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Army Special Operations Forces
Foreign Internal Defense

Contents

Page

PREFACE .............................................................................................................iv

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1-1
Overview............................................................................................................. 1-1
Relationship to Internal Defense and Development........................................... 1-1
Internal Defense and Development.................................................................... 1-2
Operational Framework for Foreign Internal Defense........................................ 1-2
Relationship With Other Operations...................................................................1-4
Department of Defense Tools ............................................................................ 1-5
United States National Objectives and Policy..................................................1-10

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................... 2-1
Overview............................................................................................................. 2-1
Support From the United States......................................................................... 2-1
Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic: The Four Pillars of the Support Framework ............................................................................................ 2-2
National-Level Organizations ............................................................................. 2-4
Combatant Command Organization................................................................. 2-8
Subordinate Unified Commands ........................................................................ 2-8
Joint Task Forces ............................................................................................... 2-9
United States Diplomatic Mission and Country Team........................................ 2-9
Supported Host Nation ..................................................................................... 2-12

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Chapter 3 PLANNING .........................................................................................................3-1
Overview .............................................................................................................3-1
Planning Imperatives ..........................................................................................3-1
Department of State Guidance ...........................................................................3-2
Department of Defense Guidance ......................................................................3-2
Theater Planning Requirements ........................................................................3-4
Security Cooperation Planning .........................................................................3-5
Planning Procedures and Considerations ..........................................................3-6
Regional, Transregional, and International Concerns ........................................3-8
Foreign Internal Defense Assessment.................................................................3-9
Training Plan .....................................................................................................3-10
Planning for Force Protection ...........................................................................3-11

Chapter 4 TRAINING...........................................................................................................4-1
Overview .............................................................................................................4-1
Responsibilities for Training ............................................................................4-1
Training and Skills Needed for Success .............................................................4-2
Training Strategy .................................................................................................4-5
Training and Advisory Assistance .......................................................................4-7

Chapter 5 EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS.................................................................5-1
Overview .............................................................................................................5-1
Employment Factors ...........................................................................................5-1
Civil-Military Operations Estimate of the Situation ............................................5-6
Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation ...........................................5-8
Health Service Support .....................................................................................5-10
Site Survey Procedures ....................................................................................5-13
Advising the Host-Nation Military ......................................................................5-16

Chapter 6 OPERATIONS ....................................................................................................6-1
Overview .............................................................................................................6-1
Indirect Support .................................................................................................6-1
Direct Support ......................................................................................................6-5

Chapter 7 COMBAT OPERATIONS .................................................................................7-1
Overview .............................................................................................................7-1
Considerations for United States Combat Operations .......................................7-2
Command and Control .......................................................................................7-5
Sustainment .........................................................................................................7-5
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency .................................................................7-5
Terrorism .............................................................................................................7-6
Information Operations .......................................................................................7-7

Chapter 8 REDEPLOYMENT ...............................................................................................8-1
Overview .............................................................................................................8-1
Termination of Operations ..................................................................................8-1
Mission Handoff Procedures ............................................................................8-2
Postmission Debriefing Procedures ....................................................................8-5
Figures

Figure 1-1. Foreign internal defense development process .................................................. 1-3
Figure 1-2. Foreign internal defense operational framework ................................................. 1-4
Figure 1-3. Relationship of security assistance and foreign internal defense ...................... 1-6
Figure 2-1. Foreign internal defense coordination ................................................................. 2-3
Figure 2-2. Country Team concept ....................................................................................... 2-10
Figure 2-3. Security assistance organization departmental alignment .................................. 2-11
Figure 2-4. Security assistance organization functional alignment ..................................... 2-11
Figure 3-1. Policy agents, routes, and products ..................................................................... 3-3
Figure 3-2. Theater security cooperation planning ............................................................... 3-6
Figure 4-1. General objectives of training programs under security assistance .................... 4-8
Figure 5-1. Joint force employment factors in foreign internal defense operations ............... 5-2
Figure 5-2. Example of a Civil-Military Operations estimate ................................................ 5-7
Figure 5-3. Example of a Psychological Operations estimate ............................................... 5-9
Figure 7-1. Information operations capabilities ...................................................................... 7-8
Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide .............................................................................. 8-6
Figure A-1. Propaganda of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam of Sri Lanka attempting to discredit the government for alleged government-sponsored human rights abuses .................................................... A-4
Figure B-1. Functions of internal defense and development .................................................. B-2
Figure B-2. National-level internal defense threat planning and coordination organization .................................................................................. B-9
Figure C-1. Intelligence process ............................................................................................ C-3
Figure C-2. Ongoing collection files ...................................................................................... C-5

Tables

Table 4-1. Speaking skill level guide ...................................................................................... 4-6
Table D-1. Phase model based on significant U.S. operational focus shifts ......................... D-3
Table D-2. Example implementation matrix for interagency plan ......................................... D-4
Preface

Field Manual (FM) 3-05.137 provides the doctrinal guidance for United States (U.S.) Army special operations forces (ARSOF) on conducting foreign internal defense (FID). It is the keystone manual for all subordinate ARSOF FID doctrine. FID has been and remains an ARSOF core task, whose relevance in the contemporary operational environment (OE) continues to grow. The acronym ARSOF represents Special Forces (SF), Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA)—all supported by the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) (SB[SO][A]).

PURPOSE

This FM incorporates lessons learned from both the War on Terrorism (WOT) and emerging doctrine concerning irregular warfare (IW) and its constituent elements. This manual describes FID as an integrated ARSOF effort to include the role of supporting ARSOF elements and in conjunction with other agencies. It provides an overview of the other elements of national power brought to bear to support FID and the impact and interaction of ARSOF units on and with these other elements. In addition, it illustrates how FID is a key component of a host-nation’s (HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD) and that the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support that IDAD program.

SCOPE

This Army manual complements and is consistent with joint and Army doctrine. This manual will provide the principles, fundamentals, guidelines, and conceptual framework of FID, addressing the inherently complex regional, transregional, and international environment for ARSOF commanders, staffs, and Soldiers conducting FID. It provides the linkage from joint and Army doctrine to ARSOF doctrine; therefore, great effort has been made to integrate joint and Army concepts and terminology into this manual. In addition, the interagency nature of FID mandates close scrutiny and exposition on ARSOF interaction with (and in some cases at the guidance of) other United States Government (USG) agencies. It will also provide conventional Army units, joint headquarters and staffs, and other agencies and departments of the USG with a reference useful to affect integrated efforts during the conduct of FID operations. The FM will avoid detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for any ARSOF discipline. Subordinate FMs contain FID TTP.

APPLICABILITY

FM 3-05.137 provides the joint and land component force commander and his staff a broad understanding of how ARSOF units conduct FID operations. This manual also provides guidance for ARSOF commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare ARSOF units to conduct FID. This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

This manual is unclassified to ensure Armywide dissemination and to facilitate the integration of ARSOF units in the preparation and execution of FID. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or by e-mail to JAComments@soc.mil.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

President John F. Kennedy
Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961

FID is a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. ARSOF, particularly SF, PSYOP, and CA units, are well suited to conduct or support FID operations. These forces have unique functional skills and cultural and language training. FID is a legislatively directed activity for special operations forces (SOF) under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This does not mean that, historically and in the future, conventional forces have not taken or will not take part in FID operations. Indeed conventional forces play an ever-increasing role in FID operations in much the same way as in current stability operations and in support and conduct of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

OVERVIEW

1-1. SOF may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of conventional forces. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States (2006) states that regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. U.S. policy currently deals with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.

1-2. The key differentiating factor between FID and other operations is the involvement, engagement, and support of the HN government. Historically, because of some similarities between the TTP used to conduct FID and those used to conduct other operations, such as unconventional warfare (UW), there has been confusion and incorrect usage of the terms FID and UW. FID and UW have been erroneously used as synonyms. Further confusion arises during the course of FID when an adversary controls or governs areas within the HN and resistance groups are organized in those denied areas using UW TTP. Despite this exigency, should it arise, FID universally involves the support of a standing government and its lawful military and paramilitary forces. Other operations, including UW, involve working by, with, and through irregular forces that are not organized or sanctioned by a nation as an element of their standing military or paramilitary forces. UW typically is conducted in countries in which the United States has limited or no international relations, up to and including not having an open embassy or consul in the country in question. FID is universally conducted in HNs in which the embassy and the Country Team are not only present but are also frequently the lead agency in the operation.

RELATIONSHIP TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1-3. The SOF core task of FID is only one component of an HN’s IDAD policy and programs. Although always an important (and frequently critical) part of a nation’s IDAD strategy, FID may be one of the smaller programs within the IDAD strategy in terms of funding, focus, facilities, and personnel committed.
The effect of a successful FID can be inversely proportional to the amount of resources expended on it. Equally true, however, is that an unsuccessful FID will cause the failure of far larger and more intensive programs that the other instruments of national power are conducting. In nations in which the military has been the disproportional focus of national resources to the detriment of civilian institutions and development, the FID portion of the IDAD strategy and program may be deliberately downsized. Just as nations that have failed to donate adequate resources to military and paramilitary institutions may need a more intense FID program.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

1-4. IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Collectively, threats that rise to levels with the potential to topple an HN’s government, economy, or even social structure and subsequently the nation’s internal security can be termed internal defense threats (IDTs). The United States defines an IDT as any person or organization that interferes with, disrupts, or damages the domestic, lawfully constituted economic, military, informational, or political institutions of a nation through illegal means or methods in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner. Examples include criminals, vigilantes, terrorists, insurgents, or separatists. Nations formulate an IDAD strategy to combat and curtail IDTs. IDAD focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, military, and social) that respond to the needs of the society. IDAD is the HN’s program. The HN has responsibility and control of the program. Development programs that are carefully planned, implemented, and properly publicized can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to insurgents or other IDTs. Security programs provide an atmosphere of peace within which development can take place.

1-5. The IDAD strategy is founded on the assumption that the HN is responsible for the development and execution of its own programs to prevent or defeat IDTs. The fundamental thrust of the IDAD strategy is toward preventing the escalation of internal conflict. Anticipating and defeating the threat posed by specific organizations and working to correct conditions that prompt violence are effective means of prevention. If subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, or terrorism occurs, the emphasis is to hold down the level of violence. The population must be mobilized to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is an overall strategy for the prevention of these activities and, if an insurgency or terrorism should develop, for COIN and counterterrorism (CT) activities.

1-6. U.S. Army FID operations contribute to the overall IDAD strategy of the HN. These operations are based on integrated military and civilian programs (Figure 1-1, page 1-3). FID operations can be conducted jointly with or complimentary to programs undertaken by the Department of State (DOS) and its agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Because IDAD often puts civilian programs in the lead over military programs, FID operations, such as medical civilian assistance programs, can sometimes be viewed as cogs in the greater machinery that is the civilian lead effort. As will be discussed in greater detail later in this manual, FID operations can be woven into the IDAD strategy not only by enhancing the security of the HN but also by complimenting a myriad of civilian programs throughout the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) arena.

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-7. In times of need, nations often look to other nations for assistance. Nations seeking assistance are often struggling to quell unrest within their borders or are looking for ways to strengthen or further professionalism within their military. Internal problems or potential problems could stem from economic issues, public dissatisfaction with the government, social unrest, or terrorism. The United States has historically promoted democracy and freedom in other nations by assisting nations seeking solutions to improve security and quell unrest within their borders. Numerous U.S. civilian and military organizations support this effort. For the military, this effort is FID. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), defines FID as the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
1-8. FID planners must consider all the elements of national power and how those elements produce the operational framework for FID. Figure 1-2, page 1-4, uses the DIME model to structure and illustrate the FID operational framework. FID fits into this framework as the chief operation and effort under the military element of national power. The National Security Council (NSC) is responsible for planning guidance for FID at the strategic level. The DOS is normally designated as the lead agency for the execution of FID programs up to the point that the President authorizes major combat operations (MCO). However, military assistance is often required to provide a secure environment to accomplish an HN’s goals. The Department of Defense (DOD) provides personnel and equipment to help achieve FID objectives.

1-9. Supporting the FID requirements and the identified needs of an HN is a compilation of the national military strategy (NMS), joint plans, and the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) developed plans and integrated military activities. These plans are based on U.S. policies developed with friends, allies, and partner nations. These strategic commitments may lead to enhanced security, greater cooperation, and stronger alliances with the nations involved. Commitments to other nations based on providing more secure environments lead to various programs to help build or enhance their IDAD program or provide assistance in other areas. Military involvement in FID activities could range from training HN forces to secure a port’s waterway to providing courses to combat terrorism. FID could also be interrelated with other military operations, such as UW (as discussed above) or actual combat operations. One ARSOF unit could...
have a FID task to train a force while another military unit works with that trained force and conducts actual combat operations. A conventional military unit, such as an engineer company, might work permissively in a secure part of the HN building a road with an HN civilian agency while a Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA) begins to organize a resistance organization in a denied area.

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Figure 1-2. Foreign internal defense operational framework

1-10. FID is a powerful pillar of the operational framework within the range of programs utilizing all instruments of national power. Mission success in the interagency effort that is U.S. support to the HN’s IDAD strategy involves the successful integration of all DIME elements and resources in concert. Chapter 2 contains information on the specific aspects of DIME elements.

**RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER OPERATIONS**

1-11. The strategic end state of FID is an HN capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to eradicate IDTs. Ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment. FID is among the operations within the IW construct. It is one of the most prevalent IW subset operations; however, FID may simultaneously be conducted with operations outside this construct. FID takes place in an arena that invariably includes nation assistance (NA) and may also include greater or lesser degrees of operations, such as support to COIN, CT, peace operations (PO), DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations, and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). These categories may include FID operations as an integral
component in supporting the fight against IDTs. FID programs are distinct. They will vary from country to country in support of a country’s IDAD program.

1-12. In light of the complexities of the WOT and the foreseeable likelihood the U.S. military will predominately, if not exclusively, be involved in limited conflicts (albeit accented with some instances of MCO), FID will undoubtedly be intertwined with other operations. Sometimes those operations will precede or evolve from deteriorating conditions in an HN, such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). The likelihood remains that other operations, such as humanitarian demining operations, may be part of future FID operations. In addition, the increased internal and regional stability fostered by successful FID may reduce the likelihood of states either acquiring or proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or WMD delivery systems.

1-13. The likelihood of failed states requiring intervention by the world community will remain an issue for some time. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations move such states into more stable, functioning entities. FID operations are an integral subset of SSTR. The exact point at which an SSTR operation evolves into solely a FID operation under a viable HN IDAD program will remain highly variable. Because this sort of transition will likely follow a major intervention by U.S. or coalition forces, the change in characterization will be made at very high levels. Such a change in characterization is the province of the President or his designee. In the case of transitioning to an exclusively FID operation, it can be argued that the designee must be the U.S. Ambassador. The universal constant will be that such a transition can only happen when the U.S. Country Team is once again the lead agent in the country in question and the U.S. military presence in the HN is at levels commensurate with a robust FID. Although highly fluid and somewhat difficult to define, this sort of involvement (for example, a robust FID) might be characterized as being dominated by a limited number of SOF and conventional forces assisting the HN military in subduing residual security threats, coupled with a larger contingent of SOF and conventional trainers. This shift in balance from a majority of operational forces to a majority of trainers is a reasonable demarcation between SSTR and FID. It is not, however, an absolute mark on the wall.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TOOLS

1-14. The DOD brings a host of SOF and conventional capabilities to bear to support HN IDAD through FID. DOD conducts activities under a variety of programs established in the United States Code (USC) that are regulated under the auspices of both DOD and civilian agencies. (Appendix A provides additional information.) All of these programs can be characterized as indirect support, direct support, or combat operations. However, it must be emphasized that U.S. forces may be simultaneously conducting some degree of all three forms of support at different locations and times during FID. Although the DOS regulates some of the programs discussed in the following paragraphs, the paragraphs discuss programs from the standpoint of tools available to the DOD. These programs should neither be construed as rights of the authority of the U.S. Country Team nor suggestions that only DOD-executed portions of these programs contribute to the HN IDAD program.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

1-15. Indirect support operations emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic, military, and other capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The U.S. military contribution to this type of support is derived from security cooperation guidance and is provided primarily through security assistance (SA). Indirect support is supplemented by multinational exercises, exchange programs, and selected joint exercises. ARSOF units may simultaneously conduct indirect and direct support of the HN military. For instance, a Psychological Operations support element (PSE) might train and advise HN PSYOP personnel on producing a PSYOP series while simultaneously producing a PSYOP series of the same supporting Psychological Operations objective (SPO).

1-16. Security cooperation involves DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. Figure 1-3, page 1-6, depicts the relationship of security cooperation, SA, and FID. The
DOD security cooperation guidance provides goals and activities for specific regions, directs the preparation of theater security cooperation (TSC) strategies and implementation plans by the GCCs, and provides the overarching framework for many FID-related activities.

Figure 1-3. Relationship of security assistance and foreign internal defense

1-17. SA is a principal instrument in the U.S. FID effort. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies, as well as those of the military. Effectively, SA provides defense material, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. The express goal of the USC governing SA is the furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives by enhancing the ability of lesser-developed nations to remain secure from primarily external but also internal threats. Overall, only a portion of the SA effort encompasses FID but that portion is a large part of the overall FID effort. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (as amended) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 (as amended) authorize the SA program. The program is under the supervision and general direction of the DOS.

1-18. The military component of SA, implemented by DOD in accordance with policies established by the DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program (FMFP), international military education and training (IMET), foreign military sales (FMS), and PO. The DOS provides financial support to international peacekeeping operations (PKO), a subset of PO, through a PKO fund. These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and commercial sales licensed under the AECA, are SA tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort.

1-19. FMS is a nonappropriated program through which governments can purchase defense material, services and training from the United States. Eligible nations can use this program to help build national security infrastructures. A limitation of this program, especially in relationship to FID, is that many nations needing the benefits of this program lack the resources to purchase the material and training. The dilemma
for those nations is that to execute FMS they need to take money from civilian programs that may exacerbate the problems motivating an IDT. The FMFP program, when authorized as an alternative to facilitate FMS, can provide funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through FMS or commercial channels. The FMFP can be an extremely effective FID tool, providing help to nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford U.S. assistance.

1-20. IMET contributes to internal and external security of a country by providing training to selected foreign militaries and related civilian personnel on a grant aid basis. The program helps strengthen foreign militaries through U.S. military training (and exposure to values) that are necessary for the proper functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, professional military. This program has long-term positive effects on U.S. and HN bilateral relations. IMET serves as an influential foreign policy tool where the U.S. shapes doctrine, promotes self-sufficiency in maintaining and operating U.S.-acquired defense equipment, encourages Western values, and occasionally causes marked changes in the policies of the recipient governments. Foreign students—many of whom occupy the middle and upper echelons of their country’s military and political establishments—are taught U.S. defense doctrine and employment of U.S. weapon systems resulting in greater cooperation and interoperability.

1-21. The military component of SA funds U.S. PO, such as the multinational force and observers in the Sinai and the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. The five types of PO encompass PKO, peace enforcement operations, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. These operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, although related to FID operations, are generally considered separate activities with focused goals and objectives.

1-22. Antiterrorism (AT) assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts, such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. DOD training of law enforcement personnel is significantly restricted by Section 660 of the FAA; however, awareness of and liaison with HN and USG law enforcement agencies can only improve those FID programs that involve CT training, exercises, or actions.

1-23. Joint and multinational exercises strengthen U.S. and HN relations and interoperability of forces. They are joint and Service-funded and complement SA and civil-military operations (CMO) by validating HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. Their effect can be magnified through the lens of information operations (IO), in particular PSYOP conducted unilaterally or bilaterally with the HN. There are very strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support. Chapter 6 and Appendix A provide additional information on legal restrictions and monetary limitations.

1-24. Military exchange programs also support the overall FID program by fostering mutual understanding between forces; familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other; and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET SA program, are extremely valuable in improving HN and U.S. relations. These programs may have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments.

**DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)**

1-25. Direct support operations involve the use of U.S. forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. These operations differ from SA in that they are joint or Service funded. In addition, they do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment. When direct support includes training local military forces, it is distinguished from indirect support in the immediacy with which the HN force will utilize their training operationally. In such cases, the HN unit may go directly from training to combat or potential combat situations. Typically, such training represents the validation of HN units that already are in a high state of readiness. Direct support operations normally are conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. Assistance will usually focus on CMO (primarily the provision of services to the local populace), PSYOP, communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support. In some cases, training of the military and the provision of new equipment may be warranted.
1-26. CMO are a variety of activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO not only can support a COIN program but also can enhance all FID programs. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to address root causes of instability in a reconstructive manner after conflict or in support of disaster relief, consequence management, civil defense, CD, and AT activities.

1-27. Civil Affairs operations (CAO) are defined as those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or other governmental agencies (OGAs) to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO or other U.S. objectives. CAO serve as a critical link between U.S. forces providing support in an HN and an HN government, military force, and civilian population. In FID, CA facilitates the integration of U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation.

1-28. The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. FHA programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

1-29. HCA activities are designed to assist the HN populace in conjunction with U.S. military operations. HCA activities are integrated into the overall FID program in order to enhance the stability of the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), as well as to improve the readiness of U.S. forces deployed in the theater.

1-30. Military civic action (MCA) is the use of predominantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels, in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. These activities may involve U.S. supervision and advice but normally the local military will conduct them. MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program. MCA assists the local government with developing capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population. MCA also builds or strengthens ties between the HN military and the civilian population. It may mitigate and eventually, when coupled with other activities eliminate ill will and mistrust toward the HN military.

1-31. The focus of joint military Psychological Operations objectives (POs) during FID operations is to support U.S. national objectives, to support the GCC’s regional security strategy objectives, and to support the objectives of the Country Team. PSYOP is used to promote the ability of the HN to defend itself against IDTs in several ways. Successful use of PSYOP discards and marginalizes IDTs while simultaneously fostering trust in HN institutions. PSYOP also introduce, clarify the position of, and then articulate the exit strategy for U.S. and coalition forces. Much like other ARSOF forces such as CA and SF, PSYOP elements often continue to have a presence in scaled back FID activities well after a larger contingent of SOF and conventional forces have succeeded in achieving the main goals of FID.

1-32. U.S. military training support to FID should focus on assisting HNs in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats. When organizing, planning, and executing military training support to a FID program it is essential that the emphasis be on IDAD. This emphasis helps the HN address the root causes of instability in a preventive manner rather than reacting to threats. U.S. military involvement in FID historically has often been focused on COIN. Increasingly however, U.S. FID programs may also aim at other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, corruption, human rights abuses, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. Many of these threats are increasingly intertwined. For instance, whereas the typical Communist insurgency disdained illicit drugs (at least officially) modern IDTs feel little if any compunction to avoid this or any other criminal endeavor that furthers its aim. Religious extremism increasingly blurs the line between terrorism and insurgency. It is useful however to maintain a distinction between that part of FID that is CT and that which is COIN. For instance, it may be highly counterproductive to the PSYOP effort to characterize insurgents who do not engage in terrorism or who are citizens of the HN as terrorists. U.S. military training, therefore, should focus on the specific IDTs present.
1-33. It is necessary however, in FID operations, to recognize that COIN operations or relevant COIN TTP may represent a large or even a preponderance of FID efforts. The likelihood that some sort of ideological based insurgency will remain a perennial FID focus in the future is high. In addition, insurgents and other IDTs may employ the same tactics and techniques against the HN, to include classic insurgency methods. In terms of operational focus, it is irrelevant if an IDT is a true insurgent or is, for instance, a narco-terrorist group using political rhetoric to foster recruitment and gain legitimacy. The focus of such FID operations may be a mix of classic CD operations and COIN techniques to separate the group from their base of support in the populace. Increasingly, IDTs of all types will attempt to employ religious or political rhetoric to further their standing/fear in the HN and sometimes even more importantly in the U.S. and among third parties. Typically, this has been done through the regional and global media. In this case, it is irrelevant if the IDT is actually ideologically based or simply disingenuously using religious or political rhetoric to further their aims. They can, in affect, become legitimate if sufficient media exposure elicits a broad perception of legitimacy or even the inevitability of their victory. Therefore, a fundamental ethos of COIN remains a constant in FID, namely, denying an IDT popular support through a balance of lethal and nonlethal interdiction as well as measures directed at winning the support of the populace for the HN.

1-34. The characterization of an operation as primarily FID with COIN elements is the province of the overall military commander and or the Country Team. In an operation with significant U.S. military support committed for the interdiction of insurgents, major U.S. interests are typically at stake. As such, the decision to characterize an operation as COIN usually rests at the highest levels of the USG, up to and including Presidential visibility/decision. ARSOF commanders and Soldiers must be cognizant if an operation and an IDT is deemed best interdicted by not characterizing them as insurgents. This can be a challenge when at the tactical and operational levels that interdiction is accomplished through COIN TTP. For ARSOF commanders the blend of COIN, CT, CD, and other operations TTP is accomplished on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis on one or another subset of IW techniques employed in FID is influenced by the conditions in the HN and the amount of resources available to combat an IDT. ARSOF commanders prioritize FID operations based on the threat and that threat may evolve or devolve quickly. Comprehensive FID plans anticipate this change and respond to it proactively by adjusting the balance of COIN, CT, or other techniques.

1-35. U.S. military capabilities may be used to provide transportation or maintenance support to the HN military in operations that will not routinely expose U.S. personnel to hostile fire. Logistic support must be provided with consideration of the long-term effect on the capability of the local forces to become self-sufficient. Providing logistic support for a surge capacity that the HN is incapable of on their own may be warranted but this must be articulated as temporary and must be balanced with the ability of the HN to return to a stable situation afterward without permanently overextending their capabilities.

1-36. During tactical operations, U.S. intelligence and communication range from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting. With the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems, as well as other organic ARSOF collection assets, the ability for SOF Soldiers to support HN forces with timely intelligence and information continues to grow. As an adequate intelligence collection and dissemination capability is often one of the weakest links in the HN’s military capability, the ability to provide this support to the HN in FID can prove decisive. The release of classified information to the HN is governed by national disclosure policy. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior U.S. commander in the chain of command and distributed to subordinate commands supporting FID in accordance with all statutory and regulatory guidance. Limited delegation of authority, where appropriate, can supplement detailed written guidance.

**COMBAT OPERATIONS**

1-37. The introduction of U.S. combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until the security situation is stabilized and HN forces are able to provide security for the populace. In all cases, U.S. combat operations support the HN IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature. However, major offensive combat operations will typically be the rule in FID operations that involve authorized combat. Despite the goal of achieving a stable strategic defense, once combat operations are authorized, they may not be confined to the HN. They may entail operations in willing bordering nations and may not include a defensive action. Although joint and Service
doctrine provides specific tactical procedures, there are certain principles that should guide employment of U.S. forces in a tactical role in support of a FID program. These principles, and the specific command and control (C2) and employment considerations for joint and multinational tactical operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations in this publication.

1-38. The primary role for U.S. military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other support and means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements. If the level of lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level that HN forces cannot control, U.S. forces may be required to engage the hostile elements. In this case, the objective of U.S. operations is to protect or stabilize the HN political, economic, and social institutions until the HN can assume these responsibilities. In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. Given the multinational and interagency impact of conducting combat operations supporting FID, commanders can expect complex C2 relationships.

1-39. The nature of U.S. tactical participation in HN internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to U.S. forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and assist the cause of the opposition. Conversely, failure to use sufficient force to gain and maintain security will doom FID operations and destroy the credibility of U.S. and HN forces to protect the populace. Civilians may endure hardship and accept collateral damage if an IDT is completely interdicted. ARSOF FID planners and executors must accept that a civil populace may expect nonlethal interdiction or that some populations will be satisfied only with lethal interdiction. The latter may be from either cultural imperatives or the simple desire to be completely rid of a threat.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY

1-40. A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions will be best preserved and enhanced as part of a community of free and independent nations who adhere to the principle of the rule of law both within their borders and among the world community. In this regard, the U.S. endeavors to encourage other countries to do their part in the preservation of this freedom and independence. The objective is to support U.S. interests by means of a common effort. This common effort makes use of all instruments of national power to support an HN. The diplomatic instrument is often first used to show U.S. commitment. The political system within the HN is important in providing stability, and must be willing to improve stability within its borders. The economic instrument has influence across all aspects of FID.

1-41. In many cases, FID is incorporated into HN programs within nations that are less developed. These nations require a means to improve their economy. HN programs can range from favorable trade arrangements to military financing. The informational instrument gets the message out to the public. IO portray the positive efforts and accomplishments of the HN. These operations also publicize the U.S. support to the HN and U.S. efforts to improve the HN. Although the focus of this publication is on the military instrument, the military instrument is primarily a supporting role to the overall FID program.

1-42. Those governments that lack the will to address their social, economic, or political problems are unlikely to benefit from outside assistance. However, governments that do mobilize their human and material resources may find that outside help, to include U.S. SA, makes a critical difference. Where significant U.S. national interests are involved, the United States may provide economic and military assistance to supplement the efforts of such governments.

1-43. The creation of a relatively stable internal environment, one in which economic growth can occur and the people are able to determine their own form of government, is a primary U.S. objective. Economic assistance, supplied either by the United States through bilateral agreements or supplied by several nations through multilateral agreements, may help achieve this objective.
1-44. The threatened government is primarily responsible for creating a stable atmosphere through the commitment and use of all its internal resources. Under certain conditions, U.S. policy supports supplementing local efforts to maintain order and stability. These conditions are as follows:

- The internal disorder is of such a nature as to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests.
- The threatened country is capable of effectively using U.S. assistance.
- The threatened country requests U.S. assistance.

In addition, the magnitude of human suffering within a country may compel U.S. action in a country or region where our national interests are not at stake.

1-45. The USG spends billions of dollars a year in programs to improve allied and friendly nations. There are numerous benefits for the U.S. military from conducting FID throughout the world. These benefits include:

- FID programs bring diverse U.S. teams of Soldiers that embody the principles of freedom, fairness, and humanity to countries troubled by ethnic, racial, and religious strife and intolerance.
- FID programs help build and foster favorable relationships that promote U.S. interests. In many cases, FID programs lead to the establishment of personal and unit relationships.
- FID programs strengthen the capabilities of friendly nations, which ultimately strengthen U.S. security concerns.
- Many of the foreign areas aided by the United States provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.
- Training exercises with foreign nations (FNs) increase the proficiency and skill of U.S. forces.
- FID programs improve U.S. forces’ regional knowledge of specific areas (environmental, geographical, social, political, economic, cultural, and spiritual), which can be disseminated throughout the force.
- FID programs improve the effectiveness of the WOT.

1-46. Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency are the result of specific conditions within a nation. They may stem from the population’s perception (often grounded to some degree in reality) that they are suffering from poverty, unemployment, religious disparity, political issues, crime, or tribal unrest. These conditions have historically set the stage for lawlessness and insurgency against an established government. This type of internal strife or conflict within a nation’s borders may remain a local problem or expand, which allows an outside source to influence or create opposition toward the legitimate government. In some cases, outside sources may threaten the HN’s stability by exploiting the conditions within that nation to further their own cause. This outside influence may even establish itself within the HN to promote and support civil unrest. These types of conditions promote insurgencies and their violent methods, like terrorism.

1-47. Identification of the root cause of the problem, analysis of the environment, and identification of the specific needs of the HN are crucial in tailoring military support to assist an HN’s IDAD program. The emphasis should be on helping the HN to address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner rather than react to threats. Such reactionary strategies have invariably been proven to fail. The United States will support specific nations based on U.S. policy toward that nation or region and will implement FID programs to support that nation through GCC’s security cooperation programs. FID programs of all types, such as humanitarian assistance (HA) and CT programs, can prevent, reduce, or stop mitigating factors that can contribute to the beginning or spread of terrorism, insurgencies, and other IDTs. FID activities against an incipient or even mature IDT implemented through the GCC may ultimately lead to stability within that nation or region and effectively reduce threats to the United States. In addition, even FID operations that escalate to combat operations reduce the number of U.S. casualties and the length of time committed to overcoming a virulent IDT.
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Chapter 2

Organization and Responsibilities

To assist a country with its IDAD efforts, FID planners must understand the political climate, social attitudes, economic conditions, religious considerations, philosophy or plan of the IDT, the host government, and the local populace. In addition, within the globalized world, FID planners will rarely have the luxury of discounting other regional, transregional, and even global influences. FID is primarily an instrument of the USG, with varying (and sometimes highly limited) degrees of support from other nations as partners to assist the HN. When considering the IDAD effort and FID’s role in that effort, it is essential to realize that DOD is only one organization fulfilling some of the many responsibilities to support IDAD. Appendix B provides additional information on IDAD strategy. All international relationships along the continuum from peace to war are increasingly a complete effort that employs all the instruments of national power. This is not a new lesson of an emerging age only an amplification of an existing reality since man first engaged in conflict. All the power of the political entity in conflict must be brought to bear in a synchronized and mutually supportive role. This is no truer than in FID operations and perhaps most telling for the HNs conducting an IDAD program. This chapter will detail the instruments of national power and their responsibilities with emphasis on how these other instruments synergize with the military arm of national power.

OVERVIEW

2-1. For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the U.S. must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies. Interagency coordination during joint operations ensures that all DIME instruments complement each other. This coordination also allows all available resources to be used in concert to build upon each other and avoid redundant and, therefore, wasteful efforts. Effective integration is difficult and consists of much more than mere coordination. Rarely will any one instrument accomplish an IDAD program component in the absence of other DIME elements. Ideally, the FID program will incorporate all instruments in a coordinated and supported manner that addresses HN requirements and U.S. national policy and interests. Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies.

SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES

2-2. The U.S. routinely aids nations around the world in varying capacities. In some ways, this aid could be said to support IDAD in the general sense because it fosters stability in states that have few or low-level IDTs. However, U.S. support for IDAD that includes FID activities signals an environment in which the USG recognizes a viable threat and, therefore, institutes a plan to support the HN’s IDAD strategy using the military instrument of DIME. This may well be after long-term engagement solely or primarily through the other instruments of U.S. and HN national power. The USG may engage other elements of national power under various criteria, but when FID is planned and executed, it is because of the three criteria stated in Chapter 1.

2-3. The President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) decides the level and type of military assistance needs to support a FID program. Each FID program is distinct, even if regional similarities can provide potential best practices planning suggestions. In addition, some FID programs can have coordinated
activities when an IDT operates in two or more bordering countries. However, each FID program is country specific based on the IDAD strategy. The reality is that even in a regional effort the level of FID support in countries that are in close proximity or even adjoining may differ greatly. Ordinarily, when FID limits support to minor levels of SA or CMO, there is no requirement for a special management program. In these cases, standard interagency coordination (typically under the chief of mission [COM] or designee) should be adequate. Major FID programs may demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the interagency, combatant command, and Country Team levels. Typically, these programs will be the sort of direct support or combat operations dealt with later in this publication.

**DIPLOMATIC, INFORMATION, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC: THE FOUR PILLARS OF THE SUPPORT FRAMEWORK**

2-4. As is evident in Figure 2-1, page 2-3, the lines of organization and C2 in a FID situation are complex. They follow the framework laid out in the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*. NSPD-1 has had a lasting influence on the development and execution of complex contingency operation planning and execution. It mandated changes of behavior that continue to increase and improve interagency coordination and unity of effort centering on the institutionalization of the NSC practices to manage a crisis and coordinate political-military plans.

2-5. In addition, NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, articulates the basic policy of U.S. efforts in stabilizing and reconstructing foreign states by various operations, including FID, when it states: *The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.*

**DIPLOMATIC**

2-6. FID makes extensive use of the diplomatic instrument of national power. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal instability. Diplomacy is often the first instrument exercised by the United States in countries dealing with an IDT. Depending upon the decision of the President or his designee, the diplomatic instrument of national power may be the only practical instrument of national power that can be brought to bear. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other support all make significant diplomatic statements by demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve. Therefore, the diplomatic instrument is always a complimentary component of any involvement of U.S. military forces. In addition, the interaction of DOS and DOD personnel in the typical FID model where DOS is the lead agency reinforces the concept of civilian rule. (This model and its importance are discussed at length throughout the balance of this manual.)

**INFORMATION**

2-7. Much like the diplomatic element of national power, the use of information may be the primary practical force that can be brought to bear to support the HN’s IDAD. Effective use of public diplomacy, CMO, public affairs (PA) activities, and PSYOP are essential to a FID program. Harmonization of these elements in a mutually supportive effort is imperative. The establishment of FID programs offers an opportunity for public misunderstanding and for exploitation by elements hostile to the United States and its allies. U.S. foreign assistance that includes a military component is often met with skepticism (foreign and domestic). In the past, it has been the target for adversary propaganda. Use of military PSYOP forces in the informational realm remains a contentious issue both among those who have a clear understanding of
the role and function of military PSYOP and among those who erroneously equate all military PSYOP with deception.

Figure 2-1. Foreign internal defense coordination

2-8. FID offers a tremendous opportunity to portray U.S. support in a positive light, but not at the expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to exploit U.S. aid efforts if doing so creates the perception that the HN government or military is impotent or incompetent. Those planning and conducting informational support to FID must be continually mindful that information can travel to the majority of any population on the globe in minutes. Therefore, accurate portrayal of U.S. FID efforts through positive information programs can influence HN or regional perceptions of the U.S. FID programs. Information programs can also highlight the HN’s desire to embrace the changes necessary to combat IDTs. Every FID effort must be viewed in informational terms as a potential global impactor. This means that ARSOF Soldiers conducting FID must evaluate every action in terms of its informational (primarily psychological and political) impact.

MILITARY

2-9. The military component of FID can greatly vary. Countless examples of small teams of ARSOF Soldiers conducting generations of FID operations have created a proactive IDAD umbrella in many parts of the world. FID is not the sole province of SOF. FID is an operation in which the inherent qualities and training of ARSOF Soldiers place them in a natural position to conduct and, in joint environments with conventional forces, command through organizations, such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF). FID by definition cannot take place without military support to the HN; however, it is necessary
to remain mindful in terms of the IDAD strategy as a whole. FID is a component of the military portion of national power used by the U.S. FID may be the smallest part (numerically and financially) of support to the HN. In addition, whether the FID operation is one with a small contingent of U.S. forces or a substantial force authorized to conduct combat operations, it is a multinational and interagency effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power.

**ECONOMIC**

2-10. Economics influence every aspect of FID support. Often, unfavorable economic conditions give rise to the internal strife a supported nation is facing. IDTs may further exacerbate economic hardships through violence and destruction, which results in a worsening spiral. The weakening of national infrastructures and increase in instability create or worsen the perception that the HN government is not able to meet the basic needs of the people. IDTs may then begin to usurp the HN authority by conducting campaigns to provide for the basic needs of the populace. This tactic has historically been combined with a continued deliberate targeting of the infrastructure in other areas to heighten the perception of worsening conditions in HN government-controlled areas. The U.S. economic instrument of power is used in a variety of ways inside the HN, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements to the provision of foreign military financing under SA. When an IDT receives support from third-country or nonstate organizations, economic and financial sanctions can be used to cut support to insurgent or other elements in the HN.

**HOLISTIC APPROACH**

2-11. The concept of DIME comes with the inherent implication that no one element is exercised in a vacuum. In some instances, conditions may cause one element of national power to be the principal force wielded in FID. However, most actions in support of FID utilize all the elements of DIME to some degree. To cite a single example, economic support to FID might include an active program to reduce corruption and graft at all levels in the HN. The following example illustrates some of the actions of each element in this case:

- Diplomatic elements interface with the highest echelons of the HN government to bring pressure at the national level for change.
- The informational element, through organic DOS elements and DOD PSYOP, assists the HN with both indirect and direct support to influence target audiences (TAs) capable of reducing or reporting graft and corruption.
- The military element (in addition to informational support) conducts active training with HN military members on the dangers of graft and corruption.
- The economic element in conjunction with the other elements brings pressure by denying contracts or improvement projects to known companies or agencies engaged in corrupt practices.

**NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS**

2-12. The United States uses multiple national-level organizations to address IDAD issues. The successful interaction and synchronization of IDAD efforts among these many agencies is evolving and is described in JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*. This reference points out the reality that currently and in the foreseeable future joint operations will bring together a myriad of USG agencies all with different doctrine, terminology, culture, and, most importantly, capabilities. The following paragraphs discuss some of the national-level organizations involved in supporting FID. This discussion presupposes substantial crossover portions of interagency coordination and activity conducted within the continental United States (CONUS), HN, and third countries. In addition, unless specifically stipulated, these activities are conducted by various echelons (frequently to the lowest echelons during FID operations) of all the agencies mentioned.
NATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

2-13. Intelligence is critical to the execution of FID. Beyond that, it is critical to the planning and the decision at national levels to execute or refrain from FID operations. One of the advantages available to FID planners and executors under the reorganizations and expansions resulting from the WOT is an increasingly connected, collaborative, and accessible national-level organization for intelligence gathering and dissemination. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is responsible to the President to oversee the intelligence assets of the USG. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is an integral part of the DNI’s arsenal of intelligence gatherers and analysts. The CIA’s mission is to support the President, the NSC, and all officials who make and execute U.S. national security policy. Through personnel in CONUS and in the HN, the CIA provides invaluable (and in some cases otherwise unobtainable) support to intelligence for FID. The National Security Agency (NSA) was established by Presidential directive in 1952 to provide signals intelligence and communications security activities for the government. Since then, the NSA has gained the responsibility for information systems security and operations security (OPSEC) training. Appendix C contains more information about intelligence organizations under the DNI and the specific products, means, and methods they provide to FID.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2-14. The National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949) created the NSC. The NSC’s formal members are the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and SecDef. The DNI, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), President’s national security advisor (the assistant to the President for national security affairs, also director of the NSC), and deputy advisor usually attend NSC meetings as invited guests. The Council also has a civilian staff. The President appoints an executive secretary to head the staff. Decisions for FID operations to commence, escalate, and terminate often require a decision by the NSC body. Invariably FID progressing from direct support to combat operations will involve the NSC advising the President (the sole authority to authorize combat operations in FID).

ARMS TRANSFER MANAGEMENT GROUP

2-15. The Arms Transfer Management Group is an interagency board that advises the Secretary of State on matters relating to SA program funding levels and arms transfer policies. The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology chairs the Arms Transfer Management Group. The Group manages and coordinates weapons- and equipment-related SA matters. It includes representatives from agencies throughout the executive branch who deal in SA matters. Its members are frequently from but not limited to the—

- NSC.
- DOD.
- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).
- CIA.
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
- Office of Management and Budget.
- Department of Treasury.
- DOS.
- USAID.

2-16. The Group coordinates military assistance and military-related supporting assistance. This coordination encourages mutually supporting programs and increases the efficiency of the SA program.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2-17. The DOS is the federal department in the United States that sets and maintains foreign policies. The DOS is normally the lead agency for execution of FID programs and is responsible overall for the SA programs. The DOS is involved with policy formulation and execution of FID programs from the national level to the lowest levels within the HN. In the one instance where FID operations pass to DOD as the lead...
agent (if there is an escalation to combat operations), FID commanders and planners retain no more potent interagency ally in conducting operations than the DOS and the head of the DOS in the HN, the COM.

**Bureau of Political-Military Affairs**

2-18. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, led by an assistant secretary, is the principal link between the DOS and DOD. This bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, SA, military operations, and defense trade. It is instrumental in the DOS’s efforts to accomplish three major goals under the United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs: CT, regional stability, and HA.

**Coordinator for International Information Programs**

2-19. The coordinator for the Bureau of International Information Programs (BIIP) supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations. The coordinator for the BIIP also advises the President, his representatives abroad, and various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. DOD and DOS International Information Programs efforts must be mutually supportive. Close coordination among embassy public affairs officers (PAOs) and cultural attaches, military PA offices, and PSYOP elements is essential. The BIIP uses various media and methods to—

- Publicize U.S. policies.
- Plan and conduct informative programs in support of U.S. or host-government agencies.
- Counter propaganda hostile to U.S. interests.
- Coordinate and synchronize PSYOP with guidance from the DOS.

**United States Agency for International Development**

2-20. USAID has the responsibility for conducting nonmilitary U.S. foreign assistance programs and for the continually supervising all assistance programs under the FAA of 1961. It is primarily concerned with developmental assistance and HCA. It also plans and implements overseas programs that improve economic and social conditions.

**Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs**

2-21. The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in the DOS, and other departments and agencies within the USG on the development of policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. A secretary who is under the direction of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs heads INL. INL programs support two of the DOS’s strategic goals:

- To reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
- To minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.

2-22. Counternarcotics and anticrime programs also complement the WOT by promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies charged with the CT mission.

**Department of Justice**

2-23. The U.S. military in general and ARSOF units in particular have a long history of working with various agencies under the Department of Justice (DOJ) in joint interagency operations. FID is certainly no exception. IDTs frequently cannot be given neat one-dimensional definitions. A political or religious based insurgency may frequently have no problem with acquiring funds through criminal activity, such as piracy (intellectual and maritime), narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Narco-traffickers only need to slip Marxist rhetoric into a pseudoideology to cross the line into narco-terrorism. FID CD operations must involve the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other ARSOF FID operations may involve extensive coordination and intelligence sharing with DOJ agencies. For instance, close cooperation between the DOD and DOJ on programs like the various Rewards for Justice Programs has yielded
positive results in FID operations. In addition, as more terrorist activity abroad has been directed at USG property, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has increasingly worked with DOD elements to prosecute the WOT.

2-24. The DOJ has several standing programs executed abroad that support the goals of FID where there is a criminal element, an untrained or corrupt judiciary and police, or both. The International Crime Investigative Training Assistance Program develops police and corrections institutions, while the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training develops prosecutorial and judicial institutions and legislative reform. USAID funds and the DOJ manages Senior Law Enforcement Advisors (SLEAs) or prosecutors known as Resident Legal Advisors. These advisors are stationed in a host country for at least one year. They provide full-time advice and technical assistance in establishing fair and professional justice sector institutions and practices. SLEAs are also assigned for a minimum of one year, but many serve several years at one or more posts. SLEAs create a single point of contact (POC) for all areas of law enforcement-related training and technical assistance in a given country.

