

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 18 November 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2214 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Gerard **van Bohemen**
Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities



Letter dated 22 September 2015 from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

I enclose the report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team prepared in accordance with paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2214 (2015), in which the Monitoring Team was requested to submit a report on the terrorism threat in Libya posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Ansar al Charia and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida operating in Libya, and on their sources of arms, funding, recruitment, demographics and connections to the terrorist networks in the region and recommendations for additional actions to address the threat.

The Monitoring Team notes that the document of reference is the English original. For ease of reference, the four recommendations made by the Team are in bold type.

(Signed) Hans-Jakob **Schindler**
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established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)

**Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council
resolution 2214 (2015) concerning the terrorism threat in
Libya posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant,
Ansar al Charia, and all other Al-Qaida associates**

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I. Summary

1. The current political and security challenges in Libya present an opportunity for groups associated with Al-Qaida (QDe.004), such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), Ansar al Charia in its various reiterations, the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014) and Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141) to opportunistically exploit and complicate an already difficult situation on the ground.
2. While Ansar al Charia Derna (AAD) (QDe.145) and Ansar al Charia Benghazi (AAB) (QDe.146) seem to have weakened since the establishment of ISIL in Libya, AQIM, Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Al Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) (QDe.143) continue to use the country as a rear base for their operations in the region. The leadership of ISIL recognized the situation in Libya as an opportunity to establish a new foothold outside its current area of control in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.
3. The financing of groups in Libya that are associated with Al-Qaida seems sufficient to sustain their operations for now. However, ISIL operations in Libya do not generate revenue, nor are they currently organized, to the same extent as its operations in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.
4. Since 2013, the country has experienced several waves of Libyan returnees, which also formed the backbone of the newly established ISIL in Libya. In addition, the country continues to attract foreign terrorist fighters in significant numbers from North Africa. While currently concentrated in its stronghold in Sirte, ISIL could seek local alliances to expand its territorial control, also entailing the risk of motivating additional foreign terrorist fighters to join the group in Libya.
5. Groups associated with Al-Qaida procure arms and ammunitions from the thriving domestic illicit arms trade and are not yet strategically dependent on outside supplies. The increase in the use of improvised explosive devices and the increasing number of suicide attacks are areas of concern.

II. Strategic assessment

6. It is the assessment of the Team that the threat associated with Al-Qaida in Libya is intimately connected to the continuing political and security challenges. Groups associated with Al-Qaida have established a significant presence in Libya, including facilities for training, implying a longer-term strategic goal to sustain a presence in the country (with external operations capability). The resulting threat is regional and international, with particular significance for Africa, given the growing numbers of foreign terrorist fighters and the presence of a globalized group of terrorists from different Al-Qaida backgrounds.
7. The pronounced rivalries between groups in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq that are associated with Al-Qaida, for example, the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) and ISIL, are currently not yet replicated with the same ferocity in Libya. For example, while groups are competing for influence and resources in some regions of the country, they are able to cooperate if this serves their interest.
8. ISIL is an evident short and long-term threat in Libya. The group is benefiting from the "appeal" and notoriety of ISIL in Iraq and in the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the group's threat should be realistically assessed. ISIL is only one player

among multiple warring factions in Libya and faces strong resistance from the population, as well as difficulties in building and maintaining local alliances. Nevertheless, ISIL has clearly demonstrated its intention to control additional territory in Libya. This is a concern, given the country's strategic location as a transit point within the region, control of which would enable groups associated with Al-Qaida, including ISIL, to further influence various ongoing conflicts in North Africa and the Sahel, in addition to offering a new hub outside ISIL-controlled territories in the Middle East.

III. Evidence base

9. Since the adoption of resolution 2214 (2015) by the Security Council on 27 March 2015, the Monitoring Team has undertaken six country visits to Member States and participated in international and regional conferences, meetings and workshops, where it discussed issues raised in the resolution. The Monitoring Team wrote to 47 Member States and 10 international, regional and subregional organizations and, as at 22 September 2015, had received responses from 12 Member States and one regional organization, and had exchanged information with one international organization and with the panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) (the "Libya Panel"). The Monitoring Team has also met with Libyan representatives in New York and during its trips. In addition, the Monitoring Team also discussed resolution 2214 (2015) with representatives of eight Member States during the thirteenth regional meeting of heads of intelligence and security services that was held in Vienna in April 2015. In order to gain a better understanding of the more technical aspects relating to the present report, the Monitoring Team had a range of discussions with international organizations and financial, security, law enforcement, energy, and migration experts working on the situation in Libya.

IV. Historical background

10. Al-Qaida-related terrorism in Libya is not a new phenomenon. In the early 1990s a group of Libyan Afghanistan veterans created a cell called "Sarayat A Mujahidin" ("the mujahidin brigade") aiming to overthrow the Libyan regime. In 1994, Sarayat Al Mujahidin was rebranded as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (QDe.011) and was involved in a series of violent attacks in Libya, including a foiled attempt to assassinate Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Qadhafi (LYi.013) in 1996.

11. The development of LIFG occurred during a phase when other groups in the Maghreb region, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) (QDe.089), the Tunisian Combatant Group (GICT) (QDe.090) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (QDe.006) were set up using networks between individuals established during the Afghan civil war. Based on the common experience as Afghan veterans, LIFG associated with the GICM in planning the May 2003 bombings in Casablanca, Morocco, that killed over 40 persons. It also played a central role in the 2004 attacks in Madrid.¹

¹ Narrative summary of reasons of the listing ("narrative summary") of QDe.011. All narrative summaries are available at www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/narrative.shtml.

12. The LIFG links to Al-Qaida were reinforced in the 2000s, when two of its members, Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr Qayed (alias Abu Yahya al-Libi) (QDi.297) and Ali Ammar Ashur al-Rufayi (alias Abu Laith al-Libi, deceased) reached senior positions in Al-Qaida's hierarchy. LIFG also facilitated the transfer of a first wave of foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq after 2003 and pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2007, through the intermediary, Abu Laith al-Libi. The group was weakened after a significant faction reconciled with the Libyan Government in 2009. Nevertheless, former members of LIFG have played a major role in or inspired the creation of current Al-Qaida affiliates in Libya, such as AAD and AAB. In fact, the leader of AAD, Soufiane Ben Guomo (QDi.355), was involved in the creation of LIFG in Afghanistan.

13. AQIM has taken advantage of the persistent turmoil in Libya and instability in the wider Maghreb and Sahel region since 2011 to infiltrate Libya, using the country as a zone of retreat. In addition, as several Member States explained to the Monitoring Team, AQIM uses Libyan territory for logistical support and to procure arms and ammunition.

14. According to one Member State, the AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel (QDi.232), dispatched Moussa Bourahla, the AQIM "emir" of external relations, to Libya to ensure coordination with other groups associated with Al-Qaida. The group also benefited from arms it was able to obtain from looted Libyan army stocks. Those arms played a significant role in the advances achieved by Al-Qaida affiliates in northern Mali in 2012. After Al-Qaida affiliates were dislodged from their sanctuaries in Mali, the remaining fighters withdrew to Libya.

