National Capital Region (NCR) Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions

Prepared for Exercise Forward Resolve 2010

Draft - October 12, 2010
National Capital Region (NCR) Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions

Draft – October 12, 2010

Prepared for Exercise Forward Resolve 2010

Limited Distribution – For Review and Comment Only
This page intentionally left blank
# Contents

Security Information and Handling Instructions .......................................................... 7

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 8
  Background ................................................................................................................. 8
  Purpose ....................................................................................................................... 8
  Planning Process ....................................................................................................... 9
  Scope ........................................................................................................................... 9
  About the National Capital Region ......................................................................... 10

Overarching Assumptions and Common Findings ....................................................... 11
  Evacuation of Federal Employees ........................................................................... 11
  Basic Assumptions ................................................................................................... 11
  Common Findings .................................................................................................... 11

Summaries by Department/Agency ............................................................................. 13
  United States Congress ............................................................................................ 13
    Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA) ............................................................................. 13
    United States Capitol Police (USCP) ................................................................. 15
  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ......................................................................... 16
  Department of Agriculture ...................................................................................... 18
  Department of Defense ............................................................................................ 19
    Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) ....................... 19
    Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CapMed) ....................... 20
  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ............................................................... 22
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ........................................... 22
    United States Coast Guard ................................................................................... 23
    USCG Sector Baltimore ......................................................................................... 23
    Federal Protective Service (FPS) .......................................................................... 24
    United States Secret Service ................................................................................ 24
  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ........................................................ 25
  Department of the Interior ....................................................................................... 27
  United States Park Police ......................................................................................... 27
  Department of Justice .............................................................................................. 29
    Federal Bureau of Investigation .......................................................................... 30
    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) ......................... 30
    U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) ........................................................................... 31
  Department of State ................................................................................................ 32
  Department of Transportation (DOT) ....................................................................... 34
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ............................................................... 35
  General Services Administration (GSA) ................................................................. 36
Security Information and Handling Instructions

THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED BUT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

Certain actions that federal departments or agencies may take following a catastrophic incident in the National Capital Region may be sensitive. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) have attempted to strike a balance between these security concerns and the objective of providing useful, practical information to NCR stakeholders. Some capabilities or planning assumptions listed in this document may be more detailed than others.

This document may contain sensitive security information that is controlled under the provisions of 49 CFR 1520. No part of this document may be released without the written permission of the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public availability is to be determined under 5 U.S.C. 552.

This is a pre-decisional draft, released to a limited distribution for review and comment only. Do not disseminate.
Introduction

In the event of a catastrophic incident or threat to the National Capital Region (NCR), the significant federal presence would both necessitate and complicate a robust response. In order to facilitate the coordination that would be required for the integration of federal, state, and local response efforts, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEMA Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) have compiled this draft *NCR Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN) of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions.*

For planning purposes, a catastrophic incident is defined in the National Response Framework as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, which results in an extraordinary level of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

Further discussion regarding the nature of catastrophic events, including risk analyses, limitations, and critical assumptions, is provided in the NCR Catastrophic Incident Strategic Plan, finalized on January 2, 2010.

Background

Coordination among federal departments and agencies in the NCR during a catastrophic event is critical to protecting life and property; however, no single comprehensive policy exists to coordinate the protective measures necessary to safeguard the federal workforce during such an event.

State and local jurisdictions within the NCR are responsible for developing emergency operations plans, which include provisions for public safety. The NCR jurisdictions have developed various mechanisms to coordinate emergency management activities, including a Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP), Regional Emergency Support Functions (RESFs), an NCR First Hour Checklist, and various Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). (For more references, please see Appendix B.)

However, there was no established mechanism to coordinate and de-conflict the planning assumptions and potential protective actions that federal agencies may implement following a catastrophic incident in the NCR.

Purpose

The purpose of this CONPLAN is to identify the authorities, responsibilities, and potential actions of key federal departments and agencies that may be relevant during a catastrophic incident in the NCR—particularly an incident that may trigger the large-scale early release of federal employees or mass evacuation of the region.

This CONPLAN represents the first effort to capture the planning assumptions, anticipated coordinating mechanisms, and possible actions that federal departments and agencies may implement within the
This document is not an operational plan, but rather a collection of authorities and assumptions, which will be made available to NCR stakeholders to inform other emergency planning efforts. Nothing in this document supersedes or replaces any other existing plans, authorities, agreements, or responsibilities.

**Planning Process**

In December 2009, representatives from FEMA NCRC and OPM established a new subcommittee of the Joint Federal Committee (JFC), called the NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness Subcommittee (NFWPSC), which guided the development of this CONPLAN.

As part of this effort, FEMA NCRC and OPM staff interviewed representatives from a cross-section of federal agencies to determine:

- Support needed from municipal, county, and state entities during a catastrophic incident in the NCR, given that OPM or other appropriate authority has called for the early release of all federal employees;
- External authorities or responsibilities that may affect the plans or operations of other stakeholders;
- Protective measures or actions that might be taken to protect employees of each agency (particularly measures that might impact other agencies);
- Communications with other agencies regarding the implementation of these actions;
- Information-sharing mechanisms; and
- How actions might be coordinated with state and local jurisdictions.

For the full interview guide, please see Appendix A.

Respondents were given an opportunity to review their interview notes for potentially sensitive information and/or details that may not have been captured correctly. This revised product was then combined with language summarizing department and agency responsibilities that commonly appears in other federal planning documents in order to form the “Summaries by Department/Agency” section.

This draft version of the CONPLAN represents only a preliminary outreach effort to the federal community in the NCR. As this effort progresses, planning assumptions and authorities from additional departments and agencies can be included, and existing summaries can be enhanced.

**Scope**

Because this document is intended to facilitate coordination among NCR stakeholders, the scope of this document is limited to those planning assumptions, authorities, potential actions, and coordination mechanisms that impact other agencies, external partners, or the general public. Therefore, this document does not address any plans, processes, or systems that are intended solely for the internal use of one agency, such as an internal radio system or internal employee notification system. Similarly,
this document does not discuss internal shelter-in-place procedures for federal buildings or other specific protective measures, except where those measures potentially could involve or interfere with the operations or plans of other stakeholders.

