Document and Media Exploitation

June 2010

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Document and Media Exploitation

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Preface

TC 2-91.8 provides doctrinal guidance to Army professionals in a tactical, operational, or strategic environment who conduct and support document and media exploitation (DOMEX). TC 2-91.8—

- Can be used by leaders; planners; doctrine writers; trainers; and training, materiel, and combat developers for addressing DOMEX-related issues.
- Informs commanders and their staffs about the mission, requirements, and capabilities of DOMEX assets.
- Is an integral component in supporting the overseas contingency operations.
- Supports the development of training support packages; doctrine, tactics, and techniques packages; and mobile training teams.

For purposes of this manual, captured materials include captured enemy documents and captured enemy materiel.

This training circular uses joint and Army terms. These terms are italicized and the number of each proponent publication follows the definition.

This training circular is the proponent publication for the Army definition of document and media exploitation. The definition is bolded in text.

All intelligence operations must be accomplished within applicable laws and policies, which include U.S. law, the law of war, relevant international law, relevant Department of Defense (DOD) directives, DOD instructions, and military executive orders, including fragmentary orders.

DOMEX operations require intelligence components to perform authorized functions in a manner that protects the constitutional rights and privacy of U.S. persons. There is no absolute ban regarding properly authorized intelligence collections on U.S. persons. Intelligence components may collect information on U.S. persons when it falls within one of the procedures listed in DOD 5240.1-R and AR 381-10.

TC 2-91.8 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR), unless otherwise stated.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, USAICoE, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D (TC 2-91.8), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to ATZS-FDC-D@conus.army.mil or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Introduction

DOMEX IN MODERN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Modern military operations are conducted in complex and ever-changing operational environments. Tactical military leaders must have access to accurate and timely information when conducting operations. Tactical, operational, and strategic leaders are enabled by accurate information about enemy forces through rapid and accurate extraction, exploitation, and analysis of captured materials.

Document and media exploitation (DOMEX) is an increasingly specialized, full-time mission that requires advanced automation, communications, and analytical support, as well as expert linguists. DOMEX and translation operations were once considered human intelligence (HUMINT) processing activities, directly associated with language capabilities and extensive background knowledge in area studies. Currently, HUMINT is not the sole asset capable of conducting DOMEX operations. Personnel involved in DOMEX do not require HUMINT training to screen or translate documents. DOMEX is an Army-wide responsibility used by all military specialties.

To use DOMEX products as force multipliers, rapid exploitation of captured materials must occur at the lowest echelon. At the tactical level, DOMEX assets provide timely and accurate intelligence support to the warfighter besides the collection, analyses, rapid exploitation, and evacuation of captured materials. DOMEX assets also provide commanders with discussion ideas and feedback from higher echelon analysis operations.

The intelligence staff uses any form of communication to disseminate vital information, including DOMEX-derived information. Depending on the tactical situation, available resources, commanders’ critical information requirements, and specific information requirements, the staff disseminates critical information quickly and accurately from the lowest to the highest echelon—specifically to tactical commanders.

Commanders and staffs determine how to task-organize their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to accomplish the mission. For commanders’ or task requirements that cannot be fulfilled by assigned assets, units consider requesting specialized or uniquely trained units. Assigning these specialized units to the requesting organization may be the best solution, but often they are assigned to higher headquarters and attached to requesting organizations based on availability and priority.

Efficient DOMEX operations require a synchronized concept of operations. Other than in intelligence units, representation from assigned intelligence personnel generally ends at the battalion level with the battalion intelligence staff. Battalion staffs plan for the DOMEX operations of their subordinate units. They provide intelligence below the battalion level by task-organizing intelligence personnel as company intelligence support teams, or they train company or platoon personnel in specific handling, screening, and inventorying techniques.

When tactical assets are insufficient, operational and strategic assets can be used to support a unit’s organic assets through personnel augmentation or through virtual or long-distance support to tactical operations—from the continental or outside the continental U.S. DOMEX support elements.

The skills, knowledge, and equipment for specialized processing are available at intelligence community organizations through the communications intelligence architecture. Units can request assistance from the—

- National Security Agency.
- Defense Intelligence Agency.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
• National Media Exploitation Center.
• National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).
• Joint document exploitation centers.

Other U.S. or multinational intelligence community organizations use specialized techniques and procedures to extract additional information from captured audio and video materials. Application of specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the classification of the processed information and restrict its dissemination.

SITE EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS

DOMEX can occur during site exploitation operations. Captured materials may be acquired—
• From detainees or from an immediate association with detainees.
• From refugees or local civilians.
• In abandoned enemy positions in the operational environment.
• By the capturing unit or by various specialized exploitation personnel, such as multifunctional teams, raid support teams, and exploitation teams.

THE ARMY DOMEX PROGRAM

The Department of the Army (DA) G-2 has designated NGIC as the program manager for the Army DOMEX program. NGIC is responsible for creating, developing, and training DOMEX teams. The Army DOMEX program has established tactics, techniques, and procedures that support standing operating procedures development in coordination with DOMEX standards developed by—

• Defense Intelligence Agency.
• DA G-2.
• U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
• U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.
• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.

The Army DOMEX program provides—
• Direct support to combatant commanders.
• Training to Soldiers and joint Service personnel preparing to deploy.
• Translation support through the Reserve Language Support Program.
• Tactical operations support to the National Harmony Database.
• Deployable systems enhancement.
• Tools integration.

NGIC’s Foreign Materiel Program uses data derived from captured materials to save lives by preventing technological surprise on the battlefield. Captured materials can provide detailed reporting on foreign weapon capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Chapter 1

Document and Media Exploitation Overview

The demand for accurate and timely document and media exploitation (DOMEX) information has grown tremendously in recent years. Commanders now recognize that DOMEX is a force multiplier at all echelons. Threat capabilities and limitations along with the identification of support elements, operational structures, and intentions of future threat operations may be derived through the exploitation of captured materials; such information has proven invaluable in both conventional warfare and irregular warfare.

DOCUMENT AND MEDIA EXPLOITATION DEFINED

1-1. *Document and media exploitation* is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government’s physical control and are not publicly available.

1-2. DOMEX includes the systematic extraction of information from all media in response to commanders’ collection requirements. DOMEX operations—

- Maximize the value of intelligence gained from captured documents.
- Provide commanders with timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of enemy capabilities, operational structures, and intents.
- Provide timely and accurate intelligence support to the warfighter throughout the spectrum of conflict.
- Assist in criminal prosecution and legal processes by maintaining chain of custody procedures and preserving the evidentiary value of captured materials.

WHAT IS A DOCUMENT?

1-3. A document is any piece of recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics. Documents may include—

- Printed materials—books, newspapers, pamphlets, operation orders (OPORDs), and identity cards.
- Handwritten materials—letters, diaries, and notes.
- Electronically recorded media—computer files, tape recordings, video, sound or voice recordings, and digital media.
- Storage devices on communications equipment—cell phones, answering machines, and radios.
- Information engraved or stamped on a weapon or weapon system (qualifies as a document since that information can be exploited).

*Note.* Digital media usually refers to electronic media that works on digital codes. For purposes of this manual, digital media comprises information contained on both digital and analog devices.
CAPTURED MATERIALS

1-4. To assist in their exploitation and evacuation, captured materials are divided into—
   • Captured enemy documents (CEDs).
   • Captured enemy materiel (CEM).

1-5. Captured materials are documents, items of equipment, or materiel in the possession of enemy forces that subsequently end up in the hands of friendly forces, regardless of origin, including U.S. or multinational documents or materiel once in enemy hands. During military operations, understanding the DOMEX process requires understanding collected, exploited, and processed items.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

1-6. A CED is any piece of recorded information—written, printed, engraved, and photographic matter—that pertains to the enemy and weather and terrain data. CEDs include video, sound, or voice recordings; imagery; and electronic files contained in computers. CEDs also include associated materials such as punched cards, punched paper tape, and printed output, as well as reproductions of the original material by whatever process.

1-7. There are three types of CEDs—identity, personal, and official, which includes documents of organizational value and confiscated items of governmental or military origin. Table 1-1 lists examples of each type of CED. Knowledge of these CED types assists collectors in determining the handling and disposition of the CEDs.

1-8. Storage devices on communications equipment, such as cell phones, answering machines, radios, digital video and voice recorders, and closed circuit televisions, may contain CED data. Table 1-1 lists additional examples of storage devices that may contain CED data.

Table 1-1. Examples of captured enemy documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Identity documents</strong></th>
<th><strong>Personal documents</strong></th>
<th><strong>Official documents</strong></th>
<th><strong>Data on memory devices</strong></th>
<th><strong>Data on magnetic or digital storage devices</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification (ID) cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maps.</td>
<td>Digital camera memory devices.</td>
<td>Floppy disks (3.5” and 5.25”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality or citizenship cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wristwatches that store data.</td>
<td>Magnetic tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Compact flash cards.</td>
<td>Digital cameras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extreme digital picture cards.</td>
<td>Audio tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secure digital memory cards.</td>
<td>Video tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal computer memory cards.</td>
<td>Beta video tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military, police, or civil ID cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Codes.</td>
<td>Multimedia cards.</td>
<td>Digital cameras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee ID cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports.</td>
<td>Readers and adaptors.</td>
<td>Video home systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union affiliation cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video game consoles and cartridges.</td>
<td>Hi-8 tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition issued ID cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mini-DV tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter registration cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8-track tapes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food ration cards.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8-mm tapes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legends: 3.5” and 5.25” are the common floppy disk formats used for data storage.
Note. Some documents may seem of little importance to operations, but they are in fact important. Therefore, it may be necessary to collect some CEDs that, at face value, might appear of little significance to the collector. Proper precollection training assists collectors in choosing the documents that should be collected.

**CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIEL**

1-9. CEM includes foreign warfighting equipment and associated equipment—for example, weapons, weapons systems, and weapon components such as improvised explosive devices. (See FM 2-22.401.) CEM also includes all types of foreign and nonforeign equipment—
- Found on a detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application.
- Identified on the collection requirements list within annex B (Intelligence) of the OPORD.
- That is unidentified, appears modified, or is otherwise out of the ordinary or unexpected.

1-10. There are a multitude of items that may be considered CEM; however, CEM containing electronically recorded media is the most relevant to DOMEX. Table 1-2 provides examples of CEM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1-2. Examples of captured enemy materiel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unidentified and modified warfighting equipment and associated materiel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Artillery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** This includes any related spares, repair parts, and support equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Computer hardware equipment</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Central processing units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Desktop computers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Laptop computers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Computer drives (external and internal)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• External magnetic hard drives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External digital hard drives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Jaz drives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Peripherals and network devices</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Data cables and wires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Docking stations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Communications materiel</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Radios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Antennae systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cellular phones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subscriber identity module cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Equipment containing digital media is sometimes designed to disguise or conceal its true purpose. This equipment is cleverly hidden or transported on an individual as wristbands, pens, watches, earrings, pocketknives, credit cards, toys, and other everyday objects. Thorough and proper search techniques ensure collection and exploitation of such digital media, regardless of its form.
THE DOCUMENT AND MEDIA EXPLOITATION PROCESS

1-11. The DOMEX process, as depicted in figure 1-1, comprises four phases.

1-12. The capabilities and responsibilities of each DOMEX operation vary with the echelon—from hasty exploitation by the capturing unit at the tactical site, to advanced processing at a joint DOMEX processing site. Many of the procedures within each phase may occur across the echelons, depending on the requirements of that echelon, including the inventory, screening, accountability, translation, analysis, reporting, and evacuation of captured materials.

ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGHOUT THE DOMEX PROCESS

1-13. Accountability procedures are exercised throughout the four phases of the DOMEX process. Accountability includes—

- Inventorying captured materials as they arrive.
- Initiating necessary trace actions based on the transmittal sheet.
- Maintaining a log of captured materials or evidence/property custody documents.

1-14. Strict accountability of captured materials is vital to maintaining the integrity of timely and relevant intelligence and the chain of custody for prosecutorial purposes. Accountability begins when the collector takes possession of captured materials. Maintaining accountability occurs even after the evacuation process; each element or activity takes possession of the original captured materials and maintains complete and accurate records of the location and status of these captured materials. This ensures total control of the captured materials.

1-15. Accountability procedures include—

- Logging captured materials in and out.
- Copying captured materials as required.
- Procedures for the proper storage of captured materials.
- Receiving and transmitting captured materials.
- Maintaining files.
- Other routine activities.

1-16. Depending on the quantity of captured materials, accountability procedures can be performed by one individual at a lower echelon, or by several individuals in warehouse-sized operations with large volumes of documents at a theater document repository.
**EVACUATION THROUGHOUT THE DOMEX PROCESS**

1-17. Proper evacuation procedures are necessary to preserve the integrity of potential intelligence and the evidentiary value of the captured materials. Strict accountability during evacuation procedures ensures information derived from captured materials is useable in all areas—during in-depth analysis, as evidence in judiciary proceedings, and for other such functions as deemed appropriate. Evacuation may occur several times throughout the processing of the captured materials in question, the destinations of which depend on the phase of exploitation, the resources available, document types, and the intelligence or evidentiary potential of the captured materials involved.

1-18. Maintaining segregation of the captured materials throughout the entire chain of custody is essential to preserve the intelligence and evidentiary value of the captured materials. Segregation involves keeping captured materials separate according to their types, categories, or sources; their acquisition date; and other factors determined by individual circumstances. Handlers of captured materials maintain segregation during evacuation and transfer of the materials in accordance with applicable policy and procedures.

**Evacuation of Classified Captured Enemy Documents**

1-19. Classified CEDs are handled in accordance with AR 380-5 and the appropriate level of classification. Personnel accompanying the transfer of the CEDs must have the appropriate security clearance and courier orders and must ensure appropriate security containers or safes are used to secure the contents.

**Evacuation Destinations**

1-20. The capturing unit sends captured materials through intelligence channels (the battalion intelligence staff processing site is the first element to receive the captured materials) to a supporting brigade-level captured materials processing site. Information gained from captured materials is often time-sensitive; therefore, it is vital that coordination (established by unit standing operating procedures before conducting operations to ensure the smooth transfer of priority captured materials) occurs among the capturing unit, intelligence staff, and subsequent processing site.

*Note.* If the captured materials are associated with a detainee, they are evacuated with the detainee.

1-21. Capturing units are capable of exploiting some captured materials to avoid losing valuable time. Any time lost in processing and analyzing captured materials may reduce or even negate the value of the information. Procedures used by any element must ensure the captured materials reach their proper destinations in a timely manner. Communication and digital devices are frequently the most valuable and time-sensitive of captured materials; therefore, they are delivered immediately to technicians with the capability to exploit them. To expedite this process, the intelligence staff should have an established liaison with the appropriate technical specialists and facilities.

1-22. Once the captured materials are inventoried and initially exploited, the capturing unit attaches a captured materials transmittal sheet and evacuates the materials.

1-23. Captured materials are evacuated based on their primary evacuation destinations (see figure 1-2, page 1-6):

- Criminal evidence.
- Specific limiting criteria (SLC).
- Technical intelligence (TECHINT).
- CED processing.
  - Maps and charts.
  - Air Force documents.
  - Navy documents.
Chapter 1

- Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
- Human intelligence (HUMINT).

Figure 1-2. Evacuation destinations

**Criminal Evidence**

1-24. The battalion intelligence staff separates, secures, and sends all documents constituted as criminal evidence (used in legal proceedings against persons suspected of significant crimes) to the appropriate authority. The staff separates these documents from other documents, marks them accordingly as “CRIMINAL EVIDENCE,” and stores them under guard or in a secured area until presented to the nearest staff judge advocate, criminal intelligence asset, or war crimes investigative unit. The collecting unit should contact the criminal investigation division liaison first and seek assistance from the staff judge advocate for additional guidance on chain of custody requirements.

**Specific Limiting Criteria**

1-25. SLC captured materials are of a counterterrorist or counterintelligence nature and require special handling because, if compromised, they could endanger ongoing operations, sensitive sources, or methods. Items containing SLC information are classified Secret and immediately evacuated to the nearest counterintelligence activity.
Technical Intelligence

1-26. Captured materials of TECHINT interest include equipment identified on the collection requirements list, new weapons, tracked vehicles, and equipment manuals. Unidentified, modified, or unexpected equipment should elicit a spot report. Once generated, the spot report is sent through reporting channels for disposition and instructions. TECHINT equipment of interest is then transported to the nearest captured materiel exploitation center for processing and exploitation. Captured or recovered technical documents consist of firing tables, logbooks, packing slips, and other documentation. If the tactical situation does not allow for equipment evacuation, the associated documents or a photograph of the equipment is forwarded to the captured materiel exploitation center along with a description of the equipment. (See TC 2-22.4.)

Captured Enemy Document Processing

1-27. If further CED processing or exploitation is required, CEDs are evacuated to the next higher echelon CED processing site for subsequent screening, processing, and dissemination:

- **Maps and charts** containing any operational graphics are sent to the battalion intelligence staff, who forwards them to the brigade or division analysis and control element or all-source analysis center for analysis and exploitation by imagery intelligence personnel.

- **Air Force documents** are evacuated through the battalion intelligence staff and brigade DOMEX processing site to the nearest Air Force headquarters or Air Force Office of Special Investigations element.

- **Navy documents** are evacuated through the battalion intelligence staff and brigade DOMEX processing site to the nearest Naval Criminal Investigative Service at Navy headquarters.

Signals Intelligence

1-28. Captured materials with cryptographic or communications systems information are evacuated to a unit’s supported SIGINT unit or to other SIGINT units specified in annex B (Intelligence) of the OPORD. Communications-electronics equipment, not immediately exploitable for HUMINT value, is evacuated immediately with dial settings and frequencies recorded to the supporting SIGINT unit by the quickest and most secure means possible. Captured materials containing cryptographic or communications systems information are handled as Secret. (See table 2-1, page 2-15, for document categories.) Category A captured materials may contain time-sensitive operational and technical information requiring immediate processing and analysis by SIGINT personnel. The staff limits the number of personnel having knowledge of the materials’ capture or contents.

**Note.** In order to facilitate follow-on operations, specially trained media exploitation personnel at the brigade level are capable of digitizing, exploiting, and reporting captured materials. In such cases, communications-electronics equipment with a memory card, including computers, telephones, personal digital assistants, and Global Positioning System terminals, may be exploitable by DOMEX teams or other specially trained media exploitation personnel before evacuation to the supporting SIGINT unit or the National Media Exploitation Center for more in-depth exploitation.

Human Intelligence

1-29. Captured materials removed from detainees accompany them to the detainee holding or detention facility. This is an essential task since the captured materials are necessary for effective HUMINT collection operations. The unit transporting the detainees and the captured materials keep them separate to ensure detainees do not alter or destroy the materials. Captured materials need to be bagged and tagged with their detainees’ information to maintain the association of each document or materiel with its detainee.

**Note.** All other documents, unless specifically outlined above, are evacuated to the next higher echelon.
FINAL DISPOSITION—DOMEX REPOSITORIES

1-30. DOMEX repositories are established warehouses that—

- Receive captured materials for centralized archival accountability.
- Establish a centralized point for permanent storage.
- Provide transportation to other repositories in theater of operations or at higher echelons for final disposition of captured materials, as applicable.

1-31. While warehousing procedures for captured materials differ according to command, unit standing operating procedures, and other guidelines, warehousing procedures may include the reception, screening, category evaluation (as applicable), tagging, inventorying, digitization, and uploading of captured materials to the Harmony database suite and final storage. The Harmony database suite forwards electronic captured materials to the translation teams for data entry, gist translations (rough outline of a text’s meaning), and quality control in the Harmony database suite, as needed, before final upload to the National Harmony Database.
Chapter 2
Initial Collection Phase

The rapid and accurate extraction of information from captured materials contributes significantly to commanders’ situational understanding. The collection of captured materials functions as the U.S. and multinational forces’ initial acquisition of threat documents and materiel. Proper collection and handling procedures are vital to the document and media exploitation (DOMEX) process.

