

**NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN / COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION
COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN, AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY DEVELOPMENT**

**Afghan Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army General Staff
Master Ministerial Development Plan**

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This campaign plan connects the strategic level from the ISAF theater commander to the tactical level daily work by NTM-A, Afghan National Army (ANA) Development advisors working in the Afghan Ministry of Defense offices and the Afghan National Army General Staff.

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1. Introduction and Background

At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December 2011 and again at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the international community made a commitment to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014. Thus, as Afghan authorities assume the lead for security in all regions, and the NATO-led combat mission changes in scope, ministerial and institutional development will likely continue as an enduring mission.

This mission is currently being conducted under the authority of Commander, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) as a U.S. mission through bilateral agreements with Canada and the UK. Within the NTM-A/CSTC-A organization, the Deputy Commander - Army (DCOM-A), in coordination with the Ministry of Defense (MoD), generates and sustains the Afghan National Army (ANA), assists in the development of its leaders, and guides the establishment of an enduring institutional capacity in order to deliver a competent and capable Afghan security force. This plan will be reviewed and revised on an annual basis (in November of each year) to ensure that the advising effort and personnel resources are properly adjusted, as the institutional capability and capacity of the MoD and GS continues to develop.

The original implementation of a MMDP was designed to bring together the quarterly assessments based on the individual office's Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs) into a longer term, overarching plan. What was required was a conversion from a quarterly view to a long term "until Transition to Afghan control" plan supported by advisors with a logical sequence of tasks progressing to that transition point. Diverse attempts at advisor measurement of their respective offices or organizations needed to be consistent and checked for validity. A shift away from strictly qualitative to a mixed qualitative-quantitative method, using several cross-checking methods, brought the MDB process to a higher level of confidence and assurance about results.

Once the Ministerial Development Board (MDB) process was formalized and in use as an assessment system, further overarching guidance was required to synchronize the advising effort. A document search vertically and horizontally yielded documents that direct, prioritize and shape the overall Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG) effort. This led to the drafting of a "Master Ministerial Development Plan" or MMDP, with DCOM-A direction at the time being to:

Develop an ANA Ministerial Master Development Plan (MMDP) that synchronizes *NTM-A/CSTC-A partnering and advising* activities within the MoD/GS through to the Fielded Force. The plan should follow selected lines of operation that will enable self-sufficiency of the ANA (ie. Personnel Management, Logistic Systems, Operations, Horizontal/Vertical integration, etc) *in consultation with the MoD/GS* with a view to them adopting it as their development plan. We must provide *mentored Afghan*

solutions, be principle-based and incorporate consideration of the Afghan strategic, security, economic, and cultural realities. NATO adaptations to MoD and ANA will be incorporated where they are mandatory for interoperability and where the results are assessed to endure post-ISAF.

Additional direction from the DCOM-A concerned two critical areas affecting the advisors and their MDPs. First, was the ability to measure progress in the MoD and GS, which meant:

Develop(ing) a more rigorous way to measure progress in MoD/GS and ANA development. Measuring CM ratings in the field force may be easier to achieve based on training objectives and ETT/OMLT or unit partnering. In the MoD/GS this can be more difficult. We must develop straight-forward performance measurement criteria that allow us and the Afghans to measure progress with a *balance between objectivity and subjectivity*. This will be tied to goals and objectives in the MMDP and will be *reported regularly* at the MAG Advisor Council Meetings and at the quarterly MDB. *Feedback to the MoD/GS* in a regular, systematic manner.

Second, just as the MDPs had to focus on a Transition state that might not come for months or years, the MMDP would also have to maintain an orientation into the future through transition and beyond through:

In consultation with the MoD/GS, selectively turn over elements of force generation and employment activities to MoD/GS in preparation for the transition phase of the mission. Engage the Afghan MoD/GS in NTM-A/CSTC-A planning activities to educate and build competencies in order to *transition policy development, planning and execution activities* that will be required to continue to sustain the ANA in the long term. Take specific, measurable steps in transitioning selected planning and execution activities to the Afghans that are captured in the MMDP.

This document will require annual review to capture lessons learned, progress and actions which will adapt it to the future needs and requirements of DCOM-A, NTM-A and ISAF.

2. Key Terms and References

Battlefield Circulation (BFC). A term used to define a general officer touring areas, units, facilities, or attending awards ceremonies, away from their normal business location. A BFC generally does not involve actively monitoring operations, allocating additional resources to immediately affect a tactical engagement's outcome, or briefing local commanders on upcoming operations.

Key Leader Engagement (KLE). For the purposes of this plan, the KLE is limited to the original (aligned with the ISAF definition) use as a deliberate, planned, and focused meeting between a Coalition general officer (or civilian equivalent) or above, and an Afghan counterpart of equal or higher rank in order to achieve a desired outcome. These meetings may be part of a regular series that cover general mutual topics of interest, or may be on an "as-needed" basis to discuss particular topics of an immediate nature. The daily or regular meetings conducted between advisors and their Afghan counterparts are not to be termed as KLEs.

Advising. The use of influence to work by, with and through Host National (HN) security forces. This type of training relies on the ability of the adviser to provide relevant and timely advice to HN security forces. Advisers may also provide HN security forces with joint and multinational capabilities, including but not limited to air support, artillery, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and intelligence. (AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, 2011, p. 5-24)

Mentoring. The voluntary developmental relationship that exists **between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience** that is characterized by mutual trust and respect. (AR 600-100, Army Leadership, 2007, p.6)

Liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition, 2010, p. 2-L-4)

Facilitation. The act of helping people deal with a process or reach an agreement or solution without getting directly involved in the process, discussion, etc, yourself. (Cambridge English Dictionary)

Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs). Measure of how well an operational task or task element is accomplished through using a system. They describe the influence or benefit of a concept within its operational context.

Measures of Performance (MoPs). Qualitative or quantitative measures of capabilities or characteristics, indicating the degree to which that capability or characteristic performs or meets the requirement under specific conditions. They show the influence or benefit of a concept in terms of its internal structure, characteristics, and behavior.

2.1 Required Documents (most current listed).

- 2.1.1. ISAF OPLAN 38302 (Revision 6). 31 Oct 11.
- 2.1.2. Draft ISAF OPLAN 38302 (Revision 6 Amendment 2). 31 Aug 12.
- 2.1.3. NTM-A/CSTC-A BASEORD 2012-2014. 12 Dec 11.
- 2.1.4. NTM-A/CSTC-A FRAG O 12-734 TO BASEORD 2012-2014. 23 Sep 12.
- 2.1.5. Afghan MoD Organization and Functions Manual. 14 Feb 11.
- 2.1.6. Afghan MoD Strategic Defense Planning Directive. Mar 12.
- 2.1.7. Afghan National Military Strategy. 22 Jun 12.
- 2.1.8. Afghan Guidance for Operational Planning. 22 Jun 12.
- 2.1.9. Afghan General Staff Planning Guidance. Dec 10.
- 2.1.10. Afghan Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance. 22 Jun 12.

3. Framing the Environment for MAG Operations

As a coordinated effort, institutional development activities shall be conducted in direct support of established priorities of ISAF, CSTC-A and the ANA. The ANA priorities can be found in the documents in the aforementioned paragraphs 2.1.5. - 2.1.10.

3.1 National Security Policy (NSP). The NSP states the MoD and ANA's top priorities are, "education, training and equipping of the national army with the aim of creating a professional army with strong operational capability to fight terrorism and armed insurgencies." The NSP further addresses the reforms and capacity building initiatives required to make the MoD a more effective institution; these include:

- 3.1.1. Creation of a financially sustainable force;
- 3.1.2. Development of transparent mechanisms and accountability processes;
- 3.1.3. Ensuring appointments and promotions are based on merit;
- 3.1.4. Creation of an ethnically balanced force; and,
- 3.1.5. Ensuring all military units observe and respect Islamic and Afghan values.

3.2 National Military Strategy (NMS). The Foreword of the NMS states one of the MoD's priorities is, "creating a sustainable, well-trained, representative, and professional military force that can provide security and uphold the rule of law." The document then addresses the foundations of this professional military force, which include:

- 3.2.1. The MoD and ANA shall epitomize loyalty and obedience to the Constitution and the legitimate political leadership of the country;
- 3.2.2. The assignment of leadership cadre in various echelons will be based on merit, ability, good behavior, honesty and devotion to duty;
- 3.2.3. The professional force shall embrace effective training, exacting military education, fair and transparent personnel policies, and a leadership dedicated to the highest ethical principles; and,
- 3.2.4. The MoD/ANA shall maintain proportionate ethnic representation. Additionally, ten percent of the force shall be female. [Note: this direction was recognized in November 2012 as being unachievable in the short term, therefore, it was modified to aim for 10% women *in fields where they are employed.*]

3.3 Ministry of Defense (MoD).

The MoD is the Afghan government's executive department responsible for implementation of defense policies. It is the strategic level headquarters of the Afghan military forces. The MoD's objectives are to defend the nation, its' interests, and to defeat the current insurgency. With the end of the COIN fight, a wider regional view of strategy and operations for the nation will take place. The MoD also manages routine policy functions of the Afghan military, contingency planning and defense related logistics.

The internal workings of the Ministry dynamic decision making process is complicated by subtle and overt agendas based on past histories of the various personalities involved. These complicating factors include, but are not limited to: education, military experiences, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, regional affiliation, patronage, and politics. Often these influencers are more important than actual doctrine or commonly accepted staff procedures. Human terrain interactions could best be described as "rich and vibrant."

There is also a need to "civilianize" the Ministry side of the MoD. The majority of leaders on the Ministry side of the MoD are currently serving Afghan senior officers. There is a need to civilianize this force so that there is a balance of civilian leadership with military leadership within the MoD. This is also the level of the MoD that should be developing, refining and implementing strategic policies to achieve the objectives put forth in the NSP.

3.4 ANA General Staff (GS).

The GS implements strategic policy passed down by the Ministry side of the MoD, and gives operational and tactical direction to the fielded forces. For the GS, it must align itself and its' actions with the MoD to defend the nation and Afghanistan's national interests, with a current focus on defeating the insurgency. A reshaping of the force is expected to take place in the post-COIN period. The GS manages, oversees and implements the policies and operational guidance to the tactical-level forces. Currently this is being done directly from the GS to the Corps and Div-level organizations, but in the future, the intent is to execute command and control of these elements through the Ground Forces Command (GFC) HQ.

The human terrain interactions of the GS reflect the same type of influencers seen at the MoD level. While officially aligned vertically with a separation of command levels, the GS exhibits the same informal network for decisions and work. As an example of internal issues, the GS senior officers are a combination of: former Soviet-period trained officers; former Mujahideen commanders (with little or no formal military training); and, Western schooled and trained officers. This is all wrapped up in the ethnic ties and patronage networks that influence not only the MoD, but Afghan culture as a whole.

