KANDAHAR CITY MUNICIPALITY & DAND DISTRICT

DISTRICT NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

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By the Stability Operations Information Center
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Table of Contents

(U) KEY FINDINGS ......................................................................................................................... 3
(U) BACKGROUND OF THIS DOCUMENT .................................................................................. 5
(U) OVERVIEW & RELEVANCE OF KANDAHAR CITY ............................................................ 7
(U) LOCAL PERCEPTIONS & ATMOSPHERICS ........................................................................ 8
   (U) LOCAL CASUALTIES HAVE DISTANT CONSEQUENCES ............................................. 13
(U) GOVERNANCE & TRIBAL DYNAMICS ................................................................................. 15
   (U) TRIBAL DYNAMICS & PERSONALITIES ...................................................................... 15
   (U) GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION, AND KEY PERSONALITIES............. 29
(U) RECONCILIATION & REINTEGRATION ................................................................................. 44
(U) AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES .......................................................................... 45
   (U) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP) ........................................................................... 45
   (U) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA) ............................................................................. 51
   (U) NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY (NDS) ....................................................... 51
   (U) JUDICIAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 51
   (U) PRISONS & DETAINENES ............................................................................................. 52
(U) ISAF PRESENCE .................................................................................................................... 53
(U) DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................................... 54
   (U) LESSONS OF DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN KANDAHAR CITY ................................ 54
   (U) CURRENT DEVELOPMENT APPROACH ....................................................................... 55
   (U) RISKS OF CURRENT APPROACH ................................................................................. 58
(U) ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE ................................................................................. 61
(U) SECURITY ............................................................................................................................. 62
   (U) LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY .......................................................... 62
   (U) THE TALIBAN’S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS INSURGENCY .............................................. 62
   (U) TALIBAN CAMPAIGN FOR KANDAHAR CITY .............................................................. 63
   (U) CURRENT SITUATION .................................................................................................... 65
(U) APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................ 68
(U) KEY FINDINGS

1. **(U) Public Support for the Taliban is Weak.** Despite a decline in public confidence in the government and coalition forces over the past few years in Kandahar City, atmospherics and polling data suggest the people of Kandahar City are still predisposed to support the government—they just need to be convinced that it will take hold. Similarly, it does not appear that separating insurgents from the population is a core concern inside Kandahar City. While the insurgency is quite capable of carrying out acts of violence in Kandahar City and intimidating the population, the insurgency enjoys little popular sympathy. For more on public perceptions and atmospherics in Kandahar City, start reading from p. 8.

2. **(U//FOUO) Taliban Assassinations of Officials are Effective and Poised to Continue.** While the insurgency may not be an attractive alternative in the eyes of Kandaharis, it has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of fear in Kandhar City through an effective and ongoing campaign of suicide bombings and assassinations. Many government officials have barricaded themselves against the violence. Whether the Taliban have the will or ability to expand their campaign of violence in the city remains unclear, with compelling evidence for and against the case. For details on the Taliban’s assassination campaign and the state of insurgency in Kandahar City, see pp. 62-67.

3. **(U) Recent Civilian Casualties Have Damaged ISAF.** Stories of civilian casualties in Uruzgan and Helmand in February 2010 had a clear and widespread negative impact on Kandahar residents’ attitudes toward international forces. Though the casualties occurred in other provinces, the effects felt by patrolling ISAF troops in Kandahar City included having rocks thrown at them by residents and, in a couple of cases, being spit upon. The negative feelings were not limited to Afghan civilians. Afghan National Police officials in Kandahar City repeatedly brought up the civilian casualties in the Uruzgan air strike with their American police mentors. For more on this subject, see p. 13.

4. **(U//FOUO) Gul Agha Sherzai’s Ambitions.** Gul Agha Sherzai, governor of Nangarhar Province, has signaled his desire to reassert his influence in Kandahar and establish himself as the key powerbroker for southern Afghanistan. He made a public visit in February, offering himself as someone who could broker a peace deal with the Taliban. But he has reportedly said he would not seek to return to Kandahar as long as his political rival Ahmad Wali Karzai presides over the province’s affairs. For more on this subject, see pp. 19-20.

5. **(U//FOUO) Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai’s Influence.** Arif Khan Nurzai, head of the Nurzai tribe, is being overlooked in some quarters in terms of his potential to influence his tribesmen, who constitute a significant component of the Taliban in Helmand and Kandahar. For more on Arif Khan Nurzai and his potential influence, see pp 24-25.
6. **(U) Risks of Surging Development Aid**: A significant risk to the Coalition plan to help stabilize Kandahar through development and aid projects this summer is that the flood of dollars will serve to undermine, rather than create, stability. Independent research and anecdotal evidence indicates that this is a common outcome of international aid projects in Afghanistan, particularly where large sums of money and limited oversight are concerned. While the problem has long been discussed—money invested unwisely or with limited supervision fuels corruption, which triggers negative public perceptions about the government, which leads to instability—it has yet to be comprehensively addressed as the Coalition prepares to channel immense levels of money into Kandahar as part of the District Delivery Plan and military stabilization effort. See p. 58.

7. **(U) The Imperative of Locally-Appointed Afghan Staff.** Another risk to the District Delivery Plan (DDP) is that the central government in Kabul (represented by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, or IDLG) will dictate who serves in staff positions in each of the districts. Experience suggests this will not work, and that at least half of the staff should be selected by government at the district level. If locally-appointed staff is not incorporated into the plan, local populations may deliberately undermine the DDP rollout.¹ For further discussion of this topic see p. 59.

8. **(U//FOUO) Space Limitations at Sarposa Prison.** Security and prison living conditions have improved substantially at Kandahar City’s Sarposa Prison since 2008. But the capacity of the prison is limited. The ISAF operations planned in Kandahar this summer will likely produce more—perhaps far more—prisoners than Sarposa Detention Facility can handle. For more on Sarposa Prison, see pp. 52.

¹ These insights were provided by an American aid official in Kandahar in late February 2010.
(U) BACKGROUND OF THIS DOCUMENT

(U) This document is a district narrative assessment of KANDAHAR CITY & DAND DISTRICT. A small team of analysts and information gatherers from International Security Assistance Force Headquarters (HQ ISAF), ISAF Joint Command (IJC), and Regional Command South (RC-S) spent four days in late February 2010 at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City reading some of the substantial information available at the PRT and interviewing PRT personnel—military and civilian, Canadian and American—in order to piece together a rudimentary review of the district. As a precursor to the standup of Regional Command-South’s Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC-South), the goal was to capture “white, green, blue, and red” information (that is, information about the population and government, the Afghan National Security Forces, international civilian and military efforts, and the insurgency) and to summarize some of the most salient information in an accessible written format for civilian and military officials at all levels and for the PRT itself. The reviews are designed, in part, to answer many of the questions that higher commands have about what is happening at the ground level, thereby helping shield PRTs and other field units from being constantly bombarded with formal “Requests for Information.”

(U) The information and analysis presented here is not comprehensive. Readers familiar with Kandahar City will undoubtedly scratch their heads at omissions, overstatements, and misjudgments. The document really should be thought of as a Wikipedia page: a living document that will be made more accurate and authoritative over time with the input of knowledgeable readers themselves. It is intended as a “first stop” for civilian officials, military members, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), academic researchers, and other qualified readers seeking a district overview and advice about where to find additional information and resources (a classified version may also be released that contains limited classified information to supplement what is essentially an unclassified, open-source document). To date, ISAF has not compiled meaty, holistic reviews of most Afghan districts. For this reason alone, we believe the value of this document, even in its imperfect state, will outweigh its shortcomings.

(U) These are some guiding principles for this and future district narrative assessments:

- Sources or source-documents for the information in the reviews shall be cited thoroughly and clearly throughout. Citations must indicate the date of the information and tell readers as much as possible about where they can find the source documents and additional relevant information.
- The assessments shall be updated and revised periodically with relevant information and vignettes.
- The assessments shall be proactively disseminated to the widest audience.
- The assessments shall contain a section called “Key Considerations” up front that provides readers with important, “actionable” analytical insights culled from the overall district assessment.

(U) A final note: The authors firmly believe these district assessments demonstrate the importance of augmenting PRTs and maneuver units with roving or permanently stationed writers and analysts who are tasked with examining each district as a whole. The majority of the
information contained in this report could not have been obtained without the authors personally visiting the PRT.

(U) Contrary to common belief, most PRT personnel actually prefer speaking personally with analysts as opposed to receiving formal “Requests for Information” (RFIs) from them. RFIs, which are often redundant, and always tedious, are more time-consuming for the PRTs than talking directly to analysts. If the quality and flow of information is to increase sufficiently to support international efforts in Afghanistan, writers and analysts must be stationed at (or frequently travel to) where the information is, including PRTs and units in the districts themselves.

(U) The authors would like to thank the staff of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, the Kandahar Intelligence Fusion Center, Task Force Kandahar, the staff of Regional Command (South) Stability Operations.

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OVERVIEW & RELEVANCE OF KANDAHAR CITY

Of all the districts and cities in Afghanistan, none is more important to the future of the Afghan government or the Taliban insurgency than Kandahar City. As of March 2010, the stage is being set for Kandahar City and its surrounding districts to serve as the scene of ISAF operations that, over the next 12 months or so, may determine the fate of ISAF’s mission to leave behind a functioning and sustainable government.

There are some indications that the Quetta Shura Taliban views the next 12 months in the same light. Contrary to a common assumption in late 2009 that the Taliban will “wait out” U.S. troops, whose withdrawal from Afghanistan is scheduled to begin in mid-2011, there are signs the Taliban leadership believes it cannot afford to remain idle as a surge of foreign troops and the largest influx of development aid in modern Afghan history are focused on establishing governance in the Taliban’s birthplace and former capital. A recent loss of momentum by the insurgency in Kandahar Province, together with a flurry of ISAF initiatives, may generate a public perception that if the Taliban continue at their current pace, Afghan National Security Forces and government institutions may grow strong enough to weather the insurgency after ISAF forces begin drawing down next year.

If these perceptions can be dramatically reinforced through ISAF and Afghan government actions over the coming year, they will probably compel the Taliban to make a political compromise with the Afghan government or to wage a climactic campaign of violence in Kandahar City (or perhaps even both).

There are some promising indications that the Taliban has lost more momentum over the past few months than the expected seasonal downturn in activity would have suggested. The Taliban’s campaign to broadly penetrate Kandahar City via the Arghandab River Valley has been effectively checked by ISAF and Afghan forces in 2009. Insurgents complain that they are finding it more difficult to recruit and to acquire supplies. And Kandahar City residents have weathered a more than two-year campaign of assassinations and bombings without abandoning their hopes that, despite years of disappointment, their government will survive and begin to deliver on some of its promises. Though public esteem for the Afghan government has fallen substantially over the past few years, the people of Kandahar City generally hold the Taliban in even lower regard.

While the insurgency may not be an attractive alternative in the eyes of Kandaharis, it has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of fear in Kandahar City through an effective and ongoing campaign of suicide bombings and assassinations. Whether the Taliban have the will or ability to expand their campaign of violence in the city remains unclear. Encouraging the perception among the Taliban and Kandahar citizens that the success of the Afghan government is inevitable may offer the best chance for bringing about a political compromise that gives the Afghan government the time and space it needs to overcome the external pressures of a multi-front insurgency and the internal problems of rampant corruption and illegitimacy.
LOCAL PERCEPTIONS & ATMOSPHERICS

(U) From the Department of State’s first poll in the winter of 2000-2001 to the most recent ABC/BBC poll in early 2010, surveys throughout Afghanistan have shown that extremely negative views of welfare, institutions and the Taliban government in early 2001 were replaced with rising optimism after the Taliban overthrow, especially by 2004 and 2005. Optimism faded in the following years, hitting lows in 2008. Views started improving in early 2009. Though their mood has not rebounded to 2005 highs, Afghans continue to be more positive about the country’s direction than they were during the Taliban regime. And while support for international efforts is down, it is not completely gone.

(U) Public opinion in Kandahar City has followed a roughly similar pattern to national pattern described above, though optimism has taken longer to rebound. Levels of violence in the city, particularly Afghan-on-Afghan violence, has had the effect of dampening public opinion about the Afghan government security forces (particularly the ANP), and ISAF over the past few years. It has also cast an edgy mood across the city that is in contrast with the first few years following the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001. A typical saying among city residents these days upon parting company is, “I’ll see you soon, if we’re still alive.” Residents say the prevailing ethos is one of pursuing short-term gain. Violence in Kandahar City is common enough that, after a typical IED blast, it takes less than an hour for activity in the city to return to “normal.” Figure 1 highlights the persistent low public perception of safety within Kandahar city:

Figure 1.

(Analyst’s note: The reliability of poll data in Afghanistan is the subject of debate. Longtime Afghanistan resident Sarah Chayes wrote about the unreliability of polls in the essay “Assessment of Asia Foundation Afghanistan Opinion Surveys” (18 November 2008). “Concerns about the reliability of polling data are especially relevant to Afghanistan,” Chayes wrote. “One of the most difficult aspects of the culture for me to come to grips with, over the 7 years that I have lived there, has been Afghans’ complex relationship with the truth. I know very few who would simply tell the truth, for its own sake. Life has been too dangerous, for too long, for Afghans to take such a risk.” Even so, we believe polling data is useful for indicating trends in public opinion over time.)


This was an observation of Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, two Kandahar-based researchers who are among the very few—perhaps only—Western civilians living outside the wire in Kandahar City on a long-term basis. This observation was contained in their article “See You Soon, If We’re Still Alive,” Foreign Policy (November 2009) pp 84-85. At the time they published their article, they were in Kandahar editing the memoirs of Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan.

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ACSOR Public Perceptions Poll, ANQAR/NWS, 10 Dec 2009.
(U) Public opinion has fallen a long way since the days, in 2006, when Kandahar City residents crowded the streets to cheer Canadian soldiers returning from assaults on Taliban-controlled villages to the west of Kandahar City. The fall in popularity has tracked with the increase in violence and influence of the Taliban in Kandahar City.

Figure 2.\(^7\)

(U) Yet, in spite of the dimmer views about their government and security forces, a majority of Kandahar residents hold the Taliban in far lower esteem—a critical advantage the government holds over the insurgency. Life goes on in Kandahar City, which still enjoys lower levels of violence than several surrounding districts, and which serves as a relative bastion that draws many tens of thousands of new residents each year from the countryside. By some estimates, the city’s population has nearly doubled since 2004 to around 800,000 people. Other estimates put the population closer to 500,000 people. Construction is booming, and commerce is common enough that, when the government recently decided to clear several city blocks to

\(^7\) ACSOR Public Perceptions Poll, ANQAR/NWS, 10 Dec 2009.
build a school, more than 4,000 shops and stalls had to be relocated. “This is not a dying city,” said a Canadian officer with the Kandahar PRT. “It’s growing, it’s vibrant.”

(U) PUBLIC SURVEY DATA

(U) Public survey data compiled by the ACSOR project, with the most recent surveys conducted in November 2009, shine a light on the general perspective of the residents of Kandahar City. As stated previously, while support for the Taliban in Kandahar City grew over the course of 2009, a large majority of the population holds an unfavorable opinion of the Taliban (figure 3).

Figure 3:

![Graph showing public opinion of the Taliban]

(U) Mirroring the lack of popular support for the Taliban, the population of Kandahar City is largely supportive of the Afghan government, although this support dropped in 2009 as expected improvements have failed to take place (Figure 4).

Figure 4:

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8 Information was conveyed by a Canadian Kandahar PRT staff officer in late February 2010.
9 ACSOR Public Perceptions Poll, ANQAR/NWS, 10 Dec 2009.
10 ACSOR Public Perceptions Poll, ANQAR/NWS, 10 Dec 2009.
While the coalition can take comfort in the population’s support of GIRoA and general dislike of the Taliban, the struggle for control in Kandahar City still has not been decided in the public’s perception, with between 25-40% of the population believing that the Taliban will ultimately control Kandahar Province (figure 5).

Figure 5:

Doubts in the minds of Kandaharis about who will ultimately rule the city suggests the critical task the government faces in convincing the population that it will “stand up” and establish lasting, effective governance in the region. Declining confidence in GIRoA is evidenced in Figure 6, which shows that while the majority of the population is supportive of GIRoA’s efforts to improve the quality of life in Kandahar city, between Mar07 and Sep09, satisfaction in the government’s efforts has fallen by more than 20 percent.
(U) While the populace is generally supportive of GIRoA, this trend was in decline over the past three years, driven in large part by the perception of worsening security, the general dissatisfaction with the employment situation (figure 7), and the common perception that local and provincial government officials are exceedingly corrupt (figure 8).

Figure 7:

Figure 8:

(U) (Analyst’s note: A key take away from the figures above is that the coalition does not need to waste effort in convincing the public of the importance of official governance structures. Similarly, it does not appear that separating the insurgents from the population will be the primary issue in Kandahar City. The people of Kandahar City are predisposed to support the government—they just need to be convinced that it will take hold.

(U) By the same token, there is significant work to be done on convincing the populace that GIRoA and Provincial and Municipal Government will ultimately win the governance battle against the Taliban. The poll data suggest that improving the capability of government officials to deliver employment opportunities while increasing transparency and decreasing corruption will be paramount.)

(U) LOCAL CASUALTIES HAVE DISTANT CONSEQUENCES

(U) Stories of civilian casualties caused by ISAF get significant play in Kandahar City’s news media. Even incidents that occur hundreds of kilometers away have a clear and widespread negative impact on Kandahar residents’ feelings about international forces. There was a noticeable negative turn in atmospherics in several sub-districts of Kandahar City in late February 2010, for example. Canadian and American officers in Kandahar attributed the change in atmospherics to an air strike in Uruzgan province in February that killed more than 20 civilians, and to reports of civilian casualties in a Coalition Forces offensive in the town of Marjah (also spelled Marja or Marjah) in Helmand Province. The effects felt by patrolling ISAF troops in Kandahar City have included having rocks thrown at them by residents and, in a couple of cases, being spit upon. These incidents occurred in neighborhoods that a few weeks earlier had seemed indifferent or welcoming of international forces.  

(U) The negative feelings about civilian casualties were not limited to Afghan civilians. Afghan National Police officials in Kandahar City have brought up the civilian casualties in the Uruzgan

12 Several officers with Canadian forces in Kandahar City and with the U.S. 97th Military Police Battalion relayed similar stories in late February about a sudden shift in atmospherics that they attributed to recent civilian casualties in Helmand and Uruzgan.
air strike with their American police mentors. While the conversations never escalated into shouting, the ANP “would not let the subject die.”

(U//FOUO) Other recent reports corroborate this link between civilian casualties in Helmand or Uruzgan and damaged perceptions of ISAF in Kandahar City. Public surveys of local Afghans conducted by ISAF’s Atmospherics Program Afghanistan found that Kandahar City residents’ opinions have soured somewhat in view of civilian casualties in Operation Moshtarak in Marjah, Helmand Province. Before the operation, surveys suggested the majority of the populace within Kandahar was in support of the operation. On 2 February 2010, for example, local nationals from the region stated that the operation would help improve the security situation within Helmand and Kandahar. The population believed that the ANA, with ISAF supervision, would eliminate the Taliban from the district. But as of early March, the perceptions of Kandahar City residents have shifted and the operation is viewed in an increasingly negative light, with civilian casualties the leading concern.

(U//FOUO) It is worth noting that positive actions by ISAF troops correlate with improved atmospherics in Kandahar City. Atmospherics have improved, for example, around ISAF patrols since Canadian forces in late 2009 adopted a less aggressive posture on mounted patrols and increased the ratio of foot patrols to mounted patrols. The Kandahar PRT commander in late 2009 ordered his troops to remove the “STAY BACK!” signs from their armored vehicles, open the hatches and wave to locals, and to reduce the size of their patrols. He also demanded they obey local traffic laws, such as stopping at stop signs, slowing down, and honking their horns less frequently. It was quickly apparent that local residents were responding favorably to the new approach. Upon returning from the first patrol under this new approach, a Canadian soldier reported that “a woman in a burkha waved back for the first time.”

(U) (Analyst’s note: For information about how Kandahar Taliban perceive themselves, the government, and international forces, see the section titled “THE TALIBAN’S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS INSURGENCY” near the bottom of this document.)
(U) GOVERNANCE & TRIBAL DYNAMICS

(U) TRIBAL DYNAMICS & PERSONALITIES

(U) PASHTUN TRIBES\textsuperscript{16}

(U//FOUO) The Pashtun tribal system in Afghanistan is widely portrayed as being divided into different confederations, tribes and sub-tribes. The most prominent confederations nationwide are the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlyani, and Ghurghusht. The Durrani and the Ghilzai confederation subsume more than two-thirds of all Afghan Pashtuns and predominate in southern Afghanistan.

(U//FOUO) The Durrani confederation is split into two main sub confederations: Zirak and Panjpai. The Achekzai, Alokozai (sometimes spelled Alkozai), Barakzai, Mohammadzai and Popalzai make up the Zirak Durrani confederation. Afghan rulers since Nadir Shah (1747) traditionally came from the Zirak Durrani confederation, which defeated the Ghilzai confederation (described below) for control of Afghanistan in 1747. Geographically, they are concentrated in Kandahar and eastern Uruzgan, and western Zabul.

(U//FOUO) The Panjpai Durrani (literally five legs) is composed of Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai (sometimes spelled Noorzai), Khogiani and Maku tribes. The Panjpai were originally Ghilzai tribes. The Zirak alliance slowly integrated the Panjpai tribes into the Durrani confederation in the South to help the Zirak keep the Ghilzai at bay. Even so, the two main Panjpai tribes, Noorzai (also spelled Nurzai) and Alizai, have had historically uneasy relations with the Zirak alliance, which treated them as lesser members of the Durrani confederation.\textsuperscript{17} Large Panjpai populations live in Helmand, western Uruzgan, Farah and Nimroz. When it came to power sharing, they usually had to take a second seat to the Zirak Durrani.

