



Target Capabilities List User Guide



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I. Purpose

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) Implementation Project is the method by which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will update the TCL and implement the doctrine of capabilities-based preparedness as outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines. The goal of the project is to provide more user-friendly, accessible, and credible capability targets with which to link all preparedness cycle activities to strengthen preparedness across prevention, protection, response, and hazard mitigation capabilities.

The purpose of this document is twofold. First, it explains the history of the TCL and why FEMA is leading the effort to streamline and revise the content found in TCL Version 2.0 through the establishment of updated *Target Capabilities*. Secondly, the document provides an executive summary of the updated *Target Capabilities*, how they can be applied to identify capability targets and gaps, and explains how jurisdictions may leverage the *Target Capabilities* to build capabilities along each phase of the Preparedness Cycle.

II. Background

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) -“National Preparedness”¹ directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. The *National Preparedness Guidelines*² (previously the *National Preparedness Goal*), published in September 2007, sets forth the doctrine, priorities, and systematic approach for enhancing the level of preparedness across the Nation.

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) Version 2.0,³ also released in September 2007, supports the *National Preparedness Guidelines (Guidelines)* by providing guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that Federal, State, local, tribal, and non-governmental entities should develop and maintain in order to ensure readiness for all-hazards. The TCL provides references and baseline information for 37 capabilities across the prevention, protection, response, and hazard mitigation mission areas. While the 37 capabilities found in the TCL are not the only capabilities that should be built and maintained, they are those that have the highest payoff in terms of national readiness.

The TCL is derived from the tasks identified to be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the 15 *National Planning Scenarios*⁴ that are representative of the range, scope, magnitude, and complexity of major incidents, including terrorism, natural disasters, and other hazards.

The TCL is also designed to serve as a reference document to assist jurisdictions in understanding what actions they may take to build and sustain capabilities, as well as to help

¹ Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8 is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html>.

² The National Preparedness Guidelines is available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf.

³ The Target Capabilities List is available at <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf>.

⁴ *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act*, Public Law 109-295, 109th Congress, 2nd session. (January 3, 2006), §645.

align the development and delivery of Federal preparedness assistance programs. Its intent is not to replace discipline-specific efforts already underway among government and private-sector partners, or to replace any of the DHS strategic priorities and policies outlined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS),⁵ the National Response Framework (NRF),⁶ or the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)⁷.

III. TCL Evolution

The TCL is a living document. It is designed to be modified to fit the changing preparedness landscape and to address stakeholder recommendations for improvement. Through continued engagement with the stakeholder community, FEMA obtained the input necessary to inform updating the content and structure of the TCL.

Users have collectively recommended improvements to both the structure and level of specificity contained within the TCL 2.0. Specifically, stakeholders commented that the TCL should be rooted in measurable and objective outcomes in order to best assist jurisdictions in determining their respective levels of preparedness. Section 646 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)⁸ reiterates this need by requiring FEMA to create guidelines that are “specific, flexible, and measurable.”⁹

Stakeholders also noted that the TCL 2.0 suggests that all jurisdictions require the same level of capability regardless of population or other applicable risk factors such as proximity to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). Stakeholders recommended that the next iteration of the TCL identify different capability targets for jurisdictions with varying risks and characteristics.

PKEMRA reaffirmed the National need to build capability in accordance with risk by charging FEMA with defining “risk-based target capabilities for Federal, State, local, tribal, and non-governmental entities.”¹⁰ PKEMRA directed that the risk-based targets include the “variables of threat, vulnerability, and consequences related to population, areas of high population density, critical infrastructure, coastline, and international borders.”¹¹

Based on the abovementioned guidance, FEMA has initiated an effort to enhance TCL by developing an updated *Target Capability* for each of the 37 capabilities described in TCL 2.0. The effort, entitled the “TCL Implementation Project,” is intended to better assist jurisdictions or entities understand: How prepared are we? How prepared do we need to be? What should we do to close the gaps?

⁵ Information on the *National Incident Management System* can be found at <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/>.

⁶ The *National Response Framework* is available at the NRF Resource Center, <http://www.fema.gov/NRF>.

⁷ See <http://www.dhs.gov/nipp> for additional information on the *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*.

⁸ The text of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006 can be found at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.3721>

⁹ *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act*, Public Law 109-295, 109th Congress, 2nd session. (January 3, 2006), §846 (c).

¹⁰ *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act*, Public Law 109-295, 109th Congress, 2nd session. (January 3, 2006), §846 (a).

¹¹ *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act*, Public Law 109-295, 109th Congress, 2nd session. (January 3, 2006), §652 (d).

TCL Evolution Priorities

- *Increased usability* – The new *Target Capabilities* are intuitive, concise, and consistent with how communities think about building capabilities.
- *Alignment with other preparedness documents* – The new *Target Capabilities* reflect consistent alignment with industry standards, planning guidance, laws, and Federal policies and doctrine such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF), and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
- *Emphasis on outcome-oriented, measurable performance metrics* – The new *Target Capabilities* establish measurable targets for jurisdictions that allow them to assess readiness status and identify how they may build capabilities.
- *Provision of jurisdiction-specific capability criteria* – The new *Target Capabilities* provide guidance on incorporating risk factors in determining desired levels of capability for jurisdictions of different size and characteristics.

