

PENNSYLVANIA ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #40

TARGETED ACTIONABLE MONITORING CENTER

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STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

1. Nigeria's Deadly Sectarian Clashes: An Opening for Al-Qaeda

In the past month, massive inter-religious conflict in Nigeria has left nearly 500 people dead. Police in the country recently announced the arrests of over 300 people involved in the violence, which involved riots and killings between Christian and Muslim sectors of the population in and around the city of Jos. Violence reportedly began with an attack on Christians at a church in the city, which lies on the border between Nigeria's Muslim north and Christian south.

Massive sectarian violence is not new to Nigeria, with hundreds of people killed each time in rioting in 2001, 2004 and 2008. However, as of August 2009, a new factor came into play when Nigeria's anti-Western Boko Haram (BH; a.k.a. Nigerian Taliban) Islamist group formally placed itself at the service of Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which already expressed its call for jihad in Nigeria, issued a communication at the time explicitly supporting BH and saying that all Nigerian Muslims must come together under the banner of Islamic law. All Muslims must be "as one hand," the AQIM statement said.

Of particular note in light of recent events is that the AQIM author wrote to his Nigerian co-religionists, "'Finally, we hereby announce that the blood of the jihad martyrs was not shed for no reason, with Allah's help, rather in order to illuminate the way forward for Nigerian Muslims and to burn the cross-worshippers, and to water the tree of Islam in Nigeria."

In announcing his group's AQ affinity, BH's leader Mallam Sanni Umaru gave extensive targeting information for his group's planned actions:

* Regions: not limited to northern Nigeria; "in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria." Southern Nigeria, majority Christian and scene of Muslim attacks, was promised "a horrible time."

* Specifically, the BH terror campaign is "beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt," Umaru declared. Also, he added, the "infidel" tribes Yoruba, Igbon and Ijaw "will be our immediate target."

* Individuals: BH says they will "kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Shari'a in Nigeria, and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished."

* Alleged Western behaviors: constitutional rights and privileges of women; homosexuality; drug trafficking; rape of infants; multiparty democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country; X-rated films; prostitution; alcohol consumption; etc.

* Umaru presented a timeline starting in August 2009, but "bombing will not stop until Western civilisation is wiped out from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are tuned into ashes."

A video tape released by Al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, on 3 August 2009 also focused on Nigeria as a front in the global Islamic jihad. He and other jihadists, at the time, focused on Niger as a potential "gateway" into Nigeria, which is significant on the strategic level as it shows a link between AQIM with sister organizations deeper in Africa. In fact, members of BH arrested by Nigerian authorities have admitted to receiving terror training in Afghanistan.

Thus, the possible steps linking the Nigerian Islamist who became the Christmas Day bomber in the US with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula begin to become clear. Furthermore, ITRR analysts believe that there are strong indications the current round of sectarian violence in Nigeria is an outgrowth of the incitement promoted by a radicalized BH, firmly in the Al-Qaeda sphere of influence. The latest killings will also, no doubt, serve to encourage some Muslims to join the Nigerian franchise of Al-Qaeda to demonstrate fidelity to Islam and hatred for the Christians.

In this event, ITRR analysis indicates, the "winner" both tactically and strategically from continuing inter-religious violence in Nigeria is Al-Qaeda, in all its jihadist glory.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC THREATS, INDICATORS AND/OR WARNINGS

Sector: GOVERNMENT FACILITIES

2. Expect Continuation of Jihad Attacks in Russia

Current jihadist communications identified by ITRR are discussing what they describe as Russian proxy attacks on the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (IEC) perpetrated by the regional government of Chechnya. According to the communications, Chechen official security forces are carrying out operations "to suppress and eliminate" Islamist organizations in the country.

Jihadists claim that Chechen troops, in cooperation with Russia, have deployed weapons forbidden by international conventions in an extensive counterterrorist operation in recent weeks.