(U//FOUO) The Ghilzai confederation is made up of the Ali Khail, Andar, Hotak, Kharoti, Naser, Suliman Khail, Taraki, Tokhi and Tota Khail. They are most prominent in the provinces of Ghazni, Paktika, Zabul and parts of Kandahar.

(U//FOUO) The Ghurghusht tribal confederation in Afghanistan is mostly made up of the Kakar tribe. There are few Kakar living in Uruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul. A much larger part of the Kakar tribe lives in Pakistan. The Kakar tribe in Kandahar does not consider itself pro-government, and different Kakar leaders have supported the Taliban (e.g. the late Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah Lang). In Kandahar politics, the Kakar support Gul Agha Sherzai and would like to see him return to the governorship.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Much of the information in the “Pashtun Tribes” section of this paper was provided by the report “Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009,” which was produced by the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO), an Afghan non-governmental organization.

\textsuperscript{17} “The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen’s competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006,” by Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah. Central Asian Survey (Routledge: June 2007) p 169. (Analyst’s note: This article offers a useful background on the rise of former Kandahar Province Governor Gul Agha Sherzai and his decline in power in Kandahar relative to Ahmad Wali Karzai beginning in the mid-2000s. The article examines the critical role U.S. patronage played in the rise of both men.)

\textsuperscript{18} Author interview with Haji Bobai, leader of the Kakar tribe in Kandahar, 25 Feb 2010.
(U//FOUO) The Karlyani tribes are prominent in southeast Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.

(U) Pashtun tribes in Kandahar

(U//FOUO) The Panjpa Durrani and the Ghilzai tribes have historically been in the shadow of the much more powerful Zirak tribes in Kandahar City. While the Taliban regime in the 1990s attempted to bridge tribal divides, the current government returned to an exclusionary pattern of ruling, with the Zirak (especially its Popalzai and Barakzai tribes) monopolizing government power to a large extent. Thus, with the fall of the Taliban the tribal rivalries between the Zirak Durrani and the Panjpa and Ghilzai confederations resurfaced. The Panjpa and Ghilzai were stigmatized as the backbone of the Taliban movement and subjected to harassment and arrest.

(U//FOUO) Only the business sector seems to be open to all tribes (see the list of key Kandahar City businessmen and their tribal affiliation in the Appendix). Of the 19 main traders in the table, four are Achekzai, two Alizai, one Alokozai, one Barakzai, two Kakar, four Nurzai, four Popalzai and of unknown background.

(U//FOUO) Given the rapid growth of Kandahar City, exact numbers on tribal affiliation do not exist. There are members of an estimated 40 tribes living in Kandahar City, and 20 of them have populations of less than one percent of the total population. Estimations were first made on the tribal confederation level. This resulted in the following breakdown: Zirak Durrani 50%, Panjpa Durrani 15%, Ghilzai 15%, Shia 8% and 12% others, such as Wardak, Mohmand, Kakar, Sayed, Tajik, Baluch, and other tribes (see Figure 9). For the Panjpa and Ghilzai tribes, no percentages are provided for individual tribes but among the Panjpa the Nurzai are most numerous and among the Ghilzai the Hotak, Tokhi and Lodin. The most sizeable population among the other Pashtun tribes is the Kakar.

(U//FOUO) Figure 9: Tribal tree of Kandahar Province:
(U) Zirak Durrani Tribes

(U//FOUO) The Zirak Durrani tribes have been the most powerful actors in Kandahar City’s history since Ahmad Shah Durrani established the dynastic rule of the Popalzai tribe in 1747. The rule of the Popalzai tribe lasted until 1818, after which Dost Mohammad of the Mohammadzai (sub-tribe of the Barakzai) provided the leading figures until the communist coup d’état in 1978. This is the historical rationale for Zirak tribes to see themselves as the “rightful” leaders of Kandahar. While they had to share power during the Communist government and Taliban regime, they returned to an exclusionary style of rule in the current government by monopolizing political power. They make up an estimate 50% of the city population.

(U//FOUO) As noted earlier, however, the Zirak Durrani tribes are far from united and not all Zirak tribes are equally influential. The Alokozai, for example, are less influential for three reasons: first because of the “hand-over” of Kandahar City to the Taliban by their most prominent leader Mullah Naqibullah, something the then-governor Gul Agha Sherzai interpreted as treason; second, because parts of the Alokozai were allied with Yunus Qanuni of the Northern Alliance/United Front; and third, because they have lost their traditional influence over security apparatuses to the Achekzai, who are allied with the powerful Barakzai.

(U) Popalzai

(U//FOUO) The Popalzai, the tribe of President Hamid Karzai, ruled Kandahar from 1747 to 1823 and represents the biggest Zirak Durrani tribe (20%) in the city. They also have been influential in government, education, and business; they are large landowners and entertain good contacts with international actors. Besides living in Kandahar City, they can also be found in the provincial districts Arghistan, Daman, Dand, Ghorak, Khakrez, Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot, and Zhari. The Popalzai are also influential in neighboring Uruzgan province.
(U) **Main leaders**

(U//FOUO) **Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK).** The Popalzai in Kandahar are currently led by Ahmad Wali Karzai, the half-brother of President Hamid Karzai. He is married to Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister, which has allowed him to co-opt parts of the internally divided Nurzai tribe. As noted earlier, during the governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai created and headed the “Eslahi shura” that represented the Popalzai pole of power and counterweight to the provincial governor. He was chosen as representative of Kandahar Province in the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga and in the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga. Since 2005 he has been the head of the elected Provincial Council; in the 2009 provincial council elections he received the highest score of all candidates.

(U//FOUO) Ahmad Wali Karzai and Hamid Karzai come from a noble Popalzai family that has long been involved in national-level politics. Their lineage comes from the village of Karz in Dand District (just outside Kandahar City). Abdul Ahad Karzai—father of Ahmad Wali Karzai and President Hamid Karzai—was leader of the Popalzai tribe during the *jihad and mujahedeen* time. He had initially supported the royalist faction within the Taliban who promised to bring back King Zahir Shah (in whose government he had served) from exile in Rome. Over time however, the influence of the pro-monarchist camp within the Taliban movement was weakened while the influence of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI increased. Abdul Ahad Karzai thus distanced himself from the Taliban movement. He was assassinated by gunmen in Quetta in 1999. Ahad Karzai was succeeded by his oldest son Hamid Karzai as leader of the Popalzai tribe. Initially close to the Taliban movement, he later became active in a network of exile Afghans (known as the “Rome Group”) planning a political reorganization of Afghanistan starting in 1997. Well positioned in different networks by 2001, he became the interim and then first President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Ahmad Wali Karzai rose to power only after Hamid Karzai became president. His other brother, Qayum Karzai (also spelled Qayyum or Qayoom), who owned an Afghan restaurant in Baltimore, Maryland, functioned in an advisory role.

(U//FOUO) The main rival within the Popalzai tribe is Amir Lalay. The differences between them are best described as one of different social backgrounds, as Lalay represents an achieved leader that rose to power during the *jihad*, rather than the traditional landed elite from which the Karzai family hails. The Karzai clan resented Lalay’s increasing importance in Kandahar. Furthermore, during the *jihad*, Lalay switched over to the Jamiat-e Islami faction and become close to Rabbani. During the Talibran regime, after a short period in exile, he joined the Northern Alliance. He still has good relation with Jamiat-e-Islami and supported the Northern Alliance candidates Yunus Qanuni and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections against Karzai, respectively. Other Popalzai key actors are presented in appendix 1.

(U) **Main rivalries: Popalzai vs. Barakzai**

(U) (Analyst’s note: See the sub-section “Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Popalzai” under the Barakzai heading below.)

(U) **Main alliances**

(U//FOUO) The Popalzai have been more successful than the Barakzai in co-opting parts of the Panjpai tribes and also maintain better relations with the Alokozai as well as the Nurzai tribes. Ahmad Wali Karzai is married to Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai’s sister and has good relations with the main Alokozai leaders Agha Lalay and Karimullah Khan.
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(U) **Barakzai**

(U//FOUO) The Barakzai are the second largest of the Zirak tribes in Kandahar-city (15% of total population) and have maintained influence through successive regimes from monarchy (1823-1978) up to today. The Barakzai tribe in Kandahar was close to the Mahaz-e Milli faction that represented the interests of the tribal establishment and large landowners. They have been influential in government, education, business, and dominate also as large landowners. Besides the city, they also live in Arghistan, Daman, Dand, Maruf, Nesh and Takhtapul districts of Kandahar and they are also influential in parts of Helmand Province.

(U//FOUO) During the Kandahar Provincial governorship of Gul Agha Sherzai (2002 until December 2004), the Barakzai were the most powerful tribe in Kandahar. Many important political positions were filled with Barakzai and they had established good contacts with international actors, especially military ones. The Barakzai managed to control much of the logistics for the international forces as the airport was occupied in 2001 by Gul Agha Sherzai's brothers Abdul Raziq and Haji Bacha. Since then Gul Agha Sherzai's Barakzai militia have been in charge of the security of the airport and dominate the business surrounding the logistical support of the international military forces stationed at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). They also have a quasi monopoly on the gas business. Khalid Pashtun, a Barakzai close to Gul Agha Sherzai and his former spokesman, owns a construction company that implements PRT projects. The Barakzai are also strongly present in the ANP, with former Barakzai militiamen now serving as uniformed police. Sherzai's “second corps” merged into the ANP after it went through demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), and is close to Coalition Forces.

(U) **Main leaders**

(U//FOUO) Gul Agha Sherzai is the most powerful member of the Barakzai tribe though he does not come from a traditional tribal elite family and is does not carry the title of tribal leader (as of March 2010, the leader of the Barakzai tribe, at least in name, is Haji Hamidullah Helmand, who lives in Nawa District, Helmand Province). Gul Agha Sherzai achieved his status, stepping into the footsteps of his father, the late Haji Latif, a prominent and well-respected Barakzai commander of Mahaz-e Milli during the Soviet occupation who was poisoned in 1989. Gul Agha Sherzai is one of the main strongmen in the province, having held the governor position trice, once during the mujahedeen government, and twice during since the 2001 fall of the Taliban. The family of Gul Agha Sherzai is from the Nurdinzai sub-tribes of Dand district.

(U) Gul Agha Sherzai rose to power in Kandahar with the backing of the U.S. government in late 2001. He was not an experienced military commander but, together with his allied Achekzai (also spelled Achakzai) tribal militia, showed the most military potential out of possible U.S. allies in the south. After the Taliban fell, he and the rival Alokozai tribe under Mullah Naqibullah both angled to take the governorship of Kandahar Province, but Mullah Naqibullah backed down, fearing U.S. intervention on his enemy’s side.

(U) While U.S. support later waned somewhat, its backing in the first 6 months of 2002 was decisive in giving Gul Agha Sherzai the opportunity to consolidate his hold of Kandahar. His

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19 Information provided to authors by ISAF officials in Helmand Province.
relationship with Pakistan was important to his success, too. By the time U.S. money dried up, Gul Agha had already found alternative sources of revenue, chiefly the Spin Boldak border crossing with Pakistan. (Spin Boldak in Kandahar Province and Torkham Gate, aka “Khyber Pass”, in Nangarhar Province constitute the two primary customs collection points on the border with Pakistan). He established monopolies in a number of business sectors, including water sources, stone quarries, gasoline distribution and tax services between Kandahar and other cities. He also imposed taxes on local businessmen. While other Kandahar strongmen had revenue sources, including narcotics trafficking and land graft, Gul Agha Sherzai maintained an edge over them through his access to customs revenue.

(U) Gul Agha Sherzai was eventually appointed governor of Nangarhar Province by President Hamid Karzai, allowing the presidents younger half-brother Ahmad Wali Karzai to eclipse Gul Agha Sherzai as the main powerbroker in Kandahar Province.

(U//FOUO) Sherzai shook up Kandahar politics in February 2010 during his very public visit to Kandahar City while ostensibly visiting at the behest of Ahmad Wali Karzai. This occurred during the absence of Kandahar Governor Wesa, who was called to Kabul prior to Sherzai’s visit and did not return until after his departure. This and the many comments from Sherzai and his allies that “Kandahar needs a strong and dynamic governor,” suggest the real reason for Sherzai’s visit was to pave the way for a return as the Governor of Kandahar.

(U//FOUO) Gul Agha Sherzai reportedly stated in conversation in early 2010 that he would like to return to power in Kandahar, that he would relish the “challenge” of bringing order to southern Afghanistan, and that he envisions himself filling a post as a sort of super-governor of southern Afghanistan (Analyst’s note: Gul Agha Sherzai’s chief rival within the Barakzai tribe, Nur-ul Haq Ulumi, filled a similar role under the ill-fated Najibullah regime until 1992). Gul Agha Sherzai also said he would not seek to return to power in Kandahar so long as Ahmad Wali Karzai is in power there.

(U//FOUO) The main rival of Sherzai within the Barakzai tribe is Nur-ul Haq Ulumi (see appendix 2 for other Barakzai key actors); the two men have a different outlook and worldview. Nur-ul Haq Ulumi was a member of the Parcham (“flag”) faction of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan during the communist government and served as Minister of Defense and governor of Kandahar during the government of Dr. Najibullah, who was installed by the Soviets and remained in power for several years after the Soviet withdrawal. Sherzai, as noted, fought against the PDPA on the side of the mujahedeen.

(U//FOUO) On the intertribal level, the Barakzai are involved in rivalries with the two other largest Zirak tribes: the Alokozai and the Popalzai. While the Alokozai rivalry dates back to the mujahedeen time, the Popalzai-Barakzai emerged after Hamid Karzai became the interim president, making the Popalzai into the “ruling” tribe.

21 “The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen’s competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006,” by Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah. Central Asian Survey (Routledge: June 2007) p 173. (Analyst’s note: Customs revenue has been the primary source of wealth, and by extension a key underpinning of political control, in Kandahar for much of its history.)

22 Conversation between author and a staff member of the Nangarhar PRT who heard Sherzai’s remarks.
(U) Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Alokozai

(U//FOUO) The Barakzai have a tense relationship with parts of the Alokozai since the jihad and especially with the late Alokozai leader Mullah Naqibullah (also known as Mullah Naqib) who supported the rivaling faction Jamiat-e-Islami. More significantly, some local respondents attribute the bad relationship to the role Naqibullah played in the handover of Kandahar City to the Taliban in the mid 1990s, when Sherzai was the mujahedeen Governor of Kandahar. Mullah Naqibullah declared support for the Taliban and weakened Sherzai’s position. Since both the Barakzai and Alokozai rolled over large contingents into the Kandahar City police force, their rivalry weakened the police internally.

(U//FOUO) By the end of 2002 the Alokozai and Barakzai militias came close to an all out war when Chief of Police Zabit Akrem Khakrezwal (an Alokozai) tried to fire his Barakzai Deputy, Naser Jan, leading to the transfer of Zabit Akrem Khakrezwal out of Kandahar. In 2004 Khan Mohammed, an Alokozai leader and former jihadi commander, lost his position as commander of the 2nd Army Corps (Alokozai-dominated) when it was abolished as part of a country-wide demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) campaign. Less than a year later Khan Mohammed, like Khakrezwal, was transferred outside the Province. These transfers of key Alokozai leaders outside of Kandahar happened during the governorship of Sherzai and his successor, Yusef Pashtun (both Barakzai), and were interpreted by the Alokozai tribe as deliberate attempts by the Barakzai tribe to weaken them. The Alokozai had been one of the largest contributors to state security forces in Kandahar—a tradition reaching back to the 18th and 19th centuries—due to their famed tribal militia.

(U) Main rivalries: Barakzai vs. Popalzai

(U//FOUO) The Popalzai tribe led in Kandahar by Ahmad Wali Karzai is the main political rival to the Barakzai. While Gul Agha Sherzai became the first provincial governor of Kandahar in the new government, Ahmad Wali Karzai established a consultative council of 100-150 men called “Eslahi shura” six months after the fall of the Taliban regime to create a counterweight to the provincial governor. The Eslahi shura was dissolved once Sherzai was transferred to Nangarhar in 2005 and a Provincial Council was created in its place. Once Hamid Karzai was confirmed as president in the October 2004 elections and Ahmad Wali Karzai was elected as the Provincial Council head, the power in Kandahar shifted from the Barakzai to the Popalzai.

(U) Main allies

(U//FOUO) The main ally of the Barakzai tribe is the Achekzai tribe. The Achekzai were a Barakzai sub tribe until they were elevated to the status of a proper tribe during the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747), the Popalzai leader whose tribal policies shaped southern Afghanistan significantly. To fight against the Taliban in Kandahar in late 2001, Sherzai allied himself with the Achekzai tribal militia under the command of Abdur Raziq (also known as Colonel Abdul Raziq), whose uncle was a key lieutenant to the infamous mujahedeen commander Ismat Muslim (also spelled Esmat Muslim). (Analyst’s note: Though Gul Agha’s father Haji Latif and Ismat Muslim had been bitter enemies during the jihad, political expediency made political bedfellows of Sherzai and Abdur Raziq23). When Sherzai was provincial governor, Raziq’s militia was integrated into the Spin Boldak border police, which, as of March 2010,

Abdur Raziq still commands. Sherzai was thus able to form a strategic Barakzai–Achekzai alliance in Kandahar for the purpose of controlling the Kandahar–Spin Boldak road, the economic lifeline of Kandahar, including the border crossing to Pakistan in Spin Boldak.

(U//FOUO) Another main ally of Gul Agha Sherzai was the late Habibullah Jan, an Alizai whom Sherzai helped to carve out the new Zhari District from Maywand and Panjwayi Districts. He was killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen and since then the alliance between the Alizai and Barakzai in Kandahar has been weakened. The relationship of the Barakzai with the Alizai, however, was always somewhat ambiguous, as Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai), the former provincial governor of Helmand (2002-2005) is married to a sister of Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai, whose other sister is married to Ahmad Wali Karzai.

(U) Alokozai
(U//FOUO) The Alokozai, the third largest tribe in Kandahar City (7.5%) are part of the Zirak Durrani “troika” forming the power elite of Kandahar. Historically, however, they have been weaker than the Barakzai or Popalzai. Their main bases of power are located in Arghandab, Khakrez and Panjwayi district. Since the late commander Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (also known as Mullah Naqib) in 1992 grabbed and distributed government land in Kandahar City’s Loya Wiala neighborhood to fellow Alokozai, the tribe has made up much of the population of Sub-district 9 of Kandahar City. The Alokozai tribes were mostly affiliated with the group Jamiat-e-Islami (including Naqibullah a.k.a. Mullah Naqib) and to a lesser degree Mahaz-e-Milli (Zabit Akrem Khakrezwal).

(U) (Analyst’s note: See the sections above on the Popalzai and the Barakzai tribes to read about the dynamics between those two tribes and the Alokozai).

(U//FOUO) Internal divisions in the Alokozai tribe started to become apparent in 2004 when half the tribe backed Mohammed Younes Qanuni (Tajik candidate of the United Front) in the presidential elections while the other half, lead by Senator Wasifi, an Alokozai tribal elder long-exiled in Europe, backed Karzai. Divided internally, and weakened by provincial power holders, Alokozai leadership (all with jihadi background) was then targeted for assassination by the insurgency from approximately 2005 onwards to further weaken the tribe: Haji Granay, Zabit Akrem Khakrezwal, Mullah Abdul Hakim Jan, and Malim Akbar were assassinated while Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (a.k.a. Mullah Naqib) was seriously wounded in a mine explosion and died later in the fall of 2007. This has left the Alokozai vulnerable as the new leadership still has to be consolidated.

Main leaders
(U//FOUO) The main leaders of the Alokozai tribe that remain alive are Karimullah Khan from Arghandab and Haji Agha Lalay from Panjwayi.

(U//FOUO) Karimullah Khan is the son of the late Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (Mullah Naqib). Mullah Naqibullah did not come from the tribal establishment but gained his influence as a Jamiat-e-Islami commander and was known as a political opportunist. After Mullah Naqibullah Akhund’s death, President Karzai intervened and selected Mullah Naqibullah’s son Karimullah Khan as successor of the Alokozai. Tribal leadership in Pashtun society is semi-meritocratic, rather than strictly hereditary, and tribal leaders, moreover, are traditionally chosen by the tribe
and not by outside authorities like President Karzai, who is of the Popalzai tribe. As a result, Karimullah’s “crowning” is not viewed as legitimate by significant portions of his own tribe. He is better connected with Ahmad Wali Karzai than with Gul Agha Sherzai.

(U//FOUO) Haji Agha Lalai Dastgeeri (var. Dastagir) is a member of the Provincial Council, the head of the Panjwayi district council and a member of the Qayum Karzai council. He has good relations with Ahmad Wali Karzai and is presently involved in preparing a new Kandahar tribal council upon suggestion of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He has a better relationship with Ahmad Wali Karzai than with Gul Agha Sherzai. He was also head of the new reconciliation commission but resigned in May because he was running again for the provincial council. He was re-elected with the 5th highest score. He comes from a very influential khan family that revolted against the Communist era People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) because they were heavily affected by land redistribution. The revolt cost his father his life. During the jihad he switched factions frequently and later became a Taliban commander. He also used political marriage to create networks. One of his sisters is married to a Taliban commander, the other with a commander of the Nurzai tribe that was led by Ustad Abdul Malim. He is a regionally influential tribal elder with good links to both the government and the Taliban insurgency. He is also said to be influential beyond the Alokozai tribe. He successfully reclaimed the land of his family and is one of the wealthiest of all Alokozai khans, owning 350 jeribs (70 hectares) of land plus three vineyards.