About the National Capital Region

The National Capital Region (NCR) was created pursuant to the National Capital Planning Act of 1952, 40 USC 71. The Act defines the NCR as the District of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in the State of Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William Counties in the Commonwealth of Virginia; and all cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area bounded by the outer boundaries of the combined area of said counties. Today, the NCR includes the District of Columbia and eleven local jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The NCR also includes:

- The headquarters location of all three branches of the federal government (Executive, Judicial, Legislative)
- 271 federal departments and agencies
- 340,000 federal workers
- Over 5 million residents
- 2,500 square miles
Overarching Assumptions and Common Findings

Evacuation of Federal Employees

There is currently no comprehensive federal evacuation plan for the NCR. Under current law, only the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia, may issue evacuation orders for their respective jurisdictions.

However, OPM could call for the early release of all federal employees in the NCR, and the White House could change the Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government Condition (COOP/COGCON Level) for all executive departments and agencies, which, when combined, may have the same practical effect as an evacuation of federal employees.

Basic Assumptions

These assumptions are accepted as true for the purpose of the development of the CONPLAN:

1. Each federal department and agency develops, maintains and, when necessary, implements an Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) to protect life and property in federally-occupied space under emergency conditions (41 C.F.R. § 102-71.20).
2. Federal departments and agencies within the NCR have current, approved plans that describe the evacuation and/or shelter-in-place procedures for their facilities and personnel.
3. Such plans anticipate procedures that other agencies may implement that will impact the evacuation of the general public from the NCR during a catastrophic event (e.g., the closure of certain roads surrounding key facilities).
4. State and local emergency management agencies and other stakeholders have developed, or are developing, coordinated plans for catastrophic incident response.
5. OPM develops, maintains and, when necessary, implements emergency dismissal or closure procedures applicable to federal executive branch agencies within the NCR.

Common Findings

Most agencies interviewed:

- Have an Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) for their facilities;
- Have Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans and responsibilities, with an Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) or other cadre of mission-essential personnel that must leave the NCR and relocate to an alternate facility;
- Have principal officials with protective details, who may set up rolling roadblocks in order to move their protectees;
- Use the National Warning System (NAWAS) and/or the Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System (WAWAS), as well as other NCR situational awareness tools and technologies;
• Rely on reporting from the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the NCR desk within the NRCC;
• Maintain their own internal alert/notification systems for their own employees; and
• Defer to OPM for guidance on a decision to release federal employees.

Common coordinating mechanisms include:

• Communications among operations centers;
• NAWAS/WAWAS;
• DHS NOC blast calls; and
• National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) calls for public affairs contacts.
Summaries by Department/Agency

The following section highlights the responsibilities and mission priorities, potential actions, coordination and support activities, and information-sharing mechanisms by department and agency, listed in alphabetical order by department.

United States Congress

Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA)

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities
- As the chief law enforcement officer of the Senate, SAA is charged with maintaining safety and security in Senate areas of the U.S. Capitol and all Senate office buildings, as well as protection of the members themselves.
- SAA is responsible for immediate supervision of the Senate floor, chambers, and its galleries.
- SAA has the authorization to arrest and detain any person violating Senate rules.
- Decision-making power resides with Senate leadership.

Coordination and Support
In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the Senate Sergeant at Arms (SAA) would work closely with the House and USCP to coordinate a response. SAA has scenario-based processes in place to address specific threats. Typically, SAA and the Leadership Offices collaborate to come to a decision and present a course of action to Senate Leadership.

- The Senate is its own sovereign entity and has the authority to make decisions independent of OPM guidance.
- Each individual Senate office has the authority to make decisions independent of the recommendation of the SAA (e.g., Members may choose to release their own employees, activate COOP plans, etc.)
- SAA has the authority to work with USCP on protective details.
- SAA is a member of the Capitol Police Board.

During National Special Security Events (NSSEs), representatives from SAA participate in various emergency coordination centers such as the Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC), Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), etc.

Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Capital Police (USCP); U.S. Park Police (USPP); U.S. House of Representatives Sergeant at Arms; Architect of the Capitol.

Potential Actions
In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by the SAA:
• In consultation with USCP, roadway barriers could be put up and would stay up until the identified threat passes.
• Supporting barriers, outside of Capitol Square, could also be activated.
• Mutual aid agreements could go into effect with identified partners.
• Protective measures include:
  o Evacuation to an approved assembly area
  o Relocation to an “unknown-in-advance location” and/or
  o Internal relocation to a defined space with enhanced respiratory equipment.

**Information Sharing**
SAA coordinates closely with USCP, who ultimately disseminates information to relevant agencies. The information-sharing activities taken by the SAA are a derivative of the directions given by USCP. Various means of communicating, such as fire alarms, the public address system, and alert messages to mobile devices, and are used to disseminate information. SAA also has an automated accountability system – ALERTS – that channels information on staff and OEP groups to USCP.
Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

- USCP has exclusive law enforcement jurisdiction within the Capitol Grounds and extended jurisdiction, abutting Capitol Grounds, shared with Metropolitan Police and United States Park Police.
- The Chief of Police has the authority to make decisions regarding protective actions, and may make such decisions independently of the Executive Branch or local government to insure the security of the Capitol Grounds and Member of Congress.

Potential Actions

In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by USCP:

- USCP could initiate a “lockdown” of the Capitol grounds to restrict entry to the Capitol or House and Senate Office Buildings.
- Traffic barriers could be erected within the Capitol Grounds, including on Independence and Constitution Avenues, to prevent access for all non-emergency vehicles during an emergency. (The Metropolitan Police Department would be notified immediately.)

Coordination and Support

In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, USCP would coordinate closely with key stakeholders (e.g. Sergeant at Arms of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Architect of the Capitol), and federal and local law enforcement partners to facilitate the safe movement of evacuees while insuring the security of the Capitol Complex.

Information Sharing

The USCP Command Center is the nexus of information sharing and communication with the Congressional community, key stakeholders, and government partners. Full-time liaison officers are assigned to the USCP Command Center by the U.S. Supreme Court Police and the Metropolitan Police Department to facilitate emergency communications and general operational awareness. A range of internal notification systems are used to provide emergency action messages to USCP personnel, stakeholders, the Congressional community, and visitors.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

In the event of a mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the Security Protective Service would be responsible for coordinating protective actions for the CIA. In addition to their responsibilities as first responders, the Security Protective Service is also responsible for planning, preparedness, and coordination efforts in advance of any such response.

