

SCADA: A Deeper Look

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
Outline

- ▶ Vendors
- ▶ Protocols
- ▶ DNP 3.0 Protocol Example
- ▶ Demonstration

SCADA Principles of Operation

- ▶ Interface with Physical Devices
 - Remote terminal unit (RTU)
 - Intelligent electronic device (IED)
 - Programmable logic controller (PLC)
- ▶ Communications
 - Directly wired
 - Power line carrier
 - Microwave
 - Radio (spread spectrum)
 - Fiber optic

Typical SCADA Architecture



Major SCADA/EMS Vendors

- ▶ Asea Brown Boveri (ABB)
- ▶ Siemens
- ▶ Alstom ESCA
- ▶ Telegyr Systems
- ▶ Advanced Control Systems (ACS)
- ▶ Harris
- ▶ Bailey

SCADA Protocols (Partial List!)


- ▶ ANSI X3.28
- ▶ BBC 7200
- ▶ CDC Types 1 and 2
- ▶ Conitel 2020/2000/3000
- ▶ DCP 1
- ▶ DNP 3.0
- ▶ Gedac 7020
- ▶ IBM 3707
- ▶ Landis & Gyr 8979
- ▶ Pert
- ▶ PG&E
- ▶ QEI Micro II
- ▶ Redac 70H
- ▶ Rockwell
- ▶ SES 91
- ▶ Tejas 3 and 5
- ▶ TRW 9550
- ▶ Vancomm

Protocol Background

International Standards Organization Open System Interconnection Reference Model
ISO OSI Reference Model (protocol stack)

7	Application	Provides interface to application services
6	Presentation	Data representation
5	Session	Starts, maintains, and ends each logical session
4	Transport	End-to-end reliable communications stream
3	Network	Routing and segmentation/reassembly of packets
2	Data Link	Transmit chunks of information across a link
1	Physical	Transmit unstructured bits across a link

Intermediate Nodes



Simplified Protocol Stack

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
Enhanced Performance Architecture (EPA)

3 Application

Provides interface to application services

2 Data Link

Routing and segmentation/reassembly of packets

1 Physical

Transmit bits of information across a link


SCADA Protocol Example

- ▶ Distributed Network Protocol (DNP) 3.0
- ▶ SCADA/EMS applications
 - RTU to IED communications
 - Master to remote communications
 - Peer-to-peer instances and network applications
- ▶ Object-based application layer protocol
- ▶ Emerging open architecture standard

DNP 3.0 Data Link Layer

- ▶ Interface with the physical layer
 - Packing data into the defined frame format and transmitting the data to the physical layer
 - Unpacking frames received from physical layer
 - Controlling all aspects of the physical layer
- ▶ Data validity and integrity
 - Collision avoidance/detection
 - Perform message retries
- ▶ Establish connection, disconnection in dial-up environment

DNP 3.0 Data Link Layer




START	2 starting octets of the header
LENGTH	1 octet count of USER DATA in the header and body
CONTROL	1 octet Frame Control
DESTINATION	2 octet destination address
SOURCE	2 octet source address
CRC	2 octet Cyclic Redundancy Check
USER DATA	Each block following the header has 16 octets of User defined data

DNP 3.0 Transport Function

- ▶ Supports advanced RTU functions and messages larger than the maximum frame length in the data link layer
- ▶ Additional data integrity verification
- ▶ Packs user data into multiple frames of the data link frame format for transmitting the data
- ▶ Unpacks multiple frames that are received from the data link layer
- ▶ Controls data link layer

DNP 3.0 Transport Function



FIN 0 = More frames follow

 1 = Final frame of a sequence

FIR 1 = First frame of a sequence

 0 = Not the first frame of a sequence

SEQUENCE Number between 0 and 63 to ensure frames are being received in sequence

DNP 3.0 Application Layer

- ▶ Communications Interface with Application Software
- ▶ Designed for SCADA and Distributed Automation Systems
- ▶ Supported functions include
 - send request
 - accept response
 - confirmation, time-outs, error recovery, etc.

SCADA Trends

▶ **Open protocols**

- Open industry standard protocols are replacing vendor-specific proprietary communication protocols

▶ **Interconnected to other systems**

- Connections to business and administrative networks to obtain productivity improvements and mandated open access information sharing

▶ **Reliance on public information systems**

- Increasing use of public telecommunication systems and the internet for portions of the control system

Vulnerability Concerns

▶ Confidentiality

- Protecting information from unauthorized access
- Important for deregulation, competitive intelligence


▶ Integrity

- Assuring valid data and control actions
- Most critical for real-time control applications


▶ Availability

- Continuity of operations
- Important for real-time control applications
- Historically addressed with redundancy


Laboratory SCADA Vulnerability Demonstration



Operator Interface



Protocol Analyzer
(Intruder)



