Gangs Infiltrating Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies

Intelligence Report

15 January 2010

NATIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE CENTER

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SUBJECT: (U) Gangs Infiltrating Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies

SUMMARY:

(U//LES) Gang infiltration of law enforcement, government, and correctional agencies poses a serious security threat due to the access they have to restricted areas vulnerable to sabotage, sensitive information pertaining to investigations, and access to personal information or protected persons, whom they may view as potential targets for violence. Gang members serving in law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities compromise security, criminal investigations and operations, and agency integrity. Compromised law enforcement officers and correctional staff assist gang members in committing their illicit activities, disrupt legitimate law enforcement efforts to investigate such activities, thereby protecting members from discovery and apprehension. Gang members, gang associates, and their family members most commonly infiltrate law enforcement through non-sworn civilian positions. Police dispatchers and records clerks have access to confidential information than officers do and are not always subjected to in-depth background checks prior to employment. However, a number of gang members and former gang members have served as sworn law enforcement and correctional officers.

Key Findings:

- (U) Gang members infiltrating law enforcement, government, and correctional agencies pose a serious security threat. Former gang members employed by law enforcement, government, and correctional agencies are at risk for targeting by gang members and for reengaging in criminal and gang activity since their allegiances will most always lay with their gang, rather than their agency.

- (U) Gang members often infiltrate law enforcement, government, and correctional agencies through family members, friends, and associates employed by the agency who provide gang members with sensitive information and impede investigations.

- (U) Compromised police officers and correctional staff may assist gang members by using their position in law enforcement to grant favors to criminals operating on the street, incarcerated gang members, smuggle contraband into the facility, shield their illicit activities, and protect them from apprehension.

- (U) African-American and Hispanic gangs appear more likely to engage in deliberate attempts to infiltrate law enforcement and correctional agencies, while White supremacist groups and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) appear to more commonly exploit their family, friends, and associates’ civilian employment with law enforcement.
BACKGROUND:

(U) Gang members have been infiltrating major law enforcement and correctional agencies for decades, compromising institution security and impeding investigations. Several major police agencies and correctional facilities have been corrupted by gang members, with devastating consequences.

- (U) In the late 1980s six of nearly 15 Miami-Dade police officers, also gang members, were convicted of robbery, drug trafficking, murder, and bribery, according to open source reporting. In 2003, 11 Miami-Dade police officers were accused of using throw-down guns and attempting to cover-up misconduct in four questionable shootings between 1995 and 1997.  

- (U) In the mid-1990s a Chicago police officer was charged with working for Gangster Disciples leader, Larry Hoover. In 1997 a Conservative Vice Lords served as a Chicago police officer, according to open source information.

- (U) In 2004 a Denver, Colorado police sergeant was arrested for assisting the Mexican Mafia, according to law enforcement reporting.

- (U//LES) Several years ago, a female Chicago Police Department officer who was dating a Gangster Disciple member, provided sensitive information to the Gangster Disciples, including information on Chicago Police Department and FBI surveillance operations.  

- (U) In the late 1990s, two Los Angles Police Department (LAPD) Rampart Division police officers were gang members who provided security for rappers. One of the officers, a member of the Bloods gang, was involved in the cover-up of a $772,000 bank robbery, shot and framed another person, and stole and resold at least $800,000 of cocaine from LAPD evidence lockers. He is also suspected of murdering rapper Notorious B.I.G. In 2005 a civil lawsuit was dismissed after it was discovered that an LAPD detective withheld information linking the murder to rogue LAPD offices, according to open source reporting.

DETAILS:

(U//LES) White supremacist groups and OMGs have successfully infiltrated and have made numerous attempts to infiltrate law enforcement, military, and government agencies and recruit law enforcement personnel, according to FBI reporting and local law enforcement reporting. Associates and family members OMGs, such as the Hells Angels and the Outlaws, have been employed by police departments, government, courts, and correctional facilities.

- (U//LES) In 2009, a female jail guard who was an Aryan Brotherhood associate employed at the Texas Department of Corrections aided incarcerated Aryan Brotherhood members to communicate by passing messages, according to FBI reporting.
• (U) In July 2006, a former police officer with suspected ties to the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) was charged with civil rights violations involving alleged death threats made against black school children and a black city council member.5

• (U) In June 2006, a state correctional officer at the California Institution for Men in Chino, California was convicted on federal racketeering charges for helping the Nazi Low Riders white supremacist gang distribute drugs and assault other inmates.6

• (U) According to law enforcement and open source reporting, in February 2005 a former Atlanta police officer admitted that he was a lieutenant in the Diablos Motorcycle Gang, and that he assisted the gang with crimes such as robbery and drug trafficking during the course of his employment as an officer. He pleaded guilty to assisting in the abduction of a rival gang member who was severely beaten.

