images that enhance the likelihood that the deception target will form the desired perceptions and accept them as true.	RESCIND
unwitting actor	An individual participating in the conduct of a military deception operation without personal knowledge of the facts of the deception.	RESCIND
witting actor	An individual participating in the conduct of a military deception operation who is fully aware of the facts of the deception.	RESCIND

23

24

25

Chapter 1

Construct of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter defines inform and influence activities and discusses each action in the definition. Lastly, it discusses the considerations of inform and influence activities.

INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES DEFINED

1-1. *Inform and influence activities is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking.*

INTEGRATE INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

1-2. All assets and capabilities at a commander's disposal have the capacity to inform and influence selected audiences to varying degrees. While specific assets termed as "information-related capabilities" are information-centric in mission and purpose, others are standard capabilities that inform and influence officers use for planning to support commanders' information strategy and mission objectives. The primary information-related capabilities that support inform and influence activities typically include, but are not limited to, public affairs, military information support operations, combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs, cyber electromagnetic activities, counterintelligence, operations security, military deception, and others so designated by a commander. In addition to the primary information-related capabilities, there are operational capabilities not solely designed to inform or influence that commanders can designate to assist in achieving mission objectives, such as maneuver forces, engineers, and medical units. Success depends on commanders and staffs effectively employing all available operational assets to best shape the information environment.

SYNCHRONIZE THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS WITH OPERATIONS

1-3. Commanders synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform and influence the various audiences within their area of operations and area of interest. Audiences include groups, organizations, and individuals. Synchronization of themes, messages, and actions promotes and shapes the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors of the audiences in the area of operations while marginalizing or defeating adversary or enemy information efforts towards the same. Synchronization supports the commander's operational goals by aligning words with deeds to avoid message confusion or information fratricide. ***Information fratricide is the result of employing information-related capabilities operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.***

1-4. Soldiers' actions are among the most potent factors in successfully executing inform and influence activities. Visible actions coordinated with carefully chosen, truthful words influence audiences more than uncoordinated or contradictory actions and words. All audiences—local and regional as well as adversary and enemy—compare the friendly force's message with its actions. Consistency contributes to the success of friendly operations by building trust and reinforcing credibility. Conversely, if actions and messages are inconsistent, friendly forces lose credibility. Loss of credibility makes land forces vulnerable to enemy and adversary propaganda or counter-messaging and places Army forces at a disadvantage. Aligning inform and influence activities with the overall operation ensures that messages are consistent with forces' actions to amplify the credibility of those messages.

41 **INFORM**

42 1-5. Inform and influence activities provides the process to synchronize and integrate information-related
43 capabilities across the information environment. Informing activities are the responsibility of commanders.
44 Commanders have a statutory responsibility to conduct public affairs to inform U.S. audiences on the
45 conduct of operations within the area of operations to the fullest extent possible. Using the capabilities of
46 both public affairs and military information support operations enables the commander to inform foreign
47 audiences. Commanders balance informing foreign audiences about their operations with the responsibility
48 to protect the operations and their troops through operations security.

49 **INFLUENCE**

50 1-6. Inform and influence activities assists commanders in integrating and synchronizing the various
51 means of influence in support of operations. U.S. forces strictly limit their influence activities to foreign
52 audiences only. Influence activities typically focus on persuading selected foreign audiences to support
53 Army operations or to cause those audiences to stop supporting adversary or enemy activities. To better
54 achieve operational objectives, commanders may direct efforts to shape, sway, or alter foreign audience
55 perceptions and ultimately behavior.

56 **AFFECT ADVERSARY AND ENEMY DECISIONMAKING**

57 1-7. Achieving ultimate victory requires adversary and enemy decisionmakers—from the lowest to the
58 highest levels—to willingly and sincerely capitulate to U.S. demands. Inform and influence activities
59 provides robust, manpower-effective, and nonlethal means to affect their decisionmaking processes. It may
60 affect those processes through messages and actions intended to create doubt at the individual level all the
61 way up to activities meant to deny an adversary or enemy force’s ability to make timely and effective
62 decisions.

63 1-8. Commanders at all echelons lead inform and influence activities as part of unified land operations.
64 They apply it during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Homeland security and defense support
65 of civil authorities operations can require inform and influence activities to assist local, state, and or
66 Federal responders achieve greater transparency in informing the domestic audience.

67 **INFORM DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL AUDIENCES**

68 1-9. U.S. laws oblige U.S. forces to inform Americans of their operations, programs, and activities. The
69 global expanse of information technology and the environment enables news reports and analyses to
70 rapidly influence public opinion and decisions concerning military operations. In addition to the domestic
71 audience, commanders understand the imperative to keep other audiences, including interagency and
72 multinational partners, allies, and international organizations, informed of their operations as well. They
73 understand that truth and transparency mitigate the impact that adversaries and enemies have when seizing
74 on negative news stories and exploiting information to their advantage through their own information
75 operations activities.

76 1-10. Inform and influence activities informs and educates audiences through public communications—
77 news releases, public service announcements, and press conferences—to provide an accurate and informed
78 portrayal of operations. Audiences receive these messages best through the actions and words of individual
79 Soldiers. To gather such personal information, units embed media personnel into the lowest tactical levels,
80 ensuring their safety and security. Public communications fosters a culture of engagement in which
81 Soldiers and leaders confidently and comfortably engage the media as well as other audiences.

82 **INFLUENCE FOREIGN AUDIENCES**

83 1-11. Victory depends on a commander’s ability to shape, sway, and alter foreign audience perceptions,
84 especially within the area of operations. The most powerful tool or asset in influencing others is truth, but
85 various audiences perceive the truth differently. Astute commanders employ inform and influence activities
86 to unify perceptions and support with their desired end state.

87 1-12. In addition to military information support operations and products, Soldiers again play a key role in
 88 influencing specified foreign audiences. Soldiers communicate information through their actions, as well as
 89 through Soldier and leader engagements to achieve the commander’s intent. When Soldiers’ actions adhere
 90 to the rules of engagement and reinforce themes and messages, they strengthen and substantiate trust and
 91 credibility. Leaders ensure that Soldiers stay continually aware of enduring and evolving themes and
 92 messages and consider them when taking action and while engaging with the local audiences. Through
 93 training and command information efforts, commanders empower Soldiers to be a significant means to
 94 influence.

95 **AFFECT ADVERSARY AND ENEMY DECISIONMAKING**

96 1-13. Adversaries and enemies have proven and will continue to prove adept at using information to gain a
 97 marked advantage over U.S. forces. Inform and influence activities aims to thwart this advantage and gain
 98 the upper hand in the information environment. Inform and influence activities affects the data,
 99 information, and knowledge used by adversary or enemy decisionmakers through the employment of
 100 psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add, modify, or remove information from the information
 101 environment and thereby affect decisionmaking. Certain information-related capabilities affect the
 102 infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes, and stores information in support of targeted
 103 decisionmakers, or they influence the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and
 104 knowledge.

105 **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES CONSIDERATIONS**

106 1-14. Unified land operations requires effective commanders to consider what will affect the operational
 107 environment. Commanders lead inform and influence activities while considering the following: combat
 108 power, mission command, mission command system, themes and messages, information management and
 109 knowledge management, legal considerations, and intelligence support. Inform and influence activities is
 110 an integration process that assists commanders with synchronizing all information-related capabilities
 111 available to them while taking account of the above considerations into the operations plan.

112 **COMBAT POWER**

113 1-15. Effective commanders consider how they will apply combat power. *Combat power* is the total means
 114 of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a
 115 given time (ADRP 3-0). Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action.
 116 Combat power consists of eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and
 117 maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The last six elements are established warfighting
 118 functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using the critical elements
 119 of leadership and information.

120 1-16. To influence and enhance their mission, commanders apply information as an element of combat
 121 power to shape and lead inform and influence activities in the three dimensions of the information
 122 environment (see paragraph 2-8). Successful commanders use information and actions, in concert with
 123 operations, to effectively shape the information and operational environments to multiply the effects of
 124 friendly successes. Ultimately, commanders use information to create shared understanding and purpose
 125 throughout the area of operations, first within their own organizations and subsequently among all affected
 126 audiences. Information is critical to understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, and leading
 127 operations towards achieving the desired end state.

128 **MISSION COMMAND**

129 1-17. Mission command requires commanders to actively lead and guide the use of information to inform
 130 and influence all selected audiences whose actions may affect the operational environment. *Mission*
 131 *command* is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable
 132 disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct
 133 of unified land operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to
 134 integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission (FM 6-0).

135 1-18. With regard to inform and influence activities, commanders continually facilitate shared
136 understanding and purpose, most critically through the commander's intent and subsequent guidance. They
137 conceptualize the desired themes and messages that unify activities and reinforce shared understanding.
138 Commanders recognize their critical role as key engagers. To enhance operational success, they
139 continuously shape the information environment by fostering a culture of engagement in which Soldiers
140 and leaders make the most from communicating with people.

141 **MISSION COMMAND SYSTEM**

142 1-19. A *mission command system* is the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems,
143 processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enables commanders to conduct operations
144 (FM 6-0). The mission command system is organized to not only support commanders' decisionmaking,
145 but also to collect, create and maintain relevant information and prepare knowledge products to support the
146 commander's and leaders' understanding and visualization. It is designed to prepare and communicate
147 directives and establishes the means by which commanders and leaders communicate, collaborate, and
148 facilitate the functioning of teams.

149 1-20. Successful inform and influence activities operations rely on a mission command system to integrate
150 and synchronize information-related capability activities into the supported unit's operations. The G-7 (S-7)
151 must understand how to use all the components of the mission command system. This officer works, both
152 personally and electronically, with the staff. Using various available networks to leverage existing and
153 emerging technologies (such as Command Post of the Future) helps them transfer knowledge horizontally
154 and vertically. (See FM 6-0 for more on mission command system.)

155 **THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS**

156 1-21. Commanders use themes and messages to support their narratives which in turn are tied to actions. A
157 narrative is a brief description of a commander's story used to visualize the effect the commander wants to
158 achieve in the information environment. Themes and messages are distinct from each other. Each has its
159 own purpose; they are not interchangeable. As commanders plan for inform and influence activities, they
160 should consider the link between themes, messages, and actions to their narrative.

161 1-22. Themes are planning tools that guide the development of messages and other information products
162 (talking points, military information support operations print and broadcast products, and public affairs
163 guidance). Themes represent the broad idea the commander wants to get into the mind of the target
164 audience. They are not communicated to the target audience; that is the role of the messages. Themes are
165 broad and enduring, and as such they do not change frequently.

166 *Note:* By doctrine, there are no inform and influence activities or information operations themes
167 and messages. Military information support operations and public affairs have themes and
168 messages. The G-7 (S-7) element may have to develop command themes and messages, but this
169 is done in coordination with the military information support operations and the public affairs
170 representative.

171 1-23. Messages support themes. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports
172 a theme focused on an audience. It supports a specific action or objective. They are communicated by
173 speech, writing, or signals, and they contain information delivered to the target audience. Messages are
174 tailored to specific audiences. They are meant to communicate clear information and, if necessary, elicit a
175 response or change in behavior. Messages constantly change with the situation and mission. Command
176 information messages convey local commanders' policies and commander's intent to their subordinates.
177 The public affairs officer develops these messages. Public information messages convey information from
178 host-nation officials to local target audiences through news, public-service information, and
179 announcements. The public affairs officer develops these messages. Psychological messages convey
180 specific information to selected foreign audiences to influence their attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, and
181 behavior. The military information support operations officer develops these messages.

182 1-24. To gain and maintain support of populations in conflict areas, commanders consider the perceptions
183 and ramifications of their actions. Gaining and maintaining support or empathy for the mission is critical to
184 successful unified land operations. Commanders first understand host-nation laws and cultures enabling
185 them to operate more effectively in the information environment. Then they determine how to inform
186 audiences at home, gain support abroad, and generate support or empathy for the mission in the area of
187 operations. By leading inform and influence activities, commanders ensure their staff is integrating all
188 available information-related capabilities and other designated operational assets to support messaging and
189 communications efforts and ultimately operational objectives and the mission end state.

190 1-25. Commanders orchestrate themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform or influence
191 audiences within the commander's area of operations and area of interest. Commanders often have two
192 intentions. First, they want to promote and shape the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors of foreign
193 audiences residing in the area of operations. Second, they want to marginalize or defeat adversary or enemy
194 information efforts towards the same. Synchronized themes, messages, and actions support the
195 commander's operational goals by integrating words and deeds that serve to avoid confusion or information
196 fratricide.

197 **INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT**

198 1-26. The G-7 (S-7) uses information management and knowledge management activities to assist the
199 commanders in building and maintaining situational understanding. *Situational understanding* is the
200 product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the
201 mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking (FM 6-0). To build situational understanding, staffs
202 determine and communicate relevant information. In digital tactical operations centers, the common
203 operational picture most effectively communicates relevant information commanders need. The common
204 operational picture is a tool commanders and staffs use to track and refine information and develop
205 knowledge and understanding. Using information management procedures and knowledge management
206 principles, the staff assists the commander in identifying information gaps, opportunities, and threats to the
207 force and mission accomplishment.

208 1-27. *Information management* is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect,
209 process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (FM 6-0).
210 Information management far exceeds the technical control of data. It involves all aspects of the mission
211 command system. This system assists the commander by anticipating and answering the commander's
212 critical information requirements. Commander's critical information requirements are used to prioritize the
213 processing effort. Information requirements are answered with relevant information—all information of
214 importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of mission command. (See FM 6-0 for details about
215 information requirements.) Information requirements focus on collecting and processing data into
216 information developed and used as knowledge.

217 1-28. *Knowledge management* is the art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge to
218 facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking (FM 6-0). The staff and commanders use
219 knowledge management to generate knowledge products that help generate collaboration, improve
220 organizational performance, and aid in the conduct of operations. The by-products of knowledge
221 management are improved staff performance, better decisionmaking, and improved situational
222 understanding. Since knowledge transfer occurs among people, knowledge management includes creating
223 techniques and procedures to develop knowledge skills in leaders, build experience, and transfer expertise.
224 (See FM 6-01.1 for detailed information on knowledge management.)