3.5 ISAF Commander's Mission Statement

The Commander of ISAF has articulated the *Mission* for the entire organization as:

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. (ISAF web site "Mission," Dec 12)

3.6 NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander's Direction and Guidance. The MMDP was developed to directly support NTM-A/CSTC-A Commander's guidance, while providing a number of enabling or indirect efforts that reduce risk across the current mission. The most relevant tasks from the commander's guidance and how the MMDP supports these tasks follow:

3.6.1 *Mission.* NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations, supports the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security. (Dec 12)

3.6.2. *In support of the ANSF, we develop Afghan leaders.* The MMDP focuses on developing leadership and management skills of senior, executive level leaders in the MoD and ANA GS. Ministerial capacity building efforts within this plan specifically emphasize professional education, transparent decision mechanisms, mission command concepts and military accountability/justice.

3.6.3. *In support of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Interior, we build enduring institutional capacity.* This plan provides a prioritized roadmap to support the Afghan MoD to build enduring institutional capacity required to successfully direct, employ and sustain the ANA. It also emphasizes the need to build enduring institutional capacity that is common across the MoD and MoI – highlighting interdependencies that are critical to both organizations' success.

3.6.4. *Success equals accountable Afghan security ministries that can direct and sustain operations.* Accountable security ministries should demonstrate responsiveness and compliance with orders of their civilian leaders, and by extension, the Afghan citizens and elected representatives. A critical war fighting aspect of this accountability is a demonstrated and successful ability of the security ministries to direct and sustain operations for purposes of protecting the population. In Afghanistan, an added and somewhat unique aspect of this accountability is the need for the security ministries to be accountable to the agreements and funding provided by donor countries. This plan emphasizes the

formulation of these accountability mechanisms, ones that are unlikely to develop without significant and sustained coalition advising and oversight. Developing MoD and ANA GS plans that are transparent, with objectives that should be communicated to the Parliament and the President of Afghanistan, are essential to fostering accountability. Afghan public perception of ANA tactical engagements will be shaped by Afghan and international media – the MMDP focuses on improving MoD and ANA GS capabilities to articulate and share these successes. Small units that fight and win, without senior leaders able to articulate to the Afghan public and the government how these engagements matter to governance, development and security, will ultimately fail to secure the confidence of the Afghan people. By instilling systems and processes that mitigate or punish corruption and criminal networks within the ANSF, this plan also helps improve the ANSF accountability in the eyes and reports of the donor community.

3.7 Partner Organizations Requiring Coordination for Success.

The ISAF mission is divided between two major organizations that are focused on component parts of the overall mission. While NTM-A/CSTC-A focuses on the MoD and ANA GS level, the ISAF Joint Command handles the fledgling GFC and the ANA Corps. Within these are some blending and overlapping responsibilities which require carefully coordinated activities. The range of activities and ability to affect each other's work requires links and nesting of activities at every level.

3.7.1 ISAF Joint Command (IJC). This major headquarters, a subordinate of ISAF, controls tactical level support to the ANSF. The mission statement for IJC (Dec 12) is:

In full partnership, the combined team of Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF Joint Command and relevant organizations conducts population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace.

As the operational headquarters, IJC is an equal partner in development of the MoD, but oriented towards the fielded forces; in essence, finishing the training of ANA units and supporting them in combat operations. IJC includes coalition advisors with whom we must coordinate to ensure a consistent message from the Minister of Defense all the way down to the individual soldier on the ground.

3.7.2 CSTC-A Coalition Advisors. While advisors are at their best when aware of differing societal and cultural issues, they must remain focused on the tasks associated with transitioning the Afghan MoD. Although understanding, respecting, and valuing the Afghan customs and traditions requires awareness and practice, advisors must engage with their principals beyond drinking chai or

being a military aide. Advisors will find that they must walk a fine line between advising, mentoring, training, liaising and facilitating. These activities can't be done from a desk in Camp Eggers; as in nearly all cases, enduring change will result from direct engagement with and support to the Afghan principal and their office. Lasting action comes from mentoring and improving not only the Afghan principal, but also leadership one and two levels down, and the office staff as a whole. An advisor should keep in mind that not everyone, particularly the Afghans, wish to be "Westernized." They welcome the support the Coalition is able to provide, but accept it within their own framework and societal values. The only way to build enduring capacity and capability with the MoD is to assist them in finding the "Afghan solution to the Afghan problem," rather than forcing a Coalition solution that won't survive the ISAF drawdown. Finding the best way to navigate among cultural norms, whilst implanting ideas to improve the office or organization, represents the top skill an advisor will be required to exhibit.

3.7.3 Bi-Lateral and Multi-National Advisors to MoD/GS external to CSTC-A.

There are a number of advisors from outside of ISAF, who are overlaid in the MoD and ANA staffs. Some are from Coalition nations and some are not, but each will be pursuing their advising duties through the lenses of their national agendas, whether those are in support of NTM-A goals or not. Coordination among the nations for development of the ANSF requires an agreed direction, method, and timeline for operations. Multi-national advisors, from international organizations or other nations outside the Coalition, must be carefully scrutinized, their special capabilities and objectives understood, and integrated into the overall advisory effort to advance the capacity and capability of the MoD.

3.7.4 Other GIRoA Whole-of-Government advisors. Unfortunately, these advisors are often encountered randomly and by surprise. Various Embassies and International Community organizations run advisor-type operations within the GIRoA, often without coordinating objectives and desired goals. As these contacts are made, efforts should be made to synchronize and deconflict messages and activities wherever possible. Where these messages are in conflict with the ISAF mission, these should be noted and passed up the chain of command for higher level situational awareness.

3.7.5 Use of outside experts. Advisors that are permanently assigned to a principal are usually in the best position to diagnose and assist the Afghans on daily problems as well as long term objectives. However, sometimes there is a requirement for outside expertise that can only come from, international community, government, NGO or contracted organizations. As an example, the Defense Institute Reform Initiative (DIRI) has conducted visits to assess what capabilities they can offer in the way of expert assistance, training, education, or professional seminars. As advisors identify a need, a request can be made for assistance from programs like DIRI.

3.8 Anti-Government Forces.

Within the country itself, several groups operate with the intent of promoting or enriching themselves. These organizations can have a direct or indirect influence on ministerial development activities in support of the ANSF. The various groups may or may not cooperate with each other, but steadily influence the population. Additionally, external groups provide safe haven and materiel support to certain groups for their own purposes. Each group, whether internal actors in conflict with the GIRoA and the Coalition directly, or an external actor waging a hidden battle, have an overriding objective at the strategic-operational level guiding their operations. The following table makes some initial conclusions about those messages and objectives.

Group	Dominant Narrative
Taliban.	Delegitimize GIRoA leaders and governance. Establish Islamic government, providing governance, security, judicial rule IAW Wahabi fundamentalist precepts.
Al Qaeda	Maintain prestige and funding; influence international messaging/actions; recruit followers; direct international long term spectacular attacks. Delegitimize Coalition actions within the theater.
Other Regional Actors	Establish compliant/friendly Afghan government, wherever possible, to provide strategic buffer against other nations, or alternatively support various groups as proxies to destabilize Afghanistan and keep it in chaos.
Splinter Groups (HiG/HiK)	Engages at different levels depending on capabilities; money, power, territory, people, resource control is major objective. Some religious motivation though often used as a cover to inspire actions.
Criminal	Retain and expand illegal control of society to accumulate money, status, power while expanding geographic area and/or criminal enterprise.
Warlords	Retain status, power, fighters maintaining control over a geographic area and funding from local and international sources.

Dominant Narratives of Various Groups Acting in Afghanistan.

3.9 Other Factors that Affect Ministerial Development. There are other factors within Afghanistan that will shape the activities and leadership of the MoD, as well as, the advising effort.

3.9.1 Cultural/Societal. There are significant differences in: societal standards, beliefs, knowledge, and acceptable behaviors, between the majority of Coalition nations and the Afghans. Coalition members in Afghanistan are often viewed as:

highly paid; well fed; extravagant and wasteful; and, having high expectations for their own living conditions and welfare. Understanding these cultural or societal factors, and how they may impact on ministerial development, is critical for advisors as they work within the MoD.

3.9.2 Religion. Nearly 100% of the Afghan population practices Islam and this guides decisions in everyday life. Islam serves as one of the major unifying themes in Afghanistan. Afghans feel a deep-rooted loyalty to the Islamic faith, which often influences their work life on top of other factors like ethnicity, tribal family, and a deep sense of personal honor. The mosque serves not only as a worship center, but also in many cases a community center. Understanding the Islamic belief system and how it influences Afghan daily life/routine; as well as, the influence Islam holds over individuals and their actions, is important for every advisor to gain a better understanding of their counterparts and how they view their work.

3.9.3 Ethnic. While the exact numbers for each ethnic group in Afghanistan are unknown, membership in an ethnic group is extremely important in daily Afghan interactions. For advisors, the ability to trace ethnic connections and networks will often provide insight on particular issues and decisions in the MoD. Ethnic balancing based on an estimated (and generally agreed upon) percentage of the population is also extremely important for the MoD. Under the Bonn Agreement, percentage balancing based on the population was directed to ethnically balance the ANA. This affects military assignments to units and staff positions, unit composition, military recruiting, and specialty training for the military. While a somewhat alien concept to western militaries, ethnic balancing, required percentages, and connections are important factors to understand in daily advisor work.

3.9.4 Tribal. The tribe is actually a sub-division of the ethnic group, but also includes connections through geographic birthplace, parental heritage, and other factors. The same basic ethnic group may be found in several areas of the country, but tribal connections may or may not automatically ally these disparate groups. The blending of tribes in the urban setting has sometimes lessened the direct connection to a single tribe, or ethnic group, but never underestimate the impact that this may have on your principal's interactions within the MoD. Public pressure is often felt by individuals to participate in the tribe or ethnic group decision whether they actually agree with it or not.

3.9.5 Corruption. Views of corruption unfortunately often differ between Coalition nations and the Afghans. Understanding minor differences in what is and isn't seen as corruption, is important to advisors for a complete understanding of the MoD environment. An awareness of corruption is also important to the advisor so that they may actively engage in pointing out the undesirability of corrupt activities, particularly where it is detrimental to the ANA, the soldiers and, by extension, Afghanistan and its citizens. Instances of

perceived corruption must be reported to the chain of command immediately and in as much detail as possible; however, one must never forget that as an advisor you are not an active intelligence collector, but rather a passive collector based on your daily interactions at the MoD.

3.9.6 Political Power. Afghan society does not use a Western-style model of political parties and positions. Candidates for political offices mainly come by region and ethnic groupings, backed by informal power structures within the society; leading to a combination of elected and PoA appointed members in Parliament and in the Provincial Governments. Groups based on ethnicity, tribe, and other factors or allegiances become critically important for power, prestige, and economic distribution within society. The flow of international support, both money and equipment, has created a nation that is currently very cognizant of and dependant on international community funding. Political power is often tied to the ability to access and distribute this funding. The MoD and GS mirror this structure especially in the devolution of Coalition funding and equipment to lower level headquarters and organizations.

3.9.7 Patronage and other connections. Historical Afghan leadership revolved around a central tribal elder, who drew on the support of the villagers, but in return owed the villagers his sponsorship and loyalty. This leadership structure continues today in a different form; as senior leaders within the MoD and other government organizations are promoted, the "patronage network" that supports them also grows. This network is an informal powerbase for the leader, which comes with the reciprocal cost of the leader having to "provide" for this power base. Often senior leaders are expected to "give back" to the informal powerbase in the form of personnel selection bias or financial remuneration.