IV. Intended Audience

As a whole, the *Target Capabilities* are being written chiefly for those who have a responsibility to ensure that their jurisdiction is prepared for large-scale incidents. As such, the intended audience includes elected and appointed leaders (e.g. Federal department or agency heads, State Governors, mayors, Tribal leaders, and city or county officials) and emergency management and homeland security practitioners across State, local, and Tribal government.

Use of term “Jurisdiction”

Though this document will refer to the end-user of *Target Capabilities* as “jurisdictions,” this should not be confused with the intent to define capabilities in terms of the level of government (city or county) or entity (mass transit system) that has authority to deliver a specific capability.

Each *Target Capability* is designed for a specific audience.

For example, the *WMD/Hazardous Materials Rescue Capability* may be most utilized by fire chiefs and HazMat operators, while the *Animal Disease Emergencies Capability* may be utilized more often by State veterinarians and public health officials. While some of the language in each *Target Capability* reflects this subject area specificity, FEMA has designed the *Target Capabilities* to be read by all emergency response practitioners, regardless of their specialization.

V. TCL Implementation Project Development

FEMA will release *Target Capabilities* on a rolling basis beginning with the following target capabilities:

- Animal Disease Emergencies
- Multi-Agency Coordination (EOC Management)
- On-Site Incident Command
- Intelligence
- Mass Transit Protection
- WMD/Hazardous Materials Rescue

Because the *Target Capabilities* are only as strong as the validation they receive from the homeland security community, FEMA will first circulate the drafts for review and comment through the FEMA Regions and stakeholder groups. Following the broad national review, subject-matter experts will assist FEMA with adjudicating all comments received. Once complete, FEMA will release the *Target Capability* drafts for formal review through the Federal

Register. Comments received will be incorporated into the documents or catalogued for future consideration. The first six draft *Target Capabilities* are planned for circulation in calendar year (CY) 2009 and FEMA plans to complete development of the remaining suite of target capabilities by 2010.

VI. Target Capabilities

The *Target Capabilities* aim to streamline the TCL to provide jurisdictions with clearer guidance on target levels of capability in order to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a catastrophic natural disaster and/or large scale terrorist attack. Each of the 37 target capabilities described in the TCL will be revised and released as *Target Capabilities*. The *Target Capabilities* will be different from iterations contained within TCL Version 2.0 as information will be presented in a series of three (3), inter-related charts illustrated in Figure VI-1 that define:

Scope

The intent of the *Target Capabilities* is to provide performance targets for jurisdictions to build capabilities against through preparedness programs and activities to demonstrate they can deliver a capability during a large-scale disaster or terrorist attack.




Figure VI-1 – Target Capability Components

The following sections explain in greater detail the three components of a *Target Capability*. Where appropriate, examples have been added for clarification. The following sections are not intended to be a technical assistance resource or training guide. Rather, they are intended to provide readers with an understanding of the TCL and updated *Target Capabilities* such that they can be immediately utilized for preparedness purposes.

VII. Classes

The first chart of each *Target Capability* defines Classes. Classes account for reasonable differences among jurisdictions that possess varying risk characteristics per the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Risk data and modeling, subject-matter expertise, and historical perspective (e.g., after-action reports) will be used to group jurisdictions into no more than

- Classes – Key Points**
- Acknowledge that different jurisdictions have varying capability needs.
 - Not every risk variable is relevant for each capability.
 - Jurisdictions may belong to different Classes for different capabilities.

five Classes per capability. Population and population density may drive the initial placement of jurisdictions, and adjustments will be based on proximity to critical infrastructure and other factors specific to a given capability. Other factors may serve to drive the delineation of Classes based upon the unique characteristics of the 37 Capabilities.

Classes ultimately help define *who* should possess *how much* of a capability. Classes will most often be based on the level of government or entity with statutory authority to deliver a capability – either a city or county government. This is consistent with the central tenet of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that most emergency situations are handled locally. However, the end-user will determine how they will be organized to build and sustain a capability and the *Target Capabilities* present risk factors based on a “jurisdiction or entity” perspective.

Defining preparedness at the statutory authority level should be combined with the emphasis FEMA has placed on regional collaboration. While preparedness will be measured by political jurisdictions, the effort to improve preparedness must be a collective effort. The *Target Capabilities* do not suggest that any entity is expected to deliver a capability by itself. Rather, they allow for jurisdictions and entities to access capabilities through mutual aid and regional collaboration.

Identifying Your Class

The Classes chart groups jurisdictions according to shared risk characteristics. End-users should self-identify which Class they belong to through a four (4) step process:

1. Determine who – city, county, State, or other jurisdiction or entity – has authority to deliver the capability.
2. Based on answer to number 1, identify the requisite Class based on primary risk factors defined in Section A of the “Classes Illustrated” table below. Note that Classes are not always initially identified by population factors. For example, the Mass Transit Protection *Capability* may use total modal passenger miles or number of unlinked passenger trips.
3. Consider the use of additional risk factors to determine whether or not the jurisdiction’s Class may be adjusted based on criterion defined in Section B of the “Classes Illustrated” table.
4. A Jurisdiction or entity may identify itself as belonging to a Class by virtue of meeting criteria for any one or more risk factors.