225 **LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS**

226 1-29. The planning and execution of inform and influence activities typically involve complex legal and
227 policy issues requiring careful review, coordination, and approval. The U.S. constitution, U.S. laws, and
228 international laws set boundaries and establish precedence for military activities in the information
229 environment. Another country's legal basis and limitations for a military activity in the information
230 environment may differ. U.S. forces conducting military activities in the information environment are
231 subject to U.S. laws and policy. (See JP 3-13 for discussion about legal support.)

232 1-30. As commanders and staffs consider the legal implications for inform and influence activities, there
233 are many things to consider in addition to standing authorizations, regulations and laws. The timeline and
234 process to gain new approval and authorization for capability use under certain conditions is often a long,
235 tedious, and man-power extensive process. Other aspects to consider could be the perceptions of host-
236 nation or external audiences regarding use of particular capabilities as a hostile or intrusive action. How
237 domestic, international, criminal, and civil laws affect national security, privacy, and information exchange
238 might impact planning options, as well as what international treaties, agreements, and customary
239 international laws apply to inform and influence activities. Commanders and staffs also consider the effects
240 of inform and influence activities on the structures and relationships among U.S. intelligence organizations
241 and the overall interagency environment, including nongovernment organizations.

242 **INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT**

243 1-31. Intelligence support is critical to the planning, execution, and assessment of joint information
244 operations and inform and influence activities. Useful intelligence is timely, accurate, usable, complete,
245 relevant, and objective, supporting military inform and influence requirements. The intelligence
246 warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational
247 environment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Intelligence is more than just a collection of
248 information. Staffs develop intelligence. This development is a continuous process that involves analyzing
249 information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. Intelligence is the product
250 resulting from collecting, processing, integrating, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting available
251 information. This information pertains to foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements,
252 or areas of actual or potential operations.

253 1-32. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield support to inform and influence activities differs from the
254 traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield in purpose, focus, and end state. The purpose is to gain
255 an understanding of the information environment and to determine how the threat will operate in that
256 environment. The focus is on analyzing the threat's information systems and the use of those systems to
257 gain the advantage in the information environment. The end state is the identification of the threat
258 vulnerabilities friendly forces can exploit with inform and influence activities and threat information
259 capabilities against which friendly forces must defend. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is vital to
260 successful inform and influence activities at all echelons. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield follows
261 the doctrinal principles and four-step methodology as portrayed in FM 2-01.3.

262 1-33. Conducting inform and influence activities depends on the intelligence warfighting function for three
263 reasons. First, intelligence operates many of the Army's collection assets that help define the information
264 environment and identify potential inform and influence activities targets. Second, intelligence provides
265 real-time insight into how the adversary or enemy uses information-related capabilities to its advantage or
266 counter friendly information-related capabilities. Third, intelligence provides capabilities that support the
267 collection of metrics that enhance inform and influence activities assessment.

268 1-34. The commander's critical information requirements are elements of information required by
269 commanders that directly affect decisionmaking and dictate the successful execution of military operations.
270 Commander's critical information requirements include priority information requirements and friendly
271 forces information requirements. The G-7 (S-7) recommends commander's critical information
272 requirements to the G-3 (S-3). Establishing commander's critical information requirements is one means
273 commanders use to focus assessment effort.

274
275

Chapter 2

Aspects of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses the aspects of inform and influence activities. It discusses how inform and influence activities is an integrating activity with an inform line of effort and an influence line of effort and simultaneously employs the information-related capabilities both offensively and defensively throughout unified land operations. The chapter then discusses the information environment and how inform and influence activities focuses on shaping it to achieve the commanders' mission objectives. It also discusses how inform and influence activities supports joint information operations and strategic communication. Lastly, the chapter addresses how inform and influence activities is the commander's means to affect the cognitive aspect of the operational environment.

INTEGRATING ACTIVITY

2-1. The inform and influence activity concept brings together several separate functions as information-related capabilities which commanders use to shape the information environment. While staff officers and operators of each information-related capability integrate within their area of expertise and with other staff sections for execution coordination, it is the G-7 (S-7) inform and influence activities officer and section's responsibility to plan for and integrate all potential operational assets. This allows for message alignment, reinforcement, and consistency in support of the overall concept of operations rather than individual events or missions. To center their integration efforts, the G-7 (S-7) plan using lines of effort to focus their strategy.




Figure 2-1. Integrating inform and influence activities

23 **LINES OF EFFORT**

24 2-2. Two lines of effort contribute to inform and influence activities: the inform line of effort and the
25 influence line of effort. These lines of effort enable commanders and staffs to apply the right capability or
26 mix of capabilities to the right circumstance and audience ensuring statutory and regulatory compliance.

27 2-3. All activities in the information environment communicate in some way. They serve to make an
28 impression on the mind of those that observe or hear them. What distinguishes the two lines of effort is the
29 intention of the communicator and the message. Sometimes, a communication intended merely to inform
30 might eventually lead to a changed opinion or behavior. And a communication designed to influence may
31 not achieve the desired outcome.

32 **INFORM LINE OF EFFORT**

33 2-4. The inform line of effort aims to provide information to domestic and global audiences that
34 accurately describes operations. It does not try to force a particular point of view on these audiences but
35 rather provides them with facts to make their own decisions. Providing factual and accurate information
36 serves as a venue to counter false information disseminated by others (misinformation or disinformation).
37 Maintaining transparency and credibility is paramount within the inform line of effort. Capabilities under
38 the inform line of effort include public affairs, military information support operations, and Soldier and
39 leader engagements. In addition, capabilities such as combat camera, civil affairs operations, operations
40 security, and cyber electromagnetic activities provide support to executing the inform line of effort.

41 **INFLUENCE LINE OF EFFORT**

42 2-5. The influence line of effort aims to change attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately behavior of foreign
43 friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences to support operations. It tries to guide target audiences to
44 make decisions that support the U.S. forces commander's objectives. Examples of influence objectives
45 include misleading enemy decisionmakers or convincing enemy forces to surrender or cease their efforts.
46 The influence line of effort also includes actions designed to extend influence over foreign partners,
47 civilians, and actors in the area of operations. This type of influence seeks to create and strengthen
48 relationships when Army forces do not have command over partner forces. Effective Army forces leverage
49 relationships based on trust and mutual confidence, demonstrating how the U.S. Army provides added
50 value to others' objectives. Capabilities that primarily support the influence line of effort include military
51 information support operations and Soldier and leader engagement. Additionally, information-related
52 capabilities such as military deception, combat camera, counterintelligence, civil affairs operations,
53 operations security, and cyber electromagnetic activities provide support to executing the influence line of
54 effort.

55 **INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

56 2-6. A complex relationship exists among the operational factors—political, military, economic, social,
57 infrastructure, information, physical environment and time (known as PMESII-PT). This relationship
58 requires commanders to holistically perceive how operations and the information environment relate and
59 affect their actions and processes. Inform and influence activities focuses on shaping the information
60 environment to achieve mission objectives. A subset of the operational environment, the *information*
61 *environment* is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or
62 act on information (JP 3-13).

63 **CONSIDERATIONS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

64 2-7. The information environment presents commanders with significant and interrelated opportunities
65 which, if seized upon, can enhance operational success. Leveraging the information environment
66 effectively requires that commanders have four considerations. First, they understand the effects of the
67 information environment. Effects in the information environment affect local, regional, and global
68 audiences with or without commanders' ability to control actions or seek the audience's consent.
69 Commanders strive to shape and optimize these effects to support their operational objectives and


70 commander's intent. Second, commanders recognize that military operations occur in full view of the
 71 global audience, to include adversaries and enemies, due to real-time media and global communications
 72 capabilities. Third, commanders consider the influence of their communications on others. They consider
 73 how their units' actions, words, and messages will shape information and operational environments and
 74 affect perceptions among audiences. They shape their training and planning from this influence. Lastly,
 75 commanders respect and appreciate the various aspects of the information environment. Such aspects
 76 include indigenous channels of communication, key influencers in the area of operation, cultural and civil
 77 considerations, and the various audiences and stakeholders involved. Potential audiences and stakeholders
 78 include the Americans, decisionmakers (friendly, neutral, and adversarial), multinational partners and
 79 allies, interagency partners, international organizations, and the local civilians.

80 **DIMENSIONS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

81 2-8. The information environment consists of the physical dimension, informational dimension, and
 82 cognitive dimension. See figure 2-2.

83 2-9. The physical dimension is composed of command and control systems and supporting infrastructures
 84 that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the air, land, sea, and space domains.
 85 This dimension has physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them.
 86 Communications networks include the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and
 87 populations. Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest of the three dimensions to
 88 measure. Combat power has traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension.

89 2-10. Units use the informational dimension to collect, process, store, disseminate, display, and protect
 90 information. In this dimension, commanders execute mission command and convey their commander's
 91 intent. It consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, military forces strive to protect the
 92 informational dimension.



93 **Figure 2-2. Information environment**

94 2-11. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decisionmaker and relevant audiences. In this
 95 dimension, people think, perceive, visualize, and decide upon their future actions. It is the most important

96 of the three dimensions. A commander's orders, training, and other personal motivations affect this
97 dimension. Battles and campaigns are won or lost in the cognitive dimension. Many factors of the cognitive
98 dimension influence its workings. The factors include leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of
99 mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, public opinion, perceptions, media, public
100 information, and rumors.

101 2-12. The dimensions of the information environment are dynamic and constantly evolving. The global
102 media, networked communications, and other factors feed the information environment with data that can
103 be inaccurate, incomplete, or presented out of context. Effective commanders anticipate how all
104 information-related capabilities could shape the information environment to better meet their operational
105 requirements. By using information as an element of combat power, commanders work to maintain the
106 initiative while preventing the adversary from setting the terms of a conflict in the public arena. (See
107 JP 3-13 for additional information on the information environment.)

108 **JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC** 109 **COMMUNICATION**

110 2-13. Inform and influence activities supports joint information operations and strategic communications.
111 Creating shared understanding and purpose is not simply a tactical goal but an operational and strategic
112 one. The Army achieves this goal through the conduct of mission command. Mission command supports
113 joint information operations and strategic communication, in support of national objectives. At the strategic
114 level, information is recognized as an element of national power, coequal with diplomatic, military, and
115 economic efforts (all the elements of national power are referred to as DIME).

116 **JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

117 2-14. *Information operations* is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-
118 related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the
119 decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 1-02). Information
120 operations are joint operations. Each Service component contributes to an integrated whole synchronized
121 by the joint force headquarters. Through the mission orders process, the Army supports joint information
122 operations and strategic level objectives by integrating the information-related capabilities through inform
123 and influence activities.

124 2-15. Army units may work as subordinate elements of a joint task force or form the core headquarters of a
125 joint task force. While Army forces use the inform and influence activities staff section (G-7) to integrate
126 information-related capabilities into the operations process, joint headquarters integrate information
127 operations within the J-39 staff section. Army headquarters transitioning to become the staffs of joint task
128 forces have the option of maintaining the functional cell, integrating cell structure outlined in FM 5-0 or
129 converting to a joint organizational model.

130 2-16. The theater campaign plan and communication strategy guides the planning of inform and influence
131 activities and cyber electromagnetic activities. The Army contributes an integrated inform and influence
132 activities plan—which includes cyber electromagnetic activities and other capabilities and processes—to
133 support joint information operations. The joint force headquarters then synchronizes inform and influence
134 activities into the overall joint information operations plan.

135 **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

136 2-17. *Strategic communication* is United States Government efforts to understand and engage key
137 audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States
138 Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes,
139 messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power (JP 5-0). The
140 themes and messages that strategic communication provides have a whole of government application and
141 support national objectives.

142 2-18. Strategic communication, information operations, and inform and influence activities overlap. The
143 Department of Defense does not engage in public diplomacy directly, but it supports the strategic

144 communication effort. The Department of Defense ensures its objectives are synchronized and
145 complementary in nature with other information efforts. At the strategic and theater levels, joint
146 information operations support strategic communication. In turn, at the operational and tactical levels,
147 inform and influence activities support joint information operations, ensuring themes, messages, and
148 actions are nested and integrated across all lines of operation.

149 **COMMANDER'S MEANS**

150 2-19. Inform and influence activities is the commander's means to affect the cognitive aspect of the
151 operational environment. The *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and
152 influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0).
153 The operational environment has always been complex and ambiguous. It is even more so in a networked
154 and interconnected world. Threats to U.S. security and its interests have become increasingly diverse,
155 innovative, adaptive, globally connected, and networked. These threats increasingly defy the traditional
156 definition of a threat. They operate conventionally or unconventionally using adaptive tactics and
157 techniques to accomplish their goals. They can use sophisticated information campaigns, in combination
158 with lethal and nonlethal attacks, on a range of targets to sway and influence local to global audiences. The
159 complexity of the threat and thus the operational environment makes simultaneous support to offensive and
160 defensive operations all the more critical for commanders and their staffs.

161 **OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

162 2-20. Inform and influence activities officers plan for both offensive and defensive operations throughout
163 unified land operations. Planning and execution of information-related activities includes simultaneous
164 offensive and defensive actions that support desired effects ranging from informing and influencing
165 (nonlethal) to destroying (lethal) within the same area of operations. What is also crucial for inform and
166 influence activities are the second and third order effects from operations driven by the various audience
167 perceptions and how commanders can mitigate negative reactions and exploit positive ones.

168 2-21. Commanders and staffs synchronize offensive and defensive inform and influence activities to
169 produce complementary and reinforcing effects. Offensive inform and influence activities supports the
170 decisive operation, while defensive inform and influence activities protects friendly force critical assets
171 and centers of gravity. Conducting offensive and defensive inform and influence activities independently
172 detract from the efficient employment of information-related capabilities. Without simultaneous support to
173 offensive and defensive operations, redundant employment of information-related capabilities leads to
174 inefficient use of resources. Likewise, uncoordinated efforts increase potential for conflicts and operational
175 interference. This could compromise friendly intentions or result in information fratricide.

176 **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SIMULTANEOUS SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE** 177 **OPERATIONS**

178 2-22. Inform and influence activities supports offensive operations by proactively integrating information-
179 related capabilities. These activities either adversely affect enemy decisionmaking or influence others in
180 order to achieve or promote specific mission objectives. Commanders can use all information-related
181 capabilities to support offensive operations.