- The officers of the CIA Security Protective Service are a federal law enforcement officers and have law enforcement jurisdiction in the federal facilities under their protection.
- The Security Protective Service has established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the NCR jurisdiction of Fairfax County to control roads and direct traffic in the areas immediately surrounding the facilities under their jurisdiction.

Potential Actions

- If there is an order to evacuate/release, the CIA Security Protective Service could station police officers at major intersections on and adjacent to the entrances and exits to CIA-controlled facilities to control the flow of vehicular traffic, according to established MOUs. Coordination with local jurisdictions (e.g., VDOT and Fairfax County) would take place during all actions.
- The CIA Security Protective Service could send a representative to the local NCR jurisdiction’s EOC to coordinate actions requested by the agency. For example, the CIA Security Protective Service has a desk at the FFX EOC and have established relationships the FFX EOC personnel to facilitate more effective and timely coordination.
- The Security Protective Service could coordinate with the local and state jurisdictions to reset the timing of traffic lights to support increased traffic flow from their impacted facilities via established evacuation routes. The CIA Incident Management Team would depend on pre-existing protocols established with the local NCR jurisdictions and partner federal agencies.
- In the event of any direct impact to CIA facilities and personnel, the initial response would be taken by the CIA Security Protective Service. The relevant local jurisdiction would support any secondary response, such as the Fairfax County or College Park Fire and Police Departments.

Coordination and Support

The CIA Security Protective Service has an established relationship with the Fairfax County Office of Emergency Management (FFX OEM), and the two agencies regularly coordinate and participate in joint exercises.

In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the Security Protective Service would coordinate with the local jurisdictions where CIA facilities are located through their emergency operations centers and with federal partners through established means of coordination. Examples include coordination with FFX OEM through the Fairfax Emergency Operations Center (FFX EOC) and the U.S. Park Police (USPP).
The CIA coordinates its emergency plans with the Virginia Department of Transportation, Virginia State Police, Fairfax County OEM, Fairfax County Police and Fire Departments, and the U.S. Park Police. They participate in area exercises with these entities.

Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Park Police

Information Sharing

The CIA Security Protective Service works directly with both federal and local partners. The CIA works regularly with Fairfax County for information sharing, planning, and coordination between federal and local jurisdictions. The primary means that the Security Protective Service would use to coordinate and share information with their local jurisdiction partners during an emergency would be through the local jurisdiction’s EOC. The Threat Management Unit of the CIA Security Protective Service is directly integrated with Fusion Centers and the CIA communicates via all available means (i.e. voice, data, text messages, etc.) with the other D/As. Additional tools such as IronGate – a data terminal that federal partners can use to monitor, match, and share information – are used to coordinate information and provide situational awareness.
Department of Agriculture

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

The USDA does not have external actions or responsibilities during a catastrophic event that will impact the NCR region.

The USDA relies heavily on the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to respond to incidents affecting their facilities. However, approximately three-quarters of USDA security personnel are designated as special police officers. The USDA special police hold warrants in D.C. to manage traffic and execute arrests.

Potential Actions

USDA security guards will take initial action during an incident, but the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and/or D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services (FEMS) will take over once they arrive at the scene.

Information Sharing

The USDA uses the following information-sharing tools:

- WAWAS
- Roam Secure
- FEMA NCR Watch Desk / NOC Watch Desk alerts
- WebEOC
- Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)

Coordination and Support

USDA participates in exercises with neighboring agencies, to include the Smithsonian and the Department of Energy. When releasing federal personnel, USDA relies on decisions from the Office of Personnel Management.
Department of Defense

Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR)

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities
Joint Forces Headquarters–National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) plans, coordinates, maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs forces for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities in the National Capital Region Joint Operations Area to safeguard the Nation’s capital.

In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, JFHQ-NCR would review force protection measures to perform an assessment or gather intelligence to determine if a coordinated attack was taking place.

JFHQ-NCR has the following relevant authorities:

- Immediate response authority. (The Commander can immediately respond without Presidential approval if the response prevents loss of life, suffering, or damaged critical infrastructure.)
- Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). In this capacity, JFHQ-NCR would respond in accordance with the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System.

Coordination and Support
During an incident or National Special Security Event (NSSE), JFHQ-NCR has 13 locations where liaison officers are stationed. Close coordination with DCHSEMA, USCG, and PFPA would also take place.

JFHQ-NCR would look for support from federal police escorts to move initial operational forces downtown, enabling response teams such as the Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) to respond. State or Federal police escorts are preferred since they have the authority to move through multiple jurisdictions.

Emergency plans, such as the base plan that exercises emergency preparedness within the NCR, are tested during exercises such as Capitol Shield. JFHQ-NCR works with state and local entities on exercising these plans.

Key Federal Stakeholders: USSS; FEMA; USCP; Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); USPP; FBI; DC HSEMA; USCG Baltimore/DC.

Potential Actions
In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by JFHQ-NCR:

- Activate initial operational forces
- COOP to alternate site locations
- Implement protective measures, including:
Raising force protection levels
- Increasing inspections, such as the inspection of every car, building, etc.
- Closing particular building(s)
- Closing installations
- Evacuating to an approved assembly area
- Deploying quick reaction forces (e.g., armed soldiers)

**Information Sharing**
JFHQ-NCR uses several systems to disseminate, receive, and share information. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) performs 24x7 strategic watch and situational awareness of the NCR. The JOC maintains a common operating picture and oversight for air, maritime, and land domain. Several forms of communication are used to disseminate information, such as NAWAS and WAWAS. WebEOC, a web-enabled crisis information management system, is used to share information real-time.

**Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CapMed)**

**Responsibilities and Mission Priorities**
When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense through USNORTHCOM, JFHQ-NCR transitions to the Joint Task Force-National Capital Region (JTF-NCR), assumes command and control of military forces, and provides timely consequence management response in order to assist civil authorities to establish control of the situation, save lives, mitigate human suffering and facilitate recovery operations. JTF-NCR will respond to Requests for Assistance (RFA) in accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF) and DoD policy and guidance. JTF CapMed will provide direct support to JTF-NCR as the “Functional Medical Component.” JTF CapMed, J5 Plans Division develops the plans to support the JTF-NCR in response to all-hazards in the NCR and JTF CapMed, J3 Current Operations implements these plans.