Classes Illustrated

1 →

RESPONSE CAPABILITY - WMD/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESCUE					
The capability to quickly assess a WMD/hazardous materials event (from either a natural hazard or a deliberate release); manage the rescue operations; rescue the victims; confine the hazard; and decontaminate the victims.					
I. Classes: Lead jurisdiction or entity risk considerations for capability building (based on meeting one or more of the criteria listed in each column). Classes can be defined by individual jurisdictions and entities or through a grouping of multiple jurisdictions.					
Risk Factors	Class One	Class Two	Class Three	Class Four	Class Five
A. Primary Risk Factors: Jurisdictions or entities are initially grouped into a Class by population and population density, and may be re-grouped based on additional risk factors set forth in B. Jurisdiction population may include tourist and commuter populations.					
Population	Jurisdictions or entities with population greater than 3 million	Jurisdictions or entities with population between 1 million and 3 million	Jurisdictions or entities with population between 500,000 and 1 million	Jurisdictions or entities with population between 100,000 and 500,000	Jurisdictions or entities with population less than 100,000
Population Density		Jurisdictions or entities with population greater than 500,000 and density greater than 10,000 people per square mile	Jurisdictions or entities with population between 250,000 and 500,000 and density greater than 5,000 people per square mile	Jurisdictions or entities with population less than 100,000 and density greater than 2,500 people per square mile	U.S. territories not identified in Classes I-IV
B. Additional Risk Factors: Jurisdictions or entities may move up in Class based on additional risk factors. Once a jurisdiction has identified their Class using primary risk factors, they should identify which additional risk factors they meet to determine Class placement. See End Notes (Table IV) below for risk factor definitions.					
Critical Infrastructure: Chemical Targets		Jurisdictions or entities less than 25 miles from a chemical plant	Jurisdictions or entities less than 10 miles from a DOD Chemical Stockpile Facility		
Commercial Targets		Jurisdictions or entities with major stadiums/ arenas and/or amusement theme parks	Jurisdictions or entities with major office buildings or hospitality facilities		
Energy Targets		Jurisdictions or entities with major oil and/or gas refineries, pipelines, natural gas storage	Jurisdictions or entities with major power generation facilities; substations or regional transmission centers		
Government Facility Targets	National capital		State capitals	Jurisdictions or entities adjacent to major U.S. Military Bases	
National Monuments and Icons Targets			Jurisdictions or entities with Monuments / Icons of National Significance		
Nuclear Targets			Counties less than 10 miles from a nuclear reactor	Counties less than 20 miles from a nuclear reactor	
Transportation Targets		Jurisdictions or entities with underground subway systems or major rail terminals	Jurisdictions or entities with rail yards containing large quantities of hazardous materials	Jurisdictions or entities with population centers located in close proximity to a fixed passenger or freight system that carries large quantities of hazardous materials	
		Jurisdictions or entities with major seaports (passenger and freight)	Jurisdictions or entities with major airports (passenger and freight)		
Likelihood of Major Incidents			Jurisdictions or entities at risk of major natural disasters (e.g., hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, major flood) and those along coastlines		

Component	Details
1. Class	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates a capability-specific group of jurisdictions or entities according to shared risk characteristics.
2. Primary Risk Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates a jurisdiction or entity's initial Class placement.
3. Additional Risk Factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates whether a jurisdiction or entity's Class is adjusted based on additional risk factors including proximity to CI/KR, proximity to areas prone to natural disasters, and proximity to international borders.

VIII. Performance Objectives

Once a jurisdiction or entity identifies its appropriate Class, capabilities are then expressed in terms of Performance Objectives in the second chart. Performance Objectives measure the critical few activities that should be completed in order for the capability to be achieved. To be consistent with NIMS span-of-control principles, *Target Capabilities* should have a limited number of Performance Objectives. Generally, no more than five or six Performance Objectives will be used to outline a single capability. Furthermore, Performance Objectives measure outcomes, or the end-state, and do not prescribe *how* the jurisdiction or entity must meet the objective.

Performance Objectives are linked to each specific Class. The associated performance measures define the target or scale of the benchmarks with which to build capabilities against. Some Performance Objectives will be universally applicable across all Classes (e.g., all jurisdictions

need to “rescue victims” as part of the WMD/Hazardous Materials Rescue capability). Conversely, some Performance Objectives may only apply to *some* Classes (e.g., rural jurisdictions may not need to “disseminate intelligence” as defined in the Intelligence capability). The target of a Performance Objective measure can also vary by Class. For example, large jurisdictions may be expected to rescue *more* victims within a certain time period than small jurisdictions.

Outcome-oriented Performance Objectives are important because they identify the highest priority actions necessary for a given capability. The focus on no more than five (5) Performance Objectives helps decision-makers understand the fundamental set of skills needed to demonstrate proficiency in a particular capability. As such, Performance Objectives are set to the best possible target, or measure. Measures have been established based on existing industry standards, subject-matter input, and a review of lessons learned and best practices from previous disasters.

