

Government of Sudan Security Forces in Darfur

1. Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) - Command and Control

1.1. General

1. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) is a conventional armed force with a mandate to protect and to maintain internal security.¹ It carries out its mandate mainly through ground forces, including Popular Defence Force (PDF) militia, as well as an air force and navy. (A1)

1.2. Organization

2. The Supreme Commander of the armed forces, Lieutenant General Omar Hassan Ahmad el-Bashir, holds both the posts of *National President and Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces* and *People's Defence Forces (PDF)*. For operational purposes he exercises this power through the Minister of Defence (currently major-general Bakri Hassan Saleh). The Minister appoints a *Commander of the Armed Forces* and *Chief of General Staff* (currently, general Abbas Arabi) who, together with five *Deputy Chiefs of Staff* (Operations, Intelligence, Logistics, Administration, Training and Morale), form the *Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* or *Command Group*. The air force and navy are individual services under the commander-in-chief. (A1)
3. The SAF is structured into an operational force of combat divisions (8)² under Regional Commands (9) that constitute the dynamic component of the defence, and a territorial structure under the command of Military Districts (10) that has more static and support purposes.
4. The ground operational forces are:
 - 1 Armored Division (earmarked for national/strategic reserve)
 - 1 Mechanized Infantry Division
 - 6 Infantry/Mechanized Divisions
 - 1 Airborne Division (composed of 2 Airborne Brigades and 1 Special Forces Brigade³)

¹ Article 122, Part VII, Constitution of Sudan

² Combat divisions are located in Atbara, Dongola, Juba, Kassala, Khartoum, Nyala, Omdurman, and Port Sudan

³ The only Special Operations Force (SOF) in the Sudanese military is the Army Special Forces (SF) Brigade, which has only two subordinate units, the 143rd and 144th Special Forces Battalions. Their primary mission is counterterrorism and hostage rescue within Khartoum.

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- 24 Infantry Brigades⁴
 - 1 Reconnaissance Brigade
 - 3 Artillery Brigades
 - 2 Engineer Brigades
 - Air Defense⁵
5. Regional Commands are
- Northern Command (Shendi)
 - Eastern Command (El-Fahdi)
 - Western Command (El-Fasher)
 - Central Command (El-Obeid)
 - Khartoum Command (El-Fahdi)⁶
 - El Roseires Command (El-Damazin)
 - Upper Nile Command (Malakal)
 - El Ghazel Command (Wau)
 - Equatoria Command (Juba)
6. The SAF is further organized into General HQ and ten Military Districts:
- Khartoum Military District.
 - Northern Military District.
 - Eastern Military District.
 - Western Military District.
 - Central Military District.
 - Red Sea Military District.
 - White Nile Military District.
 - Blue Nile Military District.
 - Upper Nile & Equatoria Military District.
 - Al Mijlad & Western Nuer Military District.

1.3. Command and Control structure

7. Planning for all military operations is done in Khartoum by the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Orders in relation to a particular operation are passed from the Committee to the Director of Operations, who gives them to the Regional

⁴ Approximately 18 of the 24 infantry brigades are under the command of the 6 infantry divisional headquarters. The remaining six brigades are believed to be capable of independent operations.

⁵ Air Defence Forces (ADF) forces are primarily concentrated in Khartoum and Port Sudan and are part of the Sudanese Army. Each airport facility includes constructed positions for air defence equipment. The mission of the ADF is to protect Khartoum (essential government facilities, airports, and ports) from air attack. The ADF has an estimated 3,000 personnel.

⁶ Khartoum Command appears to be subdivided into 3 x Military Sectors: Khartoum, Omdurman and North Khartoum.

Commander. The Regional Commander then gives the orders to the Divisional Commander, who shares them with the Brigade Commander for implementation. (B1)

8. With regard to reporting, information flows from Battalion level, to the Brigade Commander, to the Divisional Commander, to the Regional Commander, to the Director of Operations, and finally to the Deputy Chief of Staff and Command Group. The Command Group reports to the Chief of Staff who reports, if necessary, to the Minister of Defence and finally to the Presidency. Within the army, reporting and all other communications take place up and down the chain of command as with most conventional armed forces. (B1)

1.4. Military Intelligence (MI)

9. The *Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat al-Askariyya)* is a branch of the General Staff with its own administration and command. The status of the MI is not completely clear, but it appears that under emergency laws, it has the power to arrest, detain and interrogate. With regard to communication and reporting, the MI branch passes information through the operational chain, as well as directly to the Presidency, through the Chief of the MI branch. (B2)