*****ANALYSIS*****

T/I/W Rating: SEVERE

For two months, ITRR analysts have noted explicit statements by IEC leader Doku Umarov that the 27 November 2009 double bombing of the Nevsky Express in Russia (which killed around 30 people) is only the beginning of a lengthy terror campaign deep inside Russia (see PAIB nos. 16 and 30). Following the counter-terror operations in Chechnya, as well as the passing of time since the last threat was issued with no major attacks in Russia, ITRR analysts believe that Umarov is under pressure to carry out a serious attack. He will likely step up efforts to perpetrate attacks in the immediate future in order to achieve several goals:

1. To raise morale of the IEC supporters and members;
2. To demonstrate to Russia and the government in Chechnya that, despite their extensive operations, they can not defeat the jihad; and
3. To influence Russian and Chechen public opinion, so they then pressure the federal government to stop their attacks on the IEC.

Even without an explicit order to the Al-Salihin Battalions, which carried out the Nevsky bombing, another attack inside Russia is likely. The original battalion members behind the train attack were never caught and they, or cells like them, are likely still inside Russia with operational plans already in effect.

Specifically named targets in December and January IEC communications included infrastructure assets, economically significant targets, energy assets, mass transit, power lines and energy pipelines, as well as civilians. The IEC declared that the Nevsky Express attack was part of a larger plan to strike "a number of strategically important assets" in Russia, after "it was decided to transfer the sabotage war to the territories of Russia, along with strong blows to the occupier's infrastructure in the Caucasus." Umarov emphasized his organization's full operational readiness, as well as the numbers of would-be suicide bombers at his disposal. Among other threats to Russian "homes", he said, "Planes will be blown up ... and war will be unleashed on your streets."

ITRR analysts see the repeat IEC announcements as authentic indications of Caucasus-based jihadist intentions and capabilities. Students, faculty and business travelers from Pennsylvania in Russia are advised to take measures to reduce exposure to an attack. Students at Russian

educational institutions through programs such as those of Bryn Mawr College in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Vladimir should be made aware of the current increase in risk. Researchers and linguists pursuing continuing studies through American Councils and similar programs in the Caucasus regions of Russia are particularly vulnerable to attack and abduction by local jihadist elements.

SECTORS: ENERGY; COMMERCIAL FACILITIES

3. Eviction of Anti-Mining Squatters Begins - 'New Phase' of the Struggle

This week law enforcement began the project of evicting squatter-protesters of the anti-mining Mainhill Solidarity Camp, sponsored by Coal Action Scotland. The activists are resisting eviction.

The Solidarity Camp in Mainhill Woods, Scotland, was set up to protest planned coal mining operations at the site. Squatters and vandals have been at the site for several months, "in solidarity with outraged local residents and disadvantaged communities around the world," in the words of the activists involved.

In response to the eviction efforts, eco-radicals issued a new, urgent appeal for activists "to head up to Mainhill and help defend the site." As of 28 January 2010, Coal Action Scotland reported: "Many more people still occupy the site in pockets of resistance holding out against the onslaught of climbers and police."

In terms of tactics, intelligence and targeting, the Scottish group informed supporters:

- a. "The site has not been secured and it is very easy to get into the trees and areas of plantation."
- b. "They have also moved a huge amount of heavy machinery on to site, so opportunities for actions to stop work on site are literally everywhere."
- c. In addition to the implied call for vandalism and sabotage, the group notes "incredible fights put up by people in trees and down tunnels, and a constant presence by the support team outside."
- d. Elsewhere, Coal Action Scotland reported, "the coal rail terminal at Ravenstruther was shut down for a third time, as a key machine was climbed and locked-on to. Coal lorries were backed up all down the A70 and had to eventually dump their load."
- e. "Simultaneous solidarity action shows what we are capable of as a direct action campaign - resistance will not stop at Mainhill and will continue no matter how many people they arrest."

The eco-radicals promise: "In the battle for Mainhill Wood, the struggle will not end with this eviction," and, "It's not the end, just the beginning of a new phase!"

In previous PAIB editions, ITRR analysts noted that from 29-31 January 2010, an environmental activist group is to be reinforcing the Mainshill Solidarity Camp with additional manpower.

***** ANALYSIS*****

T//W Rating: MODERATE

The dramatic ongoing confrontation at Mainshill Woods, along with the insistence by activists that it is part of a larger anti-coal initiative, according to ITRR analysts, increases the current potential for North American "direct actions" targeting coal mining operations.