Identifying Your Performance Objectives

The Performance Objective chart identifies each Class along the horizontal axis and the corresponding Performance Objectives along the vertical axis. End-users should identify which Performance Objectives and associated measures identify their capability targets through a two (2) step process:

1. Confirm which Class your jurisdiction belongs to based on risk factors identified in the Class chart.
2. On the Performance Objectives Chart, locate your Class across the horizontal axis and scan down for the listing of measures for each associated Performance Objectives.

Note: An end-user would only need to know the Performance Objectives and measures for their specific Class. While the Performance Objective chart displays the objectives across all classes, the end-user should only need to review their class objectives.

Performance Objectives Illustrated

1

2

3

4

5

II. Performance Objectives: Target outcomes and metrics are aligned by Class (Table I) and serve as guidance for capability building (outcomes are met through any combination of a jurisdiction or entity's resources, mutual aid, and other assistance)		Class One	Class Two	Class Three	Class Four	Class Five
1	Assess the event/incident	Ensure the ability to assess each of three separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by responding to each with personnel possessing operations-level HazMat competency in less than 5 minutes following the initial response.	Ensure the ability to assess each of two separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by responding to each with personnel possessing operations-level HazMat competency in less than 5 minutes following the initial response.	Ensure the ability to assess a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with personnel possessing operations-level HazMat competency in less than five minutes following the initial response.	Ensure the ability to assess a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with personnel possessing operations-level competency in less than five minutes following the initial response.	Ensure the ability to assess a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with personnel possessing operations-level HazMat competency in less than five minutes following the initial response.
2	Manage the HazMat rescue operations	Ensure the ability to manage each of three separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat rescue operations responding to each with a branch director/group supervisor in less than 30 minutes using responders with operations-level HazMat training and mission-specific competencies for HazMat rescue and PPE.	Ensure the ability to manage two separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat rescue operations by responding to each with a branch director/group supervisor in less than 30 minutes using responders with operations-level HazMat training and mission-specific competencies for HazMat rescue and PPE.	Ensure the ability to manage a WMD/HazMat rescue operation by responding with a branch director/group supervisor in less than 30 minutes using responders with operations-level HazMat training and mission-specific competencies for HazMat rescue and PPE.	Ensure the ability to manage a WMD/HazMat rescue operation with a branch supervisor in less than 30 minutes using responders with operations-level training and mission-specific competencies for HazMat rescue and PPE.	Ensure the ability to manage a WMD/HazMat rescue operation by responding with a branch director/group supervisor in less than 30 minutes using responders with operations-level HazMat training and mission-specific competencies for HazMat rescue and PPE.
3	Rescue the victims	Ensure the ability to respond to three separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes that can rescue and physically remove 600 non-ambulatory victims from each incident.	Ensure the ability to respond to two separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes that can rescue and physically remove 600 non-ambulatory victims from each incident.	Ensure the ability to respond to a WMD/HazMat event/incident with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes that can rescue and physically remove 300 non-ambulatory victims.	Ensure the ability to respond to a WMD/HazMat event/incident with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes that can rescue and physically remove 150 non-ambulatory victims.	Ensure the ability to respond to a WMD/HazMat event/incident with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes that can rescue and physically remove 60 non-ambulatory victims.
4	Control the hazard	Ensure the ability to control the hazard at each of three separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by arriving to each incident with at least one Type I HazMat Response Team in less than 30 minutes upon request, and have access to at least 8 HazMat Response Teams (any combination of Type I, II, and III).	Ensure the ability to control the hazard at each of two separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by arriving to each incident with at least one Type I HazMat Response Team in less than 30 minutes upon request, and have access to at least 4 HazMat Response Teams (any combination of Type I, II, and III).	Ensure the ability to control the hazard at a WMD/HazMat event/incident by arriving to the incident with at least one Type I HazMat Response Team in less than 30 minutes upon request, and have access to at least 2 HazMat Response Teams (any combination of Type I, II, and III).	Ensure the ability to control the hazard at a WMD/HazMat event/incident by arriving to the incident with at least one Type II HazMat Response Team in less than 30 minutes upon request, and have access to at least 1 HazMat Response Team.	Ensure the ability to control the hazard at a WMD/HazMat event/incident by arriving to the incident with at least one Type III HazMat Response Team in less than 60 minutes upon request, and have access to at least 1 Type I or II HazMat Response Team.
5	Decontaminate the victims	Ensure the ability to begin decontaminating 1,200 victims from each of three separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by responding to each with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 30 minutes.	Ensure the ability to begin decontaminating 1,200 victims from each of two separate/simultaneous WMD/HazMat events/incidents by responding to each with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 60 minutes.	Ensure the ability to begin decontaminating 600 victims from a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 60 minutes.	Ensure the ability to begin decontaminating 300 victims from a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 60 minutes.	Ensure the ability to begin decontaminating 120 victims from a WMD/HazMat event/incident by responding with HazMat trained and equipped personnel between 10 and 60 minutes.

