



San Diego  
**CROSS-BORDER  
KIDNAPPING**  
THREAT ASSESSMENT



## (U) SAN DIEGO: CROSS-BORDER KIDNAPPING THREAT ASSESSMENT

*(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Border and Financial Crimes Team, San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center; San Diego Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Southwest Border Branch, Border Security Division; Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis; Chula Vista Police Department; San Diego Sheriff's Department; and San Diego Police Department. Coordinated with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Intelligence; and U.S. Department of State Diplomatic Security Service.*

### (U) SCOPE

The San Diego Law Enforcement Center (SD-LECC) convened an analytical task force in Spring 2010 to address the question: "What does cross-border kidnapping in San Diego look like?" Intelligence Analysts from Chula Vista Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis analyzed statistical, investigative and open source intelligence from local law enforcement agencies, FBI, DHS, ICE, CBP, DEA and the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs to prepare this assessment. There is strong evidence—based on intelligence gathered from traditional and alternative sources, such as banks, hospitals, citizen interviews, wiretaps and private consulting firms—that kidnappings in the San Diego area are widely underreported. Consequently, this assessment offers a strategic baseline only; there is insufficient data to support a definitive study of cross-border kidnapping tactics and techniques. This assessment is intended to support law enforcement executives and practitioners in their efforts to collect additional information and combat this problem.



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## (U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY / KEY FINDINGS

*(U//FOUO) The San Diego-Law Enforcement Coordination Center's Area of Responsibility (SD-LECC's AOR), which includes San Diego and Imperial counties, has encountered five types of kidnappings that cross the U.S. Southwest border: for-profit, drug retribution, express, virtual, and coyote. The SD-LECC assesses with medium confidence<sup>1</sup> that cross-border kidnappings pose a low probability, low impact threat to most residents in the SD-LECC AOR, but a medium probability, high impact threat to those who frequently engage in either licit or illicit cross-border activity.*


*(U//FOUO) Cross-border kidnappings are underreported for several reasons: involvement of the victim (or his family members) in illicit activity; threats and intimidation from the kidnapers; and inherent suspicion of government and law enforcement officials in Mexico and among Mexican immigrants in the U.S.*

*(U//FOUO) Despite the close geographic proximity of San Diego and Tijuana, violence in Northern Baja California does not correlate directly with violence levels in the SD-LECC AOR.*

## (U) THE SITUATION IN SAN DIEGO

### (U) Drug-related Kidnappings

(U//LES) Kidnappings have been an integral part of Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and cartel operations for decades, starting in the 1980s and increasing throughout the 1990s. DTOs originally used kidnapping as an enforcement or punishment technique. Individuals were taken in retaliation, as debt collateral, for turf enforcement, or for some other goal related to the larger narcotics criminal enterprise. Mexican law enforcement officials were aware of these kidnappings, but were either content to allow the cartels to use kidnappings in their war of attrition or were themselves involved in the crimes. By the mid-2000s, organized crime groups and lower-level criminals were well-versed in the fundamentals of kidnapping as an enforcement tactic and money-making venture.<sup>i</sup>



(U//LES) The most common type of drug-related kidnapping is referred to as a drug "rip." These happen in retaliation for a drug dealer's mishandling of a drug shipment (losing the shipment, selling it for profit, etc). The kidnapping ransom is meant to replace the original value of the lost drug shipment. This type of kidnapping also may be a retribution kidnapping, used to enforce territory, pay back a DTO member for an insult or personal slight, or for capricious reasons like romantic entanglements or grudges. Initial ransom demands are typically very high – upwards of U.S.\$1 million.<sup>ii</sup>

<sup>1</sup> (U) High Confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. Medium Confidence generally means that the information can be interpreted in various ways, that analysts have differing views, or that the information, while credible, is of insufficient reliability to warrant a higher level of confidence. Low Confidence generally means that the information is scant, questionable, or very fragmented; that it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or that the analyst(s) has significant concerns or problems with the sources.