(U//FOUO) In addition to holding a seat on the Provincial Council, he is also head of the Panjwayi District Shura. He is a close associate of Ahmad Wali Karzai and reportedly also has direct access to President Karzai. Dastgeeri is a former member of the Taliban who left that movement through the “Peace Through Strength” reconciliation program, which he later led for a time.

(U//FOUO) It is assessed that he will be an influential player in working with Ahmad Wali Karzai in aligning the Kandahar power structure following an eventual ISAF withdrawal. Other influential elders are listed in appendix 3.

Major Rivalry: Alokozai vs. Barakzai

(U//FOUO) The main rivals of the Alokozai are the Barakzai. (Analyst’s note: See the Barakzai section above to read about the rivalry between these two tribes.)

Achekzai

(U//FOUO) The Achekzai (also spelled Achakzai) were considered a Barakzai sub-tribe until Ahmad Shah Durrani elevated them to a proper tribe to weaken his Barakzai rivals during the 18th Century. They are a cross-border tribe and have large populations in Spin Boldak, Takhtapul Pul districts and in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. They make up an estimated 5% of the population of Kandahar-city. Their influence and power comes through links with the Barakzai and their effective control of the road from Kandahar to Spin Boldak, their main power base. They are traditionally well established in business and cross-border smuggling activities. They had three provincial council members, one of which was assassinated in early 2009 (Sitara Achekzai). They also head several provincial departments.

The killing in June 2009 of the Achekzai Chief of Police (CoP) of Kandahar Matiullah Qatea has raised some concerns as to the further destabilization of the government. Local respondents claim that the people involved in the killing of the CoP, who were subsequently arrested by American forces, are mostly Popalzai. This may create future problems with the Popalzai tribe. Appendix 4 provides an overview of other prominent Achekzai figures.

Main rivalries and alliances

Their main rival on the provincial level is the Nurzai tribe from the Panjpai Durrani sub-confederation. They have been engaged in a century old conflict over political power and economic resources in Spin Boldak. During the jihad, many Achekzai in Spin Boldak fought under Ismat Muslim’s Fedayin faction that was known for switching between the mujahedeen and the PDPA government opportunistically. The Nurzai on the other hand were closer to different mujahedeen factions and later to the Taliban government whom they also used to settle scores with the Achekzai. When the Taliban government collapsed, the Achekzai tribe entered into an alliance with Gul Agha Sherzai and the Barakzai tribe. Achekzai and Barakzai forces captured the airport as they moved on Kandahar City and since then the Achekzai have been strongly present in the border police led by Abdur Raziq. This has come at the expense of the Alokozai tribe, a tribe traditionally known for mustering a strong militia. The alliance of the Achekzai with the Barakzai has brought the Nurzai closer to the Popalzai.

During the post-Taliban period, Nurzai/Achekzai tribal tensions have not been confined to Spin Boldak. The Afghan government used Abdur Raziq (also known as Colonel Abdul Raziq) and his militia to fight the Taliban in Nurzai dominated Panjwayi district. Raziq’s forces were defeated as Nurzai tribesmen from across the south and southwest flocked to Panjwayi to assist their fellow tribesmen.

Mohammadzai

The Mohammadzai are a sub-tribe of the Barakzai but are often considered as a proper tribe because of their past importance. They lead the pre-war elite of Kandahar since Dost Mohammad established the dynastic rule of the Mohammadzai in 1818, providing members of the royal family. They influenced the creation of a much more hierarchical tribal system than in the east and southeast of Afghanistan and the affairs of government for a time became largely the realm of the Mohammadzai. The new hierarchy meant that on the very top were the immediate families of Mohammadzai rulers and landowning aristocracy followed by non-Durrani (Ghilzai, Farsiwan, and Qizilbash) who ran much of the administration.

Targeted by assassinations during the early People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) years, most of the Mohammadzai tribe emigrated and are part of the large Afghan diaspora living in many different countries. They make up 2.5% of Kandahar City’s population. The two key Mohammadzai leaders in Kandahar city are mentioned in appendix 5.

Panjpai Durrani Tribes

The Panjpai Durrani tribes in Kandahar include the Alizai, Ishaqzai, Nurzai and few Maku villages. Within Kandahar Province, they are mostly concentrated in Maywand, Panjwayi, Zhari, Maruf and Spin Boldak. They make up an estimated 15% of the Kandahar City population.

(N) Nurzai
The Nurzai is the largest of the Panjwai tribes in Kandahar, but their exact numbers are hard to estimate. They are mostly settled in Maywand, Panjwayi, Spin Boldak, Takhtapul and Zhari district. Some of their leaders have been able to establish connections to the central power holders, most notably Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai (see below). The Nurzai also have two members in the provincial council and one head of a provincial government department. Like their main rival, the Achekzai, they are a cross-border tribe with a large population in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. They are traditionally well established in business and cross-border smuggling.

The Nurzai are said to be particularly divided and their leadership has good relations with Afghan government power holders as well as the Taliban insurgency. The Nurzai are often stigmatized as Taliban supporters which has made them the prime target of international military forces despite their connections to the government.

Main leaders

Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai comes from a family of Nurzai tribal elders of Panjwayi and is the Nurzai leader in Kandahar. He is a member of the provincial council and well connected to Ittehad-e-Islami (IEI, or “Islamic Union”),. He maintains good relations with other influential individuals and is linked to the Karzai family through the marriage of his sister to Ahmad Wali Karzai. Arif Khan also has a sister married to Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (Alizai tribe), the former provincial governor of Helmand (2002-2005). During the Taliban government he lived in Quetta, Pakistan. His forefathers were tribal elders. He is influential in the region. In the pre-2005 cabinet he served as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs. He is the son of Haji Musa Jan Nurzai who was said to be one of the drug barons during Zahir Shah’s time and his family has been allegedly involved in drug trafficking since the 1960s and thus managed to amass wealth from illegal and legal business. His uncle is Muhammad Yunus, a resident of Nawi Khar city who became the first Director of the Customs Office post 2001. His cousin (and reported rival) Haji Basher Khan Nurzai (var. Hajji Bashar Khan Nurzai), one of the first jihadi commanders to support the emerging Taliban movement, was the former Taliban district governor of Maywand and a major narcotics dealer. Haji Basher was arrested in 2008 in New York and is currently serving a life sentence for narcotics offences.

Because Nurzai tribesmen constitute a significant component of the Taliban in Helmand and Kandahar, Arif Nurzai could potentially play a significant role in persuading large numbers of Nurzai Taliban to refrain from armed resistance against GROA.

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25 (U/FOUO) Analyst’s note: Ittehad-e Islami Bara-e Azadi-e Afghanistan (Ittehad-e Islami, or IEI) was a broad-based mujahideen organization founded in 1986 in an effort to unite a variety of Islamist opposition groups operating in Afghanistan led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Bolstered by Saudi funding and a massive influx of foreign fighters, IEI quickly became a major player in the Afghan jihad despite its late start. After the fall of the Najibullah government, IEI fought against Hizb-e-Islami (HI) and Jamaat-e Islami (JI) for control of Kabul from 1993-1994. With the rise of the Taliban, IEI reluctantly joined the Northern Alliance. After the fall of the Taliban, IEI was reorganized into the political party Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-e Afghanistan and is currently represented in the Afghan parliament.
Given his political and family alliances with Ahmad Wali Karzai and previous tenure as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs, it is not surprising that there are credible allegations of involvement in narcotics trafficking. In addition, Arif Nurzai has lost considerable influence among pro-Taliban elements of the tribe over the course of the last decade due to the group's influence in large portions of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, he continues to be widely recognized as the paramount head of the Nurzai and has recently become a leading advocate for the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) program (including in Uruzgan Province) in a likely effort to combat Taliban influence among his tribesmen.

Arif Nurzai's family owned a great deal of land in the the Panjawyi, Maywand, and Spin Boldak districts of Kandahar province and it appears that much of the family's wealth and status among the Nurzai were based off revenue generated from land ownership, control of the Spin Boldak border crossing, and narcotics facilitation since at least the 1960s.

During the Saur Revolution, Arif Nurzai survived the fate of other senior Pashtun tribal leaders by fleeing from his family lands and joining the mujahideen. Throughout the 1980s he served as a prominent commander for Ittehad-e Islami (IEI, Islamic Union) in western Afghanistan, a posting that appears to have removed him from a majority of the fighting in the Nurzai areas of Kandahar between Esmatullah Muslim's majority Achakzai Fidayan-e Islam (FI) militia and Hizb-e-Islami – Khalis (HIK) forces under the command of Arif Nurzai's cousin, Haji Bashir Khan Nurzai. The fighting between the pro-Soviet FI and HIK devastated large portions of Kandahar province between Spin Boldak and Kandahar City; HIK ultimately prevailed over Esmatullah's militia in 1991.

An overview of open source reporting on Arif Nurzai’s career in the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the Afghan Parliament) highlights the following accomplishments: Leading a delegation to investigate reports of human rights abuses in northern Afghanistan; working to integrate Kuchi nomads in Nangarhar into the government; establishing a border patrol militia based around Spin Boldak to maintain security at the key border crossing; working with Afridi tribal leaders in Paktia to hold al Qaeda and Taliban fighters accountable for their actions; Helping to negotiate a cease-fire between two feuding tribes in the Shindand district of Herat province; participating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga intended to reconcile disputes between the two countries; leading GIROA efforts to reconcile and reintegrate Taliban fighters back into the existing political system.
(U//FOUO) **Haji Neamatullah Khan** is the main Nurzai leader from Spin Boldak. He is a member of both the provincial and Kandahar tribal council. He was a Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli. He has good ties with Ahmad Wali Karzai, Gul Agha Sherzai and Arif Nurzai. The connection to Arif Nurzai is the main factor for his involvement in the council. He allegedly also has contacts with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI.

(U//FOUO) **Hafiz Majid** is an old guard Taliban from the 1990s Taliban regime. From a religious family, his father Mullah Abdullah Jan was mullah of a mosque in Panjwayi (Safid Rawan area). During the jihad he studied at a religious madrassa in Pakistan and memorized the Koran. He became a group commander of Ittehad-e Islami by the end of the jihad and spent his time during the mujahdeen government as a sub-commander of Arif Khan Nurzai at the 7th Division at Kandahar airfield. He rose to prominence during the Taliban government. Known as a ‘right-hand’ to paramount Taliban leader Mullah Omar, he served as Chief of Police of Kandahar province during the Taliban government. During the old Taliban regime, he allegedly tortured potential opponents. Amid the Taliban collapse, he reportedly stocked huge cashes of ammunition at an unknown location in Panjwayi. He leads the insurgency activities in Panjwayi from Quetta, Pakistan. Other prominent Nurzai figures are listed in Appendix 6.

(U//FOUO) **Mohammed Ehsan Nurzai** is the Deputy Chair of the Kandahar Provincial Council. He is the cousin of Arif Khan Nurzai as well as BGen Mirwais Nurzai, the former Kandahar CoP. Arif and Mirwais’ sister is married to Ahmad Wali Khan. There is possible animosity between Ehsan Nurzai and his cousin Arif.

(U) **Main rivalries and alliances**
(U//FOUO) The Nurzai’s main rival on the provincial level is the Achekzai tribe.

(U) **Other Panjpai tribes**
(U//FOUO) Other Panjpai tribes include the Ishaqzai and the Alizai. The Ishaqzai is the second largest of the Panjpai tribes in Kandahar settled mostly in Maywand and Panjwayi. They have large populations in neighboring Helmand Province. They are marginalized in the government and have no provincial council member or heads of government departments.

(U//FOUO) The Alizai are not very powerful either but are better connected to the central government because of the marriage of Mullah Sher Mohammad Akhundzada—an Alizai former Governor of Helmand and ally of the Karzai family—to a sister of Arif Khan Nurzai. The tribe has one head of a provincial government department and one of the Chiefs of Police of Kandahar was an Alizai who hailed from Musa Qala District in Helmand. They are in Kandahar’s Zhari District and in Northern Helmand Province. Their main leader in Kandahar was Habibullah Jan from Zhari who was killed in 2008 by unknown gunmen. One of the main reasons he created Zhari district was to give the Alizai an area where they were in the majority.

**Ghilzai**
(U//FOUO) The Ghilzai confederation tribes have shared much of the same predicament as the Panjpai Durrani and have historically been in the shadow of the much more powerful Zirak tribes. The Ghilzai are even weaker than the Panjpai in terms of connections to the provincial government as they have no provincial council member or other key government positions.
(U//FOUO) Even more so than the Panjpai, the Ghilzai tribes were associated with the Taliban regime, as many of the old guard Taliban (including their leader Mullah Omar) were from the Ghilzai confederation. This has been used as an excuse to sideline them from post-2001 politics, and also made them a prime target for arrests by the international military forces. It is alleged that the overwhelming majority of prisoners all across southern Afghanistan are Ghilzai.

(U//FOUO) The Ghilzai tribes created their own council in order to counter balance the influence of the Durrani, but it is seen by many Ghilzai as mainly composed of pro-Karzai Ghilzai. While this Ghilzai shura has an official status with the provincial government it holds less power than the provincial shura. Currently, efforts are underway to create a new Ghilzai shura.

(U//FOUO) Kandahar Province’s large Ghilzai Pashtun community is not lacking grievances. The tribes of the Ghilzai confederation have no representation in Kandahar’s provincial government and feel marginalized by the Durrani Pashtun majority. Community leaders describe a steady decline from full integration of the different branches of the Pashtun family during the Taliban era to a “conspiracy” against the nationwide Ghilzai shura in 2004-2005 that was unwittingly facilitated by coalition action. Certainly, some of the solutions sought by Ghilzai leaders are unrealistic, such as the appointment of Ghilzai to key government positions by coalition fiat. However other suggestions are very pragmatic and in the assessment of PRT officials, bear serious consideration.

(U//FOUO) Among the Ghilzai tribes, the Hotak are the most prominent in Kandahar City (5%), especially among the religious figures. The overall percentage of the Ghilzai is hard to gauge due to their diversity.

(U//FOUO) Mohammad Hassan Akhund is a Hotak, a prominent religious scholar and one of the most famous mullahs of Kandahar province. He was never linked to any faction. He is affiliated with the Moyi Mobarak Jamai Mosque, where hair of the Prophet Mohammad is said to be kept. Another well known religious scholar of the Hotak tribe is Haji Kari Sahib. He is a member of the ulema shura and the Mullah Imam of the Moyi Mobarak Jamai Mosque and has good relations with major Kandahar power holders. Mohammad Haq Akhunzada is another elder of the Hotak tribe. He was never linked to any party and is a conflict mediator known for impartiality.

Kuchi
(U//FOUO) During the winter season, an estimated 6,000 nomadic Kuchi families from Ghazni (Muqur), Zabul (Qalat), and Uruzgan provinces pass the Kandahar City area on their way to Garmisir district of Helmand province. They stay for about two or three days in the area of the Nisaji factory located in the east of the city between the border of Daman district and the city. During the summer months they return to the highlands.

Shia population
(U//FOUO) There is a sizeable Shia population in Kandahar City (8%) that lives mostly in nahiya 1. They are most likely descendents of Qizilbash who came to Kandahar during the time of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Baba and constituted large parts of the administrative class in the past. The Shia are renowned potters and jewelers and are involved in the import of construction materials such as farming tools and pipes. They are well represented in NGOs and many Shia women work. There are indications most girls in Kandahar City schools are Shia.
(U//FOUO) During the anti-Soviet *jihad* the Shia mostly supported *Harakat-e-Islami*, led by Ali Yawar, a resident of Taop Khana in Kandahar City. The Shia community has set up their own council in the city. Appendix 7 profiles important Shia leaders in Kandahar-city.

**Tribal rivalries and the effect on governance**
(U//FOUO) There is currently a backlash by the Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes who have been left out squarely from the access to resources and power as the Zirak Durrani hold the scepter firmly in their hands. In southern Afghanistan, the US military strategy relied heavily on Zirak Durrani anti-Taliban forces who were subsequently rewarded with the control of key business sectors, political positions and the security apparatus. The new (and old) Zirak power holders suggested a simplistic friend and foe schemata that allowed for a stigmatization of Panjpai and Ghilzai tribes as Taliban and their subsequent marginalization. Similarly, the jails of southern Afghanistan are filled with Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani whereas Zirak Durrani tribes often avoid imprisonment because of their connections to the police or other central power holders (see Box 4 below). The example of the Sarpoza jailbreak below is telling in this regard. The current Taliban insurgency has been fast in picking up on these grievances.

(U//FOUO) A story, probably apocryphal, that has made the rounds in Kandahar City highlights the sense of disparity between the tribes. During the infamous Sarpoza jailbreak of June 2008, which allowed the escape of over a 1,000 prisoners, some hundreds of them Taliban, two prisoners (a Popalzai and Ghilzai) supposedly stayed behind rather than flee. When the Afghan security forces arrived, they found that the two had seized weapons and prevented 120 inmates from fleeing. The Afghan security forces gave the two hostage takers their respective ‘rewards.’ The Popalzai prisoner, who had been convicted of 15 murders and stealing fuel was pardoned and became commander of the security of the Police headquarters. The other hostage taker, a Ghilzai who had been convicted of a relatively minor crime, was thrown back into jail.

(U//FOUO) Kandahar-city is the seat of all provincial wide government institutions as well as the municipality government (*sharwali wolayat*). The most important among them are the Provincial Governor, Chief of Police, the 15-member Provincial Council, National Directorate of Security (NDS), and provincial line departments (see overview of the directors of these departments in appendices 8-11). Municipal government structures exist as well in the city. The district of Dand refers to the rural area immediately south of Kandahar City. Dand is not recognized by the national government, which considers it part of Kandahar City. As such, Dand has no *tashkil*, although it does have a district leader, who “governs” through a network of Dand village leaders. The Dand “District Governor” is Haji Hamdullah Nazak.

(U//FOUO) It is important to note that the ‘official’ government only exercises limited power by virtue of its institutional legitimacy. Significantly greater power is exerted by the pre-eminent personalities in Kandahar province, some of whom have been discussed, and many others of whom will be discussed later in this document. The authority of many individuals in the provincial and city governments usually results from their status in the informal or tribal

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26 Much of the information in the “Government Structure…” section of this paper was provided by the report “Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009,” which was produced by the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO), an Afghan non-governmental organization.
hierarchy. As such, the two primary power brokers are Ahmad Wali Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai.

(U//FOUO) Of the 33 provincial government positions, including the heads of provincial departments, provincial governor, provincial chief of police and head of the provincial council...

- Twenty (20) are held by Zirak Durrani (seven Achekzai, five Popalzai, four Mohammadzai, three Alokozai, one Barakzai)
- Two (2) are held by Panjpai Durrani (one Alizai, one Nurzai)
- Five (5) are held by Ghilzai, three of which are not natives of Kandahar (two are Suliman Khail from Laghman; one is Ahmadzai) and two are Tokhi
- Six (6) are held by members of other tribal confederations (Barets, Tarin, Kakar, Zazai), a Dari speaker and one is unknown

(U//FOUO) Figure 10: Distribution of government positions among tribal confederations

(U//FOUO) Of the 34 positions of district governors and district chiefs of police in the 17 districts (Note that in Miya Nishin no district governor or chief of police has been present since 2007 but the numbers include the last ones) (see Figure 11 below) over half (26) are held by Zirak Durrani (11 Popalzai; 6 Achekzai; 4 Alokozai; 5 Barakzai); five by Panjpai Durrani (3 Alizai; 2 Nurzai); two by other Pashtun tribes (1 Barets, 1 Kakar), and one from another ethnic group (Baluch). None are held by members of the Ghilzai confederation.
(U/FOUO) In light of the above, the government is clearly dominated by the Zirak Durrani confederation, and within the Zirak confederation increasingly by Popalzai, while the Panjplai and Ghilzai are strongly underrepresented compared to their population size. According to local respondents this domination is also manifest in the overall provincial government administration with a majority of Zirak Durrani bureaucrats.

**Provincial Governors**
(U/FOUO) Kandahar has had five governors in eight years. According to local respondents, the replacement of governors, with the exception of Gul Agha Sherzai, has not changed the balance of power significantly and they claim the city is under the authority of Provincial Council Head Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter already wielded a considerable amount of power as head of the Kandahar *shura* when Gul Agha Sherzai was provincial governor, and some local respondents spoke of the ‘two governments’ of Kandahar (Karzai vs. Sherzai). It is alleged that most governors since Sherzai had to ally themselves with Ahmad Wali Karzai in order to stay in power.

(U/FOUO) **Gul Agha Sherzai** (Barakzai) served as Governor of Kandahar three times: from 1992 to 1994 during the pre-Taliban *mujahedeen* government and twice under the current Afghan government—the first time from early 2002-September 2003, and the second time from December 2004 - June 2005. During the 15 months between his tenures he switched positions with Yusef Pashtun, the Minister of Urban Affairs in Kabul. In June 2005 he was replaced by Asadullah Khalid and appointed Governor of Nangarhar.

(U/FOUO) **Yusef Pashtun** (Barakzai) is from Kandahar and served as Provincial Governor in Kandahar from September 2003 to December 2004. He had worked with the Demining Agency for Afghanistan during the *mujahedeen* government and lived in Quetta during the Taliban government. He returned to Kandahar in 2001 and was advisor and spokesman of
Gul Agha Sherzai. He is currently Minister of Urban Development, a position he also held before his governorship.

