

**IDC Weekly Security Narrative: Week of 06 SEP – 12 SEP 2010****RC – NORTH:****1. General Assessment of RC-N AOR**

The number of enemy initiated events in RC-N stayed about the same (41 events this week versus 42 last week) over the last week, when compared to the previous reporting period (22 – 29 AUG 2010). RC-N has seen a steady rise in enemy initiated activity over the last several weeks, generating concerns that this area is becoming a major focus of insurgent operations, especially as the elections approach. Nearly half of these events were direct fire events, marking a shift from previous weeks when incidents were more often related to IED emplacements. Of these events, nine (9) were IED finds or detonations, composing about a quarter of all events. There were several demonstrations in normally quiet Fayzabad, Badakhshan Province over the proposed Quran burning at a Florida church. Two of these, both on 11 SEP 10, are of particular note as they resulted in casualties when ANP forces attempting to contain the protests opened fire, wounding several LNs. The same sentiments that drove people to protest lead directly to the rocketing of the nearby German PRT base in Fayzabad. Overall and as usual, Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces saw the vast majority of the attacks in RC-N. Indeed, the normally very active Dowlatabad and Qaisar Districts saw little activity this week.

Of particular concern as the elections approach is the potential for greater insurgent attacks in Kunduz City, Imam Sahib District, Archi District, Ghormach District and along HWY 1 in Dowlatabad District in Faryab Province. These areas have seen the most concentration of events in the recent past and will likely continue to remain this way.

On 10 SEP, the Faizabad PRT, partnered with ANA forces, found an IED 52 km SW of Faizabad city. ANA cleared the IED successfully.

On 10 SEP at 0940 PRT Faizabad reported a peaceful demonstration with about 500 people near the Governor's Palace in Faizabad City. The purpose of the demonstration was against the announced burning of the Quran in the USA. The demonstration calmed down, but a minor group with strength up to 100 people moved towards the PRT HQ. At 1125, a demonstration in front of PRT HQ was reported. PRT Faizabad withdrew its own troops back to PRT FAY and closed the main gate. The Chief of Police in Faizabad told the PRT commander to hand over the American Flag IOT burn it by the demonstrators. At 1200 400 to 500 demonstrators were reported and several stones were thrown towards the ANP. IOT control the demonstration ANP and the Civilian Guards shot several warning

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rounds. Two demonstrators were wounded by ANP shots. COM PRT Faizabad talked and negotiated with demonstrators in a mosque. During the negotiation, the demonstrators underlined that the inhabitants of Badakhshan Province are strictly against the burning of the Quran and demanded an independent commission to investigate the weapon use during the demonstration. After the negotiation the PRT commander conducted an interview with a local TV team and the leader of the demonstrators informed the other protestors about the result. The demonstration dissolved 20 minutes later. The MP investigation team confirmed a huge amount of bullet casings but did not find any traces of blood. Additional three civilian casualties were reported by the media. One ANP policeman and one guard of PRT HQ were wounded during the demonstration.

At 2245 10 SEP PRT Faizabad was attacked by two rockets. One impact was inside the camp and the MP tent caught fire. Three ISAF soldiers were treated. The rockets were launched 5 km S of the PRT HQ. Additionally, a hand grenade detonation in the garden of the Faizabad City house was reported.

On 11 SEP, PRT Faizabad reported a demonstration with about 150 persons IVO the Governor's Palace in Faizabad City. The purpose was again against the announced burning of the Quran in the USA. The Mullahs calmed down the crowds and the demonstration remained peaceful the whole day until it was been finished at 1546. Additional demonstrations in Kishim and Jorm were reported by the OCC-P.

On 11 SEP, PRT Faizabad gained information about a demonstration in Kishim District 50 km SW of PRT Faizabad. No ISAF forces were IVO the demonstration. According to FHT reports the demonstration was peaceful and ended at 1545.

At 06 1530 SEP 10 the Governor of Nahrin District AHMAD JAWSHAN POUR and his driver were killed during an INS ambush 31km N of Pul-e Khumri. No information on his successor has been reported.

On 08 SEP 10 forces in Baghlan-e Jadid reported that four reintegrees (part of the Afghan Reintegration Program) were attacked on their way from Shahabuddin to Pul-e Khumri by a suicide bomber. Two reintegrees were KIA and two were wounded. One wounded reintegree died of his wounds on the way to the Pul-e Khumri PRT HQ. The other wounded reintegree was treated at the PRT HQ and will be sent to Mazar-e Sharif for further treatment.

On 09 SEP, CF discovered an IED 11 km N of Kunduz City. An EOD team was sent to the spot and investigated the IED.

On 06 SEP, forces in Kunduz conducted a key leader engagement in BAJOWRI Village 9 km SW of the Kunduz airport. They received small arms fire at 1327. They engaged the INS with their armored vehicle heavy machine guns and the INS broke contact.

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At 06 1716 SEP 10 the PRT that operates in Mazar-e Sharif received information about an INS attack against two troop formations 82 km S Mazar-e Sharif and requested CAS to support the troops but when the CAS arrived, the contact was over.

The PRT in Mazar-e Sharif received information about possible INS in Zig Zig Village, 35 km W of the city. The PRT established a cordon and the NDS searched the compound in Zig Zig but did not find any signs of INS.

On 07 SEP, the Mazar-e Sharif PRT received the message from the Swedish OMLT that about 100 INS were gathering in Gardan Madrassa, 175 km SW of Mazar-e Sharif. Due to the imminent threat towards CF bases in Darzab District, the unit requested CAS support. The CAS was redirected to another incident at 1840. At 1844 the OMLT observed about 50 civilians without weapons inside the garden.

08 SEP, CF in the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif received SAF 23 km N of the city. The unit engaged the INS. No casualties and no damages were reported.

At 08 2114 SEP 10 the Mazar-e Sharif PRT received an alarm message regarding an INS attack against a PRT unit in BAJOUCH Village, BALKH Province. One vehicle was hit by an IED. Medical Evacuation was requested and arrived at 2219 on scene. Additional forces were sent to the location. At 0139 all supporting units were on the spot and the EOD team started the investigation. At 0614 the units returned to the PRT HQ. No casualties and no further damages were reported.