SECTION I – COLLECTOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES

2-1. Tactical operations, such as raids and cordon and search operations, where site exploitation is conducted result in substantial yields of captured materials. Soldiers and leaders must understand the importance of the collecting team’s handling and exploitation of captured materials and their relationship to DOMEX. Proper team handling and exploitation—

- Feed the intelligence and operations processes.
- May quickly answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Lead to follow-on tactical operations.
- Assist in the prosecution of criminals.

2-2. “Collectors” refer to personnel or elements involved in the initial collection phase. They may include the capturing unit, exploitation team, DOMEX team, human intelligence collection team, raid support team (RST), weapons intelligence team, or battalion intelligence staff. Regardless of how U.S. and multinational forces initially obtain captured materials, the collector is responsible for—

- Removing captured materials from a person, vehicle, or facility—safety permitting.
- Not marking, altering, or defacing captured materials.
- Performing hasty screenings of captured materials to identify time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value.
- Reporting time-sensitive information.
- Properly handling, tagging, and packaging captured materials.
- Placing dry documents in waterproof containers (boxes or plastic bags).
- Completing two copies of DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), part C, DA Form 7671-R (Captured Enemy Materiel), or a field expedient tag. (See TC 2-22.4.)
- Placing one copy of the completed DD Form 2745, part C inside the document container.
- Attaching one copy of the completed DD Form 2745, part C to the outside of the container or to the captured enemy materiel (CEM).
- Evacuating captured materials to battalion or higher intelligence staff or other dedicated DOMEX processing site.

HANDLING PROCEDURES

2-3. The proper collection and handling of captured materials are vital because they allow captured materials to move forward through the DOMEX process. Proper handling of captured materials has become a critical function in recent military operations particularly when information or evidence must be used by U.S. forces for exploitation purposes and by host-nation authorities for prosecutorial actions. The
mishandling of captured materials could result in the loss of valuable information, a lost opportunity to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, or the loss of friendly forces.

2-4. Captured materials should not be handled before their actual collection. Trained collectors use extreme caution when collecting, handling, and protecting forensic evidence. However, collections occurring in high-threat environments may require the fast pick up and bagging of evidence by untrained personnel, consequently, without the prerequisite protection of forensic evidence. Because the actual collection of captured materials is key to the DOMEX process, when trained collectors are not present, untrained personnel must exercise the utmost care in their collection of evidence, thus not destroying forensic materials. The safety of U.S. and multinational forces is of primary importance under any condition or circumstance.

2-5. In handling captured materials, personnel involved in all phases of the DOMEX process must take every precaution to preserve the evidentiary value of the original captured materials. The captured materials may carry the fingerprints of those individuals being charged in criminal proceedings. When possible, handlers at each echelon should wear the appropriate gloves to preserve evidence that can be extracted through fingerprint analysis.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

2-6. Before inventorying captured materials, personnel involved in their handling must ascertain whether hazardous materials are rendered safe; personnel safety is the first priority. In the event that munitions or other hazardous materials, such as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE), are discovered during the inventory of captured materials, evacuate the area immediately and summon the appropriate authorities.

Note. The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit is the only asset authorized to perform render-safe procedures.

2-7. The EOD unit can initially assess and neutralize found munitions. These munitions may include single munitions, captured enemy ammunition sites, and items recovered during military operations (patrols, raids, maneuvers). Weapons intelligence teams may contribute valuable information regarding locally encountered devices and munitions, as well as collect technical intelligence. For safe handling procedures, consult trained professionals such as the EOD unit, support battalion ammunition specialists, a CBRNE representative, or another appropriate activity in accordance with unit standing operating procedures (SOPs).

SECTION II – COLLECTION OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-8. The initial collection phase of the DOMEX process comprises the tasks as listed in figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. Initial collection phase

COLLECT

2-9. The manner in which a capturing unit executes the initial collection phase of the DOMEX process depends on whether the captured materials are associated with a detainee or a site.
COLLECTING CAPTURED MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH A DETAINEE

2-10. When collecting captured materials associated with a detainee, capturing units secure and search the detainees by employing the search, silence, segregate, speed, safeguard, and tag (5Ss + T) method and by securing all captured materials in the area of capture. The capturing unit allows detainees to retain protective military equipment—such as helmets; protective masks; body armor; identification cards and tags; and insignias of grade, service, and nationality—only after the items have been searched for any hidden documents or materiel.

2-11. Capturing units remove all documents or materiel, except for one official primary identification document, from detainees to safeguard them from alteration or destruction. The capturing unit evacuates these captured materials with, but not on the detainees. Following interrogation, the HUMINT collector or DOMEX team, as per unit SOPs in accordance with applicable rules and regulations, decides which personal documents or materiel to return to the detainees. (For further information, see Article 17, Part III, Section I, Geneva Conventions.)

COLLECTING CAPTURED MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH A SITE

2-12. Before capturing materials associated with a site, the capturing unit clears the site to ensure safe entry. The unit then processes individuals not to be detained and the captured materials in accordance with unit SOPs. Items captured at a site are identified with that site upon collection.

2-13. If resources and time are available, the capturing unit should photograph the site, the documents (such as graffiti on wall), and any materiel too large or dangerous to remove from the site (such as large equipment, ordnance, and hazardous materials). A digital photograph provides a graphic record of possible relationships of the captured materials, as found at the site, that support the DOMEX process and tactical operations. The unit must annotate or otherwise include the captured materials tag with a digital photograph or sketch to ensure their accountability and traceability.

COLLECTING LARGE QUANTITIES OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-14. If a capturing unit has neither the resources nor the expertise to collect large quantities of captured materials, the unit should request collection and exploitation support from—

- Task-organized site exploitation elements.
- RSTs.
- DOMEX or other specialized exploitation teams.
- Supporting military intelligence units.
- Corps DOMEX support elements.
- Nearest joint document exploitation center.

Note. The RST consists of a task-organized detachment from the corps DOMEX support element assembled to augment existing unit resources for a limited duration, surge, or suspected high-yield or high-value operations.

2-15. Requesting collection and exploitation support reduces the burden on the requesting unit, facilitates the rapid extraction of information, and enables the priority evacuation of important documents to higher echelons. The requesting unit must safeguard and protect the captured materials until the exploitation team arrives. The capturing unit submits a spot report in the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) format or a similar report and includes a request for collection and exploitation support in the remarks line. (See figure 2-2, page 2-4.) The report should include—

- Location of captured materials, including eight-digit map coordinates.
- Enemy situation in the vicinity of the captured materials site.
- Description of the captured materials site (such as city hall, munitions storage facility, or terrorist training camp).
- Estimate of the number and type of captured materials.
- Presence of computers, file servers, copying machines, or similar communications and processing equipment.

**TITLE:** Spot Report

**TO:** Usually, address of the supported S-2/G-2 (in accordance with [IAW] unit standing operating procedures [SOPs]).

**FROM:** Unit or team designation or duty position, as appropriate.

**DTG:** When report is being submitted (in date-time group format).

**Report Number:** IAW unit SOPs.

1. **(S)ize/Who:** Expressed as a quantity and echelon or size (for example, 1X brigade). If multiple echelons are involved in the activity being reported, there can be multiple entries (for example, 1X brigade; 2X battalion). Nonstandard units are reported as such (for example, bomb-making class; support staff).

2. **(A)ctivity/What:** Focal point of the report that relates to the priority intelligence requirement (PIR) or important non-PIR information being reported. It should be a concise bullet statement.

3. **(L)ocation/Where:** Generally a grid coordinate that includes the 100,000-meter grid zone designator. The entry can also be an address, if appropriate, but still should include an eight-digit grid coordinate. City names are followed by the two-character country code. (See FM 1-02.) If the activity being reported involves movement (for example, advance, withdrawal), the location entry includes “From” and “To.” The route used will be reported under “Equipment/How.”

4. **(U)nit/Who:** This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the “Activity/What” entry. Include the complete designation of the military unit, identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as appropriate.

5. **(T)ime/When:** For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Past events are usually not the subject of SALUTE reports, but if a past event is to be reported, the “Time/When” entry will generally reflect when the event ended. Ongoing events are reported as such. Reports of composition of forces, morale, and electronic technical data and other nonevent topics are reported as ongoing. When reporting on the disposition, the “Time/When” entry is generally the last time the source was at the disposition.

6. **(E)quipment/How:** The information reported clarifies, completes, or expands on information reported in any of the previous sources. It includes information concerning equipment involved, tactics used, and any follow-up information not reported in the previous paragraphs.

7. **Remarks:** Use this entry to report the source of the information, whether a person, a captured enemy document, open-source media, or other source. Include the date of information and the PIR that the reported information addresses. Include map data for coordinates given in the “Location/Where” entry, stating map series name, sheet number, scale, and edition. If there are enclosures to the spot report, such as sketches, annotate them here.

**Note.** The above examples are for guidance and not to be construed as strict requirements.

**Figure 2-2. Example spot report**

2-16. The capturing unit makes every effort to ensure that computers, magnetic media, telephones, recording devices, and communications equipment remain in captured configuration (powered up or powered down) until relieved by specially trained exploitation personnel. Capturing-unit personnel remain in place to provide security while the exploitation team processes the site.

2-17. The exploitation team notifies the requesting unit of their estimated arrival time and route as well as any other relevant force protection information. The exploitation team collects, tags, inventories, and evacuates the captured materials in accordance with unit SOPs and instructions in the operation order (OPORD). Depending on the enemy situation and time available, the exploitation team performs a hasty
screening of the captured materials before evacuation to ensure the identification and reporting of time-sensitive information.

SCREEN

2-18. The capturing unit performs a hasty screening of all captured materials to determine—

- Their type.
- Whether the captured materials are exploitable at the field location.
- If relevant, the detainees to which they are associated.

2-19. The initial screening aids in expediting the evacuation process and can assist in the site tactical questioning of detainees regarding the captured materials. During screening, time-sensitive information or information of immediate tactical value is identified and reported.

Note. The battalion intelligence staff repeats the screening of captured materials to identify time-sensitive information or information of immediate tactical value and categorizes the captured materials. Therefore, during the screening of captured materials, the capturing unit should not decide what is important and unimportant because the information may be of intelligence value to higher echelons.

EXTRACT AND REPORT TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION

2-20. Once identified, pertinent information is reported using the spot report in SALUTE format for immediate dissemination. A copy of all reports is evacuated with the detainee and captured materials. If linguists are unavailable to translate written items and translation equipment is unavailable for key word identification, swift evacuation is critical for translation support.

Note. Under no circumstances is magnetic media to be reviewed or exploited at the field site. Safeguard magnetic media against damage until it can be evacuated to the appropriate technical experts, such as media exploitation personnel. At the brigade and corps levels, media exploitation personnel may be task-organized as part of a DOMEX team. Media exploitation personnel may also be at facilities such as joint document exploitation centers and combined media processing centers.

TAG

2-21. Collectors are responsible for properly tagging captured materials using DD Form 2745. (See figure 2-3, page 2-6.) Tagging responsibilities and procedures must be clearly established by unit SOPs; the document tag is an essential task that establishes accountability and traceability of all captured documents. As part of core warrior tasks, all personnel must be instructed on proper tagging procedures, with emphasis on protecting and preserving the original condition and markings of the captured materials. The capturing unit should not make any marks on or otherwise deface original captured materials.
### ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW) CAPTURE TAG (PART A)

For use of this form, see AR 190-8. The proponent agency is DCSOPS.

1. Search – For weapons, military documents, or special equipment.
2. Silence – Prohibit talking among EPWs for ease of control.
3. Segregate – By rank, sex, and nationality.
4. Safeguard – To prevent harm or escape.
5. Speed – Evacuate from the combat zone.
6. Tag – Prisoners and documents or special equipment.

Attach this part of tag to EPW. (Do not remove from EPW.)

### UNIT RECORD CARD (PART B)

Forward to Unit. *(Capturing unit retains for records.)*

Use string, wire, or other durable material to attach the appropriate section of this form to the EPW's equipment or property.

### DOCUMENT/SPECIAL EQUIPMENT WEAPONS CARD (PART C)

Attach this part of tag to property taken. *(Do not remove from property.)*

As a minimum, the tag must include the following information:

- Item 1. Date and time of capture (YYYY/MM/DD).
- Item 8. Capturing Unit.
- Item 9. Place of capture (grid coordinates).
- Item 10. Circumstances of capture (how the EPW was cured).

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**Figure 2-3. DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag)**
TAGGING PROCEDURES

2-22. A unit-specific administrative number is required to account for each detainee or captured enemy document (CED) or CEM. Unit SOPs have a unit-specific format for creating unit-specific administrative numbers. The following convention may be used:

- Platoon designation.
- Company designation.
- Battalion designation.
- Date-time group (DTG) of capture.
- Unique sequential number.

2-23. For example, the third detainee captured by the 2d Platoon of B Company, 2d Battalion, 125th Infantry, at 0845 hours on 24 February 2009 would be recorded as—2/B/2/125/240845FEB09/0003.

Tagging Captured Materials Not Associated with a Detainee

2-24. Assign administrative numbers to each package and annotate the number on the captured materials tag. Since captured materials not associated with a detainee do not have a person or a person’s name associated with them, the location, location description, and DTG of capture are critical for exploitation purposes. This information helps a unit differentiate materials collected during multiple rotations to a war zone. A unit is likely to use the same numbering system to avoid confusion from rotation to rotation regarding a location and DTG of capture.

2-25. CEDs not associated with a detainee may be bundled, bagged, or packaged and given a separate administrative number for each package followed by the letter “D” as the identification for document. For example, the administrative number for the fourth package of documents captured at a certain site or during a particular incident by the 2d Platoon, B Company, 2d Battalion, 125th Infantry, at 0845 hours on 24 February 2008 would be 2/B/2/125/240845FEB08/0004D. In the event of a large volume of CEDs, additional numbers may be used.

Note. Although there is no specific form or format for the captured materials tag, it can be produced or reproduced locally or DD Form 2745, part C may be used.

Tagging Captured Materials Associated with a Detainee

2-26. When captured materials are associated with a detainee, the capturing unit completes DD Form 2745, part C:

- Record the administrative number in block 2 (Serial No.).
- Record the captured materials and any personal effects (money and items of personal or sentimental value, such as letters, pictures, jewelry) associated with a detainee in block 10 (Description of Weapons, Special Equipment, Documents).

2-27. At a minimum, the capturing unit provides the following information:

- Capturing unit identification.
- Date and time of capture in DTG format.
- Location of capture, including eight-digit map coordinates and a detailed physical description of the location.
- Identity of the detainee or other source that possessed the document, if applicable.
- Summary of circumstances for capture.

2-28. Bag and tag the captured materials and personal effects. Individually receipt and transfer high-value items (such as money and jewelry) that have a perceived or actual value, regardless of that actual value. This ensures accountability. Attach DD Form 2745, part C to all captured materials and personal effects associated and evacuated with the detainee; use multiple forms, if necessary. Keep all captured materials...
Chapter 2

2-29. Capturing units also complete DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement) to accompany the detainee. (See figure 2-4.) A sworn statement—

- Provides more information about the detainee’s capture circumstances; the captured materials with the detainee; and how, when, and to whom the detainee and associated captured materials were transferred.
- Indicates any items that were specifically receipted and to whom.
- Details the detainee’s physical condition and any medical treatment provided, offered, or refused by the detainee.
- Includes other detainees captured with the detainee and may include any significant statements made by the other detainee.

FIELD EXPEDITED TAGGING PROCEDURES

2-30. The collection of captured materials associated with a detainee is critical to further intelligence collection from the detainee and the captured materials. When DD Form 2745 is not available, capturing units should use any paper available to duplicate the information as it appears on DD Form 2745. Record the minimum information (as outlined in paragraphs 2-22 through 2-23 and 2-26 through 2-29) on the paper and then attach it to the detainee and the captured materials using the best application available—without causing harm to the detainee or the captured materials.

2-31. Captured materials from a captured site may also be tagged using field expedient methods if a captured materials tag is not available. Notebook pages; meal, ready to eat (MRE) boxes; or the blank side of other forms can be used to record information about the site. Units anticipating the capture of detainees and other items should make every effort to keep a supply of DD Forms 2745 and captured materials tags to ease the process. Regardless, the absence of these forms does not relieve a unit from recording necessary information.

INVENTORY AND GROUP

2-32. Inventory and group captured materials based on their association with specific detainees or location of capture. In other words, group together all captured materials associated with a specific detainee and group separately from captured materials associated with a different detainee. The same applies to large volumes of captured materials at a site—group based on their location of capture or group based on the room of capture at a certain location. Units gathering captured materials from multiple locations in one day should inventory and group them according to the location of capture.

EVACUATE

2-33. The initial evacuation of detainees, civilian internees, and captured materials is the responsibility of the capturing unit. The capturing unit is normally responsible for moving the detainees from the point of capture to the nearest initial detainee control point (IDCP) and evacuating captured materials to the next higher echelon.

EVACUATE CAPTURED MATERIALS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH A DETAINEE

2-34. Once all captured materials from a site are bagged, tagged, and readied for evacuation, the capturing unit gathers the captured materials and reports to the battalion or brigade intelligence staff for debriefing and hand-over of the captured materials. Capturing units are responsible for ensuring the safe and speedy evacuation of captured materials to areas designated by higher echelons and are required to use their organic equipment.
Figure 2-4. Example of DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement)
Chapter 2

EVACUATE CAPTURED MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH A DETAINEE

2-35. Evacuate captured materials associated with a detainee through detainee evacuation channels—*with* the detainee, but *not on* the detainee. If possible, units rapidly move CEDs and CEM to the IDCP. If located at the IDCP, designated DOMEX personnel initiate screening and exploitation of captured materials as soon as practical to provide time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value and to answer CCIRs. Commanders or leaders do not delay the evacuation process or allow the separation of detainees and captured materials. At the IDCP, military police take possession of the captured materials, which begins the official chain of custody for source-associated captured materials.

CAPTURED MATERIALS TRANSMITTAL SHEET

2-36. Prepare a captured materials transmittal sheet for captured materials transported from any echelon. DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) can be used as a captured materials transmittal sheet. (See figure 2-5.) Produce a captured materials transmittal sheet in triplicate—one each for the exploitation element, activity, and facility that archives copies of the captured materials transferred.

2-37. Unit SOPs determine the exact format for a captured materials transmittal sheet; however, it should contain at a minimum the following information:

- Element receiving captured materials (include name and rank of Soldier accepting the materials).
- Unit forwarding captured materials (include name and rank of Soldier releasing the materials).
- Whether screened or unscreened.
- Screening category, if applicable.
- Transmittal sheet identification number.
- Harmony numbers assigned to exploited captured materials, if applicable.
- Captured materials serial numbers.
- Transfer date and time in DTG format.

RETURN/RELEASE OF CAPTURED MATERIALS TO A DETAINEE

2-38. The return of materials captured with a detainee upon the detainee’s release from custody depends on the intelligence value of the captured materials and on unit SOPs. Capturing units must not return captured materials.
Figure 2-5. Example of DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document)
SECTION III – BATTALION INTELLIGENCE STAFF

2-39. Since every Soldier is a sensor and a potential source of relevant information, the battalion intelligence staff performs patrol debriefings to support the intelligence process. The battalion intelligence staff is responsible for debriefing returning patrols, exploitation teams, DOMEX teams, leaders who may have traveled to meetings, returning human intelligence collection teams, helicopter pilots, and others who may have obtained information of intelligence value. The battalion intelligence staff debriefs personnel, writes and submits reports, or reports information verbally, as appropriate. Following each mission, a debriefing by the intelligence staff should take place. Leaders should not consider the mission accomplished until the debriefings and reports are completed.