(U//FOUO) Asadullah Khalid, a Taraki (Ghilzai) from Ghazni, served as Governor of Kandahar province over three years (from June 2005 to August 2008). He was previously the Governor of Ghazni Province (2001 to 2004). Khalid was a controversial governor and there were allegations of torture of prisoners and corruption under his tenure and the security situation worsened (bandits, assassinations, kidnappings). He escaped an assassination attempt in early 2007 when he was targeted by a suicide bomber. He was replaced by Rahmatullah Raufi in August 2008 and appointed Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. Assadullah Khalid was affiliated with the Ittehad-e Islami faction that had allied itself with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. During the Taliban time he spent time in the USA. He maintains close links to the Karzais, but his main source of power has been good relations with ISAF.

(U//FOUO) Rahmatullah Raufi (Wardak, Mir Khail) from Wardak, was Provincial Governor for a mere four months (August – December 2008). He had completed his military studies in the Soviet Union and was a pro-People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) army commander in the Afghan wars. In the current government he became the commander of the 205 Atal (Hero) corps, was a senior military commander of the Afghan Nation Army (ANA) and a main commander in Operation Mountain Thrust. On 15th of August 2008, he became the new governor of Kandahar province. He was allegedly replaced because of a tense relationship with the head of the provincial council, Ahmad Wali Karzai. Local respondents perceived him well, but his short time in office makes any evaluation difficult.

(U//FOUO) Tooryalai Wesa (alternate transliteration: Weesa, Vesa), the current governor of Kandahar Province is a Mohammadzai originally from Arghandab District. He has been the Governor of Kandahar since December 2008. A native of Kandahar, he was appointed as the Dean of Kandahar University and served there until he left Afghanistan in 1991 for Canada. He only recently returned at the President Karzai’s request to the governorship. An expert in agriculture, he holds dual Afghan and Canadian citizenship. He has good connections with foreign forces and to the local and central government as he was a childhood friend of President Karzai and knows his brother Qayum Karzai. His Western outlook and lack of mujahideen credentials are, however, liabilities in Kandahar’s conservative culture.

(U//FOUO) It is assessed that Weesa’s ‘outsider’ status and proximity to the Karzais compromises his perceived legitimacy.27

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27 District Level Governance in Kandahar Province briefing, Tiger Team RC-S/TFK, KPRT, 1-4 Feb 2010
Deputy Governor
(U//FOUO) Ghulam Jilani Hamayoun is the Deputy Governor of Kandahar Province, a position he has filled since Gul Agha Sherzai’s governorship in 2004-2005. He is considered a marginal player in Kandahar politics.

Chief of Staff
(U//FOUO) Haji Mohammad Anas has served as the Chief of Staff to the Governor under the communist, Taliban and now the Karzai regimes.

(U//FOUO) He is a member of the Barakzai tribe and a known associate of Ahmad Wali Karzai. He is a skilled administrator capable of communicating effectively with coalition elements and mobilizing Kandahar’s notoriously difficult to manage government.

Provincial Council
(U//FOUO) The Provincial Council (PC) was elected in September 2005 and is composed of 15 members. The members are elected by popular vote and four seats are reserved for women. There are no fixed quotas for representatives from the different districts however. According to an AREU Briefing Paper, the rights and obligations of the Provincial Council fall into three categories: Participation in provincial development planning, monitoring and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions, participation in three inter-related activities of conflict resolution, the elimination of customs “contrary to the law and sharia” or human rights standards, and the reduction of illicit drug activity. The composition of the provincial council clearly shows a) the dominance of the Zirak Durrani tribes who hold 10 of 15 seats (66%) and b) the weak representation of Panjpai Durrani tribes (2 of 15 seats; 13%) as well as a complete absence of Ghilzai tribes. Notable is also a skewed geographic representation due to the fact that those with the highest votes take all. The northern, southern and eastern Kandahar districts are not represented at all. There have been four attacks on provincial council members since 2008: the Shiite member from Kandahar City was killed by unknown gunmen in Kandahar.
City in 2006 and the female clerk was assassinated on the street in 2009. Members of the Provincial Council can be found in appendix 11.\(^{28}\)

(U//FOUO) The Provincial Council, while nominally a consultative body whose primary function is to advise the governor, often acts as an executive body with members approving development projects and exercising other executive authorities by virtue of their tribal standing.\(^{29}\)

(U//FOUO) The Provincial Council is not truly representative of the geographic or tribal composition of Kandahar. It is increasingly dominated by the Karzai-Sherzai competition and serves the political/economic interests of its membership.\(^{30}\)

(U//FOUO) Provincial Councils are the only democratic institutions in provincial-level politics in Afghanistan. Perhaps by design, they are also among the weakest, with little concrete mandate beyond serving as a discussion forum and advisory body to the Governor. Most Provincial Councils across Afghanistan are largely irrelevant to governance; Kandahar’s is an exception. Under Ahmad Wali Karzai’s chairmanship, the Kandahar Provincial Council has become an important venue for deal-making and coordination between Kandahar’s powerbrokers.

(U//FOUO) Because the election process for Provincial Council members treats Kandahar province as one giant constituency (with the top 15 province-wide vote-earners winning a seat), the council’s membership consists almost entirely of tribal leaders who can mobilize their tribesmen to vote en masse. With all of the key tribal leaders in one place, Ahmad Wali Karzai uses the Provincial Council to build, sustain and exploit strategic alliances that are far more effective in producing results than are the formal avenues of provincial governance. Unfortunately, these alliances better serve the personal and business interests of the council members themselves than they do the population of Kandahar City or Kandahar Province.

**Line ministries**

(U//FOUO) With few exceptions, Kandahar Province line ministries lack capacity and representation across the province. Ministry officials are largely appointed through connections and not their qualifications. What competent officials there are, are more often than not lured away by the salaries of the international community and NGOs operating in Kandahar. As such, the clarity of the mandate of ministry officials and accountability for results is sorely lacking.\(^{31}\)

**Kandahar Tribal Council**\(^{32}\)

(U//FOUO) In 2005, Qayum Karzai, the brother of President Karzai and former Member of Parliament, created a “Shura for Security and Reform” in Kandahar, composed of 29 tribal elders. The purpose of the shura was not entirely clear to local respondents and some dismissed it as a tool to support the president’s brother in the province, an election campaign shura for President Karzai (as all members are seen as close to Ahmad Wali Karzai) or simply as a way of getting donor money. The shura was widely seen as a failure. In 2008, Provincial

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\(^{28}\) Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.

\(^{29}\) Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.

\(^{30}\) District Level Governance in Kandahar Province briefing, Tiger Team RC-TFK, KPRT, 1-4 Feb 2010

\(^{31}\) District Level Governance in Kandahar Province briefing, Tiger Team RC-TFK, KPRT, 1-4 Feb 2010

\(^{32}\) Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.
Governor Rahmatullah Raufi attempted to create a larger tribal council that was perceived as a reconciliation shura, but it met the opposition of Ahmad Wali Karzai. The latter proceeded to create another shura called the Kandahar “Tribal Council” that held its first session on 11 March 2008.

Local respondents claim the Kandahar Tribal Council is more balanced in tribal composition than the provincial council. The tribal representation is: Achekzai (3), Alizai (2), Alokozai (2), Barakzai (2), Kakar (2), Ishaqzai (3), Popalzai (3), Nurzai (4), Tokhi (2) one each Sadat, Farsiwan, Mohmand, Mohammadzai, Mojaddidi/Hazrat, and one unknown; thus, 38% (11 of 29) are Zirak Durrani, 31% are Panjpai, 7% are Ghilzai, and 24% from other Pashtun tribes or ethnic group.

As in the provincial council, representatives of the northern, southern and eastern Kandahar districts are largely absent, displaying a strong geographic inequality of political power. Six members are also part of the Provincial Council (until 2009). (See Appendix for members of the tribal council.

Kandahar Municipal Government

The municipal government is composed of a city mayor who works with district councils. The latter are a link of the population to the head of the municipality, but often the people address him directly. The municipal government is perceived to be little more than an extension of the power of the head of the provincial council Ahmad Wali Karzai. Except for the first mayor of Kandahar, the other three city mayors were ‘suggested’ by Qayum Karzai and are very close to the Karzai family.

Kandahar City is an extremely challenging city to administer by any standard. In addition to the security problems caused by insurgent and criminal interests, the municipal government must also cope with uncertain city boundaries and jurisdiction, chaotic and unreliable roads and other public infrastructure, and a rapidly expanding population that pays no property tax, yet demands public services. The Kandahar City municipal Government is led by a dedicated and seemingly incorruptible mayor, Ghulam Haider Hamedi (also spelled Hayder Hamidi). Unfortunately, he lacks a similarly capable staff or network of sub district managers to maintain control over the chaos of Kandahar City. There have been four mayors to date which are listed in detail in appendix 10.

Background on Ghulam Haider Hamedi

Mayor Hamedi is known as a hard-working man with principles. He is actively involved in governance and community development. He is a member of the Mohammedzai tribe and a cousin of Governor Wesa, although their working relationship is not as tight as the familial link might suggest. Mayor Hamedi is trying to start a land registration process in the city, but it is proving to be difficult, with significant interference from the ANA (who owns much of the land) and ANP (who are trying to benefit from it). He manages a surplus, but has a difficult time spending it due to the lack of qualified experts to advise him. Perhaps by necessity, the Mayor is a micro-manager who has a hard time delegating work (or finding qualified people to delegate to). He has endured at least one assassination attempt during his

33 Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.
tenure. He is said to have many enemies in the business community because he does not accept bribes and tries to tax businesses in the city.

(U//FOUO) Due to his efforts to collect taxes, he has raised city revenues by 700%. He is championing an effort to convert untitled land to private property in the city’s Sub-district 9 by offering plots for sale to the current occupants at 10 percent of the assessed value. He is currently confronting Kandahar power brokers who have appropriated government land in and around Kandahar City. He has compiled a list of names of the worst abusers, which he intended to read over the radio in an effort to publicly shame them. He ultimately refrained from taking this step.

(U//FOUO) Mayor Hamedi, who maintains a residence outside of Washington, D.C. and lived for a significant time in the United States, is widely regarded as an honest man, though he is not universally liked. Continually frustrated by the demands of his office, he has made references to resigning from his post and was encouraged to stay by Kandahar PRT officials.

(U//FOUO) Hamedi’s staff is assessed to be weak—what influence is exerted by the municipal government is the result of Hamedi’s tenacity. His activity is continuously hamstrung by a lack of quality staff, an understandable tendency to micromanage and the influence of Kandahar City powerbrokers on his office (particularly on issues of land ownership and use).34

**Kandahar City sub-districts**

(U//FOUO) The official managers of the city’s sub-districts (also referred to as “districts”) are appointed by the Mayor. However, they are incapable of handling governance of the entire sub-districts. They are often corrupt and are generally not respected by Kandahar City residents. It is assessed that Kandahar City and the surrounding sub-districts will remain a highly politicized and competitive environment. Influential Kandaharis, both in and out of Government, will be motivated more by their licit and illicit financial interests than by a commitment to economic or political growth. As such, current government capacity and capability is insufficient to deliver effects without cooperation from these Kandahari elites. These localized powerbrokers draw authority from various sources depending on their community (e.g. religious leaders, elders, businessmen, former mujahedeen commanders.) Their influence is usually limited to a single village/neighborhood and they generally occupy no official government position. Several have questionable backgrounds and connections.35

(U//FOUO) Each sub-district has a unique set of governance issues and powerbrokers. Below are highlights of select sub-districts.

**Sub-district 6**36

(U//FOUO) Sub-district 6 has a population of approximately 15,000 people. Given its geographic location near the intersection of Dand and Panjway districts, the dominant tribes are most likely Barakzai and Nurzai, with pocketed minorities of Alokozai and Popalzai.

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34 District Level Governance in Kandahar Province briefing, Tiger Team RC-S/TFK, KPRT, 1-4 Feb 2010
35 District Level Governance in Kandahar Province briefing, Tiger Team RC-S/TFK, KPRT, 1-4 Feb 2010
36 White SA Profile for Kandahar City, Sub-District 6, TF Kandahar White SA Team, 10 Jan 2010
The manager of Sub-district 6 is Abdul Latif, who was recently appointed following the Mayor’s firing of the previous manager following insurgent events in August 2009. Abdul Latif has taken some steps to cooperate with KPRT to bring projects to the Sub-district. However, the municipal government of Kandahar City has relatively little influence over the Malaya area and many of the residents of this predominantly rural area feel a closer connection to Dand District than to the City.

Residents consistently report the security situation as good, but they are no doubt aware of a significant insurgent presence in the area. They most likely believe that INS will not bother them if they don’t cause any problems. As Malajat serves as a bed-down/staging area for INS, very few actual operations take place in the area itself. The Police Sub-Station Commander for Sub-district 6 is Sgt Abdul Salam Jan. It is assessed that ANP from this sub-district are quite professional, however the relatively comfortable INS presence in the sub-district suggests they are not particularly effective. The ANP have traditionally been non-players in the area, but their public perception has improved dramatically since the USPMT have been providing them with focused mentoring. Locals now have positive reviews of the ANP and they patrol on a regular basis.

The stated priorities of the community in Sub-district 6 are availability of electricity, access to clean water (the area contains several broken wells requiring remediation. No new wells can be drilled before engineers conduct an inspection to assess their impact on the overall water supply), waste removal, canal rehabilitation, and education.

Local leaders include Malik Abdul Karim, who is the Malajat representative at the Dand District Shura and a respected Barakzai elder; Malik Mohammad Zahair who is the leader of the Pakhah Polan village; Malik Abdul Mohammed, leader of Ghani Khan Kalacha village; Malik Sardar Mohammed, village leader and mullah in Hanna Gosh, Suldan Mohammed, preacher at the Ghani Khan Kalacha mosque/madrassa and Haji Murcha Agha, a Sufi religious leader known all over Kandahar who is very well respected and preaches a message of peace (he admonishes the Taliban for perverting Islam to serve their violent agenda). Haji Murcha has not been targeted by the Taliban, most likely due to his advanced age (in his 70s) or his popularity. His son Toor Agha is beginning to step into his father’s shoes. It is unclear whether his message will have the same anti Taliban tone.

Sub-district 7
Sub-district 7 is a sparsely populated area, whose primary industry is agriculture. Wheat is grown in this area and there is some evidence of drug cultivation. While a Kandahar sub-district, the residents are more Panjwayan than Kandahari. While there is a general perception among the populace that security is improving, Sub-district 7 is still believed to have a significant insurgent presence.

The Asia Ye Chap village is led by Malik Mohammed Sagiq. There are approximately 40 families in the village. The village is poor, but well kept. There is no electricity or health care in the village.
The Kobey village is led by Abdul Samad and is home to approx 20 families. There is periodic electricity (4-5 hours/day). Most residents work in Kandahar City.

Now Dey village is comprised of 100 families and is led by Mohammad Wali. Now Dey is home to many Panjway ANP, all of whom are Alikozai.

The Taliban have been relatively active in the Mirwais Mena area in Sub-district 7, which has served as a final assembly and staging area for vehicle-borne IEDs.

Sub-district 8
Sub-district 8 is managed by Obaidullah Raji. Raji reportedly is not well respected by the population, nor does he reside in the area. By the mayor’s own assessment, he is one of Kandahar City’s most corrupt and least effective Sub-District Managers. Raji claims to have a team of officials working for him in Sub-district 8, including the following individuals: Muhammed Gul, Sayeed Mohammed Agha, Ahmed Khan, Barab Aka, and Dad Khan. The sub-district also has its own shura, which is led by Haji Abdul Halik. Halik’s tribe is unknown. He has expressed a lack of trust in higher government authorities and the ANP in the sub-district. He has identified the following key needs in the sub-district: road improvement, water supply, protection from seasonal flooding, electricity, employment and health care.

Police sub-station (PSS) 8 has 86 personnel and is commanded by Lalai Mama. Opinion of Mama is mixed. On numerous occasions, US mentors have observed behavior that strongly suggests Mama is fully aware of, and perhaps complicit in the orchestration of insurgent attacks against ISAF patrols. Mama is known to have an intense rivalry with Abdullah, the NDS representative for the sub-district. Sarpoza Prison is in District 8.

Sub-district 9
The Southern portion of Sub-district 9 is home to the wealthier, more established tribes of Kandahar (i.e. Alikozai, Popalzai) and is home to prominent figures such as Karimullah Akhonzada and the PSS 9 Commander, Zulmi (both Alikozai). The Northern portion of Sub-district 9 is comprised of a mix of tribes comprised mainly of migrant or newly-arrived residents from Kandahar’s rural districts, other provinces or even Pakistan. On the Northwestern edge of the sub-district are a few Kuchi settlements occupying abandoned compounds.

There is electrical supply in the area, but it functions only 4-5 hours/day. Many of the public wells are observed to be inoperable as of Dec 2009 and the ablution facilities at the mosques have no water. The roads are good (albeit unpaved) and have generally good drainage.

The Taliban has established a notable presence in Sud-district 9. In 2008, 90 percent of the IEDs detonated or found in Kandahar City were in District 9.

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39 White SA Profile for Kandahar City, Sub-District 8, TF Kandahar White SA Team, 23 Jan 2010
(U) KANDAHAR CITY POWER BROKERS
(U//FOUO) Below is a list of the top 12 primary power brokers of Kandahar city, with their primary areas of responsibility and a brief description. 41

Akhtar Mohammed (Sub-districts 10 and 5)
(U//FOUO) Akhtar is reputed to be the owner/director of the command compound in Sub-district 10. He is an associate of Ahmad Wali Khan and is likely the “go to guy” for issues from which AWK must keep his distance. He sources personal security guards for AWK and provides security for the Aino Mina residential development in Sub-district 10. He is believed to supply vehicles, weaponry and accommodations to private security firms, criminal groups and possibly insurgents. He is a major importer/vendor of diesel fuel to Kandahar City. He also imports computers and electronics via Spin Boldak. He is the Ghilzai tribal leader for Daman district.

Karimullah (Sub-district 9)
(U//FOUO) Karimullah is an Alokozai tribal leader and the son of famed mujahedeen commander Mullah Naqib. He resides in Loya Wala neighborhood of Sub-district 9 and maintains a private security force around his residence. He owns construction contracting companies in Kandahar City and Arghandab.

Zulmai (Sub-district 9)
(U//FOUO) Zulmai is the PSS 9 ANP commander. He is an Alokozai associate of Karimullah and lives nearby. He is known to collect baksheesh from contractors and residents building new houses in Sub-district 9.

Haji Abdullah Khan (Sub-districts 1, 2, and 10)
(U//FOUO) Haji Abdullah is the owner of KC exchange market and the Afghan United Bank and as such serves as a conduit for foreign investment from multiple countries. He owns the contract for residential construction in Aino Mina. He is a senior Barakzai affiliate and hosts high level tribal shores at his residence. He reportedly uses bodyguards provided by Gul Agha Sherzai.

(U//FOUO) However, Halim’s strategic choices and lack of political savvy have limited his accumulation of wealth and influence in both the post-Soviet and post-Taliban periods. Since his return to Kandahar from exile after the fall of the Taliban regime, Halim’s level of influence has fluctuated under the administration of different governors. Despite his best efforts, Halim has never truly risen to the level of provincial-level powerbroker. Today, he exists as a big fish in the relatively small pond of Mirwais, Mina. There he uses his fame and high level connections to control the security and economic activity in much of the sub-district. Despite his comfortable lifestyle, Halim still hopes to play a bigger role in Kandahar and to trade his reputation as a warlord for more respectable status as a legitimate tribal or political leader.

Faizuddin Agha (Sub-district 2)

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41 As assessed by White SA cell, PRT Kandahar, 30 Jan 2010.
(U//FOUO) Faizluddin was Karzai’s campaign manager and the former district leader of Spin Boldak. He is a suspected narco-trafficker and the absentee Malik of Zalakhan village in Panjway. Three of his sons were kidnapped by insurgents, one of whom was killed in Sep 2009 for unknown reasons.

**BGen Mirwais Nurzai** (city-wide)
(U//FOUO) BGen Mirwais is an ANP officer and the former Provincial Chief of Police for Kandahar Province. He is the brother of the Nurzai tribal leader Mohammed Arif Nurzai. BGen Mirwais is a suspected narco trafficker and is additionally suspected of protecting AWK and his brother’s drug operations in Kandahar using his position within the ANP.

**Fazel Mazali** (Sub-district 1)
(U//FOUO) Fazel is the PSS 11 commander. Although he is a 2nd LT, he is referred to as “General Mazali”. He is a suspected narco-trafficker who claims to own land adjacent to the Governor’s Palace. He has threatened major civil unrest if bazaar that sits on his claimed land is moved to make way for a new school.

**Haji Murcha Agha** (Sub-district 6, 3, and 8)
(U//FOUO) As previously discussed Haji Murcha is a Sufi religious leader known all over Kandahar. He is considered a mystic, but is well-respected by local nationals who visit his home in Zor Shar. He is not involved in politics and appears to be “untouchable” in the Taliban’s eyes.

**Toran Abdul Khaliq** (Sub-district 3)
(U//FOUO) Toran is a former ANA Captain and a relative of President Karzai and AWK. He is the leader of Loy Bala Karz village and a former district leader of Spin Boldak.

**DAND DISTRICT**
(U//FOUO) The district of Dand refers to the rural area immediately south of Kandahar City. Dand is not recognized by the national government, which considers it part of greater Kandahar City. As such, Dand has no tashkil, although it does have a district leader, who “governs” through a network of Dand village leaders. The Dand “District Governor” is Haji Hamdullah Nazak. Nazak, who is in his 30s, is seen as capable.