On 10 SEP, PRT Maimanah received information from the OCC-P about an ongoing firefight between INS and ANSF in the Dowlatabad area. Two wounded ANSF soldier were reported; one of them later died of wounds. The ANSF retreated to the ANP HQ and the wounded soldiers were treated at a clinic IVO the ANP HQ.

On 11 SEP, an ANA patrol was hit by an IED in western Qaisar District, Faryab Province. The Norwegian OMLT requested a 9-Liner for the five wounded ANA soldiers at 0815 and confirmed one ANA soldier KIA. The wounded ANA soldiers were brought to PRT Maimanah HQ within 51 minutes.

ANSF lifted an IED IVO the Russian Hill in Shirin Tagab District 30 km N of PRT Maimanah HQ. A NOR EOD team disconnected the explosive part and disposed the charge.

RC – WEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-W AOR

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The level of insurgent activity decreased dramatically throughout RC-W, with a total of about 26 events recorded (compared to over 60 last week).

In Herat, the level of INS activity remained mainly the same as in previous weeks, though slightly less in kinetic events and some more in other types of events. INS activity has been recorded all around the province and, with SHINDAND having the most activity. Main takeout for the week would be recorded threat against LN that drive their trucks in support of IC logistical needs, not only in HERAT Province, but RC W AOR wide. Events might be related to new INS Code of conduct (released in the end of May 2010) that is specifically unforgiving (death sentence) toward LN that work in support of ISAF/CF, truck drivers among them. INS have attacked convoys of LN drivers in Kushk (Rabat-e Sangi) and Karukh (Sabzak Pass) Districts, resulting in the destruction of several trucks and the abduction of at least 8 drivers. Two of them were confirmed killed (from Kushk event last week event), while the fate of the rest of them is unknown.

IED events were not as frequent as of previous weeks and most of the activity was performed against ANSF or LN, resulting in 7 ANP KIA and 3 WIA in two separate IED events. After a long period of relative calm in northern districts, INS have started conducting attacks again (IED, SAF, convoy attack).

INS in SHINDAND have shown a capability to perform anywhere in the district, further spreading insecurity in the area. Additional suicide threats were recorded in Herat City. It is possible that some INS elements from outside have come in to the area with the specific task to manage suicide activity (a nascent suicide bomber network).

In addition, during August 2010 nearly all of the key leaders have been replaced in Herat Province (Herat Province Governor, CDR of 207th ANA CORPS, CDR of 606th ANSAR (ANP), Chief of NDS, CDR of 4th ABP). This is expected to have a domino effect further down the ranks in next few months and in the short term will not help to ANSF/GIRoA effectiveness or security in the area.

Reporting and INS activity has decreased over the past week in Badghis Province. Activity was focused in the area of Bala Murghab, Murghab District. The INS have changed their objectives in this week, attacking softer targets (ANSF OP) rather than CF COPs. There was an attempt by INS to shoot down a helicopter, but it was attempted with small arms fire and was completely ineffective.

The other part of the district that usually has INS activity is the main route, which was calm this week with neither INS attacks nor movements reported. On the other hand, along this route in Muqur District, another direct fire engagement was reported during the construction of a new CF base. A kidnapping happened in Kalan Khanah Village, but the victim was quickly released.

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The overall situation in FARAH Province has experienced only minor changes since last week. The areas most affected by INS activity were Bala Boluk, Gulestan and Pusht-e Rod Districts. It is important to consider however that the number of SIGACTs is directly related to the rate of CF and ANSF presence. The main events in Bala Boluk area were the arrest of two insurgents and the seizure of some explosive materials. In Bakwah District INS targeted civilian contactors supporting CF. A sequence of IED events happened within the Bala Boluk and Gulestan areas. In particular along the route from Delaram to FOB Gulestan. During the week, several warnings were received mainly pointing out IED emplacements in the main roads or the planning of possible attack activities in the whole province.

This week in Ghor Province INS activity has been present fundamentally in the northern part: Chaghcharan, Lal Va Sar Jangal and Dolainah Districts. This week there have been several updates about the most significant event that happened in Chaghcharan District last week: an IED exploded when a night security patrol of was keeping watch in the area, but it is still not known who was behind the IED emplacement. Moreover, four Catholic Relief Services workers suffered an attempted kidnapping by INS. However LN did not let them in CHAGHCHARAN District. In addition, one IED was found on the HWY 2, Dolainah District. In Taywarah District, INS stole three vehicles. There was also an intimidation case related to a candidate in the upcoming elections in Lal Va Sar Jangal District.

Significant Events:

At 0709 on 06 SEP 10, CF reported that an observation post received small arms and RPG fire from a location west of the OP. The ANA returned fire and some minutes later the incident was over.

At 0900 on 06 SEP 10, CF reported that a civilian escort, composed of eight civilians and two vehicles, was attacked in an insurgent ambush. The civilian escort was moving in Gulestan District to pick up the civilian trucks at CF base when they received direct fire. An unknown number of local nationals were injured. The escort involved arrived at the CF base. The ambush resulted in four LNs killed (burned in their vehicle), one LN wounded by small arms fire (hit in the head).

At 2230 on 07 SEP 10, a rocket was launched against CF bases in northeastern Farah Province. At 2240, a second rocket was launched, and four minutes later a third one.

The possible point of origin of these rockets was between Tappeh Village and Tudanak Village. Only one of the rockets impacted near the bases (300 m. away from perimeter).

At 0650 on 07 SEP, CF found a pressure plate IED at grid 41S MS 16340 94408.

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CF and ANSF set a security cordon and an EOD team was requested. At 0702 CF reported that IED detonated due to an of unknown reason.

CF reported that, on 08 SEP 10 at 1230 during a reconnaissance patrol in the vicinity of Kulab Village, an IED hit the first vehicle of the column (ANSF pick-up), destroying it.

The result of the IED strike was: 3 x ANSF KIA, 1 X ANSF wounded (died of wounds later) and 1xANSF seriously wounded.