(U//LES) In June 2009, a Chula Vista, California resident and restaurant owner was abducted, murdered, and found in his vehicle shortly thereafter. Before his abduction, the victim's employees overheard him make threatening phone calls to unknown subjects seeking unspecified payments. They also witnessed individuals making cash payments to the victim at the restaurant. The employees suspected the victim was involved in illegal activities, including drug trafficking.<sup>iii</sup>

(U//LES) In July 2007, a U.S. citizen drug dealer planned to steal a drug shipment from his supplier rather than pay the amount promised. The supplier learned of the plot and kidnapped the dealer from his home in Bonita, California before the dealer could execute the theft. The supplier held him in Tijuana, Mexico until his cell members could pay the amount owed.<sup>iv</sup>

(U//LES) In May 2007, a U.S. citizen was kidnapped from his residence in Campo, California because he and his family would not allow drug traffickers to use their family farm in Mexico to grow marijuana or to serve as a clandestine landing strip for DTO aircraft. The victim also had refused money to drive large loads of marijuana from Mexico to Los Angeles. He was held captive for over seven months and eventually was released for a ransom payment of \$315,000.<sup>v</sup>

(U//LES) During the last 18 months, the San Diego Division of the FBI has encountered several instances of drug "rip" kidnappings that were thwarted before the abduction could take place. These plots all involved DTOs that tried to kidnap a former member or rival who had stolen part of a drug shipment. U.S. Law Enforcement received details of the planned kidnappings—including the number of subjects, vehicle information, routes, times, and victim identifications—during the planning phase and stopped the kidnappers during the plots' execution. These thwarted kidnappings resulted in arrests that yielded valuable intelligence, as well as drug and weapons seizures.<sup>vi</sup>

(U//LES) For example, in April 2009, drug traffickers hired a Mexico-based kidnapping cell to come to the United States to kidnap a U.S. citizen.<sup>vii</sup> The cell leader made several advance trips to the United States to find the victim, obtain a vehicle to use in the kidnapping, and bribe Mexican customs officials to secure clear passage to Mexico with the victim. This planned kidnapping was ultimately thwarted by law enforcement.<sup>viii</sup>

(U//LES) The San Diego area of responsibility (AOR) defines a **cross-border kidnapping** as including one or more of the following:

- (U//LES) Victim(s) or close family member(s) of the victim gives the appearance of wealth;
- (U//LES) Victim(s) and kidnapper(s) are Mexican nationals; the kidnapping takes place wholly within Mexico, but Mexican law enforcement or the victim(s) family requests FBI assistance;
- (U//LES) Victim(s) is a Mexican national with ties to the U.S. [legally lives/works in the San Diego region, has relatives who legally live/work in the San Diego region]. The kidnapping takes place in Mexico, but the ransom demand/extortion reaches north to the victim's U.S. family/associates;
- (U//LES) Victim is a U.S. citizen with ties to Mexico [owns a business, has family in TJ, etc]. The kidnapping occurs either in Mexico or the U.S. (and victim is transported south into Mexico). Ransom/extortion can occur on either side of the border.

(U) Source: San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center, Cross Border Kidnapping Working Group working definition.

(U//LES) There are typically three different types of kidnapping cells: **DTO-managed cells**, which focus on retribution kidnappings and on enforcing DTO territory and rules; **DTO-sanctioned cells**, which are allowed to operate independently and keep kidnapping profits separate from drug operations; and **rogue cells**, which operate without DTO knowledge or approval and which risk reprisals from DTOs for working within their territory without paying proper deference. The farther a kidnapping cell is from DTO control, the more unfettered its operating practices. For example, unaffiliated cells are more likely to kidnap those with no criminal history, including the elderly, women, and children, and to engage in psychological abuse and sexual assault. DTO cells, by contrast, almost exclusively target men already engaged in illegal activity, even though these cases often end in torture, murder, and public display of corpses (to intimidate rivals or individuals providing information to law enforcement).

(U) Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division.

## (U) For-Profit Kidnappings

(U//LES) Prior to 2008, most kidnapping cases had a link to drug trafficking, with the kidnapper and victim both involved in criminal activity and the kidnapping usually used as a form of retribution. San Diego law enforcement has since seen an increased use of kidnapping solely as a money-making enterprise, often targeting victims unrelated to drug trafficking.<sup>ix</sup> General local law enforcement consensus holds that this shift probably stems from several factors that have cut into cartel profits, including the massive Mexican Government crackdown on drug cartels; the weakening or dissolution of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), a group historically associated with high volume and extremely violent kidnappings; splinter cells created in the wake of the internecine fighting within the AFO beginning in 2008; and the worldwide economic recession. In addition, increased U.S. law enforcement presence at the border further contributed to decreased ease in the cartels' ability to traffic drugs, prompting the turn to kidnapping to supplement dwindling income that used to come solely from drug trafficking.<sup>x</sup>