(U//FOUO) Haji Hamdullah Nazak has served as Dand District Governor since 2007. He is proactive but corrupt, and has a good relationship with Coalition Forces. He commands a personal police force that is not accountable to the District Chief of Police, Shir Shah Ahmadzai of the Ahmadzai tribe. While Haji Hamdullah Nazak is a Barakzai, he has closer ties with Popalzai networks via his relationship with Ahmad Wali Karzai, a fact that has alienated him somewhat from local Barakzai leaders. While he states that all Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) offices are staffed in Dand district, it is indicated that, as of March 2010, the Sectoral Office, Finance Office and Village Office are vacant. The confusion may come down to the fact that district residents have filled these positions unofficially.

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42 Dand District Link Analysis, TFK White SA Team, 13 Oct 2009
(U//FOUO) **Tribal Dynamics.** The Barakzai and Popalzai tribes dominate the population of Dand. There are also other tribal minorities in Dand, in particular Alokozai, Achezkai and Ghilzai, but nowhere are these populations concentrated enough to form a significant stronghold. One minor exception is the small but significant Kuchi nomad settlement that exists on the outskirts of Deh-e Bagh village. Although the presence of high-level tribal powerbrokers such as Gul Agha Sherzai and the Karzai family can be felt in Dand in the form of tribal militias and large, walled, private compounds, the district generally does not serve as a battleground for tribal rivalries. Instead, the politics of Dand are defined by much more specific issues of personality and economic interest.

(U//FOUO) **Village Dynamics.** At the moment, there are three distinct mentalities that define the leadership of the villages in Dand. Where ISAF stabilization operations are well-established, such as in Deh-e Bagh, the leadership situation is stable even if the role of the village leader is reduced by the significant influence of the District Governor. In villages where stabilization operations are relatively new, the leadership situation remains dynamic as some powerbrokers seek to place themselves in a position of authority while others deliberately avoid being identified as an official leader. This is particularly true in the villages of Belanday and Rumbasi. Finally, where ISAF presence is not yet fully established, such as in Gorgan, villages are intimidated by the threat of insurgent reprisal and consciously avoid any public association with stabilization efforts. In these areas, leaders are hesitant to even identify themselves.

(U//FOUO) **Security Dynamics.** Although the prevalence of insurgent activity in Dand is far lower than in Kandahar’s other districts, in particular Panjway and Zhari, the district still faces serious challenges that prevent it from being considered genuinely stable.

(U//FOUO) The poor state (and reputation) of the ANP is probably the single greatest hindrance to district stability. There is an overall lack of police officers in the district and of those that are there, many are unregistered, illiterate, poorly trained and under-equipped. Most are owed several months in back pay. As a result, their discipline, professionalism, and overall effectiveness are severely lacking.

(U//FOUO) Until recently, the police headquarters in Dand was in an equally unimpressive state. It lacked a functional electrical generator or septic system. It is badly in need of repair, did not have a functional septic system and, despite having a new generator installed in March 2009, was experiencing significant problems with its electrical supply.

(U//FOUO) What complicates the policing situation in Dand even further is the presence of multiple “police forces” under different chains of command. In addition to Shir Shah’s official ANP, there are at least three other “ANP” forces in Dand, including a personal security force commanded by District Governor Amadullah Nazak, unofficial police checkpoints manned by police officers loyal only to high-level Barakzai tribal leaders, and at least one security checkpoint near the private compound of Qayum Karzai manned by “police officers” loyal only to Popalzai tribal leaders.

**District Level Powerbrokers.**

(U//FOUO) **Amadullah Nazak.** Nazak (also spelled Nazek) has served as District Governor of Dand since Aug 2007. He is considered a sharp and capable individual and shows a genuine
interest in exercising coherent district-level leadership over the various villages of Dand. His status at the young age of 32 is surprising in the Afghan culture that privileges seniority. His appointment is said to have offended many landowners and senior tribal elders in Dand and his rocky relationship with Assadullah Khan is evidence of this. While possibly the most capable district governor in Kandahar, Nazak is by no means above using his position for personal gain.

Haji Hamdullah Nazak, the Dand District Leader

(U//FOUO) While Nazak is a Barakzai, he is seen to affiliate himself closer to the Popalzai by his look and attitude. This could be the result of his desire to appear supportive of Ahmad Wali Karzai. His associations with Ahmad Wali Karzai may have hindered his ability to work with other members of the Barakzai tribe in the Dand District. Nazak reportedly does not get along with many senior Barakzai and Achezkai leaders such as Gul Agha, Bacha Sherzai and Khalid Pashtun. Insurgents have targeted Nazak for assassination on multiple occasions using possibly two suicide attacks, IEDs and tow rocket attacks. He often works through his brother Fatay Khan on development projects.

(U//FOUO) Fatay Khan. Fatay Khan is the younger brother of Amadullah Nazek. He acts both as Nazek’s personal assistant as well as the representative for development projects in Dand. Ostensibly this is because Nazek cannot trust anyone outside of his own family for security reasons, and because he believes the Community Development Councils (CDCs) in Dand to be corrupt. In reality, working solely through Fatay Khan allows Nazek to control every aspect of development contracting and to maximize his own profits.

(U//FOUO) Assadullah Khan. Assadullah Khan is the former village leader of Deh-e Bagh and a major landowner in Dand. He is a member of the Alokozai tribe. Khan has been largely unsupportive of stabilization operations in Dand, both because he is not in a position to profit from development contracting and because the higher wages offered by stabilization projects have caused him to lose workers who would ordinarily be sharecroppers on his land.
Col. Shir Shah. Colonel Shah was named District Chief of Police in Dand in September 2009, following the dismissal of his corrupt predecessor Esmatullah. Shir Shah is an educated and capable leader, and one of the strongest ANP leaders that Kandahar has seen for some time. He has only recently transferred to Kandahar from Kabul and has brought a refreshing outsider’s perspective to restructuring and retraining the Dand ANP.

Shir Sha’s morale has been on a downward slide since arriving in Dand. In return for his efforts to modernize the Dand police, he is facing stiff resistance from his own sub-commanders who are being forced to clean up their act. He has also been targeted by multiple cell phone threats on his life and at least one IED attack.

Haji Bacha Sherzai. Bacha Sherzai is the younger brother of Gul Agha Sherzai, head of the Barakzai tribe and former Governor of Kandahar. Bacha is the most senior Barakzai in Dand and he is considered both a successful businessman and a good public speaker.

Haji Juma Khan. Juma Khan is a member of the Popalzai tribe and head of the Dand district Shura. He is less influential than his counterparts in other districts given the empowered role of the District Governor in Dand.

Abdul Ahad. Abdul Ahad is a Barakzai and as of November 2008 has served as Director of Education in Dand. Little is known about him except that as of that time, he had served in the position for seven years and was considered extremely knowledgeable on educational concerns, needs and development initiatives in Dand.

Ahsiq Muhumud. Ahsiq Muhumud is a member of the Popalzai tribe, and as of Oct 2008, served as the Director of the District Development Assembly in Dand.

Village leadership.
Below are the village leaders for the major villages in the Dand district:

Deh-e Bagh. Sultan Mohammed is the village leader. His tribal affiliation is unknown and he is considered a relatively weak and uncharismatic leader. Given Deh-e Bagh’s co-location with the Dand District Center, Mohammed’s role is somewhat marginalized given the relative influence and authority of the District Governor. Deh-e Bagh was chosen as a “model village” for development by Task Force Kandahar and has been the recipient of significant aid and infrastructure improvement.

Belanday. Sayed Gul Agha is the village leader and a close friend of former village leader Bari Dad, a Popalzai, who served in this role until July 2009, when he claims to have been kidnapped by insurgents. Although Agha’s comportment as a leader has improved since assuming his role in August 2009, it is still unclear whether he is the genuine authority in Belanday or if Bari Dad is using him as a proxy. Rumors persist that Bari Dad engineered his own kidnapping as an excuse to resign and that he now exercises power “from the shadows” via Agha.

Teymurian. Haji Kolalai is the Village leader and a member of the Barakzai tribe. He is very open and cooperative with visitors in his village.
Rumbasi. Haji Mohammed Daoud, whose tribal affiliation is unknown, is the village leader. He recently returned from a prolonged absence to reclaim his position, much to the chagrin of Mohammed Ghose, a member of the Alokozai tribe who had unofficially usurped the position in his absence. Unhappy at being displaced, Ghose enlisted the help of Alokozai tribal ally Abdullah Ajan, an ANP sub-commander in Dand, to lobby the district governor to have Ghose officially named district leader, an attempt that eventually proved unsuccessful.

Gorgan. Abdul Salam is a Barakzai and self-proclaimed cousin of Gul Agha Sherzai (there is no information to either support or refute this claim). He is the head of a group of eight elders appointed by the Dand District Governor to act as a village leadership in Gorgan while there is no official elected leader. The Gorgan elders will likely only elect an official village leader when the security situation has improved.

(U) RECONCILIATION & REINTEGRATION

There are competing efforts by Kandahar’s two leading power brokers to bring the Taliban to the table for peace talks. Both Gul Agha Sherzai and Ahmad Wali Karzai made separate visits to the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team in early 2010 to promote themselves as the preferred figure to bring the Taliban to the table to strike peace deals. Sherzai, the former governor of Kandahar and current governor of Nangarhar province, recently suggested that tribal elders in Kandahar could act as peace envoys. “It’s possible to have peace in the regions,” Sherzai said. “Bring two members of each tribe and discuss the matter, and then give them the duty to talk to the Taliban to convince them to put down their weapons and stop destroying their country.”

See also the section on Mohammad Arif Khan Nurzai in the Governance and Tribal Dynamics section of this paper.

43 This information was conveyed to the authors by a U.S. civilian official at the Kandahar PRT in late February 2010.
(U) AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

(U) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE (ANP)

(U) LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANP

(U//FOUO) The ANP have been as much a source of instability as stability in Kandahar City. The influence of corrupt powerbrokers over their senior ranks has resulted in many weak or corrupt officers being put in leadership positions. Additionally, nepotistic and tribal influences in the lower ranks combined with an overall lack of resources has allowed the development of a largely unprofessional and poorly-trained force that engages in theft, drug use, and intimidation or harassment of the local population for money. That said, there are promising individuals within the organization and where focused and sustained mentoring has been applied, the performance and public perception of the ANP has greatly improved.

(U) Local residents will much more readily interact with international troops on foot patrols than with Afghan National Police. The police must be prodded by their U.S. mentors to approach residents and engage in the friendly chitchat that is such a crucial part of on-the-beat police work and information gathering. Several American military police mentors have stories of how Afghans they were chatting with retreated to the side of the road or into their homes when ANP officers approached.45

As figure 12 demonstrates, the public perception of ANP is moderate, with less than two-thirds of the population holding a favorable opinion of them.

Figure 12:

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45 This information was conveyed to the authors by several members of the 97th Military Police Battalion at Camp Nathan Smith in late February 2010.
(U) The Afghan National Police, in the estimation of a few officers and a senior enlisted with the 97th MP Battalion, would not, as of February 2010, be able to stand on their own without the mentorship and support of ISAF forces.  

(U) UNITS, LEADERSHIP & CAPABILITIES

(U) Kandahar City

(U//FOUO) Kandahar Province has seen eight police chiefs between 2002 and 2009, most being appointed for one year only, with some staying only a few months. (Previous Chiefs of Police can be found in appendix 8).

(U//FOUO) General Sardar Mohammed Zazai has been the Kandahar’s Provincial Chief of Police since September 2009. Zazai commanded Kandahar’s branch of the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which assumed policing responsibilities in Kandahar’s various districts while the ANP received training under the Focused District Development program. As a result, Zazai is well-versed in the security challenges facing the province.

(U//FOUO) Zazai likely directly controls only perhaps half of the forces ostensibly under his command. The rest are influenced by Kandahar’s powerbrokers and tribal leaders. When the provincial governor recently instructed him to replace a district police chief in Panjwayi, the Provincial Chief of Police’s orders were countermanded after local power brokers intervened.

(U//FOUO) Colonel Sherzad is the ANP Chief of Security for Kandahar City. The ANP are made up of four components: The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP); Criminal Investigation Division (CID); Counter-Narcotics Division (CND); and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

(U//FOUO) Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). The Afghan Uniformed Police are the largest component of the Afghan National Police in Kandahar City. There are approximately 784 AUP operating within Kandahar City and the surrounding area. The AUP maintains a Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) in Kandahar City as well as a number of checkpoints throughout the area. Further, the AUP maintain a number of Precinct Sub-Stations (PSS) with at least one PSS located within each police precinct. There are six female AUP officers stationed at PHQ. These female officers are used to conduct searches of female Afghans during operations. When their services are required, they deploy from PHQ to the operation area, perform their assignment, and redeploy back to PHQ.

(U//FOUO) Criminal Investigation Division (CID). The CID commander is Colonel Shah (COL Shah). COL Shah is willing to work with coalition forces so long as he is given something in exchange for his cooperation. For example, COL Shah recently requested that coalition forces install HESCO barriers around his private residence. Coalition forces agreed to provide these

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46 This information was conveyed to the authors by several members of the 97th Military Police Battalion at Camp Nathan Smith in late February 2010.
47 Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.
48 Tribal Liaison Office, Kandahar-city, Kandahar Province District Assessment, November 2009.
49 IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
50 IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
barriers and COL Shah became more open with coalition forces and willing to work with coalition forces. But when coalition forces informed COL Shah that there would be a delay in securing the HESCO barriers for him, he again became distant and unwilling to cooperate. This tendency to cooperate with coalition forces only when there is the potential for personal benefit extends to all CID personnel in Kandahar City. CID commanders do not want to delegate authority to their subordinates for fear of losing some measure of their own personal authority. COL Shah is aware that illicit drug traffickers are paying off corrupt ANP officers within the city, but he is afraid to take action against them.

(U//FOUO) The CID contains the following specialized investigative squads:

- Homicide Squad
- Theft Squad
- Youth Squad (investigates crimes by individuals ages 14 and below)
- Observation Squad (this squad apparently conducts surveillance)
- Fugitive Squad (tracks down fugitives from justice)
- Anti-Corruption Squad

(U//FOUO) Counter-Narcotics Division (CND). The CND commander is Colonel Sabor (COL Sabor). COL Sabor took up his position in late December 2009. COL Sabor publicly maintains a strict “no tolerance” policy concerning the illicit drug abusers and traffickers, and prosecutes them accordingly. His men appear to take seriously his policy; it “seems to make his men pretty nervous,” the source of this information said. Nearly 100 percent of CND officers are literate in Pashto. Very few claim to be able to understand English. In general, CND officers have the skills to be a competent counter-narcotics force, but shortages of equipment and the poor quality of their facilities are a hindrance to effective enforcement.

(U//FOUO) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). ANCOP personnel fill in for AUP personnel who are away undergoing Focused District Development Training (FDDT). When an AUP policeman returns to normal duty, the ANCOP policeman who was filling in for him shifts to backfill the next AUP policeman who departs to undergo FDDT. Currently, only 25 to 30 percent of AUP personnel in Kandahar City have undergone FDDT.

(U) Dand District
(U//FOUO) In Dand District, there is no dedicated police tashkil as Dand is not officially a district. Multiple quasi-state police forces exist that do not report to District Chief of Police Colonel Shir Shah Ahmadzai (of the Ahmadzai tribe).

(U//FOUO) The poor state (and reputation) of the ANP is probably the single greatest hindrance to district stability. There is an overall lack of police officers in the district and of those that are

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51 IIR 7 398 1083 10  (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Criminal Investigation Division in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
52 IIR 7 398 1083 10  (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Criminal Investigation Division in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
53 IIR 7 398 1086 10  (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Counter Narcotics Division in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
54 IIR 7 398 1085 10  (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
there, many are unregistered, illiterate, poorly trained and under-equipped. Most are owed several months in back pay. As a result, their discipline, professionalism, and overall effectiveness are severely lacking.

(U//FOUO) Until recently, the police headquarters in Dand was in an equally unimpressive state. It lacked a functional electrical generator or septic system. It is badly in need of repair, did not have a functional septic system and, despite having a new generator installed in March 2009, was experiencing significant problems with its electrical supply.

(U//FOUO) What complicates the policing situation in Dand even further is the presence of multiple “police forces” under different chains of command. In addition to Shir Shah’s official ANP, there are at least three other “ANP” forces in Dand, including a personal security force commanded by District Governor Amadullah Nazak, unofficial police checkpoints manned by police officers loyal only to high-level Barakzai tribal leaders, and at least one security checkpoint near the private compound of Qayum Karzai manned by “police officers” loyal only to Popalzai tribal leaders.

(U) SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS (AWOL RATE, LOGISTICS SHORTFALLS)

(U) Kandahar City

(U//FOUO) The ANP in Kandahar City has enough patrolmen to fill their tashkil. However, there are very few ANP officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Approximately 5 ANP officers leave the Kandahar ANP force every month. Some of these individuals leave to join the Afghan National Army, which is seen as more prestigious. When ANP commanders leave or are fired from the ANP, they typically take 10 to 15 men with them. These groups usually take their ANP-issued weapons with them.\(^\text{55}\)

(U//FOUO) The ANP form used to request supplies is the MOI-14 form, which most ANP officers do not know how to properly complete. Only one to two ANP officers per PSS are literate. As a result, most ANP logistics requests are made by way of telephone calls or hand-written notes to superiors. Such requests are difficult to track and very few records are kept. This leads to poor asset visibility which, when combined with poor inventory procedures, leads ANP officers to claim widespread equipment shortages when the equipment in fact exists somewhere in the city, but no records of its location exists. For example, the Kandahar City ANP has an equipment warehouse and an ammunition storage bunker that are full of supplies and ammunition. But some substations have chronic equipment and ammunition shortages.\(^\text{56}\)

(U//FOUO) In some cases, the shortages of one substation may be explained by the surpluses of other substations. For example, the tashkil for PSS 7 authorizes 72 policemen and five vehicles. But there are 151 policemen and 12 vehicles currently assigned to PSS 7.\(^\text{57}\)

\(^{55}\) IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)

\(^{56}\) IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)

\(^{57}\) IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
The ANP has national contracts for fuel, generators and generator maintenance, firewood, and communications equipment.\textsuperscript{58}

- Generators. Under the national contract, local nationals are supposed to install and provide maintenance for ANP generators in the Kandahar City area. However, once these generators are installed, ANP personnel attempt to rewire them to provide additional power and end up ruining the generators.

- Firewood. Despite the existence of a national firewood contract to supply ANP with firewood, ANP officers often complain there is insufficient firewood to distribute to all the substations.

- Medical Care. Kandahar City ANP officers have poor medical treatment options. Sick or injured policemen must go to Merwais Hospital for treatment. Merwais Hospital has a poor reputation for care among locals. There are very few policemen that are qualified to provide first aid treatment.

**Dand District**

**DEGREE OF PARTNERSHIP**

AUP officers and NCOs undertake most operational planning at the Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) level, with minimal coalition forces assistance. At lower levels, AUP officers and NCOs require much higher levels of supervision in order to properly plan for operations.\textsuperscript{59}

The Kandahar City ANP have partnered well with female U.S. mentors as well as with male ones. The U.S. 97\textsuperscript{th} Military Police battalion that is partnered with the ANP includes female soldiers. On one mission, local residents blocked male ANP from conducting a search of their home under the pretense that there were women in the house. The ANP had American female soldiers enter the house, who found the women of the house protecting illegal weapons and other materials.\textsuperscript{60}

Higher ranking ANP, including the provincial chief of police General Zazai, treat the female American military police with respect and affection, as though they were their daughters. The city’s chief of police, Colonel Sherzad, points to the example set by American female military police as a way of shaming his own policemen. For example, he will tell a policeman, “Look! She can carry 70 pounds. Why can’t you pull your weight?” As might be expected, some junior ANP resent this and treat the female military police as if they were invisible.\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
\item \textsuperscript{59} IIR 7 398 1085 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of Afghan National Police Uniformed Police Forces in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
\item \textsuperscript{60} Information conveyed to authors by a detachment commander with the U.S. 97\textsuperscript{th} Military Police Battalion at Camp Nathan Smith in late February 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Information conveyed to authors by a senior officer within the U.S. 97\textsuperscript{th} Military Police Battalion at Camp Nathan Smith in late February 2010.
\end{itemize}
Once per week, representatives from the Kandahar City area Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and National Directorate for Security (NDS), meet in Kandahar City for a security meeting. During these meetings, representatives from these organizations work together relatively well and are able to coordinate their activities while avoiding conflict.62

The female U.S. military police have taken initial steps to partner with Kandahar City’s six female AUP. In February 2010, for example, the American MPs hosted the Afghan policewomen for shooting practice at the Camp Nathan Smith firing range. Deeper cooperation has been prevented for a logistical reason: the 97th MP Battalion lacks a female Pashto-English linguist.63

CORRUPTION

A new ANP "pay parity" plan took effect on 01 February 2010 in Kandahar City. This plan attempts to bring ANP levels of pay up to the current ANA levels of pay for equivalent ranks and positions. The goal of the pay parity program is to reduce attrition within the ANP. So far, there has been positive feedback from ANP personnel regarding the program. The parity plan was originally scheduled to go into effect in December 2009, but delays caused it to be implemented approximately two months behind schedule. ANP officers are receiving back pay, retroactive to December 2009.64

Afghanistan has six Mobile Anti-Corruption Teams (MACTs) which are controlled by Ministry of Justice prosecutors in Kabul. These MACTs travel to ANP facilities and conduct shakedowns in order to uncover the presence of corruption. One MACT is assigned to Kandahar Province.65 (Analyst’s note: It is unclear how effective these MACTs are in Kandahar province.)