4. Overarching Mission and Intent for the MAG

4.1 MAG Mission. The mission for the MAG is:

The MAG will develop the capabilities and capacity of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff in order to establish enduring institutions which can direct and sustain Afghan-led security operations.

4.2. End State for the Offices of the Ministry of Defense. The Office of the Minister of Defense is the civilian led executive element that establishes overarching defense strategy and policy and provides oversight of the General Staff and the ANA. It must therefore be capable of conducting, formulating and implementing defense analysis, policy, strategy, programming and budgeting. The offices of the Assistant Ministers and Chiefs of Departments must be capable of supporting the Minister of Defense and First Deputy Minister in the conduct of their senior management responsibilities and representation of MoD to regional and international counterparts.

4.3. End State for the ANA General Staff. The General Staff (GS) must be able to provide combat ready forces for employment by the President of Afghanistan (PoA), Minister of Defense (MinDef) and Chief of General Staff (CoGS). It must be able to implement the strategic and policy guidance from the MinDef and his principal and special staff, and translate this guidance into strategic-operational plans and orders that provide direction to the fielded forces. This will enable the CoGS to articulate independent military views, analysis and advice.

4.4. Risks to the Ministerial Development effort. Various factors might impact the Ministerial Development effort, as there remain a number of unknowns during the preparation of this MMDP. Of particular concern are the still to be determined variables of the final contributions from NATO and the International Community, and the security situation during the transition period. Additional risks are discussed below:

4.4.1. *Force enablers.* The combat forces of the international partners have not only provided their expertise, but have also supported the Afghans with critical enablers, such as ISR and lift capability. As the Coalition Forces (CF) draw down, the availability of these enablers will decrease, impacting the ability of the ANA to conduct the full range of operations. Thus, MoD and GS leaders could become increasingly focused on resolving this issue, at the expense of other issues critical to the development of the ministry.

4.4.2. *Drawdown of CF.* As illustrated by the announcement of an accelerated withdrawal of French forces following their election, the actual pace of the drawdown of CF is still uncertain.

4.4.2.1. This has the potential to impact the security situation as well as the restructure/re-sizing of the force. It thus impacts a number of Ministerial Development issues such as Strategic Planning Process, intelligence, logistics, and development of the budget.

4.4.2.2. Equally important is the impact of the overall CF drawdown on the number of personnel to support the advising mission. There will likely be pressure to redeploy advisors once the offices they advise reach CM1B status. There should, however, first be a redistribution of advisor assets, focusing on those offices whose progress is lagging.

4.4.3. *Literacy.* The Ministerial Development effort must take into account the ANA's low literacy rate and the low computer literacy rate, as well as, the expense of purchasing and maintaining Information Management Systems. Automating processes may not always be the best solution and will likely require a number of pre-requisite conditions/steps over an extended period of time.

4.5 Tasks. Tasks for the MAG include the following:

- 4.5.1. Synchronize partnering and advising activities with the fielded force.
- 4.5.2. Follow the emphasized, selected, lines of operation for the MoD and the ANA GS.
- 4.5.3. Advise, Mentor, and teach when required, the Afghans in their solutions to enable self-sufficiency.
- 4.5.4. Adapt and incorporate NATO organizations, methods, and procedures that permit interoperability with Coalition nations.
- 4.5.5. Emphasize and model high standards of principled, ethical behavior that incorporates Afghan religious and cultural realities.

4.6 Sub-Tasks. Further refinement of the major tasks listed above, reveals five specific sub-tasks to be performed over the course of advising from the present through the transition of functions to the Afghans. Each specified task might have other implied tasks that are not explicitly directed, but are still necessary. These implied tasks may cut across several advisors and/or offices, or may become subjects requiring work by a higher headquarters to set conditions for success.

4.6.1. *Continue working to transition ministerial functions to GIRoA's MoD/ANA General Staff through accomplishment of transition objectives in individual Ministerial Development Plans.* This sub-task is nested and necessary within the task to synchronize and partner work with the fielded force, while focusing on transition. A supporting task requires that advisors ensure transition planning synchronizes current ministerial decrees and transition plans.

4.6.2. Build and transition the institutions, functions, and capacity with the Afghans to ensure they can successfully manage their systems. This sub-task is nested and necessary within the second, third, and fourth tasks to work on the priority lines of operation, mentor for Afghan long-term solutions, and adapt NATO organizations into acceptable and sustainable Afghan offices. A supporting task requires the development of opportunities to broaden and deepen the placement of advisors and development through partnering for the MoD and ANA staff officers.

4.6.3. Ensure Afghan involvement in the system/institutional transition planning process. This sub-task is nested with the second and third tasks to work priority lines of operation to get what is necessary, but also to create a future partnership with NATO and other professional military services. There are two important supporting tasks. First is to "Develop a Coalition advisor and Afghan Ministerial Development plan for each designated office or organization, which supports transition objectives." Second is to "Maintain the Ministerial Development Plans from now through to transition, for every designated office or organization." These supporting tasks permit the Coalition advisors to guide and track development over the long term, providing benchmarks of progress with their Afghan counterparts.

4.6.4. Ensure transition plans incorporate the ability to redefine the end-states for the systems and institutions over time, and without regression of the progress made. This sub-task is nested within the first, third, and fifth major tasks. For the first, the transition plan must be synchronized with the upper level staffs and down through the organization to meet the needs of the fielded force. With the third task, the plans must focus on the Afghans and their work to enable self-sufficiency, so they rely upon themselves. Finally, with the fifth, the MoD and ANA must exhibit high professional standards with commensurate honor and attractiveness to society as a whole. This sub-task has two supporting tasks. First, to "Review Ministerial Development Plans quarterly, with major revisions done annually, usually in November-December, which benefit from advisor lessons learned and Afghan progress," that will ensure the MDPs reflect current realities. The second supporting task is to "Continually review personnel requirements in relation to advisor realignment that conforms to available expertise, any national caveats, recruiting/training lead time, and contract restrictions." This review permits DCOM-A to anticipate requirements and interact with other DCOMs and their advisors, or review requirements throughout NTM-A, IJC, and ISAF.

4.6.5. Develop, coordinate, and execute the institutional assessment in parallel with (partnered) ISAF/IJC/Afghan current assessment methods using the Ministerial Development Board process and the cross-checking components - Ministerial Development Plans and Quad Briefing Charts. This sub-task is nested within the first, second, and fourth tasks, requiring synchronization and

coordination of efforts; maintaining the priority lines of operation; and working for interoperable-future partnering-compatible organizations and operations with Coalition nations. Three supporting tasks enable this sub-task. First, the development does not stop suddenly on a certain date, but is organized and planned so that, "the MAG maintains contact and oversight of lines of operation with the MoD and GS offices until ISAF departs." The second supporting task requires MDPs to "Support and conform to NTM-A plans and orders for transition," vertically coordinating the efforts toward transition. These plans require development and partnered effort and buy-in by the Afghans. Finally, the MAG, the MoD and the GS will "Conduct MDB quarterly reviews to report the progress in all offices," to assist in tracking and maintaining an emphasis on future cooperation between Afghanistan and Coalition nations.

4.7 Constraints, Restraints and Freedoms.

The MAG has recognized several constraints, restraints, and freedoms which affect the advising mission. NTM-A constraints, restraints, and freedoms have been incorporated in the MAG plan.

4.7.1. Constraints.

4.7.1.1 Transition planning, both overall and for individual offices, must incorporate ISAF operational considerations, and consider IJC and MAG planning and progress.

4.7.1.2. The MAG must plan for the reinvestment of assets as transition occurs by office, section or organization.

4.7.1.3. Synchronization of information, methods, and techniques for institutional development within the ANSF may delay or require acceleration within some offices.

4.7.1.4. Transition and thinning out of advisors is a deliberate process and requires DCOM-A's approval.

4.7.1.5. Transition plans for offices develop from the final stages of the advisor Ministerial Development Plans, but must also be linked with DCOM/TAG, IJC, and ISAF transition tasks.

4.7.2. Restraints.

4.7.2.1. Advisor plans must be coordinated and consider the effects on the MoD as a whole. Plans cannot be developed in isolation of political and operational requirements.

4.7.2.2. MAG transition plans must be placed in context with Afghan demographics, perceptions, capabilities, acceptance and culture. Plans must be developed and implemented in a partnered, sharing relationship with the Afghans. Considerable effort has been expended in the past to re-learn the

lesson of not trying to impose things, since the Afghans will simply ignore the document and “wait out the advisor’s tour”.


4.7.3. *Freedoms.*

4.7.3.1. MAG advisors, have the ability to develop individualized transition objective focused plans, tailored to their office/organization, which are nested within higher headquarters guidance and framework requirements.

4.7.3.2. The advisor team leads may define the system, institutional function, and reinvestment within their areas, subject to approval by DCOM-A.

4.7.3.3. Advisor teams conduct continuous review of their MDP to remain focused on transition objectives, adjust tasks to fit needs, and accelerate or slow advising progress as needed for an accurate assessment.

5. Term Goals and Objectives to Shape Advising



DCG Ops – Ministerial Development – Way Ahead (Dec 2012)

5.1 Short-term (January to March 2013).

January to March 2013 will be filled with significant milestones that will shape the MAG's advising efforts. First, there will be another quarterly review brief to the MinDef in January. This will be a "three-month" marker for his term in office and we will help provide a "self-assessment" of some of his initiatives that have been successes and failures. Second, we will have more detailed information on what ISAF sees as a "follow-on" advising effort under NATO for post-2014. This information will be critical in helping determine where and how advising should transition over the coming year. Third, the possible operational validation and stand-up of the Ground Forces Command, will have a significant impact on the General Staff and may drive changes to how and where we are advising. In the 0-3 month timeframe, our goals should predominantly be focused on "staying the course" and tracking changes to the MoD/GS that may drive modifications in how we do business.

5.2 Mid-term (April to December 2013).

This period will likely see the impacts of any further acceleration of the US drawdown and any adjustments to forces, missions or support as a consequence. As a result of the US announcements, Coalition forces will also likely modify their missions in concert with their national objectives. Heightened interest throughout the command for transitioning organizations to CM-1B at an accelerated rate will also likely occur,

possibly leading to changes in the definition of Capability Milestones. Waning general interest throughout the international community is likely to occur during this period, although there will likely be an increased interest in corruption and its impacts on the commitment of funds in the future. ANA transition will likely focus on the implementation of enabler packages to replace US combat support. On the advising front, it is expected that there will be significant emphasis on transitioning advising to a post-2014 ISAF mission.

5.3 Long-term (2014 and beyond).

As per the diagram above, the goals and objectives for NTM-A and the MAG will transition post-2014. The Afghans are already demonstrating competence and confidence in how they generate and employ their forces; however, they still currently lack the experience and knowledge in how to develop their forces. In the future, less emphasis will be placed on advising the Afghans at the principal-level; instead, more emphasis will be placed on training, advising and assisting the subordinate uniformed staff in the GS and the civilian staff in the AMoDs. This is the period that may also see a transition of advising from a CSTC-A lead to a NATO lead. Although it has not been confirmed, ministerial development may move from being a function within NTM-A, to a function directly under the control of COMISAF.