• (U//LES) In March 2001, the National Alliance white supremacist organization engaged in heavy recruitment efforts targeting members of academic institutions, members of the military, and law enforcement officers.7

(U) Several street gang members have successfully infiltrated law enforcement and government agencies. The Latin Kings have infiltrated and have made several attempts to infiltrate law enforcement agencies in New Jersey, New York, and Florida.

• (U//LES) Several Latin King gang members and associates have served as police officers in Union County, New Jersey, according to law enforcement reporting.8

• (U) In 2008, a Latin King member in Connecticut advised FBI officials that his family, all comprised of Latin King members – offered to pay for his education in criminal justice, so that he could work in law enforcement and assist them.9

• (U//LES) In approximately 2004, the Brevard County Sheriff’s Office in Florida recovered job listings for several positions within correctional agencies and court systems during a search of a Latin King member’s residence. Also recovered were letters discussing a plan for gang members without criminal records or tattoos to attain positions of government employment, police, courts, and correctional agencies.10

• (U//LES) In 2000, a Latin King gang leader served as a New York City school safety officer, and several other Latin King gang members were reportedly employed by the New York court system.11

• (U//LES) In 2008 a US Customs and Border Patrol agent in Tucson, Arizona, attended the funeral of his cousin, a gang member, to conduct his own investigation into his cousin’s death. The agent was ultimately terminated from duty.12

(U) Correctional facilities and staff are particularly vulnerable to being infiltrated and compromised by gang members. Several large correctional facilities in California, Texas, Florida,
and New Jersey have been infiltrated by gang members in recent years. Compromised correctional staff pose a serious security threat because they assist gang members by using their position in law enforcement to grant favors to incarcerated gang members, smuggle in illicit items and weapons, and shield inmate’s illicit activities.

- (U) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) facilities have been infiltrated and compromised by gang members numerous times. Dozens of CDCR employees in recent years have been investigated, dismissed, and arrested for their gang associations or for assisting gang members, according to CDCR reporting.\(^{13}\)
  
  - (U//LES) In 2009 a female CDCR employee provided confidential information, including the social security numbers of correctional officers, to her incarcerated husband, a Mexican Mafia member.
  
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  - (U//LES) In approximately 2007, a correctional officer in Salinas Valley granted favors for gang members in his facility, such as opening cell block doors, and manipulating housing assignments.

  - (U//LES) In approximately 2003, a Vagos Motorcycle Club member in Sacramento was employed as a computer technician for the CDCR.

  - (U//LES) In 2002, a female correctional officer at Folsom State Prison was investigated after letters to her inmate husband, a Northern Structure gang leader, were intercepted. The letters revealed sensitive information about the correctional facility and staff.

  - (U//LES) In 2001, the vehicle of a female correctional officer and Blood gang associate employed at Ironwood State Prison was used in a drive-by shooting involving fellow Blood gang members.

  - (U//LES) Several years ago, Corcoran State Correctional Institution hired a former Hispanic gang member. Within five years, he became involved in gang activity and ultimately hired gang members to murder his wife.

- (U) In 2009, a former Texas deputy sheriff and 27 others plead guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and for operating a major methamphetamine trafficking organization in west Texas, Arizona, and in the Modesto, California area since 2003. The sheriff deputy’s co-conspirators, members of the Aces and Eight Outlaw Motorcycle Gang, transported large amounts of U.S. currency from Texas California to purchase large quantities of methamphetamine from co-conspirators. The deputy not only obtained sensitive law enforcement information for the benefit of the conspiracy, but he also disrupted legitimate law enforcement efforts to investigate the conspiracy, thereby protecting it from discovery and its members from apprehension. He aided and abetted prohibited persons in possessing firearms, aided and abetted a co-conspirator in possessing a sawed-off shotgun, and assisted that same co-conspirator in fabricating a statement in an attempt to avoid liability for that illegal shotgun.\(^{14}\)
• (U//LES) A 2009 New Jersey Department of Corrections report revealed that inadequate background investigations on correctional guard applicants and vetting for gang affiliation had resulted in major staff corruption. Corrupt corrections officers and civilian staff visitors have smuggled various contraband, including drugs, weapons, and cell phones into prisons and distributed them to inmates. The investigation further revealed that gangs actively try and infiltrate correctional facilities and that the State Department of Corrections did not examine correctional officer applications for gang affiliations.15