At 2310 on the 08 SEPT 10, a CF base in Badghis Province started receiving small arms fire and RPG rounds. The attack came from the vicinity of grid 41SNV 2570 4220.

At 1030 on 09 SEP 10, CF reported that their base in northeastern Farah Province received in direct fire. A rocket was launched from the south west. The rocket hit the external perimeter of the FOB.

At 1836 on 19 SEP, a CF observation post started receiving accurate sniper fire from Sini village. The OP returned fire and a ground fire mission was requested. At 1850 a mortar platoon in a nearby CF base performed the fire mission in support

of the OP with a single 120MM HE mortar round. At 1900 a second CF unit fired a second round while. At 1905 another 120mm mortar round was fired. AT 1914 another 6 120mm mortar rounds were fired, totaling ten rounds fired. AT 1915 it was reported that enemy was suppressed.

At 1927 on 10 SEP 10, the ANP Bazaar Khona post started receiving small arms, heavy machine gun and RPG fire. Fire was returned and the enemy fire stopped.

CF reported that, at 0903 on 10 SEP 10, they received small arms fire and RPG fire from an unknown number of INS. They returned fire. At 0959 CF were still receiving fire but 3-4 INS dismounts were pinned down in the vicinity of grid 41S NV 295 413. Air support dropped two bombs and ended the fire fight.

CF reported than at 1020 on 10 SEP 10, there was a small arms fire fight between LNs in Farah Rud Bazaar. Some rounds were fired between civilians; ANA reached the spot and the firing stopped. According to the ANP a crowd of civilians got close to a CF base and was very agitated and wanted to demonstrate against the proposed Quran burning in the US. ANA over reacted, firing and killing a local national. ANA also reports that the crowd was directed by some INS coming from the Safarak area.

Two other demonstrations were reported at about the same time along on RT517. A US patrol had stones thrown at it. After that the ANP took care of situation and may have opened fire on LNs.

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AT 1200 the demonstrations ended and a shura was performed to manage and calm the situation. The participants were: village elders, ANP, ANA and a CF commander. At 1246 CF reported that no LN was killed but four of them were injured during the demonstrations.

At 1400 on 10 SEP 10 in Farah Province, CF reported that 4 COROLLAS with 2 or 3 possible INS inside were showing pictures of the Quran burning from Florida in order to instigate the protest. Approximately 300 protestors started throwing stones outside the ANSF's CP and against a CF base. Some minutes later the ANA arrested four LNs and two shura leaders but they were soon released.

AT 1844, the information regarding the demonstrations was updated and according to ANSF and CF involved:

Two LN KIA (one is named Bahidullah from Waryah village), three LN WIA (one is named Jamaluddin), both the killed and wounded were transferred to an unknown place. According to the ANA, the riots broke out because a Pakistani Mullah declared that the Quran burning had already taken place and he urged the population of Farah Rud to protest against it. They also reported that the total amount of participants was around 2000 people.

CF reported that, at 1146 on 11 SEP 10, a vehicle struck an IED and was engaged by small arms fire. Some minute later, INS broke contact but the vehicle was unable to move and it was necessary to recovery it to the US FOB in Kushk-e Kohnah. In the fight a LN was injured and was evacuated by helicopter.

RC – SOUTHWEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-SW AOR

During the past week, there were two hundred fifty-five (255) INS events in the RC-SW. This is a major decrease on the level of events from the previous week, which saw five hundred fifty-nine (559) events. The areas of most activity were Marjeh, Nad 'Ali, Garm Ser, Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin.

During the past 7 days, there were two hundred and fifty-five (255) INS kinetic events in the RC (SW) AO.

There was one (1) IED attack, and one (1) IDF attack in Reg-e Khan Neshin;

there were twelve (12) IED finds, four (4) IED attacks, and one (1) DF attack in Garm Ser;

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there were six (6) DF attacks, and two (2) IED attacks in Nawah-ye Barakzai;

there were forty-eight (48) DF attacks, seven (7) IED finds, six (6) IED attacks, two (2) SAFire attacks, one (1) UXO find and three (3) cache finds in Marjeh;

there were two (2) IED finds, one (1) IED attack, and one (1) IDF attack in Khash Rod;

there were two (2) DF attacks and one (1) IED attack in Washer;

there were eight (8) IED finds, two (2) DF attacks, four (4) IED attacks, and one (1) complex attack in Now Zad;

there were nine (9) IED finds, six (6) DF attacks, and six (6) IED attacks in Musa Qal'ah;

there were three (3) DF attacks, two (2) IDF attacks, and one (1) complex attack in Kajaki;

there was one (1) cache find, twelve (12) DF attacks, twelve (12) IED attacks, and seven (7) IED finds in Sangin;

there were twenty-four (24) DF attacks, nineteen (19) IED attacks, nine (9) IED finds, and three (3) IDF attacks in Nahr-e Saraj;

there were sixty-seven (67) DF attacks, four (4) IED attacks, three (3) IED finds, three (3) UXO finds, and one (1) SAFire attack in Nad 'Ali;

there were eleven (11) DF attacks, one (1) IED attack, and one (1) IED find in Lashkar Gah.

IEDs were still used in a primarily defensive manner, but because of the massive decline in the use of direct fire attacks, they accounted for the plurality of the kinetic events (47%). Direct fire events, normally by far the most popular insurgent tactic, accounted for 45% of all events in RC-SW. This decrease in direct fire events is attributed to the departure of many insurgents from the battlefield as they celebrated the Eid holiday and took a break from fighting. It is expected that direct fire events and kinetic events in general will return to their normal levels next week, especially with the approaching elections.

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


Figure RC-SW 1: These charts show the level of significant events in RC-SW over the last two weeks.




Figure RC-SW 2: This chart depicts the level of significant events in the Marjeh over the last two weeks.