15. AQIM senior leaders see the growing appeal of ISIL as serious competition to their group. Nevertheless, AQIM leaders maintain relationships with local groups who have declared allegiance to ISIL, such as the Ansar al Charia branch in Sirte in 2014. In addition, an emissary from the Al-Qaida core, Abdelbasset Azzouz (alias Abou Hamza al-Libi),² was dispatched to Libya in November 2011 to manage and supervise a network dedicated to hosting foreign terrorist fighters from North Africa and Europe in training camps in Derna, before their onward travel to the Syrian Arab Republic. However, the arrest of Abu Anas al-Libi (reportedly deceased) in Tripoli in October 2014 and that of Abdelbasset Azzouz in Turkey in November 2014 were major losses for Al-Qaida in Libya.

V. Ansar al Charia

16. A small network of radical individuals, who later formed AAB and AAD, made its appearance in Derna in mid-2011. That network was aligned with small groups in Benghazi, Ajdabya and Sebratah, under the leadership of Ben Goumo, who also supervised a training camp for local affiliates and returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, according to some analysts, Ansar al Charia at this stage was less a structured organization and more a term used to describe a loose coalition of groups.

17. AAD and AAB coordinated their actions, provided training and logistical support to AQIM and established links to Al Mourabitoun and AAS-T. According to a Member State, at least 12 of the 28 individuals involved in the attack on the

² Member State-provided information.

Tiguentourine gas field (in Amenas, Algeria) by Al Mourabitoun and Al Mouakaoune Biddam (QDe.139) in January 2013, had been trained during the summer of 2012 in camps run by AAB. In addition, both groups took part, on 11 September 2012, in the attack against the Consulate of the United States of America in Benghazi. AAB and AAD also run terrorist training camps for the benefit of foreign terrorist fighters operating in the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Mali. Between 2011 and 2014, AAB conducted many terrorist attacks and assassinations.³

18. Since the establishment of ISIL in Libya, AAD and AAB have been weakened, owing to the loss of fighters who either joined, or were killed during clashes with, ISIL. For example, AAD was split after one faction publicly pledged allegiance to, and was literally taken over by, ISIL.⁴ Another AAD faction joined an anti-ISIL coalition under the banner of the “Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna” (SCMD). AAB was weakened after its founder and leader, Mohamed Zahawi, was killed late in 2014 in a clash with Government troops.⁵ Zahawi was eulogized by Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) in “The Islamic Spring” audio recording, demonstrating that Zahawi was seen as part of the wider global Al-Qaida affiliate network. The size of AAB further diminished after one faction defected to ISIL, and a second one allied itself with the “Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries”. Therefore, as with AAD, the current size of AAB is but a fraction of its size and influence of 12 months ago.

VI. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Libya

19. Libya is strategically important for ISIL, in view of its geographical location at the crossroads between the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Owing to the current political and security challenges the country faces, resulting in a weakened national security apparatus, the country is also viewed as a potential retreat and operational zone for ISIL fighters unable to reach the Middle East.⁶ The ISIL central command in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic views Libya as the “best” opportunity to expand its so-called caliphate. Abu al-Mughirah Al Qahtani, the so-called delegate leader of the ISIL Libyan Wilayat, stated in a recent interview that “Libya has a great importance because it is in Africa and south of Europe. It also contains a well of resources that cannot dry. [...] It is also a gate to the African desert stretching to a number of African countries”.⁷ Libya’s importance for ISIL has also been reflected in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s (QDi.299)⁸ appointment of close aides to lead ISIL in Libya, including Wissam Al Zubaidi (alias Abu Nabil Al Anbari), Turki Mubarak Al Binali (alias Abu Sufian) and Abu Habib al-Jazrawi.

20. Several Member States highlighted the “unique” position of ISIL in Libya among the group’s other affiliates. It is the affiliate with the closest connection to the “centre” in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. While several pledges of allegiance to

³ Narrative summaries of QDe.146 and QDe.145.

⁴ Narrative summary of QDe.145.

⁵ “Leader of Libyan Islamists Ansar al-Sharia dies of wounds”, *Reuters*, 23 January 2015.

⁶ See also, for example Wael Assam, “Qiyadi fi «al-dawla al-Islamiyya» min al-Faluja yushrifu ala idarat al-tanzim fi Libya wa shamal Ifriqiya (An ISIL official from Fallujah supervises ISIL in Libya and North Africa)”, *Al-Quds Al Arabi*, 19 February 2015.

⁷ “Interview with Abu al-Mughirah Al-Qahtani. The Delegated Leader of the Libyan Wilayat”, *Dabiq*, 11th edition, 1436 Dhul-Qa’dah [September 2015], p. 60 ff.

⁸ Listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai.

ISIL by groups in the Middle East and Africa have not translated into concrete outreach and cooperation, ISIL in Libya has thus far been the only known ISIL affiliate that has benefited from support and guidance by ISIL in the Middle East. The pledge of allegiance by the local affiliate of ISIL in Libya in September 2014 was organized in the presence of emissaries sent by Al-Bahgdadi. Abu al-Bara al-Azdi, a Yemeni national, and Al-Jazrawi, a Saudi national, travelled to Derna for that purpose. Al-Baghdadi also dispatched the Bahraini preacher, Turki Al-Binali, a member of the ISIL religious council, to Libya in 2013 and 2015. Soon after Binali's first visit, a wave of foreign terrorist fighters arrived in Libya from the Maghreb, Egypt, Yemen, the Palestinian territories and Mali.⁹

21. This close relationship between ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and ISIL in Libya is also based on two additional elements. First, a significant number of Libyan nationals (around 800) fighting with ISIL in Libya had previously fought with ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁰ Those fighters have only relatively recently returned to Libya and still maintain close relationships with their contacts in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Second, ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to send emissaries with instructions, albeit infrequently, to ISIL in Libya. The travel of these emissaries distinguishes the ISIL affiliate in Libya from other ISIL affiliates where travel of emissaries has not been reported.

22. ISIL in Libya was created by a core of Libyan returnees from the Syrian Arab Republic, who, when in the Levant, created Al-Battar Brigade in 2012¹¹ to support ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. Many of its members returned to Libya in the spring of 2014, where they reorganized in Derna, under the banner of the Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC). In October 2014, IYSC pledged allegiance to ISIL and declared eastern Libya to be a province of the so-called "Islamic state", calling it "Wilayat Barqa" (the Cyrenaica Province).¹²

23. According to the ISIL magazine, *Dabiq*, ISIL in Libya has been placed under the leadership of Abu al-Mughirah Al-Qahtani, described as the "delegated leader for the Libyan Wilayat", which could correspond to the most senior ISIL position in Libya. Al-Qahtani, whose name seems to originate from the Arabian Peninsula,¹³ has not been mentioned in past ISIL propaganda. Furthermore, the Monitoring Team has not received Member State confirmation that he is in Libya or that he is leading ISIL in the country.

A. Strength of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Libya

24. In contrast to other groups in Libya, ISIL is perceived by local stakeholders as the "outsider". Nevertheless, its relatively quick establishment and expansion in Libya was a surprise to many local groups. Three factors increased the number of ISIL fighters in Libya: (a) the hard core of Libyan foreign terrorist fighters who returned

⁹ Member State-provided information.

¹⁰ In total, around 3,500 Libyan nationals had left the country to join groups in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, 800 of which have come back to join the newly formed ISIL affiliate. They returned in several waves over the past two years. Member State-provided information.