(U//LES) Although no two kidnappings are identical, kidnapping cells use similar tradecraft in committing a “for-profit” kidnapping. Initial ransoms are often low relative to drug-related ransoms, ranging from \$50,000 to \$250,000. Kidnapping cells often select their victim ahead of time; conduct in-depth surveillance for two to three days prior to seizing the victim; transport the victim in stolen vehicles; use multiple stash houses; intimidate victims with physical and mental violence; and keep their organizations highly compartmented to minimize the number of people (save two or three top-ranking lieutenants) who know the entire cell's membership, motives, or methods.<sup>xi</sup>

(U//LES) In January 2009, a victim was taken because kidnappers believed his family to be wealthy, since they owned their own business, lived in a nice house, and operated two luxury automobiles.<sup>xii</sup> Drivers of the kidnapping vehicles were instructed where to drive via cell phone. They did not know their destination before conducting the attack.<sup>xiii</sup> Kidnappers referred to the victim as “clean,” meaning he did not have any affiliation with drug trafficking, cartels, or other criminal activity.<sup>xiv</sup> The victim was held at a stash house with multiple other victims.<sup>xv</sup> Kidnappers checked on their victims' medical needs, offering assistance and medication (for such preexisting conditions as diabetes) if required.<sup>xvi</sup> Guards at stash house referred to each other by numbers (rather than given or nicknames) for security.<sup>xvii</sup>

(U//LES) This scenario demonstrates several common features of for-profit kidnappings. For instance, kidnappers chose their victim based on the victim's family's perceived wealth. In addition, kidnappers treated their victims relatively well; victims were given medical treatment, food, and water. This suggests the kidnappers were interested in keeping victims alive and healthy to garner a ransom payment rather than to kill the victims for retribution. For-profit kidnapping cells often take multiple victims and demand smaller ransoms than is the case with drug-related kidnappings, in an effort to make bigger profits from multiple small ransoms.

(U//LES) In addition, while not a part of this particular scenario, some for-profit kidnappings were further characterized by systematic violence in the form of amputations used as proof-of-life substantiation. Kidnapping cells kept medical professionals on retainer; these individuals performed surgical amputations of fingers and toes, which were then sent to victims' families as proof of life, but also as an intimidation tactic to encourage payment of ransoms. Usually these amputations happened as a matter of course (not in retaliation for non-cooperation on the part of the victim), and exhibit the type of violence and premeditation inherent in cells that devote themselves entirely to the enterprise of kidnapping for profit.<sup>xviii</sup>

## (U) Coyote Kidnappings

(U//FOUO) In the last three years, DHS/ICE has served as the agency of referral for all coyote or immigrant kidnappings. These kidnappings target immigrants as they try to cross into the U.S., immigrants who are already in the U.S. illegally, and immigrants who are staged in Mexico awaiting final crossing. It is not uncommon for kidnappers to target families of prospective immigrants as well.<sup>xix</sup>

(U//LES) Between FY2007 and 2nd Quarter FY2010, ICE initiated 17 coyote kidnapping investigations in the San Diego region. During FY 2009, the year with the most cases, only four of the seven cases initiated actually involved migrants who were being smuggled. In those four cases, family members living in the U.S. and Mexico were called and usually asked to wire the ransom money, which ranged from \$500 to \$5,000.<sup>xx,xxi</sup>

(U//FOUO) Coyote kidnappings are unlikely to be reported to law enforcement because the victims are in the U.S. illegally. Family members, some of whom are also in the U.S. illegally, fear retribution and deportation if they contact authorities. DHS/ICE has encouraged the reporting of crimes against aliens through public affairs campaigns and by providing victims with referral services to help them deal with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or rape. Despite these efforts, case statistics illustrate the drastic underreporting of this type of kidnapping.<sup>xxii</sup>


(U//LES) In July 2009, DHS/ICE agents identified a criminal organization that falsely represented itself as an alien smuggling organization in Tijuana. This group used violence and intimidation, including rape and murder, to force 15 undocumented aliens and their families to pay thousands of dollars for their release. Border Patrol agents rescued 13 victims near Campo, California and found the bodies of two in Tecate, Baja California later that summer. In this case, only one victim had a relative who contacted ICE for help.<sup>xxiii</sup>