182 2-23. Inform and influence activities in support of offensive operations helps units seize the initiative.
183 Inform and influence activities creates a disparity between the quality of information available to friendly
184 forces and that available to adversaries and enemies. Commanders apply actions—destroy, disrupt,
185 degrade, deny, deceive, and exploit—to inform and influence audiences to create this information
186 advantage.

187 2-24. **Destroy means to use lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information**
188 **useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.** It is most effective when timed to occur
189 just before enemies need to execute a mission command function or when focused on a resource-intensive
190 target that is hard to reconstitute.

191 2-25. **Destroy means to use lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information**
192 **useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.** It may be desired when attack resources
193 are limited, to comply with rules of engagement or to create certain effects. Electronic attack is a common
194 means of disrupting the information system and networks.

195 2-26. **Degrade means to use nonlethal or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of**
196 **targeted information system and information collection efforts or means.** Offensive inform and
197 influence activities can also degrade the morale of a unit, reduce the target's worth or value, or reduce the
198 quality of decisions and actions.

199 2-27. **Deny means to withhold information about friendly forces, operations, or situations that can be**
200 **used by the adversary and enemy.** Effective denial leaves opponents vulnerable to offensive capabilities.
201 Operations security is the primary nonlethal means of denial.

202 2-28. **Deceive means to cause a person to believe what is not true.** Military deception seeks to mislead
203 adversary and enemy decisionmakers by manipulating their perceptions of reality to come to a false
204 conclusion or decision.

205 2-29. **Exploit means to gain access to targeted information networks to collect information or to**
206 **insert false or misleading information.**

207 2-30. **Influence means to cause audiences to think or behave in a manner favorable to the**
208 **commander's objectives.** It results from applying perception management to affect the target's emotions,
209 motives, and reasoning. Perception management also seeks to influence the target's actions, perceptions,
210 plans, and will to oppose friendly forces. Targets may include noncombatants and others in the area of
211 operations whom commanders want to support friendly-force missions or not to resist friendly-force
212 activities. Perception management achieves the influence effect by conveying or denying selected
213 information to targets.

214 **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SIMULTANEOUS SUPPORT OF DEFENSIVE** 215 **OPERATIONS**

216 2-31. Information-related capabilities simultaneously support defensive operations through inform and
217 influence activities. Officers of inform and influence activities may not have primary responsibility for
218 many defensive activities. However, they will still remain involved and serve as the primary information
219 advisor for assessment, perception, and potential effects from activities and procedures that commanders
220 require. These activities and procedures protect and defend friendly information, troops, and systems, as
221 well as the ability to continue shaping their area of operations. Inform and influence activities in support of
222 the defense also denies adversaries and enemies the opportunity to exploit friendly information systems and
223 information for their own purposes through the exploitation or insertion of misleading information.
224 Commanders apply actions—protect, detect, and respond—to maintain an operational advantage by
225 safeguarding their area of operations to the best of their ability.

226 2-32. Protect is to take action to guard against manipulation, damage, destruction, or capture of personnel,
227 equipment and information. In inform and influence activities, operations security is integrated into the
228 operations process to mitigate the effects of adversary or enemy access to or action upon friendly
229 personnel, networks, information systems, and equipment. It denies adversaries and enemies information
230 about friendly information-related capabilities and intentions by controlling indicators and capabilities.
231 Protect also includes actions in support of perception management.

232 2-33. **Detect is to discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information**
233 **systems.** Detection is the identification of adversary or enemy attempts to gain access to friendly
234 information and mission command systems. Timely detection and reporting enable units to initiate
235 restoration and response.

236 2-34. Respond is to react quickly to an adversary or enemy information operations attack or intrusion.
237 Timely identification of adversaries, enemies, and their intentions and capabilities is the cornerstone of
238 effective response to adversary offensive information operations. Inform and influence activities could also
239 be preemptive actions to mitigate follow-on events or situations.
240

Chapter 3

Capabilities of Inform and Influence Activities

This chapter discusses only a number of information-related capabilities that typically support inform and influence activities. It also discusses why the integration of these capabilities is critical to the commander and successful operations.

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

3-1. A capability is the ability to execute a specified course of action. Given the complex challenges confronting the Army and conduct of unified land operations, rarely is a single course of action or capability enough. Complex problems demand complex solutions that appear simple through the skillful coordination, integration, and synchronization of multiple capabilities, each complementing and amplifying the other. This synergy is especially critical if inform and influence activities are to be successful and decisive. Therefore, commanders may delegate any of their organic capabilities and request many others to support their objectives and desired effects in shaping the operational environment.

3-2. Information-related capabilities are capabilities that support a commander's ability to communicate across a range of operations and to many audiences to inform or influence and, consequently, shape desired outcomes. Theoretically, all capabilities send a message (or make an impression) and serve to inform and influence audiences. While conducting inform and influence activities, commanders consider all capabilities in devising solutions and plans. The commander and staff regularly use traditional information-related capabilities to inform and influence audiences:

- Public affairs.
- Military information support operations.
- Soldier and leader engagement.
- Combat camera.
- Military deception.
- Cyber electromagnetic activities.
- Operations security.

3-3. The commander and staff can delegate many other capabilities. Using these other organic information-related capabilities to support efforts of inform and influence activities enhances and reinforces mission objectives and shaping the operational environment. The other delegated information-related capabilities that support inform and influence activities include—

- Counterintelligence.
- Civil-military operations and civil affairs operations.
- Special technical operations.
- Presence, posture, and profile.
- Physical attack.
- Physical security.
- Other capabilities.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

3-4. Public affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed. It helps to establish conditions that lead to confidence in the Army and its readiness to conduct unified land operations and decisive actions. It strives to enhance public understanding and garner American, as well as

42 global, support for the Army by engaging with both domestic and foreign media entities. See FM 46-1 for
43 additional information on public affairs.

44 3-5. Public affairs fulfills its mission through public information, command information, and community
45 relations. Public information focuses on external audiences. It primarily engages the media to convey its
46 themes and messages to American and global audiences. Command information focuses on internal
47 audiences—Soldiers, civilians, and family members. It recognizes that an informed force is a more ready,
48 reliable, and resilient force. Community relations focus on the communities surrounding military
49 installations. It recognizes that a positive rapport between the Army and its host communities is mutually
50 beneficial, supporting the Army as an institution as well as its individual Soldiers.

51 3-6. Public affairs integration with other information-related capabilities helps the commander shape the
52 information environment, provides valuable media assessment, and counters enemy propaganda and
53 disinformation. It assists the commander develop themes and messages and collaborates with other
54 information-related capabilities to protect operations security and avoid information fratricide.

55 3-7. Public affairs participates in the information integration process within the inform and influence
56 activities section by continually assessing the media to determine the degree and nature of media coverage,
57 taking steps to correct misinformation or propaganda. It also seeks to leverage other information-related
58 capabilities, such as combat camera or civil affairs operations, to provide greater accuracy and breadth of
59 information. Additionally, it provides reinforcing messaging for other information-related capability
60 actions and the overarching engagement strategy.

61 **MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

62 3-8. Military information support operations is the commander's primary dedicated information-related
63 capability to inform and influence foreign populations within the operational area. Military information
64 support operations is conducted to induce or reinforce specific attitudes and behaviors favorable to U.S.
65 military objectives. See FM 3-53 for more information on military information support operations.

66 3-9. Inform and influence activities receives support from military information support Soldiers. These
67 Soldiers provide a staff subject matter expert within the G-7 (S-7) inform and influence activities section
68 and primary member of the inform and influence activities working group for advising, planning,
69 operations oversight, and assessing of military information support operations. The military information
70 support units also provide military information support products and are the the primary executors for many
71 of their audio, visual and audio-visual products for the purpose of informing, influencing, and directing
72 target audiences. They also provide the inform and influence activities section and staff post-delivery
73 measures of performance and measures of effectiveness assessment. The inform and influence activities
74 section also relies heavily on its audience analysis and continuous assessment of adversary information and
75 capability, including information for effect, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.

76 **SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT**

77 3-10. Soldier and leader engagement broadly describes interactions that take place among Soldiers, leaders,
78 and audiences in the area of operations. Chapter 6 discusses the specific contributions of Soldier and leader
79 engagements to inform and influence activities.

80 **COMBAT CAMERA**

81 3-11. Combat camera provides commanders with a directed imagery capability to support operational and
82 planning requirements. These forces use video documentation capabilities ranging from aerial photography
83 to underwater photography to support inform and influence activities. They access areas and events
84 inaccessible to other personnel or media. Furthermore, combat camera teams have a technological
85 capability to transmit real-time images. The accurate portrayal they provide of U.S. forces in action enables
86 the inform and influence activities section to reinforce other information-related capability efforts.
87 Likewise, their documentation of operations and provided imagery products support countering
88 misinformation or propaganda. For more information on combat camera, see FM 3-55.12.

89 MILITARY DECEPTION

90 3-12. Military deception involves actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary,
91 or violent extremist organization decisionmakers. This information-related capability intends the adversary
92 to take specific actions (or inactions) that contribute to accomplishment of the friendly mission. Military
93 deception does not fall under the direct purview of the G-7 (S-7) but is considered a primary influencing
94 capability of inform and influence activities. Military deception consists of counterdeception, deception in
95 support of operations security, and tactical deception.

96 3-13. Counterdeception contributes to situational understanding by protecting friendly human and
97 automated decisionmaking from adversary deception. Counterdeception strives to make Army commanders
98 aware of adversary deception activities so they can formulate informed and coordinated responses.

99 3-14. A deception in support of operations security protects friendly operations, personnel, programs,
100 equipment, and other assets against foreign intelligence security services collection. It creates multiple false
101 indicators. These indicators confuse the adversary or enemy. Sometimes they make friendly intentions
102 harder for the adversary or enemy intelligence gathering apparatus to interpret. Often it limits the adversary
103 or enemy's ability to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces.

104 3-15. Tactical deception consists of deception activities planned and conducted to support battles and
105 engagements in real time. Tactical-level commanders plan and execute tactical deception to cause enemy
106 actions favorable to U.S. objectives. These activities aim to gain a tactical advantage over an adversary, to
107 mask vulnerabilities in friendly forces, or to enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. Tactical
108 deception usually nests in other operations as part of the joint force command or joint task force's
109 Annex C-3-A.

110 CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

111 3-16. Cyber electromagnetic activities seize, retain, and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the
112 electromagnetic spectrum. The result enables Army forces to retain freedom of action while denying
113 freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, thereby enabling the overall operation. For more information
114 on cyber electromagnetic operations, see FM 3-36.

115 3-17. Although inform and influence activities and cyber electromagnetic activities are interrelated, each
116 requires a uniquely different skill set to perform the required processes effectively. Ultimately both work
117 towards contributing to affecting personal cognition, and both activities are able to mutually support one
118 another. Therefore, cyber electromagnetic activities is considered an information-related capability that
119 must be synchronized and integrated through inform and influence activities. Not only can it reinforce
120 messaging efforts by providing additional means for message distribution, but it is also incorporated to
121 execute or support offensive and defensive operational planning against an adversary or enemy audience.

122 OPERATIONS SECURITY

123 3-18. Operations security is the process by which the Army protects human and automated decisionmaking
124 in peacetime and in conflict. It is a commander's responsibility and is supported by every Soldier and
125 supporting civilian staff members and operators. Operations security aims to enhance the probability of
126 mission success by preserving the advantages of initiative secrecy and surprise. Operations security is a
127 force multiplier. It includes reducing predictability and eliminating indicators of operations. Commanders
128 use operations security countermeasures to deny adversaries knowledge of friendly operations, requiring
129 adversaries to expend more resources to obtain the critical information needed to make decisions. For more
130 information on operations security, see FM 3-37.

131 3-19. Inform and influence activities' primary focus is the successful integration of words, images, and
132 deeds into the commander's overall plan. Operations security is very important to inform and influence
133 activities because its primary focus is to protect the unit's words, images, and deeds. In order to achieve
134 success by meeting the commander's desired effects and intended end state, effective messaging through
135 those words, images, and deeds must occur. A successfully executed operations security program enables
136 successful messages by preventing misinformation, disinformation, and information fratricide.

137 **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

138 3-20. Within inform and influence activities, counterintelligence has two specific contributions. First, it
139 counters human intelligence targeting of friendly inform and influence activities. Second,
140 counterintelligence provides threat analysis for enemy signals intelligence analysis. Information provided
141 by counterintelligence becomes usable intelligence for the commander and staff. With it, they develop an
142 inform and influence activities strategy. This strategy aims to counter, deter, neutralize, exploit, or at least
143 mitigate the adversary's information operations program. For more information on counterintelligence, see
144 FM 2-0.

145 3-21. Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the
146 multidiscipline intelligence activities of adversaries. By executing their mission, counterintelligence
147 elements are instrumental in contributing to situational awareness in the area of influence. Their asset
148 reporting also provides valuable information and assessments that contribute to determining inform and
149 influence activities measures of effectiveness.

150 **CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS**

151 3-22. The difference between civil-military operations and civil affairs operations as they relate to inform
152 and influence activities is purpose, focus, and specialization. Civil military operations are activities by a
153 commander to build relationships between military forces and civilians to aid the friendly cause. Civil
154 affairs operations involve applying specialty skills (normally the responsibility of civil government) to
155 enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Both civil-military operations and civil affairs operations
156 focus on the local population and creating favorable civil considerations in which military operations can
157 occur. Where any unit can perform civil military operation, because of their specialization, civil affairs
158 forces focus on issues such as infrastructure, governance, agriculture, health and human services, and
159 finance. For more information on civil-military operations, see FM 3-28. For more information on civil
160 affairs operations, see FM 3-05.40.

161 3-23. Since any civil-military operation or civil affairs operation involves direct interaction with the local
162 populace, inform and influence activities integrates both functions to support the commander's engagement
163 strategy. It recognizes the power of civil-military operations and civil affairs operations to contribute to the
164 commander's overall inform and influence activities effort and harmonizes this contribution with other
165 capabilities, such as military information support operations, public affairs and Soldier and leader
166 engagement.

