(U) STAC Bulletin: Threat of Gang Infiltration to Law Enforcement Agencies

(U) Threat of Gang Infiltration

(U/FOUO) Infiltration of any law enforcement agency by a gang member can have severe ramifications for the agency involved, its employees, the public it serves, and its allied agencies. Gangs employ various tactics to include infiltrating an agency directly or indirectly, to achieve their objective; to counter this threat, law enforcement must remain cognizant of and employ mitigation strategies. Gangs' motivations for infiltrating agencies vary; thus law enforcement must remain cognizant of suspicious employee behavior, identify possible motivations for infiltration, and employ mitigation strategies to counter infiltration threats.

(U) Kinds of Infiltration

(U/FOUO) A person who infiltrates an organization on behalf of an aggressor – a gang in this case – is called an infiltrator. There are two different kinds of infiltration: sources of information and influencers. Officers, dispatchers, records personnel, correctional officers and non-sworn personnel with access to sensitive and/or confidential information are examples of potential sources. Influencers include persons who can affect policy or make important decisions, such as correctional officers – who can recommend housing assignments, work details, or issue write-ups – and law enforcement supervisors and managers.

(U) Recruitment Cycle

(U/LES) The recruitment cycle is the process of enticing someone to covertly work against their organization. The process is similar to law enforcement's recruitment of informants or the infiltration of an undercover agent into a criminal organization. Gangs use whatever means necessary to infiltrate an agency, including a model that appears to resemble the

Figure 1: Recruitment Cycle Example
penetration cycle utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency. This model consists of five primary stages of the recruitment cycle: spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting/exploiting, and running.¹ There is no predetermined amount of time for each stage of the cycle. Depending on the urgency of the gang’s needs and the amenability of the potential recruit, each stage may be calculated and well planned or spur of the moment if the situation presents itself.

(U) Spoting

(U//LES) Spotting techniques include inserting one’s self into environments largely consisting of potential recruitment targets, conducting surveillance, or accessing public records or documents. Mixing into an insider’s environment allows the recruiter to initiate interaction and establish rapport with target personnel. Surveillance provides the recruiter with information the insider may not be willing to divulge or information they may leverage to coerce the insider to assist them. Public records and documents may reveal private information or vulnerabilities of the targeted personnel.

(U) Assessing

(U//LES) Assessing the insider’s exploitable vulnerabilities and motivations are the next step in the recruitment cycle. For example, is the insider disgruntled; seeking friendship, family, or companionship; ideologically motivated; adventurous; or egomaniacal? The recruiter is looking for vulnerabilities or problems he/she can exploit and is more likely to target an employee who openly discusses their dissatisfaction with their agency, is greedy, or is looking for personal gain. An employee who openly discusses their dissatisfaction with their agency, is greedy, or is looking for personal gain may be more susceptible to recruitment or exploitation. Recruiters also seek out personnel who romanticize the gang lifestyle and try to take advantage of the target’s perception of gangs.² Examples of motivators may include: financial gain, a sense of power, and access to sex, narcotics, and weapons. For example, a former Transportation Security Administration worker, employed to stop the illegal transport of drugs, benefited from selling and distributing drugs to other dealers.³ Gangs often use a target’s greed (or desire for personal gain) to influence them to engage in criminal and/or gang-like activity. Recruiters often recruit for personal gain but in a manner that will benefit the gang overall.

(U//FOUO) Infiltration is often seen in jails or prisons where officers and custodial staff have close and constant contact with inmates. Some inmates will try to build a relationship with a nurse or clerical staff member. In the field, officers must often build a rapport with gang members they encounter, as that rapport is established, some gang members may try to exploit the relationship.
(U) Developing

(U//LES): Once the recruiter has assessed the insider’s vulnerabilities, the recruiter moves to the next phase in the cycle and begins to develop a relationship with the insider. It is in this stage that the recruiter exploits the insider’s vulnerabilities. An officer’s appreciation for the gang lifestyle, an association with inmates or gang members, blurred boundaries, and false sense of friendship or loyalty may create a forum for the recruiter to entice the officer. The recruiter may also begin to ask for small, seemingly innocent favors. The recruiter’s intent is to gain control and exploit the insider. They maintain control by helping the insider justify his/her actions and agency betrayal. An Orange County Prosecutor was caught providing sensitive case information to a Hells Angels drug-dealer in exchange for free trips to Las Vegas. He pled guilty to a charge of drug-trafficking conspiracy; he admitted being manipulated by the drug dealer and had not intended to cause harm.5

(U) Recruiting/Exploiting

(U//LES) Once the recruiter has developed a relationship with the insider, recruitment and/or exploitation begins, whether ambiguous or unambiguous. Ambiguous recruitment, which is unspoken and progresses “naturally,” is often seen in relationships where the insider’s motivations are typically personal (e.g., friendship, love, sex, etc.) Unambiguous recruitment is much more clear and concise. The insider and recruiter have clearly stated their relationship; the insider is often motivated by tangible gain (e.g., money, power, weapons, etc.) Once this has begun, the recruiter has successfully infiltrated an agency. Four Maryland correctional officers, and members of the Black Guerrilla Family, were arrested on Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization charges for smuggling contraband into two Maryland prisons in exchange for money and other compensation.6