Component	Details
1. Classes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirms the jurisdiction's Class based on the Classes Chart.
2. Performance Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates the critical few activities that must be completed to demonstrate a Performance Objective can be accomplished.
3. Performance Measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates the minimum benchmark, or measure, jurisdictions should strive to meet for each Performance Objective (Example is for Class 3).

IX. Resource Elements

Resource Elements provides a reference for resources to help meet *each* Performance Objective and are organized based on the emergency management “preparedness cycle” illustrated in Figure IX-1. The Resource Elements table references what each jurisdiction should accomplish with respect to plans, personnel/teams, equipment, training, and exercises to ensure that they can meet each Performance Objective target.

The Resource Elements table does not prescribe the precise amount of resources needed to deliver the capability. Based upon the targets and guidance provided by the *Target Capabilities*, each jurisdiction should determine the precise number of personnel, equipment, and other assets needed based upon its unique risks, planning objectives, geography, and governance structure. Jurisdictions should perform a gap analysis to determine their precise needs.



Figure IX-1 – Preparedness Cycle

Jurisdictions do not need to *own* each of the resources listed in the Resource Element charts. Rather, jurisdictions should demonstrate that they have *access* to such resources (e.g. through mutual aid or regional collaboration), and that such access can be granted during disasters in the time-scales identified in the Performance Objective (e.g., a jurisdiction must address whether the HazMat Response Team can get to the incident scene within 30 minutes if the nearest team lives 100 miles away).

Measuring Proficiency

Proficiency in a certain capability is measured by a jurisdiction's ability to meet the five Performance Objectives through a combination of plans, personnel/teams, equipment, training, and exercises.

Absent a real-world test, jurisdictions will never have absolute confirmation that they have the appropriate level of preparedness. However, plan reviews and exercises do provide a meaningful proxy for determining whether minimum capability benchmarks can be met. Jurisdictions that use the *Target Capabilities* for planning purposes should first identify and review Resource Element deficiencies against the resources listed in the *Planning, Personnel/Teams, Equipment, and Training* Resource Element tables. Once those gaps or deficiencies have been corrected, jurisdictions should employ exercises to understand whether or not they can meet a capability's performance objectives.