6. Ministerial & Institutional Development Lines of Operation (LOO)

6.1 Master Ministerial Development Plan (MMDP). The first draft of the MMDP was prepared AFTER there were already existing Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs) in most of the offices. The MMDP would provide the context within which advising and ministerial development would happen, while the MDPs would provide the specific goals and objectives to advance each individual office until it was ready to transition. In late 2011 changes were made to the MMDP that complicated this hierarchy. An outside organization did an assessment of Ministerial Development and recommended that rather than addressing progress within each office (intra-office), progress should be looked at through the lens of inter-office LOOs or "cross-cutting initiatives". As a result, the MMDP was reworked, without confirming: first, that individual offices were at a level that supported transitioning from an intra-office development to an inter-office methodology; and second, that the existing MDP process supported the change. Unfortunately, neither of these assumptions was true. Does this mean that LOOs should be discarded or be considered mutually exclusive from an individual office's development? No, while we continue to develop the offices independently, we should be keeping an eye on inter-office initiatives or LOOs that bring them closer together. Also, as offices reach capability milestone CM-2A and subsequently CM-1B, this is likely the timeframe when the advisor and Afghan principal should now be focusing on inter-office goals and synchronization. Therefore, each organization should use a "combined" approach, focusing on intra-office development but within the context of a future inter-office structure.



Inter-office versus Intra-office Development

6.2 LOO #1: Support to Operations.

End State: The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff will identify and prioritize threats to Afghanistan and develop strategic and operational options to counter these threats. The MoD will provide guidance that will enable the GS to effectively plan and coordinate operations that will enable the ANA leadership to direct the employment of military force as part of a whole of government and coalition effort.

Lines of Development

- 1.1. Provide intelligence support to operations
- 1.2. Provide operations advice to MinDef and PoA
- 1.3. Plan operations
- 1.4. Direct operation
- 1.5. Support operations

6.3 LOO #2: Human Resource Management.

End State: The Ministry of Defense and General Staff have an affordable and sustainable Human Resource Management (HRM) system based on transparent and fairly applied laws, policies, and regulations that are applied to the basic personnel life cycle. The Human Resource Management System includes manpower, recruiting and retention, merit-based practices, training and professional education, compensation, and distribution and utilization of personnel to get properly qualified persons to the right place at the right time, and is supported by a professional HRM staff, reliable and accurate data systems, and an enforceable disciplinary system.

Lines of Development

- 2.1. Sustained ability to develop, coordinate, update and implement personnel policies that conform to current and new laws, presidential decrees, ministerial orders and strategic guidance
- 2.2. Develop and execute a professional and merit based civil service program
- 2.3. Manning the force. Execute personnel readiness management, recruitment/retention strategies, manpower planning, strength management and personnel information management systems
- 2.4. Force management. Develop, review and manage a force structure that will field a sustainable and affordable ANA based on the direction of the National Military Strategy
- 2.5. Develop, implement, control and assess training program to meet ANA requirements
- 2.6. ANA Gender Integration
- 2.7. Recruiting

6.4 LOO #3: National Logistics.

End State: By transition the MoD, AT&L and GSG4 must be able to generate policy, define requirements, manage strategic level logistic nodes and enforce compliance with national directives. To accomplish this, they must have the fundamental management ability to forecast requirements, effectively procure all classes of supply, distribute those supplies to adequate storage depots throughout the theater of operations and, at the same time, maintain asset visibility and accountability in order to support and sustain independent stability operations as assigned by GIRoA.

Lines of Development

- 3.1. Assume command and control of the national logistics function
- 3.2. Develop and implement a national material management capability
- 3.3. Accelerate transition of acquisition responsibility for all classes of supply from NTM-A to ANA
- 3.4. Develop a comprehensive logistics budget (based on well-defined requirements) that can withstand parliamentary scrutiny

6.5 LOO #4: Executive Leadership & Defense Policy.

End State: The MoD and GS must be capable of acting as an integral part of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, both externally and internally. They must be able to articulate and communicate a national defense strategy, a defense and military assessment of threats to Afghanistan, and the needed budget to implement this strategy. These offices (with particular emphasis on the four senior leaders and AMoD S&P) must be able to articulate, formulate, publish and oversee defense and military policy while carrying out all duties and responsibilities as assigned by GIRoA. They must be able to conduct international defense relations, inter-ministerial coordination and outreach to Parliament. These offices must be capable of communicating defense and military objectives, activities and requirements to the people of Afghanistan and the international community. They must be able to provide a strategic framework for and management of plans and policies for developing the force structure of the ANA. The GS senior leaders must be able to ensure the manning, organization, training, materiel acquisition/testing and equipping of the ANA while ensuring adequate sustainment policies and practices are in place. The executive leadership cadre must be able to provide leadership and oversight of subordinate staff, as well as subordinate institutions above Corps. They must be able to exercise command and control of military forces, to include enforcing accountability and personnel standards as required. They must ensure the entire Ministry is managed soundly and with integrity.

Lines of Development

- 4.1. Employ the ANA in conjunction with other ministries of GIRoA, while assuring civilian command and control of operational forces
- 4.2. Formulate and implement defense policy

- 4.3. Administer the organizations of the MoD and GS
- 4.4. Communicate and advance NMS objectives with parliament, the press and the public
- 4.5. Manage defense relations with the coalition and other countries to advance the NMS

6.6 LOO #5: Resource Management.

End State: In accordance with Afghan law and the policies and procedures of the Afghan Ministry of Finance, and in support of the Afghan National Military Strategy (NMS), the Ministry of Defense and General Staff possess a resource management system that enables MoD to submit a properly planned and budgeted 3-year financial plan and budget submission; procure and contract for necessary goods and services; and execute the MoD budget up to an annual capacity to meet Afghan needs each year to organize, train, equip, and train the ANA and AAF.

Lines of Development

- 5.1. Strategic Organizational Planning
- 5.2. Financial Planning and Budget Preparation
- 5.3. Budget Execution and Measurement of Planning Outcomes

7. MDP Guidance.

7.1 Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs). The plans for each of the Ministry or GS key offices detail the goals and objectives for a calendar year. The MDP is normally an annually reviewed product (reviewed in November and released in December) which is updated as part of the MDB quarterly review to reflect past work, experiences, and accomplishments. The annual re-write is to capture the lessons learned from the previous year as well as to capture the future objectives and goals of the specific Afghan office. Advisors should be open and cooperative about the MDP with their counterpart(s) in determining tasks, performance standards, and associated required timelines. Each MDP starts off with outlining the LOOs and the applicability of them to the specific office. While all activities are focused on the intra-office Core Competencies required for transition, each is broken down and traceable to discreet Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance. Logically arranged to build capabilities through intermediate objectives, they are also arranged through a time sequence which takes the office or function from the present level of ability all the way to transition. While not a daily "to-do" list, it allows a monthly (maximum recommended) self-assessment of progress that is rolled-up each quarter as part of the MDB review. MAG direction is to have a discussion on the MDP and quad chart between the advisor and their counterpart on at least a monthly basis. The MDP aligns with direction and orientation of the MMDP, maintaining the focus through successive advisor team member changeovers. The breakout of the MDP format (shown below) should be organized and written to eventually attain Capability Milestone (CM) rating 1A.

7.2. MDP Format. The MDPs use a standard format for section headings. All advisor teams will produce a MDP, which provides a yearly work plan that moves the Afghan organization towards CM 1A, self-sufficiency. Individual plans are enduring and updated on a regular basis. The standard for any plan is that it must provide sufficient guidance to allow a replacement advisor to continue progress with little or no disruption in ongoing work. The MDP must support the MMDP. Although advisors may adapt the format and content of their MDP to best suit their Afghan organization, the following general outline should be followed:

7.2.1. Transition Objectives. Each plan's core objectives must be focused on transition; an end-state in which the Afghan organization can operate on its own. Transition objectives are drawn from the Organization and Function Manual (OFM) and other official guidance which defines the MoD's role, mission, and tasks.

7.2.2. Supporting Capabilities. Plans will focus on the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPFP) construct in order to evaluate and address the organization's capacity and capability:

7.2.2.1. The plan must address those capabilities that are essential to the organization's ability to operate without support – the minimum needed to function; and

7.2.2.2. Assessments will evaluate whether the organization has the necessary DOTMLPFP in place to carry out its mission.

7.3. MDP Basic Outline.

7.3.1. Background/Introduction

7.3.2. Function and End State (documented mission and end state at transition)

7.3.3. Capabilities/Core Competencies.

7.3.4. Transition Objectives

7.3.5. Supporting Objectives (DOTMLPFP).

7.3.6. Risks.

7.3.7. Work Plan - by Quarter and through CM-1A.

7.3.8. Advisor Team


7.4. Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness. Criteria are selected and refined according to Core Competencies required for sustained strategic tasks and Transition Objectives related to Coalition support levels. The Competencies and Objectives are each further refined into Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) statements, usually one MoE to each Competency or Objective. The MoE is a statement to be confirmed or denied; basically fitting as an assessment of "how well" a Competency or Objective is being performed. From the MoE level, further fine-tuning of what is to be measured takes place to develop Measures of Performance (MoPs), which varies between two and five questions in order to be manageable. The MoP is similar to a category question that will be answered. Each MoP is then broken down further into actual metrics, or specific questions, that can be measured directly (quantitative) or requires observation and best professional judgment by the advisor (qualitative). This means a mixed methodology must be used to support the ratings and conclusions reached by the advisors. Instruments used must be validated, authoritative, and provide sufficient rigor to withstand scrutiny within the bounds of working conditions present in Afghanistan. One supporting structure for this comes from the internal consistency checks and balances between the methods and collection of data.

8. Measuring Progress

8.1. Measuring Progress. Due to the subjective nature of operational and strategic-level advising, imposing a system of rigorous, authoritative, and valid progress measurements is difficult when working with the MoD and GS. At the tactical level, measurement by advisors is more direct through observation of the training exercises and the conduct of actual operations. For the MoD and GS, creating capacity and capability in an office, or drafting/implementing a strategic policy, are events that can take months or years before the true effectiveness of the action is measurable.

8.2. Ministerial Development Board (MDB). For the MAG, the MDB serves as the assessment and tracking method for progress towards core task competency and preparation for transition. Over time the MDB system, with annual adjustments, serves as the historical record of the advising mission for each area, recording progress, stability and regression, along with the reasons why. By keeping their MDPs current, thoroughly planned out, and used as a tracking tool of each core competency, the advisors have a common vision with their counterparts. By engaging our counterparts in shared work to jointly obtain the competencies and transition objectives, we jointly shape the MDP to what is needed in the current conditions and situation. As progress is made in each office or organization and CM-2B is reached, advisors begin planning to reduce their presence or shift emphasis within the office they advise. The CM rating of CM-2B begins the transition process. A rough planning figure of three to four quarters per CM rating is historically accurate. Since not all offices or organizations will fulfill the CM-1B and then CM-1A requirements at the same time, the weighting of advising effort requires close coordination and monitoring. The adjustment of advisors during the CM-2B (plan for transition) through CM-1A (complete transition and steady state) should be viewed as a re-alignment of advisors from one area to another (or in some cases one specialty to another) as a thinning of fully capable areas to an emphasis of areas still requiring assistance. Eventually, offices or organizations will have a "liaison and facilitation officer" who regularly checks the operation and provides assistance on a requested or required (probably irregular) basis. Over the long term, the MDB provides a cumulative assessment history that generates meaningful data for adjustment of processes, methods, and end states; not only in Afghanistan, but in future assistance and training missions.