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

2-25. The Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) was created within the Department of Treasury to address broad illicit financing concerns. TFI combines the department’s intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. TFI consists of the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of Foreign Asset Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

2-26. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has an important role in the interagency FID framework. Historically, most insurgencies occur in countries where a majority of the population is dependent upon agriculture and the unemployed or underemployed rural youth are considered prime candidates for recruitment. Development of the agricultural sector and its institutions helps facilitate trade and increase incomes, thereby reducing recruitment to or support for an insurgency or other IDT. The Foreign Agricultural Service has the primary responsibility for the USDA’s international activities, including market development, trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics and market information. The Foreign Agricultural Service carries out a broad array of international training, technical assistance, and other collaborative activities with developing and transitioning countries to facilitate trade and promote food security.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

2-27. Within the DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) acts as a policy-making organization in most FID matters. Numerous activities at the OSD level affect FID programs. The following are directly involved in the areas of SA and in the general areas of low-intensity conflict and FID-related issues:

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) exercises overall direction, authority, and control concerning SA for OSD through the various Assistant Secretaries. The USD(P) serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the SecDef for all matters involving the integration of DOD plans and policies with overall national security objectives.

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities) oversees DOD special operations. This Assistant Secretary has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can affect all areas of FID policy and programs.

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is responsible for executing the following functions for the DOD:
  - Administering and supervising SA planning and programs.
  - Formulating and executing SA programs in coordination with other government programs.
  - Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.
• Managing the credit-enhancing program.
• Serving as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry concerning SA activities.
• The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs supervises and establishes policy for PA programs with the DOD. PA is an integral part of military support to FID programs.
• The OJCS plays a key role in the SA effort through the joint planning process. Key OJCS plans are the Joint Strategic Planning Document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning. In addition, the OJCS continually reviews current and ongoing programs for specific countries and regions to ensure compatibility with U.S. global security interests.

COMBATANT COMMAND ORGANIZATION

2-28. The GCCs are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID within their AORs. The GCCs integrate all military SA plans and activities with regional U.S. military plans. The role of the GCC is critical. His regional perspective is at the operational and strategic level of conflict. He identifies and applies military and certain humanitarian or civic action resources to achieve U.S. national strategic goals. With proper and timely employment, these resources minimize the likelihood of U.S. combat involvement.

2-29. The GCC is responsible for coordinating and monitoring all military activities in the AOR in support of FID programs. Combatant commanders use theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs) as integral tools to coordinate FID activities. Because threats often operate regionally, TSCPs may sometimes coordinate separate FID operations in multiple countries within the GCC’s AOR. In addition, the FID operation in one country in the GCC’s AOR may need to be coordinated with the UW effort in an adjacent country. Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations. For example:
• Plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance; therefore, FID must be considered within the context of the priorities for the AOR as a whole.
• Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command’s AOR. Many of these activities are habitual and are likely to span the tenures of multiple GCCs.
• Combatant commanders may coordinate to expand the military presence in the Country Team, for instance the commitment of a military information support team (MIST) or military liaison element (MLE).
• In most instances, the application of U.S. military resources in support of an HN’s IDAD programs will function through the framework of the U.S. Embassy staff.
• Should it become necessary to expand U.S. assistance to higher direct-support levels or to a combat role, a joint task force (JTF) or JSOTF normally will be established to coordinate this effort.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS

2-30. Combatant commanders may form area and functional subordinate unified commands. An example of a regional subordinate unified command is United States Forces, Korea (USFK), which falls under the United States Pacific Command. The responsibilities for FID support in these commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant commands. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the combatant commander. In addition, in some subordinate unified commands (such as USFK), ongoing programs to support the HN IDAD program are for all practical purposes a large, ongoing FID operation.

2-31. Functional subordinate unified commands, such as United States Special Operations Command South, which is the theater special operations command (TSOC) for United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), control a specific functional capability. These functional commands contribute to FID planning and execution through management of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise. TSOCs are of particular importance because of the significant role of ARSOF units in FID programs. The TSOC normally has operational control (OPCON) of all SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility
to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID. ARSOF units assigned to a theater are under the command authority of the GCC. The GCC normally exercises this authority through the commander of the TSOC. Coordination between the TSOC and the other component commands of the GCC is essential for effective management of military operations in support of FID, including joint and multinational exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), SOF integration with conventional forces, and other operations.

JOINT TASK FORCES

2-32. Combatant commanders may form JTFs to execute complex FID operations. The formation of a JTF signals a larger U.S. commitment and typically involves HNs of strategic importance to the United States or nations in which FID is necessitated by a grievous natural or man-made disaster. One example would be JTF-BRAVO, which is subordinate to USSOUTHCOM. JTF-BRAVO was formed by the combatant commander for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting U.S. military training exercises in Honduras during a time when a U.S. forward presence in Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the JTF. Other JTFs may be organized to accomplish specific functional missions, such as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts. In the WOT, JTF-510 in the Philippines and JTF-Horn of Africa have provided proactive support of HN IDAD programs. Much of the training, CAO, and PSYOP conducted by a JTF may warrant the creation of a subordinate JSOTF, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint Psychological Operations task force (JPOTF).

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND COUNTRY TEAM

2-33. U.S. organizations within the HN may be responsible for coordinating, planning, and resourcing numerous activities, to include FID. These organizations comprise U.S. military and DOS personnel. The primary organizations within an HN involved with FID are described below.

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

2-34. The U.S. diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the country. The COM, normally an ambassador, ensures all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests, as well as regional and international objectives. Depending upon the size or economic import of a country, the U.S. may maintain only an embassy and no consular offices. The United States may maintain one or more consular offices in some countries. Typically, ARSOF elements conducting FID will deal with embassy officials, even in nations with a consular office. Relationships with consular offices will be determined on a case-by-case basis. The same basic entities and offices existing in the embassy will be present or liaised at the consular offices.

COUNTRY TEAM

2-35. The Country Team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The members of the Country Team will vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within that country. The Country Team is usually led by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission and is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The Country Team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Usually, the primary military members are the defense attaché and the chief of the security assistance organization (SAO). ARSOF unit engagement with the Country Team will primarily be with the SAO and this organization are discussed first. However, several other attachés and offices may be integral to ARSOF FID operations as well. Figure 2-2, page 2-10, shows the Country Team concept.
Security Assistance Organization

2-36. The SAO is the in-country mechanism for ensuring that DOD SA management responsibilities, prescribed by law and executive direction, are properly executed. It oversees all foreign-based DOD elements with SA responsibilities. The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the SA program. SA offices also help the U.S. Country Team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. The SAO may be known in-country by any number of personnel assigned, the functions performed, or the HN results desired. Typical designations include Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Joint U.S. Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission, Defense Field Office, or Office of Defense Cooperation. The chief of the SAO reports to the theater GCC and is a member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team. Figure 2-3, page 2-11, shows the SAO departmental alignment. Figure 2-4, page 2-11, shows the SAO functional alignment.

United States Defense Attaché Office

2-37. The United States Defense Attaché Office (DAO) performs representational functions on behalf of the SecDef, the Secretaries of the Military Services, the JCS, the Chiefs of the U.S. Military Services, and the GCC. The defense attaché serves as the military advisor to the COM, liaises with the HN military, and manages the U.S. SA and military-to-military programs. The DAO assists the GCC and his staff with FID programs by exchanging information on HN military, social, and political conditions.
United States Defense Representative

2-38. The United States defense representative (USDR) represents the SecDef and the appropriate unified commanders for coordination of administrative and security matters for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned. The USDR in foreign countries is an additional duty title assigned to a military officer serving in a specifically designated position with prescribed authorities and functions. The USDR is the COM’s single POC to assist the COM in carrying out his responsibilities. The responsibility of the USDR is established for U.S. governmental administrative and security coordination only. USDR duties are coordinated with the appropriate GCC.

Other DOS Officers and Agencies

2-39. The deputy COM serves as executive officer and chief of staff for the ambassador and directs the diplomatic mission in the ambassador’s absence (then called the Chargé d’affairs). PSYOP units involved in FID may work closely with the deputy COM because the ambassador may delegate authority to approve
or prereview PSYOP series to the COM. The political counselor directs the political section and often fills
the position of third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political or
military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs. The political
counsel may have input on both PSYOP and CA FID activities.

2-40. The cultural attaché is a DOS public diplomacy officer responsible for implementing the U.S.
information program throughout the HN. This individual will often also serve as the PAO and, since the
stand-up of the BIIP, will sometimes serve as the chief of BIIP programs in the HN as well. If an embassy
has both a cultural attaché and a PAO, the PAO will typically be responsible for BIIP programs. All
ARSOF units can benefit from the latest information the cultural attaché has to offer. PSYOP, in particular,
will frequently work closely with the PAO and BIIP.

2-41. The Agency for International Development is represented by the in-country director of USAID. The
director supervises the nonmilitary U.S. developmental efforts in the HN. CAO in support of FID should
be closely coordinated with USAID efforts. In addition, every relief or improvement project undertaken by
USAID should, when possible, be coordinated and exploited for its PSYOP and PA value. In addition, the
USAID personnel can greatly further the production of area assessments with knowledge they have already
gained. In addition to these offices, ARSOF Soldiers may coordinate with the following USG elements:

- Commercial attaché.
- Treasury attaché.
- Agricultural attaché.
- Labor attaché.
- Air attaché.
- Science attaché.
- DEA representatives.
- Director of the Peace Corps.
- Legal attaché (representing the DOJ).
- CIA station chief.
- FBI representatives.

SUPPORTED HOST NATION

2-42. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire FID effort is
tailored to the needs of the individual nation and designed to support the HN IDAD strategy. Appendix B
contains a more extensive explanation and details a generic IDAD organizational structure. For ARSOF
FID planners, it is important to realize that HN agents may hold widely divergent outlooks on the HN
IDAD strategy and, particularly, any FID program. Significant internal opposition to the HN’s IDAD
strategy and FID operations is by no means a guarantee of mission failure; however, FID strategies that do
not address internal opposition frequently fail or degenerate into combat operations. Conversely, ARSOF
FID planners should capitalize on positive governmental and popular support within the HN for the IDAD
program and FID operations.

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES

2-43. Although IDAD organizations will vary depending on the environment, resources available, and
other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful IDAD program. These principles include—

- Responsive governments.
- Unity of effort.
- Maximum use of intelligence, PSYOP, and CA.
- Minimum use of violence.

These principles may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the
result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government.
HOST-NATION ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

2-44. Just as the United States organizes to support a FID program, so must an HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. The HN IDAD strategy provides a detailed view of the organizations and methods that facilitate control and coordination of IDAD programs, including FID. The concept typically requires an organization that is geographically divided into national and regional levels. Each of these levels should have its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels of those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the accompanying security, neutralization, and mobilization functions. It is important to note that different HNs may have a wide range of ability to form and implement an IDAD strategy. One of the first challenges of implementing both IDAD cooperation with an HN and FID operations may be extensive assistance in formulating or finalizing both IDAD strategy and FID planning.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE

2-45. Operations in support of FID, both those that include combat and those that do not, are by definition multinational and at a minimum binational. FID operations may frequently be multinational as the HN receives IDAD support from several nations besides the United States. FID planners must be aware that other participating nations may have divergent or competing strategies and aims that are at odds with U.S. national policy and goals. Multinational coalitions in which the U.S. is an active participant are typically conducted within the structure of an alliance that is the result of a formal agreement or an ad hoc arrangement for common action. Such multinational operations require innovative C2 and coordination procedures for FID planning and execution to facilitate unity of effort. Each multinational operation in support of FID is different. Key planning and execution considerations may vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members.

ROLE OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

2-46. U.S. military involvement in FID has traditionally focused on support of HN COIN efforts of allies and friendly nations. COIN remains an important aspect of military FID operations. However, ARSOF involvement in FID operations is not limited to conducting COIN. ARSOF FID operations may involve several other areas, including CT and supporting CD. As IDTs diversify and expand their repertoire of asymmetric approaches to destabilizing HNs, the types of activities ARSOF Soldiers will use to counter such threats will also adapt and expand.

SPECIAL FORCES

2-47. COIN remains an important aspect of SF FID operations. However, the primary SF mission in FID is to organize, train, advise, assist, and improve the tactical and technical proficiency of the HN forces. The major difference in the way that SF and conventional forces conduct FID operations is in the area of advisory operations. As a force multiplier, SF units maintain advanced skills and capabilities (such as language) that enable them to conduct advisory operations with the HN for extended periods. Improved proficiency enables HN forces to defeat internal threats, thereby limiting direct U.S. involvement. The emphasis is on training HN cadres that will in turn train other HN forces. The capabilities that SF employ to perform FID tasks are similar to those inherent to the UW mission.

2-48. All SF personnel must understand the political and legal implications of the operational environment. Legal considerations in planning and implementing FID programs are complex and subject to changing U.S. legislation. Commanders must keep their legal advisors involved in the planning process. Appendix A summarizes key legal aspects of FID activities.

2-49. In the early stages of a nation’s need for assistance, the level of SF participation may be as small as one SFODA. In the more advanced stages, an SF company or battalion may establish an operational base (within or outside of country) and exercise OPCON of SF units. Operational and support elements may be assigned to the base on a rotational or permanent basis. When the entire SF group or battalion deploys to
Chapter 2

the country, it normally establishes a special operations task force (SOTF). The SOTF may then elect to establish one or more SF advanced operational bases. SF units participate in a variety of operations to accomplish their FID task. The HN’s needs and the U.S./HN’s agreements will dictate the quantity and level of support required for the HN’s IDAD program.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

2-50. Requests for CA forces may originate with the ambassador, defense attaché, or SA organization chief. Requests are then passed through the appropriate GCC to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS ensures proper interagency coordination. If the forces are available in-theater from theater-assigned forces and there are no restrictions on their employment, the GCC can approve and support the request. If insufficient CA forces are available in-theater, the GCC requests additional forces through JCS. The forces will be sourced once United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) validates the request for Active Army CA, United States Joint Forces Command validates the request for reserve component CA, and the SecDef orders the deployment of those forces.

2-51. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement, as well as to combat other IDTs. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency or strengthening of another IDT. A national development program can solidify the position of the HN government and improve conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of IDT activity.

2-52. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of a FN or HN. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the TSOC (GCC). These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and populations in the operational areas.

2-53. CA forces provide expertise in populace and resources control (PRC), FHA, NA (MCA is a subtask of NA), support to civil administration (SCA), and civil information management (CIM). They also provide support in limited medical and engineer advisory capabilities. CA personnel supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid FN or HN military units. CA elements supporting FID—

- Review U.S. SA program goals and HN IDAD goals and plan CMO to support the HN plan.
- Plan CMO based on the phases of insurgency described in FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Unconventional Warfare.
- Train the HN military to plan, train for, and conduct NA, PRC, and other CAO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
- Train on developing indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills to isolate IDTs from the civil population and protect the civil population.
- Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Identify specific CMO missions the HN military can and should conduct.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

2-54. PSYOP support to FID focuses on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter IDTs. U.S. PSYOP involvement in FID has traditionally been focused on helping another nation defeat an organized movement attempting to disrupt, usurp, or overthrow the government. U.S. FID programs may address other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Increasingly, IDTs have learned to use, exploit, and produce media portraying their cause and actions in a favorable light. IDTs are increasingly learning the value of Psychological Operations actions (PSYACTs), that is, action (typically violent) conducted primarily for its psychological rather than military value. Initial PSYOP support to the HN may be to analyze and then suggest means, methods, and series that may counter increasingly sophisticated use of propaganda by IDTs and their regional or global supporters.
2-55. PSYOP support FID programs through both indirect and direct support to HN governments facing instability. PSYOP may be simultaneously conducting direct support of FID operations with a MIST working out of the embassy and indirect support through training opportunities provided by the joint combined exercise for training (JCET) program. In a larger FID operation, a PSE or Psychological Operations task force (POTF) will typically conduct significant unilateral PSYOP in addition to working with HN PSYOP units. In some instances, an HN may not have previously organized PSYOP units. Building HN PSYOP capability must be balanced with the need to counter IDT propaganda and further U.S. and HN objectives through production of PSYOP series. In the early stages of FID, the emphasis may need to be on conducting PSYOP rather than building HN capacity.

2-56. PSYOP support to FID combat operations is also a critical force multiplier. Should combat operations be authorized, U.S. PSYOP forces will typically be organized as a robust PSE, POTF, or JPOTF. In some instances of combat operations during FID, the situation may have degenerated rapidly. In this instance, if the HN did have an organized PSYOP force, it may be disorganized, reduced, or even decimated. In addition, infrastructure damage in the HN may limit its ability to produce or disseminate PSYOP series. In this instance, U.S. PSYOP may be the only effective means of communicating with HN TAs. Long-term involvement of U.S. PSYOP will frequently be necessary after the end of combat operations.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION REGIMENT

2-57. The special operations aviation regiment (SOAR) assists FID operations by providing aviation assets to supported multinational SOF requiring the SOAR’s skills and equipment. SOAR normally assists only in the movement of HN SOF to conduct surgical operations, such as precision application of fire with minimal or no collateral damage. In a FID environment, general aviation operations are normally inappropriate for SOAR missions. However, the SOAR may conduct or support tactical operations in support of FID operations. The objective of tactical operations in FID is to provide a secure environment in which balanced development can occur. Tactical operations should not be independent military operations aimed solely at destroying insurgent combat forces and their base areas. Tactical operations should be part of a synchronized effort to achieve the national strategic objectives of the HN and the United States. Historically, SOAR has not typically participated in SA; however, future organizational alignments are addressing SOAR FID requirements in support of SA and the need for increased regional alignment and regional knowledge.

2-58. The SOAR can provide freedom of maneuver for ARSOF units and coordination within the HN. Generally, the SOAR is of limited use in CA and PSYOP. Normally, it only supports CA in support of an SF unit in a FID environment. As in PSYOP, the best use of the SOAR is in covert or clandestine missions when hostile nations or TAs require penetration of nonpermissive airspace.

SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (AIRBORNE)

2-59. Logistic support as discussed here does not include activities authorized under SA. SB(SO)(A) logistic support operations are limited by U.S. law. They usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support to other ARSOF units while retaining the possibility of training HN logistics, transportation, and other personnel. Legal restrictions prohibit the transfer of equipment or supplies under these programs. In addition, the President or SecDef must authorize the combatant commander to provide logistic support to the HN military. Often authorization to provide this type of support is in response to a major military emergency that threatens the internal security of the HN. This type of support is normally authorized for limited periods to accomplish very narrow objectives.

2-60. Logistic support is integrated into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict. Major employment factors when providing logistic support as part of the theater FID program are the need to—

- Develop definitive ROE and force protection (FP) measures.
- Educate all members of the command on permissible activities in providing the logistic support mission. For example, ensure that all personnel understand that they may not transfer equipment and supplies to the HN military.
- Build a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in-country. This database should include information of local supply availability, warehousing and maintenance facilities, transportation assets, lines of communications (LOCs), and labor force availability.
- Tailor the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the HN.

**RANGERS**

2-61. Ranger units will not typically be involved in FID operations unless direct support or combat operations in support of the HN military are authorized. Rangers may be used when a ground force is required to establish a credible American presence in any area of the world to demonstrate U.S. resolve or interest. Rangers also participate in JCS-directed exercises overseas, facilitating regional engagement through military-to-military contact, joint interoperability, and adaptive joint-force packaging.

**ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT TO COALITIONS**

2-62. When conducting FID in multinational coalitions, ARSOF Soldiers frequently bring unique, deep-rooted training relationships with other military coalition members to the table. For example, a Southeast Asian nation experiences a crisis and requests assistance. The nation has never had FID operations conducted inside its borders before. A regional coalition is formed that includes ARSOF Soldiers, members of the Royal Thai Army, the South Korean Army, and personnel from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Because ARSOF personnel have had routine training relationships with all members of this coalition, they bring cultural expertise, sensitivity, and language skills to the FID operation. Whether or not ARSOF Soldiers involved in a coalition have language skills corresponding to the other coalition partners, their inherent cultural awareness and sensitivity foster relationships and rapport.
Chapter 3
Planning

A major tenant of the WOT is the premise that terrorism will be defeated in large measure through the establishment of viable nations possessing the ability to preempt or defeat terrorist threats. FID is one of the primary vehicles for accomplishing this end state. FID planners focus on an end state in which a terrorist threat or other IDT is at a level manageable by the HN. Ideally, this state is at a point maintainable by HN law enforcement organizations rather than military forces. All FID planning presupposes that the HN’s internal defense ability must be raised. A broad continuum of HN abilities faces FID planners. One HN may require training only at the upper echelons of relatively well-trained military and paramilitary organizations where another may require training and assistance at the lowest levels of their military force. The former may require short-duration FID operations and the latter may require long-term FID operations that may take several years, perhaps generations, to accomplish. The art of planning for FID is recognizing where the HN falls on this continuum and planning FID operations with realistic milestones and timeframes.

OVERVIEW

3-1. FID operations are planned at the national, regional and, especially with ARSOF units, the local level. The FID effort should involve the integration of all instruments of national power down to the local level. Ideally, the HN’s IDAD goals can be met by skillful use of these other instruments without conducting FID operations. However, historically this is not the case. FID operations will fall under two major categories—those under the responsibility of the DOD and those under the responsibility of the DOS. Most DOD and DOS activities are incorporated into the theater-planning process. Through the theater-planning process, identified activities are intended to help shape the theater in which the activities are conducted. Depending on whether the mission has originated through the DOD or DOS, how, where, and at what level the planning, coordinating, and resourcing take place will vary. For example, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC), governs DOS programs and indicates that participants in these programs are noncombatants. Programs under Title 10, United States Code (10 USC), authorities do not restrict participants from being combatants.

PLANNING IMPERATIVES

3-2. FID has certain aspects that make planning for it complex. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans are as follows:

- **Understanding U.S. foreign policy.** NSPDs and NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guiding documents of this understanding. NSC directives also set forth U.S. FID policy. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents reflect the military’s responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance. Planners must be prepared to adjust FID plans as political conditions change in both the HN and the United States.

- **Maintaining and increasing HN sovereignty and legitimacy.** If U.S. military efforts in support of FID undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government through any action, then they have effectively sabotaged the IDAD program.

- **Understanding long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all U.S. assistance efforts before implementing FID programs.** HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both
which may require large investments of time and materiel, are especially important in planning for FID. This imperative runs parallel to several ARSOF imperatives. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, provides additional information on ARSOF imperatives. ARSOF FID planners assess the following:

- The end state of the IDAD strategy.
- The sustainability of development programs and defense improvements.
- The acceptability and the perceptions of fairness of development models across the range of HN society.
- The impact of development programs on the distribution of resources within the HN, to include potential shortages and bottlenecks.
- The potential negative side effects of socioeconomic change.
- The potential resistors to socioeconomic change.
- The relationship between improved military forces and existing regional, ethnic, and religious groups in both the military and society as a whole.
- The impact of improved military forces on the regional balance of power.
- The impact of military development and operations on civil-military relations in the HN.

- Tailoring military support of FID programs to the environment and specific HN needs. Consider the threat, as well as local religious, social, economic, and political factors, when developing the military plans to support FID. Failure to do so can result in equipment, training, and infrastructures that are either unsuitable for or unusable by the HN.

- Ensuring unity of effort. FID is a national-level effort that involves numerous USG agencies. In all cases, the DOS will play a significant role in providing the content of FID plans. In most cases, the DOS’s role in planning will be significant, because the COM is typically the final approval authority for the FID plan in all situations not involving combat operations. Even when FID planning involves combat operations, the COM remains a significant partner in planning FID operations. To reduce inefficiencies, contradictions, or redundancies in FID programs, other services, USG agencies, and allies must be coordinated with in an integrated theater effort that is joint, interagency, and (sometimes) multinational. Appendix D describes an interagency plan that provides a means for achieving unity of effort among USG agencies.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDANCE

3-3. Generally, the DOS is the lead agency for approving the execution of FID programs. Under 22 USC, the DOS and DOD are responsible for SA to foreign countries. The DOS provides general program guidance, determines participating countries, approves specific projects, and integrates the military SA programs with other activities. Requirements for SA are resourced primarily by the HN and U.S. grants provided to DOD by executive transfers. DOD executes the SA program, identifies and prioritizes requirements, procures and delivers military equipment, and provides services. Within DOD, the DSCA provides overall direction, implementation, and supervision of approved SA and defense sales.

3-4. TSC planning incorporates policy, planning, and implementation of SA programs, which includes planning for military FID operations. However, because of the different aspects of congressional oversight and funding of SA, the DOS determines SA, and DOD implements it. SA policy flows from the President and eventually converges at the SAO (Figure 3-1, page 3-3). Generally, requirements for SA originate at the SAO in consultation with the HN and the GCC. The DOS puts forth policy to the embassies and DOD. Throughout the policy flow, agencies produce plans that support SA policy and issue additional guidance throughout the process (for example, mission performance plans, TSCPs/strategy, and training plans).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE

3-5. DOD guidance ensures the force is focused on supporting the President’s policy set forth in the NSS as well as any other specific directives or policies. The goal of a portion of this guidance is to accomplish security cooperation objectives without sacrificing combat readiness. The following documents and systems produce guidance for security cooperation and ultimately lead to military FID operations.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

3-6. The NMS is the master document containing the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives across the range of military operations. This document articulates how the United States will employ the military element of power to support the national security objectives found in the President’s NSS. The NMS establishes three military objectives that support the National Defense Strategy. They are to—

- Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression.
- Prevent conflict and surprise attack.
- Prevail against adversaries.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

3-7. As the principal military advisor to the President and the SecDef, the CJCS is responsible for a significant portion of development of strategic direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for the national defense. The JSPS, supported by the joint warfighting capabilities assessment process, is the planning system used by CJCS to achieve these objectives. The JSPS process assists the CJCS in preparing strategic plans; preparing and reviewing contingency plans; advising the President and SecDef of requirements, programs, and budgets; and providing net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed Forces.

Figure 3-1. Policy agents, routes, and products
Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of their potential adversaries. The JSCP is one of the products of the JSPS.

**JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN**

3-8. The JSCP provides guidance to the GCC and Service chiefs for accomplishing military tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It also directs these agents to develop plans to support the strategy contained in the NMS and counter threats using current military capabilities. It apportions resources to GCCs according to military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The capabilities of available forces, intelligence information, and guidance issued by the SecDef determine the resources apportioned. The JSCP directs the development of contingency plans to support national security objectives by assigning planning tasks and apportioning major combat forces and strategic lift capability to the GCCs. As a capabilities planning document, the JSCP represents the last phase of resource management. The JSCP apportions the resources provided by the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system to develop operation plans (OPLANs). It provides guidance, missions, and resources to GCCs to develop concept plans and OPLANs to support FID operations. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and SecDef.

**JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM**

3-9. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides the foundation for conventional C2 by national- and combatant command-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. It includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. The JOPES (complimentary to the Joint Operational Planning Process) is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations. The JOPES is used in joint operational planning in either deliberate or crisis action procedures to meet the tasks identified in the JSCP.

**ARMY INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM**

3-10. The Army International Activities Program (AIAP) implements the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) from the DOD. It supports DOD security cooperation goals and provides the Army goals and objectives for Army security cooperation activities. AIAP supports the NSS, NMS, regional strategies, and TSCP of the combatant commanders, as well as the defense initiatives in the areas not assigned to the regional commands.

3-11. The AIAP is the policy and guidance link between the DOD SCG and the combatant command TSCP regarding security cooperation. It provides the guidance link to the Army component of the combatant command from the Army with policy and additional command guidance. Through this guidance, the Army component of the combatant command defines its role within the combatant command to effect security cooperation within that region and theater. In addition, the Army component of the combatant command is receiving direction from the combatant command regarding policy on security cooperation within that combatant command. The AIAP includes but is not limited to exchange programs, training programs, exercises, military-to-military contacts, and SA.

**THEATER PLANNING REQUIREMENTS**

3-12. GCCs often develop theater strategies and campaign plans that support taskings from the JSCP. The planning instruments used by GCCs vary. However, military activities in support of FID requirements are universally integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level. Because of the unique and unparalleled capabilities of ARSOF units, they are typically integrated into planning at all levels. However, ARSOF units will frequently be employed at the strategic or operational level in all instances other than training HN forces.
3-13. Theater strategy translates into long-term, regionally focused priorities across the range of military operations. Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities, enhancing stability in the theater as a whole, and dealing with specific regional problems. FID is an integral part of this strategy. ARSOF units frequently have long-term relationships with various HN militaries in a theater that spans the tenure of several combatant commanders and their theater strategies. Knowledge of past theater strategies and how those strategies have been translated into FID operations is typically relevant to current FID planning.

3-14. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. Some frequent common elements in the theater strategy include—

- The analysis of U.S. national policy and interests in the region.
- The strategic assessment of the AOR.
- The threat analysis.
- The GCC’s vision.
- The theater missions and objectives.

3-15. These elements translate into a theater campaign plan. The theater campaign plan provides the framework for supporting OPLANs. Planners from the TSOCs may have substantial input to theater planning in general and FID planning in particular. The deliberate planning process is typically employed for FID planning, since most FID programs should be planned as part of a larger strategy or campaign. In addition, ample lead-time is usually available when other operations, such as SSTR, transition to FID operations.

SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

3-16. The TSCP is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link GCC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. Direction for the GCC is provided through the SecDef SCG and the JSCP. This guidance provides regional focus and security cooperation priorities. The TSCP implements the SCG. The TSCP provides region-specific guidance, country guidance, and direction to further U.S. interests in the AOR. Service component commanders and the Commander, Special Operations Command, develop supporting security cooperation strategies to support the TSCP.

3-17. Combatant command planned and supported operations and activities produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and security cooperation. However, prioritizing peacetime military security cooperation activities ensures efforts focus on those that are of greatest importance without sacrificing warfighting capability. The TSCP identifies the synchronization of these activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from GCC security cooperation activities that support national strategic objectives.

3-18. The combatant command typically conducts some type of annual planning conference, working group, or meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to identify what type of SA, activities, and programs to implement in support of the SCG. Guidance from this meeting prioritizes activities and allocates the activities to specific countries. Assessments can also be conducted on the previous year’s activities to ensure validity, support to current guidance, and required updates. Annual planning conferences can provide continuity for long-term FID efforts through the examination of assessments.

3-19. The TSCP will specify all activities that will be conducted. Included within the TSCP are operational activities, combined exercises, combined training, SA, and HA. Planning, managing, and implementing of a security cooperation plan within the command are not identical. Each command may use various methods to develop a security cooperation plan. TSCP planning is a continuous process. The GCC TSCP strategic concept is normally updated biennially, and the activity annex is developed for the year of execution and the following seven years. The theater engagement planning process occurs in two stages. A four-phase process (Figure 3-2, page 3-6) results in the production of a TSCP. The phases are initiation, strategic concept development, activity annex development, and plan review.

STAGE 1

3-20. In Phase 1, initiation, the GCCs receive planning guidance and planning tasks from the JSCP and the SecDef SCG. In Phase 2, strategic concept development, the GCC derives prioritized theater, regional, and
country objectives. The strategic concept is developed. Resource requirements are identified to execute the strategy. The strategic concept is reviewed and integrated and then collectively approved by the CJCS. This strategic concept marks the completion of Stage 1.

STAGE 2

3-21. Stage 2 begins with Phase 3, which is activity annex development. This phase identifies security cooperation activities. It describes in detail the activities to be conducted, to include operations, SA, exercises, and HA. Activities from this annex become tasked as FID operations. Identifying forces and resources, analyzing requirements, and recognizing shortfalls occur during this phase. As required, the functional GCCs, Services, and other defense agencies prepare and submit supporting and coordinating plans. The completed product is a TSCP. In Phase 4, plan review, the joint staff, Services, supporting GCCs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) review the TSCP. The TSCP is integrated into the Global Family of Plans approved by the CJCS. The Global Family of Plans is then forwarded to the USD(P).

![Figure 3-2. Theater security cooperation planning](image)

PLANNING PROCEDURES AND CONSIDERATIONS

3-22. Prior to individual ARSOF units utilizing the military decision-making process (MDMP) to develop supporting plans, a FID plan must be completed at the joint level. As laid out in JP 3-07.1, this planning must include SOF planners. Frequently these planners will be ARSOF Soldiers assigned to the relevant TSOC. They provide input for a plan that may be initiated in one of three ways:

- From the top down through the JSPS.
- From the bottom up by the HN or Country Team in the GCC’s AOR. The GCC may then forward these requests to the SecDef for authorization.
- From the GCC. Military support to FID programs that is not directed under an existing, specified, or implied mission may be identified and authorized by the SecDef.
**JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT OVERVIEW**

3-23. Before beginning FID planning, the GCC’s staff will conduct a thorough mission analysis of the OE and IDT. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for FID concept development and planning. The following areas are considered in the concept development: threats to HN IDAD; HN social, economic, and political environment; international aspects; and mission analysis.

3-24. During the planning guidance phase, the commander outlines tentative courses of action (COAs), additional assumptions, and a planning directive to his staff and subordinate commanders. Several important FID guidelines that may also greatly affect ARSOF unit planning include—

- **Legal authorizations and restrictions.** This includes the regulatory and policy considerations outlined in Appendix A.
- **Third-country interests.** These are outlined in greater detail below.
- **Restrictive use of force.** This may turn the focus of some FID operations to CAO, PSYOP; and training and advising programs.
- **Maximize intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) capabilities.** This includes those outlined in Appendix C.
- **ROE and economy of force measures.** ROE may limit the mobility and TTP availability of some ARSOF units. Economy of force in FID operations has historically dictated that some FID operations be conducted by small contingents of all ARSOF personnel. This trend is likely to continue.
- **Account for sustainment.** ARSOF units may be engaged for years in some HNs.
- **Measures of effectiveness (MOEs).** MOEs may be both long term and difficult to quantify for ARSOF units.

3-25. The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the running estimate process of concept development. ARSOF planners and subject matter experts frequently develop or provide vital input to the three running estimates given to the commander as a tool for selecting final COAs. The following are three estimates to facilitate an effective FID plan:

- The intelligence estimate.
- The CMO estimate.
- The PSYOP estimate.

These estimates will be covered in greater detail in Appendix C.

**JOINT PLAN DEVELOPMENT**

3-26. Joint plan development begins after the GCC’s strategic concept is fully developed. Plan development balances mission requirements against available resources and regional priorities. This action is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct a particular FID operation may be made up of USAR forces and, in most cases, are unavailable (short of use of Presidential Reserve Callup Authority) for long-term operations. In major military operations in support of FID, the commander may face a shortage of an Active Army CA and PSYOP capability when beginning to develop the plan. In this case, use of USAR PSYOP or CA units may entail complex planning for rotation of several individual units over the duration of FID.

**JOINT PLAN REVIEW**

3-27. The joint plan review is a comprehensive review of the plan for adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and compliance with joint doctrine. Deconfliction of Service and interagency doctrine and policy is accomplished at this stage as well. The review for adequacy determines the sufficiency of scope and content of operations to accomplish the assigned task, the validity of assumptions, and the degree of compliance with higher headquarters task assignment and guidance. The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish assigned tasks using available resources within the timeframes of the plan. It considers both the appropriateness and the planned use of available resources.
3-28. Acceptable plans provide for accomplishment of the mission by maximizing all instruments of national power and minimizing losses of personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations. Commanders and their staffs should consider that many FID objectives will involve a long-term (sometimes generational) effort and that MOEs may be difficult to evaluate in the short term. For ARSOF units, PSYOP and CA effectiveness, in particular quantifiable MOE as well as the direct cause and effect relationship, may be impossible to gauge immediately.

**ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE SUPPORTING PLANS**

3-29. FID operations are predominately planned within the TSCP. ARSOF units take a supporting role during the implementation of FID planning and operations within a theater. This is true even if ARSOF Soldiers make up the majority of military forces conducting FID in the HN, because FID operations are holistic, interagency-supported endeavors. TSOC representatives advise the GCC on the capabilities of SOF, provide SOF for employment, and fully integrate SOF into theater plans. TSOC representatives support the GCC by developing strategies to support the TSCP. TSOC representatives plan, coordinate, and recommend strategies that are then included in the TSCP activity annexes.

3-30. During larger operations involving a JSOTF, ARSOF units may support a plan implemented by conventional military forces within the HN to accomplish the combined U.S. and HN goals. ARSOF units may be required to conduct various missions in support of FID operations. The JSOTF may be tasked to plan and conduct HN training. HN training can range from teaching advanced skills to training a force to conduct personal security detachment missions. The higher echelon may task the JSOTF to conduct specific training requirements or may set an end-state requirement that the JSOTF must plan and resource independently. Missions will vary in size and scope based on the combined U.S. and HN goals and the supporting role of ARSOF units. Once JSOTF-level plans are developed, ARSOF forces may be required to establish a SOTF to develop training plans to support FID within their assigned area of operations (AO).

3-31. In the JSOTF, ARSOF CA units will operate out of the CMO center under the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or civil-military operations staff section (J-9). PSYOP support to the JSOTF is composed of two avenues with a PSE under the J-3 and a PSYOP plans officer in the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). The SOAR is normally attached to a JSOTF. The SOAR conducts planning through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. OPCON of the SOAR may be exercised by the JSOTF through either functional or Service components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a joint special operations air component commander exists as a functional component of a JSOTF, the JSOTF normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached joint SO air assets through the joint special operations air component command. Rangers normally plan through command posts collocated with other SOF or conventional units. In this instance, Rangers will plan through liaison officers (LNOs) resident at the JSOTF J-3. SB(SO)(A) normally integrates and may plan with the JSOTF logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4).

3-32. During larger operations, other ARSOF units may either set up as or fall under other task forces or supporting agencies within the JTF structure. PSYOP units in a robust FID may set up as a JPOTF, while ARSOF CA forces may plan out of a JCMOTF. Although not a CA organization, the JCMOTF will most likely have CA units at its core or as subordinate elements and may be commanded by a CA commander.

**REGIONAL, TRANSREGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS**

3-33. With the advent of instant or nearly instant communications and media access in even the most remote regions, U.S. FID efforts in any HN may be scrutinized much closer within the region, surrounding regions, or even globally. In addition, FID operations may affect countries throughout the region or even cause international debate and opposition. In some theaters, traditional rivalries and hostility toward the U.S. will be a factor. For example, U.S. assistance to a nation with long-standing adversaries in the area may be perceived by those adversaries as upsetting the regional balance of power. Although it is increasingly an untenable position, some nations within a region or elsewhere internationally may consider the HN to be within its *sphere of influence*. The ethnic rivalries in the Balkans and the quasi-religious dogmas of the jihadists promulgating the WOT show that history, even a millennium old, can still foster
fanatic resistance to U.S. FID efforts. These last examples also highlight the propensity of some IDTs to use revisionist history in their propaganda.

3-34. Regional, transregional, and even distant nations may see U.S. intervention in the area (or any area) simply as U.S. domination or outright imperialism. Some nations and nonstate actors may perceive this (and seek to portray it) as U.S. political, cultural, and economic imperialism. Regionally, a neighbor to the HN may fear increased economic competition from the HN should FID operations bear fruit. Globally, given the flat world of the digital age, opposition to a U.S. FID operation can come from virtually any corner of the world and any interest. Opposition, however, does not dictate U.S. policy but does require careful evaluation and consideration, as well as possible alternate planning.

3-35. Proactive PA programs can accurately depict U.S. efforts. Effective or believable adversary propaganda warrants a concerted U.S. PSYOP program to defeat it. The United States can pursue a proactive PSYOP effort in the HN and neighboring regional countries to prepare key TAs for U.S. FID operations. In addition, PSYOP can exploit early successes in the HN. U.S. commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN’s region and envision how they will perceive U.S. support. PSYOP and PA can be coordinated to address regional, transregional, and if applicable, global audiences that may have (or perceive they have) a stake in any U.S. FID operations.

3-36. ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to operate in a FID operation that takes place under a regional or global media and political microscope. Culturally and politically attuned ARSOF Soldiers know that in the contemporary OE the smallest misstep (or perceived misstep) in any arena can quickly balloon into an international politico-media circus. In addition, ARSOF Soldiers, even those trained in the HN nation’s language and culture, are cross-trained on the culture and history of their unit’s aligned region. Therefore, ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to advise their HN counterparts and trainees on how best to approach regional or transregional rivalries or deal with outside pressures from potential extraregional spoilers. Planners must be mindful that all FID operations, even those composed of a small, all-ARSOF contingent, have the potential to move quickly from obscurity to the center stage of global media. Planners must also keep in mind that regional issues (and beyond) can be mitigated if properly identified.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSESSMENT

3-37. Primarily, planners within the theater responsible for conducting FID programs assess what programs to conduct. DOS representatives work with foreign governments and DOD representatives work with foreign military personnel to develop programs that are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and useful to the country concerned. The representatives developing FID programs use the TSC planning process to assess currently implemented programs and exercises. The representatives developing FID programs assess the previous programs (excepting the rare instances of countries first opening up to U.S. military assistance) for relevancy and success to the overall goals within the region. Assessments identify the effectiveness and strategic impact of the programs. To meet the goals of the U.S. security concerns and HN goals, the representatives review SA, exercises, training programs, and operational activities. These programs are assessed based on key trends, shortfalls, future opportunities, and challenges.

3-38. In instances of long-term success, a waning IDT or incipient insurgencies may be best countered in either their endgame or birth pains stages by nonmilitary instruments of national power with limited or no military FID involvement. In this instance, the FID assessment may conclude that HN training may be substituted with limited direct or indirect support by select ARSOF units.

ENVIRONMENT AND TRAINING ASSESSMENT

3-39. When military FID programs are assessed as warranted, specific personnel or forces are allocated to programs approved for implementation within a region. Exercises can be planned through the CJCS and GCC or Service-sponsored training programs. The DSCA supports the implementation of approved U.S. SA programs.

3-40. Assessments to conduct a given mission or program can be completed at all levels of planning. At the tactical level, ARSOF units conduct a training assessment before conducting a training mission. The
Chapter 3

unit assesses the training requirements, personnel manning shortages, individual training needs, and equipment shortfalls of the HN SOF counterpart or the conventional unit that will be trained to SOF standards.

3-41. When required, DOS will vet personnel before conducting the mission. ARSOF units must implement procedures to help the DOS and Country Team vet HN forces before they can receive training. Any personnel who are not vetted must be removed from training. The primary purpose of vetting is to ensure the identification of personnel with a history of human rights violations. The U.S. policy is to prevent U.S. cooperation with government of any country that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Ideally, a site survey team gathers this information. To properly conduct the training, ARSOF units need to determine or identify—

- The HN unit mission and its mission-essential task list and its capability to execute them.
- The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment and for personnel and equipment actually on hand.
- Any past or present foreign military presence or influence in doctrine, training, or combat operations.
- The unit’s ability to retain and support acquired skills or training from past MTTs or foreign training missions.
- The organization and leadership level that is responsible for training the individual soldier. Does the HN have institutional training established? Is it effective?
- Any operational deficiencies during recent combat operations or participation in combined or joint exercises with the U.S. personnel.
- The maintenance status, to include maintenance training programs.
- The language or languages in which instruction will be conducted.
- The religious, tribal, or other affiliations within the HN forces that need to be considered. (Notably differences between HN forces and the local populace.)
- The potential security concerns with employing U.S. members (and allies) in the HN training areas.
- The local infrastructure and possible positive or negative impacts of training on the local populace.
- The local populace’s attitudes toward U.S. military and government personnel, as well as ordinary U.S. citizens (to include presence and behavior of expatriate U.S. populations).
- The local populace’s prejudices or fears.
- Any key local leaders, communicators, and potential spoilers.
- The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of NGOs and IGOs.
- The individual ARSOF unit’s area assessment needs, for example, local media for deploying PSYOP.

TRAINING PLAN

3-42. A key component of developing the training plan will be an agreement (frequently referred to as a memorandum of agreement or letter of agreement) between the HN and the ARSOF unit conducting the training. These are, in effect, signed contracts detailing the specifics of what is being provided by each party. Training plans at the operational level will vary based on HN needs and unit training capabilities. An assessment for the training to be conducted should begin with some sort of pre-mission site survey by all ARSOF units deploying in the HN. For instance, SF units routinely do so during a predeployment site survey (PDSS). In another case, a PSYOP unit may deploy a PSYOP assessment team for a larger FID operation. In other cases, ARSOF units may deploy a minimum of survey personnel. The considerations in the following paragraphs will aid the ARSOF unit conducting unit-level training.

3-43. After completing the training assessment, each ARSOF unit analyzes the assessment and site survey and prepares a training plan. The unit develops FID tasks, conditions, and standards to train the HN forces. Units tasked to train HN forces use the appropriate U.S. doctrine as a template to attain the training goals. For example, they may use battle drills and Combined Arms Training Strategy, when applicable, to support HN training. However, planners should examine HN doctrine for contradictions with U.S. doctrine.
Therefore, to develop useable, attainable training that the HN can adopt and codify into new doctrine, the training plan may have to address issues, such as constraints in resources, societal or military culture, or other concerns. HN training strategies must include multiechelon training whenever it is feasible. Multiechelon techniques save time and achieve synchronized execution of mission-essential tasks throughout the HN force. However, constraints on both U.S. force commitment and the HN’s own needs may dictate a concentration on one or two echelons. As an example, operational realities and constraints during FID operations might dictate that SFODAs exclusively train a COIN field force at the company level while PSE concentrates limited assets at the highest-strategic levels of HN government/military. When planning training programs and field exercises, ARSOF units assess (among others) the factors listed below:

- HN’s current level of training to determine if the training plan requires changes because of its level of proficiency or needs.
- HN’s ability (or inability) to field systems or equipment.
- Potential training facilities and areas based on projected training (for example, ranges and military operations in urban terrain sites).
- Individual and unit proficiency in tactical operations and other skills required in IDAD operations involving intelligence, CMO, and PRC. Because of varied missions and limited resources, individuals and units require cross-training.
- Equipment availability (for example, radios, weapons, and vehicles).
- C2 systems and logistics procedures, to include medical treatment and evacuation that stress decentralized operations over large areas.
- Cooperation level with U.S. and HN intelligence agencies during operations and training exercises.
- CAO surveying and planning need. A realistic assessment of unit resources is necessary to ensure that the unit’s primary mission and the HN sustainability are kept in mind.
- Constraints on U.S. PSYOP and past HN PSYOP miscues and history.
- Orientation on the terrain, climate, and unusual health requirements.

**PLANNING FOR FORCE PROTECTION**

3-44. FID operations span a complete continuum of FP environments. However, adequate FP is always a critical mission factor. Commanders must address FP during all phases of FID operations, from planning through deployment, employment, and redeployment. Deploying ARSOF Soldiers must receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel-protection requirements before arrival in the operational area. Any updates to the situation in the HN must be briefed on arrival.