2-40. The battalion intelligence staff debriefing should include reviews of the route traveled, the mission’s collection objectives, and the collection methods employed. When the intelligence staff performs its debriefing, it should have the patrol report and all documents produced (such as mission logs, sworn statements, spot reports, sketches, photographs, and videos) from the handling of captured materials. The collector’s reporting streamlines the debriefing process, which allows the intelligence staff to concentrate on filling gaps and following up on reported information. For example, by reviewing the collector’s actions chronologically, the intelligence staff can help the collector to recall and record information that flows logically because it has been organized based on time of occurrence. The intelligence staff should—

- Use a map to determine the site’s location. If the capturing unit has completed a sketch, the intelligence staff can use a copy as a reference during the debriefing.
- Ask the capturing unit to provide a description of events that occurred during the exploitation of the site.
- Avoid asking questions that elicit a yes or no response.
- Avoid asking only for information in response to the CCIRs. Doing so might limit the capturing unit’s answers and cause something of significance to be missed.
- Ascertain whether spot reports were disseminated; if not, disseminate the reports, as applicable.

2-41. DOMEX teams task-organized at battalion level provide the tactical commander with a means to rapidly process large volumes of captured materials. DOMEX teams may comprise military intelligence personnel assigned to the battalion intelligence staff or in accordance with the commander’s needs.

2-42. Based on the circumstances (for example, under enemy fire) under which the capturing unit or exploitation team collected the captured materials, the battalion intelligence staff may be the first echelon to establish a proper chain of custody for captured materials and follow the procedures as outlined in the initial collection phase of the DOMEX process.

COLLECT

2-43. The reception of the captured materials constitutes collection at battalion level. The DOMEX team performs the initial screening, extraction, and reporting of information of immediate tactical value. The team determines if all captured materials are properly tagged and contacts the capturing unit, if necessary, to gather the pertinent information. After the confirmation of all tagging information, the DOMEX team inventories and groups the captured materials and prepares them for evacuation.

2-44. Although the DOMEX team at battalion level may have the capability to conduct hasty analysis of captured materials, the team should not hold the materials at battalion level to accomplish hasty analysis; rather, it should quickly evacuate the captured materials to the next echelon.

2-45. Under the direction of the battalion intelligence staff, DOMEX teams screen CEDs as they tag and inventory the documents. Upon recognition, the DOMEX team immediately reports time-sensitive information collected from a document using reporting guidance to determine when direct reporting to affected units is authorized. The spot report in SALUTE format is used by most units for reporting time-sensitive information unless otherwise specified in annex B of the OPORD or other reporting guidance. The battalion intelligence staff also forwards a hardcopy of the reports along with evacuated documents to
reduce the potential for redundant reporting. The typical battalion does not have the capability to screen, exploit, or extract information from CEM, but a battalion should assign a preliminary category to the CEM for priority of evacuation purposes.

SCREEN, CATEGORIZE, AND EXTRACT AND REPORT TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION

2-46. Upon receipt of captured materials, the battalion intelligence staff, with the DOMEX team’s assistance if applicable, evaluates the captured materials, assigns a preliminary exploitation category (see paragraph 2-58), and reports time-sensitive information obtained from captured materials not previously reported by the capturing unit or exploitation team.

2-47. Although the commander has the authority to determine a material’s priority designation, prioritization is based on which captured materials contain the most value. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom the following items were determined to be of the most value:

- Digital devices.
- Communications equipment.
- Contact information (names and addresses or phone numbers).
- Large amounts of currency or narcotics.
- Identification documents.
- All other documents, including photographs, weapons, and currency.

Note. This generalized prioritization list of captured materials does not supersede CCIRs or the commander’s guidance.

INVENTORY AND GROUP

2-48. Before beginning the inventory process, the battalion intelligence staff or DOMEX team must ensure that hazardous materials are rendered safe. If space permits, the battalion intelligence staff should create a separate location to screen captured materials, thus preventing the potentiality of hazardous materials in the workspace. When in doubt about safe handling procedures, consult trained professionals, such as the EOD unit, support battalion ammunition specialists, or CBRNE representatives.

2-49. By using captured materials tags to identify collected materials, the capturing unit greatly assists the battalion intelligence staff. Additionally, details from the captured materials tag assist in inventorying a batch. A batch is a group of captured materials seized in association with a specific individual or captured at the same location. If the capturing unit does not have captured materials tags, the unit may use some other type of field expedient marking technique to identify specific items. Regardless, the battalion intelligence staff or DOMEX team must obtain specifics regarding the original disposition of captured materials.

TAG

2-50. All captured materials must have completed captured materials tags. If captured materials are not tagged, the battalion intelligence staff must contact the capturing unit, exploitation team, or other collection team to obtain information to complete the captured materials tag before evacuating the materials to the next higher echelon or processing site for processing and exploitation.

EVACUATE

2-51. Frequently, the battalion intelligence staff is the first element to receive captured materials from the capturing unit and inventories them to ensure accountability during subsequent evacuation. Different items
require different evacuation procedures. The staff determines evacuation locations of captured materials based on their contacts and knowledge. (See paragraphs 1-23 through 1-29.)

LOGGING CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-52. Using the information on the captured materials tags, the battalion intelligence staff logs all captured materials and their evacuation locations on a captured materials log (produced locally). If evacuation locations are unknown or the proper evacuation is not possible, the battalion intelligence staff forwards the captured materials to the next level for further evacuation. The staff annotates this information in the captured materials log. The battalion intelligence staff—

- Briefly describes the condition (for example, good, paper torn, cell phone partially burned) of the captured materials in the remarks section of the captured materials log.
- Annotations on the captured materials log whether the captured materials were captured in association with a detainee or from a captured site. If associated with a detainee, the staff records the detainee administrative number (see paragraph 2-22) and indicates this information on the log.

2-53. Proper inventory procedures and proper completion of the captured materials log ensures strict accountability of all captured materials and preserves their evidentiary value.

DIGITIZED CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

2-54. If resources and time are available, the battalion intelligence staff scans or photographs the CEDs to create a digital record that accompanies the spot report or is sent directly to the processing site. Digitization enables the staff to use machine language translation tools to identify important words, names, and phrases through a rough translation of the document. The staff must annotate or otherwise include all information from the captured materials tag with digitized documents to ensure document accountability and traceability.

TRANSMITTAL OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-55. Since captured materials can contain valuable intelligence information (whether associated with a detainee or not) and are seldom delayed at the battalion level, the battalion intelligence staff begins evacuation procedures immediately following the inventory. To prepare for evacuation of the captured materials, the intelligence staff uses the inventory information to complete the captured materials transmittal sheet. The staff must identify in the captured materials log and on the transmittal sheet which captured materials are being sent to a higher echelon or special processing sites (such as technical intelligence or signals intelligence facilities), and which captured materials are accompanying any detainees. If an item, such as a weapon or weapon component, was captured with a detainee and is sent to another exploitation site, the associated detainee must be annotated on the captured materials transmittal sheet. Some captured materials, such as cell phones and Global Positioning System devices can and should be evacuated with the detainee.

2-56. Attempts to process and report information derived from captured materials are annotated in the captured materials log. Transmittal sheets are sent to higher echelons. Unit SOPs and reporting guidance contain the precise format for a captured materials transmittal sheet.

2-57. Once completed, the battalion intelligence staff sends a softcopy of the captured materials transmittal sheet and an estimated evacuation time through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to the destination-processing site. If the captured materials are associated with a detainee or contain cryptographic information or technical information associated with CEM, include the appropriate additional message addressees. A softcopy of the captured materials transmittal sheet helps addressees anticipate and organize their captured materials processing resources as well as alerts multiple organizations about information of potential intelligence value.
Note. The battalion intelligence staff retains a copy of each captured materials transmittal sheet along with any copies of resultant intelligence reports, translations, and digital images.

EVACUATION PRIORITIZATION OF CAPTURED MATERIALS

2-58. The battalion intelligence staff or DOMEX team evacuates captured materials not associated with a detainee according to exploitation priority. Evacuate higher priority materials first. Determine priority based on the category assigned to the captured materials during screening. Table 2-1 provides the categories of captured materials and their basic descriptions. In addition to determining the priority for exploiting and evacuating captured materials, categories also determine their handling procedures.

Table 2-1. Categories of captured materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Critical, time-sensitive information that requires priority reporting, evacuation, or special handling; answers priority intelligence requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Information that answers a higher echelon information requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Routine information that may have no intelligence value but requires accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Routine information that has no information of intelligence value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Use DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) for accountability or criminal evidence, currency, and other potential high-value property items, such as works of art. Handle cryptographic information as Secret.

2-59. At the time of evacuation, assign a category C to unevaluated captured materials. Ensure the captured materials transmittal sheet clearly indicates that the captured materials are “unscreened” or “not evaluated.” Evacuating units hold category C or lower priority captured materials that are not evacuated until scheduled transportation arrives.

2-60. When determining evacuation priorities, the intelligence staff considers all captured materials that are ready for evacuation:

- Do not evacuate lower priority items—no matter how old—ahead of higher priority items.
- A package of captured materials must contain materials of only one category.
- Unscreensed category C captured materials are not packaged with screened category C materials.
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Chapter 3

Processing Phase

Unless the collector or capturing unit has a supporting document and media exploitation (DOMEX) team, translator, or linguist, most units that collect captured materials normally have no way of determining their intelligence value. Once captured materials arrive at an echelon with a dedicated exploitation team, DOMEX processing site, or other intelligence activity, trained exploitation personnel can screen, process, and extract information from the captured materials. The degree that the brigade-level and higher echelon sites process the captured materials depends on the sites’ resources and missions and the categories of captured materials.

SECTION I – BRIGADE AND ABOVE DOMEX PROCESSING SITE

3-1. Processing captured materials at brigade and above includes the tasks as listed in figure 3-1.

![Figure 3-1. Processing phase](image)

3-2. The majority of DOMEX processing involves digitizing, transcribing, and translating non-English graphics, recordings, and text documents into English text format. Language capability is therefore essential to processing non-English language documents. In addition, language-based processing activities require procedures and management to ensure transcripts and translations are timely, accurate, complete, and free of bias. Generally, the priorities for processing at brigade and above are based on the—

- Categories assigned to the captured materials.
- Commander’s collection requirements.
- Established reporting guidance.
- Commander’s situational understanding.

3-3. At the brigade level, the capability to exploit some media devices for time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value exists as specialized DOMEX support teams. Specially trained media exploitation personnel, assigned to these task-organized teams, assess whether the extraction of information of immediate tactical value is possible before evacuating the media devices to the supporting signals intelligence unit or the National Media Exploitation Center for in-depth exploitation.

3-4. Army DOMEX processing sites at brigade and above do not normally possess capabilities for voice recognition and identification, comparative analysis of video content, and cryptanalysis. The skills, knowledge, and equipment for specialized processing are available at intelligence community organizations through the communications architecture. Units can request that the following bulleted organizations use specialized techniques and procedures to extract additional information from the collected audio and video information. Application of specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the classification of the processed information and restriction of its dissemination:

- Defense Intelligence Agency.
- National Ground Intelligence Center.
- National Security Agency.
Joint document exploitation centers (JDECs).
National Media Exploitation Center.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Other U.S. intelligence community or multinational organizations.

DOMEX processing also includes the recovery of damaged documents, the decryption of encrypted documents, the translation of documents into English, and the extraction of documents from electronic media, such as the downloading of files from a computer disk or hard drive. The need for document recovery, translation, and other specialized processing frequently limits the amount of processing that occurs without the assistance of a specially trained DOMEX team, other exploitation team, or outside processing sites, such as a JDEC or combined media processing center.

INVENTORY AND LOG PROCEDURES

Accountability is the proper control, custody, and accounting of all captured materials through the use of various custody documents. Strict accountability must be maintained by each element, echelon, or activity that collects, handles, processes, or evacuates captured materials and their accompanying products. They maintain accountability via the following inventory and logging procedures:

- Log captured materials in and out using the captured materials log.
- Inventory captured materials.
- Initiate trace actions, if necessary.

SEGREGATION

Captured materials arrive in a variety of states, ranging from completely intermingled in a worst-case scenario to already having been inventoried, segregated, and subsegregated by location of capture or association with a specific detainee. Normally, captured materials do not arrive as neatly separated batches with the names of the individuals who possessed the captured materials or the site where the materials were collected; receiving neatly separated batches is an inappropriate assumption.

Captured materials are kept separate by category and batch to ensure the integrity of their intelligence potential and evidentiary value, to facilitate screening at each echelon, and to assist in the interviewing of detainees. Grouping items collected from a site as a batch assists in preventing the compromise of site exploitation where items are collected as part of a criminal investigation.

Segregation of captured materials is critical to mission success. Soldiers must do their utmost to ensure that different batches of captured materials remain separated until they can be transferred. It is incumbent that leaders stress the importance of collection, handling, and segregation of captured materials during mission briefings for patrols and other tactical missions.

PHOTOGRAPHS OF INCOMING CAPTURED MATERIALS

Each batch of incoming captured materials is photographed in its arrival condition to help identify each batch. Two series of photographs should be taken—one with the batch name and one sanitized of all markings that indicate the materials were exploited by U.S. forces. Sanitized photographs of detainees’ personal captured materials can be of assistance during detainee questioning sessions. Photographing captured materials should occur simultaneously with completing the captured materials log.

CAPTURED MATERIALS LOG

Maintaining accountability of captured materials is essential; therefore, the first task in processing captured materials requires that they be inventoried and logged into a captured materials log. Before undertaking any processing, handlers of captured materials must adhere to proper handling procedures.
3-12. The captured materials log can be established locally. The format is in accordance with unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), but it should contain the following information (in accordance with FM 2-22.3) for each captured enemy document (CED) or captured enemy materiel (CEM):

- A sequential file number to identify the order of entry into the log.
- Date and time of receipt in date-time group format.
- Serial number from the captured materials tag.
- Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the captured materials.
- Designation of the unit that forwarded the captured materials.
- Identification of the individual who received the captured materials.
- Date, time, and location of capture (as listed on the captured materials tag).
- Identification of the capturing unit (as listed on the captured materials tag).
- Captured materials category (after screening).
- Description of each CED or CEM, including the original language, number of pages, type of CED or CEM (such as a map, computer disk, letter, or photograph), and the detainee identification number for each CED or CEM, if available.
- Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
- Remarks:
  - Include action taken based on the type of CED or CEM and any other information that can help the unit identify the CED or CEM.
  - Include any other information that can assist the unit in identifying the captured materials, including processing codes. (Processing codes, established in accordance with unit SOPs, denote all actions taken regarding the CEDs or CEM while at the element, including intelligence reports, translations, reproductions, or return of the CEDs or CEM to the associated detainees.)

3-13. The DOMEX team or processing site inventories incoming captured materials and adds them to the site’s captured materials log. An accurate yet rapid inventory of captured materials is essential since understanding the details of the capture of documents and materiel helps produce accurate reporting and analytical products. Therefore, all units involved in collecting, transporting, and processing captured materials must maintain accurate records and accountability of all captured materials via the log.

3-14. Inventorying consists of comparing the captured materials to what is written on the tags and accompanying transmittal sheets. This comparison identifies—

- Transmittal sheets listing captured materials that are missing.
- Captured materials not listed on accompanying transmittal sheets.
- Captured materials tags not attached to captured materials.

**TRACE ACTIONS**

3-15. The DOMEX team or processing site initiates trace actions on all missing captured materials, missing tags, and information missing from the captured materials tags. The site can complete this corrective action swiftly if the DOMEX team or capturing unit completed DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag), part C correctly and retained its document transmittal sheets, intelligence reports, and digital images. If necessary, the trace action continues to the capturing unit and other elements that handled the materials. If a captured materials tag is unavailable from elements that have previously handled or transported the materials, or if the missing information and documents are unrecoverable, then the processing site completes the captured materials tag using available information and annotates the captured materials in the captured materials log. Attempts to obtain missing captured materials are critical because of the information they might contain.

3-16. When a batch of captured materials is received without a transmittal sheet, the receiving element contacts the forwarding unit and obtains a list of the captured materials serial numbers, if available. The receiving element records all trace actions in its journal.
3-17. The DOMEX team or processing site uses the captured materials tags, transmittal sheets, and results of the inventory to create and maintain a log of all captured materials. The log is a record of what the unit knows about the captured materials. In addition to information about the materials, the log also records all actions taken of the captured materials at the site, including intelligence reports, transcripts, translations, reproductions, and final disposition of the captured materials.

**Sign-Out Ledger**

3-18. When other elements, such as analysts, interrogators, counterintelligence (CI) agents require temporary use of captured materials, they must use DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) (see figure 2-5, page 2-11), if available, or locally produced captured materials sign-out ledger for accountability. The captured materials sign-out ledger has no precise format; it is based on unit SOPs. The captured materials sign-out ledger should include at a minimum—

- Harmony numbers assigned to captured materials, if applicable.
- Serial numbers of the captured materials, if applicable.
- Name, rank, and unit of assignment of individual releasing property.
- Name, rank, and unit of assignment of individual accepting documents.
- Date and time the captured materials are signed out.
- Date and time the captured materials are signed back in.

3-19. All products generated during the exploitation process should be archived in a manner that allows them to be easily accessed. Archived products may include inventories of captured materials, digital photographs of captured materials, spreadsheets containing contact information, batch reports, and DD Form 2745, part B. (See figure 2-3, page 2-6.)

**Military Police Accountability Procedures**

3-20. When DOMEX teams or processing site personnel are co-located with detainee holding or detention facilities, military police (MP) personnel maintain administrative control of detainees and their possessions, including captured materials. In such cases, DOMEX teams or processing sites must coordinate with the MPs to temporarily sign out source-associated CEDs for digitization. Once digitized, the DOMEX team or processing site personnel return the original CEDs and related products and use the copies for processing and exploitation or for use during an interrogation.

3-21. MPs also maintain a detainee information database that can be used to track detainees and their associated captured materials. MPs use the Detainee Reporting System during in processing at internment facilities. The system records data for detainee processing and tracking and is intended to interact with the biometrics automated toolset system to avoid duplication of effort.

**SCREENING CAPTURED MATERIALS**

3-22. Screening captured materials is the rapid but systematic evaluation of CEDs or CEM to determine which contain priority information. Screening captured materials is a key step in the DOMEX process workflow; essentially, it is the hub for determining the exploitation priority and procedures for CEDs and CEM.

3-23. Screening involves—

- Reviewing and categorizing all captured materials.
- Prioritizing captured materials for translation and exploitation.
- Identifying captured materials requiring special handling and immediate evacuation to specialized units for exploitation.
3-24. Screening captured materials requires senior, experienced individuals who are—
   - Well-versed in the target language and collection requirements.
   - Capable of identifying time-sensitive information of national intelligence significance.
   - Capable of making rapid decisions based on minimal information.

3-25. Screening positions are normally filled by all-source analysts accompanied by linguists with the requisite language capabilities. At higher echelons where time and resources are more readily available, screening can be accomplished by most MI professionals whose experience and training enable them to identify pieces of information that contribute to the entire intelligence picture. The number of screeners required depends on the CED or CEM flow, which may range from only a few per day at lower echelons to thousands a day at a theater-level activity.

3-26. During screening, the DOMEX team or processing site personnel systematically evaluate the captured materials and their tags to identify reportable information and determine the priority of processing. This screening may change the preliminary captured materials category that was assigned during the initial evaluation of the CEDs and CEM. The DOMEX team or processing site also reports any unreported time-sensitive information in spot report or intelligence information report format.

3-27. Captured materials can be screened using a qualified linguist or language translation tool with keyword identification capability. (See chapter 7.) Screening of captured materials does not require the full translation of a CED or CEM, but it does require sufficient translation to determine the significance of the captured materials. A nonlinguist may be able to perform a preliminary screening based on a CED’s format or CEM configurations and the circumstances of capture, such as the location where the captured materials were found.