**Key Federal Stakeholders:** Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).

**JTF CapMed has the following relevant authorities:**

- **Immediate response authority.** The Commander can immediately respond without Presidential approval if the response prevents loss of life, suffering, or damaged critical infrastructure at the request of civil authorities.¹
- **Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).** In this capacity, JTF CapMed would support JTF-NCR response in accordance with the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System.

---

Potential Actions

The following list provides possible actions that could be taken by JTF CapMed in support of JFHQ-NCR in response to a catastrophic event in the NCR:\(^2\)

- All military medical units will be prepared to provide medical response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) event and/or Consequence Management operations.
- The National Naval Medical Center (NNMC), Bethesda, MD, is the primary medical receiving facility for CBRNE event casualties.
- JTF CapMed, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), the NNMC, and the DeWitt Army Community Hospital (DACH) will establish and maintain a Tier II or Tier III-level Operations Center, depending on the JTF-NCR Tier level, as directed by the JTF-NCR Joint Operations Center (JOC).
- The WRAMC, NNMC, and the DACH will be prepared to provide medical response teams (the number and type to be determined by JTF CapMed).
- Military medical forces will be prepared to provide advanced cardiac/trauma life support (ACLS/ATLS) teams, as requested.
- Military medical forces will be prepared to provide ambulance buses with drivers and associated medical personnel to provide expanded care to first aid sites in support and in the vicinity of a CBRNE event site.
- JTF CapMed will be prepared to accept tactical control of additional aerial or ground medical evacuation assets.
- Military medical treatment facilities will implement established Memoranda of Understanding with civilian medical facilities as necessary.

Coordination and Support

JTF CapMed will provide liaison personnel at the JTF-NCR JOC to coordinate requests for military medical support during a catastrophic incident. JTF CapMed uses telephone landlines, e-mail, and handheld radios for communications and to maintain a common operating picture.

JTF CapMed conducts collective training and provides real-world Health Service Support (HSS) during Exercise Capital Shield in support of JFHQ-NCR and DSCA.

---

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) maintains situational awareness 24x7, and would monitor a significant developing incident and maintain connectivity with other operations centers as necessary. The Secretary DHS, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), is the Principal Federal Official for National Incident Management. The DHS Crisis Action Team (CAT) may activate to provide National-level crisis action planning, operations coordination and decision support to the Secretary DHS.

The DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (DHS OPS) may coordinate federal information sharing and reporting through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), via a new incident tab in the Federal Operations (FedOps), Emergency Management (EM), and Law Enforcement (LE) Communities of Interest (COI).

The DHS Office of Public Affairs may activate the National Joint Information Center (NJIC) at the DHS Nebraska Avenue Complex (DHS NAC) and/or activate a National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) call.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA is the lead agency responsible for emergency management, response and recovery planning, and coordination in relation to a natural disaster or other emergency. FEMA may operate from the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA Headquarters and/or the Region III Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Philadelphia, PA.

FEMA will be postured at the field, local, Regional, and National levels to provide an integrated response to any potential Stafford Act declaration that would direct federal consequence management support to the National Capital Region in response to an incident.

Nationally, FEMA will support information-sharing from the field, local, and regional levels to national leadership via the NRCC watch desk to the DHS NOC.

The RRCC will provide the regional mechanism for federal technical assistance, resources, and coordination on planning, response and recovery activities for incidents in the RIII area of responsibility (to include the National Capital Region). A RIII Liaison as well as a RIII Defense Coordinating Element Liaison may be deployed to the District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (DC HSEMA).

Mobile Emergency Response System (MERS) assets may provide direct communication support.
United States Coast Guard

In the event of a mass evacuation or release of the federal workforce within the NCR, USCG would coordinate with DHS, the Military District of Washington (MDW) and OPM.

(Additional information to be added at a later date.)

USCG Sector Baltimore

Coordination and Support

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Baltimore would have an operational role following a catastrophic incident in the NCR.

Sector Baltimore has a small boat station with about 25 members assigned at Bolling AFB. In the event of a mass evacuation, USCG Sector Baltimore will heighten the maritime security posture on the Potomac River (MARSEC level) and possibly coordinate the use of cruise boats and other vessels of opportunity to evacuate people by water to the south. USCG has domain over vessels crossing under bridges on navigable waters.

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

USCG Sector Baltimore has COOP responsibilities for senior flag officers at Coast Guard Headquarters, and if necessary, the Secretary of DHS. Upon request from USSS, Sector Baltimore would facilitate the maritime evacuation of POTUS and any other official under USSS protection.

USCG Sector Baltimore also has the responsibility of establishing an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) which is a community of maritime security partners. The AMSC works together as a unified team and membership is based on connection to maritime security. USCG Sector Baltimore has a maritime search and rescue responsibilities during an event. USCG Sector Baltimore has limited COOP evacuation role but provides support to DOD for higher-level government personnel.

Information Sharing

USCG Sector Baltimore receives intelligence information via the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). AMSC members are subscribers to the Alert Warning System (AWS) which is used to communicate with state, local, and other partners.
Federal Protective Service (FPS)

Mission Priorities
The mission of FPS is to deter, respond to, and investigate threats, crimes, acts of civil disobedience, and acts of terrorism directed at federal facilities or occupants and to support the lead agency in assuring the safety and security of federal employees. FPS has full law enforcement and security services responsibilities to for federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration.

Potential Actions
In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by FPS:

- DC HSEMA would be notified of the situation and forthcoming actions.
- District officers would be contacted to coordinate actions.
- Roads surrounding the perimeters of the incident could be shut down.
- Protective measures are dependent on the situation. A possible resource is the use of guard staff who act as a supplemental force that can be deployed as needed.

Coordination and Support
In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, FPS would look for support from various partners. For example, FPS works closely with the Metropolitan Police Department and the Metro Transit Police Department. Mechanisms are in place to coordinate actions through the Mega Center, a dispatch center that facilitates the FPS response to an incident.