(U//LES) In 2008 and 2009, children were held ransom by the alien smugglers their parents hired to smuggle them into the United States. In these instances, one parent who was already in the United States illegally and another who was apprehended by CBP/Office of Border Patrol (OBP) reported to local law enforcement that their children were being held by the alien smugglers they had hired. The ransoms requested were higher than other coyote cases, \$6,000-\$7,000, and the parents contacted law enforcement quickly; however, they also made initial payments via wire services.<sup>xxiv,xxv,xxvi</sup>

### (U) Coyote

"Coyote" is the colloquial Mexican-Spanish term to describe individuals engaged in smuggling. The term is mainly used for alien smugglers, but the same individuals may branch out into smuggling drugs, weapons or other contraband.

(U) DHS working definition



## (U) Express Kidnappings

(U//FOUO) Express kidnapers exploit the large volume of American tourists and business travelers in Mexico to abduct victims in public places, such as bars, taxis or restaurants, and have them contact relatives to wire ransom monies. Sometimes victims are forced to withdraw their own ransoms from ATMs. Express kidnapers receive an immediate return on investment as ransom is paid while the victim is held. In addition, the quick release of victims stymies law enforcement. Families are unlikely to report a crime, since they are typically told the victim was in a car accident or needs bail for a DUI.<sup>xxvii, xxviii, xxix</sup>

(U//FOUO) Although the term “express” describes the general speed at which victims move from abduction to release, these kidnappings can last several days to make family members believe they are responding to legitimate arrests or accidents or to avoid ATM limits on withdrawals. Ransoms are usually small; between \$1,000 and \$3,000 for a wire transfer and between \$200 and \$400 for an ATM event.<sup>xxx, xxxi, xxxii</sup>

(U//FOUO) The U.S. Consulate in Tijuana has received three reports of express kidnappings out of 27 kidnappings in the past 18 months. Tijuana experiences a lower volume of express kidnappings than Mexico City. Most victims are involved in travel or legitimate business, they have little fear of retribution against themselves or their families, and they are unlikely to report these crimes to law enforcement.<sup>xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxv</sup>


(U//FOUO) In early August 2009, an American couple was abducted at gunpoint in Playas de Tijuana and told to contact their relatives, tell them there had been in a traffic accident, and ask for \$1,000. Once the ransom was paid a few hours later, the couple was released, and they reported the incident to the U.S. consulate.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

(U//FOUO) Earlier that summer another American citizen was taken from a well known bar in Tijuana after a disagreement and moved to an unknown location for “assistance.” There he was held at gun point, treated harshly, and kept captive for two days. Kidnappers told him to contact his family and ask for \$3,000 for a “DUI incident.” Once ransom was received via wire transfer, he was taken to the border and released. Mexican authorities are investigating the general location of his captivity.<sup>xxxvii</sup>

## (U) Virtual Kidnapping

(U//FOUO) Virtual kidnappings are crimes of extortion because the “victim” is not abducted. Criminals contact the “victim’s” family or friends via phone or email, convince them a kidnapping has taken place, and demand a ransom. The “victim” has not been abducted, but generally is out of town or out of touch.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

(U//FOUO) Virtual or faux kidnappings are prevalent throughout the U.S., but most effective near border regions, where criminals wait for an intended “victim” to cross the border, check into a hotel, or book a



flight in Mexico. Once the intended “victim” is out of typical contact with family and friends, the kidnappers contact the ransom target.<sup>xxxix</sup>

(U//FOUO) Ransoms tend to run in the hundreds of dollars, and wire services are the most commonly requested methods of ransom delivery, as the success of the crime depends on quick payment, before the family can contact the “victim.” FBI and ICE records show these events are initially reported to local law enforcement and rarely rise above that jurisdiction. San Diego area law enforcement agencies have no hard statistics on how often attempted virtual kidnappings fail, since few are reported once the intended “victim” is able to be contacted.<sup>xl, xli</sup>

(U//LES) In 2010, the San Diego Police Department’s (SDPD) Robbery Unit fielded calls approximately twice a month for faux kidnappings. In most cases, the “victim” had traveled to Mexico on vacation or for business. The call was made within a day of the border crossing, when the intended victim was without cell phone access. Ransom amounts were reported to be very small, and speed was clearly of the essence. The SDPD advised relatives to try to contact their loved ones before paying any ransom and to contact the FBI if those loved ones could not be reached.<sup>xlii</sup>