CATEGORIZING CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-28. As personnel screen captured materials, they assign or reassign one of the four captured materials categories listed in table 2-1, page 2-15. Screeners at higher echelons can change the category of the captured materials to more accurately reflect the requirements at that level. The category determines the priority for processing, exploitation, reporting, and dissemination. Screening of captured materials requires that the DOMEX team or processing site personnel remain abreast of the current commander’s critical information requirements, collection requirements, the current friendly and enemy situation, the relevant threat information, and the planned operations.

IDENTIFY SPECIFIC LIMITING CRITERIA CAPTURED MATERIALS

3-29. Specific limiting criteria (SLC) captured materials are of a cryptologic, counterterrorist, or CI nature that could endanger ongoing operations and sensitive sources or methods, if compromised. Items containing SLC information must be handled as Secret and evacuated immediately to the nearest CI activity.

3-30. Items containing the following types of data should be designated SLC:
   - U.S. names (people, places, cities).
   - U.S. companies.
   - U.S. interests.
   - U.S. operatives or code names.
   - Documents containing U.S. classifications.

3-31. Items containing possible SLC data include—
   - Information that could cause risk to planned operations.
   - Evidence of espionage or CI operations.
Chapter 3

- Information that identifies sources or their methods.
- Information on illegal or inappropriate materials, such as counterfeiting, pornography, or other like items.

3-32. Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333) addresses the powers and responsibilities of U.S. intelligence agencies. EO 12333, paragraph 2.3, states that agencies within the intelligence community are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General.

3-33. AR 381-10 defines *U.S. person* as a U.S. citizen; an alien known by the intelligence component to be a permanent resident alien; an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens; a corporation incorporated in the United States that is not directed or controlled by a foreign government. A corporation or a subsidiary incorporated abroad is not a U.S. person even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States.

*Note.* Captured materials containing or suspected of containing SLC information should not be uploaded into the National Harmony Database by exploitation teams. Only CI elements are qualified to handle SLC information. CI representatives can help if there is doubt or question about a particular CED’s or CEM’s SLC qualification.

**SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SECRET CAPTURED MATERIALS**

3-34. Classified captured materials must be limited to personnel with knowledge of the particular Secret captured materials and authorization to access them. Therefore, security requirements include ensuring—

- Personnel handling Secret captured materials—
  - Have the appropriate security level.
  - Do not pose a security risk to the United States. This is particularly important when dealing with non-U.S. translators. (At higher echelons, dealing with non-U.S. translators normally requires a designated CI team to perform recurring personnel security evaluations.)
- Secret captured materials are marked in accordance with AR 380-5 and proper security measures are in place to prevent the compromise of information.

3-35. Recovered captured materials of U.S. origin should be handled in accordance with their original U.S. classification unless directed otherwise by the commander.

**GROUPING AND SEGREGATING CAPTURED MATERIALS**

3-36. During screening, captured materials are grouped according to their assigned screening category. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel must ensure captured materials are not separated from their associated groups. These large groupings can be broken down into smaller groups or batches. Each of these smaller groupings may consist of captured materials—

- Captured by the same unit.
- Captured in the same location.
- Captured on the same day at the same time.
- Received at the DOMEX element at the same time.

**RECOVER**

3-37. At larger processing sites, the recover task involves the recovery CEDs from captured materials. Recover includes—

- Cleaning soiled documents (return to former state).
- Reassembling document fragments (return to right position).
- Decrypting coded documents (decode).
- Extracting information from electronic devices or storage media (retrieve useful information).

3-38. Extracting information from electronic devices and storage media is performed by specially trained media exploitation personnel on a DOMEX team or media technicians at a JDEC or other site with specialized training, equipment, and software. DOMEX processing personnel at the JDEC work with TECHINT personnel to process electronic devices or storage media. In addition to special resources, processing at a fixed processing site prevents the introduction of corrupt and malicious software and other forms of computer attack from entering U.S. communications and processing networks.

DIGITIZE

3-39. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel scan or photograph the captured materials to create a digital record that they can then use for processing and analysis. Digitization also enables them to use machine language translation (MLT) tools to screen CEDs for keywords, names, and phrases through a rough translation of a CED. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel must annotate or otherwise include all the information from the captured materials tag with the digitized CEDs to ensure their accountability and traceability. Finally, digitization enables the dissemination of the CEDs into the National Harmony Database, where other personnel, such as those in the Army Reserve Language Support Program (RLSP) or at the Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center, can transcribe and translate the CEDs.

TRANSCRIBE

3-40. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel transcribe audio and video recordings into text format. A transcript is a verbatim, native language rendering of the information in the audio or video recording. For processing of non-English recordings, transcription is extremely important. The transcriber uses native font or transliteration to represent the spoken language in the recording. The transcript, particularly of video files, includes descriptions of the activity, setting, and conditions that the transcriber hears in the audio and observes in the video. To ensure consistency and quality, the processing team applies a standard process to translate spoken and written information into English (such as using transliteration guides). Once completed, language-qualified analysts or other specialists use the transcript to produce intelligence and update technical information. If required, the DOMEX team or processing site personnel translate the transcript into English for nonlanguage-qualified analysts and other users.

TRANSLATE

3-41. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel translate CEDs and transcripts into English-language text format, if able. As an integral part of the DOMEX processing phase, the translation of information from the target language to English requires linguists who are qualified in both the target language and English. They must possess target knowledge commensurate with the target population of the information and have the appropriate clearance level. These skills and knowledge are important because a translation, unlike a transcript, is normally not a simple word-for-word interpretation but an approximation of the literal and implied meaning of the spoken or written language. To ensure consistency and quality, linguists use online dictionaries, gazetteers, and working aids to improve the translation.

3-42. At lower echelons, translators require a more general knowledge; the same translator may perform all functions—translate CEDs and transcripts, extract the pertinent information, and report that information. At higher echelons, translators require a more specific knowledge; therefore, they often perform these functions separately. Higher echelon activities, such as the theater document repository, group their translation efforts by subject area. For example, all medical-related captured materials are grouped and translated together.

3-43. All-source analysts use translations accomplished by qualified linguists or signals intelligence analysts, human intelligence collectors, and some CI agents with the requisite language capability. At higher echelons, where in-depth and precise translations are required, translations require the availability of
military or civilian full-time linguists. At these echelons, military linguists typically oversee translation operations, which contribute to the warfighter through virtual translation of CEDs via RLSP. Civilian linguists have varying degrees of access and ability.

3-44. It is important for consumers to acknowledge that translations are not CEDs; rather, they are subjective documents that are only as reliable as their translators. To be reliable, a translation requires input from consultants on technical matters, operational matters, and technical language issues, as well as from social, cultural, and historical experts.

TRANSLATION FORMATS

3-45. When CEDs and transcripts are selected for exploitation, linguists translate them into one of four recognized translation formats:

- Full translation.
- Extract translation.
- Summary translation.
- Gist.

Full Translation

3-46. The translation of an entire document or transcript is a full translation. This translation format requires intensive time and manpower, especially for lengthy or highly technical CEDs. Normally, only a DOMEX processing site at theater or national level is adequately resourced to enable full translations, which are relevant only when the value of, technical complexity, or political sensitivity of the CEDs requires a full translation.

Extract Translation

3-47. An extract translation is a more precise translation of a specified portion of a CED or transcript. Analysts request only what they need. Rarely does an entire document contain valuable information. Often correspondence contains only one or two paragraphs of intelligence information that answers the collection requirements. Extract translations are frequently performed before full translations to assess the value of a CED’s parts before resources are committed to its full translation.

Summary Translation

3-48. A summary translation entails reading the entire CED or transcript. The linguist then summarizes the main points of information instead of rendering an extract or full translation. Therefore, a summary translation may be performed as part of the document screening process.

3-49. A summary translation is normally in writing, but a linguist may orally present the translated information, especially at the tactical level. A summary translation requires a translator with extensive analytical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the CED against time available in combat operations.

3-50. Translators with limited working knowledge in their translating languages may use a summary translation. For instance, a Russian linguist may be unable to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian-language document; however, the linguist may almost certainly render a usable summary of its content.

Gist

3-51. A gist is the function of deriving abstracts or general meanings from a CED or transcript without offering a verbatim or precise translation. In other words, the gist of a document is not a formal translation; rather, it is a rough outline of the document’s meaning or topic. At the tactical level, a gist helps to evaluate a document’s intelligence potential and identify it for further exploitation.
RESERVE LANGUAGE SUPPORT PROGRAM

3-52. Managed by the 300th MI Brigade, RLSP provides real-time language training opportunities to Soldiers to maintain their language skills during unit-training periods or cycles while providing intelligence to tactical commanders on the ground as well as to national-level consumers.

3-53. The RLSP mission is to—

- Provide translation support to Army and joint organizations.
- Provide sanctuary linguist support to the warfighter.
- Serve as a single point of contact for Reserve Component translation services.
- Ensure that all translated documents are accounted for, accurately translated, and placed in the correct databases, such as the National Harmony Database and the Worldwide Basic Information Library.

3-54. To perform its mission, RLSP has more than 800 participating linguists from the Regular Army, Reserve Components, and the other Services. The RLSP uses the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and AKO-S (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET]) for continuous—

- Access to the documents at the AKO Collaboration Center.
- Global-availability access for participating linguists.
- Online translation tools, training aids, or links to online aids available in most languages.

3-55. RLSP assists in the translation of documents in languages that are not typical for a particular theater of operations, for example, a Korean document discovered in Iraq. RLSP has access to the following languages: Albanian, Arabic, Armenian, Bengali, Bulgarian, Chinese, Czech, Danish, Dari, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Pashto, Persian Farsi, Portuguese, Russian, Romanian, Slovenian, Spanish, Serbo-Croatian, Swedish, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, Ukrainian, Urdu, and Vietnamese.

MACHINE LANGUAGE TRANSLATION TOOLS

3-56. Understanding oral and written communication in a foreign language is central to effective intelligence collection operations. The optimal solution is having a trained collector of native proficiency who is well versed in the local situation and U.S. collection requirements, and has the requisite security clearance and capability to translate and report accurately in English. These requirements are met through a combination of MI linguists, contractors, native speakers within the Department of Defense system, and locally hired civilian linguists.

3-57. Difficulties arise if the proficiency levels of MI linguists are not up to mission requirements, if the linguists do not possess the proper language for the theater of operations, or if the native linguist does not have a strong command of English. Using locally hired linguists raises security issues. An increasingly viable solution to meet some of these requirements is MLT—the use of computer software to translate text or speech from one natural language to another. MLT uses optical character recognition technology, a visual recognition process that converts printed or written text into an electronic character-based file.

3-58. Foreign language collaboration tools employed during recent military operations have had a major operational impact. The Army DOMEX program leveraged the power of MLT tools and human translators to provide access to the large volumes of information found in thousands of captured materials. Since this information is analyzed and shared, it contributes to enhanced force protection, follow-on tactical operations, and the capture of high-value individuals.

DEPLOYABLE HARMONY DOMEX TOOLS

3-59. The five basic Harmony tools used to support the DOMEX community are the Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite (DHDS), the DHDS-Collection Tool, DHDS-Template, Theater Exploitation Database, and the Dirty-to-Clean Conversion Tool. See table 3-1, page 3-10, for a description of each Harmony tool.
Table 3-1. Deployable Harmony DOMEX tools

**Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite (DHDS)**

DHDS, deployable at strategic centers and echelons above division, is an integrated set of tools used for foreign language exploitation and identification of documents of interest. These documents are then sent to linguists for full translation. DHDS uses advanced technology to improve the ability to input, organize, screen, translate, and analyze captured information in virtually all formats and many languages. This information can then be uploaded via secure closed networks to national repositories, such as the National Harmony Database. DHDS component tools include—

- Document scanning.
- Optical character recognition.
- Encoding format converter.
- Machine translation.
- Information retrieval.

**Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite-Collection Tool (DHDS-CT)**

DHDS-CT, deployable at brigade and division levels, is a highly flexible document exploitation system, customizable to suit the user’s environment. Small or large groups can use the system to collect and exploit data from all types of materials, including documents, computer files, and publications. DHDS-CT provides ease-of-use and data-collection enhanced management to support tactical, operational, and strategic DOMEX missions, as well as uploads to the National Harmony Database. Design features include—

- User interface employing menu-based function selection.
- Enhanced search capabilities.
- Common-user desktop page.

**Deployable Harmony DOMEX Suite-Template (DHDS-T)**

DHDS-T, deployable with individual translators and units that feed one of the DHDS systems, is used to generate metadata that supports inputting, translating, indexing, and searching foreign documents in the National Harmony Database, as well as DOMEX activities and systems ranging from theater tactical to national strategic applications. DHDS-T provides a means of collecting and organizing foreign documents and translations and of associating people and other broad national intelligence, security, and law enforcement activities.

**Theater Exploitation Database (TED)**

TED is a Web gateway interface on the DHDS system that allows for worldwide access to a theater-specific DOMEX repository on a single network. TED provides general search engines to perform general keyword searches or selects items in fields of interest.

**Dirty-to-Clean (D2C) Conversion Tool**

D2C is designed to exploit potentially dirty media or media containing malicious software by converting and transferring the data in a safe format. D2C uses advanced technology to extract the data and render it in a format devoid of active viruses, Trojan horses, logic bombs, or malicious codes. The data can then be transferred to DHDS applications for further exploitation and mass screening and processing using machine translation tools.

3-60. Harmony Version 3 is a prototype not yet in field use. This prototype Harmony interface, with Oracle text search functionality, is designed to provide access to Harmony metadata and associated files for novice and advanced users. Harmony Version 3 may be accessed on Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and SIPRNET from the Harmony home page.

**REVIEW**

3-61. Technically proficient linguists review each transcription and translation to ensure consistency with reporting standards and for quality control of the translation. A U.S. Government linguist should review all information that a non-U.S. linguist processes. Exceptions include operations involving long-term coalitions and U.S. contractors with the requisite skills and the command’s confidence. Each transcript and translation should undergo two levels of review—quality control and quality assurance.
QUALITY CONTROL

3-62. A quality control linguist reviews a transcript or translation report for accuracy and to ensure it clearly expresses the meaning of the original document. The quality control linguist also ensures the report is complete, free of bias, and in accordance with reporting standards. The linguist returns the report to the DOMEX team or processing site personnel for corrections or personally adds missed content, corrects minor translation errors, and fixes minor format errors. Upon the completion of the quality control review, the translation report is available for analysis.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

3-63. A quality assurance linguist reviews a transcript or translation report to ensure it contains all required information and that the translation reads naturally in English. Once reviewed, the quality assurance linguist saves the completed transcript or translation report to the local database. If authorized, a quality assurance linguist disseminates the report to external databases, such as the World Basic Information Library, or to the National Harmony Database, which links the report to the original CED.

SECTION II – PROCESS CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS FOR UPLOAD INTO THE NATIONAL HARMONY DATABASE

3-64. The National Harmony Database is the national intelligence database for foreign DOMEX and translations management. It is the single, comprehensive bibliographic reference for all available primary source foreign-technical and military documents and their translations. The National Harmony Database supports tactical through strategic users and is available to all units with access to the collateral classified SIPRNET, JWICS, or StoneGhost networks. Users do not need to establish a separate account for access to the National Harmony Database.

3-65. The National Harmony Database includes digitized versions of hardcopy documents and clean versions of media pulled from battlefields, and raids supporting the ongoing operations, as well as from items of interest acquired through different intelligence community foreign materiel programs. National Harmony Database customers include warfighters deployed throughout the various theaters of operations and analysts throughout the intelligence community. The National Harmony Database is a classified database.

HARMONY NUMBERS

3-66. Valid Harmony numbers should be assigned to category A and B CEDs as soon as the screening process is complete. The Harmony number is the report number for a DOMEX or media exploitation report. It may apply to all the CEDs in a batch or to an entire stack of compact disks deemed as reportable. The Harmony number comprises three parts: unit identifier prefix, the year, and a sequential report number. Figure 3-2 exemplifies a Harmony number and an explanation of its format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmony number: MNFZ-2007-M12345</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harmony number parts</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit identifier prefix</td>
<td>MNF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>DOMEX Main</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequential report number</td>
<td>M12345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each DOMEX team or activity will have a unique National Harmony Database prefix to identify the unit conducting the exploitation.

A report identifier “M” precedes the sequential report number when media is involved. DOMEX reports have no report identifier.

Figure 3-2. Harmony number format
3-67. Determining valid Harmony numbers requires close coordination with higher echelons. To prevent assigning numbers that are not compatible with the National Harmony Database, coordinate with the corps DOMEX support element or JDEC to establish the appropriate naming convention.

BATCH NAME

3-68. In order to process CEDs within a given batch, a unique batch name must be established during CED screening and disseminated to all elements that have a role in the custody and exploitation process or who are consumers of the products produced by the brigade or above DOMEX team. The batch identifying criteria are then referenced when tracking CEDs. Batch naming conventions should facilitate identifying property belonging to specific individuals or designating property within the batch discovered in specific locations.

3-69. Batch naming conventions are in accordance with unit SOPs. Regardless of the unit, within a batch name the following should be incorporated:

- Date of capture.
- Mission or target name.
- Detainee number, if applicable.
- Location of capture.

3-70. The National Harmony Database requires the input of a batch name to display the batch circumstances of capture. If a batch name is not assigned, the batch circumstances of capture will not be available to the intelligence community.

BATCH IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

3-71. To facilitate access to CEDs and their translations in the National Harmony Database, CEDs are processed for upload into the database. This process entails assigning CEDs within a batch a unique identifier. Unit SOPs direct how the batch identification number is assigned, using Julian date and time group. Higher echelons can provide assistance in developing batch identification conventions.

3-72. A sample batch identification number should minimally include identification of the collection station, the year of capture, Julian date of capture, and batch serial number (unique sequential number beginning with 01), for example, batch identification number MZ7155-212:

- MZ—DOMEX (collection station).
- 7—2007 (year).
- 155—Julian date (4 June).
- 212—212th batch received by this collection station.

BATCH REPORT

3-73. The batch report is one method of disseminating an analytical summary of CEDs related to a particular batch to the tactical commander to capitalize on information related to follow-on operations. The precise format for a batch report is in accordance with unit SOPs, but it should minimally contain—

- Harmony number.
- Batch name.
- Total batch contents.
- Exploitation instructions.
- DOMEX technician name and rank.
- Descriptive title of CED.
- Type of CED.
- U.S. classification, if applicable.
- Primary language.
• Date of exploitation.
• Capture date.
• Capture location.
• Capturing unit.
• Circumstances of capture.
• Nonexploited CEDs in the batch not containing priority intelligence requirement-reportable information.
• Report summary (description of the contents of each CED in the batch).

WORKFLOW BATCH INFORMATION SHEET
3-74. A workflow batch information sheet is created when groups or batches of CEDs are in the processing phase to facilitate the process and to assist in the creation of National Harmony Database records. Once completed, a workflow batch information sheet uses the Julian date to track capturing units, detainees, equipment, and any documents that may be needed to assist in the briefing and debriefing of the capturing units.

MEDIA EXPLOITATION REPORTS
3-75. The media exploitation technician of the DOMEX support team at brigade or of a media-processing site is responsible for screening and exploiting all analog and digital media that arrive in a batch of CEDs and for meeting their reporting requirements.
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Chapter 4
Analysis and Production Phase

As part of a multidiscipline intelligence effort, the use and integration of intelligence derived from document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations ensure that decisionmakers have the benefit of all sources of available information. DOMEX-derived information may provide information on threat capabilities, limitations, and intentions that are crucial for commanders to conduct military operations. During tactical operations, DOMEX may provide time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value to facilitate follow-on tactical operations.