¹¹ See also, for example: Frederic Wehrey and Ala' Alrababah, "Rising Out of Chaos: The Islamic State in Libya", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Blog*, 5 March 2015.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Callum Paton, "Isis in Libya: New leader of Islamic State in Sirte — Abu al-Mughirah al-Qahtani — steps out from the shadows", *International Business Times*, 14 September 2015.

from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; (b) foreign terrorist fighters (with a sizable contingent comprising fighters from the Maghreb); and (c) a significant number of defectors from local Libyan groups. Although a substantial number of Libyan nationals are among ISIL fighters, these are mainly “returnees” that have fought with ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq in the past few years.

25. In 2014, ISIL announced three provinces in Libya, namely, Wilayat Tripolitania (including Tripoli and Sirte), Wilayat Barqa (Cyrenaica, including Derna and Benghazi) and Wilayat Fezzan (south).¹⁴ However, this division does not translate into actual control of territory, but rather demonstrates the ISIL aspirational vision for its presence in Libya.

26. Several Member States explained that, in total, ISIL has no more than 2,000-3,000 fighters in Libya. According to a Member State, at its highest point of influence in Derna, ISIL was able to command around 1,100 fighters in the city. Many of them have since left for Sirte, where ISIL is currently able to command around 1,500 fighters.

B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant presence in Libya

1. Tripoli

27. In Tripoli, the ISIL structures are weak. According to a Member State, only 12 to 24 individuals are identifiable as a core ISIL cell in the city. Nevertheless, ISIL was able to perpetrate a high-level attack against the Corinthia Hotel in January 2015, killing eight persons, among them, five foreigners. Furthermore, in September 2015, ISIL claimed to have attacked a prison inside the Mitiga airbase in Tripoli.¹⁵

2. Derna

28. The ISIL Wilayat Barqa is the outcome of a fusion between Al-Battar Brigade and IYSC, under the leadership of Iraqi national Wissam Abedzaid Al Zubaidi (alias Abu Nabil Al Anbari), appointed as emir, assisted by Yemeni national Turki Said Ali Al Ghamidi (alias Abu Al Barae Al Azdi), who holds the position of religious judge.¹⁶ Anbari was reported to be a former Iraqi army officer who played a major role in the fall to ISIL of the Iraqi cities of Beiji and Tikrit. Before he was sent as an emissary to Libya, Anbari was reportedly appointed by Baghdadi as governor of the Salahuddin province of Iraq. He also reportedly spent time in prison with ISIL leader Baghdadi.¹⁷ Anbari and Azdi structured ISIL in Derna into several departments, such as the Al Hisba (accountability) committee, religious police, and the judicial and operations committees.

¹⁴ Several Member States provided this information. See also Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, Tim Lister and Jomana Karadsheh, “ISIS comes to Libya”, *CNN*, 18 November 2014, and Hassan Morajea and Erin Cunningham, “Libyan gains may offer ISIS a base for new attacks”, *The Washington Post*, 6 June 2015.

¹⁵ “IS Claims Suicide Raid on Prison Inside Mitiga International Airport in Tripoli”, *SITE Intelligence Group*, 18 September 2015.

¹⁶ Member State-provided information.

¹⁷ Wael Assam, “Qiyadi fi «al-dawla al-Islamiyya» min al-Faluja yushrifu ala idarat al-tanzim fi Libya wa shamal Ifriqiya (An ISIL official from Fallujah supervises ISIL in Libya and North Africa)”, *Al-Quds A-s Arabi*, 19 February 2015.

29. Clashes took place in Derna between ISIL and the SCMD coalition. In June 2015, the coalition led a series of attacks against ISIL, forcing its members to retreat to the Fatayeh region, outside Derna, after an eight-month takeover of the city. However, ISIL has remained intent on regaining control in Derna. According to Libyan officials quoted in a media report, clashes between ISIL combatants and the SCMD militants continue in the vicinity of the city.¹⁸

3. Sirte

30. According to several Member States, the ISIL branch in Sirte was constituted by former Ansar al Charia members who joined forces with ISIL, and by ISIL members retreating to Sirte from other provinces. ISIL also established a camp dedicated to training local affiliates and foreign terrorist fighters to make and use explosive belts. The ISIL Sirte cell is led by Abou Abdellah Al Ouerfalli,¹⁹ who was appointed as the emir supervising Sirte, while the operational command is led by a Tunisian national known by his nom de guerre Abou Mohamed Sefaxi. His deputy is Ali Mohamed El Qarqai (alias Abu Tourab Attounsi). Their command centre is based in the Ouagadougou Conference Centre in Sirte. A significant number of foreign terrorist fighters from Tunisia, the Sudan and the Sahel-Sahara region comprise that cell. The Sahelian fighters benefit from the services of a facilitation network operating in Ubari and Brak Al Chate, in Southern Libya, led by Abou Talha al-Libi, a previous ISIL fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic.

31. ISIL took control of Sirte in February 2015, after fighting with forces from Libya Shield. It has faced strong resistance from armed residents and sporadic but fierce clashes continue to take place. According to a Member State, ISIL temporarily took down telecommunication lines, effectively cutting communication between western and eastern parts of Libya.

32. ISIL combatants have exposed the population in Sirte to cruel practices. Residents have been imprisoned and some of them have been killed and their bodies hung in the city,²⁰ and others were also reportedly beheaded and crucified.

33. ISIL seized the state-run radio station in Sirte and has been airing speeches by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.²¹ Al Binali, Baghdadi's emissary, reportedly visited Sirte and used the station to address the public, as did Hassan al-Karami, who in September 2015, called upon Sirte's residents to pledge allegiance to ISIL before the end of the month, threatening to prosecute offenders before a "religious court" that would be established in the city in early October 2015.²²

4. Ajdabiya

34. Member State officials explained that the ISIL cell in Ajdabiya is composed of former Ansar al Charia fighters from Noufaliya and Ajdabiya,²³ led by Abdellah Khattal. The cell is reportedly coordinating between ISIL affiliates in the eastern and the central regions of Libya and is considered as a rear base for ISIL activities in Benghazi.

¹⁸ Essam Zuber, "Libya officials: Jihadis driving IS from eastern stronghold", *AP*, 30 July 2015.

¹⁹ Member State-provided information.

²⁰ "ISIL 'brutally' quells rebellion in Libya's Sirte", *Al Jazeera*, 17 August 2015.

²¹ "Alleged Isil gunmen in Libya 'seize radio station'", *The Telegraph*, 13 February 2015.

²² ISIL demands allegiance from Libya's Sirte residents, *World Bulletin*, 15 September 2015.

²³ The Ansar al Charia cell in Ajdabiya was created early 2013.

C. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant expansion in Libya

35. In its propaganda,²⁴ ISIL has announced “military and security operations” in Tripoli, Misrata, Tubruq, al-Bayda, Sabratah and Ajdabiya. It also boasts continuous control of “neighbourhoods in Derna and Benghazi in addition to complete control of the seacoast region stretching from Buqarin to Binjawad, which includes a number of cities and regions, most important of which are Sirte, al-Amirah, Harawah, Umm Qindal, and an-Nawfaliyyah”.²⁵

36. Currently, ISIL seems limited in its ability to expand quickly from its current stronghold. According to several Member States, while ISIL is able to perpetrate terror attacks in any part of Libya, its limited number of fighters does not allow for rapid territorial expansion. Furthermore, in contrast to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the relative sectarian homogeneity in Libya prevents ISIL from taking advantage of sectarian rifts and societal discord to quickly increase its domestic recruitment base.