Resource Elements Illustrated

III. Resource Elements: (met through any combination of city or county resources, mutual aid, and other assistance)																															
PLANS																															
PERSONNEL/TEAMS																															
EQUIPMENT																															
1	<p>TRAINING AND EXERCISES</p> <p>The <i>Training and Exercise Table</i> identifies the essential tasks, or learning objectives, which personnel assigned to a WMD/HazMat Rescue operation must be able to complete. Learning objectives are consistent with the forthcoming FEMA <i>Training and Exercise Integrators Training Operations</i> (TEIT/O) Training Frameworks, which will emphasize the need for jurisdictions to build their capacity in relation to the capabilities noted in the TCL. Learning objectives are not meant to demonstrate a one-to-one relationship with NFPA 472 competencies. Learning objectives reflect skills and abilities that can be observed during an operation and do not represent all related awareness and pre-requisite course requirements.</p> <p>Learning objectives form the foundation for exercise conduct. The learning objectives listed below should form the foundation for how jurisdictions conduct operations-based exercises. Jurisdictions should ensure that personnel have taken courses that teach the ability to perform each listed learning objective. The list enables course developers to align existing courses to each Performance Objective, or as a starting point for establishing new courses.</p> <p>The Learning Objectives for each capability will be integrated into the National Homeland Security Training Program (currently under development), which will oversee and coordinate homeland security training programs, increase training capacity, and ensure standardization across programs. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) and the Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEG's) will also be updated. Information on HSEEP, including the latest version of the EEG Bulker Web-based tool and a template EEG for the WMD/HazMat Rescue capability are at www.hseep.dhs.gov.</p>																														
2	<p>Assess the Event/Incident</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1 Collect hazard and response information</td> <td>1 Conduct contamination surveys</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Conduct a risk evaluation, adequately addressing the risk of various actions to both responders and the public</td> <td>1 Monitor the movement of hazardous releases, including controlling building systems</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Obtain preliminary estimate of number of victims impacted by problem, including victims exposed to the hazardous materials</td> <td>1 Confirm the identity of samples through the use of two (preferably three) different instrument methodologies*</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Develop an incident detection, monitoring, and sampling strategy on the basis of a realistic assessment of the operational hazards</td> <td>1 Conduct plume modeling*</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Conduct offensive and defensive reconnaissance operations, as necessary, to gather intelligence on the situation</td> <td>1 Ensure that assessment personnel are alert for the presence of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and secondary events</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Conduct site surveillance and monitoring</td> <td>1 Establish and identify perimeters</td> </tr> </table> <p>1 Collect, prioritize, and manage hazard data and information from all sources</p> <hr/> <p>Manage the HazMat Rescue Operations</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Establish On-Site Incident Management for a WMD/Hazmat response and support the Incident Command and Planning Sections in developing and implementing an incident action plan (IAP)</td> <td>1 Direct and coordinate ongoing assessment operations</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Integrate WMD/hazmat rescue operations into the Operations branch of the ICS</td> <td>1 Develop a site safety plan and coordinate with the safety officer to ensure the safety of responders, including establishing perimeters and control zones (hot, warm, cold)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Determine the nature and priority of rescue operations and the numbers involved</td> <td>1 Implement appropriate safety precautions when approaching and working at a WMD/HazMat incident site</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Coordinate the assembly and transport of personnel and equipment to the site.</td> <td>1 Implement preliminary and secondary public protective actions (PPA) as decided by Incident Command (IC)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. Provide required personal protective equipment (PPE) to WMD/HazMat responders in coordination with the on-scene safety officer</td> <td>1 Communicate rescue operations with law enforcement personnel and emergency medical services (EMS) providers</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. Use advanced detection, identification, and monitoring methodologies to identify the hazardous material(s)*</td> <td>1 Coordinate and control the communication process, including providing information to Federal, State, and local officials, the media, and the public</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. Assess the stability of the incident site to determine search and rescue tactical options</td> <td>1 Assess conditions, identify the at-risk populations, and determine the viability and priorities for rescue operations</td> </tr> </table> <hr/> <p>Rescue the Victims</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>1. Determine the nature and set priorities to conduct rescue operations for victims within the hot zone</td> <td>1 Monitor effectiveness of PPAs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Identify entry and exit points for rescue, and stabilize as necessary</td> <td>1 Ensure rescuers don appropriate PPE prior to conducting rescue</td> </tr> </table>	1 Collect hazard and response information	1 Conduct contamination surveys	1 Conduct a risk evaluation, adequately addressing the risk of various actions to both responders and the public	1 Monitor the movement of hazardous releases, including controlling building systems	1 Obtain preliminary estimate of number of victims impacted by problem, including victims exposed to the hazardous materials	1 Confirm the identity of samples through the use of two (preferably three) different instrument methodologies*	1 Develop an incident detection, monitoring, and sampling strategy on the basis of a realistic assessment of the operational hazards	1 Conduct plume modeling*	1 Conduct offensive and defensive reconnaissance operations, as necessary, to gather intelligence on the situation	1 Ensure that assessment personnel are alert for the presence of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and secondary events	1 Conduct site surveillance and monitoring	1 Establish and identify perimeters	1. Establish On-Site Incident Management for a WMD/Hazmat response and support the Incident Command and Planning Sections in developing and implementing an incident action plan (IAP)	1 Direct and coordinate ongoing assessment operations	2. Integrate WMD/hazmat rescue operations into the Operations branch of the ICS	1 Develop a site safety plan and coordinate with the safety officer to ensure the safety of responders, including establishing perimeters and control zones (hot, warm, cold)	3. Determine the nature and priority of rescue operations and the numbers involved	1 Implement appropriate safety precautions when approaching and working at a WMD/HazMat incident site	4. Coordinate the assembly and transport of personnel and equipment to the site.	1 Implement preliminary and secondary public protective actions (PPA) as decided by Incident Command (IC)	5. Provide required personal protective equipment (PPE) to WMD/HazMat responders in coordination with the on-scene safety officer	1 Communicate rescue operations with law enforcement personnel and emergency medical services (EMS) providers	6. Use advanced detection, identification, and monitoring methodologies to identify the hazardous material(s)*	1 Coordinate and control the communication process, including providing information to Federal, State, and local officials, the media, and the public	7. Assess the stability of the incident site to determine search and rescue tactical options	1 Assess conditions, identify the at-risk populations, and determine the viability and priorities for rescue operations	1. Determine the nature and set priorities to conduct rescue operations for victims within the hot zone	1 Monitor effectiveness of PPAs	2. Identify entry and exit points for rescue, and stabilize as necessary	1 Ensure rescuers don appropriate PPE prior to conducting rescue
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Component	Details
1. Resource Element	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identifies the resources necessary to meet each Performance Objective based on the emergency management "preparedness lifecycle."
2. Performance Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicates the critical few activities that must be completed to demonstrate a Performance Objective can be accomplished.

Identifying Capability Gaps

The TCL is intended to facilitate capability and risk-based preparedness to achieve national, regional, and jurisdictional preparedness goals pursuant to the *National Preparedness Guidelines*. The updated *Target Capabilities* outline measurable objectives for jurisdictions to strive toward achieving, through building the appropriate resources, expertise, tools, and personnel for that specific jurisdiction. To identify precisely which resources may be sought or built to help meet each performance objective, jurisdictions should perform an analysis comparing available resources against what is needed through a four-step process:

1. Use *Target Capabilities* to determine applicable Class, Performance Objectives, and Resource Elements needed to achieve the Performance Objectives.
2. Determine the availability and status of personnel and resources (owned, mutual aid, and regional collaboration) that can deliver the capability by achieving performance objectives.
3. Identify gaps in resource availability and readiness.

4. Apply resources and validate the capability level through plan reviews, exercises, and after action review processes.

Target Capabilities are intended to facilitate the identification and validation of general/National-level, regional, as well as jurisdictional-specific targets. The *Target Capabilities* serve to identify high-level, strategic recommendations and guidelines while States, local jurisdictions, private sector entities and others are responsible for carrying out the specific, tactical activities to address those National guidelines. Graphic IX-2 illustrates this relationship.