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In the past week, kinetic activity within Marjeh District was significantly affected by the conclusion of The Holy Month of Ramadan and the Eid al-Fitr celebrations. Over the first four days of the past week, kinetic activity was on a gradual rise then dropped sharply on 10 September upon starting the Eid holiday, in which insurgent fighters were reportedly given leave to celebrate Eid with their families and the local populace. Most DF attacks this week were directed at static CF positions, typically consisting of one or two "pop shots" which indicates that insurgents may have been firing at CF in the midst of celebration without real intent to engage in actual fire-fights. In the past 24 hours, kinetic events within Marjeh District were the lowest since 17 April, during the poppy harvest, when insurgents were occupied with tax collections and harvesting their own poppy fields. Insurgent activity was low not only due to visiting their own families for the celebration of Eid, but also possibly for the prevention of local national casualties due to any altercation initiated by insurgents which would likely result in a significantly negative shift in atmospherics towards the insurgency. However, upon the conclusion of Eid al-Fitr, kinetic activity within Marjeh District is expected to notably spike, probably within the next 24 to 48 hours.





Figure RC-SW 3: This chart depicts significant events in the Central Helmand River Valley over the last four weeks.

SIGACTS have dropped dramatically over the past week as the end of Ramadan and Eid-al Fitr celebrations were held. SIGACTS are expected to rebound over the following week as the Sep 18 elections approach.

RC-SW Election Security Update:



Kajaki- Local nationals (LN) in Kajaki are reportedly concerned with the ramifications of defying the Taliban and participating in the Parliamentary Elections. Additionally, LN do not feel that the results of the election will create any change in their villages. Although locals are concerned with the ramifications of voting, reporting of attacks during the elections has been minimal from within the district. Because of the minimal CF presence and significant Taliban influence, many LN in Kajaki will likely not find justification to participate in the election process this year.

Sangin- Insurgents within Qal'ah-ye Gaz, Nahr-e Saraj, reportedly plan to conduct a suicide attack targeting a polling site on Election Day. In addition, Taliban plan to significantly amplify attacks within the Sangin DC to reestablish their influence over the local populace and hinder GIRoA effectiveness. A likely SIED attack on the morning of 12 September is likely the first of several between the Eid holiday and elections, as numerous suicide bombers are reportedly in the

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area. A significant amount of threat reporting indicates an imminent increase in activity during the Parliamentary Elections.

Musa Qal'ah- District-based insurgents have recently conducted several shuras with LN throughout Musa Qal'ah seeking medical, logistical, and financial aid in preparation for upcoming attacks. LN are unsupportive of attacks against CF and have refused to assist insurgents. While dates are not specific, the planned attacks are likely related to the Parliamentary Elections. Given the recent negative LN sentiment towards the Taliban, coupled with additional recent indications of a suicide attack, the threat to elections is moderate. However, the amplified frequency of CF raids and dwindling LN support within the district will possibly suspend future attacks planned between Eid and the elections.

Now Zad- Taliban fighters plan to intimidate LN, threaten those supporting the elections, and establish mortar positions in Jalalodin and Lwar Tangi, Now Zad. Additionally, an unidentified Taliban member in Now Zad has selected 10 suicide bombers to target polling sites in the area. In Kenjak-e Sofla, LN have indicated attacks are likely to occur within the village; however, this information is possibly derived from hearsay. Furthermore, a representative of the Taliban broadcasted a propaganda campaign over the radio against Americans and President Karzai on 10 September. Insurgents are possibly creating rumors prior to the election in hopes of decreasing LN participation. Therefore, the threat level in the area remains moderate.

Nahr-e Saraj- Insurgents in Nahr-e Saraj are likely planning to conduct attacks in Gereshk during the elections. Insurgents likely intend to use these attacks to intimidate LN and dissuade them from voting. Additionally, Nahr-e Saraj is being utilized by the insurgency as a facilitation area to build a vehicle-borne IED, likely for use in an attack in Lashkar Gah. Separately, in Rahim Khil Kalay in southern Nahr-e Saraj, LN village elders held a shura to discuss the elections and whether or not their village should participate. After some debate between shura attendees, the elders decided that the village would participate. LN in Rahim Khil Kalay have enjoyed enhanced security following the establishment of CF positions in their area. Their support of the elections is a sign of positive sentiment towards CF efforts.

Nad 'Ali- Local elders in Nad 'Ali are attempting to encourage LN to vote for candidates with whom they are tribally connected. The tribal elders involved may have been bribed by supporters of these candidates to attempt to sway locals. Taliban are also planning on conducting vehicle checkpoints (VCP) during the elections to prevent LN from voting. In response, many LN in the area do not intend on participating in the election.

Lashkar Gah- Insurgents reportedly intend to conduct a spectacular attack during the elections. Mullah Agha Wali (Obj Hadrian, IS0514), Mullah Sher AGHA (Obj Chicago, no JPEL), Malim Taj Mohammad (Obj Forge, IS1494) and

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Amir Jan (Obj Misfire, no JPEL) have been associated to SIED plots within the district. The targets for the attacks are the GIROA sponsored Eid celebrations and the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team Headquarters. Insurgents intend to conduct the attacks up to and during the elections to create negative atmospherics and prevent locals from going to polling sites. Separately, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (SMA) is linked to corruption and bribery in attempts to get his brother, Abdul Hai, elected to Parliament. SMA is accused of bribing Electoral Complaints Commission to get several rivals disqualified from the elections. Additionally, SMA is accused of gathering tribal elders to convince/bribe them to have their tribe or village vote for Abdul Hai.

Marjeh- The threat of attack during elections has risen, with rumors of Taliban intent to carry out SAF and a suicide bombing at an unidentified polling center. Additionally, verbal threats are being spread that indicate physical harm will come to those who vote. However, locals still intend to cast their ballots. Participants at a recent shura were sarcastic when discussing the upcoming election; they identified that they are unaware of who the candidates are, and will choose who to vote for on the day of the election. Election turnout is likely to be impacted by the ongoing intimidation and the threat of a suicide bombing.

Nawah-ye Barakzai- Taliban in northern Nawah-ye Barakzai warned locals of the consequences of voting in the Parliamentary Elections. These threats include the removal of fingers, noses, and ears. Despite these threats many LN in the north still intend to vote as they are confident in the security CF will provide to polling locations. If an attack is to occur on Election Day, the targeting of polling locations and LN with harassing DF is likely to occur in the vicinity of the district center.