Information Sharing
Communication is coordinated primarily through the Mega Center or by the Incident Commander. FPS also uses a Regional Intelligence Agent who shares intelligence products among federal, state, and local levels. During an incident, information is disseminated to the Mega Center, which informs the GSA Building Manager and security points of contact for the affected facilities. In addition, FPS would contact every person on the affected buildings' emergency contact list, and contact state and local entities with jurisdiction where the incident occurs.

United States Secret Service

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities
In the event of a catastrophic incident within the NCR, USSS personnel would deploy to alternate work sites and other field offices. There are numerous mission-critical employees that would carry out Mission Essential Functions as Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) members. These personnel would need to travel to continuity sites or would ingress into the city to carry out the USSS mission of safeguarding designated protectees. Coordination would occur with various D/As in the jurisdiction(s) in which the incident(s) are occurring.
USSS has a responsibility to carry out their mission and ensure the well-being of protectees as well as safeguarding the country’s financial strength. In this capacity, USSS has the authority to travel into the city even if an order has been issued to evacuate the NCR. Therefore, ingress procedures are critical and the recognition of credentialing remains vital to secure the USSS mission and carry out their authorities.

**Potential Actions**

Unarmed USSS personnel would be released to go to their private residences or to move away from the site of the incident. Armed personnel would be responding to the situation or would have other mission-critical responsibilities.

To address USSS core mission requirements, the protection of protectees would remain the essential goal, and potential actions would follow suit accordingly. USSS would work with the White House Military Office and other federal, state, and local partners to ensure the safety and security of designated protectees. USSS would also continue to secure facilities (e.g., the White House, Vice President’s residence, Embassy Row, etc.). Depending on the nature of the threat or incident, road closures and motorcades could occur and could extend to every Department Head and Cabinet member – necessitating coordination with various D/As.

**Coordination and Support**

During motorcades, close coordination would take place with the affected jurisdiction. For example, if an incident happened near Baltimore Washington International Airport, coordination would occur with Prince George’s County Police Department, Maryland State Police Department, and United States Park Police. The exact location and nature of the incident would determine the specific entities with which USSS would coordinate.

It should be noted that it is important for emergency personnel to be educated on the process of credentialing for road blocks. Vehicles driven by USSS personnel often do not contain markings; therefore, it is critical that USSS credentials are recognized so that personnel are allowed to ingress during an evacuation or critical incident.

**Information Sharing**

Communication between USSS and other D/As is done primarily through the Government and Public Affairs office at USSS. The Operations Center is intelligence-driven and therefore does not communicate with other D/A’s operations centers on a daily basis for non-protective threat information. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) at USSS directly supports the protectees and is utilized for specific areas of operation.

**Transportation Security Administration (TSA)**

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. The Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), located at the Freedom Center in Herndon, VA, conducts routine steady-state operations on a 24x7 basis. The center provides domain and situational awareness, immediate notification, and initial
response actions, for threats and incidents involving the security of the transportation sector. TSA has
designated the TSOC as its incident management center.

Following a significant incident, TSA may deploy Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR)
teams, which may consist of Transportation Security Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors,
Behavioral Detection Officers, Federal Air Marshals, Explosives Security Specialists, and/or canine teams,
to the following transportation modes:

- Light Commuter Rail
- Heavy Commuter Rail
- Commercial Aviation Airports

TSA may deploy certified explosives detection canine teams with state and local law enforcement
handlers, at the request of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), through their
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) to augment security in mass
transportation venues.
**Responsibilities and Mission Priorities**

The mission of the United States Park Police is to provide law enforcement services to designated National Park Service areas within the National Capitol Region, and its two Field Offices in New York City and San Francisco, California. The USPP is the primary law enforcement agency in all of the National Parks in the District of Columbia and its environs. The USPP protects the Nation’s Icons (to include the Statue of Liberty, the Washington Monument, as well as the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials); prevents and detects criminal activity; conducts investigations; apprehends violators of federal, state, and local laws; coordinates special events and First Amendment activities; and provides protection of the President and other government officials of the United States. Approximately 20-23% of Washington, D.C. is National Park Service property.

USPP has the following relevant authorities:

- D.C. Code Ann. 5-201: The U.S. Park Police has the same jurisdiction in D.C. as MPD and can execute the same authorities and/or work in conjunction with MPD.
- USPP has authority on National Park Service designated Reservations and Park areas across the country.
- USPP signed an MOU with Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) for the use of resources throughout the NCR.

**Potential Actions**

In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by USPP:

- During events/evacuations, USPP primary responsibility is visitor and icon protection. The USPP will also partner with DC HSEMA, MPD, DDOT, VDEM, VSP, and VDOT to facilitate the evacuation of vehicles and pedestrians. During an evacuation, the GW Parkway initially would be used as an evacuation route; however, the USPP (with the assistance of the NPS and other partner agencies) would attempt to close the GWMP between I-495 and Memorial Bridge, which would then be used for emergency/authorized vehicles only. Memorial Bridge will not be designated as a walk-out option; however, self-evacuation is likely to occur.
- USPP has jurisdiction over the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, but that route is not anticipated to be closed during an incident.
- Rock Creek Parkway will be used as an egress route out of the city.
- During an incident, USPP cannot go below “minimum staffing” for critical infrastructure/key resources (Memorials, Monuments, etc.) because of the mandate to protect these areas.
- USPP will bring in staff from outlying districts to harden up the downtown areas.
- Memorials (excluding the Washington Monument) will become a safe haven during weather events; otherwise, resources will be used to move people away from the area.
Certain landing zones for air support would be in use during a mass casualty scenario.

**Coordination and Support**

In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, USPP would work closely with the National Park Service, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DC FEMS), Virginia State Police (VSP), and Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM). The USPP coordinates actions with MPD and DC FEMS on a daily basis and directly, “dispatch to dispatch.” USPP will often coordinate with MPD and DC FEMS during an event on federal property as they have shared jurisdiction. Officers from USPP frequently staff the Joint Operations Center and DC HSEMA emergency operations center during major events. WMATA is another key partner with which USPP routinely coordinates.

USPP works directly with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) in planning for a walk-out of downtown D.C. and for the appropriate use of bridges.

FPS is a partner of USPP, and has jurisdiction inside DOI agencies, which is the parent agency of the USPP.

