Tackling Security Challenges - An overview of ISAF's Mission
Tackling Security Challenges
– an overview on ISAF’s Mission

January 20th 2010

Brigadier General BERGER (FRANCE)
NATO International Security Assistance Force

Overall Classification of Briefing: UNCLASSIFIED
ISAF Campaign Plan

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Purpose: Provide information on ISAF’s Campaign Plan.

Agenda:
- Assessment
- Situation
- Mission and Intent
- Campaign Design
- Concept of Operations
- Risks
- Key Takeaways
- Pakistan
- Way Ahead
- Discussion
Strategic Assessment

• **Situation is serious and the conflict is complex**
  – Resilient and growing insurgency
  – Lack of confidence by population stemming from weak Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.

• **Mission can succeed but requires a fundamentally new approach**
  – Operational culture of ISAF: focus Counter-insurgency (COIN) on winning support of the people.
  – Stronger security partnership: accelerate Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and partner at all levels.
  – Responsive and accountable governance: an equal priority with security.
  – Internal ISAF organizational changes: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort.

• **Time is critical. ISAF must be properly resourced to gain and maintain the initiative while ANSF capacity and capability is built.**
Pathway to Campaign Plan & Requirements

**NATO Objectives**

- The GIRoA is able to exercise effectively its security responsibilities across the country
- ANSF have become self-sufficient and are taking the lead in security operations
- Opposing militant forces no longer pose a threat to stability

**Defeat; Taliban led insurgency no longer poses an existential threat to GIRoA**
- Insurgency reduced to a level within GIRoA capacity
- GIRoA / ANSF capable of protecting sovereignty from insurgent threat

**NATO Mission**

Conduct military operations to assist GIRoA in maintaining security, in order to support the extension of government authority and the facilitation of reconstruction and development

**COMISAF Initial Assessment**

**Overall Assessment Of Situation**
- Situation is serious
- Resilient Insurgency
- Crisis of Confidence among Afghans and International Community
- Mission still achievable

**Plan to Implement NATO Strategy**
- Population-centric counterinsurgency campaign
- Grow and Develop ANSF
- Prioritize Governance
- Improve Unity of Effort and Command

**Notes:**
- NATO, Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan for Afghanistan, 20 April 2009
- Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, Operational Plan for ISAF (OPLAN 30302 Revision 4), 9 April 2009
- SACEUR, Memorandum to JFC-B, 1 July 2009
Kinetic events are increasing at a sharp rate; up 300% since 2007 and 60% since 2008.

Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.

ISAF Command Arrangements

**Composition**

- **RC(N):** 1 CO, 5 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
- **RC(W):** 2 BNs, 4 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
- **RC(S):** 4 BDEs(+), 4 PRTs; 4 ANA BDEs
- **RC(E):** 5 BDEs(-), 12 PRTs; 6 ANA BDEs
- **RC(C):** 3 BNs; 2 ANA BNs

**Strength**

- **ISAF / Coalition:** ~107,000
- **ANA:** ~100.131 Operational: 63.724
- **ANP:** ~96.377 Operational: 89.030

**RCs are NATO OPCON to IJC**
ISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded and effective ANSF and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.
COMISAF Intent

Purpose
• Assist GIRQA in defeating the insurgency
• Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
• Gain popular support for the government
• Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
• Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

Method
• Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
• Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
• Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
• Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

Endstate
• Insurgency defeated to within GIRQA’s capacity
• Legitimate governance extends to local levels
• Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
• GIRQA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

**PROTECT the Population**
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

**ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces**
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability

**NEUTRALIZE Malign Influence**
- Identify corruption; assist GIRoA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

**SUPPORT Extension of Governance**
- Increase GIRoA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

**SUPPORT Socio-economic Development**
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
- Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley,
- Kunduz.
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and
- Kunduz.

- Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIRoA participation.
- Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced, foreign fighter networks disrupted, development project extortion reduced and majority of population views GIRoA as legitimate.
- Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy established; local governance mechanisms allow for reintegration; RoL and legitimate, responsive, and accountable governance extended to the population.
- GIRoA revenue collection and resource distribution mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road networks bolster licit economy and increase employment; incentive structures increase stability in local communities.

Ends

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIRoA, Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GIRoA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.

MEANS

- GIRoA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU
Protect the Population.

- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.

- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.

- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.

- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.

- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect economic corridors.
**OPLAN 38302 Rev 4 Operational Design**

**Gain the Initiative**

- **PROTECT the Population**
- **ENABLE the ANSF**
- **NEUTRALIZE Malign Influence**

**Achieve Strategic Consolidation**

- Stage A
- Stage B
- Stage C

**Sustain Security**

- Stage A
- Stage B
- Stage C

**Security**

1. **Partnered population security measures stabilize designated areas**
2. **Accelerated ANSF growth plan complete; sustainment ongoing**
3. **Malign actors are marginalized, population views GIRoA as legitimate**

**Stability**

4. **Legitimate, responsive, and accountable governance is extended to the population**
5. **Focused community development bolsters popular support for GIRoA**

**Operational Design**

- **Stage A**
- **Stage B**
- **Stage C**

- **1. Support for ISAF mission solidified**
- **2. Partnered security measures effective in key areas**
- **3. Key areas stabilized**
- **4. INS suppressed to an acceptable level**
- **5. ANSF demonstrates basic capability**
- **6. ANSF is self-sustaining**
- **7. Effective IO campaign implemented**
- **8. Corruption reduced to a culturally acceptable level**
- **9. Effective border control established**
- **10. Narco-INS-Criminal nexus and confluence of Narco-GIRoA corruption suppressed**
- **11. Afghan population recognizes GIRoA as a culturally, ideologically acceptable government**
- **12. Effective rule of law in place**
- **13. Essential services provided to key areas**
- **14. Basic infrastructure requirements met**
- **15. Sustainable, functioning economy established**
Concept of Operations

Operations impact the highest percentage of population affected by the insurgency.

**Economy of force.** Contain the insurgency in contested areas; expand governance and development efforts.

**Supporting Effort.** Generate political acceptance for governance and development commensurate with security.

**Shaping Effort.** Deny insurgent freedom of movement; improve border security and prepare for decisive operations.

**Main Effort.** Clear high-population areas directly threatened by the insurgency; separate insurgents from population in contested areas; establish campaign credibility and resolve.
Comprehensive Approach

Regional Strategy

- Central Asia
- India
- China
- Russia
- Pakistan

Increase Regional Stability

- Enhance Cooperation
- Build Trust

Reduce threats to stability

- Reduce Safehavens
- Defeat Al Qaeda
- Defeat Insurgency

Increase ability to govern and develop capacity

- National Leadership
- GIROA Ministries
- Sub-national Governance
- Civil Society

Accountable Afghan leaders responsive to the people's needs

Afghan population gains trust and confidence leading to support for GIROA

Security Zones

2009

2014

National Political Effort

International community partners to build security governance and development capacity

Civil Society
Struggle for the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas (Present)

- Prevent GIRQA development and influence
- Limit population ability to choose

Elements of Insurgent Influence
- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Essential Security Influence (2014)

- Create time and space
- Enable population opportunity to choose

Elements of Security Influence
- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable
Limited capacity requires focused prioritization of resources

The districts in the area outside of the identified “focus districts” have varying degrees of threat and security. It is possible that security, governance and development activities take place. However, weight of effort and prioritization should orient on the “focus districts.”
Risks

• GIRoA:
  – Failure to provide accountable, legitimate and responsive governance.

• ANSF:
  – Lack of capacity due to poor recruiting, retention and high attrition.
  – Failure to develop operationally effective COIN forces.

• International Community:
  – Failure to effectively unify governance and development efforts.
  – Lack of flexibility to reconfigure and create strategic effects.

• NATO and Troop Contributing Nations:
  – Inability / unwillingness to conduct effective ISAF COIN campaign.
  – Reluctance to sustain long-term commitment and resources.
Analysis indicates:

- The insurgency presently has the initiative and the population perceives it.
- Expansion of the insurgency is outpacing GIRoA’s capacity to contain it.
- Success requires that we control a significant percentage of the population and regain the initiative.
- Feasible ANSF growth alone cannot contain the insurgency before 2012/2013.
- Risk increases over time if force levels are insufficient
  - Insufficient force levels don’t accomplish the mission slower....
    ...they don’t accomplish the mission at all.
- Additional Coalition Forces are required between 2009-2011 to gain momentum, buy time for ANSF generation, and overmatch the insurgency.
Why does Pakistan matter?

RESTRICTED RUSSIAN AIRSPACE

UZB

KIR

CHINA

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

760km

1100km

Seaport of debarkation
Airport of debarkation
ISAF supplies

ISAF

NATO

TAJKISTAN

KIRGUZ

RESTRICTED RUSSIAN AIRSPACE

ALQ

HGN

TLB

HIG

60%

30%

30%

A

S
Pakistan Social divides

Biggest Group by Region
Importance of Pakistan

• Triple crisis:
  – Political instability
  – Economic crisis
  – Indigenous Taliban movement
• Pakistan = key terrain to sustain fight vs. AQ
• TLB sanctuaries
• Ambivalent attitude
• Pakistan long term interest in Afghanistan?
Major issues to consider:
1) Potential for nations to withdraw on a time line (18 months) before the conditions are suitable;
2) Constrained timeline (18 months to demonstrate momentum).