37. ISIL will likely need local alliances should it attempt to gain further territorial control. Such local alliances are, however, difficult to build in an environment in which loyalties are fluid and not primarily contingent on ideology. The events in Derna in May and June 2015 are a case in point. ISIL, which was a relatively newly established group in Libya, was not very well organized and lacked a strong central command structure in Derna. Consequently, as one Member State and several subject matter experts pointed out, when ISIL overplayed its hand, it was pushed out by the very same local allies that had “allowed” it into the city in the first place. ISIL simply miscalculated its strength in the city and its ability to go from having an alliance with the local power centre to taking over the local power centre. That said, despite the present limitations to ISIL expansion in Libya, the potential for further territorial expansion remains a risk.²⁶

VII. Propaganda

38. As far as the quality of ISIL propaganda is concerned, support from emissaries has clearly made a difference in the media and propaganda capabilities of ISIL in Libya. For example, the video showing the horrific beheadings of the Egyptian Coptic Christians, disseminated in February 2015, clearly demonstrated a quality of media production very similar to that of ISIL propaganda in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. However, as one Member State pointed out, although the beheadings took place in January 2015, the video was not released until February, demonstrating that ISIL in Libya required time, and potentially outside help, to produce the video in a professional manner.

39. Recently, professionally produced media and propaganda material seems to be released closer in time to the actual events portrayed in the material. This demonstrates that, either a certain amount of knowledge and transfer of skills have taken place, or a better technical connection to media production cells outside Libya

²⁴ *Dabiq*, issue No. 11, September 2015.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ See also, for example: Farouk Chothia, “Islamic State gains Libya foothold”, *BBC*, 24 February 2015.

has been established (for instance, raw material is sent outside the country and is then transformed into propaganda material).

40. ISIL in Libya has learned to employ its newly established propaganda machine not only for internal recruitment but also to issue external threats as a scare tactic. For example, its propaganda machine threatened in February 2015 that ISIL would flood Europe with refugees.²⁷ Interestingly, more recently, the central propaganda machinery of ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic released several statements urging Muslims not to immigrate to Europe.²⁸

41. Hassan al-Karami has recently been publicized as a leading ISIL propaganda figure and presented as the ISIL “mufti” in Sirte. Al-Karami appeared in video footage addressing a group of people in the Ribat Mosque in Sirte,²⁹ declaring Sirte an Islamic emirate subject to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi³⁰ and announcing the forthcoming beheading of 12 captured leaders of a local anti-ISIL insurrection. Al-Karami also said that ISIL in Sirte would continue to expand “against the will of all the infidels”. Al-Karami is believed to have previously been part of AAB. His reputation grew as a preacher in Benghazi and then later in Derna after the town became the first hotbed of ISIL activity in Libya. His first appearance as an ISIL preacher in Sirte dates back to May 2015.³¹

42. Meanwhile, AAB runs a radio station and its propaganda wing, Al Raya Media Foundation, relaunched its social media presence in March 2015. AAB propaganda is also relayed via social media accounts associated with AQIM.³² Its postings report on clashes with rivals and boast of efforts to provide social services for the population, as demonstrated in a posting in late March 2015 showing Ansar al Charia fighters opening a general services office in Benghazi, with construction and other service vehicles driving through the streets.³³

43. ISIL has also engaged in openly bellicose rhetoric against local and regional Al-Qaida affiliates in Libya and in the region. For example, ISIL supporters in Libya have called “for the death of Mokhtar Belmokhtar”³⁴ for his alleged role in supporting the groups that drove ISIL out of Derna. In an interview reported in *Dabiq*,³⁵ Al-Qahtani vehemently attacks Al-Qaida affiliates in Libya, accusing them of being responsible for the loss of Derna. According to one Member State, clashes between ISIL, AAD and AAB over the control of checkpoints have also been reported.

²⁷ See, for example: Eugénie Bastié, “L’État islamique menace d’envoyer 500.000 migrants en Europe depuis la Libye”, *Le Figaro*, 19 February 2015, or “L’organisation État islamique menace l’Europe d’un ‘chaos’ en Méditerranée”, *Le Point*, 19 February 2015.

²⁸ “IS Fighter Discourages Muslims from Migrating to Europe in Video”, *SITE Intelligence Group*, 16 September 2015, and “IS Fighters in Video Warn Migrants about Living in Europe, Say They Must not Leave ‘Caliphate’”, *SITE Intelligence Group*, 17 September 2015.

²⁹ Callum Paton, “Isis in Libya: Who is Hassan al-Karami the spiritual leader of Islamic State in Sirte?”, *International Business Times*, 25 August 2015.

³⁰ “Main events of the week”, *The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center*, 2 September 2015.

³¹ Callum Paton, “Isis in Libya: Who is Hassan al-Karami the spiritual leader of Islamic State in Sirte?”, *International Business Times*, 25 August 2015.

³² Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al Sharia Libya relaunched social media sites”, *The Long War Journal*, 15 April 2015.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Callum Paton, “Isis in Libya: Militant group orders death of elusive al-Qaeda jihadi Mokhtar Belmokhtar”, *International Business Times*, 25 August 2015.

³⁵ *Dabiq*, 11th edition [September 2015].

VIII. Treatment of the civilian population

44. According to officials from a Member State, during the initial phase of its presence in Libya, local ISIL sympathizers opted for a “soft infiltration” of urban centres. This tactic is similar to the initial stages of the development of ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic (see S/2014/815) and the ISIL affiliate in Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces in Afghanistan (see S/2015/648). However, as soon as ISIL gained a foothold, it imposed harsh practices on the local population, creating significant local resentment. Propaganda photos posted online show vehicles belonging to the group’s security personnel, who seek to enforce their radical interpretation of religion in and around Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya.³⁶ Before being driven out of Derna, ISIL had established a religious court and a religious police. It had also prohibited tobacco, imposed the wearing of face veils, forced underage girls into marriage with its fighters, and carried out atrocities against civilians, as well as public executions. These practices led part of the population to rally with SCMD.³⁷ In Sirte, ISIL also imposed draconian rules, including the establishment of a religious police and a ban on the sale of short-sleeved clothing; segregation of students in classrooms according to gender;³⁸ and registration of all commercial establishments in Sirte, thus making it possible to impose a tax on them.³⁹

45. However, viewed as an outsider group, ISIL is not embedded in local communities and has not succeeded in gaining the population’s support. According to a long-term observer of Libya, most of the population in Derna opposed the takeover by ISIL.⁴⁰ This could explain, in part, its inability to control large territory in Libya.

46. Ansar al Charia branches, on the other hand, initially sought to insert themselves into the social fabric⁴¹ of local society by providing social services in order to gain the community’s support. AAB, for example, runs anti-drug campaigns, blood and food drives, housing projects for the poor, school cleanings, garbage removals and bridge repairs. It also runs a cultural centre for women, provides security at the Al-Jala’ hospital in Benghazi and is reported to have opened a medical clinic for women and children. However, AAB reverted to armed action after the major offensive by Operation Dignity forces.⁴² In late January 2015, it began running “police” patrols and a religious court in Benghazi, at the same time, demolishing Sufi shrines. Within their outreach effort outside Libya, Ansar al Charia members are also reported to have been involved in providing humanitarian relief efforts in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁴³

³⁶ See also, for example: Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al Sharia photos focus on governance efforts near Benghazi”, *The Long War Journal*, 2 February 2015.