Figure IX-2 – Capability Targets

X. Applying the Target Capabilities to the Preparedness Cycle

The TCL *Target Capabilities* are designed to be used as a reference guide, but are primarily implemented during course of each step of the Preparedness Cycle:

Developing Strategy

Developing a comprehensive homeland security strategy is the first step in the Preparedness Cycle. A jurisdiction's homeland security strategy should be consistent with the strategy of its State or urban area and is intended to enumerate potential risks and identify capabilities designed to protect against these risks. This process consists of three steps: 1) risk assessment; 2) capability assessment; and 3) establishing priority capabilities.



1) Risk Assessment

A risk assessment serves as the basis for setting priorities for investments and other actions to ensure the adequacy of capabilities related to the threats and vulnerabilities of greatest concern.

2) Capability Assessment

Jurisdictions should conduct a capability assessment to identify which of their capabilities require improvement to adequately prevent, protect against, or respond to the risks they have identified. The initial assessment should be based on the Performance Objectives identified in the *Target Capabilities*.

3) Establishing Priority Capabilities

Jurisdictions should compare the results of their risk assessment with the results of their capability assessment. Based on the findings, they can identify priority goals and objectives for improving all-hazards preparedness. When determining priority capabilities, jurisdictions should also take into consideration the strategic goals and objectives developed at the State or regional levels.

Developing a Homeland Security Strategy


Example from WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability

A jurisdiction conducts a risk assessment and determines that, because it contains a Class A chemical plant, the WMD/HazMat Rescue capability is a high priority. This jurisdiction's strategy should explore the following types of questions regarding the interrelationship between capabilities and the best approaches to addressing gaps and deficiencies:

- How many people would potentially have to be rescued from the chemical plant in the event of a large-scale incident at the plant?
- How many people would potentially have to be decontaminated in the event of a large-scale incident at the plant?
- How and where would decontaminated victims be triaged?

Planning

The *Planning Elements* identify what a jurisdiction's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) or Emergency Operations Plans (EOP) should include for ensuring that contingencies are in place for delivering the capability during a large-scale disaster. A jurisdiction should review the industry standards and policy documents that have been referenced in the *Planning Chart*. Jurisdictions should follow these general guidelines when revising SOPs and EOPs. However, jurisdictions will still refer to their specific hazard and vulnerability analysis to develop requirements specific to their needs.



Comprehensive Preparedness Guides (CPG) that provide guidance on planning process for all hazards are being developed to supersede the State and Local Guide 101 document, which will include references to applicable TCL Capabilities as a preparedness resource for planning. Similarly, each *Target Capability* references applicable CPGs as planning resource elements.


Planning

Example from WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability

As noted in the WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability, some of the decontamination-related items that plans should address include the following:

- How the jurisdiction will obtain the personnel, teams and equipment needed to decontaminate victims
- The handling and disposal of contaminated clothing and contaminated soil, water, and other items that could not be adequately decontaminated
- Proper decontamination of all employees leaving a contaminated area
- How the decontamination plan will be coordinated with Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

Personnel, Teams, and Equipment



The *Personnel and Teams Elements* identify what competencies and skill sets people delivering a capability should possess. It also provides job descriptions of the major common job titles used for individuals and/or teams responsible for delivering the capability. Furthermore, the *Personnel and Teams Elements* provides jurisdictions with guidelines for credentialing professionals in certain job titles and notes existing industry standards where appropriate, including resources that have been typed by FEMA.

Jurisdictions should determine the personnel that they need, or need access to, for delivering the capability and meeting the Performance Objectives. The *Personnel and Teams Elements* provide guidelines for what competencies those individuals should possess.

The *Equipment Elements* detail what standard and/or surge equipment a jurisdiction should consider possessing when delivering a specific capability. *Equipment Elements* do not list common equipment items that personnel or teams may carry with them on a regular basis. Rather, they identify the items that personnel may not be equipped with to deliver a specific capability before a large-scale disaster.

Equipment references are drawn from existing Federal guidance including the Standardized Equipment List (SEL) and the Authorized Equipment List (AEL). The complete DHS AEL provides specific equipment requirements and can be found at the Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) at www.rkb.us.

Personnel, Teams, and Equipment Resources

Example from WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability


The *WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability* specifies that jurisdictions should possess personnel qualified to analyze the incident for the “Assess the Event/Incident” Performance Objective. Jurisdictions should refer to NFPA 472 when determining what competencies and training are necessary to be considered “qualified.” For the “Assess the Event/Incident” Performance Objective, surge equipment listed includes CBRNE detection, identification, and monitoring equipment. Based on a risk assessment and inventory calculation, jurisdictions will determine the specific CBRNE equipment that they need.

Training and Exercises

The *Training Elements* and the *Exercise Elements* are closely intertwined. Both identify the essential tasks—or learning objectives—personnel assigned to a particular Performance Objective should be able to complete during delivery of the capability. As learning objectives, the elements reflect what personnel assigned to a Performance Objective (e.g. decontaminate the victims) should be able to demonstrate during an exercise.