There is a significant degree of segregation by tribe within the ANP in Kandahar City.66 Of the many tribes represented in the police force, the Alokozai and Barakzai dominate. This is due to the fact that Sherzai (Barakzai) and Zabit Akrem Khakrezwal (Alokozai) integrated their former militias into the ANP after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. There are fewer Popalzai in the police, but they play an important role in Kandahar City because of the political support of fellow Popalzai Ahmad Wali Karzai.67 (Analyst’s comment: More information is needed about the potential problems and benefits of this segregation. On the ‘plus’ side, the tribal homogeneity of a precinct may allow for better unit cohesion and better acceptance by local residents of the same tribe. On the downside, it opens the door to potential abuse by police units tasked with protecting people of a different tribal background. It also creates the potential...
that police units will “moonlight” as private militia, enforcing the interests of powerbrokers from the same tribe.

(U) AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)

(U) LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANA

(U) Kandahar City area ANA forces are considerably better trained and equipped than the area’s ANP forces, and consequently the local populace regards the area’s ANA as the more respectable and competent force.

(U) UNITS, LEADERSHIP & CAPABILITIES

(U) SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS (AWOL RATE, LOGISTICS SHORTFALLS)

(U) ANA personnel that are sick or injured are taken to Kandahar Air Field for treatment at Coalition Forces medical facilities.

(U) DEGREE OF PARTNERSHIP

(U) CORRUPTION

(U) NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY (NDS)

(U//FOUO) Unlike the ANP, the NDS has a reputation for effectiveness and proficiency in Kandahar. The information received from NDS in Kandahar is usually reliable. The NDS is most effective at targeting low and mid-level insurgent networks.

(U//FOUO) The provincial director of the NDS is Colonel Mir Ali, an ethnic Baluch from Nimroz (also spelled Nimruz) Province. He has a long history with the NDS, having previously worked in Farah, Herat and Badghis Provinces, where he worked with other ISAF nations and PRTs. Ali was appointed as director in Kandahar in October 2009.

(U) JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(U) Kandahar City

(U//FOUO) The formal judicial system in Kandahar City is ineffective. There are 87 slots for judges on the official tashkil for the Appellate Court (also known as the area’s Superior Court), but there are currently only nine judges working in the area. Judges fear for their lives and are reluctant to serve in the area, preferring to serve in Kabul where the pay is the same and the security situation is much better. Most judicial facilities are located within Government Circle, which is located in Kandahar City District 1.68

(U//FOUO) Almost all civil disputes in areas outside of Kandahar City are resolved through tribal shuras and jirgas, which resolve approximately 80 percent of non-criminal cases within the area. Some local nationals also settle disputes through the Huqooq Department (Huqooq). The

68 IIR 7 398 1088 10 (U) Afghanistan - Kandahar City Judicial System. (Released March 2010).
Huqooq falls under the Afghan Ministry of Justice and handles civil matters such as property disputes. The rulings of the Huqooq are filed by the Huqooq and are considered legally binding. Analyst’s comment: We do not have figures indicating how common a method of resolution this is, but anecdotal evidence suggests it is far more popular with local people than the formal court system.

(U) Dand District
(U) There is no judge or prosecutor. The District Governor and shura members solve conflicts using tribal resolution mechanisms.

(U) PRISONS & DETAINEES
(U//FOUO) The Afghan Central Prisons Directorate falls under the Afghan Ministry of Justice, headquartered in Kabul. The Kandahar Provincial Prison facility is the Sarposa Detention Facility (sometimes spelled “Sarpoza”) located in Kandahar City. There are two other detention facilities in Kandahar District: Spin Boldak District Detention Facility and Arghandab District Detention Facility; these two facilities are poor. There are supposed to be district detention facilities in every Afghan district, but this is not yet the case.

(U//FOUO) Sarposa currently contains numerous Taliban leaders and there are periodic indications that another jailbreak will be attempted. On 13 March 2010, for example, a coordinated attack involving suicide-bombers and car bombs was conducted on multiple targets throughout Kandahar City, including on the Sarposa prison and the police headquarters. The attack failed to free any prisoners, but killed 35 people.

(U//FOUO) Security and prison living conditions have been improved substantially since 2008. But the capacity of the prison is still limited. Analyst’s comment: The ISAF operations planned in Kandahar this summer will likely produce more—perhaps far more—prisoners than Sarposa Detention Facility can handle.)

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69 IIR 7 398 1088 10 (U) Afghanistan - Kandahar City Judicial System. (Released March 2010).
70 IIR 7 398 1090 10 (U) Afghanistan - State of the Afghan Corrections System in Kandahar City, Kandahar Province. (Released March 2010.)
71 This information was conveyed by a U.S. civilian official at Kandahar PRT in late February 2010.
(U) ISAF PRESENCE

(U//FOUO) As of early March 2010, the Canadian contingent at the Kandahar PRT at Camp Nathan Smith is made up of over 600 personnel. The military personnel are broken into components that deal with all aspects of PRT life. Camp Nathan Smith used to be the site of a large cannery and dried fruit processing complex.

(U//FOUO) The U.S. contingent is growing. As of early March 2010, the American 97th Military Police Battalion also has its headquarters at the PRT. The battalion's soldiers mainly partner with Afghan National Police elements throughout Kandahar City at the Precinct Substations and at Forward Operating Base Walton.
(U) DEVELOPMENT

(U) LESSONS OF DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN KANDAHAR CITY

(U) From 2006-2008, the Canadian military cleared numerous villages of insurgents around Kandahar City, but lacked sufficient forces to hold them. The result was that development efforts in a given village were often wasted: insurgents would reenter villages after Canadian forces left and vandalize development projects and seek retribution against those who cooperated with the Canadians. In early 2009, Brigadier General Vance, the commander of Canadian forces in the province, recognizing the limits of his force size, decided to redirect efforts to focusing on one village at a time. Under his “Key Village Approach,” Canadian troops planned to move into one village, stay for 30-60 days until Afghan National Security Forces and government could be stood up, and then move to the next village. The first village selected was Deh-e Bagh village in Dand District, just south of Kandahar City. The village of 900 people is positioned on an important avenue into Kandahar City. The key village approach succeeded in providing international-led security and development to Deh-e Bagh—some people refer to Deh-e Bagh as the “model village”—but efforts at leaving in place effective local governance and security forces were slower than planned. Canadian forces were required to stay in the village longer than planned.

(U) Canadian forces won some goodwill with a project to revitalize the bazaar of a village by installing 12 solar-powered street lights and asphaltling the ground in the market. In June 2009, a suicide-bomber blew up the district center building, so the Canadians troops launched a project to rebuild the square. One of the lessons of that effort was to avoid over-paying local people for labor. The Canadians were paying 500 Afghani per day to each laborer involved in the project, when the going rate should have been 300 Afghani per day. The higher wage caused Afghan National Policemen and teachers to leave their jobs to participate in the reconstruction efforts. To mitigate this problem, Canadian CIMIC (civil affairs) soldiers made an effort on subsequent projects to hire relatives of teachers and Afghan National Security Forces to help prevent teachers and security forces from quitting their regular jobs to work on the project. That approach achieved the desired effect.

(U) The Canadians had trouble gaining “traction” with the village populations outside Kandahar City with well-digging projects. The wells would fall into disrepair or get vandalized by the Taliban. So the Canadians changed tack in the fall of 2009 and took the risky step of funding repairs and improvements of mosques. This turned out to be a success with local people. The Canadians provide funds for the ANP or ANA or other local representatives to repaint mosques, and install ablutions areas, solar-powered lighting, and carpets. These projects have been winners in three ways: 1) in terms of the message, they demonstrate that international forces in fact honor the local religion; 2) the improvements cannot be easily vandalized by the Taliban, who do not want to burn down mosques; and 3) appreciation for the mosque projects transcend

73 This information was conveyed to the authors between 25-28 February by Canadian officers at the PRT.
74 This information was conveyed to the authors between 25-28 February by Canadian officers at the PRT.
some of the petty local rivalries commonly associated with development projects. Whereas wells and other “secular” projects in one locale tend to stoke the jealousies of neighbors, the mosque improvements have been more broadly accepted by the community as a whole. As of late February 2010, there have been about 20 such mosque projects funded by Canadian civil affairs personnel.  

(U) CURRENT DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

(U) International development efforts in and around Kandahar City can be roughly divided into two main efforts: 1) the U.S. government’s soon-to-be-enacted “DDP,” which stands for “District Delivery Program” or “District Delivery Process,” and 2) a more than (CAN)$160 million package of small and large Canadian-funded projects, with the restoration of the Dahla Dam and its associated irrigation canal networks as the centerpiece.

(U//FOUO) Within Kandahar City, there is a loose consensus among foreign development officials that international aid should focus on three areas in the city’s urban area: 1) roads, 2) power, and 3) drinking water, which comes from wells. Outside the urban area, the main complaint by local people is lack of irrigation water. As these are big problems requiring big-budget solutions, field officers in Kandahar with USAID have, at least until very recently, lacked the funds to make much of an impact in these areas. “Big USAID,” on the other hand, which refers to the national-level programs managed by the embassy in Kabul, does have the budgets for these types of projects, but has struggled to coordinate their objectives and priorities with those of officers in the district itself. This shortfall and coordination problem is being addressed by a surge of U.S. civilians at the Kandahar PRT, including personnel from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). This new configuration will lead to more resources going to the districts and villages where they have the greatest potential to contribute to stability. Central to the strategy is an increased capacity to channel resources through government/community engagements throughout Kandahar City. These activities will also set the stage for DDP “rollout” starting in the spring of 2010, which will shift many decisions about where funds should be spent down to the Regional Command and PRT levels.  

(U//FOUO) The key impediment to using CERP funds efficiently, however, remains the poor level of training that many military officers receive in completing CERP paperwork. Efforts are being made by RC-South headquarters to address this problem.

(U//FOUO) Getting more electrical power into the city would constitute the most visible, high-impact program. Electricity is something insurgents cannot provide. It would reach most homes. And it would also boost economic growth, perceptions of security, and actual security. But it is also extremely expensive. Increasing the diesel generator capacity in Kandahar city will help, but probably will not provide a sustainable solution because of the high cost of diesel.

(U//FOUO) Kandahar City residents obtain their drinking water from hand-pump wells around the city. There is no charge for the use of these common wells. As a result, many of these hand-

75 This information was conveyed to the authors between 25-28 February by a Canadian CIMIC officer.
76 This view was provided by a foreign aid officer in Kandahar in late February 2010.
77 This view was provided by a foreign aid officer in Kandahar in late February 2010.
78 This view was provided by a foreign aid officer in Kandahar in late February 2010.
pumps are in disrepair. With the massive increase in population in Kandahar City over the past four years, many of the pumps are dry. Wells will have to be dug deeper. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has a sizeable program aimed at addressing the shortage of drinking water. CIDA awarded a contract to U.N. Habitat to serve as the implementing partner, but U.N. Habitat’s work on the project has been extremely slow.  

(U) As of March 2010, the largest road project underway, called Lake Effect Road, stretches from the western part of Kandahar City out into neighboring districts, skirting past known Taliban strongholds including Nakhonay village.

(U) THE KANDAHAR CITY STABILIZATION PLAN & THE DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM

(U//FOUO) The District Delivery Program (DDP) is designed to implement aid and governance in key Afghan districts, and is timed to occur in concert with an increased ISAF military presence in those districts. Kandahar City will be the first district in Kandahar Province targeted for DDP “rollout,” which, together with an influx of ISAF soldiers, constitutes the major gambit for consolidating the Afghan government’s hold on Kandahar. More than 80 percent of USAID resources in Afghanistan will be devoted to this program in 2010. “I feel optimistic for the first time,” a development official in Kandahar said in late February 2010. “We’ve now got the resources we need, and everyone knows what they’re supposed be doing.”

(U//FOUO) A key part of the rollout in and immediately surrounding Kandahar City will be a series of “quick hit” agricultural and infrastructure projects coordinated by the PRT, including the USAID-funded Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA), and several projects funded by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. These initiatives are already underway and will be running at full capacity by 1 June 2010. At the same time, there will be significant outlays of military assistance using CERP and Canadian CCF monies. These projects, combined with the significant Canadian CIDA outlays (discussed below), will wrap Kandahar City in a circle of assistance and development projects, followed by an influx of new projects in the city itself.

(U//FOUO) Initiatives scheduled for Kandahar City itself include installing government managers in each of the city’s 10 sub-districts. They will work in brick-and-mortar government offices, sometimes co-located with ANP precinct substations, where the district manager will hold shuras with district representatives.

(U) ARGHANDAB IRRIGATION REHABILITATION PROJECT (DAHLA DAM)

79 This view was provided by a foreign aid officer in Kandahar in late February 2010.
80 This information was provided by a Canadian CIMIC officer in late February 2010.
81 This view was provided by a foreign aid officer in Kandahar in late February 2010.
82 NOTE: For the week of 1-7 March, for example, AVIPA employed 6,000 Kandahar residents who planted 177,000 apricot and plum saplings and vine cuttings in Kandahar City’s District 8 and in Arghandab District as part of a cash-for-work program. USAID puts out a weekly summary of AVIPA projects around Afghanistan, including in Kandahar. These updates are available from the RC-South SOIC (contact information for the SOIC is at the bottom of this report).
83 This information was provided by a U.S. government official in Kandahar in late February 2010.
84 This information was provided by a U.S. government official in Kandahar in late February 2010.
The Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project is, at (CAN)$50 million, Canada’s largest development project in Kandahar Province. While the first phase of the project is centered on repairing the Dahla Dam and its main canals north of Kandahar City, the project is designed to have a significant positive impact on six districts in Kandahar Province, including Kandahar City itself. Some 80-90 percent of Kandahar Province’s more than 1 million people are anticipated to feel some benefit from the project when it is completed in mid-2011.

The purpose of the project is to replenish the Arghandab Valley’s food system, which was Afghanistan’s major source of fruits and grains for generations until the three decades of war that began in 1979. Back in the 1950s, the U.S. government funded the construction of the Dahla Dam and designed an intricate series of canals and hundreds of sluice gates that allowed water to be spread efficiently over a massive area of Kandahar Province. With the wars that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the dam, the canals, and the gates fell into disrepair with dire consequences for the food supply. The result is that, today, 70 percent of the water in the reservoir behind Dahla Dam is wasted.

In 2008, President Hamid Karzai asked Canada for help restoring the dam. Canada sent engineers to examine the problem, and contracts for Phase I were signed in late 2009.

The Rehabilitation Project has four pillars: 1) to conduct the urgent work needed to fix the dam and its main canals; 2) train farmers along those canals how to improve water efficiency and crop productivity; 3) improve local governance along the canals to mitigate disputes over water rights; 4) build the capacity of Afghans to maintain the irrigation system. The irrigation system is complex, requiring training about how and when to open sluice gates, and how to measure water flow.

Phase I is focused on improving the system to make better use of the water behind the Dahla Dam. Phase II will involve dredging the reservoir or building a new dam further up stream in order to increase the amount of water that is available (the feasibility study for Phase II has yet to be completed). SNC-Lavalin and HydroSult are two Canadian companies that formed a joint venture that won the bid to execute Phase I. Security will be provided by Watan Group, which is controlled by relatives of the Karzai family. The director of the Rehabilitation Project is a Afghan national from Kandahar. The dam and series of canals will be run as a government and public run utility.

There are currently 600 Afghans working on the project. Much of the work as of March 2010 is focused on cleaning up and re-shaping the irrigation canals. Work is apportioned so that a given stretch of canal is worked on by people who live near it, rather than outsiders. While a target of the project is to create 10,000 jobs between March 2010 and 2011, the real “bang for

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85 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010. Additional information about the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project & Dahla Dam can be found in the pdf file referred to in the appendix.
86 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
87 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
88 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
89 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
the buck” should not be the jobs created fixing the canals, but the economic prosperity delivered once the irrigation system is working properly again.90

(U) ADDITIONAL CIDA PROGRAMS

(U) Much of the rest of CIDA’s portfolio in Kandahar is designed to complement the Dahla Dam. It includes (CAN)$117 million in projects such as micro-finance cooperatives, agricultural training programs, cold-storage facilities, and goat and chicken farming start-ups. These projects are designed to introduce a “value-added” agricultural industry. Currently, for example, a tomato grown in Afghanistan is sold to Pakistan, where it is canned, shipped back to Afghanistan, and sold at four times the price.91

(U) To avoid the prohibitive electricity costs associated with above-ground cold-storage facilities, CIDA is experimenting with the establishment of an underground cold-storage facility in Zahri District. Temperatures are cool enough underground to extend the shelf-life of produce long enough to get it to market.92

(U) NGO PRESENCE IN KANDAHAR CITY

(U) Other than a handful of “implementing partners” that execute projects on behalf of Canadian and U.S. development agencies, the overall presence and impact of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Kandahar City is minor.93 Some notable Afghan NGOs in Kandahar City/Dand District include Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which helps men and women start up poultry production and rearing businesses.94

(U) RISKS OF CURRENT APPROACH

(U) A significant risk is that the flood of additional aid dollars will fuel corruption that undermines, rather than creates, stability. An ongoing, independent research project by Andrew Wilder of Tufts University into the effects of aid in five Afghan provinces, including Kandahar, has found unsettling results. Despite the billions being spent, and contrary to the assumption that aid wins the support of Afghans, “there is remarkably limited evidence from Afghanistan supporting a link between aid and stability,” according to the leaders of the research project. The researchers found that “the major factors perceived to be fueling insecurity have little to do with a lack of social services or infrastructure. Instead, one of the main reasons given by the Afghans we interviewed for the growing insurgency was their corrupt and unjust government.” What is more, the biggest Afghan criticism of aid was “the strong belief that it was fueling massive corruption, which undermined some of the positive impacts it may have otherwise had.”95

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90 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
91 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
92 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
93 This view is shared by several U.S. and Canadian aid officials at the Kandahar PRT.
94 This information was provided by Canadian development officials in February 2010.
95 Andrew Wilder, Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love,” Foreign Policy (1 December 2009). Wilder, a research director at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, is leading a two-year study on the relationship between aid and security. He is studying cases in five provinces, including Kandahar. Gordon is a senior research fellow at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
Given that more aid money is rushing into Afghanistan than at any point in its history, and that Kandahar is one of the main recipients, there is a risk that ISAF will exacerbate the popular perception that powerbrokers are the only real beneficiaries. A U.S. civilian official in Kandahar said: “With our contracts, we’ve made multimillions out of the Sherzais and the Karzais, who consolidated all the capacity for transport, construction, and private security. What used to be called warlord militias are now Private Security Companies.”

A former head of Canadian aid in Afghanistan shared a similar view. “Little evidence exists of Canadian aid investments in Kandahar contributing to the establishment of security in the province,” wrote Nipa Banerjee, a former head of Canada’s aid program in Kabul, in November 2009.

Another significant risk to the current District Delivery Program (DDP) plan is that the central government in Kabul attempts to dictate who will serve in staff positions in each of the districts. Experience suggests this will not work, and that staff should be selected by the government at the district level. Some background: in many cases, the only Afghan government officials in a given district are a district governor, a National Directorate of Security (NDS) official, and the police. For the districts to carry out the ambitious development projects that are being lined up under the “DDP rollout,” they need Afghan staff at the district level. One of the strengths of DDP is that it will pay to introduce Afghan staff at the district level. The problem is that the Afghan central government, represented by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), wants to nominate the district positions and staff from Kabul. “But once these staff members are down in the districts, there’s going to be an auto-immune response: ‘who are these people?’” an experienced American aid official said. The staff should instead be appointed by the district governor or, failing that, by the Kandahar provincial governor. At a minimum, half the staff should come from local communities rather than from Kabul. “If there isn’t a local component, then locals won’t buy into it and could undermine it deliberately.”

We have yet to find comprehensive, or even broadly representative, data of past development projects in the Kandahar City area: what projects failed, and why? Which ones were abandoned before they were done, and why? Which ones succeeded, and why? What role did development projects play in fueling corruption? Getting a handle on such information and its lessons should be an urgent priority to assist anyone involved in planning or implementing projects in and around Kandahar City.

96 This insight was conveyed by a U.S. civilian official at the Kandahar PRT in late February 2010.
99 These insights were provided by an American aid official in Kandahar in late February 2010.
An ironic side-effect of the U.S. civilian surge in Kandahar is that, because we have hired many of the best educated and motivated Afghans to support us, fewer talented Afghans are available to work for the Afghan government itself in Kandahar City. The Kandahar PRT has a couple of hundred Afghans working for it, while the governor of Kandahar Province has fewer than a dozen people on his staff, some of whom would probably be willing take jobs at the PRT because it pays better. “We’ve vacuumed up all the human capacity in the south to work for us. There’s great irony there,” a U.S. civilian official in Kandahar City said.

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100 This insight was provided by a U.S. civilian official at the Kandahar PRT in late February 2010.
(U) ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

(U) ECONOMY

(U) Kandahar City has been an economic center for millennia. For centuries it has been famous for fresh and dried fruits, including grapes, figs, pomegranate, and melons. Its population has soared over the past several decades. One hundred years ago, it had an estimated population of 31,000 people and hosted 1,600 shops. Estimates of the city’s population today range from 500,000 to 800,000 people. Commerce is so ubiquitous that when the government recently decided to clear several city blocks to build a school, more than 4,000 shops and stalls had to be relocated. “This is not a dying city,” said a Canadian officer with the Kandahar PRT. “It’s growing, it’s vibrant.”