³⁷ Member State-provided information.

³⁸ Member State-provided information.

³⁹ “Main events of the week”, *The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center*, 2 September 2015.

⁴⁰ Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, Tim Lister and Jomana Karadsheh, “ISIS comes to Libya”, *CNN*, 18 November 2014.

⁴¹ Ludivoco Carlino, “Ansar al-Shari’a: Transforming Libya into a Land of Jihad”, *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 12, No. 1, The Jamestown Foundation (2014).

⁴² Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Rise and Decline of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya”, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, May 2015, vol. 18, pp. 104-118.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

IX. Foreign terrorist fighters

A. Foreign terrorist fighters from Libya

47. The foreign terrorist fighter issue is not new to Libya, which has been the home country of a significant number of combatants who fought alongside Al-Qaida associates in Afghanistan in the 1980s⁴⁴ and Iraq after 2003.⁴⁵ According to documents seized in Sinjar in Iraq in 2007 containing personal data about foreign terrorist fighters in Iraq, the largest per capita contingent of such fighters came from Libya.⁴⁶

48. In the early months after the regime change in 2011, Libya became a location for training camps for foreign terrorist fighters heading to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. According to a *Small Arms Survey* report, several waves of Libyan foreign terrorist fighters have travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic since 2012.⁴⁷ Libyan nationals were among the largest groups of foreign terrorist fighters killed in the Syrian Arab Republic, with 21 per cent of those killed, as at June 2013.⁴⁸ However, Member State officials pointed out to the Monitoring Team that since 2014, the flow of Libyan foreign terrorist fighters towards Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has slowed.

49. Since 2013, some of the Libyan foreign terrorist fighters have returned to their country because of their disillusionment and factional disputes between groups in the Syrian Arab Republic. Several Member States explained that these returnees formed the backbone of what later became the ISIL affiliate in the country. It established courts which sentenced civilians accused of violating its harsh social rules and officially pledged allegiance to the ISIL leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in November 2014.⁴⁹

50. In addition, recently, social media accounts reportedly used by ISIL supporters invited affiliates to opt for Libya instead of the Middle East. “Please rectify your intention if you are sitting home waiting to go to Shaam [Syria]. Libya needs you”, reads one social media post from June 2015.⁵⁰

B. Foreign terrorist fighters to Libya

51. All interlocutors of the Monitoring Team agreed that currently, ISIL is the main group in Libya attracting foreign terrorist fighters, and that foreigners dominate the top leadership structure of the group in Libya. However, despite its relatively sophisticated propaganda machinery, ISIL in Libya is not yet able to recruit internationally on the same scale as ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. For

⁴⁴ It has been estimated that at least 500 Libyans joined the “Arab-Afghans” who were fighting the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Gary Gambill, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)”, *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 3, No. 6, The Jamestown Foundation (2005).

⁴⁵ Of these, more than 60 per cent came from Derna and 24 per cent from Benghazi, both in the east of the country. Alison Pargeter, “Localism and radicalization in North Africa”, *International Affairs*, vol. 85, Issue 5, September 2009, p. 1044.

⁴⁶ Clare Lopez, Material Support to Terrorism: The Case of Libya, *Accuracy in Media*, 22 April 2014.

⁴⁷ *Small Arms Survey*, “There and Back. Trajectories of North African Foreign Fighters in Syria”. Issue Brief No. 3, July 2015.

⁴⁸ “Report Shows Libyan and Tunisian Jihadists Two Largest Groups of Foreign Fighters in Syria”, *Laroché Pac*, 11 August 2013.

⁴⁹ Center for Oriental Strategic Monitoring (Cosmonitor), “The fight of Libyans against the presence of ISIS and foreign fighters”, 8 July 2015.

⁵⁰ SITE Intelligence Group.

example, according to a Member State, there are no reported cases of European individuals having left Europe directly to travel to join ISIL in Libya.⁵¹ Furthermore, in contrast to ISIL in the Levant, no cases of families or women travelling as foreign terrorist fighters to the country have been reported to the Monitoring Team. As far as demographics are concerned, currently North African males comprise the largest group of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya.

52. Member States and international organizations have difficulty estimating the precise numbers of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya. However, the numbers do not appear to be insignificant. According to one Member State, around 2,000 ISIL fighters from Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Morocco and Mauritania have been deployed in Sirte, Tripoli and Derna. Furthermore, several Member States highlighted the risk that additional advances of ISIL in Libya could trigger a flow of more foreign terrorist fighters from the region and elsewhere into the country.

53. One obvious group of foreign terrorist fighters in Libya are members of AAS-T. According to officials from several Member States, this group is training fighters in Libya near the Tunisian border.⁵² Several Member State officials highlighted to the Monitoring Team that the perpetrators of the Bardo Museum and Sousse attacks in Tunisia had trained previously in Libya.⁵³ In addition, the military intervention in the Sahel resulted in the retreat of Al-Qaida affiliated fighters to Libya. These groups use the southern Libyan desert as a staging platform for attacks in the Sahel.

X. Financing

54. The focus of the international community on the financing of terrorist groups operating in Libya has been nowhere near that of its focus on the financing of terrorist groups operating in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, especially ISIL. As a result, evidence-based analytics are difficult, given significant information gaps and available information that can be contradictory. Information from several Member States points to the fact that ISIL operations in Libya do not appear nearly as lucrative as its operations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. However, no Member State has indicated that ISIL in Libya is lacking financial resources — at least for now. Thus, the group seems to be able to obtain sufficient funding to sustain its operations. In fact, several Member States even reported that members of other groups in Libya had switched to ISIL for financial reasons. Given the much smaller size of the ISIL fighting force in Libya and its more limited territorial presence, the “burn rate” (and therefore its funding needs) is necessarily smaller.

55. As a general rule, ISIL has proven adept at adjusting to local conditions, and if there is a revenue-generating activity that ISIL can exploit in the territory it controls, it will try to do so, as has been the case with oil and antiquities in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Information provided by a Member State.

⁵² Information provided by Member States.

⁵³ See Chris Stephen, “Tunisia gunman trained in Libya at same time as Bardo museum attackers”, *The Guardian*, 30 June 2015.

⁵⁴ Given that ISIL generates revenue from the illicit trade in cultural heritage from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization pointed out to the Monitoring Team that a risk remained that illicit antiquities smuggling might also become a revenue-generating tool for terrorist organizations in Libya. However, currently, no Member State highlighted this as source of funding for the groups covered in the present report.

56. Other terrorist groups with a presence in Libya, such as AQIM and Al Mourabitoun, use Libya as a safe haven and have a limited presence and influence there. Several Member States emphasized that AQIM and Al Mourabitoun use their networks in Libya to obtain logistical support for operations in the wider region. Consequently, it is likely that AQIM and Al Mourabitoun are also generating some funds as a result of criminal activities in Libya, but it is currently unclear to what extent.