3-45. For the foreseeable future, the threat of terrorism is a constant factor in any nation, even those with advanced domestic security infrastructures. FID operations, whether conducted in nations with high states of domestic security or those with little emphasis on security because of a lack of terrorist threat, require proactive FP measures. Additional FP threats include but are by not limited to—

- Street or organized crime.
- Foreign intelligence services, possibly including the HN’s intelligence collection community.
- Local populace animosity or demonstrations (domestic or U.S. directed).
- HN regional transportation systems.
- HN military equipment, training, and procedural deficiencies.
- WMD (to include regional nations and nonstate actors).
- Weather, terrain, and environment.
- Contaminants and pollution.
- Health threats.
- Mines and unexploded ordinance.
- Political groups, parties, or individuals.
- Regional cross-border threats.
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Chapter 4

Training

During FID operations, ARSOF routinely operate in austere environments and atypical cultural surroundings. FID programs may be conducted in areas where there has been little or even no previous contact with Americans or outsiders in any form. This requires skill sets that may not routinely exist in conventional units. SOF, in general, and ARSOF units, in particular, are uniquely trained and accustomed to filling roles that might otherwise be left vacant.

OVERVIEW

4-1. Small teams may conduct FID training in remote areas in HNs where the U.S. force commitment is small. When this is the case, ARSOF units may be the primary or sole trainers of HN military or paramilitary personnel. In other cases, large numbers of forces and units may be involved in direct support (not involving combat operations). Training of HN military may continue while U.S. forces are providing direct support and, to some degree, even during combat operations. In both instances, a dual dynamic faces commanders. A commander must balance the need to operationally employ ARSOF Soldiers against their unique abilities (possibly unparalleled by the conventional units available) to train critical capabilities in the HN military. Regardless of the level of support the FID program is giving the HN, the role of ARSOF Soldiers as trainers remains a constant.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TRAINING

4-2. The CJCS is responsible for formulating policies for joint training, including FID operations. Some training supporting FID programs takes the form of CJCS directed exercises. CJCS approves the priorities for training formulated by the GCCs exercising direction over all aspects of joint training of assigned forces. The Services in turn are responsible for providing trained forces that may be used in support of FID programs.

4-3. The Commander, USSOCOM is charged by USC with training assigned forces to meet FID taskings and to ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. USSOCOM determines relevant unit sourcing to particular FID taskings with the support of the TSOCs. Taskings for ARSOF units to conduct FID operations and training are forwarded through USASOC and are typically assigned to a regionally oriented ARSOF unit. However, both in peacetime and in the exigencies of the WOT the general cultural awareness of ARSOF personnel can translate, with proper linguistic support, into the success of a FID operation in an HN outside of a unit’s assigned regional alignment.

4-4. The ultimate responsibility for training HN military or paramilitary forces rests with the ARSOF elements and Soldiers conducting FID operations. Preparing for training HN forces entails determining the extent of those responsibilities. In the case of habitual FID relationships, this may translate into a detailed knowledge of what state the HN units were at following previous FID operations and perhaps through continual contact with those units through planning conferences or other means. At the other end of the spectrum of determining training responsibilities is the first-time or long-interim lag time of FID operations. ARSOF trainers in this case must maximize PDSS, organic and higher echelon intelligence assessments, and the U.S. Embassy SAO. MISTS or MLEs, even in a neighboring country, may shed light on the HN military forces level of training. In all instances, ARSOF units having a responsibility to conduct training of HN forces must seek the best picture of the relevant HN force’s current baseline training level before beginning to develop training strategies and products.
TRAINING AND SKILLS NEEDED FOR SUCCESS

4-5. With the complex and intertwined environment of training and the skills necessary for the successful training of HN military forces for FID operations, it is easily possible to lose sight of the ultimate gauge of a successful FID program. That gauge is in fact when the military portion of the HN’s IDAD strategy is concluded and any remaining IDTs are well within the abilities of civilian agencies to combat. The following paragraphs highlight some of the training needed by ARSOF Soldiers for successful military operations in support of FID.

Note. For ease of reading the following section uses the term predeployment training exclusively. However, the areas of focus are relevant to all training and education products concerning FID.

COMMANDER’S INTENT

4-6. Ultimately, the commander’s intent drives the specific training ARSOF units receive before conducting FID operations. In addition, the baseline, common training conducted for all FID operations is driven by the commander’s intent to emphasize or de-emphasize certain aspects of FID training. In predeployment training, the commander assesses the factors and skills necessary for a specific FID operation and the state of training and readiness of the deploying element. Based on this assessment, he formulates an intent for training that emphasizes blends of all of the factors listed below. Planners and trainers base predeployment training on how best to train the unit in the areas this intent encompasses.

OVERALL UNITED STATES AND THEATER GOALS FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

4-7. The USG may have highly varying goals from one FID operation to another. One theater may have a general set of IDTs at variance with the common threat in another theater. In addition, the world is increasingly a global system and the conditions in one nation of a GCC can affect a counterpart a hemisphere away. Personnel engaged in military activities in support of FID programs must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported GCC and the potential impacts on other theaters, the WOT, or other U.S. national objectives and policies. An understanding of these goals provides a framework for ARSOF units and personnel to determine if their actions and programs support overall theater objectives without compromising other national objectives. For the ARSOF Soldier, whose any one action can potentially have strategic consequences, national and theater goals often take on a heightened importance.

COGNIZANCE OF POLITICAL REALITIES

4-8. Similar to understanding the goals within the theater and the relevant national goals and objectives, ARSOF Soldiers require a detailed knowledge of potential political pitfalls in any FID operation. An agenda of HN military and civilian personnel may be to unwittingly draw support for political or diplomatic plans that are not supported by the U.S. by orchestrating visits, photo opportunities, or statements from ARSOF commanders and Soldiers. In addition, ARSOF Soldiers should be trained on domestic political agendas within the HN that may be counterproductive to FID operations or U.S. national interests. This may be heightened in areas outside the full control of the HN government where HN authorities may be more likely to commit human rights violations or simple practices that will alienate the local populace.

JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

4-9. The joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment is, in all likelihood, never going to be the same even during different iterations of a long-running FID operation. Each deployment will typically present different mixes of agencies and forces constituting the JIIM environment. Predeployment training, when working with any elements of JIIM, needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis while planning FID train-ups. In addition, briefings or classes are given on who the agencies or forces are and how to operate by, with, through, or around those agencies. Other agencies are going to have
language and cultural differences. Typically, those differences are magnified when dealing with nonmilitary agencies.

4-10. In most cases, the joint and interagency portion of the JIIM equation has a collective agenda and shared goals with ARSOF units conducting FID. Nevertheless, training in moderate to even highly varied language (in particular acronyms or lack thereof) and culture may be required. Interagencies may have similar goals but highly different ways of attaining them. For instance, civilian agencies may hold (for valid reason) reservations about working around an armed force. Despite these differences, the typical challenges of the joint and interagency portion are a matter of training on coordination and deconfliction strategies.

4-11. Much like training for potential political pitfalls with the HN, Soldiers must train on recognizing and adapting to competing or contradictory agendas as well. Although more prevalent in some portions of JIIM (notably intergovernmental), other agencies may intentionally or unintentionally pursue policies and programs that oppose ARSOF FID goals and objectives. Training on operating around these agencies may involve negotiation, conflict resolution, or even avoidance strategies. Training on recognizing political and media ploys may be necessary as well.

CULTURE, CUSTOMS, AND CONDUCT

4-12. A FID operation can be critically disabled within the first few moments of contact with HN military, civilian officials, or even ordinary citizens if vital cultural mores are violated by U.S. personnel. The United States is a highly diverse and open culture with relatively few baseline customs other than tolerance and an inherent belief in the rights of individuals and subcultures to practice any behavior or dress that does not infringe on the rights of others. Nations in which FID operations are conducted may be just the opposite with varying degrees of tolerance of a faux pas committed by outsiders. In addition, many nations still harbor legal, economic, or cultural disparities with minority (or in some cases majority) elements in their culture. These may in fact contribute to the need for a FID program.

4-13. ARSOF Soldiers are typically aware of the cultural conventions and customs of the HN. Refresher and new personnel training may well be necessary. In addition, when possible, providing cultural awareness training to conventional forces accompanying SOF forces on FID operations should be strongly suggested or (if applicable) mandated. All Soldiers deploying on FID operations must be forewarned and prepared for HN practices that may be unfamiliar. In addition, they must be prepared for treatment by HN personnel toward them and toward HN citizens that is harsh and offensive. Predeployment training to discern between HN personnel behaviors that are simply cultural norms and those that degenerate into human rights abuses is, therefore, sometimes necessary.

4-14. ARSOF Soldiers are either trained by virtue of their military occupational specialty (MOS) or, if coming from the conventional force to an ARSOF unit, infused by the community to understand the importance of the image they project to the HN military and population. The SF ethos of striving to be the quiet professional has permeated the ARSOF community. Projection of this impression has a significant impact on the ability of the U.S. to gain both short and long-term support for the overall FID program. Infusing this ethos into attachments and newly arrived Soldiers should be part of the predeployment train-up. Specific potential issues that may arise in the HN should be covered for all personnel at this time as well. Training for potential conflict is sometimes necessary as well. During FID, interaction with HN militaries, governments, and citizens who operate in a culture of corruption, elitism, bigotry, or other unacceptable practices may often be unavoidable. Training on how best to approach these conflicts can provide Soldiers the tools to mitigate these situations.

LANGUAGE TRAINING AND INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR USE

4-15. The ideal in FID is for all personnel conducting operations to be able to communicate with HN personnel in their native language. Some ARSOF MOSs mandate minimum language proficiency for award of the MOS and language proficiency building is part of most units’ regular training. The reality of the complexities of regional languages and changes in languages equates to frequent deficiencies in the capabilities of qualified personnel in certain HN languages. In addition, ARSOF units may conduct FID operations beyond the regions in which the primary language of the HN is spoken. Familiarity with and an
attempt to use some basic phrases trained during predeployment coupled with cultural sensitivity can greatly enhance relations with HN personnel.

4-16. Language capabilities can significantly aid trainers and others who have daily contact with HN military personnel and the local population. Personnel can function much more effectively if they conduct language training in the target language before deployment. ARSOF trainers can focus on mastering or refreshing select words, phrases, and sentences for some instruction, such as battle drills. However, all ARSOF disciplines invariably must teach at least some complex classes and in some cases an entire curriculum containing technical terms and advanced theory. In these instances, only ARSOF Soldiers possessing native speaker language capability will suffice.

4-17. Although language ability is important, it is equally important for personnel (even those proficient in one or more additional languages) to conduct training on the art of using interpreters while teaching and training. Refresher or initial training in the associated vetting and employment of translators and interpreters is also warranted. Personnel serving for the first time as managers of an interpreter pool should receive training as well.

AREA AND ENVIRONMENT

4-18. Detailed knowledge of the OE is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations in support of FID programs. Regionally oriented ARSOF units typically have detailed country and area data for the region they support. However, in all FID operations, the possibility of ARSOF Soldiers having boots on the ground for the first time in one or more specific AO is likely. Training briefs based on the specifics of these areas should be developed from the PDSS. Other specific aspects of area and population studies are addressed in detail in Chapter 5 under the CMO and PSYOP estimates of the situation.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

4-19. Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, personnel conducting military activities in support of FID programs are passive information collectors and have much valuable information to provide to the intelligence system. ARSOF units and teams collect detailed information on the social, economic, and political situation that may collaterally be processed into essential intelligence by organic or higher echelon intelligence units/agencies. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of this process. To foster relationships with the HN and maintain credibility it often behooves all ARSOF units (invariably in the case of CA elements) to not be associated in the minds of the populace or their HN counterparts as intelligence collectors. This perception may be unavoidable. However, if ARSOF units return with information that is determined to be of value after being vetted through intelligence cycles, the perception is irrelevant. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and understand their responsibilities in these areas. Further discussion of predeployment training in this area is beyond the scope of this publication and the reader should refer to FM 3-05.120, (S/NF) Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence.

SPECIFIC OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY ISSUES

4-20. FID programs are likely to interact at multiple levels with OGAs from predeployment through postdeployment. ARSOF units have regular working relationships with multiple OGAs. However, this type of coordination may be new to some personnel supporting a FID program; therefore, specific training or procedures may be required. In other cases, predeployment training may be specific and detailed to include information on the specific OGA personnel and status of programs that ARSOF units will interface, integrate, or work with. Home station OGA LNOs can conduct some predeployment training.

LAW AND POLICY

4-21. Even between short rotations of a long-term FID operation, the legal, regulatory and most especially policy of either the U.S. or the HN may have changed. A single incident, even one occurring outside the HN, may change the conditions in the HN. Training on new restrictions or new latitude may be necessary. Refresher/initial training on the legal and regulatory concerns in the HN is warranted even if conditions remain unchanged. Central to this training are provisions of applicable status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs)
as well as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. A review of the ROE and rules of interaction (ROI) in support of FID must be included as well. Whether stand-alone or made part of the ROE, changes in the ROI can have a critical effect on some ARSOF units, notably CA and PSYOP units. Instituting or eliminating highly restrictive rules for interacting with the HN populace calls for extensive predeployment training. This training is especially important for operations involving recently opened or closed groups or areas.

FORCE PROTECTION TRAINING

4-22. FID operations often require small ARSOF elements to deploy to isolated areas or complex urban geographies with highly varying threats and constraints. ARSOF units face a myriad of different security measures within the range of FID operations. Predeployment training with the full range of weapons and concealment (if authorized) should be part of the FP train-up. Other areas covered in training should include—

- HN-provided security.
- Transportation.
- Counterintelligence threat brief.
- Housing and local security.
- Nonlethal options (if available or authorized).
- Media procedures.
- Disclosure and classification issues.
- Private military contractors.
- Medical threats and countermeasures.

TRAINING STRATEGY

4-23. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID task. However, this does not preclude conventional units from conducting FID support missions. The legislative mandate outlines the two types of FID training, institutional and unit. SOF forces will prepare for FID operations through institutional training while conventional forces will prepare for supporting FID operations through unit training. Training to support FID covers a broad range of areas. In some instances, ARSOF units may conduct all HN training in a small-scale FID operation. Even a small-scale FID operation may contain a majority of conventional units. This probability is increasingly likely when the IDT is not an insurgent or terrorist group. Therefore, training must often be designed to support a mix of personnel that ranges from SOF that are language trained and culturally focused to forces that are untrained and unfamiliar with either the HN or the specific area in which the FID program is located.

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING

4-24. ARSOF Soldiers, primarily SF, PSYOP, and CA, receive extensive institutional training in language, culture, regional issues, interpersonal skills, and instructional techniques as qualifications in their basic specialty. Although ARSOF Soldiers are not the only Army personnel to receive this sort of training at the institutional level, the core tasks that ARSOF units are assigned, including FID, mandate a broader and more in-depth level of training than conventional units that receive training in the above areas. Some critical areas covered in ARSOF institutional training relating to FID include—

- Overarching strategic and operational FID and IDAD principles.
- Tactical FID TTP.
- COIN techniques.
- Guerrilla warfare (underground and resistance operations when applicable).
- SA and FMS technical and legal aspects.
- Counterpropaganda procedures.
- Negotiation techniques.
- Area, training, and morale assessments.
- JIIM operations.
UNIT TRAINING

4-25. Both conventional and SOF units will conduct unit training for each new FID deployment. The unit can conduct much of the training necessary to prepare conventional unit personnel to support a FID program. A more extensive train-up for ARSOF units may be necessary when those units are operating outside of their normal region. It may also be necessary when ARSOF units are in an HN for the first time or after a long absence from it. This training focuses on the individual or, in the case of unit-size participation, involves large-scale collective training.

4-26. Predeployment training with conventional units participating in FID operations should be pursued when possible. The presence of a country or area ARSOF specialist to assist in briefing and training cultural awareness and culturally sensitive techniques can be very valuable. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID operation. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID operation. The use of role players can be invaluable, especially for personnel unfamiliar with dealing with emotionally charged situations involving indigenous populations and institutions (IPI).

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

4-27. The role of language and cultural awareness is of such import in the WOT and in the likely OEs of the near and midterm future that it crosses boundaries between institutional and unit training. Clearly, the purpose of institutional training is to acquire in-depth language ability and cultural knowledge. ARSOF units working with conventional units or attachments can facilitate combat language and cultural training. Except in those few cultures that disdain rudimentary attempts to communicate in their language, knowing a few polite and authoritative phrases is beneficial to Soldiers dealing with HN personnel. In addition, it is hard to conceive of an instance in which knowing the fundamentals of cultural norms would not be beneficial to Soldiers. ARSOF personnel should endeavor to impart as much of their expertise in these areas as is practicable when training unfamiliar Soldiers. It may be useful to evaluate and attempt to cross-level personnel with language and cultural expertise during development of a final predeployment training strategy using the established guidelines of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning. These guidelines (Table 4-1) differ slightly from the Defense Language Proficiency Test ratings. However, the guidelines are useful with nonlanguage-trained or nonmilitary-trained language speakers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPEAKING SKILL LEVEL</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The speaker does not require this skill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The speaker can ask and answer questions and participate in short conversations. He can discuss everyday survival topics and meet courtesy requirements. He is intelligible to a native speaker accustomed to dealing with foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The speaker is able to fully participate in casual conversations. He can express facts; give instructions; describe, report on, and provide narration about current, past, and future activities. The speaker is able to describe concrete topics, such as his own background, family, and interests; work; travel; and current events. He is understandable to a native speaker not used to dealing with foreigners. He sometimes miscommunicates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The speaker can converse in formal and informal situations, resolve problem situations, deal with unfamiliar topics, provide explanations, describe in detail, offer supported opinions, and form hypotheses. He can express practical, social, professional, and abstract topics; particular interests; and special fields of competence. His errors never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the native speaker. The speaker commits only sporadic errors in basic structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The speaker is able to tailor language to fit the audience. He can counsel, persuade, negotiate, represent a point of view, and interpret for dignitaries. He is able to cover all topics normally pertinent to professional needs. His language level is nearly equivalent to an educated native speaker. The speaker’s speech is extensive, precise, and appropriate to every occasion with only occasional errors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The speaker functions on a level equivalent to an educated native speaker. The speaker can discuss all subjects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRAINING AND ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

4-28. There is no distinct boundary between training assistance and advisory assistance. In broad-brush terms, training assistance is typically nonoperational in areas and under conditions where ARSOF personnel are not likely to be forced to engage any armed IDT. In equally broad-brush terms, advisory assistance may entail some operational advice and assistance beyond training in less secure areas. ARSOF personnel render advisory assistance relatively low-risk situations. However, the current global situation proves that any Soldier is, to some degree, in harm’s way. Advisory assistance (and to a lesser degree training assistance) may involve situations that require ARSOF personnel to defend themselves. Therefore, commander and the U.S. Embassy accept greater risk. The difficulty in putting exact and unqualified definitions on either type of assistance is that both may take place through the entire range from indirect support to direct support not involving combat operations during the same FID operation. As long as risk is clearly defined, planned for, mitigated where possible, and, most importantly, deemed worth the potential cost, this lack of definition causes no inherent problems. Mitigation, however, may translate into exclusion of trainers or advisors from certain areas.

Note. The above description does not abolish statutory concerns of U.S. military direct involvement with HN forces. The statutory concerns outlined earlier in this text and those in Appendix A still apply. The purpose of the above broad descriptions is merely to suggest possible areas of training emphasis.

4-29. ARSOF elements typically develop, establish, and operate centralized training programs for the supported HN force. ARSOF Soldiers can also conduct individual, leader, and collective training programs for specific HN units. Training subjects run the gamut of ARSOF tasks, and training focus ranges from individual instruction through leader development to specialized collective training. ARSOF can provide both training and advisory assistance in two ways:

- Small teams may provide training or give operational advice and assistance to HN civilian, military, or paramilitary organizations.
- Individual ARSOF Soldiers may be assigned or attached to the SAO to perform training and advisory assistance duties on a temporary or permanent basis. (Soldiers are typically assigned as advisors rather than trainers, as in the case of SF advisors working with HN operational forces.)

4-30. In either case, assistance may be provided under the OPCON of the SAO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense representative, other designated embassy official, or the TSOC, depending on the C2 arrangement.

TRAINING ASSISTANCE

4-31. The agreement negotiated between U.S. and HN officials provides the framework for the who, what, when, where, how, and why of military training assistance. Often, U.S. doctrine, as prescribed in applicable publications, must be modified to fit the unique requirements of the HN forces being trained. Procedures may vary, but the fundamental techniques and thought processes still apply. Training assistance should focus on the materiel, fiscal, and logistical realities of the HN.

4-32. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for FID taught to U.S. forces are also applicable to HN forces for IDAD. For some ARSOF units (notably PSYOP and CA), the reality of other HN agencies benefiting more in their portion of the IDAD program than the HN military does is a frequent by-product of the FID activities they conduct. Training emphasis varies according to the HN requirements, force composition, and U.S. and HN agreements. The training to be conducted depends on the situation and varies considerably. Existing military personnel, new military personnel, or paramilitary forces may receive training assistance.
4-33. HN counterpart personnel must be present with U.S. trainers. The goal is for these counterparts to eventually conduct all instruction and training without guidance from U.S. personnel. Initially, U.S. personnel may present all or most of the instruction with as much HN assistance as is feasible. U.S. trainers use the *train the trainer* concept. Figure 4-1 shows the general objectives of training programs under SA.

![Training Programs Objectives](image)

**Figure 4-1. General objectives of training programs under security assistance**

4-34. Training assistance consists of all formal training conducted by ARSOF units. However, all ARSOF Soldiers engaged in training assistance must be cognizant that they are typically under the sharp and sometimes magnified scrutiny of HN government personnel, military, media, and ordinary citizens. Part of preparing ARSOF Soldiers for providing training assistance is making them aware of the less tangible elements of training assistance that can have a deep impact. Soldiers should know that in many HNs their mere presence alongside their counterparts often bolsters that counterpart’s prestige within their organization and among the populace. Those providing training assistance should be aware that many HNs have a domestic PSYOP program and exploiting the presence of highly skilled U.S. ARSOF trainers may be part of their agenda. Generally, none of the less tangible offshoots of providing training assistance will be detrimental toward the ARSOF mission or U.S. national policy as long as trainers are prepared for them.

**ADVISORY ASSISTANCE**

4-35. Within the DOD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the SAO. ARSOF personnel may provide assistance in two ways: as an ARSOF unit providing advice and assistance to an HN military or paramilitary organization or as an individual Soldier assigned or attached to the SAO. In either case, ARSOF units may be under OPCON of the SAO chief in his role as the in-country U.S. defense representative. However, SF will usually be under OPCON of a TSOC. Other ARSOF units may also fall under the OPCON of a TSOC. The SAO includes all DOD elements, regardless of actual title, assigned in foreign countries to manage SA programs administered by DOD. The U.S. advisor may often work and coordinate with civilians of other Country Team agencies. When he does, he must know their functions, responsibilities, and capabilities, because many activities cross jurisdictional borders. Together, the advisor and his counterpart must resolve problems by means appropriate to the HN without violating U.S. laws and policies in the process. Advisors operate under very specific ROE to ensure that advisors remain advisors.

4-36. The ARSOF advisor must understand the scope of SAO activities. He also must know the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of other U.S. agencies in the HN. Because many ARSOF activities cross
the jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of other Country Team members, the advisor seeks other Country Team members to coordinate his portion of the overall FID effort.

4-37. In some situations, the HN may refuse U.S. advisors. HN military leaders may instead request and receive other types of assistance such as air or fire support. To coordinate this support and ensure its proper use, U.S. liaison teams accompany HN ground maneuver units receiving direct U.S. combat support. Language-qualified and area-oriented SF teams are especially suited for this mission. The HN government may refuse lethal support but eagerly accept support from PSYOP, CA, and various ARSOF intelligence capabilities.

4-38. An overview of the art and best practices of advisory techniques is provided later in this manual. However, there is no absolute guide to advisory assistance. Each situation will require adaptability in working with embassy staff and HN personnel. Subordinate ARSOF doctrine covers advisor techniques in depth.
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Chapter 5

Employment Considerations

Although FID is historically an ARSOF core task, it is never a foregone conclusion that ARSOF units can conduct FID operations in every instance. Typically, FID operations will fall within the parameters of the ARSOF imperatives; however, unacceptable discrepancies between a proposed FID operation and any imperative may preclude ARSOF units from participation. The employment considerations for ARSOF forces conducting FID operations apply to greater and lesser degrees with other SOF and conventional forces. In addition, the employment considerations for ARSOF units in FID programs have relevancy of varying degrees to many agencies in JIIM FID programs. Like many other aspects of FID, the employment considerations for ARSOF units require a detailed look at each FID deployment on a case-by-case basis. Just as no two nations in the world are identical, the employment considerations in one nation may have little or no bearing on those in a bordering nation.

OVERVIEW

5-1. The overall U.S. theater strategy typically incorporates FID programs with other major peacetime training and maintenance functions in a holistic effort to promote the HN’s IDAD strategy. FID programs are frequently joint and are, by definition, multinational in nature. Even small tactical operations will usually be multinational in terms of efforts with the supported HN. Up to and including combat operations, at a minimum, planning and coordination are multinational endeavors with the HN. Although a single-Service component may execute some operations, such as road building, these smaller efforts fit into the overall theater strategy and plans. Full coordination and visibility at the joint and multinational levels facilitate best-case employment of sometimes highly limited ARSOF personnel.

EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-2. Several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations. As enumerated in JP 3-07.1 and shown in Figure 5-1, page 5-2, all joint-force employment factors affect ARSOF units.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

5-3. USSOCOM is the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID core task. In fulfilling this core task, USSOCOM provides SOF in support of GCCs. In addition to dedicated theater forces, ARSOF units typically contribute to the FID effort under OPCON of the TSOC, which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. However, FID operations other than combat may have a direct C2 relationship with the COM or his designee at the U.S. Embassy. In smaller FID operations, ARSOF units may compose the majority of the force or may entirely make up the force. The opposite may be true as well; in a large FID operation, caps on total troop numbers may result in a disproportionately smaller number of ARSOF personnel than conventional forces. However, once FID operations are initiated, programs may be handed over to conventional forces. In addition, extended long-term programs may be handed off to conventional forces at some point. In both cases, ARSOF units may still have a prominent supporting role, although their focus may shift to training HN SOF.
5-4. ARSOF units possess specialized capabilities for FID, including support for COIN and, when applicable, for UW. Other support includes coordination and CAO conducted by CA elements, as well as PSYOP support through tactical Psychological Operations teams (TPTs) and MISTs. SOAR, SB(SO)(A), and Rangers may conduct training in specific areas as well, typically with HN SOF. Specialized training teams may train HN units for specific ARSOF core tasks. In addition, ARSOF units may support combat operations by conducting highly specialized missions. However, the typical ARSOF role in FID is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces. ARSOF operations in support of FID operations are frequently unilateral. However, they may support other ongoing U.S. military assistance efforts. When planning for the use of ARSOF units, C2 requirements among the combatant command, the Country Team, and the ARSOF unit must be assessed. Communications requirements for C2, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be coordinated and resourced.

5-5. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the TSOC (GCC). These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas. CA forces supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements (usually ARSOF) that train and aid HN military units. Chapter 6 provides more information on CMO.

**CONVENTIONAL FORCES**

5-6. Although ARSOF Soldiers conduct FID operations as a core task, other designated DOD conventional forces may contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct FID support. These forces can play a highly limited role, provide a moderate presence, or make up the majority of the FID effort. Each
Employment Considerations

instance of FID is taken on a case-by-case basis. Planners and employers of forces conducting FID operations must be aware that operations may change rapidly in character, and that their force structures may need to adapt as well. During the WOT, it has been shown that both the integration of ARSOF units with the conventional force and vice versa are increasingly the norm. In FID, this may involve ARSOF personnel briefing and assisting in train-up for relieving units from the conventional force. For the conventional force, this may include nontraditional employment and ARSOF collective task execution.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT

5-7. Every employment of an element of U.S. national power has a psychological impact on elements of the HN population and sometimes even the entire HN population. Regardless of whether the operation is supported by or is conducted in support of PSYOP, all efforts supporting a FID program must be executed with the identified POs and SPOs in mind. Failure to do so may derive short-term tactical benefits that have long-term negative strategic consequences. Psychological effects may be the collateral or unintended result of operations. However, most effects can be anticipated and should be the intended effects of general operations, specific PSYOP series, or the result of a PSYACT specifically executed for its psychological effect. All ARSOF forces are cognizant that their actions (operationally and incidentally) may have great psychological impact. PSYOP and other ARSOF units are trained to manage, magnify, or mitigate this impact. When employed in the JIIM environment it is typically incumbent upon ARSOF personnel as subject matter experts to identify second- and third-order psychological effects of HN, JIIM, conventional force, and ARSOF actions.

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS

5-8. Public information is important during all phases of FID operations. Although it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through PSYOP, it is also important to employ an effective PA program to inform HN, U.S., and third-party audiences of current and, when OPSEC allows, planned FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without the support of these publics, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID program. At the U.S. national level, public diplomacy programs will accurately depict U.S. efforts. These national programs are supported through the combatant commander’s (or subordinate joint force commander’s [JFC’s]) information programs. Information programs disclose the maximum amount of information deemed best in the parameters of a synchronized IO strategy within the applicable security restrictions and guidelines. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the Country Team, PSYOP elements, and other information agencies within the HN and region. In addition, the global impact of U.S. and HN actions in FID programs must not be overlooked.

IMPACT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

5-9. IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems. IO apply across all phases of an operation and throughout the range of military operations. During FID operations, IO disciplines employed must be closely integrated into all aspects of planning and execution. In small- or moderate-sized FID operations, ARSOF forces may represent the only trained core, supporting, or related IO capability. In these instances, it is incumbent upon ARSOF personnel to determine the full spectrum of IO impact. In all FID operations, the core and related IO capabilities of PSYOP and CMO play a significant role. The potential exists for PSYOP and CMO to be the sole capability employed in FID programs. In this instance, ARSOF units may need to operationally mitigate the absence of other IO capabilities.

WAR ON TERRORISM

5-10. Any IDT can contribute to the spread and growth of terrorists and terrorism. An ignored IDT, such as an organized criminal element, may evolve into a terrorist organization or begin using terror tactics. FID programs complement the WOT by reducing the impact of IDTs and curtailing incipient insurgencies before they become capable of projecting terror outside the HN boundaries. Forces can conduct specific AT and CT efforts as part of the FID program for an HN. ARSOF units conduct CT operations when
authorized and frequently support the AT and CT effort through SF training of CT forces and PSYOP training and support to AT and CT forces.

5-11. The DOS is primarily responsible for strengthening the commitment of other states to fight terrorism. ARSOF units can conduct and support efforts that can improve public perceptions in the HN of both their government and the USG. Success of an ARSOF CT force combined with proactive PSYOP series, CAO, and increased capacities of HN forces can encourage larger, more extensive HN efforts to combat terrorism. Direct military-to-military contacts encourage HN officials to advocate initial and increased operations against terrorist capabilities. ARSOF trainers and advisors stress how such measures will also strengthen its overall IDAD program. These measures can include the following:

- Decrease, interrupt, or break funding for IDTs.
- Develop or enhance HN CT force equipment and training.
- Increase border, airport, seaport, and other static entry-point security.
- Enhance HN security and intelligence agencies to include regional and international networks.
- Develop effective judicial and law enforcement systems by minimizing corruption.
- Deter potential recruits through both balanced and targeted development programs.
- Combat ideological motivators by promoting moderate views and personalities.

**COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS**

5-12. Narcotics production or trafficking may be introduced to or worsened in the HN by IDTs. This may be deliberate or incidental as IDTs break down HN infrastructure and institutions. If deliberate, motivators for doing so can range from simple greed to a means of funding that an IDT would not otherwise use. In addition, IDTs may tolerate or even encourage narcotics use in members or target groups to control or degrade unwanted opposition. In all instances, FID operations complement CD efforts by reducing and reversing narcotics problems in target nations. Integrating and resourcing CD-focused programs into theater strategies as a coordinated effort supports the HN’s IDAD program.

5-13. Within legal parameters, DOD resources may be used in connection with CD activities in nations receiving military assistance in support of a FID program. This military assistance often centers on production operations. However, it can involve in-transit CD operations. In addition, the DOD, as the lead USG agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, may conduct nonconfrontational intercepts. The DOD may also gather and process tactical intelligence from a variety of sources for intelligence or communication purposes. ARSOF units may provide limited support for such missions and should be aware of the intelligence derived from such efforts. Direct support is typically limited to surveillance and intelligence, as well as PSYOP and CAO. HN and U.S. PSYOP series may seek to reduce narcotics users, producers, smugglers, or dealers. CAO may seek to improve living conditions in areas of production and use to reduce financial and social motivators.

5-14. In a CD support role (subject to national policy and legislative guidance), the DOD may offer certain direct support to HN CD personnel and certain enhanced support to U.S. civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in the HN and the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. When direction from the SecDef is absent, ARSOF Soldiers engaged in CD activities are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. ARSOF Soldiers may not directly participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces on actual CD field operations or participate in any activities where hostilities are likely to occur.

5-15. As directed by the SecDef through the CJCS, combatant commanders will be given the authority to plan and execute HN programs using a combination of SA, training and advisory assistance (not funded by SA), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and FHA. These efforts are designed to bolster the HN’s capability to operate against the infrastructure of drug production. In FID operations, lines between purely criminal elements, narco-terrorists, and IDTs using narcotics as a financial means to an end may be blurred. A holistic effort to support the FID program may target all these elements. Therefore, ARSOF units may coordinate closely with the Country Team, DEA, and DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters representatives.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-16. ARSOF units conducting FID operations require in-depth intelligence on both general and specific elements of the HN populace and infrastructure. In some instances, ARSOF intelligence requirements will be specific to individual units. For instance, PSYOP elements may be the only portion of the U.S. force that needs details of radio station frequencies and program formats in a given province or other subnational area. In another case, an SFODA may need detailed knowledge of the customs, taboos, and mores of an isolated tribe or group having little contact with outsiders.

5-17. A thorough intelligence analysis for FID operations must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, medical, and economic (among other) aspects of the area, as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. A continuous intelligence effort will determine the effects of U.S. efforts on the infrastructure, as well as evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area. This effort also supports determining the baseline views and reactions HN population elements to FID programs. Organic, in-country ARSOF units, theater, national and HN intelligence assets must all be resourced to provide this intelligence. Appendix C provides intelligence considerations and a format for intelligence preparation of the FID operational area in detail.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

5-18. Logistic operations during FID programs support U.S. forces and primary operational missions (supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities). ARSOF logistic support may be met organically by TSOCs through the SB(SO)(A) Army Special Operations Forces liaison element (ALE), the Theater Army Service Command (ASCC), the HN or a combination of these sources. The ALE is permanently located with the ASCC to coordinate Army logistics operations in support for ARSOF units and joint SOF where the Army is the executive agent.

5-19. The SB(SO)(A) works closely with the SOF theater staff element, the ALE, and the TSOC to identify ASCC requirements for SOF support and to ensure that SOF requirements for ASCC support are adequately addressed and sustainable. When directed by the GCC, the ASCC also supports and sustains designated SOF of other U.S. Services and multinational SOF.

5-20. Some general guidelines for logistic issues in support of ARSOF units conducting FID operations include the following:

- Maximize the use of host-nation support (HNS) capabilities. Minimize logistic support requirements when reliance on the HN is not feasible.
- Balance the advantages of using HNS with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.
- Task organize logistic operations according to mission parameters:
  - Joint FID operations Service logistic support elements are integrated into the overall joint force.
  - Logistic support for the deployed forces remains a Service responsibility.
- Realize HN limitations. HNs often require support beyond their own capabilities, therefore—
  - Multinational logistic support agreements must be reached.
  - Organically unfulfillable must be identified during the planning phase of FID support.
  - Needs must be met before participation in the operation.
  - Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements negotiated with multinational partners may be beneficial to the FID effort.
  - Authority to negotiate and execute these agreements is typically delegated to the GCC by the SecDef.
- Recognize logistical needs that are not available through HNS and, in some instances, through theater logistical assets for ARSOF-unique equipment or operations.
- Recognize logistical needs in select areas that though available in limited quantity through HNS may be insufficient for ARSOF units.
Chapter 5

5-21. FID programs may be degraded or even preempted if critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities reaches IDTs. Frequently, prior to and during FID operations a select number of HN officials and the populace have prior knowledge of some ARSOF activities. In some instances, far more knowledge of activities may exist than in other operations. IDTs, particularly an active insurgency, will attempt to and in some cases succeed in placing members in positions in which they can obtain information about FID operations and spread misinformation and disinformation. In addition, they may have sympathizers within HN institutions that could be informants. Some corrupt HN officials may attempt to capitalize on one or more opportunities to sell information. This can be particularly difficult to detect with officials who engage in such activities selectively or on a one-time basis. All personnel employed during FID operations must remain vigilant to maintain OPSEC and report possible violations or suggest procedural changes that will better safeguard the IDAD effort.

LESSONS LEARNED

5-22. As FID programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID program to fit special circumstances and environments. Comprehensive after action reviews and reports focusing on the specifics of FID operations should be conducted to gather lessons learned information as soon as possible after mission execution. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned within the United States Joint Forces Command, the Army Center for Lessons Learned, and OGAs lessons learned programs provide readily available sources of information to FID planners and operators. USSOCOM’s Special Operations Debrief and Reporting System provides a repository on peacetime FID missions. This system is accessible via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network on the USSOCOM portal.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-23. The purpose of a CMO estimate is to provide information and recommend COAs on the civil considerations of the current OE in the HN. This estimate may be used in a range of circumstances from indirect FID support to combat operations, and as such, the content must be tailored to the OE and mission. JP 3-07.1 provides a guide to elements that should be included in the estimate. Relevant facts in the HN and the degree of anticipated CMO and the supporting CAO dictate the level of detail and length of the CMO estimate. The combatant command’s J-9, in close collaboration with the other staff sections and subordinate commanders or CA site survey team, usually prepares the estimate. If time allows, the preparer can make a detailed written estimate, or the format may be used as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the civil situation are considered. A major mission for CAO in the FID environment will be to support and facilitate other CMO; therefore, any analysis of CAO must include an analysis of the CMO missions. In many paragraphs of the CMO estimate, both CAO and CMO missions are examined together.

5-24. Ultimately, the supported commander will dictate the format of the CMO estimate (Figure 5-2, pages 5-7 and 5-8). The CMO estimate is derived from other CA planning and evaluation documents in addition to outside sources. Key among these will be the CMO estimate of the situation as presented in FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, and all relevant annexes and appendixes. Supporting documents include—

- Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events, and civil considerations analyses.
- MOE spreadsheets.
- Trend analysis spreadsheets.
- Trend analysis charts.
- Impact analysis charts.
CMO ESTIMATE NUMBER:_____

REFERENCES: List maps, charts, CMO-related documents, and local command guidance.

1. MISSION. Cite the restated CMO mission from mission analysis.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
   a. Characteristics of the AO. (Key CMO factors derived from the intelligence estimate and area studies and assessments).
      (1) Weather. State how the military aspects of weather affect CMO.
      (2) Terrain. State how aspects of terrain affect CMO.
      (3) Civil Considerations:
         (a) Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
         (b) Availability of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
         (c) Availability of local materiel and personnel to support military operations.
         (d) Number of dislocated civilians in the area.
         (e) Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in transportation, public utilities, and communications).
         (f) Status and character of civil government.
         (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
         (h) Ability of local police, judicial authorities, and correction officials to maintain public order.
         (i) CMO environment. When working at the tactical level, describe the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
   b. Enemy Forces. Include key CMO factors from the intelligence estimate and area assessments. Address enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians, and their ability to influence or affect planned military operations and CMO.
   c. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Current status of CMO resources (OGA).
      (2) Comparison of CMO assets and resource requirements versus CMO capabilities available and recommended solutions for discrepancies.

3. COURSE OF ACTION.
   a. List the friendly COAs war-gamed.
   b. List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staff sections use the same evaluation criteria.

4. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION.
   a. COA One.
      (1) Analyze the CMO concept of support using the CMO analysis. All staff sections use the same evaluation criteria.
      (2) Estimate the likelihood of accomplishing CMO objectives in the available time, given friendly CMO capabilities and vulnerabilities, versus those likely threat COAs.

Figure 5-2. Example of a Civil-Military Operations estimate
(CLASSIFICATION)

(3) Determine the potential for unintended consequences of CMO tasks and the possible affects on both adversary and friendly COA.

(4) Identify critical subsystems within areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events that should be evaluated within COA analysis to assess CMO requirements.

(5) Assess the effectiveness of CMO-related capabilities in relation to each other, and the most significant CMO-related vulnerabilities.

(6) Evaluate the risk of failure to reach CMO goals or objectives in terms of affects on the success of the COA.

(7) Analyze the risk in executing CMO in the COA in terms of nonavailability of assessments or resources.

(8) List EEFI for this COA.

b. COA Two. (Repeat the process outlined above for all COAs):

5. COA COMPARISON. Compare the COAs in terms of the evaluation criteria. Rank-order COAs for each criterion. Visually support the comparison with a decision matrix.

a. Compare the costs of CMO in each COA based on the resources and time required to execute them in relation to the operational impact of their success (if a stated evaluation criteria).

b. Compare the levels of risk to COA success and friendly assets should CMO fail (if a stated evaluation criteria).

c. Summarize the advantages and disadvantages for CMO in each COA to evaluate the chance of success in each (as taken from the CMO analysis).

6. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. Recommend a COA based on the comparison (most supportable for the CMO perspective).

b. Present CMO issues, deficiencies, risks, and recommendations to reduce their impacts.

/signed/
(Designation of staff officer or originator.)

APPENDIXES: (As required)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure 5-2. Example of a Civil-Military Operations estimate (continued)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-25. The purpose of a PSYOP estimate is to provide information on PSYOP aspects of military operations to aid the commander in accomplishing the mission. This estimate is important to any plan but is particularly critical to successfully integrating FID operations. The estimate is usually prepared at the joint level by the PSYOP staff element in close coordination with the other coordinating staff sections and subordinate commanders, to include the supporting PSYOP unit commander. In an all ARSOF FID operation, it may be prepared by the site survey team and any PSYOP estimate should utilize the documentation of the site survey in conjunction with any other information they use as references. Once completed, the PSYOP estimate becomes an annex to the operations officer’s estimate of the situation.

5-26. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may serve as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the PSYOP situation are considered. The detail varies with the level and type of command. The format for a joint PSYOP estimate is provided in Figure 5-3, pages 5-9 and 5-10.
Employment Considerations

Headquarters
Place
Date, time, and zone

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO._______

REFERENCES:

a. ( ) List maps and charts.

b. ( ) Include other relevant documents (such as special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and intelligence estimates).

(1) ( ) When the PSYOP estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

(2) ( ) Normally, PSYOP estimates are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. The estimate is usually distributed as an appendix to the operations annex.

1. ( ) MISSION.

a. ( ) Supported unit's restated mission resulting from mission analysis.

b. ( ) PSYOP mission statement. Describe the PSYOP mission to support the maneuver commander’s mission.

2. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATION.

a. ( ) Characteristics of the AO.

(1) ( ) Weather. How will weather affect the dissemination of PSYOP products, access to TAs (winds – leaflet drops, precipitation – print products, etc.)? End product – PSYOP weather overlay.

(2) ( ) Terrain. How will terrain affect dissemination of PSYOP products, movement of tactical PSYOP elements? End product – PSYOP terrain overlay.

(3) ( ) Analysis of media infrastructure (location and broadcast range of radio and television broadcast facilities, retransmission towers; print facilities, distribution and dissemination nodes); identify denied areas (not accessible by particular medium). End product – PSYOP media infrastructure overlay.

b. ( ) Key Target Sets. Note: These sets will be further refined into a potential TA list. During the TA analysis process, the TAs will then be analyzed and further refined. This is not the only target set that PSYOP will have to deal with. To fully assist the supported unit commander, PSYOP must consider all key target sets, not solely adversary forces. End product – PSYOP key target sets overlays (hostile, friendly, neutral).

(1) ( ) Hostile Target Sets. For each hostile target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

(2) ( ) Friendly Target Sets. For each friendly target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

(3) ( ) Neutral Target Sets. Include target sets whose attitudes are unknown. For each neutral target set, identify strength, disposition, composition, capabilities (ability to conduct propaganda, ability to help/hinder the PSYOP effort), and probable COAs as they relate to PSYOP.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Supported Unit COAs. State the COAs under consideration and the PSYOP specific requirements needed to support each COA.

(2) ( ) Current Status of Organic Personnel and Resources.

(3) ( ) Current Status of Nonorganic Personnel and Resources
(CLASSIFICATION)

(4) ( ) Comparison of Requirements Versus Capabilities and Recommended Solutions. Compare PSYOP requirements for each COA with current PSYOP capabilities. List recommended solutions for any shortfall in capabilities.

(5) ( ) Key Considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA Supportability. List evaluation criteria to be used in COA analysis and COA comparison.

d. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the PSYOP situation made for this estimate.

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF COAs.

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the PSYOP point of view to determine its advantages and disadvantages for conducting PSYOP. The level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need determine the detail in which the analysis is made.

b. ( ) The evaluation criteria listed in paragraph 2 (c, 5) above establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations that may have an impact on the PSYOP situation as it affects the COAs. Throughout the analysis, the staff officer must keep PSYOP considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but to ensure that all applicable PSYOP factors have been considered and are the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF COAs

a. ( ) Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success from the PSYOP point of view. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA affecting PSYOP. Comparison should be visually supported by a decision matrix.

b. ( ) Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.

c. ( ) State a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success from a PSYOP perspective.

5. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. ( ) Recommended COA based on comparison (most supportable from the PSYOP perspective). Rank COAs from best to worst.

b. ( ) Issues, deficiencies, and risks, for each COA, with recommendations to reduce their impact.

(signed)_____________________

J-3/PSYOP Staff Officer

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

5-27. Health service support (HSS) is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support U.S. national interests in another country. Initiatives for HSS cannot realistically improve the HN’s entire healthcare system; instead, long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN are stressed. However, short-term surge support of critical areas to the FID program can be pursued and immediate action in a humanitarian crisis may be the temporary focus of HSS. Routine HSS activities are targeted toward the health problems facing the HN military and, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, civilian health initiatives through CAO and FHA. Possible HSS activities include—

- Providing public health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, childcare, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures. This includes—
  - Medical civic action programs.
- Dental civic action programs.
- Veterinary civic action programs.
- Providing triage, diagnostic, and treatment training.
- Developing logistic programs.
- Developing education programs.
- Developing intelligence and threat analysis.
- Developing HN military field HSS support system for treatment and evacuation.
- Assisting in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities.
- Developing wellness and preventative care, including public information programs.