167 **SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS**

168 3-24. The integrated joint special technical operations process is an option when addressing inform and
169 influence activities problem sets the staff identified and when traditional information-related capabilities
170 will not successfully accomplish the desired end state. The staff requests assistance through established
171 staff channels and procedures for planning. Currently, special technical operations billets exist in division
172 and higher echelons. From these echelons, they can support these planning and execution requests and
173 attempt to fill the gap between traditional information-related capabilities and special problem sets. When
174 requesting integrated joint special technical operations support, the staff focuses on the desired end state
175 and not specific capabilities or desired effects. The integrated joint special technical operations support is a
176 complicated and thorough process. It involves many agencies to develop the concept of operations and
177 acquire authorization, typically in requiring an average of 90 days. Unless concepts and authorizations are
178 already established, staffs of integrated joint special technical operations do not plan for time-sensitive
179 events.

180 **PRESENCE, POSTURE, AND PROFILE**

181 3-25. Although not considered a traditional information-related capability, presence and posture and other
182 combined arms assets are often used to deliver a commander's message to an intended audience.
183 Depending on the intended effects the commander desires, forces can be used to inform and influence by
184 simply their presence to provide safety for a village from adversary and enemy elements, to deter adversary
185 and enemy actions, or to shape the operational environment with lethal action when necessary. Because all

186 tactical action or inaction through execution of unified land operations sends a message, ground
187 commanders must be cognizant of how their actions within their area of operations support or negate the
188 commander-in-chief's overall strategy for strategic communication.

189 **PHYSICAL ATTACK**

190 3-26. Physical attack is the application of combat power to destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of
191 information, command and control systems, and installations. It includes direct and indirect fires from
192 ground, sea, and air forces. Also included are direct actions by special operations forces.

193 **OTHER CAPABILITIES**

194 3-27. Commanders designate other capabilities during the operations process. The operations process aids
195 the commander and staff to decide what other capabilities, not specified as an information-related
196 capability, to use to support the lines of effort (see paragraphs **Error! Bookmark not defined.** through 2-
197 5).

198 **INTEGRATED AND SYNCHRONIZED CAPABILITIES**

199 3-28. The complexities and scope of the information environment make it difficult to achieve the desired
200 effects using a single information-related capability. Effective integration and synchronization of all
201 information-related capabilities is necessary to achieve a holistic approach to operations. Likewise,
202 protecting friendly mission command systems and their components also requires carefully integrating and
203 synchronizing information-related capabilities.

204 3-29. Commanders often rely on two means of integration: coordination and deconfliction. Coordination
205 focuses on how activities or capabilities come together to reinforce and amplify each other. Deconfliction
206 focuses on how activities or capabilities might compete for resources or create effects that negate or impair
207 each other and focuses on taking action to avoid or mitigate such outcomes. To achieve complementary and
208 reinforcing effects, commanders effectively coordinate and deconflict information-related capabilities. This
209 action decreases the probability of conflicts and interference that may compromise friendly intentions or
210 result in information fratricide.

211 3-30. Commanders use synchronization to protect their forces. Information fratricide results when the
212 effects of information-related capabilities conflict or compete with one other. More importantly, it occurs
213 when information-related messages or effects are contradicted by actions, creating a "say-do" gap. Such a
214 gap places commanders', the Army's, and the nation's credibility at risk.

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Chapter 4

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Roles, Responsibilities, and Organizations

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The chapter discusses the roles, responsibilities, and organizations of inform and influence activities. It first discusses the role of the commander. Then it discusses the roles of the G-7 (S-7) and the staff. Lastly it discusses the role of others—the inform and influence activities section and working group, the information operations command, the theater operations group, and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center.

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ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

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4-1. Commanders lead inform and influence activities, primarily advised by the G-7 (S-7) and supported by the entire staff. Commanders acknowledge the social aspects and dynamics of different languages of the information environment. Through mission command, inform and influence activities address the audiences in each area of operations.

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4-2. Commanders establish and synchronize information themes and messages to inform audiences and decisionmakers. The audiences are friendly, both domestic and foreign. These themes and messages influence specific foreign audiences, adversary and enemy audiences, and decisionmakers.

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4-3. Commanders incorporate cultural awareness, relevant social and political factors, and other informational aspects. These aspects relate to the mission in how commanders understand and visualize the end state and throughout operational design.

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4-4. Commanders, with the advice from the staff, guide the integration of the information-related capabilities with other actions in their concept of operations.

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4-5. Commanders require the staff to determine how these information activities affect the various audiences and their perceptions.

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4-6. Commanders, with the advice from the staff, assess and reassess how their staff uses the inform and influence lines of effort to achieve their commander's intent with all audiences.

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4-7. The commander's intent drives the military decisionmaking process, enabling units to incorporate inform and influence activities into each operation. The commander's intent envisions a future state. It acknowledges and incorporates the affects of people on the area of operations. The commander's intent enables the staff and subordinate units to focus planning efforts focused on envisioned future end state. The staff and subordinate units must change attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. Reaching that desired end state can involve breaking the enemy's will or can foster wider and more enduring support among other audiences. These audiences range from the U.S. audiences to indigenous people in the area of operations.

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ROLE OF THE G-7 (S-7) OFFICER

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4-8. The G-7 (S-7), inform and influence activities officer, serves as the commander's primary coordinating staff officer for integrating information-related capabilities and assessing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness in accordance with the plan. To best advise the commander, the G-7 (S-7) must understand the information and operational environments. Additionally, the G-7 (S-7) must have a cultural understanding of the area of operations, as well as that of joint and multinational forces and civilian organizations.

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4-9. Inform and influence activities brings together multiple information-related capabilities (see chapter 3). To provide unity of effort, a coordinating staff officer, the G-7 (S-7), is responsible for overall

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42 integration of those capabilities in accordance with the larger operations, including maneuver, fires, and
43 other such efforts. Placing responsibility for synchronizing activities of the information-related capabilities
44 on one coordinating staff officer helps commanders mass their effects to integrate information as a combat
45 element in the planning process.

46 4-10. The G-7 (S-7)'s primary responsibilities include—

- 47 ● Involvement in every step of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) (see chapter 5).
- 48 ● Monitoring execution of approved activities.
- 49 ● Continuously assessing measures of performance and effectiveness against the intended plan.
- 50 ● Advising the commander and staff when they might need to make adjustments in the plan based
51 on the assessment.

52 The inform and influence activities officer also advises the commander on how commanders can use
53 information to help shape the operational environment.

54 4-11. The G-7 (S-7) section contributes to the overall intelligence preparation of the battlefield by
55 developing inform and influence activities input. This section works with the G-2 (S-2) section to develop
56 products that portray the information infrastructure of the area of operations and aspects of the information
57 environment that can affect operations. In addition to information about the adversary, these products
58 include information on all audiences and other decisionmakers, key people, and significant groups in the
59 area of operations. They address potential strengths and vulnerabilities of adversaries and other groups as
60 well as friendly force operations security considerations.

61 4-12. A headquarters monitors the effects of its inform and influence activities and coordinates any
62 activities that directly affect operations of other commands. To do this, the G-7 (S-7) section coordinates
63 with the G-7 (S-7) section of higher and adjacent commands to obtain effects assessments in near real-time.
64 With this information, the G-7 (S-7) section tracks how the effects of other organizations' inform and
65 influence activities impact the commander's overall operation.

66 4-13. Secondary responsibilities include ensuring the unit inform and influence activities strategy is nested
67 with joint information operations and unified action partner inform and influence efforts, as well as the
68 overall strategy, themes, and messages for strategic communication. This includes both vertical and
69 horizontal staff coordination to ensure consistency of messaging. The G-7 (S-7) can accomplish much of
70 this through conducting their own inform and influence activities working group (appendix A) and
71 participating in information operations and other unit's information working group meetings.

72 4-14. Through the staff planning and coordinating process, the G-7 (S-7) will determine and nominate
73 nonlethal and potentially lethal targets for approval and will also need to establish inform and influence
74 measures for performance and effectiveness to provide post activity assessment in accordance with the
75 decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting model (appendix A). Coordination with the G-2 (S-2) is also
76 necessary to plan collection assets to support inform and influence activities assessment.

77 4-15. The G-7 (S-7) trains individuals within the inform and influence activities section on staff action
78 battle drills and inform and influence activities mission-essential tasks. The G-7 (S-7) might also be tasked
79 to train or support training for units and other staff sections, sections for inform and influence activities
80 planning, or sections for conducting Soldier and leader engagement.

81 4-16. The G-7 (S-7) is finally also responsible for standard leader actions, such as government contract
82 management and oversight, required supply and equipment coordination with the sustainment personnel,
83 and Soldier actions and unit readiness requirements regarding the personnel in the G-7 (S-7) section.

84 **ROLE OF THE STAFF**

85 4-17. The G-2 (S-2) section has staff responsibility for producing intelligence about adversaries and the
86 environment. Intelligence analysts process and analyze information (to include open-source information) to
87 produce intelligence. They incorporate aspects of inform and influence activities into intelligence
88 preparation of the battlefield to accurately describe the audiences in the information environment and
89 throughout the area of interest. Intelligence products focus on answering priority intelligence requirements

90 and identifying high-payoff targets as well as providing initial baseline and ongoing assessment of the area
 91 of operations and enemy capability status.

92 4-18. Through the intelligence system, the G-2 (S-2) section has access to higher echelon information
 93 sources and intelligence collection assets. The staff analyzes information from these sources with
 94 information from organic sources to produce the information environment portions of the common
 95 operational picture. Advanced mission command systems, adequate procedures, and trained Soldiers use
 96 the mission command network to disseminate this product throughout the command. Effective information
 97 management provides different commanders and staffs with a common operational picture based on
 98 intelligence and friendly force information.

99 4-19. The G-3 (S-3) section exercises primary staff responsibility over reconnaissance operations. To
 100 answer priority intelligence requirements, the G-3 (S-3) section tasks organic reconnaissance and sur-
 101 veillance assets. Together, the G-2 (S-2) and G-3 (S-3) sections exploit all available resources to answer the
 102 priority intelligence requirements. The G-7 (S-7) section submits information requirements to the G-2 (S-2)
 103 section. The staff submits information requirements it cannot answer with organic assets to appropriate
 104 agencies as requests for information.

105 The role of the staff includes coordination. Responsive staff coordination of the information-related
 106 capabilities intensifies as execution of the operation progresses and variances from the operation order
 107 increase. The decentralized nature of inform and influence activities execution, combined with the multiple
 108 command levels involved and the allocation of information monitoring responsibilities among the unit's
 109 assets, places a heavy demand on the G-7 (S-7) section.

110 **ROLE OF OTHERS**

111 4-20. The inform and influence activities section neither owns nor controls any of a unit's assets, but it
 112 must coordinate with many who do. Therefore, inform and influence activities officers cannot support the
 113 section's mission by themselves. To plan and integrate successfully, inform and influence activities officers
 114 collaborate via several means both internally to their unit and supporting units as well as externally to
 115 reachback units and centers.

116 **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SECTION AND WORKING GROUP**

117 4-21. The inform and influence activities section is part of the mission command functional cell.
 118 Functional cells coordinate and synchronize forces and activities by warfighting function. The mission
 119 command functional cell consists of the inform and influence activities section, the signal staff section, and
 120 the civil affairs operations staff section. In the mission command functional cell, staff sections that reside in
 121 this cell report directly to the chief of staff and not through a cell chief. The G-7 (S-7) leads the inform and
 122 influence activities section. This officer oversees the cross-functional integration of information-related
 123 capabilities and planning product development.

124 4-22. The G-7 (S-7) also leads the inform and influence activities working group. The inform and influence
 125 activities working group meets as necessary to analyze, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a
 126 particular purpose or function. Working groups are cross-functional by design to synchronize the
 127 contributions of multiple command post cells and staff sections, as well as any necessary external agencies
 128 or organizations required. The inform and influence activities working group is integrated with the staff's
 129 battle rhythm. As a critical planning event, information as an element of combat power is leveraged to best
 130 achieve an operational advantage contributing to mission accomplishment.

131 **FIRST INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMMAND (LAND)**

132 4-23. Upon tasking by Army G-3, First Information Operations Command (Land) assists commanders in
 133 conducting (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) information operations. It coordinates with joint
 134 and multinational commands, other Services, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies and
 135 organizations. Army Service component commands, corps, and divisions request support by field support
 136 teams or assessment teams, as needed. First Information Operations Command (Land) can receive
 137 reinforcement from both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to meet peacetime and

138 contingency information operations requirements for the Army. It is under operational control of the Army
139 Cyber Command and is tasked by the Army G-3 and U.S. Forces Command.

140 4-24. First Information Operations Command (Land) has the following:

- 141 ● Field support teams.
- 142 ● Army Computer Emergency Response Team.
- 143 ● Information operations vulnerability assessment teams.
- 144 ● Vulnerability assessment blue teams.
- 145 ● Vulnerability assessment red teams.
- 146 ● Army reprogramming analysis team-threat analysis.
- 147 ● Current operations center.

148 4-25. A *field support team* is a mission-tailored team of subject matter experts that provides direct
149 support for information operations or inform and influence activities to the ARFORs and joint task
150 forces of land components of combatant commands, and corps and divisions as requested. Subject
151 matter experts consist of military forces, civilians, and contractors. Normally these teams deploy first in
152 response to a request for information operations or inform and influence activities support. For long
153 duration missions, field support teams deploy in an attached (less administrative) status and become part of
154 the supported commander's information operations cell or inform and influence activities section to
155 reinforce the commander's information efforts.

156 4-26. The Army Computer Emergency Response Team is part of a computer network operations division.
157 This team deters, detects, coordinates, responds, and reports Army information systems security incidents.
158 The Army Computer Emergency Response Team leverages and integrates intelligence support, network,
159 and system management capabilities into a unified, defensive information operations effort. The Army
160 Computer Emergency Response Team, operating around the clock, is the Department of the Army's single
161 point of contact for reporting information systems security incidents and vulnerabilities. It is responsible to
162 Headquarters, Department of the Army, for coordinating an appropriate response to incidents. This team
163 exchanges reports of computer incidents with other Service, joint, and national agencies and activities.

164 4-27. First Information Operations Command (Land) provides information operations vulnerability
165 assessment teams. These teams enhance Army force protection. Information operations vulnerability
166 assessment teams assess a commander's ability to incorporate defensive information operations into
167 peacetime operations, operational and contingency missions, training, and exercises.