**Information Sharing**

All USPP dispatchers have access (read only) to WebEOC, but there is some hesitation to post law enforcement sensitive information on this tool. USPP relies on CAPWIN to obtain and share information. Additionally, USPP uses the following information-sharing mechanisms:

- RICCS
- HSIN
- LEO
- FBI JTTF and NJTF
Department of Justice

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

Duties of the U.S. Department of Justice during a catastrophic incident include:

- Advising the President and department and agency heads on legal issues relating to government operations during the incident, and representing the Executive Branch when it is a party to legal proceedings. More generally, providing legal guidance and oversight in matters requiring a federal law enforcement response.
- Protecting and providing security for federal court personnel and designated Executive Branch officials.
- Where appropriate, initiating actions to investigate, prevent, disrupt, contain, and prosecute criminal acts presented by an incident.
- Overseeing federal law enforcement support to state and local governments in responding to civil disturbances, including oversight of the use of federal military personnel pursuant to the Insurrection Act, when invoked by the President.
- Conducting federal law enforcement activities and coordinate the federal law enforcement response as needed with state and local partners.
- Providing federal law enforcement assistance to state and local law enforcement organizations when requested to aid in the enforcement of state law.
- Approving requests submitted by state governors pursuant to the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance (EFLEA) provisions of the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, 10 U.S.C. § 10501, for personnel and other federal law enforcement support.
- Coordinating ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security) functions of the National Response Framework through the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

Key offices in the NCR (judicial districts):

- U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
- U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
- U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

The FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for domestic intelligence, terrorism investigations, hostage rescue, and counterterrorism actions. During a significant incident, the Combined Tactical Operations Center (CTOC) and multi-agency Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) at the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) may be utilized, in addition to the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters.

During an incident, the FBI will focus on its lead agency responsibilities for crisis response, counterterrorism, intelligence, investigative and crime scene operations where jurisdiction exists, and related aspects of the event for which the FBI has jurisdiction.

WFO personnel will respond to incidents as required, and other agencies with operational roles in safety and security related to the event may be represented in the CTOC. District of Columbia Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) special agents and task force officers will investigate any terrorism incidents or criminal acts requiring an FBI investigative response. WFO Special Agent Bomb Technicians, HAZMAT Response Team, Evidence Response Team, SWAT assets, and WMD countermeasures assets may respond to any incidents requiring their capabilities.

[Additional information to be added at a later date.]

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

ATF protects our communities from violent criminals, criminal organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and storage of explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts of terrorism, and the illegal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products. During a critical incident, ATF will provide support to lead agencies, or serve as a lead agency, as appropriate. ATF will work cooperatively to provide assistance to prevent, mitigate or resolve an incident. Further, ATF serves as the Department of Justice agent to coordinate assistance to law enforcement under the National Response Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function 13 (Public Safety and Security).

ATF’s Joint Support Operations Center (JSOC) will maintain situational awareness following a significant or catastrophic incident. The JSOC is ATF’s 24/7 operations center that provides coordination and communication support for ATF’s national law enforcement functions. The JSOC monitors critical and catastrophic incidents, provides emergency and executive notifications, and serves as a round-the-clock access point for ATF assistance. Incidents in the National Capital Region will receive initial responses from Washington and/or Baltimore Field Divisions, with back-up support from national assets. All requests for assistance for ATF resources may be made through the JSOC or field division contacts.

ATF personnel will respond to assist federal, state and local agencies, as required. Assets may include Special Agent (SA) investigators, SA Certified Explosives Specialists, SA Certified Fire Investigators, Explosives Enforcement Officers, Special Response Teams (SWAT), National Response Team (multi-disciplinary post-fire/post-blast investigative assets), and canine teams.
640 U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)

641 Responsibilities and Mission Priorities
642 The United States Marshals Service (USMS) is responsible for several protection missions involving
643 selected government officials. The USMS would augment other law enforcement agencies in the event
644 of an ESF #13 activation.

645 The USMS maintains the USMS Communications Center, which is a 24/7 operations facility that
646 maintains contact with all USMS districts and divisions as well as providing full field support with critical
647 law enforcement databases and other mission support.
Department of State

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is responsible for the protection of the Secretary of State, other high-ranking State Department officials, and is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for protection of foreign dignitaries below the rank of head of state. DS also has protective coverage for the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, designated as a Cabinet-level position.

The Department of State has the following responsibilities:

- Responsibility for protection of all State Department facilities and staff.
- Shares authorities with the U.S. Secret Service – Uniformed Division for protective measures for foreign officials and embassies.

Coordination and Support

In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the State Department would work closely with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Federal Protective Service (FPS), and Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

There is close coordination with several nearby federal departments and agencies, including the Federal Reserve, Pan American Health Organization, U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and the Institute of Peace, as well as nearby buildings that house non-governmental organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross and American Pharmacists Association). There is a process of notification from the Department of State to these stakeholders if an incident occurs.

If State Department facilities need to be evacuated, the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and FPS would protect the perimeter of the facilities, and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) would protect the streets surrounding the facilities.

The Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security has coordinated with some of the individual embassies within the District of Columbia; however, no overall coordinated effort for joint planning or exercising with foreign embassies is in place.

Key Federal Stakeholders: U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division; Federal Protective Service (FPS).

Potential Actions

In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by the Department of State:

- Diplomatic Security uniformed officers (contractors) have Special Deputy U.S. Marshal (SDUSM) status when performing State Department protective missions – to include expanding the security perimeter and potentially closing streets in the vicinity of the main State Department complex.
During an incident, the Department of State may request that streets surrounding foreign embassies be closed off; however, they do not have the authority or assets to implement this and would rely on the USSS – Uniformed Division and MPD to implement this action.

The Department has the authority to close off International Place; however, they do not have the assets to implement/enforce this and would rely on the USSS – Uniformed Division and MPD to implement this action.

The Department coordinates the movement of visiting dignitaries to and from State Department facilities.

**Information Sharing**

The State Department depends on its operations centers for sending and receiving incident related information. There are several operations centers:

- Security Control Center – domestic focus for facility security and protection
- Diplomatic Security Command Center – international focus
- Emergency Management Center – manages day-to-day situational awareness for domestic facility operations and safety, and is the central location for managing emergencies impacting domestic facilities

Additionally, the Department’s centers use the following information-sharing tools for external information-sharing:

- NAWAS/WAWAS
- WebEOC
- Domestic Events Network (DEN)
Department of Transportation (DOT)

The Department of Transportation Crisis Management Center (CMC) is staffed 24x7 and will serve as a first point of contact for federal transportation inquiries.