5-28. ARSOF forces should be employed in HSS programs that are affordable and sustainable by the HN. This includes pursuing realistic training and acquisition programs. In addition to training HN personnel during FID operations, medical education opportunities for HN personnel through IMET may be pursued. Following a course of realistic HSS measures and programs may also entail mitigating unrealistic expectations among the HN populace. Other second order effects can emerge from HSS as well, such as a real or perceived imbalance in health care development. Resources should be shifted to areas where imbalance exists.

5-29. ARSOF units typically can provide only a small portion of the HN’s HSS needs; therefore, close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs can enhance the support provided by ARSOF. ARSOF commanders should seek to increase the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such as USAID whenever possible. Working with or near IGOs and NGOs may be untenable due to their desire to preserve the perception of neutrality. ARSOF units may have to settle for awareness of IGO and NGO activities and employ themselves so as not to duplicate efforts in HSS.

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN INDIRECT SUPPORT**

5-30. HSS indirect support to FID programs is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisors. The focus is on identification of medical threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those forces. Typically, the main effort of such training has been conducted by SF with support from other ARSOF units. PSYOP has historically supported and advised HN counterparts in programs and series to support HSS. Wellness and instructional PSYOP series can seek to simply increase participation in medical or veterinary programs that some TAs may be reluctant to use due to cultural bias. In addition, introduction of new behaviors such as sanitary food or water practices can be pursued as well. This type of support can cross boundaries into the realm of direct support as well and may involve simultaneously conducting both indirect and direct support.

**HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT IN DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS)**

5-31. Direct HSS is provided when the HN lacks the capability to provide specific types of care or general care in a localized area that rises to a level of possibly fueling recruitment, fund-raising, or propaganda for an IDT. ARSOF units may provide direct HSS support in both small-scale and large-scale FID programs. Typically this is accomplished by training and direct health care for the military, and when authorized for the civilian population. ARSOF units may be the only U.S. forces able to provide direct HSS in FID operations through de minimis HCA. ARSOF units may also provide varying degrees of transportation, logistic and informational support to such HSS activities as well.

**FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

5-32. FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided by U.S. forces supplements/complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities and international organizations that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA programs allow U.S. military medical personnel to provide care
during disasters or to support nonmilitary objectives. Activities may include any type and level of care based on the conditions in the HN. Some typical areas include—

- Triage, emergency, and trauma care in ongoing medical crises.
- Epidemic prevention and immunizations.
- Displaced person care and preventative measures.
- Dental and veterinary screening programs.
- Health care infrastructure repair.

**Humanitarian and Civic Action**

5-33. A special condition of HCA operations is that they must fulfill valid unit training requirements. Although all HCA operations should strive to meet desired MOEs, benefit to the local populace is secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. Assistance provided to HSS under these provisions is limited to—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in HN rural areas.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems that increase access to health care.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of health care facilities.
- Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

5-34. Many countries’ IDAD programs lack the resources to reach their entire population. HCA combines HN military, civilian, and international health agencies, and U.S. military efforts to provide care and to enhance legitimacy and visibility of the HN government. Typically, the mandate to train ARSOF personnel as the primary goal of HCA posses only limited planning and employment difficulties. However, coordination is critical and the use of planning and site surveys are imperative to effective use of all assets and proactive plans to derive a primary training benefit for ARSOF personnel.

**Health Service Support in Combat Operations**

5-35. HSS in combat operations in support of a FID program will generally consist of the support provided by U.S. military forces. ARSOF personnel may advise the HN military on HSS concerns in conjunction with combat or rear echelon operations. In addition, ARSOF units, notably CA and PSYOP, may be tasked with supporting HSS to displaced persons. Limited training can occur during lulls or in secure areas in combat operations, provided security can be maintained. Training of HN personnel may be necessary before they can provide sufficient HSS to relieve ARSOF or conventional units. As experienced trainers, SF and other ARSOF medics and HSS trained personnel may be tasked to provide this training. PSYOP programs during combat operations may include SPOs that target health related behaviors. TPTs may disseminate such series in the mission of supporting enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee camps.

**Planning for Health Service Support**

5-36. HSS support to FID programs must be an integral part of all U.S. military planning in order to successfully employ ARSOF units to the greatest affect. In that ARSOF units can support HN civilian as well as military HSS, planning may be broader and more in-depth than other operations. HSS planning is driven by the specific issues of each HN but following requirements should be considered:

- Patient movement.
- Hospitalization.
- HSS logistics.
- Laboratory services.
- Blood management.
- Dental services.
Employment Considerations

- Veterinary services.
- Preventive medicine services.
- Administration and C2.
- Facilities and maintenance.

**FACTORS IN HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT**

5-37. The goal of employment of HSS in support of FID programs is to achieve a state of development where the HN can self-sufficiently provide care to its population. While providing direct HSS support to the HN, ARSOF units should emphasize the development of the HN’s internal capacity to meet its needs. ARSOF units should seek to maximize the effects of their employment in HSS activities through coordinated and synchronized programs with sister-Service medical personnel, USAR forces, and other reserve forces, when available. ARSOF units should also utilize U.S. Embassy resources.

5-38. In addition to organic resources, the HSS capacity of SB(SO)(A) may be utilized to support FID HSS operations. SB(SO)(A) force health protection personnel perform the following functions:
- Treat patients with disease, nonbattle injuries, combat stress or battle fatigue, and trauma injuries.
- Provide limited sick call, triage of mass casualties, limited advanced trauma management, and surgical resuscitation and stabilization (with surgical augmentation).
- Provide operational, emergency, and essential dental care.
- Maintain Class VIII resupply and medical equipment for supported units.
- Provide medical laboratory and radiology services commensurate with Level II ARSOF medical treatment.
- Provide veterinary augmentation to supported SOF units.
- Provide extended patient holding for up to 20 patients (full team) until evacuation assets become available.
- Afford limited reinforcement and augmentation to supported battalion medical platoons.
- Coordinate with the unit ministry team for required religious support.
- Provide preventive medicine consultation and augmentation for supported units.

**SITE SURVEY PROCEDURES**

5-39. All ARSOF units conducting FID operations need a detailed site survey of the area or areas to which they are deploying. All site surveys will contain some of the same basic information but the level of detail and the specific data will vary by unit and within each unit by mission. For a variety of reasons, the number of personnel in a site survey team should be as small as possible. When practical, cross-trained personnel may assess more than one subject. However, the inclusion of some MOSs and specialists may be unavoidable. The products of the site survey vary, but all surveys need to answer the questions deemed necessary to mission success by the unit during its preparation for deployment. Various tools, including checklists or electronic templates, may be used. Paperless copies of surveys may be used as long as data is both backed up and safeguarded. Although FID site surveys are typically overt, the product of the survey may be classified and should always be treated as sensitive.

**SITE SURVEY TEAM MISSION**

5-40. The mission of the site survey team is to report accurately to its parent unit the existing HN mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions along with any specific data designated by the commander. It may establish in-country C2 systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit mission execution; coordinate the reception of the main body, sometimes termed an advance echelon; and in all cases, assess these systems. In some cases, ARSOF units may redeploy a site survey team or a portion of it to brief commanders and the main body. Typically, such personnel will deploy again with the main body.
SITE SURVEY TEAM PROCEDURES

5-41. Specific areas of concern may arise before any FID operation but all site survey teams conduct some common activities before departure. Among others the site survey team conducts predeployment activities to include the following:

- Secure required travel documents:
  - Obtain visas and passports.
  - Furnish a copy of the country clearance message sent by the U.S. Embassy, if required.
- Update medical and immunization records:
  - Obtain any pharmaceutical prophylaxis.
  - Receive medical threat brief.
- Conduct finance briefs and obtain (if issued) Class A funds and designated fund cites.
- Receive, when applicable, the Security Assistance Training Management Organization briefing.
- Confirm with the U.S. HN team that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team’s itinerary. Ensure the agencies are available for coordination.
- Receive updated threat briefing and review the ROE and SOFA.
- Conduct mission analysis and briefback as directed.

COORDINATION WITH UNITED STATES AGENCIES AND HEADQUARTERS

5-42. Upon arrival in the HN, the team informs the SAO of its arrival and status. The team makes immediate contact with the senior military headquarters in-country or the predesignated lower headquarters. Because conditions in the HN may have changed during transit, the team should obtain updated threat information. The survey team should arrive ready to brief the mission and program of instruction to the SAO and any other designated agents for approval or modification.

5-43. The survey team commander and S-3 (if deployed) establish the command relationship with the next-higher in-country U.S. commander if he is not in the team’s normal chain of command. The team commander also briefs the next-higher in-country U.S. commander on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

5-44. The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the higher in-country U.S. commander or the Country Team for the follow-on forces’ mission execution. At a minimum, this guidance includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and recovery (E&R) support, and any limitations on relationships with HN counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with the SAO:

- Training objectives.
- Terms of reference.
- Political situation.
- Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.
- Currency control.
- Intelligence support procedures.
- Administrative support.
- Legal issues and status changes.
- Procedures for obtaining in-country logistics.
- Remaining information gaps on the OEs.

5-45. The team commander confirms or establishes communications and reporting procedures between the next-higher in-country U.S. commander, the U.S. Embassy, the survey team, and the follow-on unit. The team commander must also identify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission. The team commander confirms or establishes procedures for obtaining logistics. He identifies a POC at the Country Team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of the U.S. military staff. The POC then informs the survey team of necessary actions during times of increased threats.
Employment Considerations

5-46. The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next-higher in-country or out-of-country support element. The survey team—

- Identifies the supporting element location.
- Contacts the supporting element to determine the limitations of the available support and the expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.
- Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body.
- Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, the survey team, and the follow-on unit. It identifies, at a minimum, primary, alternate, and emergency communications procedures for C2, all available logistics, and medical evacuation.
- Reports the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on ARSOF unit.

5-47. The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team either confirms or may need to initially identify the location of all HN or U.S. agencies planned for JIIM operations along with those that contingencies may require contacting. Initial contact with concerned agencies to establish coordination is then invariably a high priority. Some common areas of coordination are—

- The exchange of information and intelligence.
- The confirmation or establishment of communications procedures.
- The confirmation or establishment of other coordination protocols:
  - The IO themes to stress and avoid.
  - The approval authority of PSYOP series.
  - The parameters of acceptable CIM and reporting procedures.
  - The area’s diplomatic constraints and procedures.
  - The established IGO and NGO coordination procedures.
  - The multinational (other than HN) coordination mechanisms.

The site survey team then reports any newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the future FID plans.

COORDINATION WITH HOST-NATION AGENCIES AND UNITS

5-48. The survey team commander or specified subordinates establish direct working relationships and rapport with the HN unit commander or agency director and any key personnel deemed necessary. The survey team—

- Briefs the HN commander or agency director on the survey mission and the restrictions and limitations.
- Obtains the HN commander’s or agency director’s assistance to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisory assistance.
- Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s or agency director’s actual estimate of his unit capabilities and perceived training and advisory assistance and material requirements including—
  - Training plans.
  - Current training status and needs.
  - Units available for training.
  - Training facilities.
- Obtains the HN approval of the plan and requests linkup with counterparts.

5-49. Absent any specific authorizations to do so, the team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the HN commander or agency director about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. If authorized to communicate any planned and resourced aid, the team stays strictly within the parameters of resourced aid. In particular, the survey team
Chapter 5

5-16 does not make any comment to the host government on the possible availability of USG resources in any form. In addition, the team cannot provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat, as perceived by the HN. Providing advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations is also routinely prohibited.

ANALYZING TRAINING NEEDS

5-50. The survey team analyzes the HN unit status to determine HN requirements for training and advisory assistance. The survey team—
- Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and advisory assistance COAs.
- Prepares written estimates for training and advisory assistance COAs that are prioritized in order of desirability.
- Determines the unit location and its effects on the populace.
- Collects and analyzes all information affecting FP.
- Determines the HN unit’s existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.
- Determines the compatibility of recommended equipment with that in the HN inventory.

5-51. The survey team helps the HN unit prepare facilities (training, security, and administrative) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the HN facilities that the unit and their counterparts will use during the mission. At this time, it identifies any deficiencies that will prevent the execution of the tentatively selected training and advisory assistance COAs. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the HN commander or agency director the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found.

5-52. The survey team commander recommends to the HN commander or agency director the most desirable COAs, emphasizing how to achieve the desired training and advisory assistance objectives. The survey team commander—
- Ensures the HN understands that the desired COAs are still tentative and are contingent on the U.S. commander’s decision.
- Ensures the higher in-country U.S. commander or Country Team is informed of significant findings in the survey of the HN unit.
- Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on units, after obtaining HN input.

5-53. Some crucial items of the survey may not be able to be finalized prior to travel to the OEs. A HSS site survey is often one such portion of the survey. The site survey team gathers information to complete a detailed HSS threat assessment. This assessment is the base document for HSS planning and subsequent employment to support the FID program. Other areas could include detailed infrastructure, media, and local perceptions assessments. Finally, before departing from the HN, the survey team again visits all concerned U.S. and HN staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas. All parties, including the main body at the home station, must be apprised of issues that could deter or substantially limit ARSOF unit participation in the mission.

ADVISING THE HOST-NATION MILITARY

5-54. Influencing HN military institutions to support a democratic process can only be done practically and effectually with the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel working alongside HN forces. Personnel who arrive for short visits typically will be treated as visitors and will not be able to penetrate the fabric of the HN culture or its institutions. Although short visits (such as most JCETs) can serve other useful purposes, the long-term presence of U.S. military personnel is required to strengthen HN democratic institutions and affect individual and institutional reform in the HN military. Although the historical precedent among ARSOF disciplines for long-term dedicated advisors has typically rested with SF the possibility of other ARSOF disciplines providing advisors on a long-term basis exists. This chance increases when combat operations are authorized.
BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC HOST-NATION MILITARY

5-55. An advisor must strive to transmit the concept of democratization and a subservient military to his counterpart. These concepts are often considered inherent in the American way and are so basic in the United States that they are not discussed much in training. The most important mission of an advisor is to enhance the military professionalism of his counterpart. He must influence the HN military and prepare it to deal with a changing and typically unfamiliar environment by emphasizing civilian control over the military and demonstrating the advantages of a democratic system of government. In addition, HN officials are not normally confused over moral rules; however, because of the dangerous situation confronting the nation, they may be convinced that their only effectual recourse is to ignore these rules. Therefore, building professionalism and strictly adhering to the moral rules of a professional Soldier are critical to this process.

5-56. A major cause of an advisor’s failure is his inability to maintain a good working relationship with his counterpart. The unsuccessful advisor often fails to understand why his counterparts may not feel the sense of urgency that he does. He is unable to realize that his counterpart will remain and continue to fight the enemy long after his tour is over and he returns to the safety and comfort of the United States.

5-57. The advisor must be aware of the scope and limitations of the principal SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA. The current ROE will determine what level of SA personnel may perform any duties of a combatant nature. These include any duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities. The environment plays a big factor in an advisor’s role.

ADVISOR EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

5-58. In addition to many situational concerns, there are four major advisor employment factors, namely, the HN stage of development, the HN military organizational makeup, the status of the advisor, and rapport. Along with proven techniques and certain personal and professional qualities that typically are a catalyst to successful advising, these factors are a key to understanding the challenge facing an advisor. Advisors must rely on a combination of the predeployment information, intelligence available on the above factors, and observations of the specifics of the unit he is advising. Perhaps most important, this combination also includes a read of the personality, professionalism, and competence of the advisor’s counterpart.

Host-Nation Stage of Development

5-59. In situations where the HN government may have been in existence in its present form or independent only a short time, the administrative machinery may still be developing. The advisor must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical. In an insurgency or other major IDT, the HN government is experiencing major problems. For instance, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the HN government would use this money to cure the society’s economic and social ills. In addition, the new HN government can be dealing with problems of a previously failed government or with policies that favored the nation from which they achieved independence. The advisor must be aware that some changes are of a magnitude that may require change that is only finalized in a generational time line.

Host-Nation Military Organizational Makeup

5-60. The advisor must know HN sociopolitical and military organizations and their interrelationships, to include personalities, political movements, and forces involved. Motivating social, political, and economic factors must be determined. Advisors must impress upon their HN counterparts the need for an integrated civil-military effort to defeat an IDT. Counterparts must learn that military actions are subordinate to and supportive of the economic and social actions required to remove the IDT’s causes and sustainers.

5-61. The advisor must be aware that other military organizations are much more stratified than the U.S. military. The advisor may have a counterpart or trainees that are (or at least began) their career as conscripts. In addition, to a much greater degree, socioeconomic status can vary greatly at each level of the HN military. Many militaries throughout the world have far less opportunity to advance, especially from
enlisted to officer status. Services in the HN can have varying degrees of support from the HN government and populace with the possibility of considerable bias for or against one particular service.

**Status of the Advisor**

5-62. The advisor must fully understand his status in the HN as spelled out in agreements between the United States and the HN. These agreements may provide full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity. Without an agreement, the advisor is subject to local laws, customs, and the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of the diplomatic immunity afforded him; the advisor observes local laws, applicable laws of war, and Army regulations and directives. Indeed, because of close scrutiny, the advisor may need to visibly exceed the observance of laws and regulations. This can be particularly true when advising an HN military traditionally plagued with corruption or infidelity to civilian authority.

**Rapport**

5-63. Rapport is a sympathetic relationship between people that is based on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction characterize a lack of rapport. The need to establish rapport with HN counterparts is the result of a unique military position in which the advisor has no direct authority or control over HN unit or individual actions. However, an advisor can influence or motivate his counterpart to act in certain ways by establishing and maintaining rapport.

5-64. Rapport results when each individual perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and willing to working toward a common goal. If the advisor can convey this attitude to his HN counterpart, long-lasting, effective rapport will exist. Effective rapport must exist to gain the control needed to execute the mission. The successful advisor establishes rapport that allows influence over the counterpart’s actions despite the absence of formal authority. Effective advisors also overcome the resentment that might otherwise arise when advisors substantially or completely change the HN’s standing operating procedures (SOPs) and TTP.

**Level of Support**

5-65. Advisors may be active at all levels of support including combat operations. Advisors must be cognizant that the level of training they are providing is at either higher or lower levels of intensity than the other FID operations going on elsewhere in the HN. A wide range of possibilities confronts an advisor in this regard. An advisor may be working with elite military or paramilitary forces at a high degree of readiness. This same unit may then be part of a very selective use of lethal force used in a FID operation primarily focused on nonlethal programs. Conversely, the greatest need for ARSOF advisors during combat operations may be with conventional HN units far from a state of readiness sufficient to be operationally deployed. In addition, advisors can be active with HN units in and around U.S. indirect and direct support not involving combat. Combat operations may concurrently be going on elsewhere in the HN as well. In general, advisors will be training on a continuum from less readiness to more that may or may not parallel the level of U.S. support to the HN.

**Advisor Techniques**

5-66. An advisor must always remember that he is an advisor and not a commander. He is not there to lead troops and may alienate both commanders and the rank and file if he acts as if he is. The art of advising involves empowering commanders and their personnel as much as the tactical situation allows.

5-67. Having the counterpart select a particular COA is only possible if he perceives the advisor has the professional competence to give sound advice. If the counterpart does not believe the proposed solution to a problem is effective or realistic, he will question the advisor’s competence. The advisor must explain to his counterpart why the advice is sound.

5-68. The advisor does not use bribery or coercion, because results achieved from these actions are only temporary. As soon as the payment is made or the force is removed, the counterpart has no reason to comply. In practice, these techniques are not efficient and will not achieve the long-term goal of developing proficiency, competence and, perhaps most profoundly, initiative in the counterpart.
5-69. The advisor must be careful not to unintentionally bribe or coerce a counterpart. He must be aware that through an association with an American ARSOF Soldier his counterpart might have privileged status in the HN. The advisor’s presence may garner personal benefits for the counterpart through his position of having a one-on-one association with an American. Conversely, the advisor may make a counterpart afraid of offending to the point of complying with every suggestion the advisor makes. Detecting and avoiding or eliminating these perceptions can be a key to success.

5-70. Psychologically pressuring a counterpart is not recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last resort, because it may irreparably damage the relationship between the advisor and his counterpart. However, psychologically pressuring the HN counterpart may sometimes be successful. Forms of psychological pressure may range from the obvious to the subtle. The advisor never directly threatens, pressures, or intimidates his counterpart. Indirect psychological pressure may be applied by taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S. commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart to force the subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological pressure may obtain quick results. However, this type of pressure has very negative second- and third-order effects. The counterpart may feel alienated and possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. This may translate to the unit or portions of it that may develop similar feelings.

5-71. Advising works both ways. The advisor sets an example for the counterpart by asking his advice. The advisor must realize that the counterpart is the expert in his country and that he can learn much from him. The advisor must treat his counterpart as an equal. He must also give the respect he himself expects to receive. He must take care not to make his counterpart feel like an errand boy.

5-72. The advisor transacts important business directly with his counterpart to ensure full understanding of difficult subjects. He uses the soft approach to request official information. The advisor does not present too many subjects at one time or unnecessarily prolong the discussion of one subject. The advisor schedules another conference later if needed.

5-73. The advisor identifies and corrects the most important deficiencies first. Upon his arrival in the AO, an advisor will typically find many areas in need of immediate corrective action. Immediately telling counterparts the breadth and depth of all problems is counterproductive. Rather, the advisor identifies the good systems and policies and praises his counterpart on his successes. At this point, the counterpart will normally point out deficiencies that need correction and a joint problem-solving process can begin. In addition, when making recommendations, the advisor phrases them in a way that will not impose his will on the HN commander’s decisions. The advisor leaves enough room for his counterpart to exercise his judgment and prerogative. If not given this latitude, troops may see the advisor’s counterpart as dependent upon him. The advisor carefully chooses a time and place to offer advice.

5-74. The advisor must not be afraid to tactfully counsel against a bad decision. The general maxim is to act as a staff member who recommends a change of action to an American commander he respects and with whom he works daily. In addition to clearly bad decisions, ambiguously communicated or misunderstood decisions may require tactful correction as well. The advisor approaches the subject under discussion from different directions and with different words to ensure the advice is clearly understood. He does not accept a yes answer at its face value. Yes may mean the person understands but does not necessarily accept the suggestion. It may also be used to cover a lack of understanding. A no answer can be equally ambiguous or even disingenuous. For all of these reasons, the advisor cannot accept information from his counterpart in blind faith. The advisor must check it discreetly and diplomatism.

5-75. The advisor does not hesitate to make on-the-spot corrections; however, he must be extremely tactful. Above all, he does not make the person he corrects lose face in front of his peers or subordinates. Embarrassing the counterpart, in most cultures, can cause a serious loss of rapport and possible mission failure. The advisor respects the almost universal custom and desire of saving face.

5-76. The advisor always exercises patience in dealing with a counterpart. Suggestions and advice may not be immediately applied. The counterpart may have to learn a hard lesson in training or operations prior to implementing change. One method to overcome hesitation is for an advisor to plant an idea and let the counterpart take credit for it.
5-77. Once advisors are committed, their activities may or may not be exploited in PSYOP or PA programs. If the goal of the U.S. IO strategy is to highlight the HN and minimize the role and contribution of advisors, the public information and PSYOP series covering an advised unit may not mention or show U.S. advisors. However, the successful integration of advisors into the HN society, their respect for local customs and mores, and their involvement with CA projects may be judged as effective with other TAs. In formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN and the United States.

5-78. Regardless of how advisors are employed, it must be remembered that advisors are transients. The advisor tries to learn what the previous advisor had tried and has or has not accomplished. The incoming advisor asks the outgoing advisor for pertinent files and thoroughly debriefs him to prevent reinventing the wheel. The advisor keeps an open mind and judges matters himself. The advisor starts preparing a record about the advisory area and duties as soon as possible. Follow-on advisors should then have a complete file to assist them in completing projects.

PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES

5-79. The traits of a successful advisor encompass all the traits of leadership plus the ability to adapt to the environment. This environment changes with the assignment area. To sell himself, the advisor must prove his value and present a favorable personality in the eyes of his counterpart. This selling occurs over time by gradually demonstrating his capabilities in an unassuming but firm manner.

5-80. An advisor must be extremely flexible, patient, and willing to admit mistakes. He must persevere in providing sound advice. He must also possess the ability to be highly diplomatic and possess a high degree of tact. Persistence, balanced with patience, is a favorable trait of an advisor. The advisor avoids rushing personal acceptance by the counterpart. Overselling himself may arouse suspicion and delay acceptance.

5-81. The advisor must know thoroughly the organization, equipment, and tactics of the unit he advises. He must demonstrate an awareness of his counterpart’s problems. The advisor must be unwavering, but not dogmatic, in his approach to any subject. If, however, the advisor is not sure of the subject matter, he says so and takes the steps to obtain the correct information rather than trying to bluff his way through a problem. A successful advisor must have subject matter expertise, the ability to demonstrate his capabilities in an unassuming but convincing manner, and the clear indication of his desire to get along with counterparts and other associates. Receptiveness to learning from a counterpart typically aids this process.

ADVISING DURING COMBAT OPERATIONS

5-82. Generally, personnel participating in advisory activities that fall under SA are restricted by law from combat. The AECA (Section 21) prohibits personnel from being directly or purposefully tasked with providing defense services (including training) or from performing duties of a combatant nature. Nevertheless, advisors retain the right to defend themselves. This prohibition does not mean that advisors cannot be deployed to an HN in which combat is taking place, but rather it means that advisors must deploy to secure locations. Realistically in the age of terrorist tactics and other aggressive IDTs, absolute security for U.S. personnel is neither possible nor mandated by statute. Therefore, SA teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces while that unit is engaged in a planned combat operation or in an operation with anticipated contact with an adversary. However, advising and assisting of the HN unit by ARSOF Soldiers is not restricted in secure areas prior to or after combat operations. SA teams are further prohibited from performing operational duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and maintenance (O&M) of equipment, weapons, and supporting systems.

5-83. Once the President has authorized combat authorizations, ARSOF advisors frequently work with HN units conducting operations. Advising HN units conducting or preparing for imminent combat operations represents a unique and challenging opportunity. ARSOF advisors habitually advise at levels above their U.S. rank. In general, HN commanders will accept this disparity if the advisor utilizes the above advisor techniques judiciously. HN commanders generally recognize the subject matter expertise of ARSOF advisors, recognizing that it is not equal to but greater than a member of the HN military with
commensurate rank. The advisor tactfully advises the commander but never usurps his command or authority. Ideally and typically, this is an established relationship. The advisor does most of his advising while preparing for combat. He bases his advice on his observations or those of his subordinates during past operations. He holds a private critique with the commander upon completion of an operation.

5-84. Although less frequent in FID than in MCO, the possibility exists for ARSOF Soldiers to have formal command of an HN unit as established by a bilateral agreement. In FID, this arrangement typically is also a vehicle for advising and mentoring an HN counterpart so that he can take command of the HN unit. For instance, the advisor may lead a company and simultaneously mentor and evaluate the senior platoon leader for company command. Advising and mentoring in this case should be conducted primarily or exclusively during planning and after action. Advisors should allow for as much autonomy as possible with HN subordinates as long as mission success does not suffer. To accomplish the latter, an advisor may progress from a more directive leadership style to less directive one or may selectively employ a more directive leadership style as the situation allows.

5-85. Regardless of the exact circumstances of the unit being advised, the advisor blends the above techniques with his personal experience and informed judgment to best assist the HN commander and unit in improving their state of readiness and or their execution of operations. Further discussion of advisor techniques and considerations is available in relevant subordinate ARSOF doctrine.
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Chapter 6

Operations

Within a FID program, the military instrument falls into three categories—indirect support, direct support, and combat operations. The levels are not constrained to a specific level of involvement. All levels of support can occur independently or simultaneously, and a specific level of escalation is not required. The type of support is based on an HN and USG agreement; however, FID combat operations require Presidential approval. Combat operations may represent an escalation of previous FID support or may be authorized from the outset of FID. Chapter 7 contains more details of combat operations. Indirect and direct U.S. support of successful FID programs consists of many of the elements listed in this chapter synchronized to fit the situation of a particular country.

OVERVIEW

6-1. Indirect support and direct support make up the majority of ARSOF participation in FID programs. This reflects the majority of USG assistance to the IDAD programs of friendly and allied nations. The ultimate goal of IDAD is to empower the HN to effectively deal with any IDT using its own resources and to eventually eliminate the IDTs. For ARSOF, the goal of FID is to move any IDT from having the ability to force the HN to seek a higher level of support down to indirect support and, ultimately, to the point where ARSOF involvement with the HN military is comprised of routine military-to-military training. In general, the chance of ARSOF personnel facing hostile fire is less in indirect support than direct support, but when supporting the suppression of an armed IDT, the security posture and ROE should always be prepared for the most dangerous COA available to that IDT.

INDIRECT SUPPORT

6-2. When ARSOF units enter a FID operation providing only indirect support, the goal is not merely to avoid escalation of the conflict between the IDT and the HN but essentially to work themselves out of a job. However, indirect support is not necessarily a stage in a continuum of conflict. Indirect support is also generally going to be a significant part of FID operations involving direct support or combat operations. The goal of indirect support is to build strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. These can include unit exchange programs, personnel exchange programs (PEPs), individual exchange programs, and combination programs. Whether a part of a FID program providing other support or a stand-alone program, indirect support enhances the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

6-3. SA is a group of programs authorized by the FAA of 1961 (as amended) and the AECA of 1976 (as amended) or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. SA is a principal military instrument of the USG in assisting a friendly country along with other programs to assist a country with internal threats. The chief agencies involved in U.S. SA activities are the DOS, Arms Transfer Management Group, DOD, JCS, GCC of the unified commands, SAO, and U.S. diplomatic missions. Activities associated with indirect support to FID operations are: equipment, services, and training. ARSOF personnel may be required to support many of these programs and exercises.
Chapter 6

6-4. SA provides equipment, services, and training to supported HN forces. The equipment needs of the supported HN to execute a successful FID program are identified in a comprehensive IDAD strategy. Each SAO coordinates the resulting military equipment requests with the combatant commander’s staff and the Country Team. Finally, the combatant commander endorses equipment requirements and provides recommendations to the SecDef. Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for furnishing military assistance. However, the Services do not include military education and training activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. ARSOF FID planners should be aware that contracted SA-funded assistance under the supervision of a SAO could be substituted for DOD personnel when necessary and feasible. Contracted FID support activities may only affect HN units outside the training and support plans of ARSOF or may need to be factored into ARSOF indirect support. ARSOF units may support the equipping and servicing arms of SA but primarily focus on the training aspects of SA as detailed in the following paragraphs.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM

6-5. The principal means of ensuring America’s security is through the deterrence of potential aggressors that would threaten the United States or its allies. Foreign Military Financing, the USG program for financing through grants or loans to acquire U.S. military articles, services, and training, supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. FMS are made available under the authority of the AECA. Congress appropriates FMS funds in the International Affairs Budget, the DOS allocates the funds for eligible friends and allies, and the DOD executes the program. FMS help countries meet their legitimate defense needs of other countries, promote U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies cement cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces.

6-6. The Administration annually makes specific requests to Congress for the SA budget. The annual request is published in the Congressional Budget Justification. The Congressional Budget Justification, prepared by the DOS, in coordination with the DSCA and other U.S. agencies, is presented to the Congress for those countries for which U.S. assistance is proposed. The Congress reviews the Administration’s request and appropriates the funds for various international assistance programs; for example, ESF; Foreign Military Financing; defense administration costs; voluntary PKO; IMET; and nonproliferation, AT, demining, and related programs.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

6-7. The FMS program is the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. Responsible arms sales further national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between U.S. forces and militaries of friends and allies. These sales also contribute to American prosperity by improving the U.S. balance of trade position, sustaining highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base, extending production lines, and lowering unit costs for key weapon systems. This program also fosters training opportunities for U.S. forces.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6-8. The IMET program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key component of the U.S. SA program. The IMET program provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships. These relationships provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting or transitioning to democratic governments. IMET’s traditional purpose of promoting more professional militaries around the world through training has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism.
COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE

6-9. One program designed to assist nations in CT is the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program. It is designed to assist GCCs with their CT programs by funding foreign military officers and selected civilians to attend U.S. military educational institutions, outside the continental United States (OCONUS) mobile education and MTT courses, and selected regional centers for nonlethal training or other training and education permitted by Presidential and Congressional authorities. The Counterterrorism Fellowship Program is designed to educate foreign military officers and selected civilian officials directly involved in the WOT to build CT capabilities and to provide friendly nations with the tools to enable them to sustain and grow their internal CT capabilities.

HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAM

6-10. The Humanitarian Mine Action Program assists countries that are experiencing the adverse affects of uncleared land mines and other explosive remnants of war. Modern U.S. humanitarian mine action began in 1986, when U.S. Army SF teams in southern Honduras trained Honduran Army engineers to clear land mines from agricultural land north of the Nicaraguan border. Since then, ARSOF has been involved in humanitarian mine action around the globe. The program is directly managed by the GCCs. It contributes to unit and individual readiness by providing unique in-country training opportunities that cannot be duplicated in the United States. A DOD component of the program is training indigenous personnel on mine-clearing procedures, a train-the-trainer program. Training teams can include SF, PSYOP, CA, explosive ordnance disposal, and conventional force engineers.

NONPROLIFERATION

6-11. A major component of U.S. security strategy is the deterrence of countries and nonstate actors from acquiring WMD or, if they already possess them, from proliferating them to other countries or agents. As an ARSOF core task, CP of WMD begins at the indirect support level. The possibility of an IDT acquiring WMD is increasing. ARSOF-provided training may encompass active defense, passive defense, and consequence-management training for HN forces. In addition, education and influence of HN military personnel to encourage conventional approaches rather than reliance on WMD can be an effective means of curtailing the incipient stages of a WMD mind-set.

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

6-12. Exercises conducted are designed to support the GCC’s objectives within a specific theater or region. They are conducted to improve relations, enforce U.S. commitment to the region, improve interoperability with HN forces, and enhance U.S. warfighting skills. These exercises can be CJCS-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored events. Such exercises can positively affect the FID program of the HN in which it is conducted and the regional countries that may participate. Intentional public information and public diplomacy programs, as well as unavoidable media coverage of large-scale exercises, can bolster FID programs within an entire region by demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and friendly nations. In many instances, ARSOF unit involvement in CJCS-, GCC-, and Service-sponsored exercises involves working with SOF counterparts from the HN.

JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING

6-13. The JCET program is specific to SOF. The program’s primary goal is to train the SOF of the combatant command. The program is authorized under Section 2011, Chapter 101, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2011), Special Operations Forces: Training With Friendly Foreign Forces. A historical mission of ARSOF units has been the training of elite foreign forces. ARSOF units derive considerable institutional and individual experience from training HN forces through the JCET program. ARSOF units and personnel gain regional familiarity, cross-cultural understanding, and intensive language training through the JCET program. JCETs also provide access to numerous countries throughout the world that conventional forces would not normally have access to. Recurring JCETs develop habitual relationships with foreign military personnel in general and foreign SOF in particular.
6-14. One requirement of a JCET is that the HN provides the majority of training to the U.S. unit while the U.S. unit provides a lesser amount of training to the HN. To achieve this, training is structured with the HN quantitatively providing more training to U.S. personnel than it receives. Qualitatively, however, the HN may derive considerable, if not more, benefit than ARSOF elements. The goal of the JCET program is not to eliminate this qualitative advantage but rather to derive maximum overall benefit for both U.S. and HN forces. In addition, successive JCETs, especially those involving the same HN units over a period of years, have a cumulative effect. Although not pronounced with new members of the HN unit, this effect is often highly pronounced with professional HN officers and NCOs. Both the HN and the U.S. derive the successive benefit of war-gaming multiple scenarios that might arise in the HN.

**MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS**

6-15. An MTT is a tailored and typically task-organized element that is defined in part by JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as “a team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a FN, to give instruction.” However, in the case of ARSOF small units, the entire unit might deploy. This broad definition indicates what MTTs have become—any Service or civilian element conducting training at the trainees’ home station. Originally pioneered by ARSOF, the term MTT is now used broadly, including by other USG agencies, as well as civilian industry and enterprises. However, ARSOF MTTs are unique in the capabilities they train, with the common exception of training general light infantry tactics and some other combat arms tasks. Frequently, ARSOF MTTs train selective or elite HN military or paramilitary elements. An ARSOF MTT will fall under the funding laws and regulations of either the FAA or AECA.

6-16. MTTs are used to train an HN element that requires on-site instruction and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. An MTT may be single-Service or joint, SOF or conventional forces. Employment of an MTT is on a temporary duty basis for a period not to exceed 179 days, including travel. However, an ARSOF MTT may deploy for shorter periods, including deploying and training select HN units during a JCET. An MTT may teach one or two iterations of one of the many short, intensive ARSOF-specific courses, to include advanced special operations. If HN forces require training for longer than 179 days, training in the U.S. should be considered as an alternative. Frequently, an in-country MTT is under the supervision of the Country Team and is generally OPCON or administrative control to the SAO. In cases where a GCC is on the ground in the HN, preexisting joint and Army C2 relationships are maintained.

6-17. JP 1-02 states the mission of an MTT “is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill.” In general, a longer MTT will train an HN unit in more than one area, to include self-sufficiency in some SOF tasks. Shorter MTTs tend to train one specific area or mission set. Several factors may be considered in deciding to employ an MTT, and deployment of an MTT may not be the best option to accomplish HN training. Frequently the decision to deploy an MTT is based on the following factors:

- The training must take place as rapidly as possible or in response to a specific threat or adverse condition affecting the security of the HN.
- The training is inclusive and accomplishable within the time mandate.
- The training reaches either large numbers of trainees or critical upper-tier or elite HN forces in sufficient numbers to materially affect the situation in the HN.
- The training is in ARSOF-specific tasks or common tasks trained to a high level.
- The training requires use of ARSOF language-qualified Soldiers or expertise in the use of interpreters in a teaching environment.
- The training can only practically be trained (typically because of the HN fiscal situation) in the HN.

6-18. MTTs follow the same principles as all ARSOF FID trainers and ideally have HN linguistic experience. Regional cultural experience is necessary for MTT personnel. Typically, the MTT coordinates with the SAO or regional security officer for logistic, training, and security needs, among others. Under the legal guidelines for MTTs, some portion of the costs associated with MTTs may be born by the embassy or the HN. Some of these expenses can legally be satisfied by several agencies. Coordination is done on a case-by-case basis. Subordinate ARSOF doctrine provides more information on MTT procedures.
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

6-19. Exchange programs primarily increase military contacts and military-to-military understanding and interoperability. Exchange programs can range from the exchange of a single person to a battalion. Exchange programs allow for the use O&M money for the exchange of units or individuals. They may be used to enhance the efforts of the SA programs funded under IMET that allow HN personnel to train in the United States. These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs include the following:

- **Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program.** This program is for squad- to battalion-sized elements. Each force trains the other nation’s force in TTP. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained U.S. forces for untrained HN forces. This requirement may preclude ARSOF unit involvement.

- **PEP.** The PEP is a 1- to 3-year program in which one person from the HN is exchanged with a U.S. member. This program, like reciprocal unit exchanges, requires that the exchanged personnel be of comparable proficiency in their area of expertise.

- **Individual Exchange Program.** This program is similar to the PEP. The difference is that it is a temporary duty assignment in theater. The shorter duration of this assignment may make it a more viable option to ARSOF commanders than the PEP.

COMBINATION ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE SUPPORT

6-20. ARSOF’s role as trainers significantly increases the likelihood that ARSOF units will be the first U.S. forces to begin conducting direct support. Because of the nature of ARSOF’s capabilities and core tasks, ARSOF units may be the only units conducting direct support in some FID operations. Conversely, ARSOF units may also be the only elements conducting indirect support (training) during FID operations involving combat operations. The most frequent combination of types of support by ARSOF units is the instance of simultaneously conducting training of HN personnel while conducting activities such as de minimis HCA, civic action programs, and PSYOP. ARSOF personnel in these instances train and participate in the action. For instance, a JCET may train toward and culminate in a medical assistance program that involves HN and U.S. SF, CA, SOAR, and PSYOP personnel.

DIRECT SUPPORT

6-21. In the course of direct support, U.S. forces provide direct assistance to the HN by actually conducting operations to support the civilian populace or the military. This support can be evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support. 10 USC authorities usually fund direct support. Direct support may include training local military forces. The intent of direct support is to increase support to the HN, which may be in conjunction with indirect support. Typically, direct support is conducted when the HN is not yet self-sufficient against IDTs and is facing a security challenge that is beyond its ability to overcome. Direct support may not involve combat operations. The goal may be to keep U.S. forces from participating in combat operations, which may stem from political concerns, or to ensure the HN remains in the forefront of all operations to ensure or gain legitimacy. However, stricter ROE guide U.S. forces should they become involved in unplanned combat operations when conducting direct support activities. Typically, without the authorization of combat operations at the Presidential level, ARSOF units will be constrained to self-defense actions in the event of hostile action.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-22. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations defines CMO. This broad, generic definition denotes the decisive and timely use of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities. These activities include assisting host or friendly countries in bringing about political, economic, and social stability while encouraging the development of a country’s materiel and human resources. FM 3-05.40 further defines CMO as activities conducted by military units to enhance military effectiveness, support national objectives, and reduce the negative aspects of military operations on civilians. These activities
include PRC, FHA, NA, SCA, and CIM. CMO during FID operations support the internal development of the HN. They focus on the indigenous infrastructure and population in the OE. Successful CMO will support the development of favorable attitudes, feelings, or behaviors among the populace toward the HN IDAD projects.

6-23. ARSOF Soldiers other than CA personnel frequently become involved with CMO activities because of their association with civil and military leaders within their OE through the conduct of their missions. In general, other ARSOF elements can help CA units assist HN military forces develop effective CA programs that generate interest in the populace to support the IDAD programs of the HN government. In some instances, CA units will be more effective, more credible, or both if the population perceives them as independent of other ARSOF activities.

6-24. During mission analysis, the overall commander of FID operations may determine the need for augmentation by one or more Civil Affairs teams (CATs). A large-scale FID operation could involve a much larger force structure and possibly standing up a CMO center. Any such contingency is likely to involve some USAR CA units as outlined in FM 3-05.40. Just as with all ARSOF units, the template of FID operations for the minimal element (in this case a CAT) is relevant to larger FID operations as well. The following paragraphs will highlight CAT direct support to FID.

6-25. Early CA augmentation will build on the ARSOF unit’s understanding of the political, economic, social, religious, and cultural factors that will influence their operations in the HN. The CAT will be responsible for producing the ARSOF unit CMO estimate and CA annex to the ARSOF unit OPLAN. The CAT also assists the ARSOF unit with a postdeployment area assessment to update area studies.

6-26. CA personnel working with other ARSOF units on a FID mission provide expertise and advisory capabilities in the area of CMO. They—

- Review U.S. SA program and HN IDAD goals.
- Plan CMO to support the HN plan.
- Plan CMO according to the three phases of insurgency described in this manual.
- Train HN military to plan, prepare for, and conduct MCA programs, PRC operations, NA, and other CMO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
- Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
- Identify specific CMO missions the HN military will conduct.
- Train on the TTP required to protect the HN from IDTs.
- Develop indigenous individual leader and organizational skills to isolate insurgents from the civil population and protect the civil population.

6-27. CMO are the responsibility of military commanders at all levels. The successful military unit establishes a good working relationship with appropriate civil authorities and nonmilitary agencies in its OE. ARSOF units must demonstrate how supported HN forces can integrate CMO into their military operations.

Populace and Resources Control

6-28. Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, operations can be disrupted by the movement of frightened civilians in the environment, as well as movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities. PRC operations consist of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. For practical and security reasons, military forces use PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the full spectrum of operations. PRC operations can be executed in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations to include FID.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

6-29. FHA encompasses short-range programs, such as disaster relief, NEOs, HCA, NA, and dislocated civilian operations, aimed at ending or alleviating present human suffering. FHA is usually conducted in response to natural or man-made disasters, including combat. FHA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibility for
providing FHA. The GCC’s military strategy may include FHA to support FID operations as a component of the overall program to bolster the IDAD capability of the HN.

6-30. HCA programs can be valuable to the GCC’s support of FID programs and in training U.S. forces. HCA programs are specific programs with funding authorized under Section 401, Title 10, United States Code, Humanitarian and Civil Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military Operations. HCA programs assist the HN population in conjunction with a military exercise.

6-31. ARSOF units, in conjunction with HN units, may be directly involved in providing FHA to a needy populace. 10 USC 401 governs the use of U.S. military forces in HCA. Some forms of FHA may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary activities.

6-32. In FID operations, ARSOF units may also act as the coordinating or facilitating activity for FHA provided by the international NGOs responding to the emergency needs of a community in the FID OE. The unit should get its HN military unit counterparts involved in this activity as early as possible to foster public support for the HN military. Exploitation of FHA done by the HN military through PSYOP series, PA, and public diplomacy is generally beneficial.

**Nation Assistance**

6-33. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or wars based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation. NA operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs often include but are not limited to SA, FID, 10 USC (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations. All NA activities are usually coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the Country Team. NA subtasks are SA, FID, and MCA.

6-34. Successful MCA projects win support of the local population for government objectives and for the military forces in the area. MCA employs mostly indigenous military forces as labor. These projects are planned as short-term projects. Projects must conform to the national plan and fit the development program for the area. Examples of these projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range education programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects.

6-35. For an MCA program to be successful, the local populace benefiting from the projects must have a voice in the selection of projects and the establishment of priorities. Units must review (pretest) all projects with the populace before beginning the project. They must also conduct a posttest with the local people to determine whether the project met the objectives. Failure to follow up can negatively impact the overall IDAD mission in the area.

**Support to Civil Administration**

6-36. SCA encompasses military operations that help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. SCA occurs most often in stability operations. Some civil administration support is accomplished as an adjunct to other CAO, namely PRC, FHA, and NA. SCA operations consist of two distinct mission activities—civil administration in friendly territory and civil administration in occupied territory.