1.5. Border Intelligence (BI)

10. The Military Intelligence also include an operational unit called *Border Intelligence (BI) (Istikhbarat al-Hudud)*, headquartered in Khartoum and headed by General Al-Hadi Hamid el-Tayeed (2005), the primary role of which is to monitor and gather information in the border area. Members of this unit are recruited from the local population. They are deployed to their areas of origin, according to their experience in the area, knowledge of the tribes, and ability to differentiate between people of different tribal and national origins based on local knowledge. Border Intelligence guards are under the operational control of the Military Intelligence Officers in the particular Division where they are deployed and otherwise fall under the regular chain of command for the armed forces. (C2)
11. While initially BI officers were recruited in relation to the conflict in southern Sudan, the Government began recruiting them during the early stages of the armed conflict in Darfur in late 2002 and early 2003. Apparently, BI soldiers are recruited directly into the army in the same way as regular soldiers. An advertisement is made through media channels for volunteers who meet certain criteria, in particular with regard to age, citizenship and fitness. Approximately 3,000 Border Intelligence soldiers have been recruited in this way and deployed in Darfur. (B3)

12. It is assessed that the BI is organized in a territorial structure in the border areas of Sudan. Apparently, the BI Division for Darfur is headquartered in Masteri (South West of El-Geneina). (C2)

1.6. Popular Defence Forces

13. The *Popular Defence Forces (PDF)* constitutes one branch of the armed forces along with SAF, Air Force and Navy.
14. For operational purposes, the Sudanese armed forces can be supplemented by the mobilization of civilians or reservists into the Popular Defence Forces (PDF). The mandate of the PDF is given by the Popular Defence Forces Act of 1989, which defines the PDF as 'Paramilitary forces' made up of Sudanese citizens who meet certain criteria. Article 6 of the Act states that the functions of the PDF are to "assist the People's Armed Forces and other regular forces whenever needed", "contribute to the defence of the nation and help to deal with crises and public disasters" and perform "any other task entrusted to them by the Commander-in-Chief himself or pursuant to a recommendation of the Council." According to the Act, a body known as the *Council of the Popular Defence Forces* advises the Commander-in-Chief on matters affecting the PDF, including areas in which the PDF should be established, military training and education for PDF members, and other issues relating to the duties and activities of the PDF.
15. The mobilization/recruitment process start with local government officials asked by army Headquarters to mobilize and recruit PDF forces through tribal leaders and sheikhs.⁷ The *Wali* is responsible for mobilization in each State because he is expected to be familiar with the local tribal leaders, who can ask their people to join the PDF.
16. The PDF provides arms, uniforms and training to those mobilized, who are then integrated into the regular army for operations. At that point, the recruits come under regular army command and normally wear the same uniform as the unit they are fighting with. They are uniformed but their equipment and training are often rudimentary.⁸
17. Apparently, it seems that uniforms, weapons and ammunition are not always returned by recruits following demobilisation, and that weapons and ammunition would at times be distributed through tribal leaders in order to ensure that they are returned on demobilization.

⁷ See below for details on the relationship between the PDF and the "Janjaweed".

⁸ The recently observed trend in Darfur to provide PDF units with cleaner and newer uniforms, aims probably at making troop more identifiable thus reducing the risks of confusion between "Janjaweed" and PDF units at the expense of the government. (A2)

18. In Darfur, the PDF forces subordinated to the PDF Western District, headquartered with the military command in El-Fasher, and are deployed as follows:

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| • <i>Ababil</i> PDF Battalion | Vicinity of Kutum |
| • <i>Jamus Al Nasr</i> PDF Battalion | Vicinity of Kabkabiyah |
| • <i>Jihafil Al Nasr</i> PDF Battalion | Nyala Military Faculty |
| • <i>Khalid Bin Al Walid</i> PDF Battalion | El-Fasher Command HQ |

2. National Security and Intelligence Service

19. The *National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS)* is not part of the Sudan Armed Forces but is part of the Ministry of Interior (currently headed by Zubeir Beshir Taha (NCP) in the Government of National Unity).

20. The NSIS was formed in February 2004 as a move to create one unified service dealing with both internal and external intelligence. Its main headquarter is in Khartoum and is headed by a Director-general who is appointed by the President.⁹ The current Director-General, Major-general Salah Abdallah (also known as Salah Gosh), reports at least every second day to the President and/or First Vice-President. While he co-operates with other organs of the Government, he is accountable directly to the President.

21. Its mandate derives from the *National Security Force Act (NSFA)* of 1999, as amended in 2001, which states that there shall be an Internal Security Organ in charge of internal security, and a Sudanese Intelligence Organ in charge of external security.¹⁰ In February 2004, the two organs were merged to form the NSIS.