PRODUCING INTELLIGENCE

4-1. Intelligence personnel apply intelligence analysis techniques and procedures to extract, understand, and report information of intelligence value from collected and processed information. An initial analysis occurs at or near the point of collection and processing. This initial analysis focuses primarily on identifying facts, evaluating a source’s reliability, and evaluating a single source’s information for accuracy. Subsequent analysis and intelligence production use information from multiple information sources. At each point in the transformation of information into intelligence, analysts at each echelon assess, extract, analyze, and report information and intelligence to their supported command in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements.

4-2. At brigade and above, processing and producing intelligence requires analysts to perform the tasks listed in figure 4-1.

 IDENTIFY AND EXTRACT REPORTABLE INFORMATION

4-3. A quick assessment of a document (performed during the screening and categorizing tasks of the DOMEX process) identifies reportable information, such as immediate threats, and extracts information of immediate tactical value. Documents are assessed on their relevance to the commander’s critical information requirements. Documents that satisfy collection requirements are evaluated for time sensitivity and credibility. Once identified, time-sensitive information is immediately disseminated before further processing. Document assessment at the tactical level is referred to as tactical or hasty exploitation.

4-4. An assessment performed at higher echelons often involves extensive research, which can be difficult because of the increased volume of available information. Regardless of the level, personnel who assess information must relate their efforts to the unit’s mission to avoid wasted time and effort and to identify any reportable information.

4-5. Captured enemy documents (CEDs) can be a valuable source of information—oftentimes providing more information than a person being questioned. These documents can have significant intelligence value either to the capturing unit, adjacent units, or at higher echelons. CEDs may also provide evidence for use during legal proceedings against suspected criminals.

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4-6. CEDs can provide crucial information related to answering commander’s critical information requirements. They are analyzed together with other pieces of information to gain an understanding of an overall situation. CEDs may potentially provide information on the adversary’s intentions and planning (including deception), leadership, dispositions, tactics, communications, logistics, morale, intelligence requirements and assessments, propaganda efforts, and funding. Human intelligence collectors often use CEDs when preparing to screen and interrogate detainees.

4-7. Information that may be derived from a CED during assessment includes but is not limited to—

- Composition (hierarchy, type of unit).
- Disposition (location—past, current, anticipated).
- Tactics (intent, propaganda, modus operandi).
- Training and unit history (individual, unit, source of training).
- Logistics (food, transportation, fuel).
- Operational effectiveness (strength, goals, morale, equipment).
- Electronic technical data or communications (emitter types, frequencies, Internet use).
- Intelligence (surveillance, countersurveillance, deception).
- Recruitment (local, national, regional, use of coercion).
- Support (financial, media, sources).
- Reach (databases, assets, connectivity, and architecture).
- National agencies (loyalties, leadership, capabilities).
- Law enforcement agencies (relationship with military, loyalties, capabilities).
- International agencies and nongovernmental organizations (loyalties, agenda, leadership).
- Personality (key leaders, education level, idiosyncrasies).
- Other threats (natural diseases, biohazards, radiological, chemical hazards).

EVALUATE SOURCE RELIABILITY

4-8. Analysts evaluate the reliability of a source providing information based on previous reporting, collection, and processing of DOMEX team comments. Table 4-1 lists source reliability ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Source reliability ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Usually reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Fairly reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Not usually reliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Unreliable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cannot be judged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-9. If a source has not provided documents in the past, then the DOMEX team gives the source an “F” reliability rating. An F rating does not necessarily mean the source is unreliable, but that the DOMEX team has no previous experience with the source to determine the source’s reliability. For a CED discovered on the battlefield or in the possession of a detainee, the type and origin of the document may carry more weight in determining reliability than the source of the document itself. For example, a handwritten note with apparent contact information may be judged as “fairly reliable” when considered with other factors such as the circumstances of capture, location, and the condition of the document.
4-10. If a document is extracted from an enemy computer, then the computer may be the source and the analytical process may form the following questions:

- Who had access to the computer?
- Did high- and low-level fighters have computer access?
- If a low-level fighter created the document, did that fighter have access that supports the information?

4-11. If the source of a document is an open source, such as a local newspaper, it must be determined whether the source is objective or is a known platform for the enemy—one that only prints what supports the enemy and the enemy’s war efforts. Determining source reliability can be easy or difficult; regardless, as new information becomes available, continuous analysis is necessary.

4-12. Since a CED is usually for an enemy’s use, CEDs are usually truthful and accurate. In some cases, falsified documents have fallen into enemy hands as a means of deception, but these cases are not common. Normal policy dictates not relying on single-source information. Following this policy prevents this type of deception from being effective.

4-13. A CED can provide a portion of a larger body of information. Each CED, much like a piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence, technical data and political indicators of importance to strategic- and national-level agencies can be extracted from CEDs. CEDs are often time-sensitive; therefore, they must be quickly screened for possible exploitation.

4-14. At times, a friendly source provides a document with information critical to an ongoing operation. In these cases, the friendly source’s identity should remain anonymous; otherwise, the friendly source’s life may be endangered. A friendly source of information could be an individual who walks to a friendly base and provides written or verbal information or an individual who works with a human intelligence collection team. Regardless of the type of friendly source, procedures should be in place to protect information about any friendly source.

**EVALUATE INFORMATION ACCURACY**

4-15. In addition to evaluating the reliability of a source of information, the DOMEX team also evaluates the accuracy of the information based on previous reports from that source and information from other sources. Table 4-2 lists information accuracy ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Confirmed by other independent sources; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Probably true Not confirmed; logical in itself; consistent with other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Possibly true Not confirmed; reasonably logical in itself; agrees with some other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Doubtfully true Not confirmed; possible but not logical; no other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improbable Not confirmed; not logical in itself; contradicted by other information on the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cannot be judged No basis exists for evaluating the validity of the information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-16. If information is new, the DOMEX team gives the information a “6” information accuracy rating. A six rating does not necessarily mean the information is inaccurate, but that the DOMEX team has no means of verifying the information. Information accuracy determination is more systematic than reliable. For example, if a document references an attack, did the attack unfold as depicted in the document? If yes, then one can determine the document information to be accurate. This determination is important because it may substantiate the assumption that the information a detainee reveals is also accurate. Information accuracy and reliability is critical because it determines if the information can be used by the warfighter. It is a careful and deliberate process that takes thoughtful analysis.
ANALYZE INFORMATION

4-17. DOMEX team analysts evaluate processed information that meets the reporting criteria. Analysts must readily identify activity indicators, pieces of information that could contribute to answering requirements. The analysis of the processed information varies based on the DOMEX team’s mission, capabilities, and time available. At a minimum, the team identifies and reports the basic facts (who, what, when, where, why, and how) from the information based on information requirements. If the analysts have the time, target knowledge, and situational awareness, then they can use analysis techniques and procedures to reach conclusions about the meaning of the information. The analyst can solve problems through deductive and inductive reasoning. (See TC 2-33.4.)

4-18. Analysis, in terms of DOMEX, typically means comparing screening forms and gist, summary, partial, and full translations against collection requirements to identify information of intelligence value. Analysis includes factoring in the current situation; collection requirements; past, present, and future operations; and any information that may help focus the requirements.

USE ANALYTICAL TOOLS

4-19. Intelligence analysts use many tools to assist them in determining enemy intentions and future actions. (See TC 2-33.4.) These tools include but are not limited to—

- Incident overlays.
- Pattern analysis plotting charts.
- Time event charts.
- Association and activities matrices.
- Link diagrams.

INCIDENT OVERLAY

4-20. An incident overlay provides historical, cumulative information on trends and patterns of opposition or enemy activity. Properly maintained, an incident overlay’s entries enable the intelligence analyst to make judgments about—

- The nature and location of opposition or enemy targets.
- The relative intensity of opposition interest in specific areas.
- Adversary control over the population.
- Adversary support from the population.
- Potential opposition areas or enemy operations.

4-21. While it is useful to gauge spatial patterns, the incident overlay can also provide a clear, visual representation of chronological patterns.

PATTERN ANALYSIS PLOTTING SHEET

4-22. The pattern analysis plotting sheet shows patterns in time. It helps the analyst identify when the enemy force tends to conduct specific types of activities. By analyzing the patterns, the intelligence staff can better anticipate upcoming attacks and likely targets. The intelligence staff may possibly draw conclusions about the enemy force’s vulnerabilities and capabilities.

TIME EVENT CHART

4-23. The time event chart serves as a chronological record of an individual’s or group’s activities designed to store and display large amounts of information. It is a tool that helps reverse-engineer incidents to determine threat operating patterns. For example, a time event chart can show that an improvised explosive device activity occurs every day between 0100 to 0400 hours. When these indicators occur, the analyst can reverse-engineer the sequence to estimate when the next likely incident may occur.
ASSOCIATION MATRIX

4-24. An association matrix depicts contact between individuals. When using this tool, analysts cross-reference the names of individuals and mark known or suspected associations in a cross-linked square. The association matrix is most effective when used to understand associations between individuals and subsequently insurgent and terrorist groups.

ACTIVITIES MATRIX

4-25. An activities matrix only depicts relationships between individuals and activities. For example, whereas an association matrix depicts the association between two individuals, the activities matrix depicts that they are engaged in particular activities.

LINK DIAGRAM

4-26. Link diagrams combine the information in association and activities matrices into a single graphic. It depicts how individuals and functional groupings of individuals are connected. For example, if an analyst does not know the connection between the operational aspects of an insurgency and its sustainment or support elements, a properly developed link diagram clarifies this connection. The link diagram also allows an analyst to determine which individuals are critical to the functioning of the organization, thus allowing development of high-payoff targets for targeting consistent with rules of engagement.

ASSESS REPORTING

4-27. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel continuously assess reporting to ensure analytical products are satisfying the specific information requirements and reporting guidance in the command’s collection requirements. Ideally, the team’s efforts enable the anticipation of requirements and delivery of information to the tactical commander in time to influence decisions and actions:

- **Evaluating reports.** The DOMEX team screens reports for—
  - Timeliness, completeness, and accuracy.
  - Their relevance to the command’s collection requirements.
- **Integrating information.** The DOMEX team uses the reported information to confirm or deny information collected by other intelligence sources.
- **Providing feedback.** After evaluating the reports, the DOMEX team provides feedback to the processing teams on what to sustain or adjust in their processing, analysis, and reporting.

UPDATE DATABASES

4-28. After the analysis of CED batches, the National Harmony Database is updated with any new information. Other databases containing standardized CED files are updated as well.

4-29. Without databases, information is difficult or impossible to retrieve quickly, especially under adverse conditions. Databases support many complex analytical functions and requirements, including—

- Mission deconfliction.
- Requests for information.
- Summary reports and assessment preparation.
- Threat and friendly situation tracking.
- Analysis and requirements management.
- Targeting.
4-30. Additionally, databases—
   ● Support analytical tools, such as time event charts, association matrices, and link diagrams.
   ● Require a designated systems administrator at each echelon to verify the metadata for accuracy and completeness, which ensures a high degree of integrity. Without accurate metadata, databases cannot be easily searched for their information.
   ● Allow operators, managers, and analysts to—
     ▪ Compartment (protect) source-sensitive, operational database segments, files, records, and fields.
     ▪ Create, update, and maintain databases from locally generated information.
     ▪ Import complete or partial databases from larger or peer databases.
     ▪ Export complete or partial databases to peer or larger databases.
     ▪ Share data and databases between peers, subordinates, or higher echelons with the appropriate access authorization.
   ● Provide systematic processing and automated parsing using standardized forms in intelligence operations that are automatically parsed into appropriate databases for information storing, sharing, retrieval, and analysis.
   ● Allow query functions for decisionmaking, as well as for operational and analytical support.
   ● Provide analytical programs that are able to correlate data. This facilitates information retrieval from any data repository.
   ● Incorporate information retrieval functions, such as browsing, keyword searching, and similar functions.
Chapter 5

Reporting and Dissemination Phase

Information collected from captured enemy documents (CEDs) is normally reported in accordance with unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and reporting guidance. Reporting involves placing extracted information into a coherent, properly formatted report to facilitate the commander’s situational understanding.

COLLECTED INFORMATION

5-1. At brigade and above, reporting and disseminating information collected from CEDs requires analysts to perform the tasks listed in figure 5-1.

![Figure 5-1. Reporting and dissemination phase](image)

REPORT INFORMATION

5-2. Document and media exploitation (DOMEX) teams and intelligence staffs are responsible for reporting information derived from CEDs in a manner that ensures the information reaches not only the next higher echelon but also any tactical commander affected by the information.

*Note.* DOMEX teams and intelligence staffs are responsible for pushing information back down to the lowest echelons to ensure there is feedback to maneuver units on whether the CEDs were used, reviewed, or contained actionable intelligence.

5-3. Intelligence reports are typically forwarded electronically or as otherwise directed by unit SOPs and operational instructions. Normally an electronic or hardcopy file of each report is—

- Maintained at the unit of origin.
- Submitted through intelligence reporting channels.
- Forwarded with evacuated documents to the next unit who receives the documents to prevent redundant reporting.

*Note.* When a collector includes intelligence derived from CEDs in an intelligence report, the report must reference all identification letters and numbers, including the Harmony numbers of the CED concerned, to avoid false confirmation.

5-4. Report formats include (reporting through other formats is discouraged)—

- Spot report (standardized report).
- Intelligence information report (IIR) or tactical report.
- Batch report.
- Analytical summary.
SPOT REPORT

5-5. Spot reports are used at each echelon to ensure the timely reporting of time-sensitive information. Although the precise format for a spot report is in accordance with unit SOPs, the standard spot report is in the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) format. (See figure 2-2, page 2-4.) Each element, activity, or echelon receiving CEDs is responsible for ascertaining whether the time-sensitive information has been previously reported before a spot report is issued, which prevents redundant reporting. A copy of each spot report is forwarded with the original CED as it is evacuated through intelligence channels.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

5-6. The IIR is widely used by the intelligence community. At higher echelons, or as time allows, intelligence information is reported using an IIR, which is typically generated at a DOMEX facility, such as a joint document exploitation center (JDEC) or joint interrogation and debriefing center, and staffed with report writers. Writing IIRs at the tactical level is not usually feasible since IIRs can be time-consuming and often require extensive editing and coordination with the reports officer.

BATCH REPORT

5-7. Once a batch of CEDs has been exploited, it is normally prepared at brigade and above in accordance with unit SOPs. Batch reports are the key to providing CED feedback to maneuver units after CEDs are evacuated through intelligence channels. Batch reports should be prepared in a manner that effectively communicates the relevance of the captured item. For example, DOMEX teams or processing site personnel must appropriately label any photographs or sketches that require explanation or emphasis.

5-8. Tactical units should receive their DOMEX feedback, such as a batch report, within a reasonable amount of time in accordance with unit SOPs. Tactical units requiring additional feedback on materiel captured in their area of operations initiate requests for information through their intelligence staff. The intelligence staff should be in possession of CED serial numbers and batch names to assist in locating this information.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

5-9. Tactical commanders, analysts, interrogators, and capturing and adjacent units often require an analytical summary of captured materials related to a particular batch of CEDs. The intelligence staff is responsible for disseminating the analytical summary via the batch report, thus giving consumers the ability to access the National Harmony Database record, including linked translation reports. The format for an analytical summary is in accordance with unit SOPs. The summary must be disseminated quickly to capitalize on information related to follow-on operations.

REPORTING GUIDELINES

5-10. DOMEX personnel should consider timely, relevant, and complete information when preparing, submitting, and using intelligence reports.

Timely Information

5-11. DOMEX personnel must remember that timely reporting, especially of enemy activity, is critical. They must report accurate information as quickly as possible and not delay reports for administrative reasons, such as assuring the correct format.

Relevant Information

5-12. Reports should contain only relevant information—information that supports decision making and the conduct of operations. Limiting reports to essential information reduces the amount of time and effort subordinates must spend on collecting, organizing, and transmitting reports. Also, DOMEX personnel
should send only the parts or lines of a report that contain new information or changes. As in radio communications, brevity reduces transmission time and avoids overloading radio nets.

**Complete Information**

5-13. Most reports have prescribed formats to ensure completeness of transmitted information. Unit SOPs should outline the format for each report. They should also explain how personnel can use each report and under what conditions to submit it.

**ASSESS REPORTING**

5-14. As mentioned in chapter 4, paragraph 4-27, the task of assessing reporting is a continuous process. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel continues to assess reporting in the reporting and dissemination phase of the DOMEX process to ensure reporting is satisfying the specific information requirements as they change. Ideally, the team’s efforts enable it to anticipate requirements and deliver information to the tactical commander in time to influence decisions and actions. As new information becomes available—

- The accuracy of the information can change to more or less accurate.
- Additional recipients of the information may be identified based on changing battlefield situations.
- Analysts can receive feedback or make adjustments in their analysis.

**DISSEMINATE REPORTING**

5-15. Dissemination need not be limited to standard reporting. Depending upon the tactical situation, available resources, and the commander’s critical information requirements, critical pieces of information are passed quickly to those who can use them—specifically affected commanders. The intelligence staff must be prepared to use any form of communication to disseminate vital information. Again, intelligence staffs are responsible for reporting and disseminating information derived from CEDs in a manner that ensures the information reaches not only the next higher echelon but also any tactical commander affected by the information. DOMEX teams or intelligence staffs are responsible for pushing information back down to the lowest echelons to ensure there is feedback to maneuver units on whether the CEDs were used, reviewed, or contained actionable intelligence.

**CURRENT METHODOLOGY**

5-16. The DOMEX team or processing site personnel disseminate the original document or a copy, transcript, or combination of these documents to joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. At the tactical level, the DOMEX support team at brigade or processing site personnel send most documents to the division or corps DOMEX element or the JDEC. At operational levels, DOMEX teams send processed documents and media to the JDEC, the central theater processing point that ensures the dissemination of information to the intelligence community. For transcripts and translations, DOMEX teams use a free-flow message, a format in the translation software tool, or a translation format specified in annex B of the operation order (OPORD). The DOMEX team or processing site personnel process and upload digital forms of all original documents and processed information to the National Harmony Database, thereby making them available to the entire intelligence community as well as to brigade and lower echelons.

5-17. A detailed batch report containing a copy of the translation should accompany the original document; a copy of the translation should accompany any copies of the original document and, as required, the intelligence reports. For a recorded audio and video document, a transcript as well as translation should accompany the original audio and video document. A batch report should contain the following information:

- Identity of the element to which the report will be sent.
- Identity of the element that prepared the report.
Chapter 5

- Date-time group (DTG) of the document translation.
- Report number as designated by unit SOPs.
- Harmony numbers assigned to exploited documents.
- Document serial numbers taken from the captured materials tag.
- Document descriptions, including type of document or media, number of pages, physical construction of the document, and enemy identification number, if applicable.
- Original captured document language.
- DTG document was received at element preparing the report.
- DTG document was captured.
- Location document was captured.
- Identity of capturing unit.
- Circumstances under which document was captured.
- Name of translator.
- Type of translation—full, extract, summary, or gist.
- Remarks section for clarifying or explaining (include the identification of the portions of the document translated in an extract translation).
- Classification and downgrading instructions in accordance with AR 380-5.

WEB-BASED REPORTING

5-18. Web-based reporting is an effective technique for posting reports and transcripts, audio and video files, and technical data for multiple users within and outside the area of operations. Through various Web sites—such as Harmony, Media Exploitation, and Detainee Tracker—the DOMEX team provides units with the status of CEDs as well as links to associated reporting. The DOMEX team can also provide collection team personnel with access to online databases, including target databases that help them detect, identify, and locate their targets.

5-19. Dissemination is in accordance with unit SOPs and other guidelines. Posting via Web sites and reporting via batch reports help ensure that maneuver elements receive time-sensitive information in a timely manner. However, these methods require maneuver units to search for feedback (pull) rather than receive the information as disseminated from higher echelons (push). The most effective means for the lowest echelons to receive feedback on CEDs related to their area of operations is for the intelligence staff or battalion- or brigade-level DOMEX teams to track the location, status, and products associated with those CEDs. Tracking may be readily accomplished using batch names and numbers, Harmony numbers, or the detainee tracking system (a database listing detainees and such information as their names, dates of birth, and items captured on the detainees).