168 4-28. Vulnerability assessment blue teams, in coordination with the supported unit's staff, conduct
169 information operations force protection assessments. These assessments focus on networks and information
170 flow in the First Information Operations Command (Land). Teams assimilate information to identify
171 existing or potential vulnerabilities, estimate the level of risk, and recommend measures to diminish or
172 eliminate that risk. Assessments consider all information operations elements, unless the assessed unit's
173 commander requests otherwise. Normally, an assessment includes an analysis of the unit's information
174 flow infrastructure and decisionmaking process. This analysis identifies choke points or potential-conflicts
175 within a commander's mission command system.

176 4-29. Vulnerability assessment red teams emulate adversarial capabilities targeted against a unit's
177 information, information systems, networks, and decisionmaking process. Red team missions have a dual
178 purpose: strengthen unit readiness and verify the effectiveness of countermeasures applied by the unit and
179 blue teams. Red team operations are designed to provide realistic training and detailed feedback needed to
180 strengthen a unit's defensive information operations posture. However, public law and Army policy limit
181 the scope of red team operations. In addition, the assessed unit's commander may impose operational
182 limitations. The more permissive and open the rules of engagement, the more extensive and valuable the
183 red team's observations and recommendations.

184 4-30. The Army Reprogramming Analysis Team-Threat Analysis supports warfighters and combat and
185 materiel developers. It identifies and reports changes in worldwide signature information that may require
186 the rapid reprogramming of Army target sensing systems. Army target sensing systems consist of those
187 radar warning, surveillance, self-protection systems, and smart munitions that incorporate software
188 algorithms to identify threat systems based upon embedded reprogrammed threat parameter data. Examples

189 include smart munitions, sensors, processors, and aviation electronic combat survivability equipment. The
190 Army Reprogramming Analysis Team-Threat Analysis provides assistance that supports Army aviation
191 survivability.

192 4-31. The First Information Operations Command (Land) current operations center supports its deployed
193 teams and the supported commands with products and requests for information. The teams receive their
194 support through the concept of split-based operations and reachback support. The current operations center
195 can access multiple external departments, agencies, and databases and produce tailored analytical products
196 to meet a deployed team’s immediate needs.

197 **THEATER INFORMATION OPERATIONS GROUP**

198 4-32. A theater information operations group provides information-related capabilities to the Army Service
199 component command and its subordinate commands. It supports brigade combat teams to provide joint and
200 Army missions with information-related capabilities. It provides commanders with a scalable capability
201 that is regionally focused and culturally aware. At Army Service component command through the brigade
202 combat team, teams support the command with offensive and defensive information operations and inform
203 and influence activities with a regional cultural focus. The group’s S-2 provides capabilities for direct
204 support information operations and inform and influence activities reachback. This officer also analyzes
205 information operations and inform and influence activities regarding regional, cultural, social, political,
206 economic, and human terrain considerations. Each theater information operation group maintains
207 deployable inform and influence activities, operations security, and military deception capabilities. It
208 deploys in its entirety or as modular teams. Deployable elements are scalable and determined by mission
209 requirements to support specific operations. Teams are packaged to provide the supported command with
210 regionally focused, culturally aware joint information operations and Army inform and influence activities
211 support.

212 4-33. At the Army Service component command level, tactical field support teams assist with theater
213 security cooperation planning and joint information operations missions. At any unit level, an operations
214 security support detachment will provide information operations vulnerability assessments and operations
215 security planning support, while a web operations security support detachment will assess and enhance
216 website security. Information operations and inform and influence activities assessment teams will deploy
217 to evaluate the effectiveness of operational and tactical information operations and inform and influence
218 activities efforts. These teams will also evaluate the effectiveness of open source, cultural affairs, and
219 human terrain team analysis for regional ethnology planning support.

220 **JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS WARFARE CENTER**

221 4-34. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, a special tasking element of the joint staff J-39,
222 enables information operations and other missions for the commander of the United States Strategic
223 Command and other joint force commanders as directed. This center coordinates and synchronizes regional
224 and global information operations efforts and enhances information operations support across the
225 Department of Defense. Additionally, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center partners with other
226 entities related to information operations—internal and external to the Department of Defense—to further
227 enhance the global information operations mission.

228 4-35. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center can provide information subject matter experts
229 with special emphasis on electronic warfare, military deception, and operations security. It also maintains a
230 cadre of intelligence professionals tightly focused on the information operations problem set. It maintains a
231 working relationship with the information operations staffs of the combatant commanders and Service
232 elements, so it can provide focused and tailored products for information operations planning.
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Chapter 5

Inform and Influence Activities Integration

Commanders lead inform and influence activities. This chapter discusses the activities as an integrating function. It also discusses how the inform and influence activities work with the military decisionmaking process.

INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AS AN INTEGRATING FUNCTION

5-1. Inform and influence activities is an integrating function. It owns no capabilities but rather holistically ties together information-related capabilities to achieve the commander's intent and operational objectives. Like command itself, integration is both art and science. Since it involves not only achieving effects in the physical dimension but also in the informational and cognitive dimensions, it is less about certainty and more about probability. Integration attempts to maximize the probability of achieving effects favorable to the commander's desired end state.

5-2. To integrate inform and influence activities effectively, commanders—

- Understand the operational and information environments.
- Frame their commander's intent and mission narrative not only with the physical end state in mind but also the informational end state.
- Consider the informational aspects of operations. In other words, they continually ask how relevant audiences perceive operations and how they can shape these perceptions to their benefit.
- Lead the military decisionmaking process with inform and influence activities in mind.
- Frame themes and messages.
- Ensure that themes, messages, and actions interrelate and are cohesive.
- Develop their engagement strategy, including media engagements, Soldier and leader engagements, civil affairs engagements, and diplomatic engagements.
- Actively engage individuals and entities who will help to shape the desired end state.

INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

5-3. The military decisionmaking process (MDMP) is a seven-step process done sequentially. The staff analyzes each problem that the unit needs to address using this process to determine the proper requirements for addressing the problem.

5-4. The MDMP unifies the efforts of each staff section to solve a problem. Each staff section provides a piece contributing to the whole solution. Inform and influence activities frames the problem and conceives solutions by focusing the information environment and the effects of this environment on other efforts. For example, if the problem is that extremist voices are swaying the local populace to support the adversary, then a solution might involve presenting a counternarrative to divide the populace from the adversary. Implementing this solution means understanding how the local populace receives information, who they trust and listen to, what messages will resonate effectively, what friendly actions will threaten messaging efforts, and which channels of communications have the widest appeal and staying power.

5-5. From an inform and influence activities perspective, the MDMP would look like figure 5-1.




Figure 5-1. The MDMP from an inform and influence activities perspective

5-6. For each step in the MDMP, the G-7 (S-7) or inform and influence activities planner is responsible for actions and planning products that paragraphs 5-7 through 5-13 discuss.

RECEIPT OF MISSION

5-7. In the receipt of mission, the G-7 (S-7) participates in commander's initial assessment actions, receives the commander's initial guidance, and performs an initial inform and influence activities assessment. Lastly, this officer prepares for subsequent planning.

5-8. During receipt of mission, the staff updates the inform and influence activities estimate. The staff also creates inform and influence activities planning products. They—

- Develop input to initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including initial essential elements of friendly information.
- Develop input to initial intelligence asset tasking.
- Submit information requirements in support of inform and influence activities concerning adversary capability to collect essential elements of friendly information to G-2 (S-2).
- Develop an inform and influence activities input to a warning order. Input includes initial essential elements of friendly information.

MISSION ANALYSIS

5-9. During mission analysis, the G-7 (S-7) assists the G-2 (S-2) in conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield; submits information on threat information operations capabilities and vulnerabilities; and submits inform and influence activities input to intelligence preparation of the battlefield products. This officer coordinates inform and influence activities intelligence support requirements with the collection manager. Lastly the G-7 (S-7) ensures the G-2 (S-2) staff clearly understands the intelligence support and products required for inform and influence activities planning and execution.

63 5-10. The staff produces key inform and influence activities planning products during mission analysis. For
 64 the inform and influence activities portion of mission analysis brief, they detail applicable concepts and
 65 objectives; intelligence preparation of the battlefield tasks, assets, critical factors, and assumptions; risk
 66 assessment; and information requirements. Other specific inform and influence activities products
 67 include—
 68 • Requests for information for intelligence support.
 69 • A refined inform and influence activities estimate.
 70 • A statement of the inform and influence activities strategy.

71 COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

72 5-11. During course of action development, the G-7 (S-7) provides advice on the potential impact of
 73 friendly and enemy information operations activities-related actions or activities on relative combat power
 74 of the two sides. This officer focuses inform and influence activities planning efforts on achieving
 75 operational advantage at the decision point in each course of action. Lastly, the G-7 (S-7) develops schemes
 76 of support and objectives for inform and influence activities and input to a high-payoff target list for each
 77 course of action.

78 5-12. The staff produces key inform and influence activities planning products during course of action
 79 development. These include—
 80 • Objectives and tasks for inform and influence activities annotated on the G-3 (S-3) sketch.
 81 • The concept for the inform and influence activities graphic (inform and influence activities
 82 specific course of action sketch).
 83 • A draft task organization and synchronization input for inform and influence activities.
 84 • A high-payoff target list.
 85 • An inform and influence activities assessment plan.

86 COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

87 5-13. During course of action analysis, the G-7 (S-7) assists the G-2 (S-2) with adversary information
 88 operations, provides input on high-value targets, develops an inform and influence activities concept. This
 89 concept supports each friendly course of action, addresses critical events, and reviews and refines task
 90 organization of information-related capabilities in support of inform and influence activities.

91 5-14. The key inform and influence activities planning products built during course of action analysis
 92 include an inform and influence activities wargaming worksheet and a draft task organization of
 93 information-related capabilities in support of inform and influence activities. As a result of wargaming, the
 94 staff also refines and integrates inform and influence activities information requirements and essential
 95 elements of friendly information into the operational concept. Additionally as a result of wargaming, the
 96 staff hones and synchronizes core tasks for the inform and influence activities annex.

97 COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

98 5-15. During course of action comparison, the G-7 (S-7) provides input. This input applies to course of
 99 action selection and evaluation criteria, inform and influence activities planning products, and an inform
 100 and influence activities course of action decision matrix.

101 COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

102 5-16. During course of action approval, the G-7 (S-7) participates in the course of action selection briefing.
 103 This officer is prepared to discuss how information-related capabilities support each course of action. The
 104 G-7 (S-7) helps finalize the commander’s intent based on course of action selected. The output from the
 105 G-7 (S-7) is a finalized inform and influence activities execution matrix.

106 **ORDERS PRODUCTION**

107 5-17. During order production, the G-7 (S-7) produces inform and influence activities orders. This officer
108 also produces the following planning products:

- 109 ● Paragraph 3.a. (subparagraph 7), paragraph 3.b, and paragraph 3.c of the base order.
- 110 ● Input to Annex A (Task Organization).
- 111 ● Annex J (Inform and Influence Activities) and its appendixes (public affairs, military deception,
112 military information support operations, and Soldier and leader engagement).
- 113 ● Input to other functional area annexes—intelligence, fire support, signal, and civil affairs—as
114 required.

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Chapter 6

Soldier and Leader Engagement

This chapter discusses Soldier and leader engagement. It defines and identifies the principles of Soldier and leader engagement. Then it details the types of Soldier and leader engagements. Lastly this chapter discusses the roles of the command and staffs in Soldier and leader engagement.

DEFINITION OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

6-1. Soldier and leader engagement is defined as interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with foreign audiences in an area of operations. It can occur as an opportunity, face-to-face encounter on the street or as a scheduled meeting. This interaction can also occur via telephone calls, video teleconferences, or other audio visual mediums. Soldier and leader engagement supports both the inform and the influence lines of effort within the inform and influence activities construct. Soldiers and leaders conduct this engagement to provide information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. It provides a venue for building relationships, resolving conflict, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information. Effectively integrating Soldier and leader engagement into operations increases the potential for commanders to mitigate unintended consequences, counter adversary information activities, and increase local support for friendly forces and their collective mission.

6-2. Commanders lead Soldier and leader engagement throughout unified land operations. A fundamental and complex aspect of being a land force is that Soldiers may have to operate among local audiences. Often, audiences in an area of operations look, act, and think differently from Soldiers. The aims and ambitions of even a friendly or neutral audience may fail to align with those of Soldiers and leaders. As such, Soldiers and leaders must be prepared to bridge these differences to build alliances, encourage cooperation or noninterference, and drive a wedge between the friendly and neutral audiences and adversary or enemy audiences.

6-3. Soldier and leader engagement is a component of a larger commander's engagement strategy and an even larger inform and influence strategy collaborated by the G-7 (S-7) through inform and influence activities. This larger strategy includes public affairs engagements, especially with the media; civil-military operations or civil affairs engagements, such as medical civil action programs; and civil-military engagements, such as those in support of security force assistance efforts.

PRINCIPLES OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT

6-4. Six principles characterize the effective conduct of Soldier and leader engagement in support of decisive actions:

- Consistent.
- Culturally-attuned.
- Adaptive.
- Credible.
- Balanced.
- Pragmatic.

CONSISTENT

6-5. Soldier and leader engagements are consistent when they communicate the same essential meaning as other operational activities. Achieving consistency requires that commanders and their staffs understand

42 effects in cognitive terms—the perceptions and interpretations that various actors and populations assign to
43 operations and the conditions they cause. When audiences perceive engagement dialogue (words) as
44 inconsistent with observable behavior (actions), Soldiers and leaders lose credibility.

45 **CULTURALLY-ATTUNED**

46 6-6. Soldiers and leaders conduct this engagement in the context of local customs, beliefs, and ways of
47 communicating. Doing so builds understanding and cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and
48 mistrust. Beyond familiarization with cultural practices, interacting in a culturally-attuned manner requires
49 that Soldiers and leaders understand each population’s orientation toward indirect versus direct
50 communication styles, relationship versus task, and finally, time. A cultural support team illustrates a
51 culturally-attuned engagement. These teams consist of female Soldiers. They interact with indigenous
52 women in regions where contact between a unrelated male and female is culturally unacceptable. Cultural
53 support teams enable friendly forces to interact with a key demographic group while respecting cultural
54 norms.