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

DOT has authority under the direction of the President to exercise leadership in transportation matters, including matters affecting national security and national or regional emergencies.

- DOT has the authority to waive certain safety regulation during emergency situations.
- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can stop, redirect, or exclude any movement in the navigable airspace of the United States.
- Any movement by a rail carrier in the United States, including commuter rail, but excluding urban rapid transit not connected to the general system of rail transportation, can be stopped, redirected, or limited by the combined authority of the Surface Transportation Board (STB) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
- Upon declaration of a regional or local emergency, either by the President, designated Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) officials, or appropriate state or local officials, FMCSA regulations automatically provide temporary relief from specific safety regulations to any motor carrier or driver operating a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) to provide direct emergency assistance during the emergency regardless of the commodity involved.
  - This regulatory relief includes hours of service requirements; driver qualification requirements; CMV operation, inspection, repair and maintenance requirements; and employee safety and health standards.
  - This does not provide relief from the requirements for a Commercial Drivers License (CDL), controlled substances and alcohol testing, or motor carrier financial responsibility/insurance: However, the CDL regulations themselves include a number of exceptions, which apply at all times, not just during emergencies.
- For pipelines, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration has authority to issue an administrative order suspending or restricting operation of a gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility without prior notice and hearing if it determines that continued operation of the pipeline facility is or would be hazardous, and failure to issue the order expeditiously will result in likely serious harm to life, property or the environment.

Coordination and Support

In the event of a mass evacuation of the NCR, DOT would coordinate with DC HSEMA and the Public Safety Transportation Operations Center (PSTOC). In lieu of direct support, DOT would look to those agencies to gain a common operating picture and to maintain situational awareness. Crowd control, road safety, first aid, and traffic control would also be addressed.

When drills are being performed by NORTHCOM, emergency coordinators inform DOT and share information on the drills. During National Special Security Events (NSSEs), a DOT liaison is often sent to DC HSEMA. DOT also works closely with the various state departments of transportation.
**Information Sharing**

DOT uses several systems to disseminate, receive, and share information. The primary means to disseminate information is by e-mail and telephone. In the near future, WebEOC, a web-enabled crisis information management system, will be used to share information real-time. The Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System (WAWAS) is tested every day for operational accuracy.

**Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)**

The FAA staffs the Air Security Operations Center (ASOC) at the Freedom Center with other interagency members and will coordinate and manage aviation and airspace security incidents via the Domestic Events Network (DEN). The DEN is a 24x7 controlled-access unsecured conference call between FAA Air Traffic Security Coordinators, major air traffic control facilities, NORAD, and other entities associated with the national aerospace system and airspace security matters.
General Services Administration (GSA)

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities
During an emergency, the GSA National Capital Region primary function is to provide reconstitution services to the Federal Executive Branch, and the Legislative and Judicial branches when requested, in the form of real estate, work space, and acquisition of supplies and services. GSA NCR offers a wide range of products and services including vehicle/fleet management, procurement, real estate, communications and information technology. GSA NCR owns or leases over 750 buildings in the National Capital Region.

The GSA NCR area of responsibility encompasses all of Washington, D.C., the Virginia cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, the Virginia counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William, and the Maryland counties of Montgomery and Prince George.

GSA is also the co-lead with FEMA on Emergency Support Function #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support.

Coordination and Support
In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, GSA-NCR would work closely with GSA headquarters and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). They would seek to maintain real-time situational awareness via the GSA headquarters Emergency Operations Center and access to various local and national information sources such as WAWAS. GSA-NCR would also be in close communication/coordination with the FPS Mega Center.

GSA-NCR is open to interagency or neighborhood coordination and planning efforts and has been involved in some regional interagency activities, including the Eagle Horizon exercise series.

Key Federal Stakeholders: Federal Protective Service (FPS); all federal departments and agencies with GSA-owned or leased building space.

Potential Actions
In response to the mass release of federal personnel or an evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by GSA:

- Possible staggered release of GSA personnel (situation dependent).
- If necessary, GSA has the authority to shut down GSA owned/leased buildings with a federal presence.

The decision to take any of these actions would be made by the GSA NCR Senior Emergency Response Team (SERT).

Information Sharing
GSA NCR coordinates closely with GSA headquarters and FPS for situational awareness. GSA uses Law Enforcement Online (LEO) for situational awareness and collaboration.
Office of Personnel Management

Responsibilities and Mission Priorities

OPM is the “personnel manager” for the federal government. In the event of the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, OPM would be involved in a National Capital Regional coordination call, similar to the “snow call,” on which regional stakeholders would discuss the potential release of the federal workforce as a result of an incident. Prior to this call, OPM leadership would gather information to inform the decision of the OPM Director about a potential release. The coordination call would finalize the decision. Options for the federal government operating status during an incident include: closure, release, and delay.

- The OPM Director has the authority through the Closure and Dismissal Policy to provide guidance to executive level departments and agencies regarding the status of federal government operations for closure, release and/or delay.
- During an incident, the OPM Director has the authority, along with the Incident Commander, to make the decision regarding the operating status of the federal government.

OPM does not have the authority to order an evacuation of the federal government, but works closely with the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the respective governors of Virginia and Maryland (and local infrastructure), when an evacuation of the federal workforce is necessary.

Potential Actions

In response to the mass release of federal personnel or evacuation of the NCR, the following list provides possible actions that could be taken by OPM:

- OPM Director makes the decision regarding the operating status of federal government, to include: closure, release, and/or delay.
- Hosting a “coordination call,” similar to the “snow call,” with regional stakeholders to finalize the decision of the federal government operating status.
- Communication of the decision of the federal government operating status to the federal workforce, general public, and the media.

Coordination and Support

In the event of a catastrophic incident, OPM would work closely with the Federal Protective Service (FPS), DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DC FEMS), Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (DC HSEMA), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG).

Key Federal Stakeholders: Federal Protective Service (FPS); FEMA.