(U//LES) In January 2009, the San Diego Sheriff’s Department (SDSD) reported a call from a U.S. Citizen who said she had received a ransom call about her son, also a U.S. citizen, two days after he left home to attend a concert. The ransom caller claimed her son was in Mexico and demanded that she wire \$1,500 there. The mother followed instructions and then called SDSD. The caller demanded another \$1,500, which was not paid. Four hours later the son returned home. He advised Sheriff’s deputies he had been in Tijuana on his own volition and had not been held against his will.<sup>xliii</sup>

## (U) Possible Indicators and Common Characteristics

### (U) Abduction Kidnappings: For-Profit and Retribution

- (U//LES) Pre-surveillance of victim’s home or work. For example, suspicious vehicles might be seen in the target’s neighborhood or following the target, or strange individuals might appear in unexpected places.
- (U//LES) Potential victim receives strange calls, threats, or hang-ups.
- (U//LES) Potential victim has business, legitimate or illegitimate, in Mexico.
- (U//LES) Potential victim travels to Mexico.
- (U//LES) Potential victim has family members who were kidnapped or threatened with kidnapping, either in Mexico or in the U.S.
- (U//LES) While in Mexico, potential victim engages in displays of wealth or is not discreet about financial circumstances.
- (U//LES) Home invasion occurs, sometimes in an effort to obtain drugs, money, or people to extort.
- (U//LES) Family member or business associate has recently been kidnapped or threatened.

### Abduction Kidnappings: Common Characteristics

- (U//LES) Previous relationship of victim(s) or close family member(s) with the offender(s).
- (U//LES) In drug-related kidnappings, victim’s family and/or acquaintances are reluctant to report the kidnapping to law enforcement or, if reported, are often reluctant to give details about the victim’s activities or possible motives for the kidnapping.
- (U//LES) Except in coyote kidnappings, victims are typically male, Hispanic (or fluent Spanish speakers), average age 21-40.
- (U//LES) Tradecraft (surveillance, stolen vehicle, stash houses, etc.) in drug-related kidnappings is very similar to those exhibited in for-profit kidnappings.
- (U//LES) Subjects frequently use “throw-away” or pre-paid cellular telephones, or use the victim’s phone, to make ransom demands.
- (U//LES) Guards at stash houses are male, Hispanic, often drug addicts, and related to other members of the kidnapping cell.
- (U//LES) Perpetrators/cell leaders are well-armed, trained, highly organized (although compartmentalized), and use military or police equipment and tactics.

*(U) Virtual Kidnappings*

- (U//LES) Alleged “victims” recently left the country, checked in to a hotel, or boarded an aircraft and may be out of touch with family and friends.
- (U//LES) Alleged “victims” are in transit, or in an area known for poor cellular reception or internet connections.

*(U) Express Kidnappings*

- (U//LES) Victims may be drinking alone in bars and may have drinks spiked.
- (U//LES) Victim’s families may receive short calls asking for small sums of money to pay the police, claiming the victim had been arrested or involved in an accident.
- (U//LES) Vehicles or cabs follow potential victims.
- (U//LES) Private vehicles are offered to a victim for transport.
- (U//LES) There might be more than one person in a cab or vehicle.
- (U//LES) Victims are quoted significantly lower rates than those charged by other cabs.
- (U//LES) Taxicabs do not have the standard license displayed on the windshield or other legitimate credentials.