8.3. Capability Milestone (CM) Ratings. CM ratings are used to gauge the level of development in Afghan offices on a decreasing numerical scale, with CM-4 being the lowest rating and CM-1A being the highest. The CM ratings are defined by the degree to which the assessed MoD department or GS directorate is able to operate on its own. The Core Competencies to achieve assigned objectives should be clearly defined in specific, tailored MDPs; in other words, the level of Coalition support required from full support to monitoring.



★ Decision points: DCOM-A decides progression to CM 2A, DCG-Ops decides progression to CM1B, COM NTM-A reserves the strategic decision to move to CM-1A.

Capability Milestone Rating chart with explanation and color code (2012/12).

8.4. Assessment Narrative Worksheet. Advisors will prepare and submit an Assessment Narrative as part of their quarterly assessment. The Assessment Narrative is effectively the “report card” for the organization or office. It lists the objectives that you are trying to achieve. For each objective, it then has a summary narrative on how the office did during the current quarter. Each objective also has a recommendation section that talks about how the office is going to move forward and any recommended change in CM rating. Finally, these three things are used to come up with an objective CM rating for the objective. Other points to consider, are:

8.4.1. Objectives and Tasks must be observable, verifiable, and focused on transition;

8.4.2. Effectiveness is a measure of how well the organization is accomplishing its functions (usually affiliated with functions assigned within the OFM or defined in the MMDP);

8.4.3. Performance measures how well the organization is executing its tasks;

8.4.4. Quantifiable measures are helpful, but not essential; and

8.4.5. All measures must be easily understood and verified by a third party.

8.5. Assessment Presentation (Quad) Chart. All advisors are required to prepare a Quarterly Assessment Quad Chart presenting an overview of the priority objectives/tasks to be pursued for the next Quarter in order to advance ministerial capacity. The Quad Chart will be completed in the following format:

Last Updated: 7 Sep 12
POC: LCol McEwen, 237-1377

8.6. Request to transition from one CM rating to the next. In the event that an office or directorate is assessed to have progressed or regressed to the next CM rating level, a Briefing Note has to be produced (EXSUM format) with the following information:

- 28

9. Common Advisor Tasks to Achieve MDP Goals and Objectives

9.1 Focusing the Advisor and Advising Effort.


Military, civilian, and contractor advisors need to be screened wherever possible for qualifications and personality/temperament in order to develop a compatible working relationship with their Afghan principal. Assigning advisors based on who was sent and who is available within the command should not be acceptable. Unfortunately, this happens on a regular basis due to shortfalls in manning. Selection must begin with past qualifications - working on a senior joint or multi-national staff, national headquarters (Pentagon or equivalent) in a primary position (O-6 or equivalent civilian) offers significant screening criteria. Most advisors will be one to four rank levels below their counterpart, so advisors must be knowledgeable about strategic operations. They must understand they are not military aides and staff officers. The practice of assigning mid and junior grade officers (O-4 and below) to advise general officers is not ideal and can cause loss of face with Afghan Principals. Secondary criteria that make for a good advisor are good interpersonal skills, an outgoing temperament and an ability to engage others. In the high-context Afghan society, a premium is placed on person-to-person contacts.

Lead advisors will receive additional advisors where available to deepen the reach into the staff sections, preferably down to the daily work by mid-grade staff officers. Building the staff through education, assistance and training will be a primary task for the full/part time mix of military advisors, Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDAs), and contractors. Cross-leveling advisors among the various offices will sometimes take place as emphasis is placed in areas of concern, specific requirements are met, or sufficient progress is made to reduce the level of advising and monitoring.

9.2 Key Leader Engagements (KLE).

9.2.1. KLE General. For the purposes of this plan, KLEs are limited to the original ISAF definition of a deliberate, planned, and focused meeting between a Coalition General Officer (or civilian equivalent) and an Afghan counterpart of equal or higher rank, in order to achieve a desired outcome. These meetings may be part of a regular series that cover mutual topics of interest, or may be on an "as-needed" basis to discuss particular topics of an immediate nature. The daily or regular meetings conducted between advisors and their Afghan counterparts are not to be termed as KLEs.

9.2.2. KLE Cycle. There is a DCG Ops KLE organization that coordinates messages, themes and talking points for all NTM-A KLEs. The KLE cycle for the production of KLE themes, messages and talking points is detailed below.



KLE Cycle (Dec 12)

9.2.3. KLE Synchronization. Advisors may provide recommended talking points in their request for a KLE in a Theme-Goal-Messages framework. Each theme should be accompanied by a one-page summary of key talking points. General themes and messages will be generated through the KLE Working Group lead by DCG Ops. It is the advisor's responsibility to avoid a KLE surprise for the requested General Officer. Initially, advisors will simply have to submit the information highlighted in grey. Once the requested theme/messages have been approved by the KLE WG, talking points will be requested.

Serial	Pri	Desired Outcome	Audience (to who)	Engage By (by whom)	Frequency	Date	Theme	Messages	Talking Points

KLE Engagement Synchronization Matrix

9.2.4. KLE Talking Points Structure. The following format will be used to generate KLE talking points (maximum one page in length):

9.2.4.1. Background

- 9.2.4.2. Issue 1 – Stated in two to three sentences
- 9.2.4.3. Issue 1 Talking Points in bullet form
- 9.2.4.4. Issue 2 – Stated in two to three sentences
- 9.2.4.5. Issue 2 Talking Points in bullet form
- 9.2.4.6. Issue 3 – Stated in two to three sentences
- 9.2.4.7. Issue 3 Talking Points in bullet form

9.3 MAG and IJC Coordinated Effort.

NTM-A concentrates its advising and assisting efforts on the development of the MoD and GS at the Strategic/Operational level. IJC coordinates Operational/Tactical level advising and partnering with Afghan forces. Although the organizations are separated by their roles and responsibilities (as well as physical distance), coordination between the two headquarters is essential to reduce seams and gaps in their advising/partnering roles. Regular exchange of information with your IJC and ISAF counterparts helps this vertical and horizontal integration, as well as, synchronization of effort. The coordination effort extends to the development of structures, personnel, and measurement of improvement in the organization. An eventual example of this will trace policies and procedures from an MoD office down to the GS and then through the GFC to tactical units. To measure this type of vertical integration, and deliver the intended effect, the MAG and IJC advisors must work together wherever possible.

9.4 Implementation of a Civil Service for MoD. In the interests of building a civilian-based and controlled Ministry that provides continuity and procedural knowledge, a civilian work force is necessary over the long term as military officers and political appointees rotate among jobs. An embryonic civil service program has been established within the MoD, but it must be continually monitored and assisted.

Currently, military officers occupy most of the future designated civilian positions. Over time, these positions will transition from military to civilian either through transition, retirement or new hires. As the positions change over, continuity must be maintained to run all ministerial and/or general staff functions. The civil service, expanding to incorporate Ministry office heads and professional staff, eventually will incorporate into a larger Afghan Civil Service.

9.5 Increased Transparency and Accountability.

Increased transparency and accountability are critical to legitimizing the MoD and GS internally to the military and the Afghan people, and externally to the international community. Establishing and implementing policies for fair and merit-based systems is a new idea for the ANA. The MAG will influence leaders at all levels to put aside destructive concerns and unprofessional objectives, so that fair ethical standards and practices become commonplace. These practices must then extend down through the MoD and GS leaders into their organizations and the tactical-level units. Initial training

for officers and soldiers, along with reinforcement during follow-on military education and training, will grow higher ethical and professional standards from the bottom up.

Advisors are not expected to conduct investigations into allegations of corruption in their areas. Likewise, they are not trained intelligence gatherers. Advisor oversight includes daily observations and working with their Afghan principal to identify corrupt practices. When questionable practices are observed, a discussion with the Chief of Advisors will determine the next steps. Advisors should also be intimately familiar with the policies, techniques, and procedural methods of the offices they advise. Implementation of policies and procedures, with MAG oversight, require systems for accountability to be in place to assure effective and legitimate systems. Transparency, or the ability to hold individuals accountable for their actions, is an essential part of our external validation.

9.6. Transition to Self-Reliance and Self-Sufficiency. Over time, the advisory effort in the various offices and organizations will reach a point where the Afghans are capable of performing the vast majority of the required work without assistance; obviously, this is coordinated through DCOM-A to NTM-A and ISAF. This transition is expected to take place as each office or function is identified as being at CM-1B. As the Afghans reach this level, advisors may be "thinned out" or redistributed, leaving a smaller team in place for ongoing training, advising, and assisting.

Demonstration of CM-1B by the Afghans to the assigned advisors for at least one quarter is required to start the process of formal transition. In all cases, the formal designation of "transition" to CM-1A is reserved for the Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and requires a process detailed above. The period of gathering data and formally requesting transition can be expected to take at least one additional quarter of CM-1B status, as part of the proofing process to assure there will be no backsliding in capability.

10. Advisor Guidance

10.1 Engagement Techniques. Advisor placement and work is often the most direct method of engaging an office or a particular person in the MoD. The actual duties of the advisor may vary according to the methods of previous advisors, the Afghan counterpart's needs, the ability and experience of the current advisor, and the advisor's ability to socially interact with his/her principal. Unfortunately, advisors often devolve into assuming the role of extra staff officers or aides in the office. This type of advisor performs little training, advising or assisting; they are simply reduced to an equivalent of speech writers, note takers, liaison officers or facilitators. When used in this subservient fashion, either the advisor requires immediate removal and replacement with a trained officer of stronger personality, or the position should be eliminated to best use valuable personnel resources elsewhere. Advisors should orient on giving advice, oversight, coaching, providing guidance on best practices. In very few cases, and never at any of the upper levels, should the advisor do the work of the office or staff, unless it is first-time training in a subject.

For advisors, there is nothing similar to an attorney-client or executive privilege, meaning the advisor provides valuable insight into how and why things happen in an office and why certain decisions were made – this information is often termed “atmospherics.” Clearly an advisor is not an assigned intelligence agent; however, the atmospherics that are collected are often key to future advising efforts and KLE engagements.

10.2 Atmospherics. The MAG organization must maintain regular and significant contact with the upper level leaders in the MoD and GS. That doesn't mean that advising should only happen at that level. Advising should be happening at all levels within an office, to ensure that when a principal leaves and takes his key staff with him, that the office can continue to function. However, at the highest levels, the continued reporting of atmospherics and the communication of key interactions are necessary to direct information gathering that supports answering NTM-A/CSTC-A, and DCOM-A information needs. Atmospherics are more than a one-time report; they require astute observation of professional and personal events throughout many contact periods. In some cases, these observations will feed the development of human terrain products and KLE. Critical to this understanding is finding the hidden connections that exist among the key Afghan leaders, to hopefully provide some level of predictability regarding Afghan events and decisions. Predictive analysis of known, but seemingly minor, personal and professional connections, mean a good deal in the society as a whole. It must be clearly understood there is no equivalent relationship between advisor and counterpart that would equate to a lawyer – client relationship. Withholding information is the same as withholding support to the Commander's End State, mission success, and it potentially puts the lives of Coalition Soldiers at risk.