Information Sharing

OPM depends on its Situation Room for sending and receiving incident-related information. The Situation Room monitors several different state, local, regional, and national systems for the latest
incident-related information. The Situation Room has several standard operating procedures (SOPs) addressing a wide range of potential incidents (all hazards).

Additionally, the Situation Room uses the following information-sharing tools:

- NAWAS/WAWAS
- WebEOC
- FAA Domestic Events Network (DEN)
- RICCS
Administration and Maintenance

FEMA NCRC and OPM, in conjunction with key planning partners in the NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness Subcommittee, will test and validate the CONPLAN through an exercise process. Based on the results of the exercise(s), the CONPLAN will be revised.

The CONPLAN will be maintained and updated by FEMA NCRC with the assistance of OPM.
Appendix A: Interview Guide

Background

In the event of a catastrophic incident or threat to the NCR, the significant federal presence would both necessitate and complicate a robust response. In order to facilitate the coordination that would be required for the integration of federal, state, and local response elements, OPM and NCRC are compiling an “NCR Federal Concept Plan of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions.” The purpose of this CONPLAN is to identify what authorities key federal departments and agencies (D/As) have and what general protective actions these D/As might take in order to inform the emergency plans and response of the state and local jurisdictions. The scope of this particular CONPLAN is to identify the overlap between federal, state, and local agencies in the event of a large-scale early release of federal employees or mass evacuation of the NCR.

It is understood that the specific and detailed actions that each agency would undertake during such a scenario may be sensitive. With this in mind, OPM and the NCRC would like your assistance in striking a balance between these security concerns and providing useful information to the state and local emergency management and first responder agencies to inform their EOPs to better facilitate a coordinated response. Examples of the kind of information that could be included in the CONPLAN: federal agency authorities to close roads or restrict public access or resources, key federal/state/local partnerships, critical information that your agency would require or need disseminated to state/local first responders, critical support that your agency might require from state/local first responders, etc.

Sample Questions

- What support from municipal, county, state entities would your D/A require during an NCR catastrophic incident, given that OPM or other appropriate authority has ordered the early release of all Federal employees and/or mass evacuation of the NCR?
- What External Authorities / Responsibilities relevant to this situation does your D/A have?
  - What actions would you take based on these authorities/responsibilities?
- Are there any additional protective measures or actions you would take to protect employees of your D/A?
  - Who has the authority to implement these actions?
- Information-Sharing Mechanisms
  - In general, would your agency communicate with other federal D/As regarding the implementation of these actions? How?
  - In general, would your agency coordinate these actions with the state and local jurisdictions? How?
- Does your D/A coordinate and/or exercise emergency plans with other Federal D/As? How about State, County, and/or Municipal Agencies?
  - With other federal D/As?
Appendix B: Authorities and References

Federal Authorities

- Homeland Security Act 2002
- 5 C.F.R.§ 230
- 5 C.F.R.§ 550
- Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62
- Department of Defense Directive 5111.13 - Defense Support to Civil Authorities
- Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD)
  - HSPD 7 – Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection
- Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) 1 and 2 (February 2008)
- National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)
- Washington, D.C. Area Dismissal or Closure Procedures (OPM; Nov. 2009)
- OPM Memorandum: Human Resources Flexibilities Available to Assist Federal Employees During Emergencies (5 May 2009)

State-Level References

Emergency Management Laws and/or Code

- D.C. Code Ann. §7-2331 et seq. Emergency Management Assistance Act
- Maryland Code, Ann. § 14 Emergency Management
- Virginia Code § 44-146.13 Chapter 3.2 - Emergency Services and Disaster Law, Commonwealth of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law of 2000

State Plans

- District of Columbia Response Plan (April 2002)
- Maryland Emergency Operations Plan (March 2002)
- Virginia Emergency Operations Plan (March 2001)
- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (Public Law 104-321, October 1996)

Nation Capital Region-Level References

- Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (September 2010)
- Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and the Commonwealth of Virginia
- National Capital Region First Hour Checklist
# Appendix C: Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHC</td>
<td>All Hazards Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.F.R.</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIR</td>
<td>Critical Information Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Continuity of Government / Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGCON</td>
<td>Continuity of Government Condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>NCR Federal Concept Plan of Catastrophic Planning Assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOP</td>
<td>Continuity of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operating Picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D/A</td>
<td>Department/Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC DHS</td>
<td>District of Columbia Department of Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC DOH</td>
<td>District of Columbia Department of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC FEMS</td>
<td>District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC HSEMA</td>
<td>District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDOT</td>
<td>District of Columbia Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>Domestic Events Network (FAA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>Federal Protective Service (DHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSIN</td>
<td>Homeland Security Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Justice Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Federal Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ-NCR</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters – National Capital Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFO</td>
<td>Joint Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEO</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Officer / Law Enforcement Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>State of Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD SHA</td>
<td>Maryland State Highway Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMA</td>
<td>Maryland Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPD</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWCOG</td>
<td>Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAWAS</td>
<td>National Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Continuity Programs (FEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capital Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCRC</td>
<td>Office of National Capital Region Coordination (FEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFWPSC</td>
<td>NCR Federal Workforce Preparedness Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPP</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Protection Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Operations Center (DHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRCC</td>
<td>National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Response Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVOAD</td>
<td>National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEP</td>
<td>Occupant Emergency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCPGP</td>
<td>Regional Catastrophic Planning Grants Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC/RWG</td>
<td>Regional Executive Working Group / Regional Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECP</td>
<td>Regional Emergency Coordination Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESF</td>
<td>Regional Emergency Support Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRCC</td>
<td>Regional Response Coordination Center (FEMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIOC</td>
<td>Strategic Information and Operations Center (FBI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>Transportation Security Operations Center (Freedom Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTX</td>
<td>Table-Top Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAO</td>
<td>United States Attorney’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCP</td>
<td>United States Capitol Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPP</td>
<td>United States Park Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMS</td>
<td>United States Marshals Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSS</td>
<td>United States Secret Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDEM</td>
<td>Virginia Department of Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDOT</td>
<td>Virginia Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIPER</td>
<td>Virginia Interoperability Picture for Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOAD</td>
<td>Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAWAS</td>
<td>Washington Metropolitan Area Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH EOP</td>
<td>White House Executive Office of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMATA</td>
<td>Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>State of West Virginia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>