(U) KANDAHAR CITY MEDICAL FACILITIES

(U//FOUO) Merwais Hospital is the major medical treatment facility in Kandahar City. Merwais has a poor standard of care by Western standards (Analyst’s note: It is unclear how this hospital stacks up against the standards of other Afghan hospitals). The rate of infection at the hospital is high, and the facility’s doctors are not highly qualified. This leads many local nationals to choose local clinics and pharmacies for treatment. Pharmacies tend to put profits ahead of good medicine. For example, if the pharmacy’s supply of a particular drug is about to expire, the pharmacy will prescribe the drug to patients even if the medicine is inappropriate to a patient’s condition. Exacerbating all these factors is the presence on the market of low quality and counterfeit medicines containing insufficient or no active ingredients.

(U//FOUO) Area medical treatment facilities follow an unwritten “Five Day Rule” with regard to the treatment of serious illnesses or injuries, especially in the case of severe burns to children. Under this rule, medical facilities will not render treatment until five days have passed. If the patient survives to the fifth day after showing up with an illness or injury, then the facility will render treatment. The reason for this is that the facilities do not want to waste time, equipment, and medicine to treat patients who might die.

(U) (Analyst’s comment: See the “Development” section of this report for information about infrastructure that is under development in and around Kandahar City.)
(U) SECURITY

(U) LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY

(U/FOUO) The Taliban are widely despised, but are accepted as a fact of life. Most residents of the city share at least distant links to the Taliban, whose membership cuts across many tribes, including relatively “pro-government” ones such as the Popalzai. Citizens routinely point out the IEDs emplaced by insurgents and, in rare cases, will point out the people who laid them. The vast majority of IEDs in and around Kandahar City are discovered or pointed out before they can detonate.106

(U) THE TALIBAN’S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS INSURGENCY

(U) Beginning in August 2007, Graeme Smith, a journalist for Canada’s Globe and Mail, commissioned a survey of Taliban in Kandahar Province. Through a local partner, he conducted video-taped interviews with 42 Kandahar Taliban. The transcripts of these interviews, published in March 2008 and available at www.globeandmail.com/talkingtothetaliban, make for fascinating reading. The responses by the Taliban seem to support the analysis that the Taliban movement in Kandahar is, in essence, a rural insurrection made up of mostly local Kandaharis—farmers, drivers, the unemployed. They oppose the government’s eradication of their poppy fields (or the bribes they must pay the government to preserve their poppies), they reject a government system they accuse of tribal bias and corruption (both financial and spiritual), and most fundamentally, they oppose the Western influences that followed the fall of the Taliban.107

(U) When asked why they fight against the government, the majority of the interviewees used a variation of the two lines “Afghans must expel infidels” and “infidels have enslaved the government.” A significant portion of those interviewed—almost one-third—claimed to have family members who died in bombings by foreign troops. (Analyst's note: While these claims might be exaggerated, the accidental killing of Afghan civilians by ISAF clearly features heavily in the Taliban’s recruitment “narrative” and certainly plays a role in many farmers’ decision to join the insurgency. Many of those who joined said they were obliged by custom to replace a father or brother who had been killed by ISAF of Afghan government troops.)108

(U) Other insights that emerged from the interviews: The Taliban feel strongly that foreign influence since 2001 has brought moral rot to Afghanistan (some despaired at the Hollywood movies and pornographic videos that are now available in markets, for example), which they view as corrosive to traditional values.109

106 This information was conveyed by analysts working for Task Force Kandahar in late February 2010.
(U) Every Taliban fighter interviewed said the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar should fall inside Afghanistan’s border—a reminder that while elements of the Pakistani government may influence the Taliban, there are real limits to that influence. Despite the Taliban’s contempt for the Durand Line that divides Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s Pashtun populations, the Taliban that were interviewed were strongly reluctant to accept the notion of an independent Pashtun state—a “Pashtunistan”, if you will. The Taliban of Kandahar still want to be part of the larger country that is Afghanistan, with all its various ethnic groups.  

(U) Twenty-four of the fighters, more than half those surveyed, were willing to say that Taliban senior leader Mullah Omar was not necessarily required for their war, and not necessarily the best leader for Afghanistan. (Analyst’s note: While they spoke of Mullah Omar deferentially, their comments are one indication that their insurgency would continue even in the event that Mullah Omar died. Conversely, it may also suggest fighters would be willing to reintegrate even without Mullah Omar’s approval.)

(U) TALIBAN CAMPAIGN FOR KANDAHAR CITY

(U) The Quetta Shura Taliban, headed by Mullah Omar, has made Kandahar Province and its capital, Kandahar City, the primary objectives of their campaign in southern Afghanistan. Beginning in 2004, the Taliban has waged a campaign to exert control of Kandahar by taking over the key districts surrounding it: Zhari, Panjwayi, Khakrez, Arghandab, and Dand.

(U) These efforts picked up pace with a 2006 Taliban offensive into the Panjwayi and Zhari districts to the west of the city. Panjwayi had served as the staging ground for the Taliban movement in 1994, and it was in Panjwayi that Mullah Omar began his rise to power. In early 2006, there was virtually no international presence in those districts and only a small presence in Kandahar City.

(U) Canadian forces deployed to Kandahar in February 2006 and responded to the Taliban buildup by clearing several villages in Zhari, though they lacked sufficient troop numbers to hold these objectives. Back then, popular support in the city for the newly arrived Canadians was such that, when the Canadians returned from one successful assault, Kandahar City residents crowded the streets to cheer them. After the Taliban lost hundreds of fighters in a battle launched under ISAF’s Operation Medusa in late 2006, the insurgents evolved to use more guerrilla-type tactics, including operating in small groups and adopting IEDs as a primary, and


112 For a thorough open-source narrative on the Taliban’s history in Kandahar and their resurgence, see “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” by Carl Forsberg, Institute for the Study of War (December 2009). http://ww.understandingwar.org);


effective, tactic. Suicide bombings, virtually unheard of in Afghanistan before 2001, have also become common.

(U) Canadian forces focused on fighting the Taliban for control of Zhari and Panjwayi in 2006, 2007 and early 2008. This campaign ultimately developed into a stalemate, and in late 2007, the Taliban began approaching Kandahar City via another avenue: the Arghandab River Valley. This river valley of canals and lush vegetation to the north of the city has been used by armies and guerrilla forces several times throughout Afghan history as a base for taking control of Kandahar City. Before late 2007, this route had been closed to the Taliban by Mullah Naqib (also referred to as Mullah Naqibullah), head of the Alokozai tribe that dominates the Arghandab. But after Mullah Naqib’s death by heart failure in 2007 (several months after he was wounded in an IED attack), the Taliban effectively asserted their control over much of the Arghandab through murder and intimidation. They also set up an effective justice system in a gambit to increase their legitimacy.115

(U) The Taliban were helped inadvertently by Afghan President Hamid Karzai when he publicly crowned Mullah Naqib’s 26-year-old son, Karimullah Naqibi, as the new chieftain of the Alokozai tribe days after Mullah Naqib’s death. Tribal leadership in Pashtun society is semi-meritocratic, rather than strictly hereditary, and tribal leaders, moreover, are traditionally chosen by the tribe and not by outside authorities like President Karzai, who is of the Popalzai tribe.116 Several Alokozai figures would have made more natural successors, including some who, unlike Karimullah Naqibi, had political and military experience. President Karzai may have crowned Naqibi’s son with the intention of weakening the Alokozai tribe enough for it not to pose a political threat to his half-brother and Kandahar power-broker Ahmad Wali Karzai. The move did indeed weaken the Alokozai, but with the consequence that the Taliban took control over much of the Arghandab, including Mullah Naqib’s home village, without even sparking much in the way of coordinated Alokozai resistance.117 The Taliban proceeded to systematically assassinate several formidable Alokozai figures.

(U) Once they were entrenched in the Arghandab, the Taliban found themselves in a better position to vie for Kandahar City through a campaign of violence and intimidation. In June 2008, the Taliban pulled off a spectacularly successful operational and propaganda victory in Kandahar City by freeing hundreds of Taliban inmates from Sarposa prison (sometimes spelled “Sarpoza”) in a well-coordinated attack involving suicide bombers, gunmen on motorcycles, and buses that shuttled freed convicts out of the city.

(U) The Taliban soon extended its reach down into Kandahar City’s Sub-district 9, a poor neighborhood on the Arghandab side of the Loy Wala canal. In 2008, 90 percent of the IEDs detonated or found in Kandahar City were in District 9.118 Additional areas where the Taliban were, and continue to be relatively active, include the Mirwais Mena area in District 7, which

has served as a final assembly and staging area for vehicle-borne IEDs,\(^ {119}\) and the villages of Nakhonay and Belanday to the southwest of the city.\(^ {120}\)

(U) In 2008-2009, the Taliban carried out numerous targeted assassinations against Afghan government officials, security officials, and pro-government mullahs.\(^ {121}\) Bacha Khan, Malim Akbar Khakrezwal, Abdul Hakim Jan, Habibullah Jan are just a few of the major pro-government figures assassinated between September 2007 and September 2008. Attacks on less prominent government “collaborators”—translators, policemen, judges—also occurred.\(^ {122}\)

(U) By the summer of 2009, assassinations became less frequent, though this could be in part because many of Kandahar’s prominent officials, including parliamentary representatives, had taken up permanent residence in Kabul or barricaded themselves in compounds in Kandahar City.\(^ {123}\) Several car and truck suicide-bomb attacks took place in the city in 2009, including two that appear to have been aimed at Ahmad Wali Karzai. Several other car-bomb attacks were thwarted by Afghan National Security Forces.\(^ {124}\)

(U) The Taliban assassinated some of the few women to enter public life in Kandahar, including a senior police official and a member of the Kandahar Provincial Council. Taliban on motorcycles also attacked female schoolgirls with acid in November 2008, disfiguring many of the girls.\(^ {125}\) Such incidents have made local women more reluctant to work for the government and for ISAF elements in Kandahar.\(^ {126}\)

(U//FOUO) A female American Army officer was badly wounded in Kandahar City in February 2010 when an IED, apparently remote-controlled, detonated as she walked past during a combined foot patrol. (Analyst’s note: The soldier was in the front-middle of the procession when she was wounded; her fellow officers say it is unclear whether the attackers were targeting her specifically or whether her gender was even known to the attackers).

(U) CURRENT SITUATION

\(^ {119}\) “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” by Carl Forsberg, Institute for the Study of War (December 2009) p. 43.
\(^ {120}\) This information was relayed to the authors by Canadian and U.S. officers at Camp Nathan Smith in February 2010.
\(^ {125}\) “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” by Carl Forsberg, Institute for the Study of War (December 2009) p. 46.
\(^ {126}\) A U.S. contractor in Kandahar City in February 2010 conveyed to the authors the difficulties he is finding and keeping female employees. One female employee recently told him she was quitting, and cited the 2008 acid attack as the basis for her fears.
With the influx of additional ISAF troops into the areas in and around Kandahar City, there are some signs the Taliban campaign for Kandahar City has lost momentum and that ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces have an opportunity to seize the initiative in the battle to shape public perceptions. The violence that peaked around August 2009 during the period surrounding national elections has decreased, as have public perceptions that the government may fall to the Taliban.

At the same time, some reports suggest the Taliban is struggling to find recruits and to supply itself adequately, not only in Kandahar City, but in the rural districts surrounding the city that serve as the Taliban’s base. Afghan National Security Force blockades and checkpoints have made it more difficult to move IED components into the city. The IEDs that do manage to get emplaced inside and outside the city end up, for the most part, being spotted or turned in by local residents before they can detonate.

The insurgency “doesn’t live inside the city as a viable alternative,” was the assessment of the Kandahar PRT J-2 in late February 2010. “What we’ve got a problem with is governance and the judiciary and the police.”

While the insurgency may not be an attractive alternative in the eyes of Kandaharis, it has succeeded in creating an atmosphere of fear in Kandahar City through a campaign of suicide bombings and assassinations. Coordinated attacks and suicide bombings on 13 March 2010, for example, killed 35 people. In the week before the bombings, Taliban conducted a series of attacks that killed one or two police every night for several days.

Though it is unclear who was behind each of the recent killings and kidnappings in Kandahar City, Kandahar City residents tend to blame the Taliban, according to limited atmospherics reporting. In other words, regardless of whether the Taliban are truly responsible or not, the violence is advancing the Taliban’s goal of discrediting the government and its ability to provide security.

The bottom line is that it is unclear whether the Taliban have the will or the ability to conduct a campaign of violence within Kandahar City that would go beyond targeted assassinations and periodic suicide bombings. PRT officials seem skeptical, but some independent observers describe the possibility. A New York Times article on 27 March 2010 quoted city residents saying insurgents walk the streets with impunity, visit shops, and press people into stashing guns and other supplies in their houses in preparation for urban warfare. The article quotes Haji Agha Lalai Dastgeeri, a former Talib who is now a Provincial Council member and a close associate of Ahmad Wali Karzai, as saying the Taliban “are focusing on the...
city.... The Taliban want to show themselves to the world, to show, ‘We are here’.” He added: “The Taliban can walk around, and government officials cannot.”\textsuperscript{131}

## (U) APPENDIX

### (U//FOUO) Appendix 1: Key Popalzai actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village/area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mawladad</td>
<td>nahiya 10</td>
<td>He is the elder of his tribe and influential in nahiya 10. He only solves people’s conflicts and assumes neutrality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Abdul Ghani</td>
<td>Originally from Balakrz, now lives in nahiya 5</td>
<td>An influential man in the entire city, he is a tribal elder of his tribe and area of residence. He has not been linked with any faction and now serves as a contact-person between the government and his people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Qayum Karzai</td>
<td>Karz</td>
<td>He is the brother of President Hamid Karzai and until recently was a representative of Kandahar in the Senate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Doctor Hayatullah</td>
<td>Originally from Shah Wali Kot district but presently lives in 2nd Nahiya</td>
<td>He descends from a rich family and has inherited tribal eldership from his forefathers. During the years of jihad and the Taliban government he ran a drugstore in Khwaja Mulk. He is only influential in the district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir Lalay Shah</td>
<td>Wali Kot</td>
<td>He was an important Mahaz-e-Milli commander and led between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters. He does not come from a traditional tribal elite family. After the jihad, this put him at odds with the Karzai clan who resented his increasing importance. Lalay later switched factions to Jamiat-e-Islami and established links to Rabbani. He fought against the Taliban, fled to Iran and joined the Northern Alliance. He returned after the fall of the Taliban and since regained control over the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (U//FOUO) Appendix 2: Key Barakzai actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village/area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Abdul Majid</td>
<td>nahiya 7</td>
<td>He is a tribal elder and malik and a good conflict mediator. He is only influential in nahiya 7. He also represents his people in the government. During jihad he stayed in the city but assisted the mujahedeen in secret. During the Taliban government he stayed at home and resolved conflicts. He is a tribal elder now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Hidayatullah</td>
<td>nahiya 4</td>
<td>He never had membership in any faction. He is a businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics. He is the twin brother of Haji Abdullah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Abdullah</td>
<td>nahiya 2</td>
<td>He never had membership in any faction. He is a businessman. His area of influence encompasses the entire city. Since the years of jihad he has stayed out of politics. He is the twin brother of Haji Hidayatullah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Pacha</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>He is the son of Haji Abdul Latif, the brother of Gul Agha Sherzai and leads the Barakzai council. He is influential among the Barakzai tribes, especially in Dand. During jihad years he fought alongside his father and emigrated to Pakistan during the Taliban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nur-ul Haq Ulumi</td>
<td>Maruf</td>
<td>He was a Parcham/PDPA in the past and served as Minister of Defense and governor of Kandahar during the government of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr. Najibullah. He is a member of the Wolesi Jirga. His main source of influence is political power.

Engineer Yusef Pashtun  
Miyandoshin Awsat/Arghandab  
He is the son of Ghond Mashar Sahib. He was briefly the Provincial Governors in 2003-2004 (see section 3.1.1 for his profile). His main source of influence is political power.

General Gulalai  
He is the brother of Senator Mullah Said Mohammad Akhund (Mahaz). During the jihad he was a commander with Gul Agha Sherzai. Gulalai is general chief commander of a garrison at the airport. His main source of influence is security provision.

Haji Sayed Mohammad Akhund  
City, Originally a resident of Dand district, but now living in Khakarpur Darwaza.  
He built a huge mosque close to his house. During the jihad he was a sub-commander of Abdul Latif. During the Taliban government he stayed at home. He rose to become a tribal elder during the current government. His influence is limited to Kandahar-city. His main source of influence is conflict resolution and political connections.

Dr. Qasam Khan  
City  
He is a khan and a tribal elder in his tribe and is important in resolving people’s conflicts. He was a mujahed during the jihad; he stayed at home during the Taliban government. Now he is a member of the PC. His influence covers Dand, Kandahar-city and all Barakzai tribes. His main source of influence is conflict resolution and political connections.

Hajji Abdullah  
Dand  
He is a resident of Khapor Darwaza, and is a moneychanger. His main source of influence is business.

Haji Musa  
Dand  
He is a resident of Mullah Alam Akhund village and is from the Nurdinzai sub-tribe. He imports automobiles from Japan. His main source of influence is business.

(U//FOUO) Appendix 3: Key Alokozai actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village/area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azizullah &quot;Wasifi&quot;</td>
<td>Arghandab</td>
<td>Advisor minister during the government of Zahir Khan. Within the Alokozai tribe he constitutes the second main pole of power and advocates for closer relations with the Popalzai as opposed to connections to Qanuni based on old factional ties (see Arghandab District Assessment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mohammad Isa Sahibzada</td>
<td>Originally from Shah Wali Kot, now nahiya 9</td>
<td>He has been a respected conflict mediator from many years. During jihad he was a HIG commander. He was a conflict mediator during the Taliban government too. He is influential among all Alokozai tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Haq Jinabee Sahib</td>
<td>nahiya 2</td>
<td>He is the son of a reputable religious scholar, highly respected by the people of Kandahar City and often involved in conflict resolution. His area of influence entails the entire Kandahar province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Abdul Manan Khan</td>
<td>Originally from Khakrez, now nahiya 9</td>
<td>He is an elder and influential man of his tribe and the nahiya where he lives. He is a conflict mediator. During jihad he was a member of the Jamiat faction. During the Taliban government however he stayed at home. Now he is a tribal elder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Pacha Aka</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>He is a tribal elder. He rose to tribal eldership during jihad years. He is influential in his tribe and is considered the most active of all tribal elders. He used to be a commander of Mahaz faction during jihad. During the Taliban government he stayed at home. He plays a significant role in resolving conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69
influence is confined to his tribe in Panjwayi district.

Mohammad Haq Jinayee  
City (nahiya 2)  
His father was a famous religious scholar known as Jenabi Mawlawi Sahib. He called on people to wage jihad against the Soviet troops and was one of the most influential pirhs of the Alokozai tribe. Upon his death Mohammad Haq Jinayee became a tribal elder. Now he is a member of the Alokozai council and a respected tribal elder among others other tribes. During the Taliban government he stayed at home.

Khan Mohammed  
Arghandab  
He is a resident of Char Qulin, Arghandab. He was the assistant of Mullah Naqibullah in the army and was also CoP. He has connection with Jamiat-e-Islami and is an advisor in the MoI. He supported Dr. Abdullah Abdullah during the 2009 presidential elections.

Haji Mohammad Isa Sahibzada  
Resident of Shah Wali Kot district  
He is a tribal elder. He has inherited a reputation for spirituality from his forefathers. He is a popular amulet writer among the people. He also takes part in resolving disputes. During the Taliban government he stayed at home and resolved conflicts. He is a figure of regional influence.