10.3. Internal Advisor Coordination Requirements.

10.3.1 Weekly MAG Huddle (Chief of Advisors responsible). DCOM-A conducts a weekly (Sunday night, 1700-1800hrs) meeting for all MAG Senior Advisors and selected specialty advisors. The main purpose of this meeting is to exchange critical information between the GS and Ministry advisor groups to provide updates and maintain situational awareness across the MAG. The meeting will start off with any hails/farewells, a short intelligence update, and any selected briefings. After that, the Chief of Advisors will pass on points from the DCOM-A Orders Group and any significant issues affecting the MAG as a whole. Following the CoA points, there will be a round-table discussion where the Ministry and GS heads will pass on any key points, followed by their advisors. Verbal reports should be limited to those items that affect more than three other advisors in the room, this is not the venue for a one-on-one discussions. The MAG Chief of Staff will also use this meeting to pass on any key administration points for the MAG.

10.3.2 Consolidated Daily Sitrep (MAG COS responsible). Each advisor is responsible for providing the COS with a short but informative summary (approximately five lines) on daily significant events. These will be rolled-up as part of a daily summary of advisor activities. Essentially, if advisor activities have occurred during the day (discussions with your principal, KLEs, key meetings, etc) then there should be a summary sent to the COS. Concise, clear, understandable writing is required that provides the main point, supporting facts, and any connection to other events. The advisor should provide specifics on how a conclusion was reached by the counterpart. Finally, the advisor provides contextual analysis connecting the event to answering, "What comes next?" in the form of a prediction based on situational knowledge and awareness of counterpart influences. Also to be included as attachments are storyboards of particular items and Exchange Summaries (EXSUM) from KLEs or key meetings at the MoD or GS. This report is submitted on the CENTRIXS network, classified appropriately, due to the COS NLT 1800 hrs, Saturday to Thursday. The items are proofed and then selected for the consolidated report of the day's advising activities. The report is normally sent out between 2000-2200 hrs.

10.3.3 Monthly Advisor Council Meeting (Chief of Advisors responsible). On the third Friday of every month (currently 1630-1800hrs) there is a monthly assessment meeting of all senior advisors, as well as, selected specialty advisors, CTAG, ISAF partners, IJC partners, and UNAMA staff. This is a roundtable forum where each organization takes two minutes to run through a quick update of the assessment quad-chart for their MoD office. Every three months this meeting also serves as the office-by-office review for the quarterly MDB return.

10.3.4 Monthly Advisor Dinner (CG NTM-A host). CG NTM-A sponsors a dinner on the third Friday of every month (1800-2000 hrs) involving all of the senior

advisors from each of the DCOMs. The agenda for the evening starts with hails and farewells, followed by a short presentation from one of the DCOMs. Subjects for the presentations vary from guest speakers to advisor lessons learned to topics of interest.

10.3.5. Ministerial Development Board (Quarterly – March, June, September, December) (Chief of Advisors with Horizontal Integration & Strategic Management advisor(s) responsible). Mixed methodology using qualitative, quantitative, and trust questions building an assessment of ministerial (MoD and GS offices and responsibilities) based on codified developmental programs (the MDPs). Designed to detect, identify, and provide recommendations about systemic issues at the ministerial level perspective. The MDB assembles three major components for each briefing: the organization's MDP, the advisor's assessment worksheets and the advisor's summary briefing "Quad Chart." A rating for each of the transition objectives or line of development, as well as, an overall office or functional rating, will be derived using the standardized CM rating system.

The Master Briefing Book for the MDB is tabbed for each office or organization. Within each tab, in order, are displayed: Quad Chart, Assessment Narrative Worksheet and the MDP. The Quad Chart is a summary of the MDP and results of the quarter's work. The Advisor Assessment Worksheet is individualized and tailored to the specific office with a series of questions to introduce an element of objective measurement that supports the ratings. The MDP has been previously discussed. The Master Briefing Book will be held by the COS of the MAG.

10.3.6. MAG Advisor's Course. This course is run approximately every three months (or as required) and is approximately two-days in duration. The course is typically split across three days – Thursday afternoon, all day Friday and Saturday afternoon. It consists of a series of lectures and activities specifically designed to inculcate new DCOM-A members into their advisory role:

10.3.6.1. Audience. All new advisors to the MAG. The background and experience of new advisors varies, but it is generally assumed that they will come with years of experience in either the military or civilian sector (or both). As well they are likely to have considerable "leadership" experience, but the type and style of communication and leadership skills may vary wildly.

10.3.6.2. Material. Three types of material are addressed by the course: background knowledge in the policies, practices, organizational structure, and historical context of the ANA; practical knowledge to address common areas of concern; and, specific competencies in core advisory skills.

11. The Advisor Structure and Coordination

11.1 Supported and Supporting Organizations.

The MAG organization operates within and with a number of other organizations to accomplish the assigned Transition Objectives. Understanding these relationships is necessary in order to support the requirements of assisting the Afghans in building a professional military structure and organization for the nation. Relationships among the various organizations are important for structuring actions, resolving conflicts, and unifying efforts for consistency with the Afghans.

The ISAF headquarters goals, objectives, and directions guide all actions of DCOM-A. Daily advisor work is structured within the ISAF framework to support the goals of *building and professionalizing the MoD and GS*. NTM-A/CSTC-A, as DCOM-A's higher headquarters is also a supported headquarters. Translation and assignment of overall tasks, split into discrete tasks for army and police organizations comes from NTM-A/CSTC-A. At the operational level, the IJC is an adjacent headquarters, operating its own advisor mission, which will of course interact with the MAG efforts.

Within NTM-A/CSTC-A, the Deputy Commander – Army (DCOM-A) and Deputy Commander – Police (DCOM-P) own the majority of advisors and directed mission for developing the ANSF. DCOM-A oversees the manning, training, equipping, and support for building and delivering combat ready units to the ANA. DCOM-P performs a similar function for the various MoI police forces. DCOM-A also provides the higher headquarters organization for the fielding and doctrine for the ANA. At the level of MAG, cooperation occurs with DCOM-P Advisors to share methods, techniques, and processes. This cooperation is aimed to find and use “best practices” for similar functions across the two organizations wherever possible and appropriate.

Other assigned DCOMs perform specific functions for COM NTM-A/CSTC-A. Primarily, MAG interactions with these DCOMs are to coordinate, obtain support, and provide information. These relationships will often shift in rapid interactions through DCOM-A to answer a variety of requirements across NTM-A/CSTC-A's work to train, advise, and develop the MoD and ANA. National Support Elements conduct support operations to maintain their various nation's commitment to manning positions within the MAG.

11.2 DCOM-A.

11.2.1. The DCOM-A Commander or DCOM-A. The DCOM-A Comd (usually a Brigadier General) has authority and responsibility for MAG operations and all personnel assigned to DCOM-A. The MAG is a mixed group of military, civilian, and contractor advisors. Due to this mixed organization, authority for direction of work and relationships are more complex than in a strictly military organization. For the military members, their chain of command authority conforms to the norms established in their own countries, services, and joint organizations. A further complication to the advisor structure is the use of full time and part time,

or matrixed, advisors who have duties with the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff or other DCOMs and also devote time to advising duties in the MAG. Traditional military rank, customs, and courtesies apply. As part of NTM-A, traditional national authority applies for administrative control of individuals with "tactical" (daily work direction) control assigned to DCOM-A through the Commander, NTM-A.

For the civilians assigned to the MAG, whether national government or contractors, the responsibilities and authorities are somewhat different. Many things are the same such as: force protection measures; movement control; provision of work; required equipment; work and living space; and, assigned work. While civilians are not able to command in the military sense, they can issue instructions to military and other civilian personnel within defined areas of DCOM-A. Civilians are not given orders in the traditional military sense; they receive work instructions and operate within military defined limits, home nation civilian legal authority, and their contractual obligations (for contractors). Government civilians have a similar rank and position structure equivalent to military personnel. The rank structure for the MoDAs is based on the following equivalencies: GS-15 (Col), GS-14 (LTC) and GS-13 (Maj).

11.2.2. The DCOM-A Deputy or DDCOM-A. This position may be occupied by either a military officer or a government civilian equivalent (although it will predominantly be military). Duties for the DDCOM-A may include supporting the MAG for special tasks or even advisor duties. The DDCOM-A performs all command duties of the DCOM-A in his absence, including maintaining consistent purpose and direction for the staff and the MAG. Organization wide, the Deputy directs and coordinates administrative actions, advisor requirements, and coordination upward to NTM-A or laterally to IJC or others. Within DCOM-A, the Deputy makes personnel, assignment, and other work flow recommendations to DCOM-A, in coordination with the Chief of Staff and Chief of Advisors.

11.2.3. The DCOM-A Chief of Staff (CoS). Nominally the third senior military officer in the organization. The CoS primarily directs and coordinates the internal staff functions for DCOM-A including personnel planning, policies, compliance with regulations or orders, translators, office space, and supplies. The CoS performs and tracks internal or external staff coordination required between DCOM-A and other organizations. For interactions with contracted advisors and translators, the CoS is responsible as the primary military officer in the chain of command who operates closely with the Contracting Officer (KO) and/or Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) on site.

11.2.4. The Chief of Advisors or CoA. As the senior advisor in terms of rank and/or time in the organization, or as designated by the DCOM-A, the CoA provides guidance, historical perspective, and experiential lessons learned to the advisors. The CoA integrates new advisors to the MAG system, requirements, methods, and reporting. As the CoA, regular duties also include collecting and editing the daily, weekly, and annual reports; managing and directing the


Requirements For Information on various subjects, managing and directing advisor MDB inputs and briefs; tracking advisor coordination efforts for goals, objectives, daily direction of advisory efforts, and Key Leader Engagements.

11.2.5. Senior Advisor Ministry of Defense and Senior Advisor GS. In the past, 31 Senior Advisors coordinated directly with the Chief of Advisors. Some of these senior advisors were also dual-hatted with DCOM-A Staff duties, which made this large span of control more manageable. In October 2012, the decision was made to separate the advisors from the DCOM-A staff. This meant that close to 200 advisors were now dedicated full-time to ministerial development and all were effectively reporting to the Chief of Advisors. As a result, the decision was made to also split that MAG into two organizations, each led by a senior advisor. The Chief of Advisors' responsibilities are detailed above. The Senior Advisor to the MinDef is responsible for the coordination, integration and assessment of all personnel that advise the Ministerial side of the MoD. The Senior Advisor to the CoGS is responsible for the coordination, integration and assessment of all personnel that advise the GS side of the MoD.

11.2.6. The Advisor teams. Each advisor team is adapted to the office they work in and the Afghan counterpart capabilities or needs for the required level of performance for the ANA. Advisors may work at a ratio of 1-to-1 at high levels in the MoD/GS, or ratios of 1-to-Many in a staff section or office. Exact composition and structure for the current advising effort is shown in the latest advisor organizational chart, regularly issued within ANA Development and available from the CoS. This structure and assignment adapts to the current focus/emphasis, the work load in the MoD/GS, and other mission requirements.