Important challenges still remain:
1) 30 000 US force flow plus 7 000 from other NATO Nations;
2) Growing the ANSF (instruction and training);
3) Intensification of cooperating with Pakistan;
4) International Community (IC) commitment (44 Nations ).
Conclusion 2/2

Sense of the commitment of the IC in Afghanistan:

1) Support the Afghan people (ISAF);
2) War against the Insurgents;
3) Prevent Afghanistan becoming a “safe heaven” and a support base for Al-Qaeda.

“We are also in AFG to gain our own security”
Discussion
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

STABILITY DIVISION

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SUMMIT

An overview of ISAF Mission

Istanbul – TUR

20 January 2010

Col. ITA A Mario LUPPA
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Comprehensive Approach

Regional Strategy

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- India
- China
- Iran
- Russia
- Pakistan

Increase Regional Stability

Enhance Cooperation

Build Trust

Reduce threats to stability

Reduce Safehavens

Defeat Al Qaeda

Defeat Insurgency

Increase ability to govern and develop capacity

National Leadership

GIRoA Ministries

Sub-national Governance

Civil Society

Accountable Afghan leaders responsive to the peoples’ needs

Afghan population gains trust and confidence leading to support for GIRoA

National Political Effort

International community partners to build security, governance and development capacity

Afghan population gains trust and confidence leading to support for GIRoA

Increase ability to govern and develop capacity

National Leadership

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Accountable Afghan leaders responsive to the peoples’ needs

Afghan population gains trust and confidence leading to support for GIRoA
Engaging partners & influencing their stability decisions supporting the ISAF Campaign Plan

COMISAF

Integrated with HQ Staff to synchronize stability into security planning

CIVILIAN

MILITARY

GI RoA

UNAMA & UN

International Community: Embassies, Aid Agencies

OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

HQ ISAF Staff

NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
### Essential Elements of Progress

**NEAR-TERM OBJECTIVES**
- Partnership with responsive & accountable GIRoA leaders

**MID-TERM GOALS**
- Improvement in GIRoA competence and capacity
- GIRoA responsive and accountable to population
- Afghan population supports GIRoA
- Afghanistan recognized as credible regional partner

**LONG-TERM END STATE**
- Sustainable economic growth and development

#### GOVERNANCE
- Strategic prioritization of objectives
- International unity of effort
- Afghan Ministries plan and allocate donor funding
- Significant increase in private sector investment
- Afghanistan is not a safe haven to AQ

#### DEVELOPMENT
- Quick impact community focus
- De-nationalize donor contributions
- ANSF capacity and capability expanded through partnership
- GI RoA has sufficient security capacity
- GI RoA has effective control of Afghan territory
- Afghanistan is not a safe haven to AQ

#### SECURITY
- Momentum of insurgency is reversed
- Increase in private sector investment
- Increase in GDP
- Sustainable economic growth and development

### Timeline

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Capacity</th>
<th>ISAF</th>
<th>Taliban</th>
<th>GI RoA (supported by IC)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2009</td>
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Natural Resources

- **Chilkonsar, Samti Gold**
- **Sary-Sang, Lapiz lazuli mine**
- **Panshir valley, Emerald mines**
- **Hajigak Iron Ore & Coal**
- **Jegdalek, Ruby Mine**
- **Aynak Copper Mine**

**Mines/Resources**

- **Natural Gas**
- **Jangalikan-Gas**
- **Jumar- Gas**
- **Kashkari-oil**
- **Copper- East, West & Southern Provinces est. 240 M metric tons**
- **Gold- Badakshan & Panj River Valley ca 25 metric tons**
- **Iron Ore - Hajigak Bamyan Province est. 60 billon metric tons w/coal nearby**
- **Gemstones- Emerald, Ruby, Sapphire, Lapis Lazuli (80% illegal export India/Pak)**
- **Petroleum- Afghan-Tajik Basin 1.5 B Barrels of crude**
- **Natural Gas- Amu Darya Basin 400 B Cubic meters of NG**
- **560 Mbbl Liquid Natural Gas**
- **Aynak Copper Mine**
- **Zarkashan, Gold**
- **Industrial Sites**
- **Cotton, Textile, Food, Sugar, Chemical Sites, Steel, Construction material, Cement**
- **Power station, Power station, Pipeline (Gas)**
Weekly average of 10 engagements with UNAMA & UN Organizations
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE

QUESTIONS?

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION SUMMIT

An overview of ISAF Mission
International Security Assistance Force
Headquarters ISAF, Kabul

ISAF Director of Development
Stability Division

Peter S. Argo

Office: IVSN 686-1130
Cell: +93 (0) 797 777 356
Email: peter.argo@hq.isaf.nato.int