A. Criminal activities and smuggling, in general

57. Libya is located “along some of the oldest trans-Saharan trade and trafficking routes to Europe”; thus, smuggling and the illicit economy are not new phenomena in Libya.⁵⁵ Smuggling already existed under the Qadhafi regime, in part tolerated and in part encouraged by the regime. In an address to local revolutionary committees in 1988, Qadhafi declared “What are black markets? They are people’s markets”.⁵⁶

58. However, the worsening domestic security situation resulted in a boon for a “vast array of criminal networks” that have made use of the current security vacuum to expand their operations,⁵⁷ thus providing a potential source of funding for listed terrorist groups operating in the country. The main types of smuggling in Libya include weapons, migrants, drugs, and other commodities, such as cigarettes and subsidized goods.⁵⁸ There are myriad smuggling routes in Libya,⁵⁹ and to the extent that a smuggling route at any point traverses territory controlled by a listed terrorist group, there is an opportunity to set up checkpoints and demand payment and/or to run protection rackets. Certainly, by expanding their territorial control, terrorist groups increase their ability to profit from the many smuggling routes crisscrossing Libya.

59. According to Member State information, both ISIL and Ansar al Charia are linked to, and coordinate with, criminal groups and benefit from local criminality to the extent that it is occurring in the areas under their control. Furthermore, a public report indicated that “[ISIL] has nurtured alliances with AQ-linked groups, profiting from criminal activities to expand its reach in the country”.⁶⁰ A Member State explained that the large-scale criminal economy in Libya, encompassing goods, drugs, migrants and weapons, presents an opportunity for any terrorist group to cooperate with local smuggling networks to raise funds. It is important to note that Benghazi, where AAB is present in a limited portion of the city and ISIL maintains some cells, is an important hub for illicit trafficking and trade throughout the Maghreb.⁶¹

60. With drug trafficking through Libya on the rise⁶² and the presence of listed terrorist groups on the coast, there is certainly a risk that listed groups could collaborate with traffickers and provide protection in return for a share from that

⁵⁵ Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses”, *United States Institute of Peace* (hereafter, “USIP report”), 2014, p. 5.

⁵⁶ Cited in USIP report, p. 7.

⁵⁷ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and others, “The Crisis in North Africa”, *Clingendael*, April 2015.

⁵⁸ USIP report at p. 9 and “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara”, *The Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime* (hereafter “Global Initiative report”), 11 May 2015, p. 2.

⁵⁹ USIP report, p. 20, and Global Initiative report, pp. 2 and 5.

⁶⁰ Rivka Azoulay, “Islamic State franchising”, *Clingendael*, April 2015, p. 35.

⁶¹ USIP report, p. 33, and Global Initiative report, p. 2.

⁶² Information provided by Member States.

trade; however, the Monitoring Team has not received any specific evidence from Member States that directly links ISIL or AAB to the regional drug trade.

61. Furthermore, AQIM and Al Mourabitoun have traditionally financed their activities through crime, including smuggling and kidnapping for ransom, and it is likely that AQIM and Al Mourabitoun are benefitting financially from smuggling in Libya, although the extent is unclear, given their more limited presence in the country.

B. Human smuggling and trafficking

62. Given recent international attention to the refugee and migrant crisis, the issue of human smuggling from the coast of Libya has also come to the fore. Libya serves as a nexus point for the Central Mediterranean Route, the name given to the migratory flow from North Africa to Malta and Italy through the Mediterranean Sea.⁶³ The various routes from Western Africa and the Horn in Africa converge on the Libyan coast before the perilous Mediterranean Sea crossing.⁶⁴

63. According to Frontex, “[i]n 2014, detections in the Central Mediterranean area reached a staggering level. More than 170,000 migrants arrived in Italy alone, representing the largest influx into one country in European Union history. [...] Syrians and Eritreans were the top two nationalities, but numerous Africans coming from Sub-Saharan regions also use this route”.⁶⁵ Between January and August 2015, the number of illegal border crossings using the Central Mediterranean route already exceeded 106,000.⁶⁶

64. Due to the decentralized nature of the smuggling networks, migrants and refugees typically do not pay for their journey in one lump sum, but instead are forced to use a “pay-as-you-go” method, paying different smugglers during different legs of their journey.⁶⁷ One Member State has indicated that individuals linked to AAB are profiting from refugee and migrant smuggling by extorting the smuggling networks. However, the Monitoring Team has not yet received Member State confirmation that AAB is itself managing networks to smuggle migrants, despite existing public information to this effect.⁶⁸

65. Furthermore, the Monitoring Team has not received Member State-confirmation of ISIL profiting, whether through “taxation” or otherwise, from the migrant and refugee smuggling networks in Libya. It is certainly possible that ISIL would attempt to tap into a smuggling route to the extent that it navigates its territory. Given the

⁶³ Frontex website, “Central Mediterranean Route”, accessed on 22 September 2015.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Frontex website, “Migratory Routes Map”, accessed on 22 September 2015.

⁶⁷ According to the USIP report, the majority of migrants pay the equivalent of 800 to 1,000 United States dollars for the journey to Libya, and double that amount for onward travel to Europe. USIP report, p. 15; see also, “The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011, pp. 14, 42; and Global Initiative report, p. 4. In the Global Initiative report (p. 4), the cost of the boat trip across the Mediterranean Sea was estimated at between 1,500 and 1,900 dollars.

⁶⁸ One public report indicated that Ansar al Charia ran a network that smuggled migrants through Kufra (south-east Libya) to Ajdabiya for subsequent travel to Europe from Libyan ports. Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (editors), “Jihadism in Africa”, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2015.

ISIL penchant for extreme brutality and its public executions, the smugglers who are trying to run a business, albeit an illegal one, may be taking extra care to avoid contact with ISIL and its cohorts.⁶⁹ That being said, at least one public report indicates that a human smuggling route passes through Sirte on its way to western Libya.⁷⁰ Furthermore, ISIL has reportedly targeted migrants and refugees in different parts of Libya,⁷¹ indicating that ISIL can strike at migrants and refugees even if they are not passing through an ISIL stronghold.

66. Nonetheless, based on discussions with a number of Member States and an international organization, currently, it does not appear that migrant smuggling generates significant revenue for ISIL in Libya. Member States did, however, express concern over the issue and noted that it is one to watch closely. If ISIL is able to expand its territory, especially along the coast, its ability to benefit from migrant and refugee smuggling would increase. Given the decentralized structure of human smuggling networks in the region, even if ISIL were to align itself or take command of a local network within the territory that it controls, it would not be able to profit from the entire value chain of the journey from the starting point to the final destination.⁷²

C. Extortion and theft

67. ISIL engages in extortion, intimidation and armed robbery.⁷³ However, it has yet to establish in Libya the elaborate and organized extortion rackets that it runs in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq,⁷⁴ where it “taxes” every aspect of the economy in the territory under its control.⁷⁵ According to a Member State, the extortion in Libya seems ad hoc and more targeted at certain groups or individuals within Sirte, where, for example, ISIL reportedly looted and destroyed the homes of local politicians.⁷⁶ Furthermore, other Member States indicated that ISIL was preparing to launch a more organized “taxation” system in Sirte, and that it even envisaged establishing a state-like system in Libya, inspired by its quasi-bureaucratic organization in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.