**Civil Information Management**

6-37. Civil information is developed from data relating to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events within the civil component of the commander’s OE. This data can be fused or processed to increase the situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance of the DOD, interagency, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI. CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, and other agencies in the JIIM environment to ensure the timely availability of information.
Other Considerations

6-38. Cultural characteristics in the OE are important to the local populace and require protection from military operations. In FID operations, ARSOF units may need to tactfully approach HN forces to locate and identify religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places and to seek recommendations against using them for military purposes. This may be a sensitive subject if either the HN or an IDT has violated religious or historic sites in past operations. It is incumbent upon the ARSOF unit to help the HN forces determine methods and operational techniques that will be most acceptable to the populace and still allow for completion of the military mission.

6-39. If required, ARSOF units, with CA support, may support civil administration missions with the HN government. Typically, this will be in areas reclaimed from the control of the insurgency or other IDT. Direct support helps HN military forces plan and conduct MCA. Since MCA is part of the overall U.S. SA program, formal agreements between the HN and the United States govern this support and CAO.

6-40. PA support to CMO primarily informs the populace about the many things the HN government and military are doing for the people. PA products can also keep the people abreast of the political, economic, and social situation in other parts of the country and tactical and strategic successes of the government over insurgent forces. In addition, PSYOP series may use such successes to encourage or discourage behaviors in TAs at other locales. Various media, such as loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio broadcasts, may prepare, induce, or exploit things like the following:

- How effective are the PRC measures that are in effect?
- What behaviors will bring PRC measures to an end?
- What civic action projects are being conducted in the area?
- How can TAs access or support programs?
- How effective is encouraging the reporting of IDTs at interfering with or sabotaging programs?

6-41. ARSOF units must observe the laws of armed conflict and ROE. Units must quickly report human rights violations by HN or IDTs. Beyond this, ARSOF units must be proactive and act promptly, within their capability, to prevent or stop human rights violations.

Direct Psychological Operations Support

6-42. PSYOP typically must be an integral and vital part of an HN IDAD program. The only exception to this rule would be if the HN has employed PSYOP in the past and lost credibility with TAs or with the majority of the population as a whole. However, this may not preclude U.S. PSYOP forces from executing programs in the HN if they have credibility with intended TAs. At the other extreme, ARSOF Soldiers may have to educate their HN counterparts in the value and role of PSYOP in FID. PSYOP elements then must advise and assist HN forces in developing and implementing an effective PSYOP program. An effective PSYOP plan depends on timely information, as well as intelligence, that includes knowledge of the—

- History, culture, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential TAs.
- Organization, motivation, sources of personnel and material supply of the IDT.
- Strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political proponents and opponents.

6-43. PSYOP can be used to gain the cooperation or noninterference of critical TAs within the populace. PSYOP programs target not only IDTs or foreign groups but also TAs within the HN. Planners tailor PSYOP to meet specific needs for each area and operation. They evaluate the psychological impact of all military actions. A strict approval process governs PSYOP programs. In FID, PSYOP approval may be maintained at the highest levels, namely at the Presidential or SecDef levels. However, even in a politically sensitive or volatile FID operation, approval is frequently delegated at least to the COM or GCC. Approval can be delegated as low as the divisional level. ARSOF Soldiers as a whole must be aware that PSYOP are sensitive, strictly controlled activities that produce mid- to long-range results. They must communicate these facts to the HN chain of command and any unfamiliar elements in JIIM operations.
6-44. PSYOP support the achievement of U.S. national objectives and target specific TAs. A common misconception is that PSYOP can target mass audiences with blanket programs. PSYOP target specific TAs to induce a specific behavioral change. Mass public information programs are a function of PA. Examples of PSYOP goals for the common critical TAs in FID operations follow. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, provides more information on PSYOP.

6-45. PSYOP can support the FID mission by seeking to encourage or reinforce behaviors that discredit the IDT to supporting or neutral groups and inducing withdrawal of support for IDTs or preventing recruitment of supporters from neutral TAs. Other frequent SPOs intend to incite dissension among the IDTs, and induce defections at all levels of support for and within the IDT. Divisive programs create or exploit dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the IDT. Target audience analysis (TAA) may show that IDTs are susceptible to national programs to win insurgents over to the government side with offers of amnesty or rewards. Typically, this TAA will reveal potential motives for returning to lawful participation in society or government that can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and discouragement. TAA may also reveal that pressure from the security forces is exploitable as a persuasive agent.

6-46. PSYOP should ultimately strive to identify the cause of IDT behaviors or the contributing factors that are driving these behaviors. By isolating the cause, PSYOP can target the perceptions and beliefs that are fueling the IDT’s operations. PSYOP programs can also influence and change behaviors to indirectly deal with an insurgency or other IDT, such as the reporting of IDT activity through various means.

Civilian Population

6-47. Various TAs in the HN civilian populace are frequently the main or critical TAs to the overall FID operation PSYOP support program. Sometimes these are large TAs or several large TAs with similar vulnerabilities and susceptibilities. Conversely, sometimes only a small proportion of the populace confined in a limited number of TAs are the base of support for an IDT. In such instances, TAs may be less susceptible to PSYOP series directed toward them and may require programs of longer duration. Other goals for civilian TAs may be to actively demonstrate the resolve of the HN and U.S. forces to prevent mistrustful behaviors, such as giving false reports. PSYOP may also seek to gain civilian population TAs’ support of security measures that restrict the population, such as curfews and checkpoints.

Host-Nation Military and Paramilitary Forces

6-48. The HN military or paramilitary forces may be an important TA in the overall PSYOP program. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of these forces are critical factors in FID operations. Programs can emphasize building the morale and professionalism of military and paramilitary forces by encouraging or discouraging specific behaviors. Frequently, these programs are double-edged; for instance, a military TA might be exposed to PSYOP discouraging graft and corruption while simultaneously being exposed to other series encouraging participation in off-duty charitable or community programs.

Neutral and Third-Party Elements

6-49. PSYOP can support FID operations by encouraging participation in activities that project a favorable image of the HN government and the United States. This can include series that both seek to induce a behavior in neutral TAs and concurrently highlight the successes or benefits incurred by other participants. PSYOP can indirectly inform the international community of U.S. and HN intent and goodwill through such series. The effects can be multiplied through coordination with PA activities and products that have the express goal of informing only. PSYOP can also gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the threatened nation by revealing the nature of the IDT’s subversive activities.

External Hostile or Enabling Powers

6-50. Strategic PSYOP can seek to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile or enabling power sponsoring or condoning IDTs or enabling powers simply supplying material or services for a profit. PSYOP series are designed to cause any hostile or enabling power or organization supporting the IDT to
cease supporting them. A common approach when the IDT is suffering reverses is the inevitability that the insurgency or other IDT will fail.

Assessment

6-51. Personnel conduct a psychological assessment for all FID operations. If a PSYOP element is deploying to a FID operation, it will complete this assessment. In the event PSYOP personnel are not part of the FID deployment package, as thorough a predeployment assessment as possible should be provided and augmented with site survey data. However, this solution is not preferable. ARSOF units facing this second situation should consider requesting assets from the regionally oriented PSYOP battalion during predeployment or isolation to assist in mission analysis. To determine PSYOP requirements during mission analysis, the ARSOF unit assesses the psychological impact of its presence, activities, and operations in the OE. The ARSOF unit reviews the OPLAN or operation order to ensure it supports U.S. and HN PO. This factor is critical. Unit personnel analyze all official duties and consider the psychological impact on the populace when an ARSOF unit participates in events, such as military ceremonies, religious services, and social gatherings. In addition, ARSOF units must determine the practicality of planning and conducting training during national or religious holidays.

Coordinated Efforts in the Host Nation

6-52. The potential exists for all ARSOF units to integrate relevant PSYOP themes into their normal activities with HN civilians and military. Much as trained PSYOP personnel conduct face-to-face PSYOP, all ARSOF units can reinforce these products by simply repeating the same core ideas to their counterparts or to the public they are dealing with. In a JSOTF or SOTF setting, this can be highly synchronized with the PSYOP staff or element providing coordinated talking points to other ARSOF units. In addition, other ARSOF elements can disseminate approved PSYOP products to TAs they may encounter.

Protocol

6-53. During FID operations, all deployed personnel must conduct themselves in a culturally appropriate, professional manner. They must observe local customs and local traditions and properly balance them so as not to violate U.S. Army standards of conduct. All units conducting FID must understand HN and local customs, courtesies, and taboos. It is frequently incumbent upon ARSOF Soldiers as the knowledgeable regional specialists to impart this knowledge to conventional forces and JIIM partners. As U.S. representatives to the HN, Americans can have a psychological impact on the mission by their actions (whether good or bad, or on- or off-duty). The supporting regional PSYOP battalion along with the appropriate Country Team offices can assist ARSOF and conventional units with cultural mores and development of a rapport-building program.

Host-Nation Considerations

6-54. In addition to tactical or regional PSYOP units, all ARSOF units may have to advise or assist HN forces in gaining or retaining the support of the local populace, discrediting the IDTs, and isolating the insurgents or other IDTs from the populace. In this instance, unit personnel can greatly influence the HN forces in conducting themselves in accordance with acceptable military norms, mores, and professionalism. ARSOF personnel may train the HN military or government leadership in the advantages and techniques of maximizing public opinion in favor of the HN. However, this may entail first correcting obvious behaviors in these leaders that are alienating potential supporters among the HN civil populace.

6-55. The use of PSYOP assets and techniques will greatly enhance the effectiveness of FID programs. However, it is necessary to have a planned, proactive approach in PSYOP units, sister-ARSOF units, and any JIIM elements. All ARSOF units potentially may advise and assist HN forces in how to use PSYOP to support their FID and IDAD objectives and to integrate PSYOP capabilities. In some instances, the first step in this process may be to curtail behaviors in the HN military or government that run counter to the PSYOP program. This first stage may be analogous to the medical Hippocratic Oath of “first doing no harm,” and ARSOF units must be prepared to spend considerable effort in some cases at this stage.
MILITARY TRAINING TO HOST-NATION FORCES

6-56. During direct support to FID operations training of HN military does not completely cease. On the contrary, the HN situation during direct support FID operations typically represents an escalation of IDT capability or, at a minimum, an increase in the intensity and frequency of IDT attacks. Therefore, an increased need for military training beyond that of indirect support may emerge. During direct support, this may translate into a greater focus on training HN SOF and elite paramilitary forces as conventional forces step up training of HN counterparts.

6-57. During an escalating situation, an increased emphasis on IDAD becomes important and training may focus on specific subversion, insurgency, or other complex IDT-incited situations encountered by the HN that may be beyond its capabilities to control. At this point, ARSOF units may increase forces or reconfigure current deployment packages to both continue training of HN forces and to conduct direct support in areas that the HN is unable to execute or has too few resources to execute to sufficient levels. ARSOF units may adapt their operations in this manner. In addition, deployment of additional capabilities may be necessary to train and conduct more complex direct support operations.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

6-58. FID direct support (not involving combat operations) typically involves some increase in logistic support to the HN military. The logistic support discussed here does not include activities authorized under SA. U.S. law limits these logistic support operations, which usually consist of transportation or limited maintenance support. Appendix A provides detailed legal and policy concerns. Authorization to provide this type of support is contingent upon a major emergency that threatens the internal security of the HN. Normally, this type of support is authorized for limited periods to accomplish very narrow objectives. In some cases, the President or SecDef may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the HN and to exercise the mechanisms and processes of logistic support. ARSOF may provide expertise, intelligence, security, CAO, PSYOP, or other direct support for aspects of such a show of force, especially if the situation has not previously escalated to direct support.

6-59. Planners integrate logistic support into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict with ARSOF forces conducting direct support. Major employment considerations that should be considered when providing logistic support as part of the theater FID program in general and direct support include the following:

- Review and update definitive ROE and FP measures.
- Educate all members of the command on permissible activities for the logistic support mission.
- Determine whether more- or less-restrictive FP measures and site security are necessary.
- Determine new or heightened OPSEC and essential elements of information.
- Ensure understanding that equipment and supplies may not be transferred to the HN military.
- Ensure understanding of procedures and limitations of logistic support allowed.
- Update a logistics assessment file on logistic resources available in-country, including any changes in—
  - Local supply availability.
  - Warehousing and maintenance facilities.
  - Transportation assets and LOCs.
  - Labor force availability
  - Likely ARSOF-specific equipment and supply issues.
- Ensure equipment maintenance and training packages meet the needs of the HN and are sustainable.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS SHARING

6-60. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing among the HN, Country Team, interagency, and DOD intelligence staff. The sharing of U.S. intelligence is always a sensitive area that must be evaluated
based on each FID situation. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the United States and HN are vital; however, disclosure of classified information to the HN or other multinational FID forces must be authorized. Any element within the JIIM environment can restrict intelligence sharing to lower levels. ARSOF units should strive to include the HN as much as possible. This may be easier to accomplish with HN-specific intelligence than with regional or global intelligence. Similarly, ARSOF CI elements can provide support in kind with HN counterparts, security service, and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations.

Assisting the Host Nation From Indirect to Direct Support

6-61. The initial focus of assistance in this area will be to evaluate HN intelligence and communications architecture. The United States considers the needs of the HN, as well as its technical expertise and equipment, when evaluating HN systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect the HN’s environment, threats, and resources.

6-62. Following the evaluation, the United States determines how the FID program may assist the HN. The assessment identifies HN equipment deficiencies. During indirect support, the SA process will normally provide U.S. assistance in equipment. However, this may change during direct support to the greater use of U.S. equipment and expertise.

6-63. SA normally conducts training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support. Exchange programs and daily interaction with HN military intelligence and communications assets may provide some limited informal training benefits. During direct support, a similar training support of other HN military personnel may take place with ARSOF personnel splitting efforts between conducting direct support operations and training select intelligence specialties.

Considerations

6-64. The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must be aware of as they conduct intelligence- and communications-sharing activities in direct support of the FID program:

- Direct most intelligence and communications assistance efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. U.S. assistance that creates a long-term reliance on U.S. capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.
- Scrutinize any training assistance provided to ensure that it is within legal authorizations, and ensure that information or processes are not revealed without authorization.
- Use ARSOF-specific assets and capabilities appropriately and in situations beyond the capabilities of the HN.
- Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN.
Chapter 7

Combat Operations

If the situation of the HN government deteriorates during FID operations to the point that vital U.S. interests are in jeopardy, the President may commit U.S. forces in a combat role to affect a decisive change in the conflict. Should combat operations become necessary in the course of FID operations, it represents an escalation of IDT capability or a deterioration of the HN ability to counter an insurgency or other virulent IDT. Combat operations (by U.S. forces) are not the norm in FID operations; however, FID operations that have involved combat operations have historically also been long term and expended a great amount of resources in defense of essential U.S. interests or grievous violations of basic human rights.

OVERVIEW

7-1. It is unlikely that FID operations will begin with combat operations. However, FID operations that have grown out of an SSTR contingency may again degenerate to the point of U.S. involvement. Regardless of the process by which combat operations come about, they represent the extreme edge of FID operations where the situation in the HN can decrease in intensity or escalate from FID up the continuum to MCO and, perhaps, regional conflict. Application of decisive but simultaneously discriminate U.S. combat power can prevent this latter contingency. ARSOF units can provide a vital component of combat power and, by stated ARSOF imperative, engage the threat discriminately.

7-2. Direct U.S. military intervention can provide HN forces with the time and space to regain the strategic initiative and resume control of tactical operations. In this situation, the committed U.S. combat force is likely to find in-country SF, PSYOP, CA, and other ARSOF teams with a myriad of formal and informal arrangements and contacts. The GCC fully exploits ARSOF experience and contacts during the critical transition period when a larger force is deploying into the country. Incoming forces immediately exchange liaison personnel with the ARSOF headquarters to exploit their advice and assistance. In addition, in an escalating situation these liaisons can assist the GCC in determining total ARSOF force structures needed and requesting these assets. The headquarters provides all possible advice and assistance, to include providing—

- Situation and intelligence updates for incoming SOF and conventional force commanders and their staffs.
- In-place ARSOF elements for initial coordination with HN and U.S. mission agencies.
- Coalition support teams to facilitate integration of the HN forces into the overall plan.
- Real-time intelligence and operational reporting along with training status and operational capability assessment of HN units.
- Advisors to HN units to facilitate relief-in-place once specific objectives are met in selected sectors within the HN.
- Supervision of HCA efforts in remote areas to support the HN IDAD strategy.
- Plans, contacts, and liaison for broad CMO or CAO to alleviate civilian crises or interference.
- Psychological preparation of friendly and neutral TAs in HN or region for greater U.S. or coalition presence.
- Counterpropaganda support.
- Aggressive PSYOP series and PSYACTs planning that stress the inevitability of abject failure and defeat of the IDT.
Immediate PSYOP outlining methods of defection and surrender.
Possible UW plans for areas controlled by IDTs.
Time-sensitive interdiction of strategic and operationally critical targets through direct action by SF or Rangers.
Immediate capability to support personnel recovery.

7-3. Generally, personnel participating in activities that fall under SA are restricted by law from combat. The AECA (Section 21) prohibits personnel who are providing defense services (including training) from performing duties of a combatant nature. Training and advising activities that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities outside the United States are prohibited. Specifically, SA teams shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces in a combat situation. SA teams are prohibited from performing operational duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the O&M of equipment, weapons, and supporting systems. Therefore, even in authorized combat operations, these personnel will either need to remain conducting their current SA operations or be formally relieved from those duties and reassigned to operations in which they can carry out Title 10 activities, including combat operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR UNITED STATES COMBAT OPERATIONS

7-4. The manner in which ARSOF elements and other U.S. forces conduct combat operations does not change in FID operations. Nevertheless, the United States must consider certain areas at the operational and strategic levels of war when conducting combat operations in support of an HN’s IDAD program. Many of the considerations discussed in the other two categories of FID operations (direct and indirect support) remain important in tactical operations. Because the civilian populace remains a focus in FID operations even during authorized combat, one of the most notable areas the United States considers involves the coordinated use of PSYOP and CA, as well as coordination with JIIM agencies operating within the HN.

HOST-NATION INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

7-5. If a nation has reached a point in its internal affairs that it requires combat support from the United States, it will typically already have a comprehensive IDAD strategy. In addition, the Country Team, the GCC, and ARSOF units will usually also have a long history of supporting the IDAD program and interacting with the relevant HN IDAD organizations. At this point, these organizations must maximize all instruments of power to defeat the IDTs. USG agencies, including ARSOF elements, must be involved in this coordination and control process at the appropriate levels. The HN IDAD organization will become broader and larger at the point that the President authorizes combat operations by ARSOF and other U.S. forces.

Force Structures

7-6. Historically, SOF elements (principally ARSOF with a majority of SF, PSYOP, and CA) initially lead COIN efforts, including those in FID operations. In some instances, this force structure, when released to conduct combat operations, may be sufficient to put the HN back in a dominant position. If the HN situation takes a rapid turn toward favoring the IDTs (for instance, if there is a sudden influx of new armed elements across a porous HN border) or the IDTs continue to gain strength, the deployment of additional SOF elements or conventional forces will normally be required.

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Focus

7-7. When FID operations include combat operations, it is probable that these operations will be joint (perhaps from the outset) and include multinational operations involving the HN and the United States. If the HN requests broader support from mutual defense partners, regional defense associations, or the United Nations, other multinational forces may be involved at this point as well. An increase in interagency coordination should also be anticipated, with the possibility of the involvement of more OGAs than in indirect or direct support operations.
Transition Points

7-8. U.S. forces establish transition points for combat operations. These are situation dependent rather than time dependent. Transition points establish conditions for the return of combat operations to the HN forces. These can be different in various geographic locations. One subnational area or city of the HN may be entirely under HN control while another would be in serious peril of falling into IDT control without U.S. forces to assist in maintaining security.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMBAT OPERATIONS

7-9. An early priority for U.S. combat operations is to identify, integrate, and, where necessary, restore logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means. In a nonmature FID operation, this may be a chief issue, as the HN may not yet have built these capabilities to the levels set out in their IDAD program. Although ARSOF trainers and advisors may have had limited to no involvement in assisting the HN in these areas, they may have evaluated the need and shortcomings in these areas. When tactically feasible, HN forces should conduct actual combat operations and combat support. This increases the legitimacy of the HN government and reduces HN dependency on U.S. forces. IDT attacks may affect the areas of HN combat support, intelligence, and (notably) logistics most.

Offensive Operations

7-10. ARSOF conduct combat operations with the same goal as indirect and direct support operations, namely, to assist local governments and HN military forces to gain self-sufficiency against IDTs. Combat operations provide time and security to regroup and refit as necessary and then regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of ARSOF operations will be FP rather than destruction of adversary forces. Gaining the strategic initiative is the responsibility of the HN. Proactive control of the psychological fight shapes a perception that—

- The HN is capable of defeating the IDTs.
- The HN is not subservient to the United States or the coalition.
- The HN is responsive to its citizens.
- The HN is committed to defending its citizens.

7-11. In addition, commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure that they do not create the impression that the United States is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat internal threats. For instance, ARSOF commanders plan operations in which HN counterparts will either be a significant or lead player. If not, ARSOF units operate unilaterally until counterparts can fulfill this role.

Human Rights Considerations

7-12. Human rights considerations are central to all FID operations. Successfully deterring abuses typically requires greater vigilance during combat operations. Forces must maintain strictly respect human rights. This includes U.S., HN, and other participating multinational forces. Repression and abuses of the local population by the legitimate government reduces the credibility of and popular support for the HN government and causes the consideration for withdrawing U.S. support. Therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high ground.

Use of Force

7-13. Because of their universal proximity to civilians, carefully balanced ROE are required in all IW operations. ROE for FID combat operations may be the most restrictive of any IW operation. Forces must reach a balance between FP, danger to innocent civilians, and damage to nonmilitary areas. Close contact with civilians require that Soldiers are trained on when to use force, what type of force to use, and the degree of force to use. This training is a great enabler of successful FID combat operations. Balanced
responses to IDT attacks can be achieved with Soldier training, coupled with leaders cognizant of the need for proportional and, when tactically feasible, minimal force.

7-14. Balanced force requires restraint. Too lenient ROE may quickly destroy the infrastructure gains of previous IDAD development programs and cause civilian casualties that alienate the HN government and military from the people. Commanders must prevent the indiscriminate use of force. ARSOF commanders not only may have to find precision methods of interdiction but also may frequently have to advise frustrated HN commanders against reacting with disproportional force.

7-15. Balanced force requires resolve. Too restrictive ROE unnecessarily restrict interdiction of IDTs that have no self-imposed restrictions on the use of violence. If the ROE prevent effective self-protection of U.S. and HN forces, they further an insurgency or other IDT in the goal of wearing down those forces. In this situation, the IDT begins to win the battle of perception with the civilian populace that the U.S. and HN military cannot provide a secure environment for it. Commanders therefore must closely monitor the OE and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE, as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes.

Intelligence

7-16. The U.S. intelligence network must tie into the Country Team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military CI elements can provide liaison with local HN military CI and security and police services in their areas. Typically, information required for FID combat operations places a greater emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) efforts than on technical collection capabilities. In addition, large portions of the intelligence process in combat operations will focus on determining key personalities and cells for lethal interdiction. However, the intelligence process cannot neglect social, economic, and political information because the needs, perceptions, and sympathies of the civilian populace are similar to key terrain in FID operations. ARSOF units must be aware of changes in the OE that might require a change in tactics not only in the lethal sphere but also in the nonlethal as well.

Defensive Operations

7-17. It is antithetical for the ARSOF Soldier to pursue a defensive COA. By training, doctrine, and temperament the stress in operations is on gaining and maintaining the initiative. However, experience has shown that many HN militaries or portions thereof are more effective in the defense than on the offense. In addition, the mind-set of civilian populations is inherently defensive. Civilians typically seek security. They may be willing to participate in activities that secure their own neighborhoods or homes but may never be willing to participate in anything other than home defense. Establishing secure areas using HN forces, civilian watches, and other static means can be balanced with ARSOF units and select HN (typically designated elite) forces conducting patrols and offensive operations. In addition, PSYOP programs can influence the HN to adopt behaviors and attitudes that garner popular support for offensive operations. However, this may have to be accomplished in stages.

Ongoing Foreign Internal Defense Programs

7-18. The initiation of combat operations does not equal the suspension of other FID. In actuality, PSYOP, CMO, SA, FHA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. Training of HN SOF elements by SFODAs, PSEs, and other ARSOF teams may actually increase as well. The FID planning imperatives of taking the long-term approach, tailoring support to the HN needs, and the HN bearing IDAD responsibility remain important throughout the combat operations phase. One way of infusing others with this belief in self-reliance is to create a sense of urgency and accomplishment by increasing the goals of previously begun FID programs. However, even if the HN seeks to do so, this must not be done by compromising training standards in the interest of speed.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

7-19. In FID combat operations, as in all operations, the chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate. The President retains command authority over U.S. forces. In some instances, it may be beneficial to place appropriate U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In FID, this will typically be a commander from the HN, but it conceivably could be from another coalition partner to demonstrate regional resolve to back the legitimate HN government. In making that determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed U.S. force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. In addition, the choice will typically also serve to delegitimize the insurgency or other IDT as much as possible.

7-20. Planners tailor C2 relationships for FID combat operations to the situation based on the size and composition of the U.S. force committed and the political, social, and military environment of the HN. Whether holding the top command of combat operations or not, the HN government and security forces must remain in the forefront. HN security forces must establish strategic policy and objectives. Typically, these will have evolved from earlier IDAD strategy and will have involved input from U.S. planners or advisors. Planners should establish a single multinational headquarters to control combat operations. ARSOF planners assist the integration of ARSOF elements into a combined joint special operations task force (CJSOTF) or other established C2 structure. It is also possible that some or all ARSOF units remain under U.S. C2 while other U.S. forces remain part of a combined command under HN C2. ARSOF C2 relationships are adaptable. However, all C2 relationships will be clearly and unequivocally established prior to ARSOF units conducting combat operations.

SUSTAINMENT

7-21. The sustainment requirements of combat operations during FID operations are similar to those for other types of operations. Like all IW operations, the chief variable in FID operations is the support available from and in the HN. Political sensitivities, concern for HN legitimacy, and the overall desirability of a minimum U.S. presence affects the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. The general principles that should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations in FID are the following:

- Maximize the use of HN capabilities, including routine services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces U.S. overhead and the number of U.S. and third-nation personnel required in the HN.
- Maximize the use of existing facilities, such as ports, airfields, and communications sites. New or expanded facilities, if built, should be in keeping with the original development portion of the IDAD plan.
- Minimize the handling of supplies for short duration operations (90 days or less). Provide support through existing organic support packages and through air LOCs.
- Establish medical self-sufficiency. Many areas of the world where the United States is likely to conduct FID operations do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient HSS for combat operations during FID operations. At a minimum, commanders must establish adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, patient movement, and preventive medicine to support these operations.
- Optimize the use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible. Minimize the evacuation of equipment evacuation for repair.
- Utilize both intertheater and intratheater airlift routinely to deliver supplies.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

7-22. U.S. combat involvement in FID operations has traditionally focused on COIN. Although the potential exists for other IDTs to become dangerous enough to require combat operations to be conducted against them, generally only an ideologically motivated insurgency will sufficiently unite and draw enough support for this eventuality. In addition, this ideological motivation is predominantly political or politico-religious. Insurgents by definition are willing to use violence to secure their goals. However, there is a
broad continuum of degrees of violence insurgents are willing to use. The United States may authorize combat operations against insurgencies that strike principally military targets or those that deliberately target innocent civilians. The principal center of gravity and most common lapse in focus for COIN forces is the HN civilian populace. The insurgency that loses focus of this center of gravity quickly fails.

7-23. Insurgents who target civilians generally do so for two reasons. First, they may want to lead the HN populace or portions of it to erroneously believe that HN or U.S. forces deliberately target civilians. Second, insurgents target civilians to promote sectarian violence. Insurgencies do this either as a general destabilizing tactic or as genuine partisans of one subgroup of the population. Quite often, the latter is a historically disenfranchised group. ARSOF elements conducting COIN during FID combat operations must constantly track and counter sectarianism by all parties. As the situation deteriorates in the early stage of FID combat operations, this may chiefly consist of preventing HN counterparts from becoming sectarian in their words or actions.

7-24. COIN techniques to some degree are an inherent subset of all FID operations. Clearly, not all COIN techniques are going to translate directly to an IDT that is predominantly motivated by and pursuing crime. Should such an IDT attempt to take on the trappings of a political or religious ideology, it is frequently useful in the influence fight to characterize the IDT as what it truly is, namely a group of bandits and thugs masquerading as revolutionaries or holy warriors. At a tactical level, however, interdicting them may closely resemble COIN techniques against a classic insurgency.

7-25. The underlying principals of FID operations and the TTP for them do not change during combat operations. Such is also the case when those combat operations involve COIN. The primary pitfall for ARSOF units engaged in COIN during FID combat operations is to shift from a balanced FID program to an over allocation of resources on lethal COIN at the expense of separating the insurgents from the civil populace and, more importantly, securing the support of the HN populace for their government.

TERRORISM

7-26. If a nation is susceptible to any one type of IDT, the possibility of terrorism or organizations intent on conducting terrorist activities occurring in conjunction with that IDT or independent of it exists. As stated above, although much of the FID effort remains focused on COIN, U.S. FID programs may aim at other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as terrorism. Emphasis should be on helping the HN address the root cause of instability in a preventative manner rather than reacting to threats. Unemployment, drug trafficking, violent crime, social unrest, and internal conflicts all promote violent solutions like terrorism. Terrorism affects all aspects of a nation’s defense and development. FID programs of all types, such as HA and especially CT, can prevent, reduce, or stop mitigating factors that can contribute to the beginning or spread of terrorism.

7-27. Fighting the WOT is an effort the United States cannot do alone. It must be a global collaborative effort. The DOS leads this collaborative effort and the DOD supports it through numerous programs, which include military FID operations. These programs either directly or indirectly deter threats of terrorism within an HN and prevent the spread of a global threat by—

- Training and advising HN forces to deter crime and subversive activities.
- Sharing intelligence and communication to increase international awareness of terrorist organizations.
- Supporting CD to stop or minimize narco-terrorism.

7-28. FID programs combat secondary enablers of terrorism as well. An HN involved in combat operations against an IDT, such as an insurgency continues or as discussed above steps up programs that make the internal environment less favorable to terrorists using the HN as a base, safe haven, or means of recruitment and fund-raising. FID programs that reduce incidents of corruption, increase opportunities for employment, or even decrease the theft of intellectual property can make the HN less attractive to terrorists. Just as all instruments of an HN’s national power may be targeted by terrorists, all instruments of national power should be used against terrorists. In combat operations that will typically also include lethal and nonlethal targeting of terrorist elements whether they are part of the principal IDT or not.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

7-29. JP 3-13, Information Operations, defines IO as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, Psychological Operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. The ultimate targets of IO are human. Systems, networks, and a myriad of electronics assist the decision-making process and aid in the attainment of information superiority, but ultimately, both the cognition and the will of human minds direct an adversary’s efforts. Cognition can be reduced by degrading or eliminating systems, but the human will may remain. An adversary, at least on the localized level, may have a greater will to resist when denied information than when provided with information.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE COMBAT OPERATIONS INFORMATION OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

7-30. IO, notably PSYOP, involve complex legal and policy issues, requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval. In FID combat operations, political sensitivities may result in the retention of PSYOP approval at the highest levels. Additionally, IO require intelligence support for effective targeting and assessment. ARSOF units may generate significant portions of IO-relevant information requirements (IRs). Conversely, the answers to the commander’s IO-related commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) may require tasking ARSOF elements to fill intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs.

7-31. ARSOF typically coordinate IO through information operations staff section (G-7) and the IO cell. The IO cell deconflicts and synchronizes IO throughout the operations process to achieve unity of effort supporting the joint or Army force. As appropriate, IO target or protect information, information-transfer links, information-gathering and information-processing nodes, and the human decision-making process through core, supporting, and related capabilities.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ROLE IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

7-32. ARSOF Soldiers employ the organic core capability (Figure 7-1, page 7-8) of PSYOP primarily to eliminate the will of an adversary to resist and secondarily to degrade his ability to process information correctly on a cognitive level. ARSOF support the IO core capability of military deception with lethal and nonlethal effects. SF units employ the supporting capability of precise physical attack to degrade or destroy information systems while simultaneously producing the second-order effect of demoralizing those who learn of the physical attack. CA and other ARSOF elements support the related IO capability of CMO through multiple means and methods including CAO.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

7-33. PSYOP, when properly synchronized and integrated, aid in legitimizing the FID program by developing and maintaining internal and international support while preempting potential or existing insurgent propaganda. All ARSOF units conducting operations in support of FID combat operations can expect a high degree of interaction with the HN military and civilian populace. This interaction creates psychological effects. In addition to mission support by TPTs, PSYOP elements assist other ARSOF units in dealing with this interaction by—

- Familiarizing them with the PSYOP program and with how ARSOF activities affect the civilian population including—
  - Likely actions that will cause difficulty for civilians and result in frustration and hostility.
  - Attitudes and likely behaviors of TAs.
  - Susceptibility of local TAs to persuasion or negotiation.
- Providing talking points consistent with PSYOP series.
- Addressing topics, themes, and symbols that should be avoided.
- Supplying products from PSYOP series that can be disseminated to local TAs.
Chapter 7

7-34. In combat operations, PSYOP efforts will appropriately balance bolstering and deterring the HN military, encouraging and discouraging behaviors in civilian TAs, and, when applicable, targeting IDTs. In addition, strategic PSYOP may address regional TAs; for instance, the leadership of a bordering nation may be discouraged from interfering with internal HN matters. PSYOP will coordinate its program through the IO cell with PA efforts and those of the Country Team and OGAs. At the tactical level, support is provided to maneuver elements, including SFODAs, to conduct surrender appeals, accomplish reduced civilian interference, and provide support to civilian internee facilities.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

7-35. During FID combat operations, CA support to CMO, such as FHA planned prior to the escalation to hostilities, continues wherever the security situation allows. Like other areas of the FID program, these activities may actually increase in scope during combat operations. The goal of alleviating the root causes of the HN’s IDT problem is abandoned during combat operations. Doing so will fuel the IDT’s cause. Typically, the IDT is aware of this fact and steps up attempts to sabotage all programs improving conditions for the HN populace.

7-36. CA units and ARSOF units supporting them will also typically face a surge in humanitarian crises, at a minimum at localized spots, during FID combat operations. Typically, forces will encounter issues with dislocated civilians varying from relatively isolated incidents to a major crisis requiring a large-scale response. CA units may liaise and work with IGOs and NGOs heavily in this instance. Other examples of increased concern during combat operations are—

- Identifying religious, historical, and cultural sites in need of safeguarding in combat areas.
- Identifying potential infrastructure targets of the IDT.
- Providing representatives for targeting boards or cells.
- Providing cultural awareness training to incoming U.S. forces.
- Planning and executing PRC to evacuate endangered populaces.
Redeployment of ARSOF units conducting FID operations does not typically indicate the end of all FID operations in the HN. Rather, in long-term FID operations as security and other conditions improve and IDTs become manageable for HN personnel, direct military-to-military training by ARSOF units will continue, but this training may become more intermittent with gaps between regular exercises. In ongoing FID operations, however, continuous coverage by ARSOF units generally involve, whenever possible, mission handoff from one ARSOF unit to its replacement. Redeployment, if conducted haphazardly or prematurely, can set FID operations back substantially.

OVERVIEW

8-1. Commonalities exist between redeployments that involve direct handoff and redeployments that involve intermittent deployments. In the latter case, the possibility always exists that situations during routine training and military-to-military contact will arise causing handoff to a relieving force. Typically, this will involve the original unit or select members of it extending their presence in-country to provide continuity or to stay in place as part of a more robust force. Redeployment may also involve a transition from DOD execution of programs to DOS or OGA execution. In both immediate mission handoff and intermittent FID operations, capturing lessons learned in thorough postmission debriefings is essential to continue to build institutional ARSOF FID knowledge and refine FID keystone doctrine, TTP, and training.

TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS

8-2. The nature of the termination will shape the futures of the HN and regional countries. It is essential to understand that termination of operations is a vital link between national security strategy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and the national strategic end state. A poorly conducted termination of FID operations can have a long-term impact on USG relations in the HN; the region; and, potentially, in more than one region. Some level of operations normally will continue well after intensive FID support has ended. The possibility of an extended presence by U.S. military forces to assist FID operations should be considered during the initial planning and recommendation for execution.

TERMINATION APPROACHES

8-3. There are three approaches for achieving national strategic objectives by military force. The first is to force an imposed settlement by the threat of or actual occupation of an enemy’s land, resources, or people. Destroying critical functions and assets, such as C2 or infrastructure, or making the adversary unable to resist the imposition of U.S. will supports the threat of occupation or actual occupation. In FID, this approach is typically only taken with intransigent IDTs and the approach differs from other operations in that it still involves a preponderance of HN effort in any imposed settlement.

8-4. The second approach seeks a negotiated settlement through coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions, which convince an adversary that to yield will be less painful than continued resistance. In FID, military power alone will rarely compel an IDT to consider a negotiated conclusion. Rather, military success in providing security to the HN populace coupled with the other functions of the HN IDAD program may induce an IDT to negotiate under terms acceptable to the HN
government. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to operations requires time, power, and the demonstrated will to use both. However, some IDTs by their nature may not be viable candidates for negotiation. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there may be an armistice or truce, which is a negotiated intermission in operations, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. The efficacy of an armistice or truce must be weighed against the potential damage done by legitimizing an IDT.

8-5. The third approach for achieving national security objectives in relation to the irregular challenges posed by nonstate actors is an indirect approach that erodes an adversary’s power, influence, and will; undermines the credibility and legitimacy of his political authority; and undermines an IDT’s influence and control over and support by the indigenous population. This approach is necessary with an IDT unwilling or unacceptable to enter into discussion with.

**NATIONAL STRATEGIC END STATE**

8-6. The first and primary political task regarding termination of intensive FID operations is to determine an achievable national strategic end state based on clear national strategic objectives. For specific situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated major operations), the President and SecDef typically establish a set of national strategic objectives. Achieving these objectives is necessary to attain the national strategic end state—the broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. In FID, this is determined with the HN civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state that is mutually beneficial. Specified standards are approved by the President or the SecDef that must be met before a FID operation can be concluded or transitioned to a less intensive level of support.

**MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS**

8-7. In its strategic context, military success is measured in the attainment of military objectives supporting the national strategic end state and associated termination criteria. Termination criteria for a negotiated settlement will differ significantly from those of an imposed settlement. Military strategic advice to USG and HN leadership regarding termination criteria should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability, as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to reach the criteria. An essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and the enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives continue upon the conclusion of sustained operations. Premature reduction of FID support can trigger a rapid and dramatic upsurge in IDT activity, strength, and political viability. Proper use of the informational instrument of national power mitigates the possibility of any vestigial IDT elements characterizing a reduction in military commitment to a U.S. or HN strategic or tactical reversal.

**MISSION HANDOFF PROCEDURES**

8-8. During long-term continuous FID operations, the ARSOF commanders may elect to replace teams for a variety of reasons. Time is not the only governing factor. Changes in the HN OE may require reshaping force packages as situations change for better or worse. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support a commander’s decision to rotate teams or units; for example, new equipment may be fielded to an incoming unit that the outgoing unit lacks. Regardless of reason, mission handoff is necessary and is defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.

8-9. The overall authority for the handoff and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming commander since he will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission will continue.

8-10. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handoff process and the assumption of the mission directly or through a liaison. If this advice conflicts with the mission statement
Redeployment

8-11. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing ARSOF unit under the incoming unit’s OPCON during the changeover process. Although this procedure would present a clear and easily defined solution to establishing the incoming commander’s authority, it is not the most effective control for U.S. forces should hostile contact occur during the process.

8-12. If the incoming ARSOF unit or the HN unit it advises is in direct-fire contact with insurgents or another IDT during the handoff, the ARSOF unit immediately notifies the higher headquarters ordering the exchange. If the incoming ARSOF unit commander has not assumed responsibility, his unit immediately comes under OPCON of the outgoing unit and is absorbed into that ARSOF unit position. The outgoing ARSOF unit commander and his HN counterpart will control the battle. If the outgoing ARSOF unit commander has passed responsibility to the incoming unit commander, the outgoing unit comes under the OPCON of the incoming unit, and the HN unit coordinates its movements with the new ARSOF unit. ARSOF units in advisory or combat roles receiving nonlethal fires should follow these same procedures.

CONSIDERATIONS

8-13. Although the considerations listed below are intended primarily for a direct handoff between ARSOF units, the considerations listed below must be considered when handoff is made to a conventional force unit or OGA. In addition, the considerations should be taken into account in a mature FID operation where there may be lag time between deployments. In this latter case, preparing an analysis of the considerations listed below will aid the incoming commander on the next iteration. The incoming and outgoing ARSOF commanders or OGA lead representative must consider the ten factors discussed below.

MISSION

8-14. The incoming ARSOF commander must make a detailed study of his unit’s mission statement and understand the present mission tasks and the implied mission tasks. The mission may also require a unit with additional skill sets, such as advanced special operations, near-real-time connectivity, CA functional specialists, or complex media production ability. Knowing the mission, commander’s concept of the mission, CCIR, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and IRs will help him understand the mission. After a complete in-depth study of the operational area, the incoming ARSOF unit commander should complete the handoff in a manner that allows for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the adversary to gain any operational advantages.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

8-15. The in-country ARSOF unit provides continuous information updates to the incoming commander. PIRs and IRs were established for the original mission along with operational, strategic, and tactical information. The incoming ARSOF unit must become familiar with the ongoing PIRs and IRs, and the upcoming mission PIRs and IRs along with their linkages to planned nonlethal effects.

ADVERSARY COMPOSITION

8-16. The incoming ARSOF unit commander must have the latest available intelligence on all IDTs that affect the mission. This intelligence includes comprehensive data on terrorists and terrorist-related incidents over the previous several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming unit commander on a regular basis, the situation may call for a liaison from the outgoing unit. OPSEC is critical to prevent the enemy from discovering the impending relief and then exploiting the fluidity of the change and the concentration of U.S. forces.

FRIENDLY UNITED STATES/MULTINATIONAL FORCES

8-17. To the incoming ARSOF unit, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The unit must be familiar with the C2 structure it will deal with on a daily basis. The incoming unit must know all friendly units in adjacent OEs and be aware of the conventional forces units and the capabilities of their mission support base. The incoming unit must also be aware of other
operations, units, and their capabilities. If U.S. combat support units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the ARSOF units they support.

HOST-NATION FORCES

8-18. The incoming ARSOF unit plans and prepares for a quick and frictionless transition in counterpart relations. However, potential or anticipated friction between the HN unit and the incoming unit may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing units need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handoff. If possible, the incoming unit members should receive biographical data on their counterparts, to include photographs. This information allows unit members to become familiar with their counterparts before deployment and to determine which advisor techniques may need more emphasis. Execution of the mission must continue within the capabilities of the incoming unit, the HN unit, and the available supporting assets.

CIVILIAN POPULACE

8-19. All incoming ARSOF units must do an in-depth area study, giving close attention to local problems. General demographic data may be available from sister ARSOF units that can be expanded upon for unit-specific needs. Popular support for U.S. activities taking place within the OE may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing unit must provide this critical information and describe in detail all completed civic action projects and those that are underway. The incoming unit must understand the functioning of the HN government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its OE.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

8-20. Some handoff operations may require select ARSOF units, such as SFODAs or TPTs, to move by foot or by animal mounts into and out of the OE. In such instances, the outgoing unit plans and reconnoiters the routes used for infiltrating the incoming unit and those used for its exfiltration. These routes must provide the best possible cover and concealment. If possible, the units make this exchange during darkness or inclement weather. ARSOF units must consider significant terrain or weather features that may impede movement. Limitations of media coverage or difficulties to civic action projects because of these features are two common examples. In addition, weather conditions and significant elevations can greatly affect SOAR operations. These factors can critically affect resupply and HSS (notably medical evacuation procedures) as well.

TIME

8-21. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted will determine the time required to exchange ARSOF units. Ideally, there is an overlap period to allow the incoming unit to become familiar with the OE and to establish rapport between the incoming unit personnel and their HN counterparts. However, the handoff operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more ARSOF personnel in the OE become a vulnerable and lucrative target for IDTs. A quickly executed relief will reduce the time available to the enemy to strike before the incoming unit has time to consolidate its position. The incoming unit should not sacrifice continued and uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming unit needs to have enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and to conduct debriefing on lessons learned.

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

8-22. For the ARSOF unit being relieved of a function by an OGA handoff, procedures will typically entail longer handoff times and more complex coordination. However, the other areas of consideration still apply and in fact may be a greater issue for an OGA. Outgoing ARSOF units that have past, present, or future projects planned with OGAs must provide for the transfer of these projects to new responsible agents in the incoming unit. Outgoing unit personnel need sufficient time to put incoming unit personnel in contact with OGA counterparts. In addition, the outgoing unit should brief the incoming unit on any OGA programs affecting ARSOF FID operations.
CONTINUED ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INVOLVEMENT

8-23. The constant and unbroken presence of ARSOF units in FID operations is not a foregone conclusion. In FID operations, gaps in deployments of ARSOF units may be unavoidable. In addition, limited or single ARSOF disciplines may be present on an ongoing basis. In these instances, the ARSOF units with a constant presence must maintain continuity and brief sister-ARSOF units on aspects of the OE. A JSOTF or SOTF providing structure for continuity at the staff level during gaps or when forces are not available can ease the transition.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING PROCEDURES

8-24. The ARSOF unit commander conducts a debriefing that provides an overview of the mission and all relevant informational subsets. The range of topics can include military geography; political parties; military forces; insurgents; security forces; underground, lethal and nonlethal targets and TAs; ongoing CAO; logistic and HSS issues; ongoing JIIM projects or operations; and E&R. In addition, HN-specific concerns that are relevant in one FID operation may not be in another. The commander should also codify and debrief any informational subset that may affect mission success.

POSTMISSION DEBRIEFING

8-25. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, the ARSOF unit undergoes an extensive debriefing. The battalion intelligence staff section (S-2) officer typically organizes and conducts the debriefing, subject to unit SOP. The S-2 coordinates with higher-level intelligence organizations to take part in the returning unit’s debriefing, particularly if other organizations tasked the unit to obtain information. All deployed personnel, to include attachments, must be available for the debriefing.

DOCUMENTATION

8-26. After the debriefing, the unit or team commander, with the assistance of other members of the team and attachments, prepares two documents, an after action report (AAR) and a report of lessons learned. The unit historian or other designated person prepares a third document, the unit history of the operation.