UPLOAD REPORTS TO THE NATIONAL HARMONY DATABASE

5-20. Once completed, all reports must be uploaded to the National Harmony Database and any other relevant databases. This ensures all authorized users have access to the information. Databases allow users to retrieve reports, share information, search for information regarding a certain topic or area, and research historical data. The National Harmony Database contains all reports generated from CEDs, thus allowing for easy access to any updates on reports.

EVACUATE FOR FURTHER PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, OR DISPOSITION

5-21. CEDs are processed for information at each element having contact with the documents. Once each element has exploited the CEDs, the documents are evacuated to the next higher echelon until they reach the JDEC—the final collection point for all CEDs collected in a theater of operations.
5-22. In the event that CEDs cannot be evacuated in a timely manner, verified copies of translation reports can be forwarded separately from the original documents to an exploitation agency. This action is annotated in the captured materials log or evidence property custody document.
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Chapter 6

Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Exploitation Structure

Recent military operations have seen numerous tactical, operational, and strategic organizations involved in document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations—from capturing units and brigade combat teams (BCTs) to theater and Department of Defense (DOD) elements. These organizations contribute to the decisionmaker’s visualization and situational understanding of the area of operations. Commanders use information derived from DOMEX to conduct military operations.

DOMEX REQUIREMENTS

6-1. Requirements for DOMEX operations at the tactical level are similar to requirements at the operational and strategic levels. The number of personnel required to conduct DOMEX operations varies with the echelon and with the volume of documents. Regardless of the size of the operation, when task-organizing for DOMEX operations, units should consider the following tasks as the basis for manning, organizing, and accomplishing DOMEX missions:

● Command and control. Command and control organizations—
  ■ Provide management and oversight of subordinate collection, processing, and production elements.
  ■ Have knowledge about DOMEX operations and requirements management.
  ■ Have the skills and knowledge necessary to synchronize collection and production within their organizations and between echelons.
  ■ Understand the DOMEX collection and processing capabilities of intelligence and nonintelligence units within the supported commands.
  ■ Ensure all aspects of DOMEX operations—accountability, screening, security requirements, translation, exploitation, and reporting—are functioning properly.
  ■ Ensure adherence to policy and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); intelligence oversight; and synchronization and deconfliction.
  ■ May have additional authority and training in languages or in contracting linguists to support DOMEX operations. This task is generally accomplished by a military intelligence (MI) officer and a senior MI noncommissioned officer.

● Accountability. See paragraphs 1-13 through 1-16.

● Screening. See paragraphs 3-22 through 3-27.

● Security requirements. See paragraphs 3-34 and 3-35.

● Translation. See paragraphs 3-41 through 3-51.

● Exploitation. This task includes the identification and extraction of information in response to collection requirements and requires a high level of expertise. (See paragraphs 4-3 through 4-7.)

● Reporting. See chapter 5.

6-2. In the absence of dedicated DOMEX teams, organic assets can be task-organized to support DOMEX missions. However, commanders are increasingly using augmentees from the Army and other Services with MI or linguistic backgrounds to perform these tasks.
TASK-ORGANIZING DOMEX TEAMS

6-3. DOMEX teams are task-organized based on theater and national intelligence requirements, tactical and operational force structures, threat environments, and assigned missions and roles. The corps or joint document exploitation center (JDEC) can organize DOMEX teams from its organic assets to meet immediate requirements of echelons without DOMEX support. These teams may be attached to maneuver elements and can deploy forward or support sustainment area units as required.

6-4. DOMEX assets and other assets assigned to a DOMEX effort may consist of multi-Service and interagency components such as—
- Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps intelligence personnel.
- Foreign materiel exploitation teams.
- Explosive ordnance disposal teams.
- Chemical and biological intelligence support teams.
- Media exploitation personnel.
- Medical exploitation teams.
- Hazardous material transportation office personnel.
- Combined explosives exploitation cell personnel.
- Weapons intelligence teams.

6-5. DOMEX teams are normally found at theater- and national-level organizations. However, the overwhelming volume of DOMEX-related captured materials acquired during recent military operations, and their potential for providing information of immediate tactical value, have created the need for ad hoc exploitation teams to fulfill a variety of DOMEX tasks at brigade and lower echelons.

DOMEX ELEMENTS IN RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS

6-6. For DOMEX products to be a force multiplier, the rapid exploitation of captured materials must occur at the lowest echelon possible. Where tactical assets are insufficient, operational and strategic assets can support a unit’s organic assets, either by personnel augmentation or by virtual or long-distance support from DOMEX support elements worldwide.

*Note.* Planning identifies the specific requirements for the DOMEX element at each echelon. Commanders must allow for the augmentation of DOMEX teams with all MI specialties and non-MI personnel as directed by the mission.

6-7. Recent military operations have necessitated tactical DOMEX operations to augment their DOMEX teams to handle and process high volumes of captured materials. The composition of augmentation elements varies with the nature of the site and available resources. They can comprise a combination of Army, joint, and interagency personnel.

6-8. The following teams were established due to recent military operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom in response to requests for forces:
- DOMEX intelligence teams at battalion.
- DOMEX support teams at brigade.
- Division DOMEX management team.
- Corps DOMEX support element.
- Raid support team (RST).
- Multifunctional teams (MFTs).
DOMEX INTELLIGENCE TEAM AT BATTALION

6-9. DOMEX intelligence teams at battalion, task-organized during recent military operations, have provided the tactical commander a means to rapidly process large volumes of captured enemy documents (CEDs). DOMEX teams comprise MI personnel assigned to the battalion intelligence staff specially trained to perform the DOMEX mission. Depending on how the capturing unit or exploitation team collected the CEDs, the DOMEX team at battalion may be the first echelon that establishes proper chain of custody documents and procedures.

6-10. As part of the battalion intelligence staff, DOMEX team responsibilities and capabilities include—
- Performing the initial assessment and rapid analysis of CEDs.
- Providing appropriate translations of CEDs.
- Extracting time-sensitive information of immediate tactical value from the CEDs and reporting the information that directly pertains to the battalion commander’s critical information requirements.
- Quickly categorizing CEDs to facilitate their evacuation to higher echelons for further exploitation and dissemination to the entire intelligence community.
- Ensuring the chain of custody is established and maintained to preserve the intelligence and judiciary value of CEDs.
- Assisting in shaping the collection focus of future tactical operations.
- Promoting site exploitation and DOMEX awareness to the supported commander.
- Performing liaison between supported command and higher echelon DOMEX activities.
- Immediately evacuating digital and communications devices to specialized elements with the capability to exploit them.

6-11. Typically, digital media and communications devices contain valuable information that can be time-consuming to exploit. Depending on the tactical mission in some specialized organizations, media exploitation and communications technology resources may be co-located with the DOMEX team at battalion to further expedite the exploitation of electronic media.

6-12. The DOMEX team’s most significant responsibility is to provide tactical units with reporting that summarizes the intelligence value of captured materials collected from the captured site and is relevant to their area of operations. The reporting could be in the form of an analytical summary, a batch report, or other reporting in accordance with unit standing operating procedures (SOPs). Whenever possible, DOMEX reports, analytical products, and translations are returned to the capturing unit expeditiously to facilitate follow-on tactical operations.

DOMEX SUPPORT TEAM AT BRIGADE

6-13. DOMEX support teams at brigade conduct all DOMEX functions, including translations and more in-depth analysis in response to brigade requirements. The brigade may be the first echelon with the resources to process and format CEDs and associated reports for entry into the National Harmony Database. DOMEX support teams ensure timely dissemination of CEDs and associated reports to the division DOMEX support team and the corps DOMEX support element via electronic network, and they facilitate the transport of captured materials to specialized facilities for further exploitation.

6-14. DOMEX support teams at brigade are responsible for—
- Tactical exploitation of CEDs to support ongoing tactical and detainee operations.
- Processing all CEDs through all phases of the DOMEX process.
- Managing and tracking the flow of CEDs.
- Disseminating DOMEX-derived intelligence to the supported tactical commander.
- Disseminating DOMEX products and reporting to the DOMEX support team and corps DOMEX support element.
- Uploading all DOMEX products and digitized CEDs into the National Harmony Database.
• Providing analytical expertise in accessing the National Harmony Database to search, identify, and forward DOMEX-derived intelligence pertinent to the supported tactical commander’s area of operations.
• Maintaining chain of custody to support evidence handling procedures.
• Providing support for site exploitation operations, as needed.

6-15. Forward deployment of tactical DOMEX teams is a combat multiplier. The command and support relationships of tactical DOMEX teams must be clear to brigade and division commanders in order to ensure proper support and employment of the teams. Logistic support to a DOMEX support team at brigade includes—
• Adequate workspace.
• Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) connectivity for the media exploitation technician.
• Administrative computers for SIPRNET and NIPRNET.
• Phones with Secure Voice over Internet Protocol and Defense Switched Network (DSN) access.
• Billeting.
• Administration on the forward operating base.
• Expendable supplies.

DIVISION DOMEX MANAGEMENT TEAM

6-16. Division DOMEX management teams are located at division to conduct division DOMEX intelligence staff support and analysis. The task-organized division DOMEX management team—
• Ensures the brigade’s DOMEX support teams’ CEDs and associated reports are uploaded into the National Harmony Database and forwarded to the corps DOMEX support element.
• Provides liaison and DOMEX support to the division analysis and control element.
• Provides oversight and coordination to the DOMEX support team at brigade.
• Offers greater access and communications to DOMEX elements in theater of operations.

CORPS DOMEX SUPPORT ELEMENT

6-17. The corps DOMEX support element is an ad hoc organization task-organized to perform in-depth analysis of captured materials in response to theater-specific requirements. Subsequent intelligence reports are delivered to the corps 2X and shared with JDEC. Through the corps 2X, DOMEX-derived intelligence is shared with units in the theater of operations. Corps DOMEX support elements have a more robust capability and the additional requirement to support division teams during surge operations. These operations primarily support such tactical operations as raids and cordon and searches. The size and structure of each element is mission-dependent.

6-18. Corps DOMEX support elements—
• Are responsible for mission requirements based on commander’s critical information requirements in coordination with G-2X.
• Provide DOMEX support and oversight of the DOMEX support team at brigade and the division DOMEX management team.
• Provide logistic, personnel management, and interpreter support.
• Provide liaison between the JDEC and DOMEX support teams at brigade and division DOMEX management teams, as well as other agencies.
• Provide RST assets, as necessary.
• Provide the file transfer protocol link for transfer of documents into the National Harmony Database, as necessary.
• Are responsible for providing DOMEX operations training to maneuver units in a theater of operations.
RAID SUPPORT TEAM

6-19. An RST is designed to reduce the burden on a capturing unit due to a surge of suspected high-yield materials by assisting in exploiting a captured site, facilitating the rapid extraction of information from captured materials, and enabling the priority evacuation of important documents to higher echelons. The size of an RST is mission-dependent; it comprises organized detachments from multiple DOMEX elements assembled to augment existing unit resources for a limited time. The RST may come from higher echelons when coordinated through the corps DOMEX support element. Based on the nature of the captured materials, technical specialists, such as digital media or communications experts, may augment the RST.

MULTIFUNCTIONAL TEAM

6-20. An MFT is an element task-organized in accordance with mission requirements. For example, recent military operations have highlighted the need for specially trained and equipped Soldiers to exploit captured materials, prioritize exploitation efforts, and be familiar with forensics and evidentiary issues required to support priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and drive follow-on operations.

6-21. MI battalions and BCT MI companies may task-organize MFTs to provide multidisciplined collection, exploitation, and limited analysis to generate information of immediate tactical value and to detect, track, and locate targets. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, MFTs typically comprised elements in their areas of expertise—human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and site exploitation. However, in accordance with mission requirements, the MFTs comprised any element necessary to exploit the site.

6-22. MFTs can perform the following DOMEX-related tasks:

- Use manual translation and scanners to extract key information to support high-value individual questioning. Collectors then pass that information and adjust collection plans as necessary.
- Apply computer forensics techniques, using laptop and desktop computers with software programs, to extract intelligence from media storage devices to support questioning of detainees.

6-23. Commanders may task-organize an MFT into smaller elements to operate independently with the supported maneuver unit—depending on mission requirements—and then bring those elements back together, as required, to leverage the MFT’s multidisciplined capabilities.

ARmY ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING DOMEx

6-24. The following Army organizations offer capabilities to support DOMEX operations:

- MI battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade.
- MI brigade at theater army.
- MI battalion (interrogation).
- Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
- National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION OF THE BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

6-25. The MI battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade provides multi-intelligence organic collection capability to the division. The MI battalion is responsible for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management of organic and attached SIGINT, imagery intelligence, HUMINT, counterintelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence capabilities. Through its collection and exploitation company, the MI battalion has the capability to conduct military source operations and interrogations, as well as detect, identify, and neutralize the adversary’s intelligence operations. When not required to conduct its primary mission of military source operations and interrogations, the HUMINT collection teams may be tasked to support DOMEX operations.
Military Intelligence Brigade at Theater Army

6-26. There are five MI brigades at theater armies operating under the administrative control of INSCOM and under the operational control of the Army Service component commands (ASCCs) of their respective geographic combatant commands. (These ASCCs are called theater armies.) Each MI brigade includes a forward collection battalion with a HUMINT company that has one DOMEX team. Additionally, an Army Reserve theater support battalion, which also includes a HUMINT company with one DOMEX team, is assigned to the MI Reserve Command and operationally aligned to each MI brigade at theater army.

Note. As a rule, the DOMEX capability of an INSCOM MI brigade at theater army is limited. The DOMEX capability focuses on supporting internal brigade HUMINT collection activities; it is not designed to support a JDEC in a theater of operations.

Military Intelligence Battalion (Interrogation)

6-27. The Army established an MI battalion (interrogation) specifically designed to operate as the Army component of a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC). The MI battalion (interrogation) includes a HUMINT analysis and requirements detachment with a DOMEX team as a component of that detachment. The DOMEX team is designed to perform DOMEX and analysis at the joint task force (JTF)-level JIDC. The DOMEX team performs the following functions:

- Coordinates document exploitation with the JDEC in a theater of operations.
- Translates, screens, categorizes, and exploits CEDs and other source documents.
- Tracks and logs CEDs and other source documents.
- Determines the significance and reliability of incoming information; assists in integrating incoming information with current intelligence.
- Inputs intelligence information into the national databases for use by the intelligence community.
- Trains subordinates to support interrogation, screening, and analysis and fusion operations.

6-28. When an MI battalion (interrogation) deploys to support a JIDC, DOMEX team personnel assigned to the HUMINT analysis and requirements detachment are task-organized under the JIDC J-3 to perform their mission as part of the joint exploitation cell. The joint exploitation cell identifies detainees for further exploitation to satisfy the JTF commander’s intelligence collection requirements through the execution of face-to-face screening of detainees and through the exploitation of detainee property (CEDs or captured enemy materiel [CEM]).

Army Intelligence and Security Command

6-29. The Army has vested its intelligence at the operational level with INSCOM, the direct reporting unit responsible for the Army’s intelligence forces above corps. INSCOM’s mission is to conduct multidisciplined intelligence operations for military commanders and national decisionmakers. INSCOM’s strategy is to provide critical information and information capabilities to Army commanders. INSCOM provides a globally focused, rapidly deployable, knowledge-based, adaptable force-packaged capability and supports commanders and leaders with timely and relevant intelligence at the decision point. INSCOM serves as the national-to-tactical intelligence bridge.

National Ground Intelligence Center

6-30. NGIC is a major subordinate command of INSCOM and the home of the Army DOMEX program. The Army DOMEX program office is part of the Media Exploitation Division under the Collection and Exploitation Directorate. The Media Exploitation Division provides management and oversight to and execution of the Army DOMEX program, the National Harmony Database, and the Facilities, Infrastructure, and Engineering Systems program. The Army DOMEX program standardizes and facilitates
the DOMEX process for theaters of operations worldwide. The Army DOMEX program’s mobile training effort provides instruction to support tactical DOMEX TTP.

6-31. The Army DOMEX program provides—

- Direct DOMEX support to the warfighter through deployed military and contract personnel at brigade, division, and theater or corps levels.
- Deployable DOMEX-system hardware for mobile DOMEX teams.
- 2X staff officers and DOMEX support teams to multinational divisions, special operations forces, and selected multinational units.

6-32. The Army DOMEX program capabilities also include—

- Directing translation support for theater-of-operations PIRs via the Army Reserve Language Support Program.
- Assisting units in the development of site exploitation and DOMEX SOPs and TTP.
- Providing references and recommendations for deployed DOMEX teams.
- Evaluating unit DOMEX procedures for accuracy and timeliness.
- Providing training support and participation in related peacetime training activities, such as exercises and war games where DOMEX or site exploitation operations apply.
- Providing DOMEX coordination and operational support.

National Ground Intelligence Center Reserve Component Augmentation

6-33. NGIC integrates the Reserve Components into its production mission. The integration consists of drilling individual mobilization augmentees and six MI groups. The MI groups comprise 22 MI detachments with a total authorized strength of 352 Soldiers. NGIC has support relationships with the 203d MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence [TECHINT]) (Multi-Compo), the 629th MI Battalion (National Guard Bureau, Communications Electronic Warfare Intelligence), and the 300th MI Brigade (Linguist). Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers provide an invaluable service to NGIC and have been integrated within the various directorates. They perform analysis, production, materiel exploitation, TECHINT, translation, and DOMEX missions in the continental United States and while forward deployed.

203d Military Intelligence Battalion (Technical Intelligence)

6-34. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT), directly subordinate to the MI Readiness Command, is a multicomponent organization with a long history of TECHINT collection and exploitation. It is headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and is the Army’s only TECHINT battalion. The Regular Army Soldiers assigned to the battalion are NGIC’s tactical arm. As such, they are prepared to deploy worldwide on very short notice to support TECHINT missions. The Soldiers assist in executing foreign materiel testing and training under NGIC’s oversight. Reserve Component Soldiers are prepared to mobilize and deploy worldwide with advance warning to support TECHINT missions and to establish a captured materiel exploitation center (CMEC). They are also prepared to augment the Regular Army Soldiers in their tasks.

6-35. The CMEC, which can serve as a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC), provides direct support to theater of operations commanders through the intelligence staff. The specialized teams in the CMEC monitor materiel handling and evacuation and answer the commander’s PIRs regarding foreign equipment. (See chapter 7 for more information on the JCMEC.)

6-36. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is subordinate to INSCOM during contingencies and while at war. In peacetime, the 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) is under the training supervision of NGIC. NGIC provides training guidance and approves the battalion’s mission-essential task list, which is unique in mission and structure. The mission is two-fold and provides battlefield TECHINT with foreign equipment systems derived from the physical examination of equipment and materiel. This analysis provides indicators of the enemy’s readiness, capabilities, and intentions.
6-37. The 203d MI Battalion (TECHINT) performs the following functions:

- Analyzes and exploits CEDs, foreign equipment, weapon systems, and other war materiel.
- Performs TECHINT collection and reporting to support validated scientific and technical intelligence objectives.
- Acts as the Headquarters, Department of the Army is executive agent for foreign materiel used for training purposes.
- Performs TECHINT training for DOD analysts and Reserve Component TECHINT personnel.
- Supports INSCOM’s foreign materiel acquisition and foreign materiel exploitation operations as directed.
- Reports on the capabilities and limitations of enemy combat materiel.
- Provides reports alerting the command of the tactical threat posed by technical advances in new or recently discovered foreign or enemy materiel.
- Provides countermeasures to any enemy technical advantage.
- Provides foreign or enemy equipment for troop familiarization and training.
- Provides recommendations on the reuse of CEM.
- Supervises the evacuation of items of TECHINT interest.
- Provides task-organized battlefield TECHINT teams to support a subordinate command’s TECHINT effort.