Field Device

Scenarios

- Denial of service
- Operator spoofing
- Direct manipulation of field devices
- Combinations of above

- Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
- Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)
- Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)

Vulnerability implications vary significantly depending on the scenario and application

SCADA Message Strings

The screenshot shows the ASE2000 Communication Test Set software interface. The main window is titled "Line Monitor" and displays a stream of data in two columns. The left column shows hex data with direction indicators (<-- for receive, --> for transmit). The right column shows the corresponding ASCII interpretation of the hex data, such as "Data response 10x 06x" and "Data request 10x 06x 10x 02x 00x 01x 4Fx 00x".

```
01 A8 99 09 03 42 FF 00 10 01x A8x 99x 09x 03x 42x FFx 00x 10x 03x B7x 81x
<-- 10 06 <-- Data response 10x 06x
<-- 10 02 01 00 0F 00 01 AC <-- Data response 10x 02x 01x 00x 0Fx 00x 01x ACx
68 00 00 01 00 06 01 01 01 68x 00x 00x 01x 00x 06x 01x 01x 01x 00x 10x 03x
B7 F2 B7x F2x
--> 10 06 10 02 00 01 4F 00 --> Data request 10x 06x 10x 02x 00x 01x 4Fx 00x
01 AC 99 09 03 42 FF 00 10 01x ACx 99x 09x 03x 42x FFx 00x 10x 03x B6x 72x
<-- 10 06 <-- Data response 10x 06x
<-- 10 02 01 00 0F 00 01 B0 <-- Data response 10x 02x 01x 00x 0Fx 00x 01x B0x
68 00 00 01 00 06 01 01 01 68x 00x 00x 01x 00x 06x 01x 01x 01x 00x 10x 03x
66 1D 66x 1Dx
--> 10 06 10 02 00 01 4F 00 --> Data request 10x 06x 10x 02x 00x 01x 4Fx 00x
01 B0 99 09 03 42 FF 00 10 01x B0x 99x 09x 03x 42x FFx 00x 10x 03x B7x 2Bx
<-- 10 06 <-- Data response 10x 06x
<-- 10 02 01 00 0F 00 01 B4 <-- Data response 10x 02x 01x 00x 0Fx 00x 01x B4x
68 00 00 01 00 06 01 01 01 68x 00x 00x 01x 00x 06x 01x 01x 01x 00x 10x 03x
97 D2 97x D2x
--> 10 06 10 02 00 01 4F 00 --> Data request 10x 06x 10x 02x 00x 01x 4Fx 00x
01 B4 99 09 03 42 FF 00 10 01x B4x 99x 09x 03x 42x FFx 00x 10x 03x B6x D8x
<-- 10 06 <-- Data response 10x 06x
```

Line Monitor

Ready Total 443 886 OK 349 698 No Rsp 0 Par 94 188 Sec 0 0

Repeating easily
decipherable format

Captured by
RTU test set

Mitigation Strategies

- ▶ **Security through obscurity**
 - Poor defense against “structured adversary”
- ▶ **Isolated network**
- ▶ **Communication encryption**
 - Concerns over latency, reliability, interoperability
 - Vendors waiting for customer demand
- ▶ **Signal authentication**
 - May provide good defense without the concerns associated with full signal encryption

IEEE Standard 1402-2000

- ▶ **IEEE Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security**
- ▶ **Provides definitions, parameters that influence threat of intrusions, and gives a criteria for substation security**
- ▶ **Cyber methods considered:**
 - passwords
 - dial-back verification
 - selective access
 - virus scans
 - encryption and encoding

Additional Countermeasures to Consider

- ▶ **Implement access control with strong passwords**
- ▶ **Implement automatic reporting/intrusion detection features**
- ▶ **Create a multi-tiered access hierarchy**
- ▶ **Implement application level authentication and packet level data encryption**
- ▶ **Consider implementing public key infrastructure (PKI)**
 - **When properly implemented, PKI certificates enable authentication, encryption, and non-repudiation of data transmissions**
- ▶ **Implement properly configured firewalls and intrusion detection systems**
- ▶ **Have a defined Enterprise-level computer network security policy**

Ref: *Concerns About Intrusion into Remotely Accessible Substation Controllers and SCADA Systems*, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, www.selinc.com

Steps for Enhancing SCADA Security

- ▶ Establish a robust network architecture
- ▶ Eliminate trusted remote access points of entry
- ▶ Evaluate and deploy technology and approaches to enhance confidentiality, availability, and integrity
- ▶ Implement rigorous configuration management
- ▶ Provide adequate support and training
- ▶ Never become complacent!

Conclusions

▶ Vendors

- Relatively few
- Mostly foreign

▶ Protocols

- Several protocols being used
- Trend toward open protocols

▶ DNP 3.0 Protocol Example

- Emerging standard in the electric SCADA industry