Khash Rod- Insurgents intend to warn LN about IEDs that had been emplaced throughout the district before vacating the area themselves. Likely seeking Taliban sympathizers, insurgents may be attempting to limit LN casualties as the elections near, and are possibly concerned about Afghan National Army (ANA) presence within the district. Insurgents based within Munar have reportedly emplaced IEDs along routes nearby to hinder CF/ANA movement during the Parliamentary Elections. On 10 September, riots and protests, driven by LN sentiment towards the impending election, broke out in cities throughout Khash Rod. Insurgents and LN burned private shops, raised flags, and cursed Americans. Separately, insurgents intend to emplace RCIEDs in local bazaars as well as capture and shoot vehicles leaving checkpoints. A significant threat within Khash Rod currently exists as area based insurgents will likely continue preparing harsher methods to disrupt the elections.

RC – SOUTH:

1. General Assessment of RC-S AOR

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In the past seven days, there were approximately 287 SIGACTs in RC-S, of which two thirds (193 events) took place in the districts around Kandahar City (Panjwa'i, Zharay, Arghandab and Maiwand) or in the city itself. Over all, this was a significant decrease from the 400 events that occurred over the previous reporting period (29 AUG – 05 SEP). This decrease is attributed primarily to end of Ramazan and the arrival of the Eid al-Fitr holiday, during which many of the fighters take time to spend the holiday with their families. However, recent operations in Malajat by ANSF also likely had an effect on kinetic activity (though much smaller than the religious holiday). There seems even to have been a lull in the assassination and intimidation campaign by insurgents within the city of Kandahar itself, though this is likely temporary and will resume (and likely intensify) during this coming week.

Although the vast majority of the above mentioned activity took place in Kandahar Province, the level of violence in both Zabul and Uruzgan remains at high levels (though this also decreased over the last week). Insurgents continue to target CF and ANSF convoys along HWY 1 in Zabul with IEDs and some small arms fire. This is also the case in Uruzgan, though IEDs seem more to be used in this area to protect insurgent havens and cache sites.

In Uruzgan this week there were no casualty producing events, which is a significant decrease and reversal from last week when three IED events lead to ANSF casualties. This is attributed to the dramatic decrease in the number of events in the last reporting period and not to a decrease in IED effectiveness. It is expected that casualty rates will return to their normal levels in the coming reporting period. There were eight casualty producing attacks this past week, all of which were in Kandahar Province (and in or around Kandahar City). Six of these eight events were IED detonations (the remaining two were direct fire attacks).

In the provinces around Kandahar City, direct fire, indirect fire and IEDs remain the primary means of attack for INS in contesting advances into INS support zones. This will continue to occur specifically in the areas of Tabin, Chahar Qolbah-e Olya / Sofla and the Kalacheh. HME factories in Takia and Babur continue to supply the many IEDs available, but the significant decrease in events this week suggests that material for bomb making is stockpiled at a larger than usual rate, allowing a much greater number of IED emplacements in the week leading to the election. In southern Arghandab the IED engagement area southeast of Deh-E Kochay remained active. We expect this area to remain active in the near future (this is where several of last week's casualties were incurred).

In Zharay, INS continue to target PSC's along HWY 1 centered between Howz-E Madad and the Maiwand border. This area will remain an INS attack zone targeting PSC's. Reporting continues to indicate this week that there are ongoing

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preparations throughout Zharay, especially around Pashmul, of INS planning and reinforcing defensive positions. Attacks on CF were centered around the central Pashmul area this past week. It is also assessed IDF attacks will increase as INS are conducting reconnaissance operations. Intimidation of LN's will continue to increase the TB's support base throughout Zharay, particularly around proposed election sites.

In Maiwand, INS continue to conduct attacks along HWY 1 in specific attack zones that afford them the best survivability rate and affect the transient population of Maiwand. This week, INS primarily relied on previously laid IEDs to disrupt CF and ANSF movement as they decreased their engagement of these forces with direct fire due to the Eid al-Fitr holiday. As with such decreased throughout the AOR, this is expected to be very temporary and will return to previous weeks' levels during the new reporting period and especially as the elections approach.

RC – EAST:

1. General Assessment of RC-E AOR

In RC-East this week kinetic activity decreased by 22% (194 this week, 250 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 23% (49 this week, 64 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 10% (194 this week, 216 last year) while attack effectiveness decreased by 29% (49 this week, 59 last year). The decrease in kinetics can be contributed by INS intent to stockpile weapons and logistics for large scale attacks during the Parliamentary elections next weekend. This week RC-E saw multiple demonstrations, both peaceful and violent, regarding the proposed Sept 11 Quran burning in Florida. These demonstrations will continue to have a negative impact on CF OPS and disrupt the mission state as the population is becoming wearier of CF presence. The planned burning of the Quran was cancelled; however, the population views even the proposal to burn the Quran as an act against Islam. The incident provided INS an opportunity to exploit a negative image of CF, attempt to entrench the idea that CF has a strong anti-Muslim sentiment, and drive a wedge between the locals and CF.

Additionally, reporting throughout RC-E continues to highlight INS' plans to conduct attacks on polling sites, as they attempt to prevent participation in the elections. There is a very limited amount of reporting on the threat to the candidates, indicating a moderate threat to the candidates themselves; however there remains a significant threat to the population voting or supporting the election process. Furthermore, sporadic reporting indicates that INS are planning to conduct spectacular attacks during the election to reduce the voter turnout and create an image of turmoil and chaos, reflecting GIRoA and CF's inability to guarantee a free and fair election. Multi-discipline reporting confirms

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that current top threat areas in RC-East are concentrated in a) North-East Paktika, b) Konar and c) Khowst.