(U//FOUO) Recently, a US Custom and Border Protection (CBP) officer was caught during a sting operation and charged with bribery, conspiracy and attempting to import cocaine and methamphetamine for waving two vehicles carrying narcotics through a border checkpoint; in exchange he received more than $50,000.7 Another individual was charged with the same crimes for facilitating the crossings.8 Some personnel agree to become an insider because they believe they can get away with the crimes they are committing. According to the complaint against the CBP officer, the officer willingly used his position to negotiate with individuals he thought had ties to drug trafficking organizations to allow illegal narcotics into the United States.9

(U) Running

(U//LES) An infiltration can last from a short period of time to weeks or even years. Communication between the recruiter and insider may continue as long as it is mutually beneficial. The recruiter will keep in contact with the insider to maintain psychological control and reassure the insider, should they express fear. Likewise, the insider may continue with their behavior if their needs (i.e., greed, personal gain) are still being met.
(U) Reasons for Infiltration

(U//LES) Gangs and their members try to infiltrate agencies because they see an exploitable link that would allow them access to otherwise inaccessible agencies. Line officers are often the target of recruitment; however, other individuals subject to recruitment are records personnel or others who have access to sensitive, case, or witness information. A former Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) employee married to a validated Mexican Mafia gang member successfully downloaded and emailed a list of 5,000 names, addresses and Social Security numbers of DCA staff members to her private e-mail account.\(^{1011}\) Gangs, like law enforcement, attempt to gather intelligence. The outlaw motorcycle club, Vagos, have tried to infiltrate different agencies by having its members apply for clerical positions in order to gather intelligence.\(^ {12}\) By infiltrating an agency, gangs are also able to learn law enforcement sensitive information ranging from agency policies to protected information (criminal history information, witness identification information, officer schedules, officer assignments, etc.) The recent arrest of a Santa Clara Police Department Officer, in which the officer was providing confidential information to the Hells Angels, shows how gangs attempt to use sworn officers to obtain confidential “private party” information.\(^ {1314}\)

(U//LES) Gang members will go to great lengths to infiltrate an agency and acquire specialized training. For example, a gang member who successfully enters into a law enforcement academy will receive various strategic and tactical training. An active Avenues gang member served in the United States Marine Corps. He was also employed by a local police department, during which time he applied for the Los Angeles Police Department.\(^{15}\) As a former Marine and law enforcement officer, he acquired extensive military and law enforcement tactics and weapons training which could be used to train other gang members.

(U) Types of Infiltration

(U//LES) There are various types of gang related infiltration threats. The most obvious infiltration is the existing employee who is successfully recruited by a gang member. Some gangs try to intentionally infiltrate an agency by having someone with a clean record obtain employment. For example, while being incarcerated at Robert Presley Detention Center, a Mexican Mafia gang member developed a relationship with a Riverside County Sheriff’s deputy who had no known prior gang connection. The deputy later pled guilty to charges including being an accomplice to murder of two witnesses in her boyfriend’s case.\(^ {16}\) There are other individuals who are employed by an agency and are working or conspiring with gang members. Some gangs try to infiltrate an agency by influencing an officer or employee by discrediting or blackmailing them.
(U) Adverse Effects of Infiltration

(U//LES) Infiltration into law enforcement agencies may have serious consequences, such as subversion, loss of integrity, and loss of public trust. Additionally, criminal organizations may obtain sensitive information and/or intelligence that they could use to facilitate future crimes, hinder investigations and prosecution, or avoid detection. Search warrants or reports written by officers who are improperly associated with gang members may be found invalid, ultimately complicating or compromising investigations and past convictions. Gangs could use obtained case information, witness information, private citizen information, law enforcement tactics, raw or finished intelligence and personnel information to cause harm to rival gang members, witnesses, victims, or other officers.

(U) If you have questions or comments, please contact the STAC at STTAC@calema.ca.gov or (916) 843-3940.

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Endnotes

1 (U//LES) August 2010 communication with former Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer.
2 (U//LES) August 2010 communication with California Department of Justice, Advanced Training Center, Special Agent in Charge.
3 (U) “Ex-TSA Officer Held on $750K Bond in Drug Case.” WESH News, 09 April 2009.
4 (U//LES) August 2010 communication with California Department of Justice, Advanced Training Center, Special Agent in Charge.
10 (U) “Gangs Get into Identity Theft.” LA Times, 12 August 08.
13 (U) “Santa Clara Cop Arrested, Charged With Supplying Confidential Info to Live Oak Hells Angels.” Santa Cruz Sentinel.com, 15 October 2010.
14 (U/LES) October 2010 communication with Santa Clara Police Department Lieutenant.

15 (U/LES) Officer Safety Alert. Los Angeles Police Department, Northeast Division, Special Problems Unit. 23 January 10.