DOMEX PRESENCE AT JOINT FACILITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

6-38. DOMEX operations are present in the following joint facilities and organizations:

- JDEC.
- JIDC.
- Regional DOMEX center.

JOINT DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-39. The JDEC, established by the JDEC Operations Division within the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC), is responsible for in-theater exploitation of CEDs. The JDEC is part of a contingency operating base (with the JCMEC and the JIDC), if introduced, or a HUMINT operations cell. The JDEC is the collection, processing, and dissemination point for CEDs in a theater of operations. It receives, inventories, catalogs, selectively translates, reports, and disseminates all CEDs to theater of operations and national intelligence databases. The size and composition of JDECs are determined by mission factors.

6-40. Directly supporting the joint force J-2, the JDEC is staffed and equipped to—

- Receive CEDs.
- Perform CED screenings.
- Perform CED translations.
- Disseminate intelligence information reports to the intelligence community.
- Provide direct support to site exploitation operations.
- Train unit personnel on tactical and strategic DOMEX operations.

6-41. The JDEC serves as the final collection point for all CEDs collected in a theater of operations. DOMEX elements in a theater of operations send an electronic copy of CEDs, their translations, and all associated reports through DOMEX channels, from the BCT to corps and to the JDEC for inclusion in the theater of operations document database. The JDEC disseminates information to the intelligence community through several databases.

6-42. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) furnishes a core JDEC comprising a staff of technical experts, translators, support personnel, organic ground transportation, power-generating equipment, shelter, furniture, automated data processing communications, and mission-specific equipment. The JDEC has
sufficient dedicated communications to move media electronically to national repositories. The JDEC may require other Service augmentation to meet emerging theater of operations DOMEX requirements. The JDEC is activated during periods of joint force deployments. The joint force J-2 exercises staff responsibility over all matters pertaining to DOMEX.

6-43. The JDEC conducts DOMEX operations to obtain information of theater, strategic, and national value in response to national intelligence requirements, theater-of-operations PIRs, and other requirements. The JDEC may be co-located with the JIDC and can provide the ability to translate, screen, categorize, and exploit all types of detainee property.

JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER

6-44. An echelons above corps military police brigade normally operates a theater internment facility. The joint force commander, with a J-2 staff lead, establishes a JIDC as an activity within the theater internment facility. Normally, the JIDC is administratively and operationally self-sufficient. It functions as part of an overall detainee command and control structure, as outlined in FM 3-39.40 or by policy.

6-45. The JIDC can comprise—
- Facility headquarters.
- Operations element.
- Analysis element.
- Editorial element.
- Interrogation element.
- Screening element.
- DOMEX element.

6-46. In addition to interrogation and debriefing operations, the JIDC includes technical experts and intelligence analysts who exploit CEDs, as applicable, from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and other government agencies.

6-47. The JIDC’s operations element coordinates with the JCMEC to facilitate the rapid exploitation and evacuation of technical documents, media, and materiel that may warrant further, technical exploitation.

6-48. At a minimum, each JIDC contains a small DOMEX element to translate, screen, and extract information from and report on information of intelligence interest from source-associated documents. The JDEC in the theater of operations may be co-located with the JIDC.

REGIONAL DOMEX CENTER

6-49. A combatant commander may establish a regional DOMEX center for targeted DOMEX research and analysis to support joint, intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies within one or more theaters of operations. The center is engaged forward to support deployed forces and the JDEC, and it surges to meet changing national- and operational-level requirements. The center is also a forward deployed element for intratheater transportation of captured materials, information technology, and human resource support. The Combined Media Processing Center-Qatar, located at Camp As Sayliyah, Doha, Qatar, is an example of a regional DOMEX center.

6-50. A regional DOMEX center produces DOMEX intelligence products including—
- Highlights.
- Intelligence information reports.
- Biographical reports.
- Summary reports.
- Multimedia products.
- Analytical support briefs.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS

6-51. DOMEX operations are present in the following DOD organizations:
   - DIA.
   - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).
   - National Security Agency (NSA).

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-52. DIA is a DOD agency and an important member of the U.S. intelligence community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign MI. DIA supports operations across the spectrum of conflict, including—
   - Basic MI.
   - Counterterrorism.
   - Counterdrug.
   - Medical intelligence.
   - Weapons of mass destruction and proliferation.
   - United Nations peacekeeping and multinational support.
   - Missile and space intelligence.
   - Noncombatant evacuation operations.
   - Targeting.
   - Combat assessment.
   - Battle damage assessment.

6-53. DIA provides intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in DOD and the intelligence community to support military contingency planning and operations, and weapons systems acquisition.

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6-54. The NGA mission is to provide timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence and geospatial information to support U.S. national security objectives. NGA’s director advises the Secretary of Defense; Director, Central Intelligence; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the combatant commanders on imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. The Customer Support Office, Operations Directorate is the focal point for interface with external customers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, Services, and national and defense agencies. Units may request that intelligence community organizations, such as the NGA, be called upon to provide specialized techniques and procedures to extract additional information from CEDs, such as audio and video information. However, application of specialized processing techniques and procedures may require the classification of the processed information and restrict its dissemination.

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

6-55. The NSA is a DOD agency that coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. information systems and produce foreign intelligence information. It is also one of the most important centers for foreign language analysis and research within the Government. NSA uses sensitive equipment and techniques to perform exploitation and analysis of specialized captured materials.

6-56. NSA ensures cryptologic planning and support for joint operations. Working with a command’s tactical cryptologic units, NSA provides SIGINT and information assurance that encompasses communications security, computer security, telecommunications support, and operations security. The personnel and equipment providing SIGINT, information security, and operations security comprise the U.S. Cryptologic System. NSA, through the U.S. Cryptologic System, fulfills cryptologic command or
management, readiness, and operational responsibilities to support military operations in accordance with Secretary of Defense taskings, priorities, and standards of timeliness.

NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS WITH DOMEX CAPABILITIES

6-57. The following national-level organizations have DOMEX capabilities:

- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC).
- NMEC.
- JDEC Operations Division, NMEC.
- Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT).

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

6-58. The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the Department of Justice and has primary responsibility for counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. The FBI’s DOMEX capability is the Digital Media Exploitation Unit, which conducts computer analysis and forensics and fingerprint analysis.

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER

6-59. NDIC maintains a domestic DOMEX capability. DOMEX teams support field offices overwhelmed with volumes of perishable data seized during national priority investigations. These DOMEX teams are deployed against targets that have been deemed appropriate by the principal counterdrug operational agencies. Their DOMEX teams help identify hidden assets, previously unknown associates, other related information, and leads for further investigation.

6-60. NDIC’s DOMEX Division supports major federal drug investigations in the United States. In many cases, the division provides investigators with key information and helps them organize their evidence to prepare for prosecution. To help with the processing of evidence, NDIC has developed unique computer software known as Real-time Analytical Intelligence Database (RAID). This software, along with their DOMEX methodology, helps NDIC’s DOMEX Division assist investigators in sorting through what could be hundreds of boxes of evidence and run queries to help find new leads.

NATIONAL MEDIA EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-61. NMEC is the Director of National Intelligence Center composed of the following partner agencies: DIA, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, NSA, and the Defense Collection Coordination Center. DIA is the executive agency for NMEC. In August 2003, NMEC was tasked with the mission to rapidly exploit and share media throughout the intelligence community and to develop standards for its widest dissemination. NMEC establishes procedures for exploitation of documents above combatant command level.

JDEC OPERATIONS DIVISION, NATIONAL MEDIA EXPLOITATION CENTER

6-62. Within NMEC, the JDEC Operations Division is the DOD focal point for forming a JDEC to support contingency operations. The division participates in contingency operations planning and is prepared to deploy trained personnel and appropriate equipment to an area of conflict to establish a JDEC to support operating forces. DIA coordinates with combatant commands for augmentation and support to sustain responsive support to the warfighter. During peacetime, JDEC operations support DOD customers worldwide, including the Defense Attaché Service. In addition to contract translators, DIA draws upon Regular Army and Reserve Component translators from all Services to conduct the DOMEX mission.
**JOINT INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM**

6-63. JITF-CT is the lead national-level intelligence organization for—
- Indications and warning.
- Production of timely all-source intelligence.
- Integration of national-level analysis of all aspects of the terrorist threat.
- Development and maintenance of an accurate, up-to-date knowledge base on terrorism-related information.

6-64. JITF-CT also serves as the DOD focal point and senior defense intelligence representative within the intelligence community for terrorist threat warnings, as well as for proposing and coordinating, within the intelligence community, dissemination of such warnings to appropriate DOD organizations and combatant commands.

6-65. JITF-CT’s role in DOMEX is to establish relationships with and gain a better perspective of DOMEX elements throughout the intelligence community and to support the warfighter. Specifically, JITF-CT produces integrated all-source intelligence for the intelligence community and provides direct support to the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, and the Terrorist Identities Group by maintaining international terrorist watch list recommendations and distributing those recommendations to the Terrorist Screening Center for additional screening.
Chapter 7
Support to DOMEX Operations

Assets required to support document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations vary by echelon, mission focus, and availability. The success of DOMEX operations depends on—

- The coordination established between the personnel and intelligence sections.
- Where the DOMEX asset and supported unit reside.
- The various exploitation teams, facilities, commands, and agencies involved in the DOMEX process.

DOMEX TEAM COORDINATION WITH THE SUPPORTED UNIT

7-1. DOMEX team coordination with the supported unit is critical in ensuring clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and support requirements. The DOMEX team leader is responsible for managing the expectations of the supported commander. DOMEX missions do not always support the unit to which the DOMEX team is assigned. Occasionally, teams may be task-organized to support other missions, such as raid support or site exploitation. Therefore, understanding the availability, capabilities, and limitations of a DOMEX team helps the supported commander gain a realistic assessment of what a DOMEX team can accomplish.

7-2. The DOMEX team leader must ascertain the supported commander’s collection requirements and expectations. The leader must understand the supported unit’s standing operating procedures (SOPs), particularly as they relate to—

- Structure and capabilities.
- Acronyms.
- Movement procedures.
- Communications procedures, reporting criteria, and report formats.

STAFF COORDINATION

7-3. Successful DOMEX operations require support from the supported unit’s staff elements. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning and control of DOMEX operations.

S-1/G-1—Personnel

7-4. The S-1/G-1 DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

- Maintaining a list of qualified linguists (based on language and proficiency) within the command.
- Coordinating with the S-4/G-4 or S-9/G-9 for procurement and payment of other linguists needed to perform DOMEX operations.

S-2/G-2—Intelligence

7-5. The S-2/G-2 is responsible for developing intelligence to support unit operations. Intelligence staff DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—
Obtaining captured materials of intelligence interest, including visual and audio media and electronic equipment (such as computers, phones, personal digital assistants) taken from detainees or loaned in coordination with the provost marshal and other elements.

Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and providing feedback to maneuver or capturing units.

Coordinating with the S-3/G-3 to ensure DOMEX personnel are included in unit training plans, rehearsals, and debriefings.

Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting captured materials and coordinating with the S-3/G-3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command SOPs, operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders (OPORDs).

Projecting acquisition rates for captured materials.

Determining the number of linguists needed to perform DOMEX tasks.

Controlling procedures used to process and grant clearances to linguists as required.

Coordinating with other agencies to facilitate access to DOMEX records from other agencies not otherwise accessible.

Coordinating with other agencies and DOMEX personnel for intelligence sharing and evacuation of captured materials.

Coordinating with human intelligence (HUMINT) assets, such as mobile interrogations teams, HUMINT collection teams, and HUMINT exploitation teams for access to captured materials for exploitation and analysis.

Coordinating with designated media exploitation and signals intelligence assets to ensure the smooth evacuation of time-sensitive information.

Coordinating with military police (MPs) at holding areas, detention facilities, and interrogation and debriefing facilities to facilitate the sharing of captured materials and associated reporting for exploitation and analysis.

Coordinating with the staff judge advocate for evacuation of potential evidence in criminal proceedings involving significant crimes.

Coordinating for support of technical exploitation assets, such as communications technology, weapons intelligence teams, multifunctional teams, explosive ordnance disposal units, and the combined explosives exploitation cell, as applicable.

**S-3/G-3—Operations**

7-6. The S-3/G-3 is responsible for operations, organization, and training. DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

- Ensuring all unit SOPs, OPLANs, and OPORDs include instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting captured materials.
- Ensuring the main body of OPLANs and OPORDs under Tasks to Subordinate Units and Task Organization include DOMEX organizations, elements, and assets.
- Incorporating DOMEX operations into future operations.
- Ensuring subordinate units are trained to properly handle, tag, and evacuate captured materials.

**S-4/G-4—Logistics**

7-7. The S-4/G-4 DOMEX-related responsibilities include but are not limited to—

- Developing command policy for the evacuation and safekeeping of captured materials.
- Providing logistic support to interpreter personnel.
S-9/G-9—Civil Military Operations

7-8. One of the S-9/G-9 DOMEX-related responsibilities includes but is not limited to coordinating with local U.S. Government representatives, personnel staff representatives, and host-nation armed forces for procuring native linguists for interpreter support.

COORDINATION IN A MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

7-9. In recent military operations, the involvement of multinational partners has become the norm. This has also been the case in recent DOMEX operations, particularly with regard to host-nation intelligence and security personnel, who have been integral to the successful accomplishment of the mission in a multinational environment. Multinational operations require special planning for command and control, intelligence sharing, communications, and sustainment requirements. These relationships may be established through the use of the OPLAN or a fragmentary order.

LINGUIST SUPPORT

7-10. Linguist support is a vital asset to the DOMEX mission. It is rare that captured enemy documents (CEDs) are in English, so linguists hold a unique and valuable skill set and are a limited resource due to high demand. Linguists can be used in all aspects of DOMEX operations, including searching, screening, translating, and reporting functions. During the initial search of an objective, translators may be able to identify information that might not be obvious or apparent to nonnatives or nonlinguists that poses an immediate threat to U.S. or multinational forces. This information can be in the form of graffiti, propaganda, or writing in the margins of a document or on equipment and materiel. At higher echelons, linguists must have language proficiency and target knowledge commensurate with the target population of the information.

7-11. Time management and prioritization are significant considerations when tasking linguist support, which is a limited resource. Not every linguist may be the right fit for every mission or every document. Other considerations include—

- Security clearance.
- Linguist qualifications.
- Linguist categories.

SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS

7-12. Military and civilian linguists must have security clearances appropriate to their mission requirements. This normally equates to at least a Secret clearance since linguists must be aware of U.S. collection requirements to facilitate their work.

7-13. Document translators usually require a clearance to translate documents. Open-source document translation does not require a security clearance unless the information derived from the open-source documents is linked to specific U.S. collection requirements, plans, or operations. If so, translators require a clearance appropriate to the level of the particular contingency plan or operation to which the information is linked. Linguists without a security clearance should not be used in the exploitation of CEDs. By their very nature, the translation of these documents provides insight into the level of U.S. knowledge and the direction of U.S. planning and intentions that prevent their translation by individuals without a security clearance.

LINGUIST QUALIFICATIONS

7-14. Commanders can use various sources to obtain the linguists necessary to support DOMEX operations:

- Regular Army and Reserve Component military intelligence (MI) linguists. Based on their mission requirements, Regular Army and Reserve Component MI linguists with the required
language qualifications may be used as document translators. The advantage of MI Soldiers is that they have the appropriate security clearance and a firm grasp of collection requirements.

- **Non-MI Army linguists.** Non-MI Army linguists include numerous Soldiers proficient in a foreign language, regardless of military occupational specialty. U.S. civilians and local nationals can be contracted to provide linguist supports. Local-national hires provide the bulk of the translator support, especially for noncollection duties.

**LINGUIST CATEGORIES**

7-15. Linguists are separated into three categories appropriate to their level of security clearance and qualifications.

**Category I Linguist**

7-16. Category I linguists are generally local nationals or U.S. persons who have the ability to understand local dialects and customs in the area of operations. They possess no security clearance and frequently translate for U.S. forces performing liaison and coordination with host-nation government and civil authorities. Every six months, category I linguists must undergo a counterintelligence screening and possibly a polygraph. Although category I linguists are the most prevalent and possibly the most qualified to decipher written and audio information (due to their understanding the nuances of the languages), individuals without a security clearance should not be used in the exploitation of CEDs.

**Category II Linguist**

7-17. Category II linguists are generally U.S. citizens who were raised speaking the target language. They possess a Secret security clearance. Typically, category II linguists have good English skills with varying degrees of knowledge of the local dialects and customs. Category II linguists are often Government contractors who may not have had any previous experience working with the military or within hostile environments.

**Category III Linguist**

7-18. Category III linguists are U.S. citizens with a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information security clearance. Category III linguists typically possess excellent English skills as well as exceptional foreign language ability. Their knowledge of local customs and dialects vary.

**Employment Considerations**

7-19. Linguists’ knowledge of the commander’s critical information requirements, priority intelligence requirements, specific information requirements, or any other information requirements has to balance against their security clearance level and mission requirements. In order to effectively extract and translate information from captured materials, categories II and III linguists must have a good understanding of the command’s current requirements, specific mission information, and specific procedures to follow as pertinent information is discovered.

7-20. Linguists are a vital part of the DOMEX effort; however, if a linguist is identified as having questionable allegiance, notify the local counterintelligence detachment as soon as possible. Counterintelligence personnel are specially trained to handle such situations.

**COORDINATION WITH MILITARY POLICE**

7-21. The MPs are responsible for maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. In holding areas such as detainee collection points and temporary and fixed detention facilities, MPs maintain administrative control of detainees and their belongings, including source-associated captured materials. Once detainees and their belongings are processed into a detention facility, MPs maintain strict accountability of source-associated captured
materials. If captured materials have not yet been processed into DOMEX channels, close coordination with MPs is critical in order to obtain the captured materials for digitization and subsequent exploitation.

7-22. At higher echelon facilities, such as a joint interrogation and debriefing center (JIDC) with a resident DOMEX element, the DOMEX element ensures that processed captured materials and their related products are available to HUMINT collectors for planning and preparation of screening or interrogation operations. The JIDC DOMEX element is also responsible for uploading information derived from captured materials into the National Harmony Database.

THE ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

7-23. The Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization with primary responsibility for investigating allegations of criminal acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees. During screening, captured materials constituted as evidence in legal proceedings against persons suspected of significant crimes are marked “CRIMINAL EVIDENCE” and kept separate from other captured materials. They are stored under guard or in a secure area until turned over to a criminal or war crimes investigative unit. Direct evacuation to an element outside the chain of command occurs at the lowest practical echelon but is normally done by the first MI unit in the chain of command.

7-24. The staff judge advocate, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Marine Corps Criminal Investigation Division (CID), or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations element should be consulted concerning chain of custody requirements. They can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation and application of applicable law and policy. The staff judge advocate is also a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION AND PROVOST MARSHAL OFFICE

7-25. The local CID organization and provost marshal office are primarily concerned with identifying and apprehending criminal elements. CID personnel in cooperation with MPs play a key role in linking criminal intelligence to specific groups and events. Criminal intelligence results from the collection, analysis, and interpretation of all available information concerning known and potential criminal threats and vulnerabilities of supported organizations. (See AR 525-13.)

7-26. The criminal intelligence collection effort specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and the identities of smuggling routes that result in a significant increase in the number of confiscated weapons. The timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units enables a rapid response to serious confrontations, increased confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in an area of operations. The fusion cell within the analysis and control element develops intelligence products from strategic, operational, and tactical sources. Due to the significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID military agents and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the fusion cell to facilitate the MP intelligence function.