(U//FOUO) Appendix 4: Key Achekzai actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village/area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Torjan Aka</td>
<td>Originally from Farah province, now nahiya 9</td>
<td>He is an old man who actively resolves people’s conflicts. He was a conflict solver during the Taliban government as well. He is influential among the community from Farah living in Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ahmad Shah Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is tribal elder. And has influence in his own nahiya and in his tribe. He was member Mahaz. In the government of Taliban he stayed home and solved the conflicts of the people on that time. Now he is representative in provincial council of his tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mohammad Isa khan</td>
<td>nahiya 6</td>
<td>He is a businessman and a tribal elder in his tribe and the nahiya where he lives. He has never been associated with any faction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji AbdulWali</td>
<td>Originally from Panjwayi, now nahiya 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U//FOUO) Appendix 5: Mohammadzai leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tooryalai Weesa</td>
<td>Arghandab, Kowok Village</td>
<td>Governor of Kandahar Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>Originally from Arghandab but presently lives in nahiya 2</td>
<td>He immigrated to Pakistan during the jihad and started his private business. Now he is head of the provincial court and a tribal elder of the Mohammadzai tribe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U//FOUO) Appendix 6: Key Nurzai actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix 7: Key leaders of the Shia community**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Village/Area</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Sher Agha</td>
<td>nahiya 1</td>
<td>He is an elder among the Shia and solves their conflicts. Since the Taliban government he resolves conflicts of the Shia community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Haji Abdullah</td>
<td>Resident of Top khana</td>
<td>He is the son of Mohseni, the leader of the Harakat party and a tribal elder of the Shia. He is a member of the Shia council. During the Taliban government he migrated to Iran. He is influential and respected in his tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Sher Agha</td>
<td>Resident of Top khana</td>
<td>He is a big landholder whose lands are located in Zala Khan. His father was Malik Din Muhammad. He has inherited tribal eldership from his forefathers. During the Taliban government, he tended his farms and resolved people’s conflicts. He is only influential among the Shia of Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agha Mazfari</td>
<td>Resident of Top khana</td>
<td>He rose to tribal eldership during this government. During jihad he went to Iran. Upon return from Iran following the Taliban overthrow he became a tribal elder of the Shia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayed Mukhtar Agha</td>
<td>Resident of Top khana</td>
<td>Known as a spiritual figure, tribal eldership has been endowed to him from his forefathers. During jihad years, he was a commander of Ali Yawar. He stayed at home during the Taliban government. Following the Taliban ouster from power he became a tribal elder.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 8: CoPs of Kandahar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| General Mohammad Akram Khakrezwal | Alokozai  | 2002 – August 2003  
He is from Khakrez and was with Mahaz. During the Taliban regime he lived in Pakistan. After his tenure he became the police chief of Kabul. He had good relations with key Kandahar figures such as Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK) and Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN). He was killed in June 2005 by a suicide bomber inside a mosque in Kandahar-city during a funeral of a famous pro-government religious leader who was killed three days earlier. Khakrezwal’s brother was killed in 2008. |
| Mohammad Hashim Salangi       | Tajik     | August 2003 - March 2004  
From Parwan, he was associated with Jamiat-e-Islami and the northern alliances. He had good relations with AWK, Gul Agha Sherzai (GAS), Arif Khan Nurzai (AKN) and Karim Khan Achekzai (KKA). |
| Khan Mohammad Mujahed          | Alokozai  | March 2004 - March 2005  
See more in Section 3.2.1.3 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tribe/Ethnic group</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Malik Wahedi</td>
<td>Tajik/Shia</td>
<td>March 2005 - August 2006</td>
<td>He is a resident of nahiya 4. During the jihad and Taliban time he lived in exile in Pakistan and Germany. He has good relations with AWK, AKN and KKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayed Aziz Ahmad Wardak</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>August 2006 - December 2006</td>
<td>Resident of Said Abad district in Maidan Wardak. He was affiliated with Mahaz. He has good relations with AWK, AKN and KKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismatullah Alizai</td>
<td>Alizai</td>
<td>December 2006 - November 2007</td>
<td>He is from Musa Qala, Helmand. He has a communist (Khalqi) background and maintained good relations with AWK, AKN, and KKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayed Agha Saqib</td>
<td>Nurzai</td>
<td>November 2007 - June 2008</td>
<td>From Farah Province. Was non-aligned during jihad and Taliban. He had good relations with AWK, GAS, and AKN and KKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matiullah Qatea</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>June 2008 – June 2009</td>
<td>From Khas Uruzgan with a PDPA/Khalqi background. Son of Anif Khan, a former senator from Uruzgan Province. On June 29, 2009 he was killed in a shootout with what is believed to be Afghan Special Forces linked to the international military. He had good relation with AWK, GAS, AKN and KKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen Mirwais Nurzai</td>
<td>Nurzai</td>
<td>June-Sep 2009</td>
<td>Prior to serving as the interim Kandahar Chief of Police after the death of BG Matiullah, Mirwais showed strong leadership skills as the Deputy Regional Commander of the ANP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen Sardar Mohammed Zazai</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 2009-Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U//FOUO) Appendix 9: Tribal council or Qayum shura

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tribe/Ethnic group</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saranwal Mohammad Isa Khan</td>
<td>Spin Boldak, but lives in the City</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>He is a tribal elder from an influential khan family, has higher education and is government official. He was a member of Mahaz-e Milli, and was in the country during the jihad and the Taliban time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ahmad Shah Khan</td>
<td>Spin Boldak</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>See Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karim Khan</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>He is a member of the district council and an elder of the Achekzai council. He was a commander in the jihad time with links to Ittehad-e Islami, Ahmad Wali Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ali Shah Khan</td>
<td>Zhari</td>
<td>Alizai</td>
<td>He is a member of the Zhari district council and a tribal elder of the Alizai. He was a commander of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He had good relations to the Taliban government and of but the mentioned person did not have formal job. He is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Saidullah Khan</td>
<td>Zhari</td>
<td>Alizai</td>
<td>He is the brother of Habibullah Jan, the late commander of the Mahaz-e Milli faction. His family is accused of war crimes and has bad reputation among the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Agha Lalai</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Alokozai</td>
<td>He is a member of the Qayyum Karzai council and was re-elected to the provincial council. He is a friend of the Taliban and was a commander of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami. He is presently involved in preparing a new council by the stimulation of the Karzais. He is head of the reconciliation commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Khan Kaka</td>
<td>Arghandab</td>
<td>Alokozai</td>
<td>He is an elder of both the Alokozai and the district council. He was a Jamiat-e Islami commander, supporter of Mullah Naquibullah and opponent of the Taliban. He has great support from his tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammad Qasam</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Barakzai</td>
<td>He has some knowledge of medicine and is known as a good man. Close to Gul Agha Sherzai. Haji Nusrullah City Barakzai He is a tribal elder and businessman and linked to Gul Agha Sherzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mukhtar</td>
<td>City (nahiya 1)</td>
<td>Farsiwan</td>
<td>He has been accused on assassination and on robberies during the jihad. He is an illiterate person and has good ties with Ahmad Wali Karzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahabuddin Akhundzada</td>
<td>City (nahiya 4)</td>
<td>Ishaqzai</td>
<td>He is from a religious family, tribal elder and a distinguished person. Quoted in a New York Times article on 26 March 2010 saying, “The first thing Afghans fear is the coming of more foreign troops, and the second thing they fear is the empowering of the current leadership and administration [in Kandahar]... The Americans, the international community, all the military forces have lost the people’s trust.” (His tribe feels it has been excluded from power by the current leadership).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Abdur Rahim</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Ishaqzai</td>
<td>He is the assistant of the Panjwayi district council and an influential member of the Ishaqzai council. He is a former Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar commander and presently a member of Afghan Millat party and a close friend of Ahmad Wali and Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Fazal Mohammad</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Ishaqzai</td>
<td>He is a tribal elder. He was a mujahdeen of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar and is currently in charge of the district's Afghan Millat party. He is popular among the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Hayatullah &quot;Kakar&quot;</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Kakar</td>
<td>He is a tribal elder and was regional commander of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He is linked to Ahmad Wali and Agha &quot;Lalai&quot; and has no special status. He came to the council by district support. He was an ordinary person and had no job during the Taliban government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Sardar Mohammad</td>
<td>City Kakar</td>
<td>Kakar</td>
<td>He is a member of the Kakar council. He is head of the cadastre department and a member of the Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar’s Chaman office, now also in charge of Kandahar province. He has close ties with Gul Agha Sherzai and Ahmad Wali. He is also a friend of the Taliban insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardar Mohammad Osman</td>
<td>Maywand Mohammadzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is an elder of the Mohammadzai tribe and comes from a khan family. He is known and trusted by the people in the government, strong supporter of Gul Agha Sherzai and the family of late Zahir Shah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bismillah Afghanmal</td>
<td>City Mohmand</td>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>See Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Masoom Agha</td>
<td>City Mojaddidi (Hazrat)</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is a government official, member of Nejat-e Milli, and friend of Ahmad Wall Karzai. He has allegedly seized both communal and governmental land, especially a Kandahar graveyard and is a known as a corrupt person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Neamatullah “Shirdal”</td>
<td>Spin Boldak Nurzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Wali Mohammad</td>
<td>Maywand Nurzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant of the district council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ehsan</td>
<td>Maywand Nurzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Isa Jan &quot;Nurzai&quot;</td>
<td>Panjwayi Nurzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>He comes from an influential khan family. He was a fighter affiliated with Ittehad-e Islami. Presently he is a mediator and has good behavior with the people. He is also closely linked to Arif Nurzai.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Said Jan</td>
<td>Khakrez Popalzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Mohammad “Popalzai”</td>
<td>City Popalzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of the writers and poets association. Came to the council by the representation of cultural people and was not invited back after the first session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaiqullha &quot;Akhunzada&quot;</td>
<td>Shah Wali Kot Popalzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>He comes from a religious (ulema) family and is a member of the Shah Wali Kot district council. He was a member of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami during the jihad. He is an alim (scholar) and has a good reputation among the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Fazul-udin Agha</td>
<td>Dand Sadat</td>
<td></td>
<td>He was a farmer and a commander of Mahaz-e-Milli and linked to Sherzai. In the current government he was district governor of Spin Boldak for some few years. He has links to smugglers. He has a good reputation with the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toran Nik Mohammad</td>
<td>City Tokhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is a former military officer and was a key member of the Khalq/PDPA. He is a member of both the Ghilzai and Qayum Karzai Council. He is an opportunist and joins any government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mohammad &quot;Isa&quot;</td>
<td>Zhari Tokhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is a member of the Zhari district council. He was affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar. He has a good reputation among the district</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**
He has a membership in the traders’ association.

(U//FOUO) Appendix 10: Mayors of Kandahar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Popal</td>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Son of Munshi Abdur Rauf. During the jihad he was spokesperson of Hamid Karzai. During the Taliban he was in exile in Pakistan and the USA. Appointed in interim government. Close to Karzais, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azizullah Khan Sardar</td>
<td>Mohammadzai</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Son of Sardar Abdullah Khan, resident of nahiya 2. He was in Pakistan during the jihad, came back in mujahedeen time without particular job. He has good relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zmaray Usmani Suliman</td>
<td>Khail</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Resident of nahiya 6. During the jihad he went to Pakistan and Germany. He has good relations to Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Hayder Hamidi</td>
<td>Mohammadzai</td>
<td>Arghandab</td>
<td>Current Mayor of Kandahar. He is from Kohak Village. During Zaher Shah he was in the Ministry of Finance and went to Pakistan and USA during the jihad. He has good relations Ahmad Wali Karzai, Arif Khan Nurzai, Sherzai and Karimullah Khan and even better relation with Qayum Karzai. He belongs to an elite family. He survived a bomb attack in the city on 15 March 2009.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U//FOUO) Appendix 11: 2006 Provincial Council members (women are indicated with a *)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tribe or ethnic group</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Wali Karzai</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>He was the head of the provincial council and re-elected into the council in the 2009 elections with the highest score of 27,147 votes (11%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Ehsan</td>
<td>Maywand</td>
<td>Nurzai</td>
<td>He was the deputy head of the provincial council. He comes from a khan family. He was a supporter of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar then Ittehad. He is known as neutral, honest and considered an intellectual and has a good personality. He is a friend of Sherzai and Karzai and a nationalist. He was re-elected the 10th score 9,884 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Ahmad Shah Khan</td>
<td>Spin Boldak</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>Head of the Achekzai tribe and was affiliated with Nejate Milli. Close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, he is well liked by the people and respected across tribal boundaries. KPRT believes he should be given greater focus given his high standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Fazel Mohammad</td>
<td>Takhtapul</td>
<td>Achekzai</td>
<td>He formerly held the post of public prosecutor, but resigned. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 9th score 10,676 (4.3%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Agha Lalai Dastagir</td>
<td>Panjwayi</td>
<td>Alokozai</td>
<td>He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 5th highest score 15,709 (6.4%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mohammad Qasim</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Barakzai</td>
<td>He has studied some medical courses. He is considered an honest man and has good conflict resolution skills. He did not run again for the 2009 elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janan Gulzai</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Barakzai</td>
<td>He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not among the top 11 men qualifying for the council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah Sayed Mohammad</td>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Barakzai</td>
<td>He was a Mahaz-e-Milli commander of Sherzai. He used to be against Ahmad Wali but is now his friend. He is not well liked by the people. He is a big enemy of the Taliban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarghuna Kakar (*)</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Kakar</td>
<td>Women's delegate. When she was young she was in the Khalq faction of the communist party. She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 14th score of 566 votes (0.2%). Omar Sherzad Zhari Khogiani. He is a naqilin (migrant). He is an open minded person. He is the representative of Kandahar Province to the Senate. Also a member of the security council (shura amniat) in Kandahar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soria Barna (*)</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Laghmani</td>
<td>Originally from Laghman, but has married a Kandahari and lived there for a long time. She was a teacher in the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bismillah Afghanmal</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>He is also a member of the provincial council. He is affiliated with Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar and presently claims to be a member of the Afghan Millat Party. He is ready to do everything for the sake of his reputation. He is accused of many things, among them being a narcotics trafficker, collusion with Qanuni and known to have links to the Iranian Consulate in Kandahar. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 3rd score 19,231 (7.8%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Neamatullah Khan</td>
<td>Spin Boldak</td>
<td>Nurzai</td>
<td>He ran again in the 2009 elections but was not among the top 11 men qualifying for the council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Sayed Jan</td>
<td>Khakrez</td>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>Very close to Ahmad Wali Karzai, has no independent power base. He was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the 2nd score 22,462 (9.1%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariam Durrani (*)</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Popalzai</td>
<td>Friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai. She is also the member of a youth organization in Kandahar. She was re-elected in the 2009 elections with the highest female score, 12th overall of 948 votes (0.4%).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Newly elected:**
- Haji Rahmatullah Khan, 4th place, 18,408 votes (7.5%)
- Haji Mukhtar, 6th place, 11,730 votes (4.7%), a Shia from Kandahar-city
- Haji Saleh Mohammad Pahlawan, 7th, 11,187 votes, (4.5%)
- Haji Mohammad, 11th, 7,958 votes, (3.2%)
- Shekila Selahi (*), 13th place, 877 votes (0.4%)
(U) APPENDIX 12

NOTES ABOUT REFERENCES

KANDAHAR PRT Reporting via TACNET and the ORION Database
Review of the KANDAHAR CITY (KC) and DAND District Pages

(U//FOUO). The SOIC analysts conducted a review of the information available in the ORION Database, which is a Wikipedia containing all sorts of information about Kandahar province gathered by Canadian forces over the years. ORION itself resides on the Canadian TACNET System, which comprises of special ruggedized laptops connected to a Canadian SECRET level network (Canada’s equivalent of the U.S. SIPR network). ORION is probably the most comprehensive repository for intelligence about Kandahar Province within ISAF; it contains several terabytes of reports, data and images. Most ORION pages are marked SECRET – AUS/CAN/GBR/USA, although it appears that most of the underlying information is marked at the SECRET – REL ISAF level. The team recommends ISAF arrange to move the ORION database over to ISAF Secret and U.S. SIPR in order to make it available to ISAF allies before Canadian forces withdraw from Afghanistan in 2011.

(U//FOUO) The TACNET system is mounted on Panasonic ruggedized laptops. Based on information found at KPRT, the following distribution of the system in theater is as

- Task Force – Kandahar – ?
- KPRT – Over 30
- RC – South – 5 (1 located at KIFC)
- Canadian Embassy – 2
- ISAF HQ – 1
- CTSC – 1
- Canadian Forces – 2
- US Forces – 2

The following is a description of some of ORION’s holdings on Kandahar City and Dand District, to include page layouts:

1. **BASIC INFO Section.** This section includes general information about the Province, District Center MGRS, population data and remarks. Hyperlinks available in this section connect to each of the provinces that comprise Kandahar City. There is also a small Graphical User Interface (GUI) set up to direct the user to any of Kandahar City’s ten sub-districts. **Analyst Comment:** Kandahar City’s page layout in ORION differs in this regard. The DAND District page, for example, has no GUI and includes a hyperlink (shown as “Type: DISTRICT”) that directs the user to the most recently uploaded document for this district. For databasing purposes, entries for places that geographically belong to DAND District are instead being entered into KC pages. According to KPRT Fusion Cell personnel, this is done purposefully. KC District Pages generally replicate the various KANDAHAR Province pages in terms of layout, although there is not a DIGEST Section (described later).

2. **UPDATES Section.** This section shows the ORION user which data fields and documents pertaining to the parent record have been most recently updated. A comprehensive assessment AINO MINA Village was added, sourced from a
patrol report dated 23JAN10. Analyst Comment: This village assessment was fairly robust, with comments filling the following data fields: BASIC INFO, TERRAIN, DRUGS, ECONOMY, INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, TRIBALISM, RELATED DOCUMENTS and RELATED INCIDENTS. In this case the write-up was single source. Follow-on reports are entered at the top of data fields as the newest available data and not fused to create running analyses. Source reports are hyperlinked at the end of most entries.

3. POINTS OF INTEREST Section. The main features here are an alphabetical listing of villages within KC (or the applicable province) and a user-controlled map visually displaying each. Analyst Comment: This is a useful GEOINT-friendly map display and spreadsheet that includes a quick-reference MGRS listing for the villages as well. The villages are all hyperlinked; unfortunately, there’s no way to tell which of the village pages are populated and which are not. Analysts will need to review each village entry individually. ORION appears to be neither optimized nor comprehensive enough for crafting overarching city- or district-level assessments as a singular resource. The database will serve well as a complement to other RC(S) reporting streams, although it’s existence on the limited access CAN-US TACNET system is a challenge to its overall utility. These data need to be made more widely available.

4. TOPICS Section. This section lists additional data fields selectable by the user. The list differs somewhat comparing KC and DAND District to one another.

a. TOPICS Section of the KC Page. Available selections are KPRT INVOLVEMENT, OTHER ACTORS, DEMOGRAPHICS, GOVERNANCE, ECONOMY, EDUCATION, HEALTH, COMMUNICATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE, SECURITY, ENEMY, ATMOSPHERICS, TERRAIN, LOCAL PERSONALITIES and RELATED PRODUCTS.

i. KPRT INVOLVEMENT. No data.

ii. OTHER ACTORS. No data.

iii. DEMOGRAPHICS. Lists population and tribal data, with a separate section titled “religion”. The religion section has hyperlinks to pages listing CIVIL RELIGIOUS EVENTS, MOSQUES IN KANDAHAR CITY and MOSQUE PROJECTS IN KANDAHAR CITY. Analyst Comment: As experienced previously with the POINTS OF INTEREST section, the MOSQUES IN KANDAHAR CITY hyperlink yields a list of facilities, some of which are simply a grid reference. Others have partial and full descriptions, but there’s no way to tell without individually reviewing every entry. The user is given no sense of the list’s completeness. The MOSQUE PROJECTS selection takes the user to another GEO-referenced list, although this one is compiled as a function of project start-ups with at least some data resident for each spreadsheet entry.

iv. GOVERNANCE. Subsections comprise GENERAL COMMENTS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, IMPORTANT LEADERS, LOCAL
OPINION OF GoK, LINE MINISTRIES/MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS (a list of directors), SHURAS, JUSTICE, CDCs, GOVERNANCE PROJECTS and NEEDS. **Analyst Comment:** These are again placeholders or entries for raw data more than assessments and, in ORION fashion, the most recent entries are automatically populated at the top. The only way to get a feel for the amount of data in ORION for a given field is to individually review each – a time-consuming process that may not lead to a comprehensive assessment of the issue in question.

v. **ECONOMY.** Subsections comprise BUSINESS DIRECTORY, GENERAL, AGRICULTURE, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRY, MARKETS, BANKING, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, CONTRACTORS, PROJECTS and NEEDS. **Analyst Comment:** Two forms of data entry are sourced event descriptions and lists.

vi. **EDUCATION.** Subsections comprise GENERAL, SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, EDUCATION CONTACTS, PROJECTS and NEEDS.

vii. **HEALTH.** Subsections comprise GENERAL, MEDICAL FACILITIES, HEALTH PROJECTS and NEEDS.

viii. **COMMUNICATIONS.** Subsections comprise GENERAL, MEDIA, CELLULAR and PROJECTS.

ix. **INFRASTRUCTURE.** Subsections comprise GENERAL, ROADS, WATER AND SANITATION, ELECTRICITY, TRANSPORTATION, PROJECTS and NEEDS. **Analyst Comment:** The projects section contains separate lists for bridge projects; canals, irrigation, drainage projects; potable water projects; road projects; and utility projects.

x. **SECURITY.** Subsections comprise GENERAL, ANA, ANP, PROVINCIAL CHIEF OF POLICE, CHIEF OF SECURITY KANDAHAR CITY, LOCAL ANP COMMANDERS BY PSS, PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY, CRIME, CORRUPTION, PROJECTS and NEEDS.

xi. **ENEMY.** Subsections comprise STATUS, LOCAL SUPPORT FOR INS, LOCALS UNDER ENEMY INTIMIDATION, INDICATORS OF ENEMY PRESENCE, TALIBAN C2 ASSESSMENT and GENERAL COMMENTS,

xii. **ATMOSPHERICS.** Only a GENERAL COMMENTS subsection here.

xiii. **TERRAIN.** Only a GENERAL COMMENTS subsection here.

xiv. **LOCAL PERSONALITIES.** Only a hyperlinked list of personalities resides here.
xv. RELATED PRODUCTS. Subsections comprise RELATED MULTIMEDIA, RELATED DOCUMENTS and RELATED INCIDENTS.

b. TOPICS Section of the DAND Page. Available selections are BACKGROUND, DEMOGRAPHICS, GOVERNANCE, ECONOMY, EDUCATION, HEALTH, INFRASTRUCTURE, COMMUNICATIONS, ATMOSPHERICS, SECURITY, CRIMINAL, ENEMY, TERRAIN, LOCAL PERSONALITIES and RELATED PRODUCTS. Analyst Comment: Descriptions are written only for those sections not previously described for the KC Page.

i. BACKGROUND. Subsections comprise INTRODUCTION and HISTORY.

ii. CRIMINAL. Subsections comprise DRUGS and OTHER CRIME.

5. DIGEST Section. This section exists only for district pages and evaluates (using green/yellow/red) six focus areas for that district: DRUGS, INFRASTRUCTURE, GOVERNANCE, ENEMY, SECURITY and TRIBALISM. Three supporting bullet points are shown alongside each focal area. Analyst Comment: Unfortunately, there is no context given to support these assessments other than the bullets. The points listed are not sourced, nor do they appear to have been key points of a comprehensive district analysis (though they could be – it’s just not clear). Additional dialogue is needed to discern the methodology behind these assessments, although this will prove difficult because the write-ups are not attributed to a KPRT/Fusion Cell author.