22. According to the NSFA, a body known as the *National Security Council (NSC)* is to be established to oversee the implementation of the security plan of the country; to supervise the progress of security work; to co-ordinate between security organs; to follow-up on the implementation of security policies and programmes; to approve regulations related to the organization of work; and to constitute a technical committee from the organs forming the Council in order to assist in the progress of work.¹¹ The NSC is composed of

- the President,
- the President's advisor on security affairs,
- the Minister of Defence,
- the Minister of Foreign Relations,
- the Minister of Internal Affairs,
- the Minister of Justice,

⁹ Article 10(1), National Security Act.

¹⁰ Article 5(1) and 5(2), National Security Act.

¹¹ Article 35, National Security Act.

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- the Director of the Internal Security Organ, and
 - the Director of the Sudanese Intelligence Organ.¹²
23. The NSFA also provides for the establishment of the *High Technical Security Committee* which has a mandate to study the security plans presented by the states and the competent organs, submit the plans to the Council for approval, follow-up on implementation, and receive reports with respect thereto. The Committee is to co-ordinate the business of security committees in the various states, with regard to the security plans set out by the Council.¹³
24. The Director-General of the NSIS has a Deputy, with whom he shares his activities and functions, as well as four Directors. The NSIS has a desk specifically to address the situation in Darfur, which receives all information regarding the area, including external public information. This unit is responsible for producing and analyzing intelligence. Every unit reports up the chain of command and ultimately every action is reported to the Director-General.
25. The NSIS operates along a territorial structure, with headquarters in each state, under the command of a (usually) brigadier. It has regular operational units whose mission is to oversee the internal and external security of the Sudan, monitor relevant events, analyze the significance and dangers of the same, and recommend protection measures.¹⁴
26. *National Security Forces* operate under the general supervision of the President.¹⁵ The direct responsibility is assumed by the NSIS Director-General.¹⁶ The Director-General is responsible to the President for the execution of his functions and the overall performance of the NSIS.¹⁷
27. With regard to the Darfur crisis, the NSIS gathers information and reports to the President about the situation. Depending on the nature of the issue, it would also report to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. Based on the information received, the President would then instruct the Cabinet. He further stated that the President formed a coordinating Committee in response to the crisis, which was headed by the Minister for Federal Affairs and included Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior, Director of Intelligence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.

¹² Article 34(1), National Security Act.

¹³ Articles 38 and 39, National Security Act.

¹⁴ Article 124, Part VII, Constitution of Sudan.

¹⁵ Article 5(3), National Security Act.

¹⁶ Article 5(4), National Security Act.

¹⁷ Article 10(3), National Security Act

Source reliability: A-Source is knowledgeable and has direct access to information; B-Source is knowledgeable but has no direct access to information; C-Source is usually reliable; D-Source is not very reliable but can provide good information; E-Source is not reliable; F-We do not know.

Information validity: 1-Confirmed by several independent sources; 2-Not confirmed but very likely; 3-Likely; 4-Not likely; 5-Probably wrong information; 6-We do not know.

28. The NSFA, as amended in 2001, gives the security forces wide-reaching powers, including the power to detain without charge or access to a judge for up to nine months. Reports mention some of the detainees had been held for 11 months without charge, access to a lawyer or communication with family. Cases of torture, beatings and threats used during interrogations to extract confessions have been reported.
29. The security forces collect information on all aspects of life in the three States of Darfur. This information is disseminated to the relevant Ministries for appropriate action. This information or intelligence may relate to matters such as the presence of rebels and whether or not they have arms. The military may use this information to make operational decisions. While the NSIS does not give orders to the military, it provides it indirectly – through the Wali administration in the regions and through the NSC at country-level – with information which can be used for operational planning.

3. The “Janjaweed”

30. Although we *do not* consider *Janjaweed* as being part of the GoS apparatus in Darfur, we mention it in this report for clarification purposes.
31. The term “Janjaweed”, in particular, has been widely used by victims of attacks to describe their attackers (the words *fursan* (horsemen, knights), or *mujahedeen*). The term has consequently also been used by many international organizations and the media in their reports on the situation in Darfur, and was used by the Security Council in resolution 1564. Victims of attacks have indicated that the Janjaweed were acting with and on behalf of Government forces, but no evidence – at this stage – allows to confirm such allegation.
32. “Janjaweed” is a generic Darfurian term that can be translated as “bandits”. Historically, this word describes armed horsemen performing “razzias”¹⁸ against farmers and villagers. In the recent years, however, the word has been repeatedly used by the international community to describe combatants that cannot be clearly associated to a specific organization. In the world media, however, the word “Janjaweed” is irremediably – and often wrongly – associated to the GoS¹⁹ Cross examination of reports collected by UMAC shows that the word Janjaweed used by sources in Darfur may refer to :
- Spontaneous militias or self-defence forces (nomads or farmers) *not always* supported by the GoS; (A1)

¹⁸ French word derived from Arabic “rhazâwa” (attack)

¹⁹ The recent practice to use of the expression “armed tribesmen” in reports should reduce the finger-pointing effect against the GoS, but is no indication whatsoever about the identity of the “bandits”.