As noted in PAIB no. 21, a communication shared in anarchist forums praised and encouraged "autonomous pixie action" ("pixies" refers to unidentified cells of saboteurs), specifically citing the actions of an "autonomous group" that sabotaged machinery for three days at the Mainshill coal mining facility. In addition, as reported starting in PAIB no. 20, aggressive environmentalists just completed a Winter Action Camp in Rock Creek, West Virginia (4-25 January 2010), which focused on sabotaging the coal industry. "Campers" learned the skills of aggressive environmentalism, including "direct action" (which can mean vandalism, obstruction of public and private venues, arson, threats of violence, assault, etc.). Part of the field work these "students" conducted was a "tree sit" near a West Virginia coal mine.

According to ITRR analysts, the continuing praise and encouragement, as well as practical training, for successful "direct actions" is likely to inspire copycat actions among "autonomous groups" globally, including in Pennsylvania. Additionally, the short term affects of this West Virginia training and these actions threaten the coal supply for Pennsylvania coal burning facilities.

SECTORS: ENERGY; COMMERCIAL FACILITIES

4. RAN to Focus on 'Transforming' Chevron Oil

The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) has decided to undertake what it is calling "our biggest challenge yet" - an effort to alter the policies of the Chevron Corporation.

"Unite with RAN, Amazon Watch, teachers, students, faith leaders, investors and the Ecuadorean people, in standing up to one of the biggest, nastiest corporations in the world. Tell Chevron's new CEO that energy shouldn't cost lives. Together, we can change Chevron," the RAN call to action concludes.

***** ANALYSIS*****

T//W Rating: MODERATE

The Rainforest Action Network is extremely aggressive in their campaigns, according to ITRR analysts. In their call for action targeting Chevron, RAN reminded supporters that "RAN and its members have transformed the policies of some of America's most powerful corporations, from Home Depot to Citigroup to Goldman Sachs. Our latest campaign is focused on transforming one of the biggest, most destructive oil companies in the world - Chevron." As noted, previous RAN targets have included banks that provide financing to industries in which the group disapproves.

ITRR analysts further note that previous RAN targets have been the scene of illegal actions including trespassing, lock-downs and vandalism. Security personnel should review policies dealing with the security of their facilities and effect liaison with local law enforcement. Facilities that may be targeted in Pennsylvania include Chevron Energy Solutions in Lansdale and Penn State Institutes of Energy and the Environment, the latter of which partnered with Chevron Energy Technology Company, a Chevron Corporation subsidiary, for a joint research project. Additionally, every Chevron gas station presents a target of opportunity for individual (lone wolf) "direct actions."

No actionable intelligence at this time for the following sectors:

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASES
HEALTHCARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND ICONS
BANKING AND FINANCE
WATER
CHEMICAL
CRITICAL MANUFACTURING
DAMS
EMERGENCY SERVICES
NUCLEAR REACTORS, MATERIALS, AND WASTE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
COMMUNICATIONS
POSTAL AND SHIPPING
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

COMPILED BY NR

THREAT / INDICATOR / WARNING RATING	DESCRIPTION
LOW (Level 4)	Available intelligence and recent events indicate that hostile elements currently have little capability or intent to take action against the target. It is assessed that, although it cannot be ruled out, an attack or action is unlikely to be mounted based on current available intelligence.
MODERATE (Level 3)	Available intelligence and recent events indicate that hostile elements have the capability to take action against the target and that such action is within the adversary's current intent. It is assessed that an attack or action is likely to be a priority and might well be mounted.
SEVERE (Level 2)	Available intelligence and recent events indicate that hostile elements have an established capability and current intent to take action against the target and there is some additional information on the nature of the threat. It is assessed that an attack or action on the target is a priority and is likely to be mounted.
CRITICAL (Level 1)	Available intelligence and recent events indicate that hostile elements with an established capability are actively planning to take action against the target within a matter of days (up to two weeks). An attack or action is expected imminently.

END-CLASSIFIED-TAM-C-

For additional information, please contact the TAM-C of the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response at: +1.215.922.1080 or info@terrorresponse.org

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