SITE EXPLOITATION COORDINATION

7-27. Site exploitation are actions taken to ensure that documents, materiel, and personnel are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated to facilitate follow-on actions (FM 2-91.6).

7-28. Site exploitation is critical to DOMEX—it is a major force multiplier that requires skilled and proficient team members. Most captured materials are obtained through tactical ground operations. The capturing unit performs site exploitation on an objective to collect material of possible intelligence and evidentiary value.

7-29. Site exploitation elements are specially trained, cohesive search teams task-organized by the unit assigned the mission. Depending on the size and contents of the site, capturing units that do not have specially trained, task-organized exploitation teams may request exploitation support via a raid support team or DOMEX support team at the brigade level.
Chapter 7

7-30. Site exploitation elements are typically organized along the same lines as other additional combat teams, such as breaching teams and aid or litter teams. The use of a squad to breach and secure a site to then function as the exploitation team is discouraged since exploitation teams require significant equipment, coordination, rehearsals, and task focus to function efficiently.

7-31. Linguists are an invaluable asset to the site exploitation mission and should be made part of the team whenever resources are available. Although a linguist is beneficial for identifying key information and for the initial screening of CEDs, the site exploitation mission can be conducted without the linguist’s assistance. Nonlinguist team members can be trained to identify and prioritize critical documents and materiel by format and appearance. Machine language translation tools may be used to help nonlinguists search for keywords to detect time-sensitive information.

NATIONAL-LEVEL SUPPORT AGENCIES

7-32. Intelligence agencies from the Department of Defense, national-level intelligence agencies, and law enforcement agencies can all support the battlefield commander. In a joint task force (JTF), a national intelligence support team works with the 2X to coordinate national-level activities with JTF and component exploitation and analytical assets. Sometimes liaison officers are assigned directly to the 2X to facilitate collection activities. The following are national-level support agencies:

- National intelligence support teams.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology teams.
- National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC).

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

7-33. National intelligence support teams provide mission-tailored national intelligence reach capability to fulfill the intelligence requirements of the supported joint force land component commander. They are typically composed of Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence resources, as required. At a minimum, personnel deployed in a national intelligence support team provide access to agency-unique information and supporting analysis.

7-34. The national intelligence support team concept is designed to create a dynamic flow of intelligence to and from the JTF operational area. National intelligence support teams are able to provide unique intelligence support to JTF commanders in several ways:

- Provide reach to national intelligence community agencies and a thorough knowledge of each agency’s resources and capabilities that normally does not exist at the JTF level.
- Provide a direct agency liaison for the JTF and an excellent understanding of where to go in their parent agency to obtain the best support for commanders’ priority intelligence requirements.
- Usually accomplish reach capability informally—team members request encyclopedic intelligence or query analytic resources with quick questions that do not require new tasking of national assets.
- Facilitate the flow of information to and from the area of responsibility via e-mail or video teleconference.

7-35. Special intelligence teams may include specialized intelligence support personnel from within the theater of operations, who are battle-rostered for JTF support. The JTF J-2 establishes and supervises required functional intelligence organizations that may include a joint interrogation facility, joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC), joint document exploitation center (JDEC), and a joint imagery processing center.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY TEAMS

7-36. Captured computers and associated media are a vital resource for investigating threat activities. The National Software Reference Library data set developed by the National Institute of Standards allows
Investigators to rapidly and accurately search for suspect files disguised as legitimate programs. The software works by looking for mismatches between machine language signatures hidden within files and file extensions.

7-37. Collaborating with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Institute of Standards researchers have produced a new technique for recovering data from damaged or altered magnetic tapes and computer disks. The system allows rapid screening and authenticity analysis of tapes relevant to homeland security. With support from multiple government agencies, the National Institute of Standards is developing tools and test methods to verify the accuracy and reliability of computer forensics software. The Computer Forensics Tool Testing project gives homeland security and criminal justice agencies confidence in their forensic investigation results and gives software developers important information for improving their products.

**NATIONAL VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER**

7-38. The FBI, as the NVTC’s executive agent, is responsible for supporting the NVTC program office. NVTC provides timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence to all elements of the intelligence community, including the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security Agency. NVTC’s goal is to augment existing government translation capabilities by—

- Acting as a clearinghouse for facilitating interagency use of translators.
- Partnering with elements of the U.S. Government, academia, and private industry to identify translator resources and engage in their services.
- Building a nationwide team of highly qualified, motivated linguists and translators connected virtually to NVTC’s program office.
- Applying state-of-the-art technology to maximize translator efficiency.

**TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS**

7-39. Technical intelligence (TECHINT) includes the process of identification, assessment, collection, exploitation, and evacuation of captured enemy materiel (CEM) in support of national TECHINT requirements. TECHINT acquired through captured materiel exploitation center (CMEC) operations provides rapid performance and vulnerability assessments of enemy equipment, thus giving a critical edge to U.S. forces in current and future operations.

7-40. Each Service has a dedicated TECHINT organization capable of supporting CMEC operations. TECHINT organization personnel receive specialized training to effectively operate these organizations in hostile and austere environments:

- CMEC.
- JCMEC.

**CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER**

7-41. The CMEC acts as the central location for the collection, safeguarding, identification, battlefield exploitation and reporting, and evacuation of CEM of intelligence value in a theater of operations.

7-42. The recovery of CEM is both a combatant command and national requirement. Subsequent exploitation of CEM can provide critical intelligence on enemy strengths and weaknesses that can favorably influence operational planning and force protection. The CMEC normally conducts this exploitation mission. Combatant commands or subordinate joint forces should notify the National Military Joint Intelligence Center through command channels that CMEC support is required. This ensures the appropriate allocation of Service component resources.

7-43. The combatant commander determines the CMEC location to facilitate the storage, movement, and evacuation of CEM. The CMEC must consider force protection requirements and have easy access to communication, transportation, and other support facilities. The CMEC should be located in close proximity to the JDEC, the JIDC, and a captured materials holding area. The CMEC, JDEC, and JIDC
facilities have common site selection criteria and complimentary functions that provide efficient allocation of assets for movement, safeguarding, exploitation, and evacuation of detainees and CEM.

7-44. CMEC specialist exploitation teams may be formed to carry out highly specialized and technical analysis of a particular and unusual CEM. The teams are formed in accordance with the task-at-hand and may be dissolved when their mission has been completed. They may carry out their work in theater of operations facilities, such as main workshops, or outside the area of operations at research and development establishments with highly sophisticated test equipment, as necessary.

JOINT CAPTURED MATERIEL EXPLOITATION CENTER

7-45. AJP 2.5(A) stipulates that NATO nations may decide to establish a materiel exploitation center operating within a joint framework on a permanent or ad hoc basis. In such cases, operations to technically exploit captured materials may be conducted at a JCMC, which is under the intelligence staff’s supervision. A JCMC is normally established for any operation with significant amounts and types of CEM that may require field exploitation. Two or more nations may establish a combined joint captured materiel exploitation center (CJCMEC). CJCMEC personnel should comprise trained technicians, engineers, and scientists supported by technical translators and interpreters.

7-46. The JCMC or CJCMEC may be located in the theater of operations near main supply routes and air and seaports to facilitate rapid evacuation of CEM. If possible, the JCMC or CJCMEC should be co-located with the joint interrogation center or the combined joint interrogation center to integrate HUMINT and technical exploitation operations. Additionally, being co-located provides a single geographical area where subordinate units can bring detainees and CEM, as well as consolidate many transportation and security requirements. Regardless of its location, the JCMC or CJCMEC is staffed and fully equipped with sensitive and sophisticated test and communications equipment for—

- Exploitation of CEM based on the supported commander’s requirements.
- Production of TECHINT reports (including countermeasures) for commanders.
- Provision of render-safe procedures, in coordination with explosive ordnance disposal staff, for foreign munitions to combat units.
- Coordination for the safe handling and removal of CEM and technical documents from the area of operations to the JCMC or CJCMEC.
- Coordination with the joint interrogation center or the combined joint interrogation center for the selection and technical interrogation of detainees assessed to have knowledge of technical interest. Technical exploitation analysts and translators of technical documents may assist interrogators during interrogation of a wide range of HUMINT sources of technical interest.
- Recommendations regarding CEM disposition to the commander and staff.
- Maintenance of the command’s TECHINT database.
- Management of the command’s scientific and TECHINT requirements.
- Coordination for the collection of TECHINT and information with the command’s intelligence staff.

7-47. JCMC technical exploitation teams can be organized by the JCMC or CJCMEC from its organic assets to meet immediate echelon requirements without TECHINT support. These teams may be attached to formations and can forward deploy or support theater of operations units, as required. They carry out complementary field exploitation of CEM on the site (operations permitting). These teams should have sufficient expertise to perform field examinations and prepare TECHINT reports. Teams should be organized based on safety considerations, timeliness, and geographical areas to be covered. They should be equipped to carry out field examinations and communicate with and report to relevant agencies.
Appendix A

The Role of Intelligence in DOMEX Operations

The Army intelligence enterprise is commonly organized through the intelligence disciplines. Each discipline applies unique aspects of support and guidance called technical channels.

The Army’s intelligence disciplines are—

- All-source intelligence.
- Counterintelligence (CI).
- Human intelligence (HUMINT).
- Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
- Imagery intelligence (IMINT).
- Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).
- Open-source intelligence (OSINT).
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
- Technical intelligence (TECHINT).

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-1. *All-source intelligence* is the intelligence discipline responsible for all-source products and the processes used to produce them (FM 2-0). *All-source intelligence* also refers to intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0).

A-2. At all echelons, document and media exploitation (DOMEX) operations are supported by analysts, with the assistance of an appropriately qualified linguist, who perform all portions of the analysis and production phase of the DOMEX process. In recent military operations, analysts have been instrumental in DOMEX teams. They have been task-organized from intelligence assets in the S-2/G-2 or have been formed in response to requests for forces and provided to brigade or division by higher echelons, such as corps and the National Ground Intelligence Center.

A-3. Analysis is instrumental in converting information derived from captured materials and all intelligence from each discipline into all-source intelligence products and targeting information. From the multiple sources of information received, analysts identify and extract critical information, determine the relevancy and accuracy of the information, and reach conclusions about the information. These conclusions are immediately disseminated or used to form the basis of intelligence analysis products.

A-4. To support DOMEX, all-source intelligence analysis and production may include—

- Providing analytical summaries, intelligence summaries, and other intelligence reports.
- Updating or developing required databases.
- Providing the enemy situation.
- Driving collection to answer priority intelligence requirements.
- Supporting situational understanding.
- Providing predictive estimates of enemy actions, reactions, and enemy courses of action.
• Providing continuously updated intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
• Providing all-source target packages (or folders).

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-5. The role of CI is to detect, identify, exploit, and neutralize all adversary intelligence entities targeting U.S. and multinational interests. CI focuses on countering adversary intelligence collection activities that target information or materiel concerning U.S. personnel, activities, operations, plans, equipment, facilities, publications, technology, or documents, either classified or unclassified, without official consent of designated U.S. release authorities, for any purpose that could cause damage or otherwise adversely impact the interests of U.S. national security or its ability to fulfill national policy and objectives.

A-6. DOMEX operations are supported by CI collection, exploitation, and analysis, which are usually conducted by CI collectors when the captured materials are associated with a source being questioned or contain specific limiting criteria information. Captured materials containing information of possible CI interest are identified and isolated during screening of captured materials for subsequent evacuation to the nearest CI element for exploitation and processing.

A-7. CI special agents may coordinate with HUMINT collectors during screening operations to identify captured materials, civilians on the battlefield, detainees, and other noncombatants who may have information of CI interest or to develop CI leads. Information obtained during source or DOMEX screening operations may be used to initiate CI investigations and operations or to cue other intelligence collection disciplines, such as HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT. CI screening is also performed during the process of hiring host-nation citizens for Army and Department of Defense (DOD) employment. When appropriate, the administration of a polygraph in conjunction with this type of screening is a CI technical service.

A-8. CI special agents are specially trained in the areas of computer forensics, computer operations, and network theory and administration. In recent military operations, CI collection includes the collection and preservation of evidence—specifically evidence derived from computer forensics—that may be used in judicial proceedings or other investigations.

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-9. Section 467, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 467) establishes GEOINT. Geospatial intelligence is intelligence derived from the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (JP 2-03).

A-10. DOMEX operations are supported by GEOINT collection, exploitation, and analysis. When geospatial information and services equipment and captured materials containing geospatial referencing information are identified during screening of DOMEX materiel, they are evacuated to the nearest GEOINT personnel for exploitation after initial screening for information of immediate tactical value.

A-11. GEOINT provides intelligence to the commander based on IMINT and the exploitation of captured enemy documents (CEDs). GEOINT provides intelligence on threat capabilities, disposition, composition, and intentions.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-12. Human intelligence is the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify enemy elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities (FM 2-0).

A-13. DOMEX is not solely a HUMINT function; it may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with appropriate language support. Although DOMEX operations are activities supported by HUMINT
collection, they are usually only conducted by HUMINT collectors when the captured documents are associated with a source being questioned.

A-14. Captured materials are collected in several ways, usually as a result of tactical ground operations. Since maneuver elements often lack the requisite time and resources, and many captured materials are associated with detainees and other human sources, a HUMINT collector may be the first person to screen captured materials. HUMINT collectors screen the documents associated with human sources and extract information of use to the collectors in their immediate collection operations. Any information discovered during the initial screening that might cue another collection effort is forwarded to the appropriate unit. HUMINT collectors also use these documents during planning and preparation for interrogation or questioning of the associated detainee.

A-15. DOMEX and translation operations were once considered purely HUMINT processing activities directly associated with language capabilities and extensive background knowledge in area studies. Current doctrinal thought acknowledges that HUMINT is no longer the sole asset capable of conducting DOMEX operations. Personnel involved in DOMEX do not require HUMINT training to screen or translate a document, a piece of equipment, or other materiel—particularly since the unit may better use its sparse HUMINT assets to conduct the HUMINT mission. DOMEX is an Army-wide responsibility, and while HUMINT assets, when available, may be used to perform the DOMEX mission, HUMINT is a consumer of DOMEX information rather than the major provider.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-16. Imagery intelligence is the technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials (JP 2-03). IMINT is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (See FM 2-0.)

A-17. DOMEX operations are supported by IMINT collection, exploitation, and analysis, which are usually conducted by IMINT personnel when imagery information and captured materials containing imagery are identified during screening of captured materials. After initial screening for information of immediate tactical value, captured materials containing imagery of potential intelligence value are classified Secret and evacuated where IMINT personnel, typically located at brigade combat team and higher echelons for exploitation, use sensitive equipment and processing techniques to manipulate data extracted from captured materials into a form suitable for analysis and intelligence production.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-18. Measurement and signature intelligence is intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the emitter or sender, and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. The detected feature may be reflected or emitted (JP 2-0).

A-19. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. MASINT also includes the additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection. (See FM 2-0.)

A-20. DOMEX operations are supported by MASINT exploitation and analysis, which are usually conducted by MASINT personnel when captured materials containing MASINT-related information are identified during screening of captured materials. After initial screening for information of immediate tactical value, captured materials containing information of potential MASINT value are evacuated to MASINT personnel, typically located at division (specifically with the analysis and control element) and higher echelons, for exploitation.
OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-21. Open-source intelligence is the discipline that pertains to intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement (FM 2-0). The Army describes OSINT as relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to intelligence requirements. (See FM 2-0.) Information is generally collected by means of public speaking forums, public documents, public broadcasts, and Internet sites.

A-22. DOMEX operations are activities supported by OSINT exploitation and analysis and can be conducted by multiple personnel of various military occupational specialties. The center of Army OSINT operations is the military intelligence (MI) brigade at theater army. Each of these Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) units conducts sustained, regionally focused intelligence operations to support their Army Service component (ASCC) command and combatant command. While their OSINT capabilities may vary, each of these theater-level MI units is the focal point within the combatant command for managing Army open-source requirements and providing OSINT support to Army tactical units deploying to or operating within the command’s area of responsibility. When open-source skills and regional knowledge are not present in these deploying tactical units, personnel from the MI brigade at theater army may deploy with and form the core of the tactical unit’s OSINT organization as well as provide the control mechanism for synchronization and information exchange between echelons.

A-23. OSINT is part of a multidiscipline intelligence effort. Personnel from other intelligence disciplines and multidiscipline intelligence activities use publicly available information and OSINT to update and expand on research performed during the planning and preparation of operations. They use OSINT to evaluate the reliability and credibility of information from confidential sources. Multidiscipline intelligence personnel also integrate OSINT into reports from other intelligence disciplines to ensure their all-source, HUMINT, CI, or TECHINT reports are accurate, complete, and objective.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-24. Signals intelligence is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted (JP 2-0). SIGINT has three subcategories:

- **Communications intelligence** is technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients (JP 2-0).
- **Electronic intelligence** is technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources (JP 3-13.1).
- **Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence** is technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-U.S. aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links (JP 2-01).

A-25. SIGINT operations are activities supported by DOMEX collection, exploitation, and analysis, and usually conducted by SIGINT collectors when communications equipment and CEDs contain cryptography identified during screening of captured materials. The collected materiel is classified Secret and immediately evacuated to the nearest SIGINT unit, the National Media Exploitation Center, or other activity designated for exploitation in annex B of the operation order. SIGINT organizations use sensitive equipment and processing techniques to transform information extracted from captured materials into a form suitable for analysis and intelligence production.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DOMEX OPERATIONS

A-26. Technical intelligence is derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize any adversary’s technological advantages (JP 2-0).

A-27. DOMEX operations are activities supported by TECHINT exploitation and analysis, which are usually performed by TECHINT collectors. During the initial collection of CEDs, technical documents associated with captured enemy materiel (CEM) are initially identified and evacuated to the captured materiel exploitation center along with the CEM for exploitation. TECHINT analysts assess and exploit foreign CEDs, equipment, weapons systems, and other war materiel. Once captured materiel exploitation center personnel have digitized CEM-associated technical documents for their purposes, the documents are reintroduced into DOMEX channels for DOMEX processing, exploitation, and evacuation, as applicable. In some cases, technical documents are exploited during the planning, preparing, or executing of interrogations.
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## Glossary

### SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2X</td>
<td>human intelligence and counterintelligence staff element</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>allied joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
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<td>CED</td>
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<td>CEM</td>
<td>captured enemy materiel</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>criminal investigation division</td>
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<td>CJCMEC</td>
<td>combined joint captured materiel exploitation center</td>
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<td>CMEC</td>
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<td>DA</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DOMEX</td>
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<td>DTG</td>
<td>date-time group</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>executive order</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>G-2X</td>
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<td>G-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
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<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICD</td>
<td>intelligence community directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>IDCP</td>
<td>initial detainee control point</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>INSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command</td>
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<td>IIR</td>
<td>intelligence information report</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
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<td>joint document exploitation center</td>
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<td>JIDC</td>
<td>joint interrogation and debriefing center</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JITF-CT</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism</td>
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<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<td>MASINT</td>
<td>measurement and signature intelligence</td>
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<td>MFT</td>
<td>multifunctional team</td>
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<td>military intelligence</td>
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<td>National Ground Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>National Media Exploitation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVTC</td>
<td>National Virtual Translation Center</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<td>RLSP</td>
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<td>RST</td>
<td>raid support team</td>
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<td>S-2</td>
<td>intelligence staff officer</td>
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<td>S-2X</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
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<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>SLC</td>
<td>Specific limiting criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing operating procedure</td>
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<td>TC</td>
<td>Training circular</td>
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<td>TECHINT</td>
<td>Technical intelligence</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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### SECTION II – TERMS

**Document and media exploitation**

The processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government’s physical control and are not publicly available.
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FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008.

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None.
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DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2823. Sworn Statement.
DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.
DA Form 7671-R. Captured Enemy Materiel.
DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.
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