Overall, in the Parwan, Panjshir, Bamyan and Kapisa region, kinetic activity increased by two attacks (12 overall), with four attacks being effective, as compared to last week, when one attack was effective. During the same time period last year, there were seven attacks. Kinetic activity has remained at normal levels throughout the region. Recent reporting this week has indicated INS intent to focus attacks towards BAF (as is usual) to garner opportunities for an effective IO campaign showing CF inability to secure themselves, let alone the Afghan people or GIRoA. Due to the upcoming elections, INS are continuing to increase intimidation tactics against the local populace in order to deter them from voting. They are also continuing to target anti-INS election candidates. INS continue to target CF along the main north-south route in Tagab District in order to disrupt CF FOM throughout Kapisa Province.

In Panjshir Province, no significant kinetic activity occurred within the last week. During the same time period last year, there was also no significant kinetic activity. Due to the stable security situation, ethnic cohesiveness, and recent economic growth, Panjshir has the potential to qualify for transition status in the near future. Governor Keram cited the importance of roads and electricity for future development, and also emphasized that secure provinces should not be neglected by the donors. While Panjshir is a secure province, GIRoA has failed to adequately staff ANP positions in Panjshir, which could cause security issues in the future.

In Bamyan Province, no significant kinetic activity occurred within the last week. During the same time period last year, there was one attack, which was not effective. Reporting indicates INS intent to conduct an attack against CF in Bamyan; however, INS did not plan to attack until after Eid al-Fitr. While TB may continue to plan for attacks against CF, they will likely face problems with the local populace. Reporting suggests TB are losing local national support in areas that were previously considered safe havens. Additionally, recent reporting indicates INS intent to further exploit the cross-border seam between Bamyan and Baghlan by potentially conducting attacks.

In the Paktiya, Paktika and Khost region, kinetic activity decreased by 38% (34 this week, 55 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 11% (16 this week, 18 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 23% (34 this week, 44 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 11% (16 this week, 18 last year). Paktiya was the only province with an increase in kinetic activity. INS continue to sustain increased FOM along major routes and across the AF-PAK border. INS affiliated activity did not affect CF FOM. INS possess a sustained air threat in Gardez District, Paktiya Province; Sharana, Sar Hawza and Bermel Districts in Paktika Districts. Southern Paktika continues to remain an intelligence gap. There was no change in shadow governance in this area. We

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will see a sharp increase in kinetic activity throughout the AO due to the upcoming parliamentary elections and the lull this week that likely took place to allow INS an opportunity to enjoy the Eid holiday.

In Khost Province, kinetic activity decreased by 67% (5 this week, 15 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 80% (1 this week, 5 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 69% (5 this week, 16 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 86% (1 this week, 7 last year). The increase last week is attributed to HQN's focused targeting of major CF bases in the area. The decrease in kinetic activity is an indication that INS elements are in the planning and regrouping phase to disrupt the upcoming parliamentary elections. Reporting over the past week indicated high INS intent to increase kinetic activity in Garboz District. These activities include IDF attacks and disruption of elections in the district. INS affiliated election threat is also high in Khost District, where HQN intends to infiltrate the election process by introducing their own candidate in the elections. INS affiliates also conducted anti-GIRoA radio-propaganda in Dwamanda District. In the next week, INS activity will likely spike and will be concentrated on polling sites, CF/ANSF facilities and routes for ballot movements. This activity will also be coupled with INS affiliated intimidation against non-INS candidate friendly populace.

In Paktiya Province, kinetic activity increased by 57% (11 this week, 7 last week) and attack effectiveness increased by 200% (6 this week, 2 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 27% (11 this week, 15 last year) and attack effectiveness increased by 50% (6 this week, 4 last year). The increase in attacks is attributed to INS affiliated harassment of CF/local populace to disrupt the parliamentary elections. Reporting over the past week indicated INS activity mainly consisted of attack preparation during the upcoming elections, focusing on target population centers and polling sites in Gardez, Jani Khel, Chamkani, Jaji and Zormat Districts to cause mass CIVCAS to deter locals from voting. INS elements will also target CF structures in these districts to prevent them from providing timely security to the affected areas. Intimidation of local populace was concentrated in Zormat District where INS used various anti-GIRoA propaganda schemes such as loud speakers, death threats and night letters to sway the local populace from participating in the elections. In the next 7 days, kinetic activity will increase sharply and will be concentrated on polling sites, CF/ANSF facilities and routes for ballot's movements.

In Paktika Province, kinetic activity decreased by 45% (18 this week, 33 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 18% (9 this week, 11 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 38% (18 this week, 13 last year) and attack effectiveness increased by 29% (9 this week, 7 last year). The decrease in kinetic activity indicates that INS elements are in the preparatory phase to conduct attacks against population centers during the upcoming elections, specifically Orgun, Omnah and Sharana Districts. Reporting in the last week indicated a high INS threat to Orgun District during the election period.

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Rasul Khan, HQN sub-CDR, intends to conduct spectacular attacks against the District Center prior to the elections to deter LNs from participating in the upcoming elections. INS intend to conduct similar activities in Jani Khel, Sarobi and Naka Districts. These elements are likely using Naka and Sar Hawza Districts as a safe haven to disrupt elections and limit CF ability to provide security. INS continue to pose a heightened threat to the Arbakai near Shkin and Margha to sustain FOM in Bermel District. INS activities will likely spike in the next week due to increased focus on polling sites, CF/ANSF structures and ballot's movements.

In Ghazni Province, kinetic activity decreased by 34% (19 this week, 29 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 44% (5 this week, 9 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 32% (19 this week, 28 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 38% (5 this week, 8 last year). INS in Ghazni Province continue to work cohesively in operations that are primarily aimed at disrupting the parliamentary elections. INS intent in Ghazni remains to deny the election from occurring. Reporting this week indicated TB plans to mine roads leading to district centers IOT stop locals from travelling to polling sites to cast their vote as well as planning to attack polling centers themselves with suicide bombers. INS are also reported to be threatening locals who might surpass obstacles and get to polling centers with cutting off ink stained fingers. Other threats include cutting out the tongues of campaigners. This could potentially effect local populace sentiment and change the way the TB interact with local villagers and cause a shift in support bases. There has been no change to Shadow Governance in Ghazni Province as it is relatively effective and the local populace sentiment remains mostly sided with INS. Additionally, INS will increase kinetic OPS as the election draws nearer.