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- Spontaneous militias or self-defence units locally based supporting rebel movements; (A1)
 - *Popular Defence Forces (PDF)* supported by the GoS as part of the armed forces. The PDF are locally based, organized, trained, and equipped units raised by the government to protect local communities. The PDF are defined by the Popular Defence Forces Act of 1989.; (A2)
 - Covert units associated with “Border Intelligence” (and probably other government intelligence and security agencies) operating in Western Darfur against illegal activities across the border; (C2)
 - *Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOG)* operating across the Chadian-Sudanese border and using Darfur as a sanctuary and as a “supply” area; (A1)
 - Criminals, former combatant living out of theft and cross-border trafficking. This category is expected to increase in number as GoS and rebel armies will demobilize. (A1)
33. With the noticeable exception of PDF, these groups operate without identifiable structured command and control system. They are unevenly uniformed and have the same kind of equipment, making positive identification difficult. (A1)
34. Although the Janjaweed are often described as “Arab militias” it appears that the word Janjaweed may also comprise non-Arab actors. In fact, that many Arabs in Darfur are opposed to the Janjaweed, and some Arabs are fighting with the rebels, such as certain Arab commanders and their men from the Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes.

Appendix 1

Sudan Armed Forces deployed in Darfur (Western Military District)
(as of march 2005)

Western Military District

6 Infantry Division

7 Infantry Brigade

109 Infantry Battalion
112 Infantry Battalion
114 Infantry Battalion
231 Infantry Battalion

9 Infantry Brigade

240 Infantry Battalion
241 Infantry Battalion
242 Infantry Battalion
256 Infantry Battalion

22 Infantry Brigade

181 Infantry Battalion
243 Infantry Battalion
244 Infantry Battalion
245 Infantry Battalion
246 Infantry Battalion

46 Field Artillery Brigade

323 Field Artillery Battalion
327 Field Artillery Battalion
333 Field Artillery Battalion
363 Field Artillery Battalion

16 Infantry Brigade

94 Infantry Battalion
UI Infantry Battalion

96 Infantry Brigade

UI Infantry Battalion

Al Fashir Division & Brigade HQ

Al Fashir Division & Brigade HQ

Al Fashir Division & Brigade HQ

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Waw

Al Fashir Division & Brigade HQ

Nyala Military Faculty

Nyala Military Faculty

Nyala Military Faculty

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Nyala Military Faculty

Juba Division & Brigade HQ

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Waw Military Faculty-Regl Command

Waw

Al Mugland Infantry Brigade

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Al Fashir Division & Brigade HQ

Al Junaynah Military Faculty

Atbarah Military Faculty

Juba Military Faculty

Dilling Mil Instl & Bn HQ

Nyala Military Faculty

Buram

Buram

Ad Du Ayn

Ad Du Ayn

SAF Movement and Redeployment into Darfur**Situation in Sector IV**

1. Redeployment of forces from South Sudan to Darfur started once cessation of hostilities came into effect after 04 February 2003. This was mainly after the deployment of VMT, JMC and CPMT. (B2)
2. So far, large scale troop movements to Darfur in the last three years have only been observed from the Central Military District (5 Infantry Division in Kadugli and 14 Infantry Division in Dilling). However, Sector IV routine verification and monitoring activities show that:
 - No particular unit has moved entirely to Darfur so far and units are currently in rotation. (B3)
 - Inspections have shown that actual strength of the units still in Sector IV represents roughly 20-25% of assumed authorized strength. (assumed authorized strength of a SAF infantry division is 7'000 troops) (B3)
 - So far from it is assumed that these two infantry division are deployed in Darfur with around 10'500 troops. (B3)

Situation in Sector V (Blue Nile)

3. Currently, a rotation process is going on between certain units of Sector V and Darfur. It involves 700 SAF troops from Ed Damazin to Darfur transported by air.
 - These troops are composed of various units from 4th Division known as "Nasraulla 5".
 - The redeployment to Darfur started on 2 November. Troops are carrying personal weapons only. Duration of unit's stay in Darfur is not known. The following observations have been made (B2):

When	From	To	What
02 Nov	Ed Damazin	Darfur	300 troops
05 Nov	Juba	Nyala	200 SAF troops from Liria
12 Nov	Ed Damazin	El Geneina	30 troops
13 Nov	Ed Damazin		25 troops
17 Nov	Ed Damazin		Approx 350 troops

4. SAF is denying any information regarding any kind of troop's movement other than for JIU. (A1)

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