55 6-7. Culturally-attuned Soldier and leader engagement acknowledges that indigenous communicators and
56 leaders are sometimes the most effective at framing messages for populations within the area of operations.
57 In the past, commanders and staffs have developed messages unilaterally from their own cultural
58 perspective and simply translated them into the local languages. Invariably, something was lost in
59 translation or the message conflicted with local views or norms. Leveraging key leaders or actors from
60 target audiences allows units to draw on their familiarity and credibility with those same key audiences. It
61 increases the likelihood that an interaction will inform or influence audiences as desired. Understandably,
62 units must balance the use of such individuals against security concerns. Units should also exploit trained
63 influence specialists (such as military information support operations) and resident cultural experts to assist
64 efforts to structure carefully crafted messages and deliver them through culturally familiar means.

65 **ADAPTIVE**

66 6-8. Operational adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond to a changing operational
67 environment with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Successful Soldier and leader engagement
68 depends upon operational adaptability, and thus, relies on Soldiers and leaders who exhibit the ability to
69 think critically, reasoned judgment, comfort with ambiguity, willingness to accept prudent risk, and the
70 ability to rapidly adjust to evolving situations.

71 6-9. Recognizing the interpersonal and, often, cross-cultural nature of Soldier and leader engagement,
72 adaptability requires a commitment to learning. Acknowledging that a richer understanding of the target
73 audiences within an area of operations can improve human communication is a precondition for successful
74 adaptation. Engagement characterized by an assumed superiority—a conviction that a message’s inherent
75 rightness disqualifies it from audience scrutiny—fails to support the conditions necessary to discover and
76 adopt more effective communication approaches. Thus, effective Soldier and leader engagement is more
77 about dialogue and advising rather than dictating expected behavior.

78 **CREDIBLE**

79 6-10. Successful Soldier and leader engagement depends on trust. A fundamental criterion for trust is the
80 degree of confidence populations have in the credibility of the Army forces with whom they interact.
81 Openness and transparency, with consideration for operations security, are fundamental to this effort. Thus,
82 credibility results from an observable, sustained, and consistent pattern of factually accurate words and
83 principled deeds attuned to the local culture.

84 6-11. Establishing habitual relationships between U.S. leaders or Soldiers and representatives of key
85 audiences helps to promote credibility. The habitual partner becomes the primary conduit through which
86 information is passed. A conduit reduces the likelihood of information fratricide—the chance that key
87 audiences will receive conflicting messages or commitments from U.S. or friendly partners. It also reduces
88 the occurrence of engagement fatigue in which a single audience becomes overwhelmed by the number of
89 Soldier and leader engagements in which that audience must participate. At higher levels, these habitual

90 engagements form the basis of strategic partnering, especially important to security force assistance and
 91 building partner capacity.

92 **BALANCED**

93 6-12. Soldiers and leaders balance their engagement efforts between the inclination to achieve the desired
 94 effect and the requirement to actively listen and understand the other’s point of view. During a single
 95 Soldier and leader engagement, Soldiers or leaders may achieve little more than increased understanding of
 96 the audience with which interact. Increased understanding is an acceptable objective for a Soldier and
 97 leader engagement. Understanding is critical to the success of subsequent Soldier and leader engagement as
 98 it lays the foundation for establishing solid relationships. A balanced approach to engagements helps to
 99 ensure both parties benefit from the event.

100 6-13. Imbalanced information engagement tends to have one-way communications, implying that people
 101 mutely receive information. This imbalance may create the perception with an audience that a Soldier
 102 considers the audience and their ideas irrelevant, disrespected, and marginalized. These perceptions could
 103 ultimately prove to be significant obstacles to future engagements and achieving a commander’s intent.

104 **PRAGMATIC**

105 6-14. Pragmatism involves acknowledging that the ultimate effects of one’s efforts to communicate are
 106 difficult to both predict and control. Pragmatic Soldier and leader engagement accepts the unpredictable,
 107 often opaque, nature of communications and operates with realistic expectations of message control.
 108 Leaders guide what their units say and do. They cannot, however, control how others interpret friendly
 109 force messages and actions. Soldiers and leaders understand that the culture, biases, religion, education, and
 110 experience of the individuals and groups observing them shape perceptions or interpretations. Given the
 111 prevalence of technology, Soldiers and leaders cannot control who eventually receives communications
 112 beyond the intended receiver.

113 6-15. Pragmatism also reflects an expectation and acceptance of prudent risk. Soldiers and leaders should
 114 expect small setbacks. Nurturing relationships and building trusted networks means that sometimes they
 115 will interact with someone who is untrustworthy. Soldiers and leaders may even reveal those maligned
 116 actors who previously went undetected.

117 6-16. Soldier and leader engagement is a long-term, building effort assessed in terms of months or years
 118 rather than in hours or days. Pragmatism acknowledges that the effects of Soldier and leader engagement
 119 may not be immediately achievable or recognizable. Influencing audiences within an area of operations
 120 requires credibility. Building credibility, or trust, requires repeated and meaningful interaction.
 121 Recognizing any resulting change from these interactions requires familiarity or experience with the culture
 122 in which the Soldier and leader engagement occurs.

123 **TYPES OF SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT**

124 6-17. Two types of Soldier and leader engagements exist: deliberate and dynamic. Primarily deliberate and
 125 dynamic engagements differ in the planning and execution.

126 **DELIBERATE**

127 6-18. Deliberate engagements are anticipated and planned interpersonal interactions undertaken to achieve
 128 a specified effect or objective. These engagements may be face-to-face interactions or may be interactions
 129 via other means such as telephone or video teleconference. Examples of deliberate engagements are—

- 130 ● Scheduled meetings with key communicators or formal leaders.
- 131 ● Participation in the planned opening of a local school.
- 132 ● Delivery of information to a ministry official.

133 6-19. Effective deliberate Soldier and leader engagement integrates other information-related capabilities.
 134 This integration aims to achieve or complement desired effects. Examples of the integration of other
 135 information-related capabilities into Soldier and leader engagement include—

- 136 ● Humanitarian and civic assistance.
- 137 ● Military information support activities, such as delivery of military information support
- 138 operations products to target audiences.
- 139 ● Media engagements with local newspapers or radio stations coordinated by the unit public
- 140 affairs officer.

141 **Planning**

142 6-20. Soldier and leader engagement involves method planning. Appendix D discusses planning for

143 Soldier and leader engagement.

144 **Preparation**

145 6-21. Soldiers and leaders prepare for deliberate Soldier and leader engagements as they would any

146 military task or mission. See appendix D for preparation for Soldier and leader engagement.

147 **DYNAMIC**

148 6-22. Dynamic Soldier and leader engagement interactions are unanticipated or impromptu encounters for

149 which Soldiers and leaders have not conducted deliberate planning. Dynamic interactions occur frequently.

150 They may be spontaneous face-to-face conversations with local civilians during dismounted patrols or

151 unsolicited visitations by local leaders to an operating base or combat outpost.

152 6-23. Although unplanned, leaders can prepare their subordinates at all levels to negotiate impromptu

153 interactions successfully before deployment. Preparation for Soldier and leader engagement starts as early

154 as initial entry training when they begin the process of internalizing the Army Values found in FM 1.

155 Displaying respect for others and communicating honestly (integrity) inevitably increases the likelihood of

156 positive outcomes in any human interaction. Training for law of land warfare, rules of engagement, and

157 culture as well as role-playing exercises for Soldier and leader engagement all prepare Soldiers and leaders

158 to have successful interactions.

159 6-24. In theater, Soldiers and leaders use tools that communicate general guidance while enabling

160 adaptability and initiative. These tools include the commander's intent, mission narrative, themes,

161 messages, commander's critical information requirements, rules of engagement, and public affairs officer

162 talking points. Frequently reviewing the tools helps Soldiers and leaders act or speak in ways consistent

163 with the commander's objectives. Units review significant activity reports, intelligence estimates or

164 summaries, and patrol reports to gain situational awareness of local grievances. In its simplest form,

165 preparation for dynamic Soldier and leader engagements reflects preparation for any military operation. Its

166 characteristics may be found in the standard operating procedure for many Army units.

167 **ROLE OF THE COMMANDER IN SOLDIER AND LEADER**

168 **ENGAGEMENT**

169 6-25. Inform and influence activities are an essential component of mission command. Mission command

170 seeks to propagate leadership throughout the organization and empower subordinates to lead at their levels.

171 Still, the commander bears the responsibilities of establishing and expressing a vision that sets everything

172 else in motion and creating an environment that encourages creative outcomes through structured

173 processes. With regard to Soldier and leader engagement, the commander—

- 174 ● Frames the narrative.
- 175 ● Is the central delivery asset for the unit for themes and messages.
- 176 ● Fosters a culture of engagement.

177 **FRAMES THE NARRATIVE**

178 6-26. Mission narrative is the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission (FM 5-0). The

179 mission narrative verbalizes the commander's visualization for a specified mission and forms the basis for

180 the concept of operations developed during detailed planning. An explicit reflection of the commander's

181 logic, the staff uses the mission narrative to inform, influence, and educate the various relevant partners
 182 whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are pertinent to the operation. Along with the
 183 commander's intent and initial planning guidance, the mission narrative guides the staff in its development
 184 of the commander's themes and messages.

185 **IS THE CENTRAL DELIVERY ASSET**

186 6-27. Commanders are the key engagers because their position and authority often invest them with the
 187 greatest degree of credibility and access to undertake engagements. They do more than simply model
 188 appropriate actions. During stability operations in particular, commanders should maximize interactions
 189 with the local populace through frequent Soldier and leader engagement. Doing so enables commanders
 190 to—

- 191 ● Assess attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors first-hand.
- 192 ● Sense shifts in perceptions, both positive and negative, and take appropriate action.
- 193 ● Engender the trust and confidence of the local populace.
- 194 ● Sense and map the social networks operative in the area of operations.
- 195 ● Discover who the key leaders are, as well as trusted, credible voices, both formal and informal.
- 196 ● Bolster confidence in and consensus behind deserving local leaders.
- 197 ● Deliver messages.
- 198 ● Assess how effectively units synchronize words, images, and actions and make needed
 199 refinements.
- 200 ● Quickly correct adversary information.
- 201 ● Ensure Soldiers and subordinate leaders are engaging the populace in their areas effectively.

202 6-28. Commanders balance their duty as key engager with their understanding of cultural and local
 203 dynamics. Often, indigenous leaders will only engage the commander because it serves to reinforce their
 204 own importance and their people's view of them. This may have unintentional effects, such as undermining
 205 the influence of subordinate leaders in the unit or decreasing the commander's credibility with influential
 206 leaders of other target audiences.

207 **FOSTERS A CULTURE OF ENGAGEMENT**

208 6-29. Commanders foster a culture to achieve both their vision and their unit's mission. As commanders
 209 seek to shape a culture that exhibits and upholds the Army Values (among many other shared beliefs and
 210 practices), they shape a culture of engagement. This culture buoys Soldiers' confidence in their ability to
 211 engage many audiences, especially the populace in and through which they operate. Commanders may
 212 foster a culture of engagement in multiple ways:

- 213 ● Guidance in the development of a robust engagement strategy.
- 214 ● Commander's critical information requirements and reporting requirements.
- 215 ● Organization of the staff (such as the engagement element).
- 216 ● Employment of information-related capabilities, public affairs, or military information support
 217 operations for advice and assistance.
- 218 ● Leading by example (such as actively conducting engagements).
- 219 ● Training requirements (cultural and negotiation training).
- 220 ● Resourcing of staff (manning, funds, and time).
- 221 ● Building partner capacity with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.

222 6-30. Critical to fostering a culture of engagement is the commander's supplying subordinates with proper
 223 training and guidance. The commander's themes and messages and unit cultural training requirements
 224 provide subordinates with critical tools for engagements. Still, Soldiers and leaders will likely make
 225 mistakes as they navigate the values and norms of an unfamiliar culture. In accordance with the mission
 226 command philosophy, commanders balance their response to cultural missteps with the task to actively
 227 seek engagement with target audiences.

228 **ROLE OF THE STAFF IN SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENT**

229 6-31. The staff actively contributes to the mission narrative and Army design methodology. The staff then
230 takes the outcome of the commander’s intent, guidance, and mission narrative and turns them into plans
231 and orders. With regard to Soldier and leader engagement, the G-7 (S-7) leads staff integration. The staff
232 responsibilities include the following:

- 233 ● Develops an overall engagement strategy that supports the commander’s lines of effort.
- 234 ● Coordinates information capabilities to support planning and execution of Soldier and leader
235 engagement.
- 236 ● Assists the commander in writing mission narrative and themes.
- 237 ● Utilizes the targeting process, integrates and synchronizes deliberate engagements, and ensures
238 de-confliction.
- 239 ● Analyzes target audiences or individuals of interest; provides targeting packets.
- 240 ● Develops military information support products and delivery methods to augment Soldier and
241 leader engagement.
- 242 ● Collects, analyzes, and maintains engagement data.
- 243 ● Assesses results of engagements.
- 244 ● Coordinates refinement of future engagements.
- 245 ● Recommends re-engagement.
- 246 ● Updates the inform and influence running estimate.

247 6-32. Chapter 4 discusses other staff responsibilities during the planning process. Chapter 3 discusses
248 information-related capabilities through the inform and influence activities section into the planning
249 process.

250
251
252

1 **Appendix A**
2 **Working Group**

3 **INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES WORKING GROUP**

4 A-1. The inform and influence activities working group is the primary mechanism for ensuring the
5 effective and ongoing integration of all information-related capabilities. Like other working groups, the
6 inform and influence activities working group reviews ongoing efforts, evaluates their effectiveness,
7 adjusts their application as required, and determines upcoming requirements. Chaired by the G-7 (S-7), the
8 inform and influence activities working group can meet daily, weekly, or monthly, depending on the
9 situation, echelon, and time available.