12. Conclusion

12. Advising is a challenging and rewarding experience that requires the utmost commitment from all of us. Remember, our mission: The Ministry of Defense Advisor Group (MAG) will develop the capabilities and capacity of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff in order to establish enduring institutions which can direct and sustain Afghan-led security operations. The next year will be an interesting one, filled with many changes for the Afghans and NTM-A; stay flexible, engaged and enthusiastic.


Jim Goodman
Colonel (CA Army)
DCOM-Army Chief of Advisors

Annexes:

Annex A: Detailed Breakdown of LOOs

Annex A -- Detailed Breakdown of LOOs

6.1 LOO #1: Support to Operations

End State: The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff will identify and prioritize threats to Afghanistan and develop strategic and operational options to counter these threats. The MoD will provide guidance that will enable the GS to effectively plan and coordinate operations that will enable the ANA leadership to direct the employment of military force as part of a whole of government and coalition effort.

Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs): GSG1, GSG2, GSG3, GSG4, GSG6, GFC, AAF, ASOC, CPMD, ASC

Offices of Coordinating Responsibility (OCRs): GSG7, GSG8, VCoAF, GS Legal, GS IG, AMoD RA, AMoD Disaster Response, AMoD ATL, MEDCOM, AMoD Health Affairs, MoD IG, MoD Legal, MoD Finance

Lines of Development (with supporting objectives):

1.1. PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPS

1.1.1 Develop strategic intel process to assess threats and form operational priorities. Establish and maintain communication between GSG2 strategic, operational, and tactical echelons. (Must Do)

1.1.2 Conduct counterintelligence activities including special operations, analysis, personnel security, and foreign disclosure duties. (Must Do)

1.1.3 Perform analysis of information and production of intelligence reports to include indications and warnings, current intelligence, intelligence estimates, order of battle, and topographic papers. (Must Do)

1.2. PROVIDE OPERATIONS ADVICE TO MINDEF & POA

1.2.1. Accurate readiness reporting. (Must Do)

1.2.2. Ability to forecast future readiness. (Must Do)

1.2.3. Translate threat and readiness into strategic and operational options. (Must Do)

1.2.4. Advise the MinDef, Chief of the General Staff and operational commanders on the employment of forces. (Must Do)

1.3. PLAN OPERATIONS

1.3.1. Interpret national-level objectives into military tasks. (Must Do)

1.3.2. Develop operations in support of national objectives. (Must Do)

1.3.3. Capability to communicate between command nodes of security forces. (Must Do)

1.3.4. Develop protocols, agreements and plan to conduct joint operations between ANA, MoI, NDS and Civil Agencies. (Must Do)

1.3.5. Analyzes and Interpret MoD level strategic policies. (Must Do)

1.3.6. Produce Short range plans (less than 6 month). (Must Do)

1.3.7. Produce Long term –plans (over 6 mos). (Must Do)

- 1.3.8. Develop plans for internal/border area security, short and long-term. (Must Do)
- 1.3.9. Plan for future contingencies and develop planning options for movement and rotations of units. (Must Do)
- 1.3.10. Establishes and maintains communication systems with MoI and NDS. (Must Do)

1.4. DIRECT ANA OPERATIONS

- 1.4.1. Command and control operations. (Must Do)
- 1.4.2. Provide a sustainable communications architecture for conducting operations and to enable PoA, MINDEF and CoGS. (Must Do)
- 1.4.3. Ensure robust and redundant connectivity between command and control centers and maintain control of all communications assets. (Must Do)
- 1.4.4. Maintain high readiness combat elements. (Must Do)
- 1.4.5. Disseminate orders/directives to maintain good order and discipline. (Must Do)

1.5. SUPPORT ANA OPERATIONS

- 1.5.1. Oversee the filling and distribution of ANA stocks in accordance with established priorities. (Must Do)
- 1.5.2. Obtain and distribute resources and do so in an auditable manner. (Must Do)
- 1.5.3. Maintain auditable control of supply levels and gather information on equipment, logistic readiness, personnel life-support and facilities condition. (Must Do)
- 1.5.4. Equip ANA based upon existing Tashkil and equipment allotments. (Must Do)
- 1.5.5. Maintain and operate facilities and real property and provide for open and auditable transaction records. (Must Do)

6.2 LOO #2: Human Resource Management

End State: The Ministry of Defense and General Staff have an affordable and sustainable Human Resource Management (HRM) system based on transparent and fairly applied laws, policies, and regulations that are applied to the basic personnel life cycle. The Human Resource Management System includes manpower, recruiting and retention, merit-based practices, training and professional education, compensation, and distribution and utilization of personnel to get properly qualified persons to the right place at the right time, and is supported by a professional HRM staff, reliable and accurate data systems, and an enforceable disciplinary system.

OPRs: AIMO D P&E, GS G1, GSG7, CIVILIANIZATION, RCA, ANAREC

OCRs: Legal, IG, TAO

Lines of Development (with supporting objectives):

2.1. SUSTAINED ABILITY TO DEVELOP, COORDINATE, UPDATE, AND IMPLEMENT PERSONNEL POLICIES THAT CONFORM TO CURRENT AND NEW LAWS (ILON) PRESIDENTIAL DECREES, MINISTERIAL ORDERS, AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

- 2.1.1. Annual review of existing laws, defense strategies, policies, and regulations, eliminating gaps, duplication, and fragmentation. (Must Do)
- 2.1.2. Develop an over-arching Human Resource Management (HRM) policy to manage all aspects of Force Life Cycle Management (recruit, develop, evaluate, promote, remove, and retire) consistent with Societal Values, National Laws, National Defense Strategy and Funding. (Must Do)
- 2.1.3. Develop effective inter- and cross-ministerial coordination capabilities. (Must Do)
- 2.1.4. Oversee the successful implementation of HRM policies. (Must Do)
- 2.1.5. In coordination with MoD Finance and relevant ANA organizations, develop an effective compensation and benefits system (Special Pay). (Must Do)
- 2.1.6. In coordination with Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD) and GSG1, Develop or refine systems and processes to honorably, efficiently, and sustainably separate and retire defense personnel within the fiscal framework of the nation. (Should do)
- 2.1.7. Coordinate with RCA, GSG4, MEDCOM, and GSG1 on the design, review, and implementation of effective quality of life capabilities based on existing policy and within the constraints of the national budget. (Should do)
- 2.1.8. Ensure organizations operate in accordance with assigned roles and responsibilities of the Manual of Organizations and Functions through systemic reviews of policies, plans and operations. (Must Do)

2.2. DEVELOP AND EXECUTE A PROFESSIONAL AND MERIT BASED CIVIL SERVICE PROGRAM

- 2.2.1. Civilians have Core competencies required to perform their job. (Must Do)
- 2.2.2. Recruit and retain a professional civil service cadre. (Must Do)
- 2.2.3. Ensure adequate system in place to convert most military positions under First Deputy Minister to civilian and create a civilian career path. (Should Do)
- 2.2.4. Senior leadership program in place. (Should Do)
- 2.2.5. Professionalize the MoD HR Department. (Should Do)

2.3. MANNING THE FORCE: EXECUTION OF PERSONNEL READINESS MANAGEMENT, RECRUITMENT/RE-CONTRACTING STRATEGIES, MANPOWER PLANNING, STRENGTH MANAGEMENT, AND PERSONNEL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.

- 2.3.1. As required, either reform existing and/or develop new manpower utilization capability. (Must Do)
- 2.3.2. Develop a cadre of HRM managers and experts to run the HRM system. (Must Do)
- 2.3.3. Based on over-arching HRM policy, either modify existing system: AHRIMS and/or develop new data collection requirements and HRM data

systems that enable decision-making in accordance with established policies and procedures. (Should Do)

2.3.4. Develop an effective system to distribute and utilize personnel in order to fulfill operational requirements through career management that includes promotions, assignments, and mobilization. (Should Do)

2.4. FORCE MANAGEMENT: DEVELOP, REVIEW AND MANAGE A FORCE STRUCTURE THAT WILL FIELD A SUSTAINABLE AND AFFORDABLE ANA BASED ON CONTENTS OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

2.4.1. Develop and maintain procedures for the review, management and implementation of the ANA Tashkil. (Must Do)

2.4.2. Manage, review and implement the Tashkil. (Must Do)

2.4.3. Develop and implement fielding plans for new ANA units and capabilities. (Must Do)

2.5. DEVELOP, IMPLEMENT, CONTROL AND ASSESS TRAINING PROGRAMS TO MEET ANA REQUIREMENTS

2.5.1. Review, develop and distribute doctrine and training manuals based on available equipment and capabilities to implement effective training standards. (Must Do)

2.5.2. Develop the ANA to Professional Standards. (Must Do)

2.5.3. Implement training and education policies with transparency and accountability. (Must Do)

2.5.4. Ensure training policies (Out of Country Training) are implemented and reviewed regularly (Director and Training & Educ) and appropriate placement is made upon completion/return. (Must Do)

2.5.5. Ensure transparency in the development of criteria, selection and testing for all training. (Should Do)

2.5.6. Create a career path policy for officers through the development of Professional Military Education and career progression programs. (Should Do)

2.5.7. Develop a sustainable and executable literacy transition plan to ensure literacy remains a cornerstone of ANA - Must Do

2.6. ANA Gender Integration

2.6.1. Culture and Climate: ANA is seen as an honorable profession for women. Work environment promotes the integration of women. (Must Do)

2.6.2. Professional Development Systems: women assigned and developed to become key parts of professions assigned. (Should Do)

2.6.3. Training Systems: Women have full access to and are leaders within the training system. (Should Do)

2.6.4. Recruiting Systems: Women have full access to and are leaders within the recruiting system. (Should Do)

2.7. RECRUITING

2.7.1. Recruit an ethnically balanced ANA. (Must Do)

- 2.7.2. Screen Recruits at Military Entrance Process Station (MEPS) to determine eligibility for service. (Should Do)
- 2.7.3. Develop a national marketing plan. (Should Do)
- 2.7.4. Provide logistical support and leadership for recruits awaiting initial training. (Should Do)

6.3 LOO #3: National Logistics

End State: By transition the MoD, AT&L and GSG4 must be able to generate policy, define requirements, manage strategic level logistic nodes and enforce compliance with national directives. To accomplish this, they must have the fundamental management ability to forecast requirements, effectively procure all classes of supply, distribute those supplies to adequate storage depots throughout the theater of operations and, at the same time, maintain asset visibility and accountability in order to support and sustain independent stability operations as assigned by GIRoA.