As exercise elements, the *Target Capabilities* provide jurisdictions the opportunity to demonstrate whether they possess the minimum level of capability as defined by the Performance Objectives. Each *Target Capability* provides a link to a corresponding operations-based exercise evaluation guide (EEG) delivered by FEMA’s National Exercise Division (NED) through the Homeland Security Exercise & Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Volume III: Exercise Evaluation.

States and jurisdictions should assess and develop a plan to address training needs specific to each capability. Jurisdictions should make training decisions based on the requisite Performance Objectives and information derived from previous assessments and the homeland security strategy. Training should focus on developing the knowledge, skills, and abilities to complete the series of essential tasks, or learning objectives. DHS and its training partners provide specialized, tailored training courses to assist jurisdictions in building their capabilities. Jurisdictions can access these courses as part of their effort to execute the capability-building efforts of the Preparedness Cycle.




Conduct Training

Example from WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability

Jurisdictions conduct training to build and improve upon priority capabilities. The TCL outlines the essential tasks, or learning objectives, which personnel assigned to a WMD/HazMat Rescue operation, should be able to complete. Jurisdictions should ensure that the personnel responsible for WMD/HazMat Rescue operations have taken courses that teach the ability to perform the listed learning objectives. For example, for the “Assess the Event/Incident” Performance Objective, some of the tasks personnel should be able to complete include:

- Conduct an initial approach and positioning of responders and equipment
- Conduct an initial assessment and survey the incident scene
- Conduct a risk evaluation


Exercises qualitatively and quantitatively test the ability of jurisdictions to achieve capability Performance Objectives under simulated environments. HSEEP provides guidance, training, technology, and direct support to establish self-sustaining, capabilities-based exercise programs. The HSEEP Policy and Guidance Volumes integrate TCL language and concepts, providing a capabilities-based approach to exercise program management, design, and evaluation. To support capabilities-based exercise evaluation, HSEEP provides EEGs based on the TCL and updated *Target Capabilities*. For each capability exercised,



jurisdictions should refer to the associated EEG’s list of objectives, essential tasks, and measures to assist in the design and development of exercise objectives and scenarios.


<i>Example from WMD/HazMat Rescue Capability EEG</i>	
Tasks/Observation Keys	Time of Observation/ Task Completion
Provide required personal protective equipment (PPE) to WMD/HazMat responders in coordination with the on-scene safety officer. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – <i>Respiratory protection PPE suitable</i> – <i>Skin protection PPE suitable to the hazards and tasks to be performed, with regard to the impact of Chemical Protective Clothing (CPC) garments on heat stress on responders</i> 	Time: 9:37 AM Task Completed? Fully <input type="checkbox"/> Partially <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not <input type="checkbox"/> N/A <input type="checkbox"/>

Establishing Improvement Plans and Tracking Corrective Actions



Jurisdictions should develop improvement plans and track corrective actions to address the priority capabilities identified in strategic plans and tested in exercises or real events. Jurisdictions create corrective actions based on improvement plans generated from AARs and After Action Conferences, the outputs of which can strengthen initial strategic plans. After the exercise, exercise participants attend an After Action Conference, where they discuss the content of the Draft AAR and develop an Improvement Plan (IP). In the final AAR/IP, the content of the Draft AAR is revised and the initial recommendations are tied to corrective actions and presented in an Improvement Plan.

The completion of corrective actions leads to the improvement of priority capabilities, which informs future capability assessments and improves overall preparedness.



Updating Capability Assessment / Homeland Security Strategy / Plans

Corrective actions guide capability improvement by identifying the plans, training, equipment, and procedural areas that need to be strengthened based on findings from exercises or real-world events. Each corrective action is linked to a target capability or capability element and then assigned to a responsible party for implementation.

Jurisdictions should reference the TCL when implementing corrective actions. Specifically, the measures and critical tasks listed within the TCL can serve as benchmarks for implementation.

Jurisdictions should continually reassess their overall capabilities, plans, and strategies, taking into account the implementation of improvement plans and corrective actions. This process of reassessment and revision supports and contributes to the beginning of the next Preparedness Cycle by ensuring that updated strategies and plans can be used to retest past exercise objectives and inform new preparedness-building activities.

FEMA is charged with developing the Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) by PKEMRA to enable FEMA to assess compliance with the national preparedness system, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and other related plans; assess capability levels against target levels; assess resource needs to meet target levels; and assess the performance of training, exercises, and operations.

The CAS will function as a central repository for national preparedness data. In its first iteration, the system will integrate data from prior reports and legacy assessment systems to reduce the need for duplicative data calls. The first CAS survey will address questions about current capabilities that have not already been answered through other assessments and reports, focusing on key measures drawn from the 37 capabilities set forth in the TCL 2.0. The CAS will integrate the *Target Capabilities* into the assessment process as they are completed.

XI. Conclusion

For additional information on the TCL Implementation Project and the *Target Capabilities*, please contact FEMA at TCL@dhs.gov.