68. The report of the Libya Panel referred to allegations that in October 2013 an Ansar al Charia commando group robbed a Central Bank cash transport vehicle in Sirte with spoils amounting to as much as \$54 million (see [S/2015/128](#)).⁷⁷ According to one Member State, ISIL has also robbed banks.⁷⁸ More recently, however, press reports indicated that ISIL has closed all the banks in Sirte and demanded that the banks

⁶⁹ Information provided by a Member State.

⁷⁰ Global Initiative report, p. 5.

⁷¹ Louisa Loveluck, “86 Eritrean migrants ‘kidnapped by ISIL’ in Libya”, *The Telegraph*, 5 June 2015; “ISIL video purports to show killing of Ethiopians in Libya”, *Al Jazeera*, 19 April 2015; “Ethiopia mourns Christian nationals killed by ISIL”, *Al Jazeera*, 22 April 2015.

⁷² Information provided by a Member State and an international organization.

⁷³ Information provided by a Member State.

⁷⁴ Information provided by Member States.

⁷⁵ [S/2014/815](#), para. 69.

⁷⁶ Aaron Y. Zelin, “ISIS is ramping up its state-building project in its Libyan ‘capital’”, *Business Insider*, 12 August 2015.

⁷⁷ See also “Libya robbery: Sirte gunmen snatch \$54m from bank van”, *BBC*, 28 October 2013.

⁷⁸ Information provided by a Member State.

change to Islamic banking before reopening.⁷⁹ However, this could not be independently verified by the Monitoring Team at the time of the writing of this report.

69. Although ISIL in Libya has engaged in kidnappings, including cases of local kidnapping for ransom,⁸⁰ and this tactic has been an income stream for it in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq (see S/2014/815), the Monitoring Team has been unable to confirm that ISIL in Libya is systematically generating revenue through kidnapping for ransom.

D. Oil

70. Libya possesses the largest proved crude oil reserves in Africa.⁸¹ Furthermore, the country is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports for most of its revenue. According to the International Monetary Fund, “[h]ydrocarbons have long dominated the Libyan economy, accounting for more than 70 per cent of gross domestic product, more than 95 per cent of exports, and approximately 90 per cent of government revenue”.⁸² Oil revenues, therefore, are clearly critical to the Libyan economy.

71. Consequently, given the ability of ISIL to reap significant funds from exploiting oil resources in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the question that immediately presents itself is whether ISIL would be able to create a similar revenue stream in oil-rich Libya, especially given its stronghold in Sirte, near the vast oil reserves of the Sirte basin. Moreover, ISIL has gone so far as to admit its desire to control Libya’s oil and gas resources and deny Europe access to them. In the latest issue of *Dabiq*, the supposed delegated leader of the Libyan Wilayat is quoted referring to Libya’s vast resources and stating that ISIL control of Libya would result in a breakdown for Italy and other European States, given their reliance on Libya’s oil and gas resources.⁸³

72. However, the majority of the Monitoring Team’s interlocutors, including Member States, currently assess that ISIL is unlikely to be able to generate assets through the exploitation of the Libyan hydrocarbon sector, at least not to any significant extent. The general view is that ISIL does not currently generate any revenue of note directly from that sector and, given the particulars of Libya’s oil industry, the group is unlikely to be able to do so in the future, unless its presence in Libya is significantly strengthened and its territory vastly expanded.

73. ISIL currently lacks the capacity to secure, hold and manage oil fields and related oil infrastructure in Libya.⁸⁴ In addition, Libya has no established domestic black market for smuggled crude, and the location of ISIL in Libya would make it difficult to access potential markets in the region.⁸⁵ Distances between its current stronghold in Sirte towards the land borders of the country are larger than in the Syrian Arab Republic or Iraq where the territory under ISIL control borders neighbouring countries. Transportation of stolen crude would be problematic as it would require a large number of tanker trucks given that ISIL does not control a pipeline or a port with

⁷⁹ “Wilayat Tarabulus militants close banks in Libya’s Tripolitania”, *Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report*, 16 September 2015.

⁸⁰ Information provided by a Member State.

⁸¹ United States Energy Information Administration, “Libya”, last update on 25 November 2014.

⁸² Ralph Chami and others, “Libya beyond the Revolution: Challenges and Opportunities”, *IMF*, 2012.

⁸³ *Dabiq*, 11th edition.

⁸⁴ Information provided by a Member State.

⁸⁵ Information provided by a Member State.

an oil loading terminal.⁸⁶ An operation by sea using low-capacity vessels would not be cost-effective, whereas the chartering of a tanker would be too visible and likely to be thwarted.⁸⁷ Furthermore, there is no evidence that ISIL has developed crude refining capability in Libya, including mobile refineries, as it managed to do in the Syrian Arab Republic, and it currently does not control any of the five Libyan refineries.⁸⁸

74. Thus, the current primary concern is not whether ISIL can generate funds from controlling oil fields, but whether it can significantly disrupt production at oil fields and create a situation in which oil installations cease operation due to the unpredictable security situation, thereby denying Libya critical revenue and possibly further destabilizing the country. Consequently, sabotage and denial of revenue appear to have been important elements of the ISIL strategy so far. Groups affiliated with ISIL have attacked several oil fields in Libya, including the Mabrouk, Bahi, and Ghani fields.⁸⁹ However, ISIL forces have not made an effort to hold those fields. The intent behind the attacks appears to be to take the facilities offline or to kidnap expatriate workers.⁹⁰

E. Public salary payments

75. Several Member States emphasized the risk that listed terrorist groups operating in Libya, such as ISIL and AAB, may be benefitting from the established system of government salary payments. In Libya, the public sector is the largest employer of Libyans. According to a World Bank report, in 2012, 84 per cent of those employed worked in the public sector, most with open-ended contracts.⁹¹ Thus, it is possible that Libyan members of listed terrorist groups operating in Libya continue to be paid salaries. Furthermore, to the extent that ordinary Libyans living in areas controlled by listed terrorist groups are paid a salary, there is a risk of diversion by terrorist groups through outright extortion and theft. According to one Member State, the Central Bank in Tripoli “pays all parties involved in the crisis in Libya in a non-partisan manner”.

F. Outside sources

76. As discussed previously, emissaries sent by the ISIL central command in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq have travelled to meet with ISIL in Libya. According to one Member State, to the extent that emissaries are bringing funds with them, this finance stream is unlikely to be a major one at this point.

77. At least one media report stated that ISIL is using couriers and hawalas to send money into Libya but that, thus far, the amounts have been relatively small.⁹² Moreover, a Member State told the Monitoring Team that it was particularly concerned about ISIL ties to its branch in Libya, and that ISIL was probably using

⁸⁶ Information provided by Member States.

⁸⁷ Information provided by Member States.

⁸⁸ Information provided by Member States.

⁸⁹ Information provided by a Member State.

⁹⁰ Information provided by Member States.

⁹¹ “Labor Market Dynamics in Libya”, *World Bank Group*, 2015, p. 10.

⁹² Dion Nissenbaum and Maria Abi-Habib, “Islamic State Solidifies Foothold in Libya to Expand Reach”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 May 2015.

Libya as a regional hub to support other ISIL affiliates in North Africa. That Member State further indicated that the so-called Sinai province of ISIL coordinated the retrieval of funding from Libya, thereby signifying that ISIL has been able to deliver money into Libya.