10 A-2. The chief of staff, with assistance from the G-7 (S-7), determines the members of the inform and
11 influence activities working group. The chief of staff tailors the working group to the agenda. Participants
12 are selected because they represent a critical element or capability or have expertise in a field critical to the
13 inform and influence activities operation. Figure A-1 depicts the potential inform and influence activities
14 working group members.
15

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• chaplain• electronic warfare coordination cell• engineer coordinator• fire support coordinator targeting• foreign affairs officer• G-2 representative• G-3 representative• G-5 (S-5) plans officer• G-6 (S-6) signal officer• G-7 (S-7) section• G-9 civil affairs officer | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational representative• military deception planner• military information support operations• operations security planner• other unit G-7s (S-7)s• political advisor• public affairs officer• special operations forces liaison officer• Staff Judge Advocate• various liaison officers |
|--|--|

16 **Figure A-1. Potential members of inform and influence activities working group**


17 A-3. Active staff preparation is the key to a successful inform and influence activities working group.
18 Participants of the inform and influence activities section work together to prepare for an inform and
19 influence activities working group. Preparation tasks by the G-7 (S-7) include the following:

- 20
- Notify the participants—
 - Verifying time and place of the inform and influence activities working group.
 - Identifying additional participants.
 - Review the status of due-outs. Contact those participants with due-outs.
 - Coordinate with participants who have formal input.
 - Publish a read-ahead packet prior to the meeting:
 - If possible, provide inform and influence activities working group materials to participants.
 - Ensure participants provide input to inform and influence activities working group presentations.
 - Assign a recorder to take minutes for the working group.
- 21
22
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30 A-4. The G-7 (S-7) organizes the working group in two fashions. Some organize inform and influence
31 activities working groups along the lines of a targeting meeting. Others organize the meetings similar to an
32 operations meeting. Regardless of the organization, the purpose remains the same. The working group

33 integrates information-related capabilities into operations and synchronizes the lines of effort of inform and
 34 influence activities.

35 A-5. Targeting and inform and influence activities are both integrating processes that affect and reinforce
 36 the other. As figure A-2 reveals, *inform* and *influence* are added to the list of delivery effects that the
 37 targeting process seeks to achieve. Information-related capabilities provide assets that detect targets, deliver
 38 effects, and then assess these effects. For example, individual Soldiers provide spot reports after interacting
 39 with civilians. These reports support detection efforts. Civil affairs units provide nonlethal nation-building
 40 assistance that ultimately seeks to build confidence in governance structures and separate the populace
 41 from the enemy. Public affairs assets assess the impact of a specific campaign or operation by analyzing
 42 media reporting.



43 **Figure A-2. The Army targeting methodology**

44 A-6. Inform and influence activities supports the targeting process while the targeting process helps to
 45 shape how a commander informs and influences audiences. Audiences include all relevant people—
 46 friendly and adversary—in and beyond the area of operations. In practical terms, this means that the G-7
 47 (S-7), the inform and influence activities section, and participants in the working group have the following
 48 concurrent tasks:

- 49 • Contribute to the targeting process by identifying, delivering, and assessing nonlethal target sets
 50 and targets.
- 51 • Integrate and synchronize available information-related capabilities to achieve target objectives
 52 and, more broadly, the effects necessary to support the commander’s intent.
- 53 • Help the commander to frame the broader mission narrative in which the targeting process
 54 occurs and ensure all discrete actions contribute to this narrative. In other words, they ensure that
 55 themes and messages synchronize with actions to reinforce intended consequences and mitigate
 56 unintended consequences.

57 INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

58 A-7. The primary tool employed by the G-7 (S-7) and refined and ratified by the inform and influence
59 activities working group is the synchronization matrix. The sample matrix provided in figure A-3 is a
60 comprehensive management tool that ties together objectives, themes, messages, targets, and assessments.
61 Used effectively, it helps the staff ensure that themes, messages, and actions are synchronized with each
62 other and with operations to convey a unified narrative of effects.

63 A-8. Inform and influence activities primarily strives to maximize intended consequences and mitigate
64 unintended consequences. The G-7 (S-7) and the entire staff must continually consider how to coordinate
65 what the unit does with what it says and vice versa. The synchronization matrix facilitates this
66 coordination.

O Objective #1: Influence Citizens to support their Government in the establishment of safe and secure environment												
SEQ #	TGT SET	TARGET	IO OBJ Statement #/Effect	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	WHERE	ASSET	HOW	WHEN	WHERE	ASSET
1	Command and Control	MAJ Estefan Smith (Cell number 312-857-281)	1. Exploit	STO Assets	Cyber Electromagnetic Activities	281300APR00	AO	STO Assets	ED (location through cell phone)	281300APR00	AO	G2
2	Supply Cells	Demolition material supplier	2. Disrupt	HUMINT/SIGINT	Intercept of interactions	301300APR00	AO	HUMINT	Introduce ePP to suppliers	021300MAY00	Raven and Bluegill neighborhood	G2
3	Explosive Delivery Cell	Explosive Delivery cell assistant driver (cell number 786-488-771)	3. Exploit	SIGINT	Cyber Electromagnetic Activities	28-Apr-00	AO	SIGINT	ED (cell conversions)	28-Apr-20	AO	G2
4	Explosive Delivery Cell	IED Cell email user	3. Exploit	CNO	Cyber Electromagnetic Activities	starting 26APR00	AO	CNO		28-Apr-10	AO	G2
CDR UNIT MISSION STATEMENT												
To kill/capture the collaborating Army officer and disrupt the Demolition Material cell.												
INFORMATION THEMES												
UNITY: Governance is the responsibility of the representative government SECURITY: The people deserve freedom from fear and violence. CAPACITY: The government is responsible for providing essential services, strategic infrastructure maintenance, and security.												
INFORMATION OPERATION OBJECTIVE STATEMENTS												
IO OBJ #												
1. Exploit												
2. Disrupt												
3. Exploit												
ACTIVITY												
1. Increase												
2. Decrease												
3. Increase												
DESCRIPTOR												
MAJ Estefan Smith												
Supply Cells												
Explosive Delivery Cell												
SUBJECT												
Location Fix												
Use of timer triggers												
intelligence reporting												
EFFECT												
Exploit												
Disrupt												
Exploit												
TARGET												
MAJ Smith												
Explosive Delivery Cells												
Command and Control Cell												
ACTION												
Cell Phone Monitoring												
Control Capability												
Cell and internet communications												
PURPOSE												
IOT facilitate K/C Operation												
IOT force Cell to switch to an alternative method												
IOT provide actionable intel to maneuver units to K/C												
METRIC												
by 100%												
by 50%												
by 30%												
BASELINE												
compared to last 24hrs.												
compared to last 30 days												
compared to previous week												
MESSAGES												
TALKING POINTS												

Figure A-3. Example of synchronization matrix

Appendix B

Running Estimate

CONSIDERATIONS OF RUNNING ESTIMATES

B-1. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (FM 5-0). The commander and each staff section maintain a running estimate. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effects of new information and update the following:

- Facts.
- Assumptions.
- Friendly force status.
- Enemy activities and capabilities.
- Civil considerations.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

B-2. The commander's running estimate summarizes a problem, integrating information and knowledge of the staff's and subordinate commanders' running estimates. Each staff section builds and maintains running estimates. The running estimate helps the staff to track and record pertinent information as well as to provide recommendations to commanders.

B-3. The running estimate assesses and analyzes the courses of action the commander is considering. It includes an evaluation of how factors in the staff section's functional area influence each course of action or mission, and includes conclusions and recommendations. The commander and staff develop running estimates as part of the operations process. They can present running estimates verbally or in writing. When written, they may include maps, graphics, or charts. Estimates are as comprehensive as possible, yet not overly time-consuming. A comprehensive running estimate addresses all aspects of operations and contains both facts and assumptions based on the staff's experience within a specific area of expertise.

SAMPLE RUNNING ESTIMATE

B-4. The inform and influence activities running estimate is an estimate tailored to the specific needs of the inform and influence activities section. It assesses the situation in the information environment and analyzes the best way to achieve the commander's objectives for inform and influence activities. Leaders focus on the information environment and the use of information by enemy and friendly forces. When possible, the staff adds graphics to illustrate the less-tangible aspects of inform and influence activities.

B-5. The written estimate is a six-paragraph document. The first two paragraphs, *Situation and Considerations* and *Mission*, are necessary for all plans. See figure B-1.

1. **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.**
 - a. **Area of Interest.** Identify and describe those factors of the area of interest that affect inform and influence activities.
 - b. **Characteristics of the Area of Operations.**
 - (1) **Terrain.** State how terrain affects each information-related capability.
 - (2) **Weather.** State how weather affects information-related capabilities.
 - (3) **Enemy Forces.** Describe enemy disposition, composition, strength, and systems within the information environment as well as enemy capabilities and possible courses of action (COAs) with respect to their effects on inform and influence activities.
 - (4) **Friendly Forces.** List current inform and influence activities resources in terms of equipment, personnel, and systems. Identify additional resources available for inform and influence activities located at higher, adjacent, or other units. List those information-related capabilities from other military and civilian partners that may provide support within inform and influence activities. Compare requirements to current capabilities and suggest solutions for satisfying discrepancies.
 - (5) **Civilian Considerations.** Describe civil considerations that may affect inform and influence activities to include possible support needed by civil authorities from inform and influence activities as well as possible interference from civil aspects.
 - c. **Assumptions.** List all assumptions that affect inform and influence activities.
2. **MISSION.** Show the restated mission resulting from mission analysis.
3. **COURSES OF ACTION.**
 - a. List friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
 - b. List enemy actions or COAs that were templated that impact inform and influence activities.
 - c. List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staffs use the same criteria.
4. **ANALYSIS.** Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria from COA analysis. Review enemy actions that impact inform and influence activities as they relate to COAs. Identify issues, risks, and deficiencies these enemy actions may create with respect to inform and influence activities.
5. **COMPARISON.** Compare COAs. Rank order COAs for each key consideration. Use a decision matrix to aid the comparison process.
6. **RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.**
 - a. Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of inform and influence activities.
 - b. Prioritize and list issues, deficiencies, and risks and make recommendations on how to mitigate them.

Figure B-1. Sample running estimate format for inform and influence activities

Appendix C

Assessment

ASSESSMENT TASKS

C-1. Assessment refers to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment entails the following three tasks:

- Continuously assess the reactions and vulnerabilities of relevant audience and targets.
- Continuously monitor the situation and progress of the operation toward the commander's desired end state.
- Evaluate the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

C-2. Assessment helps commanders to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing and whether the operation is achieving desired effects. The information commanders receive from the staff often shapes how they identify, frame, and seek to solve a problem. Assessing the effectiveness of inform and influence activities is one of the greatest challenges confronting the staff and especially the G-7 (S-7). This challenge arises because inform and influence activities effects rarely occur in the physical domain, making them harder to evaluate in objective and quantitative terms. Therefore, the correlation between cause and effect is usually not immediate. Effects often take weeks, months, and even years to manifest themselves, rather than seconds or minutes as with lethal assets.

C-3. Inform and influence activities may require assessment by means other than those normally used in a battle damage assessment. The G-7 (S-7) can use a variety of means to conduct assessments, some internal to the organizations, others external. When time and resources permit, multiple assessment sources help to corroborate other sources and strengthen the conclusions drawn from results. Assessments can be obtained from various sources. The most common are—

- Intelligence assets.
- Soldier and leader engagement.
- Civil-military operations.
- Polling and surveys, often conducted by contracted organizations.
- Media monitoring and analysis, especially local channels.
- Reports or information sharing with joint, interagency, or nongovernmental partners.
- Reports or conversations with local partners.
- Passive monitoring, often by locals paid to submit reports on what they see and hear.
- Patrol and spot reports.


C-4. Despite the challenge, assessment is vital to inform and influence activities efforts. The aim is to synchronize themes, messages, and actions so the commander projects or portrays a consistent and cohesive narrative. The G-7 (S-7) notes anything that compromises this aim as quickly as possible so that the commander can direct adjustments and refinements to the operation plan.

ASSESSMENT TERMS

C-5. *Battle damage assessment* is the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force (JP 3-0).

C-6. A *measure of effectiveness* is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). Measures of effectiveness focus on the results or consequences of actions taken. These measures also assess the quality of those results. They answer such questions as, "Is the force doing the right things? Is it achieving the effects it wants? Are additional or alternative actions

45 required?" Measures of effectiveness provide a benchmark against which the commander assesses progress
 46 toward accomplishing the mission. Figure C-1 illustrates the development of measures of effectiveness.



47 **Figure C-1. Sample MOE and MOP development**

48 C-7. Numerous challenges hinder developing successful measures of effectiveness and performance for
 49 inform and influence activities. These challenges include—

- 50
- 51 ● A lack of baseline information on the area of operations.
 - 52 ● Media bias (local, U.S., or international).
 - 53 ● Limited polling (overt and covert) resources.
 - 54 ● Tester bias (pride) and qualification (training).
 - 55 ● Limited time and resources to collect and evaluate data.
 - 56 ● An inadequate number of samples.
 - 57 ● Limited access to specific audiences.
 - 58 ● Long approval times for information products.
 - 59 ● Language and cultural differences.
 - Restrictions employed by a higher command.

60 C-8. When writing measures of effectiveness for inform and influence activities, the following guidelines
 61 apply:

- 62
- 63 ● Give each effect one or more measure of effectiveness associated with that effect.
 - 64 ● Use the effect's purpose as a guide to what units must observe, report, and assess.
 - Include objective and subjective metrics in measures of effectiveness.

- 65 ● Create subjective measures of effectiveness that are observable, quantifiable, precise, and
66 correlated to the effect.
- 67 ● Write the objective measures of effectiveness directly to the effect and give the commander a
68 direct input into assessment.
- 69 ● If a measure of effectiveness is difficult to write for a particular effect, then re-visit the effect to
70 ensure it has a clearly defined and attainable result. Re-write the effect if necessary.

71 C-9. A *measure of performance* is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
72 accomplishment (JP 3-0). This quantitative measure expresses the manner in which the task or action was
73 performed. Measures of performance answer such questions as: “Did we do the things we set out to do?
74 Did we do them properly? Did we do enough or too much?” Measures of performances are based on task
75 assessment and are relatively easy to answer. Inform and influence activities examples include the number
76 of media engagements executed in a given week, the number of military information support operations
77 posters or leaflets created and disseminated, or the number of Medical Civil Assistance Program events
78 held. Figure C-1 illustrates development of measures of performance.