**(U) INTELLIGENCE GAPS**

- (U//LES) How many kidnappings with a U.S. tie or nexus occur in Tijuana in a given year?
- (U//LES) How many drug-rip kidnappings happen in the San Diego AOR in a given year?
- (U//LES) How many coyote kidnappings happen in the San Diego AOR in a given year?
- (U//LES) What is the distribution of kidnapping cells, among the three identified types (DTO-based, DTO-sanctioned, rogue)?
- (U//LES) Which person(s) within each cell typically act as a “spotter” for potential victims?
- (U//LES) What criteria does each cell use to determine who is a potential victim?
- (U//LES) To what extent are U.S. street gang members involved in cross-border kidnapping cells?
- (U//LES) What effect, if any, will the July 2010 election results have on violence, especially kidnapping, in Tijuana and throughout Baja California Norte?
- (U//LES) Would an increase in alien smuggling organizations using maritime routes lead to a drop in land-based coyote kidnappings?
- (U//LES) Is there a correlation between drug seizures in the San Diego AOR and the incidence of drug rip kidnappings?
- (U//LES) How many privately-handled kidnapping cases are reported to U.S. law enforcement?
- (U//LES) Do private kidnapping insurance policies make a potential victim more or less vulnerable to targeting by a for-profit kidnapping cell?
- (U//LES) To what extent are corrupt service providers (hotel personnel, taxi drivers, etc.) involved in virtual kidnapping?
- (U//LES) How much money do kidnap crews generate from kidnappings (not per kidnap, but over the course of their operations)?
- (U//LES) Have the recent arrests of leaders of known organizations engaged in kidnapping had an impact on kidnapping-for-profit activities?

## (U) OUTLOOK

*(U//FOUO) Given that cross-border kidnappings represent a decades-old threat in Baja California, and to a lesser extent in the San Diego AOR, this assessment projects that cross-border kidnappings will continue, although they will impact a very small subset of the larger San Diego AOR population that is involved in some type of illicit cross-border activity. However, the general population of San Diego and Imperial counties will continue to face a higher likelihood of being the victims of express or virtual kidnappings while traveling to, or through, Mexico. For-profit kidnappings will continue to be affected by the general state of DTO control of the Tijuana plaza, as well as the overall economic situation of both the United States and Mexico (e.g., recession).*

## (U) CHALLENGES TO ANALYSIS

*(U//FOUO) Possible scenarios and metrics relating to drug-rip kidnappings are nearly impossible to determine, given underreporting of and numerous intelligence gaps associated with this crime. The general cross border violence situation in Baja California is highly cyclical, experiencing ebbs and flows. Enhancing accuracy in statistical information and therefore in the resultant analytical assertions will continue to be hampered by jurisdictional issues, insofar as the boundaries imposed by San Diego's AOR make it difficult for area law enforcement to pursue perpetrators if they flee to Mexico. An additional important statistic to capture is: how many kidnappings of U.S. persons are handled by private security companies (in fulfillment of kidnapping insurance policies)?<sup>2</sup> Lack of cooperation between these private groups and U.S. law enforcement only exacerbates the difficulty in capturing an accurate scope of the problem. It is also important to remember that cross border violence stretches beyond San Diego's jurisdiction into the United States. San Diego is often a through-place for cross border crimes like kidnapping, weapons trafficking, and border-related public corruption, but these activities are not limited to a certain mile radius out from the border. This activity is based on criminal actors and their motivation, both of which may appear far outside San Diego and Imperial counties.*

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<sup>2</sup> Executives for major corporations with offices in Mexico, or citizens of some wealth and/or notoriety often purchase private kidnapping insurance. However, most of these individuals (and/or their companies) do not disclose the existence of these policies (for fear of the individual becoming an even more attractive target to kidnappers who would then likely be guaranteed a swift, substantial ransom payment). In addition, many of these policies contain provisions restricting or forbidding a victim's family or company from contacting law enforcement. As a result, kidnappings involving private insurance and private investigations go virtually unreported to U.S. law enforcement.

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- iii Chula Vista Police Department Supplemental Report, 1 June 2009.
- vi Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, July 2007.
- v Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, December 2007.
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- x (U) San Diego Union Tribune, Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens on the Rise, February 6, 2008, <http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/20080206-9999-1m6kidnap.html> accessed 10/21/10
- xi Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, historical case information, November 2009.
- xii Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
- xiii Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
- xiv Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
- xv Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
- xvi Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
- xvii Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Division, case information, February 2009.
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- xxii (U) ICE Blue Campaign <http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/humantrafficking.shtm>
- xxiii (U) ICE Case File, July 22, 2009
- xxvi (U) ICE Case File, April 30, 2009
- xxv (U) ICE Case File, August 8, 2008
- xxvi (U) ICE News Release, ICE helps rescue 4-year-old girl kidnapped by human smugglers, November 27, 2009
- xxvii (U) FBI Case File, August 10, 2009
- xxviii (U) FBI Case File, July 30, 2009
- xxix (U) FBI Case File, July 30, 2009
- xxx (U) FBI Case File, August 10, 2009
- xxxi (U) FBI Case File, July 30, 2009
- xxxii (U) FBI Case File, July 30, 2009
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