OPRs: AMoD AT&L, Acq Agency, GS G4, LOGCOM, ASC

OCRs: GFC, VCoGS, FDM, CoGS, MINDEF

Lines of Development (with supporting objectives):

3.1 : ASSUME COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL LOGISTICS FUNCTION

- 3.1.1 Develop and execute an integrated Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vision and Strategy (Must Do)
- 3.1.2 Provide 24-hours per day/7-days per week logistics liaison to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in order to assist in the improvement of combat readiness capability for all MoD units (Must Do)
- 3.1.3 Analyze routine readiness status reports, such as the Readiness Reporting System (RRS) and Logistics Readiness Assessment Tool (LRAT), to ensure consistency of the data and to ensure that unit and depot inventories are matched to budget constraints and meet operational needs (Must Do)
- 3.1.4 Revise 4-series decrees to provide standardized, legally enforceable, logistics directives and policies which match org structure and emergent processes (Must Do)
- 3.1.5 Streamline MoD 14 process or define a newer, simpler process altogether (Must Do)

3.2: DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A NATIONAL MATERIAL MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

- 3.2.1 Create a national materiel management node that manages requirements determination (working with AT&L RM to develop funding requirements). (Must Do)
- 3.2.2 Establish technical quality process to ensure accuracy of procured material and services. (Must Do)

- 3.2.3 Accuracy of forecasted requirements, adequacy of funding, procurement of proper product. (Must Do)
- 3.2.4 Champion responsive procurement lead times based on time phased plans to provide the proper product at the perfect time to the point of need. (Must Do)
- 3.2.5 Identify Future Requirements with sufficient lead time to effect completed procurement actions in advance of actual need (including FMS, weapons systems, etc) (Must Do)
- 3.2.6 Perform all Programming and Budgeting functions based on identified future requirement (Must Do)

3.3: ACCELERATE TRANSITION OF ACQUISITION RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLY FROM NTM-A TO ANA

- 3.3.1 Develop, validate and implement programs to obtain major end-items of equipment and all classes of supplies, as well as contracts for commercially provided services to meet the operational requirements for the Afghan National Army (ANA). (Must Do)
- 3.3.2 Streamline the contract approval process. (Must Do)
- 3.3.3 Develop comprehensive institutional knowledge of acquisition, procurement, contracting law, policy and management. (Must Do)
- 3.3.4 Oversee contract bidding processes to ensure fair and open competition in order to obtain best value for MoD in accordance with the law. (Must Do)
- 3.3.5 Perform technical inspections on contract items prior to acceptance to ensure compliance with specifications. (Must Do)
- 3.3.6 Maintain complete records of all contracting actions and provide reports for the MoD as required. (Must Do)

3.4: DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE LOGISTICS BUDGET (BASED ON WELL-DEFINED REQUIREMENTS) THAT CAN WITHSTAND PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY

- 3.4.1 Develop (or refine existing) consumption tables for each class of supply based on empirical data obtained from the field. (Must Do)
- 3.4.2 Calculate annual requirements for ANA sustainment based on current tashkil authorizations (personnel and equipment). (Must Do)
- 3.4.3 Identify average unit cost/price data for all commodities to be acquired in the coming year(s). (Must Do)
- 3.4.4 Create definitive current-year spend plans for all managed budget activity codes using current-year Approved Budget documents from the MoD's Finance Department. (Must Do)
- 3.4.5 Manage the execution of MoD budget authority for supplies, equipment, maintenance, and logistics support. (Must Do)

6.4 LOO #4: Executive Leadership & Defense Policy

End State: The MoD and GS must be capable of acting as an integral part of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, both externally and internally. They must be able to articulate and communicate a national defense strategy, a defense and military assessment of threats to Afghanistan, and the needed budget to implement this strategy. These offices (with particular emphasis on the four senior leaders and AMoD

S&P) must be able to articulate, formulate, publish and oversee defense and military policy while carrying out all duties and responsibilities as assigned by GIRoA. They must be able to conduct international defense relations, inter-ministerial coordination and outreach to Parliament. These offices must be capable of communicating defense and military objectives, activities and requirements to the people of Afghanistan and the international community. They must be able to provide a strategic framework for and management of plans and policies for developing the force structure of the ANA. The GS senior leaders must be able to ensure the manning, organization, training, materiel acquisition/testing and equipping of the ANA while ensuring adequate sustainment policies and practices are in place. The executive leadership cadre must be able to provide leadership and oversight of subordinate staff, as well as subordinate institutions above Corps. They must be able to exercise command and control of military forces, to include enforcing accountability and personnel standards as required. They must ensure the entire Ministry is managed soundly and with integrity.

OPRs: MINDEF, FDM, AMoD S&P, CoGS, VCoGS, VCoGS-Air

OCRs: STRATCOM, GS G5, MoD PA, TAO, SGM, MoD Legal, MoD IG

Lines of Development (with supporting objectives):

4.1: EMPLOY THE ANA IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MINISTRIES OF GIRoA, WHILE ASSURING CIVILIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONAL FORCES

- 4.1.1 Implement PoA and Parliamentary guidance and intent. (Must Do)
- 4.1.2 Establish strategic level liaison with other ministries. (Must Do)
- 4.1.3 Develop a GIRoA "whole-of-government" concept of employment for a.) COIN, b.) territorial defense and c.) all hazards emergencies. (Must Do)
- 4.1.4 Define, publish and train to a transparent policy for civilian command and control of military forces, with clear delegation for continuity of operations (e.g. deployment orders review process, delegation of civilian control from MINDEF to FDM, etc.). (Must Do)
- 4.1.5. Establish common understanding of roles and missions of other civilian ministries in comprehensive GIRoA security operations. (Must Do)
- 4.1.6. Refine GIRoA "whole-of-government" security force operations through a rigorous assessment and lessons learned process, based upon insights gained through subsequent tranches of Inteqal. (Must Do)
- 4.1.7. Develop executive leaders dependence on NCO leadership as a critical enabler of employment and sustainment activities across the ANA (Must Do)
- 4.1.8. Establish and integrate the Ground Forces Command, ANA Special Ops. Command, Army Support Command and and AAF Headquarters. (Must Do)

4.2: FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT DEFENSE POLICY

- 4.2.1. Solicit and interpret political direction from PoA and translate into strategic guidance; provide defense and military advice to PoA. (Must Do)
- 4.2.2. Assess, identify and prioritize threats to inform strategic planning and policy development. (Must Do)

- 4.2.3. Articulate strategic vision / strategic assessments and translate into strategic planning. (Must Do)
- 4.2.4. Conduct inter ministerial coordination and identify strategic requirements of other ministries for formulating defense policy. (Should Do)
- 4.2.5. Assess political views from Parliament for purposes of refining defense and military policies. (Must Do)
- 4.2.6. Develop and implement policies to support and advance the National Military Strategy. (Must Do)
- 4.2.7. Develop a five-year campaign plan (combining strategic and operational objectives) for purposes of supporting the NMS. (Must Do)
- 4.2.8. Receive policy recommendations from subordinate staff and use recommendations to improve MoD/GS performance of or adherence to NMS. (Should Do)

4.3: ADMINISTER THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MoD AND GS OFFICES

- 4.3.1. Use management bodies (e.g. HDC) to coordinate the MoD and GS activities. Emphasize executive oversight of the generation and sustainment of the ANA. (Must Do)
- 4.3.2. Implement an MoD & GS-wide Education and Training vision to direct improved education, professionalization and administration. (Should Do)
- 4.3.3. Enforce delegation of authority to appropriate OFM level within each office to reduce administrative burden on MoD/GS executive leaders. (Must Do)
- 4.3.4. Ensure & enhance the analytic skills and staff officer skills to allow effective administration of the MoD/GS, especially executive leadership front offices. (Should Do)
- 4.3.5. Establish and professionalize an investigations process for transparent use across the ANA. (Must Do)
- 4.3.6. Improve leadership development, management skills, leadership ethos (Must Do)

4.4: COMMUNICATE AND ADVANCE NMS OBJECTIVES WITH PARLIAMENT, THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC

- 4.4.1. Develop strategic communication campaigns for different audiences to advance MoD/GS interests and the NMS (Must Do)
- 4.4.2. Fully establish and integrate STRATCOM office into MoD/ANA GS activities. (Should Do)
- 4.4.3. Train and empower operational commanders to engage the public locally (Must Do)
- 4.4.4. Develop an analytic and assessment capability in executive leadership support offices that anticipates external audience agendas, concerns and questions. (Should Do)

4.5: MANAGE DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH THE COALITION AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO ADVANCE THE NMS

- 4.5.1. Regularize bilateral defense consultations and conferences in order to create enduring mechanisms for managing defense relations. (Must Do)

- 4.5.2. Participate in joint training activities, in and out-of-country, with the military forces of other nations. (Should Do)
- 4.5.3. Professionalize and institutionalize lines of communication with defense ministries of border countries, regional countries and others as appropriate (e.g. India), and NATO. (Should Do)
- 4.5.4. Develop senior MoD/ANA GS leader abilities to reject or modify coalition or other international offers of assistance in order to avoid or mitigate ANA acceptance of unsustainable or unaffordable systems post-transition. (Must Do)
- 4.5.5. Develop an intelligence cooperation program with priority regional countries and coalition members. (Should Do)

6.5 LOO #5: Resource Management

End State: In accordance with Afghan law and the policies and procedures of the Afghan Ministry of Finance, and in support of the Afghan National Military Strategy (NMS), the Ministry of Defense and General Staff possess a resource management system that enables MoD to submit a properly planned and budgeted 3 year financial plan and budget submission; procure and contract for necessary goods and services; and execute a notional MoD budget up to an annual capacity to meet Afghan needs each year to organize, train, equip, and train the ANA and AAF.

OPRs: MoD-Finance, AMOD – Strategy and Planning, MoD-Inspector General, National Logistics LOO.

OCRs: ANATEC

5.1. Strategic Organizational Planning

- 5.1.1 Establish a 5 year strategic organizational planning system aligned with the MoF Fiscal Policy Units' Medium Term Financial Framework (MTFF) with the primary output called the Medium Term Planning Framework (MTPF). (Must Do)
- 5.1.2 Develop resource planning requirements to effectively train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Army and Air Force. (Must Do)
- 5.1.3 Conduct cost analysis to produce an annual cost estimate of the MTPF and develop cost models to support the strategic organizational and financial planning. (Must Do)

5.2. Financial Planning and Budget Preparation

- 5.2.1. Develop the 3-year financial plan and budget submission per instruction issued by MoF in Budget Circulars 1 and 2 using the MTPF as the primary planning input. (Must Do)
- 5.2.2. Expand use of Budget Planning and Execution Tool (BPET) to all applicable users in Capital Region and the Regional Corps as suggested by MoF-Treasury. (Should Do)

5.2.3. Develop information sharing arrangements to facilitate MoD RM planning processes. (Must Do)

5.3. Budget Execution and Measurement of Planning Outcomes

5.3.1 Develop capability to execute an annual MoD budget up to \$5B USD in accordance with the Afghan Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law, the Procurement Law and MoF direction. (Must Do)

5.3.2. Monitor budget execution against spend plans, produce information that leads to sound current year financial management decisions, and fully implement and utilize the Afghan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) IAW MoF guidance. (Must Do)

5.3.3 Measure contract events against the spend plan which will have a financial impact during the current fiscal and following fiscal years. (Must Do)

5.3.4 Measure the outputs of the budgeted programs execution process comparing the program output to the established objectives in accordance with the Afghanistan National Defense Strategy. (Should Do)

5.3.5 Assess the outcomes of the resource management process against the goals set forth in the NMS. (Must Do)

5.3.6 Audit the MoD resource management process for compliance with GIRoA laws, and with MoF and MoD policy. (Must Do)