8-27. The AAR states the who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the major activities of the team or unit from receipt of mission to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. Within 48 hours of being debriefed, the ARSOF element normally submits an AAR through command channels to the higher command. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of team or unit AARs. If applicable, the unit historian also reviews the AAR and prepares a draft report for entry into the unit history.

8-28. Shortly after completion of the AAR or simultaneously with its submission, the leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the leader’s reflection on his most recent operation and his recommendation for the future. One preparation method is to organize the lessons according to the six warfighting functions: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fire support, sustainment, C2, and protection. This method addresses what worked and what did not work on the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing TTP in the unit.

8-29. The unit historian reviews the report of lessons learned and then completes the unit history for the operation, subject to the commander’s approval. The historian issues an official historical report of the operation in classified and unclassified versions, as appropriate, within 90 days after the completion of the operation.

8-30. Figure 8-1, pages 8-6 through 8-11, provides a general mission debriefing checklist. It is intended as an overview of areas of interest to all ARSOF units. It might serve as the basis for the combined ARSOF mission brief, where the efforts of SOF/ARSOF are in briefed to incoming units in a JSOTF or SOTF. In such instances, the briefing can cover relevant areas for Sister-SOF/ARSOF. The checklist is not considered proscriptive, limiting, or definitive.
## MISSION
- Brief statement of mission by ARSOF commander.

## EXECUTION
- Brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.
- Statement of method of operation accomplished during the operation, to include deployment, routes, activity in HN areas, and redeployment.
- Uniforms and equipment used.
- Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results.
- Communications and media equipment used and results.
  - Organic.
  - HN Force.
  - Contract.
- Casualties (friendly and enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action.
- Friendly contacts established, to include descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.

## MILITARY GEOGRAPHY
- Geographic name, Universal Transverse Mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations.
- Boundaries (north, south, east, and west).
- Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature.
- Terrain.
  - What type of terrain is dominant in this area?
  - What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area?
  - What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation?
  - What is the approximate degree of slope?
- What natural obstacles to movement were observed, and what are their locations?
- What natural or man-made obstacles to media or humanitarian distribution are there?
- What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area?
  - Direction of flow.
  - Speed.
  - Depth.
  - Type of bed.
- What is the physical layout of rural and urban settlements?
- What is the layout of various houses within the area?
- What is the description of any potential landing zones (LZs) or drop zones (DZs)?
- What is the description of any beach landing sites, if applicable?
- What is the descriptions any areas suitable for cache sites, and what are their locations?
- People.
  - What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?
  - What was (or is) their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?
  - What are the principal religion(s) of the area, and how are they practiced?
    - Main, secondary, etc. status.
    - Influence on people.
    - Influence or control on political or judicial processes.
    - Religious prayer times, regular observed days, and holidays.
    - Constraints, laws, and taboos.
    - Conflicts in or between religions, denominations, or sects.
    - Religious themes, symbology, and allegory or folklore.
    - View on conflict and martyrdom.
  - What is the description of the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, characteristics)?
    - Is there a physically differentiated minority?
    - Is there a minority differentiated by other visual cues such as dress or hairstyle?
  - What type clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?
  - Is symbolism or status attached to certain items of jewelry or ornaments?
  - What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?
    - Between males and females?

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*Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide*
MILITARY GEOGRAPHY (continued)

- Between young and old?
- Toward marriage, birth, and death?
- Between the populace and local officials?
  - **What is the ordinary diet of the people?**
    - Self-imposed restrictions.
    - Chronic dietary deficiencies.
    - Cyclic, seasonal, or localized deficiencies.
  - **What was the attitude of the populace toward U.S. and HN forces?**
    - Friendly target groups or specific TAs.
    - Neutral or uncommitted target groups or specific TAs.
    - Hostile target groups or specific TAs.
    - Specific behavioral changes noted.
    - Anecdotal occurrences or spontaneous events during current deployment.
  - **What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the HN troops toward the government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?**
  - **How did the populace cooperate with ARSOF units?**
  - **What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?**
  - **What formal and informal educational practices were observed?**
    - IDT interference.
    - IDT sponsorship.
  - **What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area?**
  - **Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how?**
  - **What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages?**
  - **Did any member of the populace approach or ask questions about ARSOF’s presence or the mission?**
    - If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

**POLITICAL PARTIES (Major, Minor and/or Illegal Parties)**

- Targeted by HN or ARSOF.
  - For IDAD support or as FID target.
  - Lethal, nonlethal, or both.
- Fundamental ideology.
  - Authoritarian or elitist. Populist or democratic.
  - Secular, theocratic, or mixed.
  - Attitude toward HN government.
  - Attitude toward U.S. government or ARSOF.
- Leaders.
  - Key Communicators.
  - Willing or unwilling to support PSYOP program.
  - Effectiveness as spoiler or antigovernment/anti-U.S. firebrand.
- Policies.
  - Influence on government.
  - Influence on the people.
    - Peaceful/cooperative or militant/front group.
    - Cooperative to PSYOP program.
    - Used in PSYOP series targeting another TA(s).
  - Overall effectiveness.
    - Percentage of electorate: claimed vs. actual turnout.
    - Money, real influence, covert influence, spoiler, etc.
  - Foreign influence.
    - Ethnic and/or ideological.
    - Regional.
    - International.
    - Stability, strength, and weaknesses.

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**Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)**
### MILITARY

- Friendly forces.
- Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength.
- Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Degree of training and combat effectiveness.
- Morale: general and specific:
  - General psychological strengths and weaknesses.
  - Degree of stratification—number of TAs.
  - Psychological vulnerabilities/susceptibilities.
  - Targeted by HN and/or U.S. PSYOP—effectiveness.
  - Targeted by IDT/foreign propaganda—effectiveness.
- Mission.
- Leadership and capabilities of officers and NCOs compared with those of the United States.
- Logistics.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
- Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.
- General relationship between HN military forces, the populace, and other forces (paramilitary, police, etc.).
- Influence on local populace.
  - Credibility.
  - Lingering effects of past bad acts/incompetence.
  - Anecdotal or empirical evidence of improvement(s).
  - Leaders or rank and file as used as key communicators/disseminators.
  - Significant operations and/or PSYACTs w/outcomes.
- Recommendation for these forces (military and/or paramilitary) for UW contact.

### INSURGENT OR OTHER INTERNAL DEFENSE THREAT FORCES*

- Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength.
- Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.
- Mission.
- Leadership capabilities.
- Logistics.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment.
- Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship between insurgent forces, ARSOF units, and the populace.
- Influence on local populace.

* Sub bullets used to describe friendly forces typically applicable to IDT(s). Eliminated for brevity.

### POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES* (Friendly and Adversary)**

- Disposition, strengths, and location.
- Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Logistics.
- Motivation, reliability, and degree of training.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship with the government and local populace.

* Sub bullets used to describe friendly forces typically applicable to IDT(s). Eliminated for brevity here and in following subsections.

** Combined in example for brevity. Should be covered separately.

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*Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)*
## AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND (Friendly and Adversary) *

- Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
- Morale and general effectiveness.
- Motivation and reliability.
- Support.
  - Logistics.
  - Intelligence.

* Combined in example for brevity. Should be covered separately.

## TARGETS

Describe the area:

- Rail system.
  - General route.
  - Importance to the local and general area.
  - Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
  - Bypass possibilities.
  - Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.
  - Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction.
  - Security.
- Telecommunications system.
  - Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.
  - Location of power sources.
  - Location and capacity of switchboards.
  - Critical points.
  - Importance to the local general area.
  - Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating at a minimum.
  - Security.
- Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) storage and processing facilities.
  - Location.
  - Capacity of storage facilities.
  - Equipment used for the production of POL.
  - Power source.
  - Types and quantities of POL manufactured.
  - Methods of transportation and distribution.
    - Rail.
    - Truck.
    - Ship.
    - Air.
    - Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.
  - Security.
- Electrical power system.
  - Location and description of power stations.
  - Principal power lines and transformers.
  - Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
  - Critical points.
  - Capacity (kilowatts).
  - Principal users.
  - Security.
- Military installations and depots.
  - Size.
  - Activity.
  - Location.
  - Units.
  - Equipment.

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*Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)*
TARGETS (continued)

Describe the area:

- Reaction time.
- Security.
- Highway and road system.
  - Name and number.
  - Type of surface, width, and condition.
  - Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
  - Bypass possibilities.
  - Traffic density.
  - Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
- Security.
- Inland waterways and canals.
  - Name and number.
  - Width, depth, and type of bed.
  - Direction and speed of flow.
  - Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions.
  - Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance crew, facilities, and reaction crew.
  - Location and description of navigational aids.
- Natural and synthetic gas system.
  - Location and capacity of wells and pipelines.
  - Storage facilities and capacity.
  - Critical points.
  - Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction time.
  - Principal users.
  - Security.
- Industrial facilities.
  - Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities in wartime to the production of essential military materials.
  - Type of facilities.
  - Power sources.
  - Locations.
  - Sources of raw materials.
  - Number of employees.
  - Disposition of products.
  - General working conditions.
  - Critical points.
  - Security.
- Lethal PSYACTs.
- Restricted targets for cultural, infrastructural or psychological value.
- Nonlethal targets:
  - CAO only targets.
  - CAO with PSYOP support.
  - Initial PSYOP program.
  - Major Series.
  - Initial TAs.
  - TAs dropped.
  - TAs added.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

- To what degree does hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?
- What cash crops are raised in the area?
- What domestic and wild animals are present?
- What animal diseases are present?

Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)
### HEALTH AND SANITATION (continued)
- What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?
- What systems are used for sewage disposal?
- What sanitation practices did we observe in the populated and unpopulated areas?
- What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?

### EVASION AND RECOVERY
- From which element of the populace is assistance most likely?
- What, if any, safe houses or areas for E&R purposes can be recommended?
- What type shelters were used?
- Were fires small and smokeless?
- Were shelters adequate?
- Was food properly prepared?
- Were campsites well chosen?
- Were campsites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one?
- HN/U.S. PSYOP support to E&R?

### CAO
- Has the end state been achieved for CAO supporting CMO?
  - HN transition plan.
  - Has coordination for handoff been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
    - If no, remaining benchmarks.
  - Have the underlying causes of the conflict been ameliorated?
    - To what degree?
    - If still existing, how do they influence future planning?
- What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish remaining CA activities?
- New humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements during current deployment.
- Will any ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
- CA Functional Specialists that remain behind and residual requirements for each:
  - Rule of Law.
  - Economic Stability.
  - Infrastructure.
  - Governance.
  - Public Education and Information.
  - Public Health and Welfare.
- Who will support CA forces that remain behind?

### MISCELLANEOUS
- Weather.
  - Wind speed and direction.
  - Temperature.
  - Effect on personnel, equipment, and operations.

Figure 8-1. Postmission debriefing guide (continued)
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Appendix A

Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

This appendix provides general guidance on legal, regulatory, and policy considerations for FID operations. It is not directive; rather, it serves as a base document of law and policy existing as of the writing of this manual. Law and policy are subject to rapid change because of new U.S. congressional legislation and Presidential executive policy changes. In addition, the concept of international law is even more fluid and far less codified outside the realm of certain international treaties, such as the Geneva and Hague conventions. Law and policy concerns have potential long-term organizational impact for ARSOF. A single violation, real or perceived, can have profound impact on multiple SOF imperatives. This situation may warrant the building of a hedge around the letter of the law with plans and policies that exceed minimum standards. At other times, this situation warrants aggressive pursuit, prosecution, and interdiction of IDTs that maximizes full use of all legal means at a commander’s disposal. Given this, ARSOF commanders must draw on the expertise of their legal staff and the organic sociopolitical expertise of SF, PSYOP, and CA Soldiers before establishing FID plans and policy. Constant monitoring of the legal ramifications of operations is also necessary.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A-1. The term international law bears the inherent connotation of being hierarchically above national law. Conceptually, much of the developed world looks at the ideal of international law as functioning much like federal and state law function in the United States. Jurists, political scientists, and members of the legal academic community attempt to define what international law should consist of, and various bodies debate how international law might be enforced. New standards of law and policy may emerge very quickly on a conceptual level. However, the historical precedent is that international treaties regarded as having the weight of law are often difficult to develop, slow to gain widespread acceptance, and largely unenforceable until after a conflict.

DISTINGUISHING SENTIMENT, POLICY, AND LAW

A-2. The underlying international sentiment as to what is acceptable behavior in conflict and war often rapidly outpaces formal treaty adoption and ratification. In short, the collective, largely unwritten will of a majority of the international community can become de facto international law. In addition, the USG often formulates and champions this emerging law and policy. In the WOT’s contemporary operational environment, international policy and sentiment has been greatly debated among the legitimate nations- states of the world, and terrorist forces and sympathizers have attempted to shape and exploit that debate to their advantage. ARSOF Soldiers conducting FID operations face similar conditions unless and until international law codifies terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of violent lawlessness. Even as such codes, laws, and conventions emerge, units conducting FID operations will likely always face disinformation and propaganda that vilifies legitimate military, reconstruction, and law enforcement efforts as violations of what the adversary will refer to as international law.

TREATIES WITH THE WEIGHT OF LAW

A-3. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, when the Republic of Montenegro adopted the four conventions of the Geneva convention in 2006, it was the 194th country to do so. More
than any other documents, the Geneva and Hague conventions and their protocols hold acceptance as international law. This has not prevented individual commanders, units, and even nations from ignoring the basic humanitarian precepts of these conventions. It is likely that selective violation of these conventions will continue for some time to come. However, even when faced with adversaries who ignore the principles and codes of international law, like the Geneva and Hague conventions, the United States has remained steadfastly committed to upholding the conventions since their inception.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-4. A declaration of war and an invasion of one country by the armed forces of another clearly result in international conflict. The definition of an international conflict is broader, however. As a rule, if the combat effects of a conflict go beyond a nation’s boundaries and seriously affect other countries, the conflict is international. All the customary laws of war on hostilities between states govern international armed conflicts. The Geneva convention and all other treaties that make up the laws of war also apply. As a practical matter, an important concern of the Soldier fighting in this type of war is his right to prisoner of war (POW) status if captured.

NONINTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

A-5. Noninternational conflicts are typically called insurgencies. Clandestine forces usually engage in hostilities. Their purpose is not to hold fixed territory or to engage government troops in direct combat but to wage a guerrilla-type war. In this war, they can hide in the civilian populace by posing as noncombatants. Insurgents, therefore, are organized bodies of people who, for public political purposes, are in a state of armed hostility against the established government. An important legal aspect of a noninternational conflict is that captured combatants do not enjoy the rights of POWs. The HN can prosecute these combatants as criminals. The fact that an insurgent follows the rules of war or is in uniform will not give him POW status under international law. Article 3 of each of the four Geneva conventions of 1949 provides the primary source of rights and duties of persons involved in noninternational conflicts. Common Article 3 has two parts.

First Part

A-6. The first part provides that persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those out of combat because of sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. Humane treatment specifically excludes—

- Committing violence to life and person; in particular, murder, mutilation, torture, or any cruel treatment.
- Hostage-taking.
- Conducting outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
- Subjecting anyone to any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth, wealth, or any other similar criteria.
- Passing of sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as vital.

Second Part

A-7. The second part requires collecting and caring for the wounded and sick. Common Article 3 does not grant POW status to insurgents. It does require the government to grant them a fair trial in a regularly constituted court before carrying out the court’s sentence after a guilty verdict. It is somewhat of a legal gray area whether an HN could execute a lawfully arrived at capital sentence on an insurgent or other IDT that is ill or wounded. ARSOF Soldiers should advise HN counterparts of the potential propaganda value of such an action to a threat organization.
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PLANNING CONCERNS

A-8. ARSOF planners and Soldiers conducting FID operations may often need a detailed knowledge of international law, such as the Geneva convention, for two principal reasons. The first is to educate HN military staffs and soldiers. The second is to counter very specific points of adversary disinformation and propaganda. ARSOF advisors and trainers may have to build either a knowledge base on international law in HN military personnel or an adherence to portions that the HN military has routinely ignored in the past. In addition, this may carry over to transgressions of their own HN laws or building acceptance of new HN laws safeguarding civil liberties. Basic human rights also include other rights, such as the right of free speech, freedom of worship, and freedom of the press, that HN soldiers must uphold in FID operations, because of the concerns of international and U.S. law. U.S. personnel who notice suspected violations of basic human rights must report the facts to their chain of command. Under U.S. law, the President must cut off SA to any country with a documented pattern of human rights abuses.

A-9. IDT propagandists increasingly use factual, partially factual, or entirely fictitious violations of international law, policy, or even sentiment to discredit HN governments. As seen in Figure A-1, page A-4, these attempts are frequently graphic to have the maximum incendiary effect. They often address third countries or international agencies and may cite specific articles of the Geneva conventions. Citing specific portions of the Geneva conventions accomplishes two goals for them. If successful, they appear to have legitimate status as a state actor and they make the HN look like a nation that ignores civil rights and the laws of war. ARSOF Soldiers must infuse an acceptance of the basic tenants of international law among the HN personnel they work with, advise, and train.

A-10. Treaties and international law dealing primarily or solely with nonmilitary matters can be contributory factors to an internal defense issue that necessitates conducting FID operations as well. An IDT can arise or grow substantially more dangerous if the HN becomes a signatory to environmental or economic treaties that adversely affect one sector of the economy. FID planners must develop a comprehensive FID plan that psychologically and economically mitigates these effects. Anticipating security threats to symbolic targets of these treaties, such as compliance or monitoring offices or their personnel, and developing proactive security measures for such sites is a necessity.

A-11. The WOT has demonstrated significant deficiencies in the concept of what constitutes lawful combatant status. The need to further codify the concept of lawful combat, as well as the collective international policing of illegal belligerence and illegal support to unlawful combatants by nation-states, continues to lag behind efforts by select members of the international community to eradicate these elements. ARSOF commanders and planners must constantly communicate the legal status of IDTs while-interdicting them and in PSYOP support and exploitation of that interdiction. Certain TTP may be appropriate against unlawful combatants but not lawful ones and vice versa.

Note. The graphic content of Figure A-1, page A-4, has been edited.

HOST-NATION LAW

A-12. The laws of the HN in which FID operations are conducted can greatly affect plans, deployment, and operations. In most cases, HN law is applicable to U.S. personnel and units conducting FID operations. Beyond this, the political mechanisms, parties, and other influencing agents within the HN can have considerable impact on FID planning and execution. ARSOF commanders need in-depth, timely information on HN law across a broad range of issues to include—

- Civil liberties.
- Criminal justice.
- Fiscal law.
- Graft and corruption.
- Environmental law.
- Military law.
- Emergency and martial law powers.
• Intellectual property law.
• Narcotics law.
• Special interest groups.
• Shadow governments and leaders.
• Political front groups.
• Unwritten law and political conventions.
• Political history of the HN.
• Religious or social policing powers.
• HN international treaty participation.
• Agreements and treaties with United States.

Figure A-1. Propaganda of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam of Sri Lanka attempting to discredit the government for alleged government-sponsored human rights abuses

A-13. ARSOF commanders must be apprised of recent changes to HN law that have come about to support the HN IDAD strategy. Such changes may be in the early stages of implementation in the beginning of FID operations. As the HN implements these legal measures, security situations may change dramatically. Planners must anticipate the reaction of the public to political, social, or economic change in the HN
because of new laws or policies. Opposition or widespread acceptance of new laws can create problems with military significance. For instance, an amnesty program that generates large numbers of defectors from an insurgent group can present logistical and administrative challenges.

### Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines

In January 2002, Joint Task Force 510 made up in large part by SOF personnel deployed to the southern Philippines to assist the Republic of the Philippines (RP) government in the destruction of the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group. The initiation of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines was only accomplished after considerable debate within the RP government and in the national press. The issue was debated on a constitutional level as the RP constitution banned foreign soldiers on Philippine soil except in time of war. Despite the ardent support of President Corazon Aquino and much of the government and with widespread public support, there was still considerable opposition to the presence of U.S. troops. An eventual compromise had operational effects on JTF 510. A cap was placed on the number of U.S. troops who could deploy, and troops were prohibited from conducting anything other than self-defense. Supplemental understandings to existing agreements were necessary.

Early in the operation, political sensitivities among the populace were challenged when U.S. personnel using an automated teller machine outside their base in Zamboanga City, Mindanao, in uniform and carrying weapons were photographed by the Philippine media. Further restrictions on U.S. personnel were necessary to placate those politically opposed to the U.S. presence. A culturally attuned approach allowed JTF 510 to assist and advise the AFP in early tactical and operational successes against the Abu Sayyaf Group. Slowly an expansion of the role of U.S. forces to include combined CAO was possible because of early sensitivity to the HN’s laws and political realities.

A-14. Changes in HN law or the enforcement of existing HN law may require drastic changes in how intelligence, military, paramilitary, or police forces operate. Planning for training to address the changes in HN SOPs may be an early priority for ARSOF elements conducting FID. Documentation of HN violations of their own law is necessary along with specific guidelines and procedures to react to such violations. Such violations may remain an internal matter for the HN; however, violations that also constitute a human rights violation will have consequences for ARSOF elements, up to and including terminating FID operations. Such violations may constitute an unacceptable breach of the SOF imperative to ensure the legitimacy and credibility of SO. This is one of the chief reasons that FM 3-05 states categorically that “ARSOF legal advisors must review all sensitive aspects of SO mission planning and execution.”

### UNITED STATES AND HOST-NATION TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

A-15. One of the most important legal concerns is the status of ARSOF personnel and units. Usually, anyone present in a FN’s territory is subject to its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the legal power a sovereign nation has to make and enforce its laws without foreign dictation. When a nation’s troops enter a friendly foreign country, international law subjects them to the territorial jurisdiction of that nation and any jurisdiction, because of their status, the sending state wishes to exercise. U.S. military forces are always subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. U.S. policy is to maximize U.S. jurisdiction over the armed forces it may deploy to a FN. However, U.S. forces performing a FID operation are not automatically immune from HN jurisdiction. The legal status of U.S. forces in a FN is usually defined in one or more of the following types of international agreements:

- Emergency wartime agreements.
- SAO agreements.
- SOFA.
Appendix A

- Status of mission agreements (SOMA).
- Diplomatic notes.

A-16. During military emergencies, the United States normally obtains exclusive jurisdiction over its troops in foreign countries. Emergency agreements have normally been short and uncomplicated. Classic examples of these types of agreements are the 1950 Korea, the 1968 Lebanon, and the 1984 Grenada stationing agreements.

A-17. SAO agreements provide a degree of diplomatic immunity to U.S. troops stationed in countries under these agreements. The United States negotiates each agreement individually negotiated with the country in question; therefore, each agreement is usually different. Usually, the United States attaches Soldiers on temporary duty in these countries (for example, a FID operation) to the SAO, and automatically accords them the same protection as SAO personnel. Agreements of this type normally provide diplomatic immunity for anything done in the performance of official duty. Personnel performing a FID operation may come within the scope of the SAO agreement itself or be included by the terms of an SA contract entered into between the United States and the HN.

A-18. SOFAs and SOMAs are the most comprehensive type of international agreement. SOFAs are usually used where the United States has stationed many forces for an extended period (Germany and Korea). Because of the WOT, there are several SOFAs in place in countries without U.S. bases. SOFAs usually provide for a sharing of jurisdiction over U.S. forces, with the United States having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses solely involving—
  - U.S. members or property.
  - Security of U.S. forces.
  - Actions occurring in the performance of official duty.

A-19. SOMAs typically cover the same points as SOFAs. The term SOMA is used frequently in the case of international monitoring or PO. It may be used in United Nations, European Union, or other internationally sponsored operations.

A-20. In any given mission, there may be agreements short of SOFAs or SOMAs, such as diplomatic notes. Diplomatic notes cover a wide range of issues. They typically address a specific situation that has arisen between nations. This may include the sort of natural or man-made crises that spark the need for FID operations. Coordination with the U.S. Embassy will reveal the existence of relevant diplomatic notes.

A-21. Planners must be familiar with any agreements that may be applicable. It is not always easy to locate all the relevant international documents affecting a mission. Planners may start by researching DOS publications, such as Treaties in Force. In addition to the relevant GCC’s or subordinate command’s legal office, the DAO, SAO, or Military Assistance Group at the embassy can provide the text of HN or other relevant agreements. ARSOF planners often need the details of not only the current SOFAs and agreements in force but also knowledge of the genesis of such agreements, because points within them may reflect long-held sensitivities of the HN populace and government to the presence of U.S. or other outside forces in their country.

UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY

A-22. The U.S. Army has been subordinate and subject to civilian authority slightly longer than the United States has been a nation. Unlike many of the nations of the world, the Army and the other Services have never attempted to intervene in the political processes of our nation. During FID operations, the HN military may have the opposite history. In fact, the HN military may still be undergoing transition from holding some sort of political power in the country. The attitude and words of ARSOF professionals as they speak about the U.S. political system is a subtle but nonetheless powerful training tool for any HN military, as is the manner in which they speak and act in an interagency environment. ARSOF commanders and Soldiers, therefore, must have a good layman’s understanding of sometimes complex USC, Presidential directives, and congressional legislation.
Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Considerations

**Title 10 United States Code Armed Forces**

A-23. FID operations in which ARSOF forces employ lethal force to further national objectives fall under the same Title 10 authorities as any other employment of U.S. forces. The United States ultimately derives all ROE from Title 10. Typically, ARSOF units will receive already existing ROE before conducting FID operations. The President or SecDef may apply specific applications or cautions regarding Title 10 provisions for FID operations on a case-by-case basis to best support U.S. national objectives in the HN. Title 10 USC also governs some of the avenues covered below for funding FID operations.

**Title 10 Funding**

A-24. Included in Title 10 programs are O&M funds and HCA. The following paragraphs discuss these programs and their related activities.

**Operations and Maintenance Funds**

A-25. The USG appropriates these funds for the support of the U.S. military. DOD has a good deal of discretion in how to spend these general-purpose funds. Under fiscal law principles, DOD cannot spend them for any foreign assistance activity for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds. Some O&M-funded DOD activities are on the periphery of SA programs. Commanders must be alert to the differences between O&M and SA activities.

**Coalition Operations**

A-26. A mission of DOD is coalition operations—knowing how to fight alongside the armed forces of friendly countries. The U.S. Comptroller General has established the following fiscal law principles on combined training:

- Combined exercises that provide overseas training opportunities for U.S. personnel and support the goals of U.S. coalition operations may use O&M funds despite providing training to HN forces.
- The permissible scope of HN training includes safety, familiarization, and interpretability training.
- Combined exercises assume the involvement of comparably proficient units. O&M funds may not be used to provide the level of training available through SA programs.
- O&M funds are provided for U.S. forces to take advantage of opportunities to train with foreign forces. SA funds are intended for U.S. forces to provide concentrated training for foreign forces.

**Special Operation Forces Exception**

A-27. 10 USC 2011 is directed toward funding expenses of training SOF assigned to the command in conjunction with train up for, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country. The Comptroller General has acknowledged that SOF Soldiers have a mission to train foreign forces. SOF may train a foreign military force to test their ability to accomplish their mission. The primary goal or benefit must be to test SOF training capabilities. 10 USC 2011 expressly authorizes the use of O&M funds to finance SOF training with foreign forces. This training is permissible as long as it is not comparable to or intended as SA training; that is, the training must be conducted as an SOF team and not be long-term.

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military Operations**

A-28. Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations (commonly called the Stevens Amendment), authorizes projects that are among the most effective instruments for dealing with HN conditions conducive to the emergence of IDTs. Until the fiscal year 1987 DOD Authorization Act, HCA was not a DOD mission. Instead, HCA was funded as a form of SA undertaken by USAID. DOD authority was limited to HCA provided from DOD assets to USAID on a reimbursable basis or to HCA provided incidental to exercises.
directed by the JCS. In the Authorization Act, Congress specifically authorized DOD-provided HCA activities. HCA authorities include the following:

- **De minimis HCA.** DOD may spend minimal O&M funds for de minimis HCA when unplanned HCA opportunities occur. The following activities constitute examples of de minimis HCA:
  - This term would include a unit doctor’s or medic’s examination of villagers for a few hours or giving inoculations and issuing some medicines. However, this term would not include the dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations.
  - This term would include the opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards, but not the asphaltling of a roadway.

- **Inherent authority.** DOD has an inherent authority to undertake HCA activities that, by chance, create HCA benefits and are carried out to fulfill the training requirements of the unit involved. U.S. medical readiness training is an example.

- **Stevens Amendment.** This amendment authorizes DOD personnel to conduct HCA activities with CJCS or combatant-commander-directed OCONUS exercises. The HCA activities can be unrelated to their own training requirements. The amendment was originally a temporary solution that has continued through DOD appropriations.

- **Interagency transactions.** Under the Economy Act, DOD personnel may conduct HCA activities for another federal agency, primarily the DOS. The DOD must make prior arrangements for the DOS to reimburse it for any costs incurred.

- **Statute.** 10 USC 401 specifically authorizes DOD to provide HCA. HCA is specifically defined as—
  - Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
  - Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
  - Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
  - Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
  - Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

A-29. The Secretaries of Defense and State must specifically approve in advance HCA rendered pursuant to this authority. Specifically appropriated O&M funds pay for HCA. An important limitation is that HCA may not be provided to any military or paramilitary individual, group, or organization.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

A-30. FID operations may be triggered by humanitarian crises or such instances may arise during the course of them. If so, CA units may provide and coordinate HA that supports FID operations. Although not necessarily factored into an HN’s IDAD strategy, timely HA may greatly facilitate internal security. Section 2561, Title 10, United States Code, (10 USC 2561), *Humanitarian Assistance,* authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The statute does not define other humanitarian purposes worldwide.

A-31. 10 USC 2561 gives a much broader authority than 10 USC 401 and allows more flexibility in emergencies to include natural or man-made disasters. However, HCA generally requires preplanned activities that promote operational readiness skills of the U.S. participants. Generally, if the contemplated activity falls within the parameters of HCA under 10 USC 401, then the more specific HCA authority is used.

A-32. 10 USC 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. In addition, unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation, HA can be conducted as a stand-alone project.

A-33. The transport of USG-donated goods to a country in need often falls under this authority. (Section 402, Title 10, United States Code [10 USC 402] applies when relief supplies are supplied by NGOs.) 10 USC 2561 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that seriously threatens the environment (such as an oil spill) if other sources of transportation are not readily available. CA Soldiers and their servicing judge advocates must obtain and review current DOD guidance for HA activities.
Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Humanitarian Relief

A-34. Section 2557, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2557), *Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Homeless Veteran Initiatives and Humanitarian Relief*, allows the DOD to provide excess and nonlethal supplies for humanitarian relief. Excess property may include any property except real property, weapons, ammunition, and any other equipment or material designed to inflict bodily harm or death. Excess property is that property which is in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office channels. If the required property is in the excess property inventory, the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office transfers it to USAID, as the agent for the DOS, for distribution to the target nation. Military personnel may distribute these supplies. This statute does not contain the authority to transport the items. However, 10 USC 2561 provides for transport of these supplies.

Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries

A-35. Section 402, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 402), *Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries* (commonly called the Denton Amendment) authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated relief supplies. The DOS and DSCA administer this. The relief supplies are transported on a space-available basis under certain conditions:

- Supplies must be in useable condition.
- Supplies must be suitable for humanitarian purposes.
- Adequate arrangements must have been made for their distribution in-country. Once in-country, the supplies may be distributed by any USG agency, foreign government agency, HN government agency, IGO, NGO, private voluntary organization, or other private nonprofit organization.

A-36. DOD may not use this authority to supply a military or paramilitary group. Since transportation of the supplies is on a space-available basis, no separate funding is necessary. However, the DOD must submit reports to Congress.

A-37. 10 USC 402 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that threatens serious harm to the environment if other sources of transportation are not readily available.

Foreign Disaster Assistance

A-38. Section 404, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 404), *Foreign Disaster Assistance*, in consultation with the Secretary of State, states that USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief, with the primary source of funding being International Disaster Assistance Funds, Section 2292 through 2292k, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC 2292 through 2292k). DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. The President may direct DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The President delegated disaster relief authority to the SecDef with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies). Executive Order 12966, 60 Federal Regulation 36949, *Foreign Disaster Assistance*, provides additional information. DOD participation must be necessary to save lives. Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian effort. This may include transportation, supplies, services, and equipment.

A-39. 10 USC 404 is rarely used because there is no implementing guidance. As a result, the DOD relies on the broad authority of 10 USC 2561 to conduct the foreign disaster assistance contemplated under 10 USC 404.

Combatant Commander Initiative Funds

A-40. Section 166a, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 166A), *Combatant Commands: Funding Through the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, provides the combatant commanders with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities that include but not limited to contingencies, selected operations., CS, joint exercises, and FP. HCA is also listed as an authorized activity under 10 USC 166A.
Appendix A

**TITLE 22 UNITED STATES CODE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE**

A-41. Title 22 USC covers the entire range of instruments of national power. Of particular relevance to ARSOF FID planners is Chapter 32, which covers foreign assistance including aspects of funding FID operations. The following paragraphs cover specific parameters of Title 22 funding.

**Title 22 Funding**

A-42. Included in Title 22 programs are the FAA and the AECA. Many aspects of FID operations fall under these two acts.

**Foreign Assistance Act**

A-43. The FAA Section 2151, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC 2151), *Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy*, is the most comprehensive of the statutes dealing with SA. The FAA provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance to developing countries. The FAA also assists foreign countries in fighting internal and external aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (and subject to Congressional approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS controls the FAA. The FAA mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the SA process. Principal programs under the FAA include the following:

- **FMFP.** This program consolidates three former SA programs: the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program, the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program, and the Military Assistance Program. Although intended as a grant and a loan program, the FMFP provides the bulk of assistance on a grant basis.
- **IMET.** This program authorizes military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries, primarily at schools in the United States.
- **AT Assistance.** This program provides training to foreign country law enforcement personnel to enhance their ability to deter terrorist activities. Training services furnished under this program cannot take place outside the United States. To the maximum extent possible, U.S. advisory personnel must carry out their duties within the United States.

**Arms Export Control Act**

A-44. The AECA contains the FMS program. The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense services (such as training), through government-to-government agreements. This program sells defense articles and services. It does not give them away. The law prohibits personnel providing services under this program from engaging in any duties of a combat nature. This prohibition includes any duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities. Although they may engage any hostile force in self-defense, training teams or personnel should withdraw as soon as possible.

**TITLE 50 UNITED STATES CODE WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE**

A-45. Title 50 USC is a far-reaching document covering areas as diverse as the establishment and scope of the Council of National Defense and the disclosure of classified information. Chapter 22 of Title 50 contains the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Title 50 also covers several legal aspects of the intelligence warfighting function. FID planners should coordinate with J/G/S-2s, as well as staff legal personnel, to ensure that communications regarding ARSOF personnel executing Title 50 responsibilities are properly classified.

**Fiscal Law**

A-46. A central legal consideration for commanders conducting FID operations is using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission. The two major types of funding are FAA funds and O&M funds. In most instances, commanders encounter problems in this area when they use O&M funds for projects that...
require FAA funding. The following fiscal principles should be observed when conducting FID operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of U.S. law:

- Commanders must be aware of fiscal law principles to avoid possible violation of Anti-Deficiency Act (Section 1341[a], Title 31, United States Code, Limitations on Expenditure
  and Obligating Amounts). The Anti-Deficiency Act violations are reportable to Congress and carry both civil and criminal penalties. Commanders cannot make expenditures in advance or in excess of available appropriations.
- Commanders must ensure expenditures reasonably relate to the purpose of the appropriation.
- Commanders must not allow expenditures prohibited by law.
- Commanders must make sure the expenditure does not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation.
- Commanders must know that if two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably.

**Psychological Operations Legal and Regulatory Concerns**

A-47. In addition to the USC constraints listed above, PSYOP units operate under Presidential and DOD regulatory constraints. Three principal areas of concern for PSYOP in support of FID operations are relevant intellectual property statutes, exposure of U.S. citizens to PSYOP, and the authority to approve PSYOP products.

A-48. The United States has well-established intellectual property laws, such as copyright and trademark. Typically, U.S. intellectual property law has driven international intellectual property law. USG agencies, including the DOD, rigidly comply with copyright and other intellectual property laws. The HN in which FID operations take place may have different internal intellectual property laws. The staff legal team conducting FID planning needs to identify HN intellectual property issues that may affect PSYOP product parameters. In addition, many IDTs routinely disregard intellectual property rights to further their propaganda products and to raise funds. Both of these actions may be exploitable through PSYOP series. Care must be taken to not violate intellectual property laws in countering IDT propaganda or exploiting the distribution of pirated goods by IDTs.

A-49. Section 1461(a), Title 22, United States Code, Dissemination of Information Abroad; Executive Order S-12333, United States Intelligence Activities; DOD Instructions S-3321.1, (S) Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U); and National Security Decision during the TA analysis process Directive (NSDD) 130, U.S. International Information Policy, direct that U.S. PSYOP forces will not target U.S. citizens at any time, in any location globally, or under any circumstances. Ancillary exposure of U.S. citizens in the HN to PSYOP products targeting HN audiences does not constitute a violation of these directives.

A-50. The precedent for the limited use of PSYOP forces to present public information to a U.S. audience was set during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. There was no challenge to this precedent during the support provided after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. If a NEO should become necessary during FID operations, information support by PSYOP forces to provide evacuation information to U.S. nationals would also adhere to the order.

A-51. The majority of PSYOP support during FID operations falls under the normal parameters of influencing and, more importantly, changing foreign TA behavior. Clearly delineated approval authority for PSYOP themes and series begins at the Presidential level. However, the President can delegate this authority. In FID operations, approval authority may be retained at high levels because of the potential political ramifications of any U.S.-produced informational product.

A-52. In all PSYOP activities, commanders need to be aware of two levels of PSYOP approval. The two levels and differences are as follows:

- **Themes and POs.** The key to centralized planning and decentralized execution of PSYOP is clarity in the statement of objectives and themes. Broad objectives and themes establish the parameters for the development of series that reach foreign TAs. They also ensure products reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of POs and broad themes are reserved
by policies and the JSCP at levels (President or SecDef, combatant command, joint force
command, and U.S. Country Teams) where the interagency process can invest PSYOP plans
with a broad range of considerations.

- **Series.** A series is all the PSYOP products and actions to change one behavior of one TA.
  Commanders subordinate to the combined joint task force (CJTF) or CJSOTF can use approved
  series to achieve their specific objectives. Approval authority to modify existing series or
develop new series can be delegated to the division commander level.

- **Attribution.** U.S. attribution openly acknowledges U.S. involvement. This disclosure must be
  made in the content of the product or in the initial phase of engaging in online exchanges.
  Concurring HN attribution allows PSYOP products and activities to be attributable to a
  concurring HN. Both the HN and the appropriate COM must agree to this attribution method
  before it is used. Nonattribution allows a combatant commander to disseminate information
  without clear attribution. When asked if the USG or DOD is the source of the specific activity,
  the DOD will acknowledge its involvement as soon as operationally feasible as determined by
  the combatant commander. If a combatant commander believes that it will not be possible to
  attribute the activity to the DOD because of operational considerations, he will request an
  exception to policy. This method is only authorized from named operations in the WOT or when
  specified in other execute orders.

A-53. In many FID operations, the PSYOP approval authority will be the U.S. Ambassador. Normally, the
Ambassador designates a Country Team member as approval authority for PSYOP forces deployed in
support of FID. This representative is normally the deputy COM, with reviewing authority to appropriate
Country Team members, such as the SAO, PAO, and the DEA representative.

A-54. During FID operations in which a CJTF or CJSOTF has been stood up, the SecDef normally
delegates PSYOP approval authority to the supported GCC in the JCS execution order and, in accordance
with the JSCP, the GCC retains approval authority following the approval of the PSYOP plan by the
President or SecDef. The supported GCC may, in turn, delegate approval authority to the designated CJTF
or CJSOTF and even down to a maneuver commander (a division commander), with SecDef approval.

**INTERAGENCY REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND PROTOCOLS**

A-55. ARSOF units may or may not conduct FID operations with other service personnel depending on the
scale of FID operations. Typically, however, some aspect (other than transportation in out of the HN) of
even a small-scale FID operation will be joint in nature. Invariably, FID operations will involve
interagency cooperation to some degree. Interagency regulations may be directive in nature, applicable to
all USG agencies and be based on provisions of the USC. Policies and protocols may not. However, the
general maxim is to adhere to another USG agency’s policies and protocols to the greatest extent possible as
long as mission success is not compromised. Deconfliction is effected through a joint interagency task force
(JIATF), joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), or the U.S. Embassy.
Appendix B

Internal Defense and Development Strategy

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Every nation’s IDAD strategy is unique, but certain universal threads run through every IDAD strategy. Conversely, the end state of every nation’s IDAD strategy is universal, namely, a responsible and accountable local, state/provincial, and national government that ensures the personal safety of its citizens and provides a climate and institutions that demonstrate the ability to improve their material well-being. In addition, those governments must ensure the basic freedoms that the world community has come to regard as fundamental. For the ARSOF planner who has been born in or naturalized into a nation founded on those principles, one of the fundamental truths he must bear in mind is that the above end state is frequently contradictory to the government the HN has had in the past or even from its inception. In some cases, one of the objectives of FID may be to assist the HN to formulate an appropriate IDAD strategy. This may mean instilling values in HN authorities that heretofore have not been present.

CONCEPT

B-1. An IDT in the HN or changing conditions that may produce IDTs necessitate an IDAD strategy. IDAD is ideally a proactive and preemptive strategy in which the HN must win and motivate the population to participate in IDAD efforts. In developing nations, an IDAD strategy may focus on preventing regression to a previous state of instability. However, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID planners must understand the HN’s IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it, and they must be prepared to build that strategy from the ground up.

B-2. The IDAD strategy should integrate security force and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. The success of both security and civilian programs hinge on the HN gaining and maintaining the support of its citizens. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through development that the populace regards as balanced and nonsectarian. This development may require change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

B-3. Often a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult. In addition, the adoption and implementation of previously nonexistent institutions and procedures, notably a freely elected, constitutional government, may face mistrust and fear among the electorate, particularly in the case of any minority. A history of authoritarian minority rule can exacerbate this. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength and will to persevere rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Short of regression to or development of authoritarian or sectarian government, any strategy that does not redress the political claims and demands of the opposition is at best severely handicapped. This is not to say that complete compliance with the demands of the opposition, especially an armed insurgency, is universally necessary,
but allowing dialog with unarmed elements of the opposition, however vitriolic, is typically warranted. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success, but if employed in an environment bereft of the other instruments of national power, force will fail. They are in fact a means to the greater political ends, with a successful FID gaining the political buy-in of not only HN military and paramilitary personnel but a majority of the population.

FUNCTIONS

B-4. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats (Figure B-1). The functions are executed simultaneously, and a single project conducted during FID operations may exercise all four functions. No function is ever executed in a vacuum, because all actions the HN and U.S. personnel take will have a psychological impact on some portion of the population.

![Figure B-1. Functions of internal defense and development](image)

BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

B-5. The people of the HN must perceive the balanced development as equitable. Its end state is a society with an egalitarian ethos and basic political, economic, and social institutions and mechanisms in place to achieve equality of access. Realistically, this is not something achieved overnight, especially in terms of economic disparity between groups. However, a successful IDAD strategy does not have to produce an instant *level playing field*, but it does have to begin addressing unreasonable inequalities between groups, races, or ethnicities within the HN society. The perception must be that the HN is making positive strides to resolve disparities and discrimination. FID planners and executors must stress to HN officials they are advising and training that this perception will only come if development truly is balanced.

B-6. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating some frustration. Difficulties typically arise when a tide of rising expectations among the populace triggers an expectation of quick or even instant gratification of their demands for change. This can be further complicated when success in one arena, for instance national politics, is accomplished quickly. Afterward, correcting the remaining conditions that make a society vulnerable is still a long-term
process. The challenge for ARSOF Soldiers and planners is to communicate to individuals and groups that results in other areas (typically economic progress) may be slow in coming. Failure to adequately prepare societies, groups, and individuals (in particular key communicators) for a long period of slow change may doom an HN to lose the support of the population it governs, including individuals who previously supported it. This can be even truer if supporters have made concessions or sacrifices to support an IDAD strategy.

SECURITY

B-7. Security in FID operations represents a return to a state of physical security for the populace at a level no lower than prior to the escalation in violence that necessitated FID operations. An acceptable security situation for an HN populace may well be a level of physical security superior to that present before an escalation in violence. In short, a return to the previous status quo level of ordinary criminal activity may be insufficient to win the support of the populace if the populace believes that an insurgency or other IDT can better protect them from harm than the government can. ARSOF planners must remember that although FID and any IDAD strategy will typically fail if hard targets are not interdicted effectively, it is virtually impossible to successfully achieve security without the support of the HN populace.

B-8. Security in FID operations encompasses all activities implemented to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. It involves success on the military, paramilitary, and criminal justice fronts. However, security can be difficult to achieve because of a reactive focus on interdicting adversaries, amassing captured weaponry, or reducing the number of successful employments of particular adversary TTP. The linchpin to obtaining security for the populace is to involve its members in providing their own security.

B-9. Successful interdictions against those who perpetrate violence must be reinforced by a concerted effort to involve the populace in the following:
- Denying IDTs safe havens and support.
- Identifying IDTs with the full knowledge and confidence of their elimination.
- Securing buy-in that this elimination may involve lethal force.
- Instilling a belief that any sacrifice to eliminate IDTs is beneficial in the long term to their physical, economic, or even spiritual security.

B-10. ARSOF Soldiers are uniquely qualified to provide this sense of security, because this effect may only be achieved when HN security forces and ARSOF personnel are collocated with the populace and share the same basic hazards that the populace shares. In this way, ARSOF Soldiers and HN forces instill an us-versus-them mentality that includes the civilian populace in the us. Responsible use of civil defense, neighborhood watch, home guard, or any otherwise irregular force from the populace may be considered as long as they are employed commensurate with their abilities. This may mean the contribution of the force is negligible in military terms. However, the psychological effect of the force can be great.

Note. Civil defense or other HN citizen guard or watch organizations should not be confused or affiliated with the civilian advisory councils described in paragraphs B-47 to B-49.