78. AAB has also received funds through donations and charities.⁹³ However, no Member State provided further specifics to the Monitoring Team on this source of funding in Libya.

XI. Arms

A. Weapons and ammunition

79. Several Member States, international organizations and subject matter specialists highlighted that all groups in Libya, including ISIL and other Al-Qaida affiliated groups, benefit from the illicit domestic trade in weapons and ammunition⁹⁴ and currently do not experience a shortage of weapons and ammunition. However, none of the Monitoring Team's interlocutors were able to provide details of that trade that would allow for an analysis concerning the potential flows of weapons to Al-Qaida affiliated groups within the country.

80. In addition to the illicit domestic trade in arms and ammunitions, since the fall of the previous regime, weapons and ammunition originating from Libya have also played an important role in the supply for conflicts in the Sahel region. In its 2013 report, the Libya Panel highlighted this issue.⁹⁵ This also includes weapons transfers by groups associated with Al-Qaida to similar organizations within the region. Several Member States explained that Ansar Bait al Maqdis, operating in the Sinai Peninsula, received weapons and fighters from Libya over the past year.

81. Several Member States highlighted their concern about the illicit proliferation of MANPADS looted from Libyan military storage facilities. However, thus far, no Member State was able to link those weapons to an Al-Qaida-associated group in the country.

B. Improvised explosive devices

82. In addition to conventional weapons and the use of acts of extreme violence, such as assassinations or beheadings, Al-Qaida-associated groups established in Libya frequently use improvised explosive devices.⁹⁶ Various international organizations engaged by the Monitoring Team on this issue had difficulties agreeing on the precise number of improvised explosive device incidents in Libya, owing to slightly varying counting and tracking methods. Nevertheless, they all agreed that such incidents had clearly increased during the last year, although they remained significantly lower than in Iraq or Afghanistan.

⁹³ United States Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2014", June 2015.

⁹⁴ See also the final report of the Libya Panel (S/2015/128), para. 187.

⁹⁵ Final report of the Libya Panel (S/2013/99), paras. 112-115.

⁹⁶ See, for example: Libyan Institute for Advanced Studies, "Beheadings, Car Bombings, and the Islamic State's Expansion in Libya. ISIS Libya Report", 13 July 2015, pp. 41, 120.

83. The main targets of improvised explosive device attacks continue to be state representatives and the security forces,⁹⁷ as well as foreign installations, including embassies. For example, the French embassy was attacked with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in April 2013,⁹⁸ and such devices damaged the Algerian embassy in January⁹⁹ and the Iranian embassy in February 2015.¹⁰⁰ However, according to information received by the Monitoring Team from international observers, the main victims of such attacks in Libya are civilians. According to a Member State, the improvised explosive devices were mainly used in Benghazi and Derna, but more recently, also in Tripoli and Misrata. Several Member States confirmed to the Monitoring Team that all Al-Qaida-associated groups in Libya possess significant quantities of explosives, in particular TNT, looted from storage facilities of the previous regime.

84. One area of concern is the transfer of knowledge. There is a serious risk that the significant number of fighters that returned in the past two years from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and joined Al-Qaida-associated groups in Libya will transfer knowledge and expertise in the construction of complex and sophisticated improvised explosive device designs to Libyan groups, including those designs utilized in suicide attacks. For example, in December 2013, a suicide bomber attacked a checkpoint in Benghazi.¹⁰¹ Although LIFG had previously used suicide bombings as one of its tactics,¹⁰² the country was spared from such attacks in the past few years. The fact that international observers record a return to Libya of this tactic¹⁰³ is a serious concern. Given this rising threat, the development of counter-improvised explosive device capacities in Libya by the national authorities should be a priority.

XII. Recommendations

85. The effectiveness of United Nations Security Council sanctions measures, including those under the Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime, relies in equal parts on both the implementation by Member States outside the area of concern and the implementation by the Member State governing the area of concern. Therefore, the current political and security challenges within Libya present a hurdle for implementation and limit the range of concrete additional measures that could be suggested.

86. The backbone of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Regime is the Al-Qaida Sanctions List. A proper targeting of this list facilitates the effective implementation by all Member States of the travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo measures against listed individuals and entities. The current list, although it includes many Al-Qaida-associated groups active in Libya, as well as a range of significant individuals, still contains gaps as far as the current situation is concerned.

⁹⁷ See, for example: “Benghazi bomb kills Libyan special forces: report”, *AFP*, 1 September 2015.

⁹⁸ See, for example: David D. Kirkpatrick, “Car Explodes Outside the French Embassy in Libya”, *The New York Times*, 23 April 2013.

⁹⁹ See, for example: “IS claims bomb attack on Algerian embassy in Libya”, *AFP, The Jordan Times*, 17 January 2015.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example: “ISIL-Linked group claims Iran embassy attack in Libya”, *Al Jazeera*, 22 February 2015.

¹⁰¹ “Libya’s First suicide attack kills seven near Benghazi”, *BBC*, 22 December 2013.

¹⁰² Eric Denécé, “Note D’Actualité No 255 Le Groupe Islamique de Combat Libyen”, *Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement*, 29 August 2011.

¹⁰³ Jane Hunter, “2015: an epidemic of suicide bombs”, *Action on Armed Violence*, 10 August 2015.

87. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee issue a note verbale to all Member States encouraging further listings relating to Al-Qaida-associated individuals and entities operating in Libya, in particular listings relating to ISIL in Libya.

88. During the Monitoring Team's discussions with Member State officials, it became clear that foreign terrorist fighters continue to flock to Libya to join Al-Qaida-associated groups in the country. These fighters and previous waves of Libyan returnees used air transport in addition to travel via land and sea. Consequently, enhanced capabilities concerning border controls, in particular of flows through international airports, which are important chokepoints for foreign terrorist fighters entering the country, can be effective in inhibiting the travel of listed individuals.

89. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee issue a note verbale to all Member States emphasizing that the travel of foreign terrorist fighters via international airports to Libya is a risk factor, reminding Member States of the possibility of using advanced passenger information provided by airlines operating in their territories to detect the departure of individuals listed on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List,¹⁰⁴ and urging those who have not yet done so to employ particular vigilance, in accordance with their national legislation, as far as travel of individuals to Libya is concerned.

90. The Government of Libya is currently faced with a range of political and security challenges. Therefore, increasing the capability and capacity of border agencies in Libya and neighbouring countries to disrupt flows of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of Libya will likely depend on international support.

91. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee hold a meeting between the Committee, the Government of Libya, appropriate neighbouring Member States, and relevant United Nations entities, as well as with the participation of the Monitoring Team, to jointly analyse potential capacity gaps, in particular as they relate to border controls and counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, and discuss potential measures on how these gaps could be closed.

92. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is currently working on various projects relating to foreign terrorist fighters and the interconnection between terrorism and organized crime. These projects might be beneficial for countering the threat of groups associated with Al-Qaida, including ISIL in Libya.

93. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee encourage INTERPOL, in cooperation with the Government of Libya and appropriate neighbouring Member States, to develop a specific project enabling information exchange between Member States on foreign terrorist fighters and the interconnection between smuggling and terrorism finance.

¹⁰⁴ See Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), para. 9.

Annex

Current status of the Al-Qaida List concerning Libya