  o (U//LES) In one instance, a female correction officer was found to have smuggled a myriad of drugs, including methamphetamine, into a prison. The Commission was also advised that corrupt staffers can profit by $500 to $1,000 per smuggled cell phone.

  o (U//LES) A gang leader explicitly advised the Commission that when incarcerated gang members discover that correction officers come from their neighborhoods or those of their cohorts, the officers become targets of efforts to coerce them into assisting with a variety of illegal activities, including the smuggling of contraband. One method of doing this, the gang leader stated, is for gang inmates to emphasize to the officers that they know where such officers’ family members live.

• (U//LES) According to a 2007 Florida Department of Law Enforcement gang survey of 17 police agencies, nine agencies reported an attempt by gang members to infiltrate the sworn ranks, and 16 agencies reported gang associates (including girlfriends and family members) attempting to secure employment in civilian positions.16

• (U//LES) Several years ago, a Bloods gang member serving as a correctional officer in a federal prison was terminated after his plans to unlock the cell doors of incarcerated Blood members was revealed.17

(U) Gang members have also infiltrated law enforcement and correctional agencies abroad.

• (U) In January 2010 a New South Wales, New Zealand police employee and outlaw motorcycle gang member was arrested for larceny and the unauthorized release of information obtained from a secure police computer database. The employee provided the sensitive information to members of his biker gang.18

• (U) Prison guards at the Cereso prison in Juarez, Mexico organized and provide weapons for a fatal 2005 gang riot in prison. Prison guards provide members of the Barrio Azteca prison gang with knives, shields, and helmets, and allowed 600 Azteca members into a segregated area housing members of the rival Mexicals gang. The riot, which killed six inmates and left many more injured, was the result of years of lawlessness and corrupt correctional staff at the prison.19
(U) Prepaid cellular telephones allow gang members and criminals to communicate covertly both inside and outside correctional facilities and allow inmates and gang members to conduct gang business such as drug distribution and plan and organize attacks. Compromised correctional staff are largely responsible for smuggling cell phones into prisons and providing them to inmates, often with serious consequences.

- (U) According to open-source and FBI reporting from November 2008, incarcerated Blood gang members in New Jersey planned retaliation against another Blood member outside of prison using prepaid cellular telephones that had been smuggled into the prison, possibly by corrupted prison guards.\(^{20}\)

- (U) In July 2007 an incarcerated Blood gang member in New Jersey issued an execution order on a witness via text message, according to open-source information.\(^{21}\)

(U) **Outlook**

(U) Gang members and former gang members employed by law enforcement and correctional agencies pose a serious security threat to those institutions as well as to the public. Numerous gang members have attempted to or have successfully infiltrated law enforcement, military, government, and correctional agencies with some devastating consequences. Family members, friends, and associates of gang members employed by law enforcement agencies will continue to pose a unique threat because their associations are often overlooked or dismissed, and their illicit activity undetected. Former gang members employed by law enforcement agencies will continue to pose the most serious threat. Despite how long a gang member has been disassociated with their gang, they are still at a high risk for being targeted for infiltration by other gang members and for reengaging in criminal and gang activity since their allegiances will most always lay with their gang, rather than their agency.
Endnotes

2 (U//LES) Chicago Police Department reporting.
4 (U//LES) FBI Dallas reporting, 12 November 2009.
8 (U//LES) Union County Sheriff’s Office, email correspondence, 3 November 2007.
9 (U//LES) FBI, National Gang Intelligence Center reporting, July 2008.
10 (U//LES) FBI Tampa and National Drug Intelligence Center reporting, January 2007.
11 (U//LES) New York State Courts, King County, email correspondence, 25 September 2007.
13 (U//LES) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Special Service Unit; telephone interview; 6 January 2010.
16 (U//LES) Florida Department of Law Enforcement, email correspondence, 12 October 2007.
17 (U//LES) US Bureau of Prisons reporting, 6 January 2010.