In Logar and Wardak Provinces, kinetic activity decreased by 28% (58 this week, 80 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 43% (13 this week, 23 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity remained the same (58 this week, 58 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 38% (13 this week, 21 last year). The reoccurring trends this week remained INS attacks on key Lines of Communication (LOC), aimed at securing their FOM. INS leadership capabilities are still obstructed due to CF OPS which have taken multiple leaders off the battlefield, resulting in a lack of experienced leaders with generally ineffective OPS. Intimidation OPS against election candidates and the populace are still continuing in light of the upcoming elections. This is coupled with the anti - GIRoA and anti - CF propaganda prevalent within the AO. The trends to discourage the populace and the Parliamentarian candidates from participating in the elections will continue. As the elections approach there will more than likely be an increase in kinetic activity against GIRoA and CF elements and infrastructure as INS try to disrupt the overall security situation. Overall there has been no change in Shadow Governance.

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In Logar Province, kinetic activity decreased by 14% (24 this week, 28 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 43% (4 this week, 7 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity remained the same (24 this week, 24 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 56% (4 this week, 9 last year). Reporting in Logar Province primarily trended around the disruption of the parliamentary elections on the 18th of September. Although INS in Logar operate in a fragmented manner, reporting has indicated efforts to operate more cohesively in order to effectively target the elections. This is indicated in reports stating that Pakistani INS are staging in Khoshi to carry out election day attacks in Azrah, Pul-e Alam and Khoshi itself. INS are reported to be using all of the usual tactics to include intimidation of the local populace, as highlighted by INS threats to cut off ink stained fingers. INS are reportedly planning on attacking locations slated to be used as polling centers. It is assessed that INS will continue to intimidate the local populace and conduct harassing attacks against future polling sites in the days leading up to the elections and on election day. Additionally, reporting indicates that Mullah Naim Kharoti has returned to Charkh and resumed OPS. Naim Kharoti is a prominent personality in the insurgency in southern Logar whose presence will likely spur motivation among lower level INS. However, several reports have indicated there may be increasing tensions between INS and the local populace in areas such as Baraki Barak, Khoshi, and Azrah. Lastly, there were two demonstrations in Khoshi and Pul-e-Alam districts in response to the Florida minister's intentions to burn the Quran. Also in Mohammed Agha District, Mullahs in a mosque were telling the populace that if the Quran was burned then they need to take up arms and attack CF. This matter concerning the Quran could potentially discredit any influence CF may have had with the populace. This could further align the populace with INS, increasing their support base. Additionally, INS will increase kinetic OPS as the election draws nearer.

In Wardak Province, kinetic activity decreased by 35% (34 this week, 52 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 44% (9 this week, 16 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity remained the same (34 this week, 34 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 25% (9 this week, 12 last year). INS are still focusing attacks against security elements along HWY-1, primarily in Sayyed Abad. INS in Wardak are operating in a localized manner and appear to be operating cohesively before elections. Preparations for attacking ANSF/CF can be noted in several reports indicating increased facilitation of weapons, especially in Nerkh and Sayyed Abad Districts. This is likely tied to the upcoming elections as INS intend to destabilize the security situation through undermining ANSF/CF. There has also been a trend with INS increasing their intent to capture/kill influential security figures such as the Wardak Chief of Police. The kidnapping of the six ANA soldiers, further threatens security while exploiting the inability to provide stability through governance or security to the populace. This in light of the elections is meant to play on the population's sentiments of GIRoA to decrease participation in elections. This is also coupled with the increased intimidation OPS from INS threatening anyone caught voting. This indicates that

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the support from the populace remains coerced. The Shadow Governance still remains effective due to increased OPS conducted and the support bases that allows for greater FoM. Also, there have been reports of foreign elements operating throughout Wardak such as the Pakistani trainer in Jaghato, an Iranian financier, and the previously reported AQ trainer. These are all derived from single source reporting, but with the increase of attack effectiveness, especially in Sayyed Abad District, could bring fidelity to these reports. Separately, there were two demonstrations in Jalrez District, stemming from the Florida minister's intent to burn the Quran. This could discredit any influence CF may have had in this area, and advantage INS by furthering their support base in this district.

In Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman area, kinetic activity decreased by 7% (71 this week, 76 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 15% (11 this week, 13 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 10% (71 this week, 79 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 48% (11 this week, 21 last year). The overall trend throughout this area has been planning for attacks against the elections that will take place on 18 September. The predominate trends in reporting for disruption include attacks against polling stations, intimidation of prospective voters, and targeting of routes to reach the polling stations. Overall, INS in this area has remained cohesive, though tensions are ongoing between INS networks in W Nangarhar, E Nuristan, and, to a limited extent, central Kunar. Shadow Governance has remained consistent. INS intimidation and propaganda has primarily been anti-election. Local sentiment throughout this area is predominately neutral, though in many areas INS have coercive control over the population.

In Nangarhar Province, kinetic activity decreased by 36% (7 this week, 11 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 50% (1 this week, 2 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 250% (7 this week, 2 last year) and attack effectiveness remained the same as well (1 this week, 1 last year). The main trend throughout Nangarhar Province is increased planning of attacks to disrupt the election process as well as intimidation of LNs to decrease voter participation. Additionally, multiple demonstrations occurred in response to the alleged plan of a US citizen to burn the Quran. The protests provide INS an exploitation point by utilizing current anti-CF sentiment to possibly affect the elections. Additionally, anti-CF sentiment could potentially affect the population's opinion of GIRoA. Overall INS in Nangarhar is cohesive, with pockets of fragmentation in SW Nangarhar due to HiG/TB rifts. Shadow Governance remains consistent, primarily focused on disrupting security for the elections. The overall population remains supportive of elections. Intimidation reporting has focused on two key themes: do not work with GIRoA or CF, and do not participate in the Parliamentary Elections. As the Parliamentary Elections approach, INS will increase their intimidation on locals as well as conducting spectacular attacks to disrupt the election process.