B-11. The end state of the security effort should be an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support at the national level. The local police or constabulary should be a viable deterrent to the residue of an IDT organization, and the civilian populace must have a continued, reliable, and safe means to report IDTs. Although each situation is unique, the types, magnitude, and prevalence of crimes and security threats that are handled in the United States by federal law enforcement agencies provide a general baseline for what sort of security situation must exist at the local level in the HN and what basic federal agencies and capabilities must be in place.

NEUTRALIZATION

B-12. Neutralization is a political concept that sufficiently marginalizes an insurgent or criminal element so that it is effectively irrelevant to and unable to affect the process of governance. Neutralization applies to
elements of insurgencies deemed unfit to enter into dialog with. In addition, entire organizations that corporately hold a wholly irreconcilable position must be neutralized. A good example of sufficient marginalization is the white supremacist movement in the United States or the Communist Party in Japan. Both exist and have at times garnered headlines and small numbers of fanatic loyalists through tactics such as inflammatory rallies, but both lie beyond even the fringe of legitimate politics. Enfranchisement of former insurgents into the mainstream political life of the HN falls under the function of mobilization.

Neutralization accomplishes several goals:

- Makes an insurgent or criminal force irrelevant to the political process.
- Separates physically and psychologically the threatening elements from the population.
- Includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the internal threat.
- Can involve public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence.
- Can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken.
- Can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate.

B-13. All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe constitutional or other codified provisions regarding rights and authority. This is particularly true of an HN operating under provision of legislated or imposed martial law or other extraordinary powers. The HN may need to exceed the minimum standards of the letter of the law and to set the moral and ethical standard for conduct. This may include foregoing some special powers. For instance, President Lincoln was well within the then perceived letter of constitutional law when he suspended habeas corpus in selected instances during the American Civil War; however, political opposition and criticism for doing so extended even to members of his own political party. Some supporters perceived this action as excessive and some detractors attempted to capitalize politically on this action.

B-14. In the case of President Lincoln, the legitimate use of duly authorized emergency powers caused friction in some quarters and bolstered support for his administration in others. However, the instances when governments or government officials have exceeded and abused emergency powers around the globe are numerous. Some of these instances have been disastrous to the governments under which the abuse happened. The need for officials and agencies to act lawfully and morally is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue. Denying the adversary an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government disarms the leaders and propagandists of an IDT. ARSOF planners and trainers must begin indoctrinating this ideal at the lowest levels of the HN government and military. In an OE that may include the presence of international news or entertainment media with real-time audiovisual transmission capability, the excesses of a single, low-ranking HN policeman or military member may be as damaging as the misstep of a national-level politician.

MOBILIZATION

B-15. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the IDT. It is important to realize, however, that this effect may not be directly proportional. Organized crime, a sectarian insurgency, and other entities may continue to maintain viability even as their base of support erodes. IDTs receiving aid from a third party can magnify this effect. This effect is further magnified when the third-party support is effectively immune to interdiction at its source. Mobilization seeks to—

- Strengthen existing government, economic, military, and social institutions in processes, procedures, and capabilities.
- Legitimize and, if necessary, reform those institutions.
- Develop new institutions to respond to demands.
- Enlist and enfranchise all members of society to contribute in some way.
Discredit and vilify IDTs permanently.
Assess and adjust programs and emphasis continuously.
Instill the sense that the change is permanent.
Create a national vision toward achieving greater goals, if necessary.

B-16. Mobilization runs hand-in-hand with enfranchisement of the population. Mobilization is of limited value if it excludes any portion of the population other than IDTs. Mobilization can include members of the population who traditionally or statutorily have not been part of the institutions they are now party to. This is particularly true of the many societies around the globe that are polarized on sectarian lines. ARSOF planners must recognize that the mobilization of the population can require cultural upheaval. It is now inconceivable in the United States that increased access to a well or a market could have major social implications that could threaten to spark violence for years, but this is the reality in many countries around the world. Ideologically, the vast majority of Americans in general and U.S. military Soldiers, DOD civilians, and contractors in particular have difficulty even imagining such conditions in our national past such as racial segregation. ARSOF planners and Soldiers must remain culturally attuned to the fact that many members of the HNs in which Soldiers conduct FID operations may be part of a legacy that includes unfounded prejudices for their own race, ethnicity, tribe, or religious affiliation.

ASSESSING THE FUNCTIONS

B-17. The HN begins with established MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs) for its IDAD program. It should have a way to collect feedback for future planning, refinement of strategy, and continued formulation of strategic national policy. The HN should then continually analyze this feedback. However, ARSOF forces supporting the HN’s IDAD program may have to initially institute and conduct this process at various levels until HN personnel become proficient. ARSOF personnel must fully utilize advisor techniques in this instance. This is the case not only to efficiently build the skill of HN personnel but also to foster the perception (based on fact) that HN personnel are proficient and legitimate rather than mere functionaries or lackeys to U.S. national interests. ARSOF Soldiers in the trainer/mentor function may need to bolster the warrior ethos of their HN counterparts during this constant examination of feedback as they critically assess themselves and potentially deal with temporary reversals or gains that are developing slowly.

PRINCIPLES

B-18. Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are—

- Responsive government.
- Unity of effort.
- Maximum use of intelligence, PSYOP, and CA.
- Minimum use of violence.

RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT

B-19. The fundamental goal of FID operations is to prevent an insurgency or other form of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. At the core of both facets of this task is developing an effective, responsive government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure responsive government at all levels with the ability to mobilize manpower and resources and distribute them equitably. These governments must foster a view in the populace that they are administratively, managerially, and technically competent.

B-20. Typically, HNs build responsive government from the top down; for example, national levels down to local levels. However, it is measured by its success at the local level. An HN can have a legitimately elected national government that is highly effective at national-level reconciliation and legislation but nevertheless fails because the government does not translate this down to the local level in the form of
increased security and improved material conditions. Although an oversimplification, the term responsive local government may best describe this principle. IDAD strategy developers should keep this idea in mind.

UNITY OF EFFORT

B-21. Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any IDT. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces and agencies toward a commonly recognized objective regardless of the command or coordination structures of the participants. In IDAD strategy development, a necessary precursor to unity of effort is recognizing the disparate or conflicting goals between portions of the populace and more importantly from an organizational standpoint between government agencies. Although this is typically accomplished by non-DOD agencies prior to ARSOF elements participation, it is necessary for ARSOF Soldiers to be cognizant of the party line of the IDAD strategy as it is and understand the genesis of that strategy and any residual conflicts associated with the current strategy. One of the first hurdles ARSOF planners must consider may be overcoming reticence or even antipathy on the part of their HN military counterparts to the HN government’s plan, or, conversely, the same feelings from civilian agencies toward portions of strategy championed by the military. The unique capability and institutional knowledge of CA Soldiers to mediate and negotiate should be utilized to anticipate, plan for, and overcome these conflicts.

MAXIMUM USE OF INTELLIGENCE

B-22. All ARSOF operations require detailed and often specialized intelligence to achieve the desired effects from employment of SOF. FID operations require the flexible applications of all sources and disciplines within the intelligence warfighting function.

B-23. FID operations invariably have a strong emphasis on HUMINT and CI. FID operations conform to this model and like other IW may place a disproportional emphasis on CI and HUMINT out of operational necessity. Cellular organizations will likely remain impenetrable (at least in some cases) by means other than CI and HUMINT in the foreseeable future. As adversaries become aware of the full reach of other U.S. intelligence disciplines, it is reasonable to assume that their countermeasures will include more and more compartmentalization that relies on decidedly nontechnological answers to trafficking information within and between cells. Total success in FID operations may not be won exclusively through HUMINT, but abject failure through its exclusion is a planning reality.

B-24. Planners must balance OPSEC and CI programs and procedures to protect friendly FID operations with the inherent risks of sharing intelligence with the HN. Countering or penetrating opposing force intelligence collection operations may build on ARSOF success prior to the commitment of forces to FID. Intelligence and CI operations must accurately assess the IDT’s capabilities to provide timely warning to HN and U.S. FID forces and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order.

B-25. ARSOF planners must provide for sufficient assets to support the IDAD strategy and the FID operation. Typically, the HN is not fully capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of U.S. FID forces. In this case, the United States must deploy additional intelligence assets to accomplish these missions. ARSOF planning maximizes the coordination lines with and use of assets under the purview of the COM and any that may be present under the GCC/TSOC. ARSOF personnel may be the chief trainers of HN internal intelligence and security forces developed to overcome intelligence capability gaps, enhance existing capabilities, and educate the HN military on using these assets in operational and tactical planning. ARSOF personnel conduct this training within the confines of USG directives, instructions of the COM, and as deemed appropriate by the supported GCC.

MAXIMUM USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

B-26. The principal battleground of FID operations is the human environment; that is, the HN’s citizens and the human terrain that can affect the HN. The key terrain of this battleground is the human will. ARSOF principles encompass disciplines that are dedicated to or familiar with shaping the human environment. They strengthen the will of allies and break the will of adversaries. All ARSOF operations
within FID operations accomplish one of these polar opposites. Maximum use of PSYOP support complements and exploits the success of SOF and conventional units, as well as USG and HN government agencies conducting FID operations. The battle for influence begins before commencement of FID operations and extends throughout the existence of the HN. Failure to analyze and plan the fight to persuade in the formulation of IDAD strategy preordains mission failure.

B-27. The use of the informational component of national power will often predate the formulation of an IDAD strategy and the commencement of FID activities. Typically, the U.S. Embassy will already be addressing the conditions that elevated into the need for conducting FID. The embassy PAO either singly or with additional support from BIIP’s various press releases, public comments, and media products articulates the USG position on conditions within the HN. PSYOP forces may deploy to support this effort and be present early in the formation of an IDAD strategy. If not, early entry of PSYOP assessors and planners into the process of IDAD program planning is critical. Some of the specific tasks PSYOP units can plan to conduct are the following:

- Articulate the conditions and mandate for the entry of United States or multinational forces.
- Communicate the end state of FID operations.
- Communicate the planned exit (even if indefinite) of United States or multinational forces.
- Reduce civil interference with military operations.
- Support civil order programs and HN law enforcement.
- Support and exploit CMO.
- Prepare the populace for elections.
- Reduce the effectiveness of rumors and disinformation.
- Support the countering of domestic (within the HN’s borders) and international propaganda.
- Promote the legitimacy the HN government.
- Reduce sectarian strife.

MAXIMUM USE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

B-28. CA planners are a driving force behind the analysis of the current physical conditions affecting the HN citizenry. After assessment, CA planners should be at the forefront of developing the balanced development function of the IDAD program. Although not the only agent of project development to improve the material conditions of the HN population, CA units may constitute the center of a coordinated development plan including U.S., HN, IGO, and NGO assets. In addition, the coordinated use of CIM provides another avenue to shape the information environment. Some of the CA tasks within the IDAD strategy include the following:

- Promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational area.
- Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.
- Reduce civil interference with military operations.
- Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the USG, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs.
- Exercise civil administration in liberated areas until HN authorities can assume control.
- Provide direct assistance to HN.
- Support civilian efforts to provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
- Provide expertise and advice in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

MINIMUM USE OF VIOLENCE

B-29. Throughout human history, civil conflicts have proved to be some of the most violent of any war or strife. Even in civil strife that has primarily been fought observing the laws, rules, and codes of conflict acceptable at the time, pockets of excessive and sometimes wanton violence have existed. For instance, the violence in parts of Kentucky and along the Kansas-Missouri border during the American Civil War rose
to heights far above those in any other theater and was widely condemned. A rapid escalation of violence that far exceeds necessary force may happen on both sides of a civil conflict. The challenge in the formulation and execution of an IDAD strategy is to—

- Examine all COAs carefully in response to the internal violence.
- Choose strategies that can best minimize violence.
- Formulate clear ROE.
- Develop means and methods to enforce the ROE.
- Publish how ROE violators will be disciplined.
- Determine if additional, specific criminal statutes are necessary to deal with IDTs.
- Plan for the potential of escalation and determine the thresholds for de-escalation.
- Assess the maximum potential for detainee levels.
- Determine if an amnesty program is feasible.
- Distance the current HN government psychologically from past abuses.
- Punish past abusers, if practicable.
- Anticipate deception, disinformation, and propaganda.
- Assess the potential benefit/detriment of a demonstration of overwhelming force.

B-30. The IDAD strategy stresses the minimum use of violence in maintaining order and communicates that intention from the highest levels. The IDAD strategy should consciously seek to seize the moral high ground in the earliest stages of FID operations. This does not necessarily prohibit the use of overwhelming force. The confidence the populace has in the government’s ability to provide security is invariably derived from the belief that the government possesses superior strength to the IDT. However, the populace loses confidence in the government or coalition forces if it perceives that strength as uncontrolled or ineffective. Therefore, claims of inevitable success will often be detrimental. In addition, collateral damage, even if perceived as necessary, erodes support over time. In other instances, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. A balance of the discreet use of force as a rule and the atypical use of force that is deliberately overt and overwhelming to maximize its psychological effect must be achieved.

ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

B-31. The following discussion provides a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD activities. Actual organizations may vary from country-to-country to adapt to existing conditions, and the organizational model for planning may evolve into a different form for execution. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized planning and direction and facilitate decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies’ normal functions. Building new agencies or organizations in the HN government presents profound challenges but studying the feasibility of this may be necessary. Modification or expansion of existing institutions invariably presents fewer challenges. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION

B-32. An IDT planning and coordination office is a national-level organization that formulates and facilitates the IDAD program. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the HN government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, terrorist, or other IDTs. Figure B-2, page B-9, depicts a planning and coordination organization at the national level.
B-33. The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources. HN civilian control of this office is not a foregone conclusion in some nations. Planners and advisors may need to stand ready to explain the necessity of civilian oversight.

B-34. The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. Representatives from intelligence agencies and police and military intelligence staff this office. At a minimum, ARSOF units conducting FID must have access to the products of this office either directly or through their supported or higher unit. ARSOF subject matter experts may be attached to this office to provide input in their areas of expertise.

B-35. The population and resources control office develops economic policies and plans and provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as law enforcement and justice, staff this office. CA personnel should be tasked to coordinate with and support this office. In addition, a planning or liaison element from the deployed PSYOP organization can augment CIM activities.

B-36. The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and allocation of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.

B-37. Five separate offices covering PSYOP, information, economic affairs, cultural affairs, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies, and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan. The social and political sensitivities of the HN must be taken into account when designating a PSYOP office. Characterizing this office in less military terms may be necessary, however, even the appearance of deception can be catastrophic to the future legitimacy of
PSYOP products. Truthful representations of the composition, mandate, and legal parameters of the PSYOP office must be sociopolitically acceptable to the HN populace.

B-38. The administration office performs support activities for the national organization and other duties as directed. It typically serves as the communication hub of the organization and provides the necessary logistical resources from the national organization. The administration office may be tasked with receiving all requests and communications from the HN population and routing them to their appropriate office.

SUBNATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION

B-39. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise OPCON over all military forces, and direct civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the joint operations area.

B-40. ACCs perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. ACCs should conduct continuous operations and communications. Senior government officials who supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest led ACCs. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to or operating in the center’s AO. Each ACC includes members from the—

- Area military command.
- Area police agency.
- Local and national intelligence organization.
- Public information and PSYOP agencies.
- Paramilitary forces.
- Local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

B-41. There are two types of subnational ACCs that a government may form—regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the ACC operates.

B-42. Regional ACCs normally locate with the nation’s first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental template (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well established, having exercised government functions in their areas before the emergence of an IDT. However, during FID operations in which a natural disaster has occurred or where an insurgency or other force has been operating unchecked, the apparatus of government may exist in little more than name only.

B-43. Regional ACCs often are the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all IDAD programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the ACC activates. This augmentation enables the ACC to coordinate its activities better by using the existing structure.

B-44. Select urban areas may require separate ACCs in order to plan, coordinate, and direct IDAD efforts. Urban ACCs are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas that might tend to overtax a regional ACC or become the focus of efforts at the expense of less populated areas in the subnational division. In some instances, this may require the collocation of a regional ACC and a separate urban ACC in the same city. The decision to physically collocate or share personnel or resources is controlled by the HN government according to its statutes and protocols. Urban ACCs organize like the ACCs previously described and perform the same functions. They contain elements from national-level organizations, but the urban ACC also includes representatives from local government and public service agencies.

B-45. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. This generally includes suburbs and communities within a greater metropolitan area. If the HN urban area has sufficiently advanced transportation, this may be defined as the area within the range of commuting workers. Although the urban ACC may be delineated by the beginning of agricultural lands, this may be problematic in
countries with high population densities, since small-scale agriculture will be intermingled with urban socioeconomic features. The incorporation of shantytowns, refugee camps or other fluid populations within the jurisdiction of an urban ACC may be warranted. Conversely, certain advantage may be gained with such populations in fostering a continued sense of identification with their original communities by bringing them under the authority of the regional ACC. Operationally this can make the transition of such populations back to those original homes easier.

CIVILIAN ADVISORY COMMITTEES

B-46. Committees comprised of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees increases their stake in and commitment to government programs and social mobilization objectives.

B-47. The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or (preferably) elected by the membership. In some instances, it may be useful to select a nonvoting moderator who is perceived as neutral. In this case, such a moderator should not be a coalition, HN, or U.S. official. An IGO or NGO official is one example of such a moderator. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These leaders may include—

- Political leaders:
  - Retired government officials.
  - Former dissenters or dissidents.
  - Returned expatriates.
- Religious leaders.
- Credible sports, arts, and entertainment stars.
- Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers).
- Respected medical personalities.
- Minority group representatives.
- Labor officials.
- Leaders of domestic charities.
- Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and editors.
- Business and commercial leaders.
- Fraternal order leaders.
- Wildcards (unanticipated new popular figures).

B-48. In addition to the list given above, it may be useful to consider placing former insurgents on civilian committees to affect reconciliation. Planners must balance the possible benefits of enfranchising the former insurgent and providing him with a nonbinding forum to redress grievances with the risk of the committee becoming mired in sectarian issues. The general maxim, however, is that inclusion rather than exclusion is the goal, because the success of a committee hinges on including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.
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Appendix C

Intelligence Operations

Intelligence is an integral part of FID operations. Because of the covert or clandestine nature of many IDTs and a common tactic of cellular organizations to compartmentalize information, there is a near certainty that information gaps will exist. This challenge is not insurmountable for organic ARSOF intelligence personnel, but it does clearly place the burden on confirming that information processed into user-level intelligence is correct. FID operations like all the subsets of IW require intelligence personnel to collect and analyze information that would typically not be of such great import in a conventional operation against nation-state’s military forces. The challenges of intelligence support to FID operations require unconventional and adaptive thinking against an adversary that is indistinct and often unpredictable as he seeks asymmetric advantages and is frequently highly adaptable in his own right.

If characterized by one word, intelligence operations for FID environments might be termed offensive. Passive collection of intelligence with most IDTs will result in constantly being one step behind their COAs. Intelligence operations for FID environments comprise utilizing existing intelligence products and frequently emphasizing HUMINT collection and CI in the OE. Although not the only relevant intelligence disciplines to FID operations, the nature of the threat typically puts great emphasis on human factors. However, all means of available information collection should be utilized; and, somewhat paradoxically, open-source intelligence may provide large portions of the intelligence necessary for FID operations. For instance, open-source intelligence may provide the vast majority of necessary infrastructure intelligence or provide a coherent and complete picture of the last elections held in the HN. In short, despite its emphasis on human factors, FID operators should use all disciplines when analyzing IDTs.

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-1. The primary duty of intelligence personnel engaged in FID operations is to produce intelligence to prevent or defeat IDTs. ARSOF units must be ready to train, advise, and assist HN personnel in intelligence operations. Intelligence personnel must collect information and produce intelligence on almost all aspects of the FID environment. When they know that insurgents, terrorists, or common criminals receive aid from an external power, intelligence personnel seek information on the external power’s role. In the contemporary environment, intelligence personnel cannot assume that an entity, even nation-states, have traditional motivators or values. Since the end of the Cold War, former client states of the United States and the former Soviet Union have sought asymmetric advantage through criminal enterprises, such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking. Many IDTs have learned by these nation-state examples. Therefore, information is needed not only on IDTs but also on their infrastructure organizations and their relationships with the populace. These relationships make the populace a lucrative source of information.

C-2. A sound collection program and proper use of the various collection agencies and information sources will result in a heavy volume of information flowing into the intelligence production element. Because of the complexities of the social environment, politics, and military tactics, intelligence personnel frequently can only meet intelligence requirements by reporting minute and sometimes technical details on
a great variety of subject areas. Each detail may appear unrelated to others and insignificant by itself. However, these details, when mapped and chronologically recorded over long periods and analyzed with other reported details, may lead to definitive and predictable patterns of insurgent or other IDT activity.

C-3. The IDT leader recognizes the shortcomings in his security and military posture. Therefore, he minimizes the weaknesses inherent in using and supporting isolated, unsophisticated forces that may use ponderous and primitive logistics systems. In addition, although employing sophisticated communications systems at times, circumstances may force the IDT leader to rely on the most basic of communications, namely a human courier. He uses the weather, terrain (including complex urban geometry), and populace and employs secrecy, surprise, and simplicity. The plans and actions these unsophisticated forces generally will carry out must be simple, comprehensive, and repetitive if they are to develop a pattern of success. Most IDTs will look toward perseverance and attrition of HN and U.S. forces and, more importantly, resolve to continue prosecuting FID operations. Therefore, the solution the IDT often seeks is diametrically opposed to the TTP that a conventional force would use.

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

C-4. The intelligence process (Figure C-1, page C-3) does not change across the range of military operations or the specific type of operation. FID operations require intelligence that adheres to the basic principle of the intelligence process, namely, that it is not linear just as the adversary is not linear. ARSOF personnel can be simultaneously conducting or supporting all categories of the intelligence process during FID operations.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

C-5. In FID operations, the targets are elements of the populace, either civilian supporters or members of an IDT. The differences between supporters and members are usually ill-defined at best. A complete awareness and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential to conducting current intelligence operations. The basic nature of the internal security problem requires an intensive initial intelligence effort to pinpoint the roots of subversion, criminality, or other antigovernment behavior.

C-6. In conventional operations, a force may succeed in capturing a military objective by attacking with overwhelming strength. A force can sometimes attain success in this situation without timely and detailed intelligence. Such success is not the likely case in FID operations. An IDT seldom holds terrain. Even in an urban environment, they may move from location to location. Typically, an IDT will only overtly commit when cornered or when the odds heavily favor their chances of winning. The one exception would be a target that is of such high value or high payoff in terms of its psychological or strategic import that it is determined to be worth the expenditure of lives and resources. It is critical, regardless of an IDT’s actions, to remember that their base of operations is in the populace itself. The IDT, therefore, cannot be easily detected and overwhelmed as long as it maintains the cooperation of or continues to successfully coerce a portion of the populace sufficient to support them. IDTs require close scrutiny, delicate and discriminating analysis, and aggressive and accurate countermeasures.

C-7. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is vital to successful FID operations. This dependence on intelligence and CI is greater in FID operations than in conventional operations. The intelligence required is of the type, quantity, and quality that—

- Supports the deduction of motivators and other human factors to understand the adversary.
- Provides goals for daily or major operations (for example, intelligence that locates guerrillas for tactical counterguerrilla operations).
- Enables HN forces to retain or regain the initiative.
- Enables HN forces to put continuous and increasing pressure on an IDT’s security and life support.
PLANNING AND DIRECTION

C-8. Planning and direction of the intelligence process in FID operations turns general intelligence requirements and the specific requirements of FID into a clear collection plan. During FID operations, this generally begins with identifying gaps in HN and U.S. intelligence. The IDT is often a patchwork quilt with several patches missing in intelligence terms at the beginning of the FID operation. Planning may also have to answer how to mitigate limited collection assets as well. Direction in the case of FID operations is more complex because of JIIM considerations and possibly classification issues. ARSOF intelligence personnel may face limitations on releasability and therefore have extra directional hurdles.

Collection

C-9. In FID operations, the problem is to identify and then locate the adversary. As frequently stated, in an insurgency the front is everywhere. The same is generally true for other IDTs, such as criminal elements. Even after identifying and establishing operation patterns of members of the IDT, the local police or security force must locate the adversary before they can capture them. There are essentially three methods of obtaining contact intelligence:

- **Patrols.** After developing some knowledge of the behavioral patterns of the IDT from a study of their past movements, patrols or police squads can search for physical evidence (tracks,
Campsites, safe houses, abandoned vehicles, and so on). If there is a consistent pattern, patrols can be selectively dispatched based on anticipated movements.

- **Forced contacts.** When IDTs are separated from the populace, their normal supply channels are cut off. This separation forces the guerrillas or other IDT members into the open to contact their command or support elements. After identifying members, the police can arrest them. The remaining IDTs will then have to visit the remaining members of their support elements more often to get required support.

- **Informants.** Using informants is a reliable and quick means of obtaining specific data required in contact intelligence. Through a process designed to protect their identity, informants pass information about movements, positions, and activities of the IDTs almost immediately. If the local security force receives this information, its commander should be authorized to take immediate action on his own authority with no requirement to seek approval from higher authorities.

C-10. Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within which an IDT operates. For example, insurgents frequently establish a centralized intelligence-processing center to collect and coordinate the amount of information required to make long-range intelligence estimates. ARSOF and HN long-range intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an insurgency or other ongoing internal threat. For example, various demographic factors (ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and political characteristics of the area in which the underground movement takes place) are useful in identifying the members of the underground, criminal hierarchy, or other IDT structure. Discerning multiple parallel and competing structures may be necessary as well. Information about the IDT’s organization at national, district, and local levels is fundamental to FID operations.

C-11. Collection of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly changing variables of a local situation is critical. Intelligence personnel must gather information on members of the IDT, their movements, and their methods. Biographies and photos of suspected members and detailed information on their homes, families, education, work history, and associates are important features of short-range intelligence.

C-12. Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the typical FID adversary. Focusing on this approach rather than a holistic approach striking at the root causes triggering the need for FID operations may actually foster larger numbers of armed resisters. However, tactical success against armed elements is an integral part of a comprehensive FID program. Initially, however, forces must neutralize the IDT’s underground cells or infrastructure, because this infrastructure is the main source of tactical intelligence and populace control. Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves two goals: it ensures government control of the area and cuts off the enemy’s main source of intelligence. FID operations need an intelligence and operations command center at the district or province level. This organization accomplishes a fusion of actionable intelligence for operations against the IDT infrastructure with feedback from the operational element. Information on IDT infrastructure targets should come from sources such as the national police and other established intelligence nets, agents, and individuals (informants). In addition, FID operators should use all electronic intelligence available to track activities such as cell phone use.

C-13. Security forces can induce individuals among the general populace to become informants. Security forces use various motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, and financial rewards) as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of protection from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must maintain the informant’s anonymity and must conceal the transfer of information from the source to the security agent. The security agent and the informant may prearrange signals to coincide with everyday behavior.

C-14. Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places, is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the requirements of different situations. The basic procedures include electronic observation (for example, video, wiretaps, or concealed microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical surveillance of subjects.

C-15. Whenever security forces apprehend a suspect during an operation, a hasty interrogation by qualified personnel or tactical questioning by any ARSOF Soldier takes place to gain immediate information that could be of tactical value. If the interrogator or questioner is unable to speak the detainee’s language, an
interpreter who received a briefing beforehand is used. Recording devices may also assist the interrogator, but at a minimum, a note taker should record all sessions. The recorder allows the interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder also lets a knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the detainee has mentioned without the interrogator/questioner interrupting the continuity established during a given sequence. The interrogator/questioner can also question certain inaccuracies, keeping pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator/questioner must be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter has to be familiar with all procedures. His preinterrogation briefings must include information on the detainee’s health, the circumstances resulting in his detention (if releasable), and the specific information required. Successful interrogation or tactical questioning is contingent upon continuity and a well-trained interpreter.

**Documenting Ongoing Collection**

C-16. Like conventional tactical situations, FID operations require large amounts of information on a continuous basis. Therefore, most records will contain everything from raw information to processed intelligence. All records, therefore, are living documents that may simultaneously have analysts executing more than one category of the intelligence process. Typical ongoing collection files are shown in Figure C-2. Intelligence analysts promptly compare new information with existing information and intelligence to determine its significance. To a large degree, the extent of the recording effort will depend upon the IDT activity in the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARSOF ONGOING COLLECTION FILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incident overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IDT situation overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trap overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Personalities and contact overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Individual local personality and organization file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General military intelligence work sheet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IDT analysis work sheet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hot file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Propaganda file and overlay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Area studies file.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure C-2. Ongoing collection files**

C-17. Depending on the echelon of responsibility, the state of IDT activity in the area, and the degree of knowledge of the adversary, the current intelligence graphic requires at least two annotated maps: the incident overlay and the IDT situation overlay. The incident overlay provides historic, cumulative information on insurgent activity trends or patterns. Properly maintained entries let the intelligence analyst make judgments about—

- The nature and location of IDT targets.
- The relative intensity of IDT interest in specific areas.
- The IDT’s control over or support from the population.
- The potential areas of IDT operations.

C-18. The IDT situation overlay represents intelligence. Analysts build much of the situation overlay around the information recorded on the incident map. They will find it difficult to pinpoint IDT installations and dispositions with the same degree of confidence as in a conventional tactical situation. Many IDTs can displace on short notice, making a report outdated before it can be confirmed. The situation overlay can graphically substantiate the trends or patterns derived from the incident overlay, which improves the economy and effectiveness of the collection effort. The situation overlay provides a ready guide for briefing the commander, the civil authorities, or other interested parties.
Appendix C

C-19. Other annotated maps include the trap overlay and personalities and contact overlay. The trap overlay is used if the IDT is capable of sabotage or terrorist action. It will portray particularly attractive target locations for sabotage or terrorism. Targets may be road and railroad bridges, communications centers, theaters and assembly halls, governance and security buildings, relief centers, and places where the terrain favors ambushes and raids. Recent experience with improvised explosive devices has shown that apart from being on a likely route of travel for HN or U.S. forces their placement is otherwise irrelevant or purposefully misleading and illogical. These areas are plainly marked on this map, directing attention to possible IDT access and escape routes.

C-20. Initial intelligence about the IDT situation may be information on locations and activities of individual agents (espionage, agitation, organization, and liaison). The personalities and contacts overlay records the appearances, movements, meetings, and disappearances of these agents. A large-scale city street map or town plan is required to track the individuals. Dated symbols indicate observations and incidents. Depending on the amount of IDT activity, intelligence analysts can combine this overlay with the incident overlay.

C-21. Each identifiable IDT personality also has an individual local personality and organization file whether named or not. (Filing by a nickname, alias, or number is acceptable in the latter case.) If the local police force carries out surveillance, it can transfer basic identifying and biographical information from dossiers to an electronic or, if necessary, card file. This file helps train friendly forces to recognize key personalities on sight. The organization section of this file contains information on—

- The history and activities of the IDT organization.
- The other subversive or suspected groups and their leaders.
- The overlapping directorates of, membership in, and liaison among different IDT groups or local organizations.

C-22. A general military intelligence work sheet and the annotated maps serve to isolate problem areas and establish links between items of information and intelligence collected. In the early phase of an insurgency, the enemy is building its own organization. Therefore, the organizational procedures and tactics will be unique. The intelligence analyst must study personalities and analyze incidents.

C-23. An IDT analysis work sheet helps identify information and intelligence needed to satisfy PIRs and IRs. It provides a guide for analysis of an environment for operations short of war.

C-24. The hot file is the most important working file. It includes all available material pertaining to an incident or groups of possibly related incidents of current interest. This file contains material on persons, agents, suspects, or places likely to be involved in IDT activity.

C-25. If propaganda is a part of the IDT effort in the area, a current propaganda file and resultant overlay should contain items pertaining to the grievances and resultant vulnerabilities and susceptibilities the IDTs are exploiting. Items in such a file include—

- Any hard copies of propaganda.
- Background material:
  - Photographs of propaganda in situation.
  - Propaganda analyses.
  - Any past counterpropaganda measures.
- Analyses of local grievances:
  - TAAs.
  - Lists of other grievances by nontargeted audiences.
- Upcoming counterpropaganda.

C-26. Area study files provide a baseline of important data that acts as a starting point for any more detailed information request. The files are also updated as new intelligence is made available. They contain data on—

- Demographics.
- Geography.
- Hydrography.
• Climate.
• Political and economic characteristics.
• HN military and paramilitary forces.
• IDT organization.
• Targets (both friendly and IDT).

C-27. Finally, a resource or archival file contains all material collected but assessed not of immediate value. This file may include inactive incident files, inactive personality and organization files, and photography. Information later judged to be of no value or erroneous can be maintained, albeit possibly only in digitized form, to aid in lessons learned for future collection plans and to possibly discern adversary misinformation or disinformation operations.

PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION

C-28. Processing and exploitation is the category of the intelligence process through which information begins to become intelligence. Processing and exploitation includes first-phase imagery exploitation, data conversion and correlation, document translation, and signal decryption, as well as reporting the results of these actions to analysis and production elements. Certain factors are unique to the FID environment. Intelligence analysts must apply these factors to determine IDT capabilities and COAs and provide the intelligence needed for all facets of FID operations. An often-overlooked technique of determining what the IDT is doing to influence the population can be found in open-source media. Analysts should make a concerted effort to review and capture any propaganda found on the Internet, television, radio broadcast, and newspapers, as well as signs or graffiti placed on walls of buildings in built-up areas. Once propaganda is collected, intelligence analysts should track and measure the propaganda against future actions of the IDT and population. These messages support understanding of the IDT’s thought process that planners can consider in counteractions.

ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

C-29. Analysis is the examination of information to determine its intelligence value. The intelligence analyst’s knowledge and judgment play a major role in analyzing information. Therefore, he must know the theory of insurgency and the mind-set of antigovernment IDTs. In considering if a fact or event is possible, he must realize that certain events are possible, even if they have not previously occurred and have been thought unlikely to occur. Intelligence production takes confirmed intelligence and puts it into a form usable by the requestor. All available processed information is evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted to create products that will satisfy the commander’s PIRs or requests for information.

C-30. Intelligence production happens only after intelligence analysts have compared it with other information and interpreted it to determine its significance. All-source analysts primarily conduct analysis and production. These analysts fuse information from all intelligence disciplines. This multidiscipline fusion effort results in all-source intelligence. All-source intelligence deduces the probable meaning of new information and determines its implications for future IDT activities. The meaning of the information is determined in relation to the IDT situation and their probable COAs. In his search for related information, the intelligence analyst checks the incident file, the friendly and suspect personality files, and the organizational file. After obtaining all related items of information from the intelligence files, he begins to assemble the available information to form as many logical pictures or hypotheses as possible. Alternative methods of assembly are an essential prerequisite to any valid all-source interpretation. The assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good judgment and considerable background knowledge. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence analyst must avoid limitations resulting from preconceived opinions.

C-31. At a joint command, the intelligence analyst uses the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. At a SOTF or other Army command, the analyst uses the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) process for intelligence production. IPOE supports commanders and their staffs in the decision-making process. The commander directs the IPOE effort through the CCIR. All other staff elements are active participants in the IPOE. FM 3-05 contains a detailed discussion of the IPOE process.
DISSEMINATION AND INTEGRATION

C-32. The final step of the intelligence cycle is disseminating and integrating the intelligence processed. Intelligence and combat information are of little value if not delivered when needed. Failure to disseminate this intelligence defeats a thorough and successful collection and processing effort. Because of IPOE, the senior intelligence officer (SIO) produces a variety of templates, overlays, association and event matrices, and flowcharts appropriate to METT-TC. He provides these products to the HN commander and J/G/S-3 for approval and guidance. As a follow-up, the SIO provides the correct products promptly to the right consumers. He also ensures these products are adequate for and properly used by them. Where appropriate, the SIO must advise and coach nonintelligence personnel in the use of the products. He must also use his IPOE products to identify gaps in the intelligence database and redirect his collection effort.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

C-33. Whether using the fundamentally similar joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment or IPOE, certain categories of information stand out as critical to obtaining a complete intelligence picture for FID. JP 3-07.1 divides joint intelligence preparation for FID operations into five categories:

- Operational environment evaluation.
- Geographic analysis.
- Population analysis.
- Climatology analysis.
- Threat analysis.

C-34. ARSOF FID IRs fall under these five categories; however, ARSOF IRs may require more detail and specificity than those of conventional forces. The following sections describe the five joint categories highlighting ARSOF-specific characteristics, as well as those relevant to the entire force whether joint or JIIM. Some of the evaluation products and overlays (for example, the incident overlay) have one-for-one corollaries with the ARSOF living collection files and others receive ARSOF input from other files. In the following discussion of the five joint categories, it must be noted that all JIIM elements present for FID operations are represented in these categories and ARSOF personnel must then include terms that will place all relevant intelligence on the final products, not merely those data determined by ARSOF units. ARSOF-specific subcategories of files and overlays are included with and under the five categories of intelligence preparation analysis and evaluations. Reciprocity of higher-echelon or JIIM analysis products and ARSOF products with other JIIM participants in FID operations is essential for a complete picture of the OE.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EVALUATION

C-35. During OE evaluation, information is collected to satisfy basic intelligence requirements across a comprehensive spectrum that includes political, military, economic, religious, social, health status of the population, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, adversaries, and third-party forces. Area study files can contribute greatly to this evaluation. Depending on the conditions in the HN, notably the maturity of the threat groups, the basic level for any area may comprise large amounts of data. One of these areas is the human terrain, hence; of particular interest in this category is the evaluation of the PSYOP and CMO situations.

Psychological Operations Evaluation

C-36. The PSYOP assessment and any available studies identify potential TAs, available and needed media, themes and symbols, and adversary propaganda capability. This information is analyzed by PSYOP personnel with the support of fulfilled IRs from organic and higher-echelon intelligence assets. Analysts developing a resultant PSYOP OE evaluation also focus on, but do not limit themselves to identifying—

- The ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area and the location and density of each group.
The key leaders and communicators in the area, such as politicians and government officials, clergy, labor leaders, media personalities, business people, and so on.

The cohesive and divisive issues within the HN and select areas.

The literacy rates and levels of education of the local population.

The types of media consumed by potential TAs and its level of credibility.

The third-country organizations or nationals in the HN, their stated purpose, their actual actions, their truthfulness, and their effects on the HN populace.

The production and trade, including significant trade agreements, restrictions, and sanctions or lack thereof.

The issues of use and ownership of natural resources, industry, and agriculture of the HN.

The HN’s PSYOP and PA programs.

The types of propaganda encountered and any background on the source.

In the course of OE evaluation, the PSYOP planners (with HN counterparts if available) coordinate with military and embassy PA personnel to prepare a matrix or other graphic identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be developed. Planners also identify target groups and potential TAs. In addition, PSYOP and PA programs must accomplish deconfliction to prevent information fratricide. The locations of mass and local media facilities in the area that can be used for the dissemination of PSYOP series and PA products. The identification of the operational characteristics and capacities of these media outlets are also important in the selection of the best dissemination vehicle for these products. In addition, guerrilla or underground media facilities (or products if facilities are clandestine or covert) are assessed as well. In particular, the PSYOP planner must evaluate—

- Studios and transmitters for radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, programming, and costs).
- Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment, that can provide or supplement the capabilities of PSYOP units.
- Accessibility of such facilities to PSYOP forces; for example, who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the United States.
- Possible HN media donors and contributors in the PSYOP program.
- Propaganda outlets ranked from immediate to lesser concern.

Civil-Military Operations Evaluation

OE evaluation of CMO in FID operations comprises an evaluation of HN civic action programs, PRC, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. The CMO planner also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the OE by the HN unilaterally or with U.S. support through CAO, such as FHA and HCA. In making the overarching evaluation, the planner utilizes local and regional assets of the HN and the supported command to get an accurate feel for the IDTs that may exist in the HN. ARSOF units conducting site surveys supplement these assets at the national and local levels. If deployed, a CA planning team assists and provides data for this evaluation.

Typically, ARSOF support to the CMO evaluation of the OE will use the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events model to determine what, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the AO. This helps to determine what civilian activities in the AO might affect military operation (and vice versa) and what the commander must do to support and interact with those activities. The model also aids in nonlethal targeting within the civilian component of the OE. Other data will typically be derived from CA area studies and assessments.

Geographic Analysis

The next intelligence preparation category to support FID operations is the geographic analysis, which considers the terrain’s affect on a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area. Normally, the seven map overlays described below are a result of the geographic analysis.
Cover and Concealment Overlay

C-41. The cover and concealment overlay graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment from the ground, as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat selection of base camps, mission-support sites, drug laboratories, or other adversary areas. Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and man-made features, such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests, and is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, man-made structures are also assessed for the cover and concealment they offer. When used with the population status overlay, the cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, and meeting places. It is worthy to note that both cover and concealment for an IDT member may be hiding in plain sight as he blends back into and is indistinguishable from ordinary citizens.

Logistics Sustainability Overlay

C-42. Logistics are essential to friendly and IDT operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and materiel supply. It however may extend to asymmetric and highly technical means. For example, insurgencies, criminal enterprises, and terrorists have used the Internet to conduct fund-raising from expatriates (notably the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka), foreign and domestic criminal activity (Hezbollah in the United States and domestic IDTs in Columbia and the Philippines), intellectual and maritime piracy (Paraguay and Indonesia), and complicated international financial fraud. It may be noted that such activity may necessitate a separate supplemental overlay.

C-43. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, and other relevant items. In built-up areas, this overlay depicts markets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. In some HNs, religious institutions can also serve as care providers. Vital to preparing this overlay is knowledge of IDT and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements. Included in this analysis and overlay is any third-party logistics sources. For instance, an NGO may not willingly support an armed combatant; however, they may not detect (or even attempt to detect) a combatant who has left his arms elsewhere and joined in with civilians seeking relief supplies or medical aide.

Target Overlay

C-44. The target overlay graphically portrays the location of possible adversary targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, bridges, electric power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other specific points most susceptible to lethal attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. Increasingly, terrorist IDTs or other IDTs willing to utilize terror tactics have savagely targeted civilian market places, schools, playgrounds and sports facilities.

C-45. Hazard estimates are prepared for those targets with collateral damage potential. For example, the threat to a large air base may focus on airframes, crew billets, and POL storage as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The target overlay is significant to the friendly commander’s defensive planning because it shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be diffused. It also provides CI personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to attack; for example, to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes. The target overlay is useful in disaster relief operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, looting, or areas of potential collateral damage. Nonlethal targeting can be included in one overlay, a second target overlay or in the PSYOP and CA overlays.
Line of Communication Overlay

C-46. The LOC overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes within the area, such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, airfields, DZs, and LZs. In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules; underground sewage, drainage, and utility tunnels; ditches; culverts; and large open areas that could be used for DZs and LZs are shown. Where applicable, this overlay also shows seasonal variations. Personnel should carefully compare recent imagery and other geospatial intelligence, adding any new LOCs to the final product. In many situations, LOC products will be readily available from the HN or other local sources. The preparer annotates IDT LOCs (or known portions thereof) on one overlay or on a supplemental overlay for clarity.

Incident Overlay

C-47. The incident overlay plots security-related incidents by type and location. Clusters of similar incidents represent a geographic pattern of activity. FID operators further analyze these incidents for time patterns, proximity to population grouping, LOCs, targets, and areas of cover and concealment. This analysis assists in the day-to-day application of security resources. The preparer of the joint overlay should combine the ARSOF incident overlay and IDT situation overlay whenever practicable and releasable in a JIIM environment.

Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Operations Geographical Overlays

C-48. PSYOP and CMO considerations also affect the geographic analysis and produce several possible overlays that are dependent upon geography rather than IDT activity. Typically, ARSOF PSYOP and CA units will produce these overlays, but commanders and staffs may use them. Personnel may use them in by commanders and staffs as well as in daily, weekly, or other scheduled briefs.

C-49. PSYOP considerations in a geographic analysis focus on how geography affects the population of the area and the dissemination of PSYOP products. This step may include preparation of a radio line of sight overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and line of sight information. For example, PSYOP terrain analysis will focus on determining the respective broadcast footprints and signal strength from the significant broadcast stations identified during OE evaluation. Adversary threat and treaties with or the stated desires of neighboring countries can dictate denied areas for leaflet dissemination, Commando Solo orbits, or no-broadcast spillover areas. Increasingly, areas of cell phone/wireless connectivity and hard-line Internet connectivity are relevant as well. Terrain-limiting loudspeaker broadcasts may be relevant as well.

C-50. CMO considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of critical threats to government and governance mechanisms and infrastructures, other threats to food and water storage facilities, toxic industrial material sites, resupply routes, and base locations. In addition, a primary consideration in FID operations is how terrain affects the ability of U.S. and HN forces to conduct CMO and CAO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unsuited to some CMO projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower and equipment needed to run such projects.

Climatology Analysis

C-51. Climatology can greatly affect ARSOF and IDT operations. Periods of dangerously low visibility, such as dust storms, gale-force or higher winds, or severe blizzard conditions, can affect SOAR operations. These conditions can affect other means of infiltration, exfiltration, and E&R as well. High winds, acoustic shadow, or precipitation can grievously affect PSYOP dissemination. Adverse weather can affect CAO as well. Weather conditions affect IDTs as well but not always adversely. Having essentially interior LOCs, they may capitalize on climate effects that limit one or more ARSOF fires or modes of mobility. In addition, insurgents or other IDTs may have traditional campaigning seasons. For instance, in an HN with harsh winters, IDTs may go to ground in sheltered areas. A climatology analysis may produce one or more overlays as appropriate and directed by the commander.
POPULATION ANALYSIS

C-52. In FID operations as in UW operations, the local population is the key element to the successful execution of the operation. Consequently, planners must conduct a population analysis of the FID OE. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, and produces overlays and other products as appropriate for the following factors: social organization; economic organization and dynamics; political organization and dynamics; history of the society; nature of the IDT; nature of the government; effects on nonbelligerents; and COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and nonbelligerents.

C-53. The generic population status overlay graphically represents the sectors of the population that are progovernment, antigovernment, prothreat, antithreat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is important because the population can provide support and security to friendly or threat forces. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment may display the home and work places of key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps or imagery are used to accurately plot information by marking rooftops of buildings. Planners should cross-reference such a refined product with order of battle (OB) files that are similar to the represented data, such as personality files or faction and organization files.

C-54. In evaluating social organization, planners look at—

- Density and distribution of population by groups, balance between urban and rural groups, sparsely populated areas, and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups.
- Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.
- Overlaps among classes and splits within them, such as the number and types of religious and racial groups that union members belong to and ideological divisions within a profession.
- Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strengths of each, that is, those who actively or passively support the government or the threat and those who are neutral.
- Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each group and subgroup.
- Population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups.
- Potential and identified PSYOP TAs.
- Factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups. Then determine which groups and composite groups support, are inclined to support, or remain neutral toward the government.