79 C-10. When writing a measure of performance for inform and influence activities, apply the following
80 guidelines:

- 81 ● Use *quantity* to describe how often or how many products need to be delivered to achieve the
82 effect.
- 83 ● Use *medium* to describe the product format to best deliver the message.
- 84 ● Use *delivery* to describe the best means to deliver the medium.
- 85 ● Use *target* to understand the audience as described by the effect of the medium


86 C-11. Combat assessments amass the assessments for the measures of effectiveness. A combat assessment
87 is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. A combat
88 assessment answers the questions, “What did inform and influence activities do? Did inform and influence
89 activities achieve the desired effect in the cognitive domain? Should the operation be modified?” Standards
90 should be measurable. Measure of effectiveness and measures of performance require qualitative or
91 quantitative standards or metrics to measure them.

92 C-12. Several different effects exist. The first-, second-, and third-order effects apply to dimensions. A
93 first-order effect is the estimate of effects in the physical dimension (such as maneuver and combat
94 operations). This effect indicates the level to which information systems and assets were affected. A
95 second-order effect is the estimate of how the informational dimension (information quality, content, and
96 flow) was affected. Affecting information collection, processing, and dissemination can present unreliable
97 information and hinder an adversary or enemy’s command and control abilities. A third-order effect is the
98 estimate of effects in the cognitive dimension. This affects adversary and enemy perceptions, attitudes, and
99 understanding and their decisionmaking accuracy and speed.

100 C-13. Other effects apply to outcomes or actions. Intended effects are the desired outcomes, events, or
101 consequences that contribute to achievement of objectives. Unintended effects are the unanticipated or
102 undesired outcomes, events, or consequences. They can help or hinder achievement of objectives. Direct
103 effect is the result of action with no intervening effect or mechanism between act and outcome. Indirect
104 effect is the effect created through an intermediate effect or mechanism that produces a final outcome or
105 result.

106 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

107 C-14. Assessment is planned into the operation from the beginning. During the military decisionmaking
108 process, the G-7 (S-7) devises the mission and objectives for inform and influence activities that will help
109 accomplish this mission. Each objective is supported by one or more measures of performance (tasks) and
110 measures of effectiveness. Within each measure of performance are one or more indicators that signal that
111 the desired activity or changed behavior is occurring. Figure C-2 provides one way to view the inform and
112 influence activities assessment process.



113 **Figure C-2. Assessment methodology for the information objective**

114 C-15. Staffs conduct a deficiency or gap analysis when units fail to meet goals and objectives. They use the
 115 deficiency analysis if the task assessment and effects assessment indicate a gap between what a unit is
 116 doing (measure of performance) and how well they are doing it (measure of effectiveness). The deficiency
 117 analysis illustrates what is wrong (or not going as intended or desired) and provides input during the plan
 118 refinement stage. Next, the staff makes a recommendation for refinement of the plan based on the
 119 conclusions of the deficiency analysis. This recommendation considers if the force has the required
 120 capability to make the necessary adjustments. If not, commanders may determine other courses of action or
 121 request additional information-related capabilities.
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Appendix D

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Deliberate Engagement

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PLANNING

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D-1. Deliberate Soldier and leader engagement involves method planning. A deliberate Soldier and leader engagement plan involves developing the commander's intent, commander's themes, mission narrative, mission statement, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, rules of engagement, and an assessment of the area of operations. Planning considerations for Soldier and leader engagement are accounted for within the targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess.

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DECIDE

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D-2. Soldiers and leaders determine the answers to who, what, when, and where in their planning. When deciding who is involved, they identify the key informal or formal leaders, actors, and target audiences. Military information support forces are uniquely qualified to analyze the operating environment and populations within that environment. Soldiers and leaders include these forces in the planning process.

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D-3. Commanders decide what they want to achieve through interaction with various audiences within the area of operations. Often they nest effects or objectives of the Soldier and leader engagement with their commander's intent. They also decide what effects best complement other operations within the operational area.

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D-4. Soldiers and leaders determine the frequency and timing of Soldier and leader engagement. They decide how often they should engage the target and when to engage the target. Soldiers and leaders verify that the timing of the engagement does not conflict with other operations (lethal or nonlethal) in the operational area.

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D-5. Soldiers and leaders determine the best location and setting in which to conduct meetings. Intelligence support of the battlefield, cultural assessments, and current events may influence the venue for Soldier and leader engagement.

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DETECT

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D-6. Just as knowing the location of a target is critical to lethal engagement, knowing the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of an audience is critical to successful deliberate Soldier and leader engagement. To simplify, in lethal targeting, one needs to know where someone stands on the ground, while in Soldier and leader engagement one needs to know where someone stands on an issue. Unfortunately, gaining information on knowledge, perceptions, and attitudes often requires creative collection methods. Possible detection methods are:

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- Face-to-face or telephone conversations or overheard discussions.
- Telephone hotlines.
- Visual collection (activity).
- Intelligence asset collection.
- Written communications such as signs, posters, and billboards.
- Media and Internet. Local, regional, and global media sources and Internet websites offer insight into attitudes and perceptions of local populace.

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D-7. Possible detection assets are:

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- Military information support operations.
- Political or cultural advisor.
- Human terrain team.
- Combat patrols and their reports.

- 44 ● Civil affairs and civil-military operations center.
 - 45 ● All-source intelligence assets.
 - 46 ● Centers of excellence, the Defense Language Institute, and other academic institutions.
- 47 D-8. Forces for military information support operations are trained specifically to analyze potential target
48 audiences and the information environments in which they live to determine baseline perceptions and
49 develop trend analysis over time. Surveys of target audiences and informal face-to-face contact further
50 assess perceptions and attitudes toward both friendly force operations and adversary and enemy operations.
51 Forces assemble key information. This information consists of demographics, media infrastructures, values
52 and beliefs, symbolic views, and education. As a group, this information documents the best types of
53 products and delivery methods forces can use to effectively send messages without negative effects.
- 54 D-9. Political and cultural experts have special insight into the local population’s culture and their
55 traditional power and influence structures. Additionally, these experts can provide recommendations for
56 best practices for communication. Typically they accompany commanders during engagements.
- 57 D-10. The human terrain team provides several capabilities, including socio-cultural expertise, research,
58 analysis, and data-collection.
- 59 D-11. Combat Patrols collect data from deliberate or dynamic (Soldier and leader engagement) reported in
60 daily patrol reports submitted by units within the area of operations.
- 61 D-12. Civil affairs Soldiers provide civil reconnaissance capabilities, experience with working with civilian
62 leadership, and training in conducting bilateral engagements and negotiations. The civil-military operations
63 center often provides insight to local perceptions, attitudes, and social and power dynamics.
- 64 D-13. All-source intelligence assets consist of human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and signals
65 intelligence. Intelligence disciplines and collection assets provide relevant information and processed
66 intelligence products that enable forces to assess local attitudes about operations or key issues.
- 67 D-14. Centers of excellence, the Defense Language Institute, and academic institutions provide reachback
68 capability, analysis, and subject matter expertise. Forces use these assets to inform commanders and their
69 staffs about the attitudes of target audiences. More importantly, these organizations act as man-power
70 augmentation for units that lack the people or time to extensively analyze collected data.

71 **DELIVER**

- 72 D-15. The G-7 (S-7) coordinates closely with other staff elements to determine best method for delivery of
73 Soldier and leader engagement effects and achieving Soldier and leader engagement objectives. Most
74 importantly, the G-7 (S-7) integrates diverse information-related capabilities to maximize the opportunity
75 for operational success. Examples of delivery methods include:
- 76 ● Private meeting.
 - 77 ● Provincial, regional, or district council meeting.
 - 78 ● Humanitarian and civic assistance.
 - 79 ● Face-to-face public interaction.
 - 80 ● Telephone conversation or video teleconference.
 - 81 ● Meeting with local merchants or residents.

82 **ASSESS**

- 83 D-16. One of the most difficult aspects of Soldier and leader engagement is assessment. During planning
84 the G-7 (S-7) accounts for—
- 85 ● Measures of performance.
 - 86 ● Measures of effectiveness.
 - 87 ● Reporting protocols.
 - 88 ● Re-engagement criteria or triggers.
 - 89 ● Subjective assessments of delivery method and asset.

- 90 ● Tracking of commitments.
- 91 ● Expressed grievances or appreciation.
- 92 D-17. The G-7 (S-7) measures performance. The officer checks that the message was delivered and
93 understood as planned to the intended individual or group.
- 94 D-18. The G-7 (S-7) measures effectiveness. The officer measures that the individual or group responded
95 or behaved as desired. This officer notes what actions it expects the individual or group to indicate that they
96 support the message.
- 97 D-19. As part of planning, the G-7 (S-7) follows certain reporting protocols during deliberate Soldier and
98 leader engagement. This officer includes priority information requirements as part of the commander's
99 critical information requirements. The G-7 (S-7) formalizes reporting requirements for information
100 captured from Soldier and leader engagement information requirements within the command. Finally, the
101 G-7 (S-7) communicates suspense for post-Soldier and leader engagement reports in the operation order.
- 102 D-20. The G-7 (S-7) and other staff sections also determine the conditions that demand re-engagement
103 criteria or triggers of Soldier and leader engagement targets.
- 104 D-21. The G-7 (S-7) accounts for subjective assessments of those engaged. Capturing the impressions that
105 Soldiers and leaders experienced during interactions may inform the assessment process. Interpreters or
106 observers often provide helpful insight into capturing cultural idiosyncrasies. They notice some nonverbal
107 cues, facial expressions and gestures, voice intonation and inflection, or certain idiomatic expressions and
108 jargon.
- 109 D-22. The G-7 (S-7) accounts for tracking commitments or promises during planning. This officer notes
110 commitments or promises made by those conducting Soldier and leader engagement. The G-7 (S-7)
111 captures and shares those promises made for continuity and avoidance of information fratricide.
- 112 D-23. During planning, the G-7 (S-7) accounts for expressed grievances or appreciation. Understanding the
113 perceived issues of the population or the acknowledged unit successes may help assess Soldier and leader
114 engagement or other friendly operations and can inform future engagements. Soldiers and leaders should
115 scrutinize both, however, as cultural or political dynamics may result in over-emphasis or misrepresentation
116 for personal or collective gain.

117 **PREPARATION**

- 118 D-24. Soldiers and leaders prepare for deliberate Soldier and leader engagements as they would any
119 military task or mission. Some preparation—such as language and cultural preparation—occurs prior to
120 deployment. Cultural understanding, survival-level language, and negotiation training prepare Soldiers and
121 leaders to address the typically unfamiliar and dynamic foreign environment encountered by Soldier and
122 leader engagement.
- 123 D-25. In theater, units have numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures for capturing the data necessary
124 to conduct Soldier and leader engagement. Regardless of the preferred format, before executing the
125 mission, Soldiers and leaders should know or have the following information:
- 126 ● Subject's target's name.
- 127 ● Title or role of subject or target.
- 128 ● Relevant affiliations of target (religious, political, social).
- 129 ● Location of the engagement.
- 130 ● Date-time group of the engagement.
- 131 ● Picture (if available).
- 132 ● Others to be present at engagement and summary of relevance to event.
- 133 ● Commander's intent or desired effect of the engagement, subject, or target.
- 134 ● Best alternative to negotiated agreement (if negotiating) for both parties.
- 135 ● Fields of possible agreement between parties.
- 136 ● Talking points, key themes, and messages.
- 137 ● Local grievances or sensitive issues.

- 138 ● Summary of previous engagements (if conducted) should include agreements made, kept, and
- 139 those unmet.
- 140 ● Agenda for Soldier and leader engagement (general order of events).

141 D-26. Additionally, Soldiers and leaders review relevant guidance from higher-level guidance as well as
142 recent updates to estimates or activity in the area of operations. Reviewing the commander's intent, themes,
143 and public affairs officer's talking points decreases the risk that information provided or action taken
144 during a Soldier and leader engagement contradicts higher-level guidance and themes. Finally, Soldiers and
145 leaders review local grievances and enemy activity. Understanding the issues most relevant to key leaders
146 or actors allows the Soldier to plan responses to potential accusations or queries.

147 D-27. In theater, Soldiers and leaders should rehearse planned engagements under conditions that closely
148 approximate the environment and conditions in which they will be conducted. If they use an interpreter,
149 they must include the interpreter in the rehearsal. They can rehearse the dialogue they plan to use during the
150 Soldier and leader engagement or use a back-translation for a document. (A back-translation is a translated
151 document translated back into the original language and then compared with the original to ensure the
152 meanings match.) Following these procedures assists in mitigating the risk that information contradicts the
153 commander's intent or guidance.

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DA	Department of the Army
FM	field manual
G-2 (S-2)	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 (S-3)	assistant chief of staff, operations
G-7 (S-7)	assistant chief of staff, information engagement
JP	joint publication
MDMP	military decisionmaking process
U.S.	United States

SECTION II – TERMS

battle damage assessment

The estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. (JP 3-0)

combat power

The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0)

***deceive**

To cause a person to believe what is not true.

***degrade**

To use nonlethal or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of targeted information system and information collection efforts or means.

***deny**

To withhold information about friendly forces, operations, or situations that can be used by the adversary and enemy.

***destroy**

To use lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.

***destroy**

To use lethal and nonlethal means to physically render enemy information useless or information systems ineffective unless reconstituted.

***detect**

To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.

***exploit**

To gain access to targeted information networks to collect information or to insert false or misleading information

***field support team**

A mission-tailored team of subject matter experts that provides direct support for information operations or inform and influence activities to the ARFORs and joint task forces of land components of combatant commands, and corps and divisions as requested.

***influence**

To cause audiences to think or behave in a manner favorable to the commander's objectives.

***inform and influence activities**

The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking.information environment.

The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information (JP 3-13)

***information fratricide**

The result of employing information-related capabilities operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.

information management

The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products (FM 6-0)

information operations

The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 1-02)

knowledge management

The art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking (FM 6-0)

measure of effectiveness

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

measure of performance

A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. (FM 6-0)

mission command system

The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enables commanders to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (FM 5-0)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (FM 6-0)

strategic communication

United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0)

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Index (Chapter Title)

F
first, 1-1

M
main, 1-1

S
second, 1-1