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In Nuristan Province, kinetic activity decreased by 50% (1 this week, 2 last week) and no effective attacks were conducted (0 this week, 3 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity decreased by 96% (1 this week, 23 last year) and no effective attacks were conducted compared to 3 last year. INS continued to plan to target elections with the installation of illegal checkpoints to block ballot boxes from being delivered to Nurgaram District. INS cohesion continues to be naturally divided between E and W, with the TB in each region capable of operating independently of each other, though no reported tensions existing between the groups. Local sentiment throughout the province is neutral-to-pro-INS except in areas where GIRoA/CF are able to project an influence. In the next week, attacks against Kalagush will likely increase as TB attempt to disrupt the election process.

In Kunar Province, kinetic activity remained the same (58 this week, 58 last week) while attack effectiveness decreased by 18% (9 this week, 11 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 18% (58 this week, 49 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 40% (9 this week, 15 last year). The overall trend in reporting in Kunar Province has continued to be planning for attacks against elections as well as intimidation of locals, and targeting of ANSF/CF. In Central Kunar, reporting indicates INS are planning an attack against Chapadara District Center intended to coincide with the elections on 18 September. Additionally, in SE Kunar, reporting indicates INS are continuing to expand influence in the region, in addition to targeting local nationals who work for GIRoA/CF. Reporting over the last two weeks suggest that kidnapping has increased, and locals who work for GIRoA or CF either have to pay a tax or face execution. The increase in activity corresponds with reporting of an influx of fighters in the area. Overall, the INS within Kunar remains cohesive, with a few pockets of discontent between organizations in Central Kunar. INS FOM remains largely unrestricted except in the northern Ghaziabad District. Shadow governance continues to remain at consistent levels, primarily focused on coordinating attacks for the elections. Local support for GIRoA/CF and INS remains divided as locals fear the INS in the area, and desire development projects. Over the next week, activity will likely spike as INS target elections.

In Laghman Province, kinetic activity remained the same (5 this week, 5 last week) and attack effectiveness increased by 100% (1 this week, 0 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity remained the same (5 this week, 5 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 50% (1 this week, 2 last year). The continuing trend in Laghman Province is disruption of ANSF/CF FOM to maintain influence over the population primarily in Dowlat Shah, Alisheng, and Alingar Districts. Reporting has continued to indicate TB plans to disrupt elections by intimidating the local population and targeting ANSF and CF. Reporting has indicated the presence of suicide bombers who will possibly be used against a CF base during the next 5 days to capitalize on media attention during elections. Shadow Governance in Laghman Province is likely most concentrated in Dowlat Shah and Alisheng Districts due limited GIRoA/CF influence in the region.

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However, Nuristan Shadow Governor, Dost Mohammad, is reportedly showing intent to expand his influence in Laghman which may lead to potential clash with local INS if the coordination falls through. In Laghman Province, population support leans toward GIRoA/CF in areas where there is an established presence of government. However, in some areas corruption may cause the population to support the INS. As Ramazan has ended and the Parliamentary Elections approach, INS will increase the frequency and intensity of attacks IVO polling sites to disrupt the election process.

RC – CAPITAL:

1. General Assessment of RC-C AOR

The number of significant events in RC-C remained about the same over the period of 06 - 12 2010, with six events recorded (a decrease of one event from the last reporting period). Of course, this remains a low level of violence and RC-C remains a relatively secure environment. Also, these events were nearly all related to protests that took place to express the local national outrage at the proposed Quran burning in the United States.

During the period of 06 – 12 SEP 2010, the following events took place:

- On 06 SEP a demonstration against the proposed Quran burning in the US took place in the eastern part of the city.
- On 07 SEP another demonstration against the same issue took place in the center of the city.
- On 09 SEP a demonstration against CF presence in Afghanistan and the proposed Quran burning took place northeast of KAIA.
- Two demonstrations took place in northern Kabul Province on 10 SEP.
- An IED was found on 10 SEP by Paghman police.

The only insurgent related event was an uncorroborated IED find in Paghman District. However, there remains a high level of threat reporting regarding Kabul City. Threats run the gamut from those against the city's usual targets (the Indian Embassy, HQ ISAF, KAIA, etc.) to those targeting the elections and those targeting ANSF in the outlying areas of Kabul (especially in MUSAH and DEH SABZ). Reporting suggests insurgents in MUSAH intend to increase their activity in order to disrupt successful GIRoA and CF aid efforts in areas of that district affected by flooding.

It is expected that such reporting will increase as the end of Ramazan approaches. However, the greatest upcoming event in the city is the 18 September parliamentary election. Much of the recent threat reporting focuses on this event and it provides a significant target for insurgents. Increased threat

reporting will invariably lead to an increased number of attacks (or at least attempted attacks) in RC-C.

The Insurgents' inability to successfully execute a major attack has resulted in some prestige loss among insurgent supporters, as well as a loss of initiative. This will intensify pressure for a major, spectacular attack in the run-up to the elections, possibly taking advantage of the Ramazan period as a mobilizing tool for potential suicide attackers (as threat reporting suggests the Haqqani Network is attempting to do). Therefore, the chances for a major, complex attack are in a sense higher after the success of the Kabul Conference, rather than lower.

Despite the general security success for ANSF, the security situation in downtown KABUL remains sensitive but under control.

The latest information indicates some INS groups and suicide bombers have entered Kabul (though these are unconfirmed reports). However, the threat of further IEDs, rocket attacks and suicide attacks remains at a heightened level, particularly against the Presidential Place, GIRoA Ministry Buildings, KAIA, ISAF/CF and ANSF bases, main hotels, guest houses and specifically, historically targeted embassies.

On the other hand INSs keep the capability to conduct a complex attack in KABUL city especially inside PD 2, 5, 8 to weaken the GIRoA legitimacy and to attract international media attention. Therefore isolated actions, mainly conducted by TB or HQN assets in KABUL and surroundings, remain burning issues.

We assess that INSs watch for opportunities to attack ANSF and ISAF in order to demoralize the public and discredit GIRoA and ISAF. Also they will continue to try to create the perception that GIRoA members and relatives are corrupted and inefficient to govern and unable to cope with the population preoccupations of security. For this purpose ANSF relaxation could be immediately used for acting.