C-55. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically look at—

- The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations in the operational area, including—
  - The enforcement of intellectual property rights.
  - The existence and characteristics of shadow economies.
  - The nature of foreign investment.
- The economic infrastructure, such as resource locations, scientific and technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.
- Economic performance, such as gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.
- Major industries and their sustainability, including the depth and soundness of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage capacity.
- Performance of productive segments, such as public and private ownership patterns; concentration and dispersal; and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation.
Public health factors that include but are not limited to birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic diseases, health of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services.

Foreign trade patterns, such as domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private) and resource dependencies.

Availability of education, including access by individuals and groups, sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training; and surpluses and shortages of skills.

Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as horizontal and vertical career mobility, include—
- Taxing authorities, rates, rate determination, disproportional burdens, graft, and corruption.
- Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.
- Population shifts and their causes and effects; as examples, rural-to-urban, agriculture-to-manufacturing, and manufacturing-to-service.
- Economic program values and resources that might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups are identified.

In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at—
- The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power, that is, pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters or strongman rule supported by the military.
- The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure; that is, is the government nominally a democracy but in reality a political dictatorship or one party oligarchy.
- Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.
- Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support, such as political action groups.
- Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlation of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations such as churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.
- The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocs, and patron-client determinants of voting.
- Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. That is, does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?
- Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.
- Centralization or diffusion of essential decision making and patterns of inclusion or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.
- Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?
- Political, economic, and social groups and then identify political programs to neutralize opposing groups, as well as provide programs favorable to friendly groups.

In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically look at—
- The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership, to include the following:
  - Was it elected?
  - Does it have a long history?
  - Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?
- The history of political violence, to include the following:
  - Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems?
  - Is there precedent for revolution, coup d’état, assassination, or terrorism?
Appendix C

- Does the country have a history of consensus-building?
- Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?
- The legitimacy of the government, acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and level of violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that will support or oppose the use of violence.

C-58. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency or other IDT, planners specifically look at—
- The ideology or lack thereof of the IDT, and determine if it is—
  - Political or religious.
  - Criminal.
- The desired end state of the IDT, clarity of its formulation, openness of its articulation, commonality of point of view among the elements of the IDT, and differences between this end view and the end view of the government.
- The stated dogma versus tangible actions.
- The groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the IDT.
- The divisions, minority views, and dissension within the IDT.
- The groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end state of the IDT.
- The organizational and operational patterns used by the IDT, variations and combinations of such, and shifts and trends.

C-59. Finally, analysts determine the stage and phase of the insurgency or other IDT, as well as how far and how long it has progressed and regressed over time. They identify unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine (if any), training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistical assistance. This should include not only the sources of support but also specific means by which support is provided and critical points through which the HN could slow, reduce, negate, or stop this support. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet or other factor constitutes an exploitable vulnerability or a weakness on which the government can build strength.

C-60. When examining hostile groups, planners examine the following from hostile perspectives:
- The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, skills, and C2 resources.
- Patterns of lawless activities (for example, illicit drug trafficking, extortion, piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, LOCs, and supporters outside of the country concerned.
- The intelligence, OPSEC, deception, media exploitation and propaganda capabilities of the hostile groups. This should include all media in league with or sympathetic to the IDT.
- The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them.

C-61. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically examine—
- General planning or lack of planning for countering the insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion, as well as planning comprehensiveness and correctness of definitions and conclusions.
- Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans, such as resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities.
- Use of population and resources and the effects on each group.
- Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces, for example, how the government protects its economic and political infrastructure.
- Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.
- PRC measures.
- PSYOP and PA programs.
- Economic development programs.
- HN asymmetric or niche capacity for countering IDTs.
- Government and IDT strengths and weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.
C-62. Finally, planners determine the strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to retain their inertia, and the requirements to make them remain or become neutral or support friendly or threat programs or forces.

C-63. In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, planners specifically answer the following questions:

- What are the categories of nonbelligerents?
- What are mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses?
- What are common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the IDT?
- What are the effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs, to include the following:
  - Does the government often kill or wound civilians in its operations?
  - Does the government often cause collateral damage to neutral or friendly civilians?
  - Is the government and military credible in words, deeds, or neither?
- Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?
- To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence?

C-64. In evaluating COAs for threat forces, the government, and nonbelligerents, analysts balance the foregoing factors and determine likely COAs, as well as probable outcomes for each element.

**THREAT ANALYSIS**

C-65. Threat analysis focuses on the examination of the IDTs’ ends, ways, means, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and friendly methods for gaining the initiative, exploiting success, and achieving early victories (even if only of limited tactical reward). Insurgents and other IDTs are potentially quite vulnerable in some areas. IDTs typically—

- Are normally outnumbered and outgunned by the security forces, although they may have local fire superiority.
- Are deficient in mobility, communications, medical, and logistical support.
- Are considered illegal by the government in power, the United States, and part of the world community.
- Lack a stable political, economic, and territorial base.
- Suffer from fragmentation and internal competition.
- Suffer leadership problems. Examples are—
  - Cult of personality susceptible to decapitation of leader.
  - Too many chiefs.
- Contain members that may have more loyalty to personal aggrandizement than group loyalty.
- Contain co-opted or coerced members that are vulnerable to defection appeals.

C-66. IDTs are generally aware of their difficult situation; therefore, they must protect and overcome their vulnerabilities. They must maintain security while building strength and support. They can do this by—

- Developing asymmetric niche capability.
- Developing underground, cellular organizations and support systems.
- Infiltrating government organizations for intelligence and political purposes.
- Persuading the willing or coercing the unwilling from the populace for intelligence, logistics, and manpower support.
- Establishing remote and fluid base areas or violate the sovereignty of a bordering nation.
- Using multiple secret routes.
- Using caches.
- Maintaining small but constant attrition to HN and U.S. forces through low-risk attacks or improvised explosive devices, mines, and booby traps.
- Maintaining psychological pressure through tactically dubious but nonetheless harassing actions.
- Exploiting all avenues of propaganda and media exposure.
Appendix C

- Building external support.
- Striking HN assets abroad in lower-risk operations.
- Combining or switching disparate tactics.

C-67. IDTs must gain and maintain the initiative by carrying out actions that distract security forces (forcing the security forces to take a defensive posture). They also can gain and maintain the initiative by carrying out actions that weaken the government’s power. They weaken the government by attacking its political and economic infrastructure through acts of terror, armed attacks against economic targets, and the skillful use of propaganda. In addition, IDTs of all types are increasingly using the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians rather than hard targets, such as police or military forces.

C-68. Security is essential for the IDT’s success, because it provides them with the time to make a long-term strategy work. To do so, they must protect their vulnerabilities and weaknesses and maintain the ability to exercise the initiative. Security is the IDT’s true center of gravity. However, it is a double-edged sword requiring support from the populace. IDTs cannot maintain security without significant support from the HN populace. The government must use intelligence to expose vulnerabilities, regain the initiative, and destroy the IDT-developed and (frequently) intelligence-oriented strategy. The HN forces must focus their efforts on planning and conducting operations that reduce the insurgents’ freedom of action and attack the IDTs’ vulnerabilities. A common mistake is to reduce this to a manhunt in the mistaken belief that liquidating the right personality will end an insurgency or stop a national criminal enterprise. Although utilitarian, this manhunt is secondary to the goal of separating the IDT from its supporters.

Order of Battle Intelligence in a Battle Without Order

C-69. OB is as important in FID operations as in conventional combat operations. However, the intelligence analyst must recognize that in most FID operations, with the exception of a mature FID operation with significant IDT forces, wide variances in nomenclature and organizational approach will predominate the IDT organization. The applicability of the OB factors differs in FID environments from conventional operations. For instance, IDTs are typically cellular organizations to at least some degree and, whether political or criminal, may be difficult to fill a complete organizational OB picture. However, this can be mitigated as additional cells are identified and consistencies in gaps indicate typical numbers within cells or other subgroupings of members.

C-70. There will also be differences in organization in different areas where IDTs possess greater or lesser influence. These can differ greatly. However, information on one of the elements will often lead to a reevaluation or alteration of information previously received on another element. The normal practice of developing and maintaining OB down to and including two echelons below the intelligence analyst’s own level of command does not apply to FID. The nature of the IDT and the phased development (or lack thereof as in a criminal IDT that only seeks a status quo to maintain incomes and influence) of its forces require much more detailed OB and pertain to much lower echelons. Some FID operations may never pass above the lowest of echelons and may remain a sporadic fight against small cells. The following paragraphs address the OB factors and explain their applicability to FID situations.

Composition

C-71. In some IDT organizations, armed force is only one of several instruments through which the IDTs seek power. Development of an armed force has the lowest priority during the early stages of an insurgency and may remain so with other IDTs. For instance, narco-terrorists may rely on selective terrorist acts (for example, targeting police and the judiciary) only as long as the HN government attempts to curtail trafficking. As long as the party core and civil organizations are established and move effectively toward the goal of the IDT, the armed or military arm may either be dormant or simply exist in cadre form until needed as a support arm. A military wing can exist primarily as a political bargaining chip. A prime example is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Although a virulent insurgent force for several years, when the Philippine government entered into peace talks with the group, members of the armed resistance stood down from armed action. Eventually some members were assimilated into the Philippine military.
Political Structures

C-72. There may be tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy, at the center of some IDTs. In most instances, this organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the village, district, province, and national levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters, totally distinct but parallel command channels may exist. Such a model usually exists in the leftist IDTs from which the model originated. There may be military chains of command and political channels of control. The party ensures complete domination over the military structure by using its own parallel organization. The party dominates through a political division in an insurgent military headquarters or a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit.

C-73. Conversely, other IDTs can have a political character far different from the classic leftist model. A right-wing IDT may implant political belief within a similar command structure. In the WOT, the same approach has typically been used by radical Islamists where political, military, and theological leaders are one in the same. Radical religious belief is not universally a basis for any real organizational outline. The Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland used religion as a point of rhetoric and propaganda, but they maintained a secular command structure. In addition, religion was a point of dogma rather than the fundamental cause of the Irish insurgency, which lay primarily with the economic disparity of many Catholics in Northern Ireland. Political and military structure in a criminal IDT are often synonymous as well. The organization of such an IDT is akin to a feudalist structure. However, a criminal IDT can use political organizations to further its control as well.

Armed Units

C-74. The organization of IDT armed forces is dependent on the needs of, the tactics used by, and the availability of personnel and equipment. Frequently, IDT units employ subordinate elements of IDT units independently. In some instances, this autonomy can be chaotic, with little central control. This presents difficulties in producing predictive intelligence but may assist in tactical successes against uncoordinated action by IDTs. The intelligence analyst who receives a confirmed report of an IDT unit operating in his area cannot assume that a parent unit or even a leader acting as a liaison from a higher echelon is also present. In addition, the tactic in the WOT of terrorist leaders advocating independent Jihad may become a commonplace TTP in future FID operations. Although isolated, perhaps comprising single individuals and probably having limited resources, this sort of tactic will be a challenge for analysts.

Disposition

C-75. Determining the disposition of the IDTs involves locating their operational training and supply bases, LOCs, and areas of political control. The intelligence analyst can arrive at the IDTs’ potential dispositions by developing patterns of activity. These patterns originate from map study and knowledge of IDT tactics. IDT base areas, for instance, are normally near areas they control through politics, intimidation, or bribery, thereby providing an early warning system. Ideological commitment, fear, or the perception of material gain can bolster this in the populace. By plotting IDT sightings and combining this information with weather conditions, time factors, propaganda clues, symbolic dates or targets, detailed investigation of IDT incidents, and AARs, the intelligence analyst can select possible enemy dispositions and possible areas of tactical deployment. These areas, while appearing to be under the control of internal defense forces, may be under the political or otherwise de facto control of the insurgents.

Strength

C-76. Intelligence analysts must think of the strength of the insurgent forces in terms of the armed units, political cadres (if any), foreign backing, and domestic popular support. The intelligence analyst can apply some conventional methods of strength computation to determine IDT strength. However, conventional strengths are irrelevant in some areas of IDT overall strength. For instance, raw numbers and weaponry are tangible, measurable, and relevant in a conventional battle. However, an IDT need only to persevere with the ability to conduct sporadic attacks to maintain credibility in the realm of domestic and international perceptions. Without conducting attacks that viably damage the overall combat power of U.S. or HN
forces, the IDT can maintain the perception of strength. In addition to the classic analysis of real combat power, analysts should track the perceived strength of IDTs.

C-77. IDTs will generally try to have their strengths overestimated by the HN security elements unless attempting deception to draw HN forces into a fight where the IDT has localized superiority. To give this false impression, the IDTs may rapidly move their units and use multiple designations for a single element. The possibility also exists of an IDT developing ghost or phantom units. IDTs may use deceptive communications as well. In addition, as IDTs are often capable of completely blending in with the populace, they may deliberately conduct understrength attacks to lure HN or U.S. forces to other locales before launching full-strength attacks. The intelligence analyst views reports from the populace on IDT strengths with caution and stresses the importance of actual counts of adversary personnel. He finds it more difficult to determine the popular support for the IDTs, although a guide may be the percentage of an area under government control as opposed to the percentage under IDT control. A useful indicator of the extent of IDT control is the willingness of the populace to report information on IDTs.

Tactics

C-78. Tactics include adversary doctrine or merely standard procedures and the conduct of operations according to that doctrine. IDTs may be more flexible in their application of doctrine than regular military organizations. Indeed, in the absence of centralized training and codified doctrine or procedures, actual tactics may vary from location to location and commander to commander. Execution of tactics may be highly dependent on leader and individual ability. The friendly forces must know and understand the doctrine that guides the IDT if they are to counter adversary efforts effectively. The choice and application of IDT tactics is an appraisal of HN and U.S. vulnerabilities against localized or situational IDT strengths. IDT tactics will typically involve political, military, psychological, and economic approaches, all closely integrated. This is a matter of necessity rather than choice. Countering any one section of this unified approach weakens the others. Speed, surprise, and heavy application of firepower and mobility describe IDT military tactics. The likelihood of IDTs using terror tactics is a distinct possibility as well. Suicide bombings, for instance, are not the sole province of Islamist terrorists. Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam have used such tactics for many years against the government of Sri Lanka.

Training

C-79. IDT training levels can vary greatly. Generally, IDT training will closely relate to the tactics they use. This is because their capacity and resources to train personnel is limited. An IDT may rely on recruiting members already trained with specialty skills and concentrate on developing baseline capacity with rank-and-file members. Typically, training will include vigorous political and psychological indoctrination. IDT training can couple this with vetting the potential member for zeal or loyalty. Analysts should seek to gain knowledge of the price of failure to any recruit. The combat groups and people within an area under the IDTs’ political domination receive training as the situation allows. Successful IDTs carefully plan and train for individual operations and phases of movements.

Logistics

C-80. In FID operations as in conventional warfare, an IDT’s effectiveness is dependent on its logistical support. In the early stages of a FID operation, the requirements for military equipment and supplies are less than in later stages. Accurate intelligence of the IDT’s sources and availability of supplies and equipment is essential to determine its capability to maintain and expand its struggle against the HN. FID planners should assess the IDT’s ability to capture or cannibalize HN equipment as well.

Effectiveness

C-81. Effectiveness describes the qualitative ability of the IDT to achieve its economic, political, or military purposes. One measure IDT effectiveness is the type and number of operations it is able to perform. Empirical polling of the HN populace as to the IDT’s support, as well as anecdotal evidence of popular support, can also gauge the IDT’s effectiveness. The ability to garner international support or deter other nations from intervening on the HN’s behalf shows effectiveness as well. In addition, economic
barometers can provide evidence of an IDT’s success. An example would be the pullout of foreign investors. The type and sophistication of IDT propaganda may show effectiveness as well.

Personalities

C-82. Planners do not list personalities as a separate OB factor in a conventional situation. However, planners do list them as a separate fact in FID operations because of their increased importance. Overemphasizing analysis of personalities detracts from analysis of root causes for FID operations. Underemphasizing personality analysis potentially misses the ability to turn, neutralize by nonlethal means, or lethally interdict critical leaders or members of an IDT.

Electronic and Technical Intelligence Data

C-83. In the early stages of OB intelligence, there is often either a lack of uniform communications procedures or an overreliance on one means of communication. The latter situation will typically be highly exploitable but temporary in nature as the IDT learns the danger of one means of communication. The former generally prevents the development of an extensive electronic technical database. Very high frequency citizen’s band sets may play a role in early IDT operations. Equipment available to an IDT will range from the most primitive to the most modern. Even equipment not generally available in the armed forces of major world powers, such as spread spectrum and frequency hoppers, can be easily obtained if the IDT possesses the financial means. Cell phones and Internet communications have become more prevalent with IDTs as well.

INTERNAL DEFENSE THREAT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

C-84. Since FID is one of the principal arms of the IDAD program for restoration of internal security in the HN, it demands a vigorous and coordinated effort to win over, neutralize, or as a last resort, lethally interdict IDTs. IDTs may generate broad, sophisticated, and ruthless CI and security programs to thwart government penetrations. Since they are also citizens of the HN, they have an inherent understanding of the agents who would try to penetrate their organization. Therefore, they set up security and early warning nets in rural and urban areas. These systems are composed of carefully recruited individuals chosen primarily because their work places them near sensitive IDT installations and, in some cases, individuals or command cells. Typically, lookouts may be newspaper vendors, building janitors, young students, farmers, small shopkeepers, or even indigent street people. As IDTs increase their organization and sophistication, they may focus on persuading or co-opting persons of status to assist in CI efforts, especially members of the HN intelligence or police organizations.

C-85. Lookouts report possible government raids or other operations to liaison men and women chosen because they can travel without attracting notice. Liaison men are often letter carriers, taxi drivers, or traveling vendors who pass the information to IDT officials. Higher-level sources may have a dedicated contact instead of an ordinary liaison. IDTs that are more sophisticated may employ drops.

C-86. The security and CI wing of the IDT political organization produces the false birth certificates, identification papers, and travel permits that the agents require for travel, jobs, and other activities. To make it difficult for the police to check the authenticity of a forged document, the fictitious birthplace listed is often in a difficult to verify location. Identity papers frequently list the bearer as a peddler, freelance writer, or artist because these occupations are difficult for the police to check. Insurgents sometimes avoid the forgery problem by stealing or buying genuine documents from some individual who they then may kill.

C-87. Meeting sites are a security problem. IDTs prefer sites in which the arrival of several persons at about the same time will not attract attention or arouse suspicion. They may use woods, parks, and other secluded areas. When they must hold meetings at a house or apartment, they try to avoid those neighborhoods in which well-known antigovernment agitators live. Such areas may be under surveillance. They change meeting places frequently. When possible, they arrange meetings to coincide with some outwardly legal, proper reason for bringing individuals together. They stagger the arrivals and departures. Family members answer the door. Guards stay after the meeting to look for incriminating items left behind.
C-88. IDT groups routinely conduct security checks of members, potential members, and collaborators. Normally, they do not accept a recruit until they have investigated his present and past family, life, jobs, political activities, and close associates. A probationary period follows. If they urgently need a person with special skills, the IDT group may bring in a person but assign him or her very limited tasks until the investigation is completed. IDTs may also employ an incrimination process where prospective members must earn trust through a verifiable act of murder, sabotage, kidnapping, or other offense against the HN.

C-89. IDTs may test clandestine agents regularly. The IDT security personnel may summon, without warning, an individual to test his reaction. If he is guilty of disloyalty, he may sense possible exposure and desert. IDT security personnel may keep a suspect ignorant of a change in meeting place. If government security forces show up at the original site, the IDT organization knows the suspect is a government informant. Strict conformance with security procedures is required. Cell members are almost invariably subject to punishment if they do not report violations. Typically, security sections liquidate hostile agents. Beyond this, reprisals against the agent’s family may serve as an intimidation technique as well. They spend as much time, if not more, watching their own personnel as they do the HN’s.

**FRIENDLY FORCES SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

C-90. The techniques pertaining to friendly clandestine collection operations also apply to covert CI activities. The emphasis, however, is on information of CI interest rather than intelligence interest. However, CI operations may uncover information of intelligence interest. CI personnel should pass this information to interested agencies.

C-91. Most of the CI measures used will be overt in nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of CI measures to use include—

- Conducting background investigations and record checks of persons in sensitive positions, as well as persons whose loyalty may be questionable.
- Maintaining files on organizations, locations, and individuals of CI interest.
- Conducting internal security inspections of installations and units.
- Maintaining control of civilian movement within government-controlled areas.
- Creating identification systems that minimize the chance of insurgents gaining access to installations and moving freely on installations.
- Conducting unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
- Conducting censorship or outgoing personal and official communications.
Appendix D

Illustrative Interagency Plan for Foreign Internal Defense

Agencies conducting FID operations use several planning and execution documents, including those used by the ARSOF units covered within this manual. Other USG agencies use other types of planning and execution documents that may be in different formats than those used by the DOD units involved in FID operations. In addition, acronyms and terms may either vary or be unfamiliar to another USG agency. An illustrative interagency plan (IIP) for FID is a coordinating and synchronizing document that ensures unity of effort between all U.S., HN, and coalition agencies by placing the planned actions of all agencies in chronological order. JP 3-08 provides details on further aspects of interagency coordination.

PURPOSE

D-1. IIPs are typically prepared by one designated agency or coordinating group. Each agency must submit all planning and synchronization documents to the designated agency or group developing the IIP. Prior to launch of FID operations, the IIP can facilitate planners and agencies in final coordination to ensure that all agencies have full visibility on all the activities planned to support the HN IDAD effort. It can also serve as a final scrub to ensure that all agencies have a common understanding of terms, acronyms, and any possible impediments to standardized communication between agencies. IIPs for FID operations accomplish the following:

- Ensure the agencies fully use all the instruments of U.S. national power available to support the HN in concert with each other.
- Establish clear criterion for transition of phases.
- Identify and sequence a checklist of taskings for each USG agency over time.
- Provide a mechanism for USG programs to be mutually supporting.
- Provide a final deconfliction of disparate or contradictory actions by individual agencies.
- Include clear MOEs and MOPs working toward clearly defined goals.
- Integrate USG activities with those of HN and other interested parties.
- Ensure all agencies communicate the same policies and IO themes.
- Justify future budget requirements.
- Inform and guide agency future strategies and plans.

CONTENT

D-2. Because there is no set format for an IIP, the commander or the lead agent for FID operations will dictate the exact form to use. Certain items, however, are critical to developing a comprehensive and effective IIP for FID. An IIP for FID operations includes the following minimum components:

POLICY PLANNING GUIDANCE

D-3. The policy planning guidance section summarizes guidance provided by the President or other national security decisions pertaining to the situation. This section may include the guidance of the U.S. Ambassador as the direct representative of the USG. Limiting treaties or further policy guidance from HN policy makers or coalition partners (as endorsed by the President or his designee) should be included in this section as well.
UNITED STATES INTERESTS AT STAKE

D-4. This section states the U.S. interests at stake that warrant U.S. FID assistance. The preparer does not need to be wordy in this section, but it should include all U.S. national interests at stake. Clearly stated, transparent motives devoid of any unstated or hidden agendas greatly facilitate the application of the informational and diplomatic instruments of national power. Examples include significant economic interests, reducing international criminal activities affecting U.S. interests; and promoting the spread of human rights and democracy.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC PURPOSE

D-5. The strategic purpose section describes the overall purpose of conducting FID operations in the HN. Increasingly, the strategic purpose of FID transcends the borders of the HN to encompass a regional, transregional, or global strategic purpose. This is especially true of FID operations that assist the prosecution of the WOT. Examples include stabilizing a country for the sake of regional stability, countering narco-trafficking or narco-terrorism and reducing the potential for proliferation of WMD.

MISSION STATEMENT

D-6. This mission statement section gives the who, what, where, when and why of the USG FID operation. Although not necessarily providing an exhaustive list of the who, that is the agencies involved; this mission statement should be in sufficient detail to encompass generalities on how the instruments of national power are going to be brought to bear so that each agency involved in FID operations can infer its level of participation. Likewise, an exhaustive list of significant dates, locations, and operations, that is the what, where, and when, is not given but a comprehensive overview is given with significant operations or known hard dates. For instance, the mission statement may include mention that during the FID operation national elections will occur on a specified date. However, some dates may have to remain open-ended. The mission statement will reflect this. The why of the mission statement should be one of the most complete and least general portions of the mission statement and should comply with and encapsulate U.S. policy, interests, and strategic purpose in the context of the HN IDAD needs.

DESIRED END STATE

D-7. This section describes the desired outcome of all FID assistance. The preparer should describe the end state in measurable and quantifiable terms rather than generalities. An example might be a situation where an HN is stabilized to the point that an insurgency is reduced from a national security threat to a minor law enforcement problem. In this case, the level of insurgents might be quantified by a specific number (expressed in an acceptable plus or minus range) coupled with an objectively verifiable metric, such as the actual number of insurgent attacks.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

D-8. This section describes in broad terms how the USG will employ the instruments of national power in the FID operation. The operational concept is not the equivalent of a military concept of operation. The level of detail within an IIP operational concept will typically be less than in a concept of operation. It will instead focus on a holistic description of the interaction of the agencies involved in the FID operation to leverage all instruments of national power to effect political-military conditions in the HN.

PHASES

D-9. This section describes phases of USG assistance to an HN. Examples might be support to an HN’s transition to a new strategy, support to an HN’s operations to regain the initiative, support to HN offensive operations, support to HN consolidation of COIN gains, and rehabilitation. Each phase includes triggers or transition points for movement to the next phase. Another approach to phasing is to outline phases in terms of significant steps in the type of support given by the U.S. to the HN as shown in Table D-1, page D-3.
Yet another alternative type of phasing is geographical; for instance, pacifying the eastern three regions of a country, then the center, then the west.

### Table D-1. Phase model based on significant U.S. operational focus shifts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>END EVENT/TRIGGER</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I—Operational Assessment</td>
<td>All provincial assessments complete. HN military, national police and intelligence services assessments complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II—Train and Equip</td>
<td>HN COIN brigade trained and conventional force at not less than 80 percent of target manning/equipping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III—Direct Support</td>
<td>Insurgent hotbed provinces X, Y, and Z reduced to not more than two insurgent attacks per month and all safe havens identified in operational assessment destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV—Indirect Support</td>
<td>All provinces and capital insurgent incidents down 85 percent and HN intelligence services capacity sufficient for unsupported collection and analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V—Transition</td>
<td>Duty of countering remaining insurgent cells transferred from HN military to national and provincial police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI—Redeployment</td>
<td>Return of HN military to garrison locations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lines of Action and Political-Military Objectives

D-10. This section describes the broad categories of FID activities that the USG will conduct and the objectives within each. An example of a line of action is support to HN security forces to enhance their capacity to deal with insurgency. Political-military objectives of a primarily military nature within that line of action could include training and equipping a COIN brigade, supplying 100 helicopters to an HN army, conducting intelligence sharing, and training the HN police to defend their stations against insurgent attacks. Political-military objectives of a primarily political nature within that line of action might include reducing corruption within the HN military and government, rallying popular support for HN COIN efforts, and capitalizing on improvements of HN military capacity to combat insurgents through PSYOP and HN public information campaigns. In addition, lines of action may embrace both political and military factors. An example is a tip and rewards program.

### Agency Responsibilities

D-11. This section outlines the primary responsibilities of each USG agency involved in this FID operation. In the case of multiple agencies having areas of commonality, limiting or delineating points may be established. In addition, this section can include information on which is the lead and coordinating agency for a line of action that involves multiple agencies.

### Implementation Matrix

D-12. This section displays the political-military objectives for each phase in matrix form. Although there is no set format for the implementation matrix, all matrices must show objectives in chronological order. This is true whether the matrix displays hard dates or not. In this case, the matrix shows items in the order they will take place. By default, this may establish *not later than times* for some open-ended lines of action. Table D-2, page D-4, shows one possible sample implementation matrix.

### Lines of Action Annexes

D-13. Annexes contain key tasks, each with its MOE, MOP, costs, and issues for each line of action. Annexes may be broken down into consolidated multiagency annexes by line of action or by individual agency listing all relevant lines of action for that agency.
Table D-2. Example implementation matrix for interagency plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEAD AGENCY</th>
<th>PARTNER AGENCY(S)</th>
<th>LINE OF ACTION</th>
<th>START DATE</th>
<th>END DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1: Operational Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2: Train and Equip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INPUT AND CONCERNS

D-14. As previously stated in this manual, ARSOF involvement in FID runs the gamut of being the only DOD units involved in FID operations to being a component of a large, joint DOD force executing FID operations. In the former example, ARSOF units will be involved in FID early, will be engaged substantially throughout FID, and may be the sole agent of action in some areas. Habitual FID roles for ARSOF units may develop in certain countries in which conventional military units rarely take part. For instance, in the USSOUTHCOM OE, PSYOP MISTs and SFODAs have had long-term presence in several countries supporting the IDADs of those HNs in conducting CD, counterinsurgent, and counterterrorist (narco-terrorist) operations. Even in a large-scale FID operation involving SOF and conventional forces the contribution of ARSOF units remains of such significant proportions that failure to include these units in the IIP is problematic at best.

D-15. ARSOF units frequently will bear specific mention under the agency responsibilities section of the IIP. SFODAs, PSEs, and CATs may bear sole responsibility for training HN military personnel even in FID operations that also employ U.S. conventional forces. A PSE may be the sole agent for dissemination of PSYOP in support of FID. However, the agency with approval authority or responsibility for PSYOP series resides with the COM or his designee or the combatant commander or his delegated subordinate. In addition to these examples, ARSOF units may have agency responsibility in many other political-military actions. ARSOF planners must also be proactive in identifying potential taskings and ramifications for their units in relation to lines of action for which other agencies are the responsible agent.

D-16. ARSOF units almost invariably operate in close contact with the HN’s populace and tailor training products and projects to be culturally attuned, relevant, and acceptable to the trainees. A driving factor in understanding and operating within a cultural context that maximizes the effectiveness of ARSOF Soldiers and units is to understand the political-military factors shaping the operational environment within the HN. Indeed, political-military factors may be the driving or even the sole stimuli for the insurgent movement that precipitates the need for FID operations. Although sections within the IIP, like the U.S. strategic purpose or the policy planning guidance, are not ignored by conventional units, these sections are not necessarily restated or communicated to the HN populace by the conventional unit. However, it may well be the day-to-day operational task of ARSOF units to instill the ideas represented within these sections to HN personnel being trained or broadcast these ideas to HN populace through multimedia.

D-17. Normally at some point during FID operations, ARSOF units will operate in an interagency environment. Frequently, interaction occurs at the lowest echelons. In addition, this interaction may continue past the redeployment of a larger force. A thorough IIP not only serves to liaise and synchronize the effort of all the agencies involved in FID but also provides a planning tool that can ensure that the effects of all instruments of national power reinforce and magnify each other. If necessary, ARSOF commanders should initiate the discussion of generating an IIP early in the FID planning process.
ILLUSTRATIVE INTERAGENCY PLAN RELATIONSHIP TO JOINT AND ARMY PLANNING

D-18. Frequently, a joint force conducts FID operations. In the case of large-scale FID operations, the JIACG or JIATF may generate the IIP. During joint operations, the JIACG or JIATF provides the combatant commander and subordinate JFCs with an increased capability to coordinate with other USG agencies and departments. If the JSOTF is the senior or stand-alone JTF, then the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal point in the interagency process. If the IIP is the product of a JIACG or JIATF, it may precede or follow the production of the relevant OPLAN's Annex V, Interagency Coordination. In either case, the IIP should reflect and agree with Annex V. In addition, although no portion of an OPLAN should be overlooked in producing an IIP, scrutiny must ensure that no line of action on the IIP conflicts with Annex Y, Strategic Communication, or Annex G, Civil-Military Operations. Likewise, an IIP must be synchronized and deconflicted with the relevant OPORD.
# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>area coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAP</td>
<td>Army International Activities Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALE</td>
<td>Army Special Operations Forces liaison element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSOF</td>
<td>Army special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIIP</td>
<td>Bureau of International Information Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Civil Affairs operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>counterdrug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIM</td>
<td>civil information management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>combined joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>combined joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSOC</td>
<td>Commander, Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>diplomatic, information, military, and economic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSAC</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>drop zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;R</td>
<td>evasion, escape and recovery, resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FinCEN</td>
<td>Financial Crimes Enforcement Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>foreign intelligence service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFP</td>
<td>foreign military financing program</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>foreign nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>operations staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>information staff officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
</tr>
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<td>IDT</td>
<td>internal defense threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>indigenous populations and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIP</td>
<td>illustrative interagency plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOE</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-9</td>
<td>civil-military operations staff section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>joint combined exercise for training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIAF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIM</td>
<td>joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>joint Psychological Operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>major combat operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDM</td>
<td>military decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIST</td>
<td>military information support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLE</td>
<td>military liaison element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>military occupational specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>nation assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB</td>
<td>order of battle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OCONUS  outside the continental United States  
OE  operational environment  
OGA  other government agency  
OJCS  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
OPCON  operational control  
OPLAN  operation plan  
OPSEC  operations security  
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense  
PAO  public affairs officer  
PDSS  predeployment site survey  
PEP  personnel exchange program  
PIR  priority intelligence requirement  
PKO  peacekeeping operations  
PO  peace operations, Psychological Operations objective  
POC  point of contact  
POL  petroleum, oils, and lubricants  
POTF  Psychological Operations task force  
PRC  populace and resources control  
PSE  Psychological Operations support element  
PSYACT  Psychological Operations action  
PSYOP  Psychological Operations  
ROE  rules of engagement  
ROI  rules of interaction  
RP  Republic of the Philippines  
S-3  operations staff officer  
SA  security assistance  
SAO  security assistance organization  
SB(SO)(A)  Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)  
SCA  support to civil administration  
SecDef  Secretary of Defense  
SF  Special Forces  
SFODA  Special Forces operational detachment A  
SIO  senior intelligence officer  
SLEA  Senior Law Enforcement Advisor  
SOAR  special operations aviation regiment  
SOF  special operations forces  
SOFA  status-of-forces agreement  
SOMA  status of mission agreement  
SOP  standing operating procedure  
SOTF  special operations task force  
SPO  supporting Psychological Operations objective
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>target audience</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>target audience analysis</td>
</tr>
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<td>TFI</td>
<td>Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPT</td>
<td>tactical Psychological Operations team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>theater security cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCP</td>
<td>theater security cooperation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAJFKSWCS</td>
<td>United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDR</td>
<td>United States defense representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOT</td>
<td>War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SECTION II – TERMS**

**Army special operations forces**

Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (FM 3-05)

**country team**

(DOD) The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

**foreign internal defense**

(DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**host nation**

(DOD) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)
internal defense and development

(DOD) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. See also foreign internal defense. (JP 1-02)

internal defense threat

Any person or organization that interferes with, disrupts, or damages the domestic, lawfully constituted economic, military, informational, or political institutions of a nation through illegal means or methods in an overt, covert, or clandestine manner. Examples include criminals, vigilantes, terrorists, insurgents, or separatists. This is also called an IDT. (FM 3-05.137)

nation assistance

(DOD) Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)

public diplomacy

(DOD) 1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community. (JP 1-02)

security assistance

(DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. See also security assistance organization; security cooperation. (JP 1-02)

special operations task force

A temporary or semipermanent grouping of ARSOF units under one commander and formed to carry out a specific operation or a continuing mission. Also called SOTF. (FM 3-05)

unconventional warfare

Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. This is also called UW. (FM 3-05.201)
References

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

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**Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>advisors, 2-7, 2-13, 4-7 through 4-9, 5-4, 5-11, 5-16, 5-18, 5-20, 7-3, 7-5, A-3, A-5, B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advisory assistance, 4-7 through 4-9, 5-4, 5-15 and 5-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>antiterrorism (AT), 1-7 and 1-8, 5-3, 6-2, A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 1-6, 5-17, 5-20, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-4, 7-2, A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Transfer Management Group, 2-5, 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of International Information Programs (BIIP), 2-6, 2-12, B-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civic action programs, 5-10, 6-5, C-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil administration, B-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs (CA), iv, 1-1, 1-8, 2-12, 2-14, 2-15, 3-7 and 3-8, 4-4 and 4-5, 4-7, 4-9, 5-2, 5-6 and 5-7, 5-12, 5-20, 6-3, 6-5 and 6-6, 6-8, 7-1 and 7-2, 7-7 and 7-8, 8-3, 8-11, A-1, A-8, B-5 through B-7, B-9, C-9, C-10, C-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs operations (CAO), 1-8, 2-9, 2-12, 2-14 and 2-15, 3-7, 3-11, 5-2, 5-4, 5-6, 5-10, 6-7 and 6-8, 6-11, 7-1, 7-7, 8-5, 8-10 and 8-11, A-5, C-9, C-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs team (CAT), 6-6, D-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil information management (CIM), 2-14, 5-15, 6-6 and 6-7, B-7, B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil-military operations (CMO), 1-7 and 1-8, 2-2, 2-14, 3-7 and 3-8, 3-11, 4-4, 5-2 and 5-3, 5-6 through 5-8, 6-5 and 6-6, 6-8, 7-1, 7-4, 7-7 and 7-8, 8-11, B-7, C-8 and C-9, C-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combat operations, 1-3 through 1-5, 1-9 through 1-11, 2-2, 2-4 through 2-6, 2-12, 2-15 and 2-16, 3-2, 3-10, 4-1, 4-7, 5-1 and 5-2, 5-6, 5-12, 5-16, 5-18, 5-20, 6-1, 6-5, 6-11, 7-1 through 7-8, B-7, C-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterdrug (CD), 1-5, 1-8 and 1-9, 2-6, 2-13, 5-4, 7-6, D-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterinsurgency (COIN), 1-1, and 1-2, 1-5, 1-8 and 1-9, 2-13, 3-11, 4-5, 5-2, 7-2, 7-5 and 7-6, D-2 and D-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterintelligence (CI), 3-7, 6-12, 7-4, B-6, C-1 and C-2, C-10, C-19 and C-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterterrorism (CT), 1-2, 1-5, 1-7, 1-9, 1-11, 2-6, 2-13, 5-3 and 5-4, 6-3, 7-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>credibility, 1-10, 4-4, 6-8, 7-3, 8-2, A-5, C-9, C-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crime, 1-11, 2-2, 2-6, 3-11, 7-6, B-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deception, 2-3, 7-7, B-8 and B-9, C-14, C-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Field Office, 2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice (DOJ), 2-6 and 2-7, 2-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of State (DOS), 1-2 and 1-3, 1-5 and 1-6, 2-2, 2-4 through 2-6, 2-9, 2-11 and 2-12, 3-1 and 3-2, 3-9 and 3-10, 5-4, 6-1 and 6-2, 7-6, 8-1, A-6, A-8 through A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic assistance, 1-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external support, C-14, C-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force protection (FP), 2-15, 3-11, 4-5, 5-16, 6-11, 7-3, A-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 1-6 and 1-7, 2-6, 5-17, 6-1, 6-4, A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 1-5, 1-8, 2-14, 5-4, 5-10 and 5-11, 6-6 and 6-7, 7-4, 7-8, C-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign military sales (FMS), 1-6 and 1-7, 4-5, 6-2, A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign nation (FN), 1-11, 2-14, 6-4, A-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding FID operations, A-7, A-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva conventions, A-2, A-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hague conventions, A-1 and A-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>health service support (HSS), 5-10 through 5-13, 5-16, 7-5, 8-4 and 8-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human rights, 1-7, 1-8, 3-10, 4-2 and 4-3, 6-8, 7-1, 7-3, A-3, A-5, C-13, D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), 1-7 and 1-8, 2-6, 2-9, 5-11 and 5-12, 6-5 through 6-7, 7-1, A-7 and A-8, A-9, C-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian demining operations, 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information operations (IO), 1-7, 1-10, 5-3, 5-15, 5-20, 7-7 and 7-8, D-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insurgency, 1-2, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-6, 2-7, 2-14, 5-6 and 5-17, 6-6, 6-8 through 6-11, 7-1, 7-4 through 7-6, A-1, B-1, B-3, through B-5, B-8, B-10, C-3 and C-4, C-6 and C-7, C-10, C-14, C-16 and C-17, D-2 and D-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intellectual property, 7-6, A-11, C-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence, 1-8 through 1-10, 2-5 through 2-7, 2-12, 3-4, 3-7, 3-11, 4-1, 4-4, 4-9, 5-4 and 5-5, 5-7, 5-9, 5-11, 5-15 through 5-17, 6-8, 6-11 and 6-12, 7-1, 7-3 and 7-4, 7-6 and 7-7, 8-3, 8-5, A-5, A-10, B-5 and B-6, B-9 and B-10, C-1 through C-9, C-11, C-14 through C-20, D-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
internal defense and development (IDAD), iv, 1-1 through 1-5, 1-8 and 1-9, 1-11, 2-1 and 2-2, 2-4, 2-8, 2-9, 2-12 through 2-14, 3-1 and 3-2, 3-7, 3-11, 4-2, 4-5, 4-7, 5-1, 5-4, 5-6, 5-12, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-6 through 6-8, 6-10 and 6-11, 7-1 through 7-5, 8-1, 8-7, A-4, A-8, B-1, through B-8, B-10, C-19, D-1 and D-2

international conflict, A-2

Internet, 5-6, C-7, C-10 and C-11, C-19

interrogation, C-4

irregular warfare (IW), iv, 1-4, 1-9, 7-3, 7-5, B-6, C-1

J

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 2-5, 2-10, 2-14, 2-16, 6-1, A-7, A-12

d joint combined exercise for training (JCET), 2-15, 5-16, 6-3 through 6-5

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, 2-8

joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), A-12, D-5

joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM), 4-2 and 4-3, 4-5, 5-1, 5-3, 5-15, 6-7 and 6-8, 6-10, 6-12, 7-2, 8-5, C-3, C-8, C-11

Joint interagency task force (JIATF), A-12, D-5

Joint Psychological Operations task force (JPOTF), 2-9, 2-15, 3-8

joint special operations task force (JSOTF), 2-3, 2-8 and 2-9, 3-8, 6-10, 8-5, D-5

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 2-8, 3-4 and 3-5, A-11

Joint Strategic Planning Document, 2-8

Joint task force (JTF), 2-8 and 2-9, 3-8, A-5, D-5

Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, 2-10

 Joint U.S. Military Group, 2-10

L

legal considerations, 2-13

legitimacy, 1-9 and 1-10, 2-12, 3-1, 5-12, 6-5, 7-3, 7-5, 8-2, A-5, B-4, B-7, B-9, C-14

logistics, 1-10, 2-2, 2-7, 2-15 and 2-16, 3-8, 3-11, 5-2, 5-5, 5-12 through 5-16, 6-11, 7-3, 7-5, C-2, C-10, C-15

M

media, 1-9, 2-6, 2-14, 3-8 through 3-10, 4-3, 4-8, 5-3, 5-9, 5-16, 6-3, 6-8, 8-3 and 8-4, 8-6, A-5, B-4, B-7, B-11, C-7 through C-9, C-13 through C-15

Military civic action (MCA), 1-8, 2-14, 6-6 through 6-8

military information support team (MIST), 2-8, 2-15, 4-1, 5-2, D-4

military liaison element (MLE), 2-8, 4-1

mobile training team (MTT), 2-9, 3-10, 6-3 and 6-4

N

nation assistance (NA), 1-4, 2-14, 6-6 and 6-7

national military strategy (NMS), 1-3, 3-3 and 3-4

National Security Strategy (NSS), 1-1, 3-2 through 3-4

noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), 1-5, 6-6, A-11

nongovernmental organization (NGO), 1-8, 3-10, 5-11, 5-15, 6-7, 7-8, A-8 and A-9, B-7, B-11, C-10

O

Office of Defense Cooperation, 2-10

operation and maintenance (O&M), 5-20, 6-5, 7-2, A-7 and A-8, A-10

operation plan (OPLAN), 3-4

OPLAN, 3-5, 3-8, 6-6, 6-10, D-5

operational control (OPCON), 2-8, 2-13 and 2-14, 3-8, 4-7 and 4-8, 5-1, 6-4, 7-5, 8-3, B-10

P

peace operations (PO), 1-5 through 1-7, 6-10, A-6

piracy, 2-6, C-10, C-14

population and resources control (PRC), 2-14, 3-11, 6-6 through 6-8, 7-8, C-9, C-14

predeployment activities, 5-14

predeployment site survey (PDSS), 3-10, 4-1, 4-4

propaganda, 2-2, 2-6, 2-14 and 2-15, 3-9, 5-9, 5-11, 7-7, 8-8, A-1 through A-3, A-11, B-7 and B-8, C-6 through C-8, C-14 through C-17, C-19

Psychological Operations (PSYOP), iv, 1-1, 1-5, 1-7, through 1-9, 2-2 through 2-4, 2-6, 2-9, 2-11 and 2-12, 2-14 and 2-15, 3-7 through 3-11, 4-4 and 4-5, 4-7 through 4-9, 5-2 through 5-5, 5-8 through 5-12, 5-20, 6-3, 6-5, 6-7 through 6-11, 7-1 and 7-2, 7-4, 7-7 and 7-8, 8-7 and 8-8, 8-11, A-1, A-3, A-11 and A-12, B-5, B-7, B-9 and B-10, C-8 through C-12, C-14, D-3 and D-4

R

rapport, 2-16, 5-15, 5-17 through 5-19, 6-10, 8-4

redeployment, 3-4, 3-11, 8-5 and 8-6, D-4

rules of engagement (ROE), 1-10, 2-15, 3-7, 4-5, 4-8, 5-14, 5-17, 6-1, 6-5, 6-8, 6-11, 7-3 and 7-4, 7-5, A-7, B-8

rules of interaction (ROI), 4-5

S

security assistance (SA), 1-5 through 1-7, 1-10, 2-2, 2-4 through 2-8, 2-10, 2-14 and 2-15, 3-2, 3-4 through 3-6, 3-9, 4-5, 4-8, 5-4, 5-17, 5-20, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-5 through 6-8, 6-11 and 6-12, 7-2, 7-4, A-3, A-6, A-7, A-10

security assistance organization (SAO), 2-9 and 2-10, 3-2, 4-1, 4-7 and 4-8, 5-14, 6-1 and 6-2, 6-4, A-5 and A-6, A-12

Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA), 1-4,
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