


**IDC Weekly Security Narrative: Week of 13 SEP – 19 SEP 2010****RC – NORTH:****1. General Assessment of RC-N AOR**

The number of enemy initiated events in RC-N increased significantly (75 events this week versus 41 last week) when compared to the previous reporting period. RC-N has seen a steady rise in enemy initiated activity over the last several weeks, but this was by far the most significant increase. Of course, this can be attributed to the elections on 18 SEP but there seems little doubt that insurgent leaders are making a concerted and deliberate effort to destabilize the previously (relatively) secure northern portion of the country.

Nearly half of these events (37) were direct fire events, continuing a shift from previous weeks when incidents were more often related to IED emplacements. Indeed, IED events were infrequent this week as insurgents relied more on the use of direct attacks, ambushes and the use of the indirect fire to disrupt CF and ANSF operations, as well as the elections. Overall and as usual, Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces saw the vast majority of the attacks in RC-N. However, the Dowlatabad and Qaisar regions of Faryab Province returned to their normally very active state, and the western region of Balkh Province saw a significant rise in activity. There were also major events in normally stable Badakhshan Province.

While throughout the country, there was a modest rise in the level of Election Day violence over last year's presidential election, but the increase in the north was substantial, further suggesting this region's growing importance to the insurgency. That insurgents were able to muster the force to over take a polling station in Badakhshan Province and were able to mount a significant number of effective (i.e., casualty producing) direct fire attacks (twenty-three, or nearly one third of the total) in Baghlan Province suggests substantial planning prior to the elections and a robust effort on the insurgents's part to disrupt these elections.

The direct fire approach was the predominant method of attack in the Baghlan – Kunduz Corridor, while IEDs were the preferred method of disruption (blocking lines of communication) in the western part of RC-N (especially in the western part of Balkh Province and in Faryab).



Graph 1: This graph shows the number and types of attacks by day from 13 – 19 SEP 2010 (note the dramatic increase on 17 and 18 SEP)

Significant Events:

13 SEP

There were two (2) events during the reporting period.

Within the last 24 hours, INS forces engaged a platoon 30 km N of Pul-e Khumri. 1 RPG hit a vehicle, but the vehicle remained operable. The platoon engaged the INS and requested CAS. The INS broke contact. No casualties or further damage were reported.

A CF unit operating in Faryab Province observed two armed groups 58 km N of Maimanah and received fire. They returned fire and fired two (2) rockets against INS positions.

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14 SEP

There were two (2) events during the reporting period.

Within the last 24 hours, according to ANSF sources, an ANP convoy received fire 23 NE of Pul-e Khumri. Two (2) ANP policemen were WIA and were brought to Camp KILAGAY by ANP forces.

At 0945, during an IED sweep near a previously damaged culvert a CF unit was hit by an IED 11 km W Kunduz City. The second explosion made the bridge impassable for any military vehicle. The CF unit ordered an armored bridge layer to the spot in order to bridge the river. The bridge was laid down at 1340 and the patrol continued the IED sweep. After the bridging operation the unit received SAF, RPG and mortar fire at 1350.

15 SEP

There were two (2) events during the reporting period.

Within the last 24 hours, a CF unit was sent to support Arbakai forces, which were involved in a firefight in DARZAB District, JOWZJAN Province.

At 1056 the new ANA Corps Commander Gen Zalmay WESA, together with branch heads, was on the way to GHORMACH in two (2) ANA helicopters. Passing the area of DARZAB and QUSH TEPA district 55 km E of SAR-E POL the helicopters received 5 rounds SAF. The helicopter of Corps Commander was hit and one (1) ANA WIA, lightly. Both helicopters could move. The helicopters continued without further problems on their way to GHORMACH.

16 SEP

There were six (6) events during the reporting period.

Within the last 24 hours, a CF unit ordered a platoon to support ANP in an INS attack along a major route. Upon arrival the INS had already broken the contact with the ANP.

A CF unit in Mazar-e Sharif reported that an ANSF Convoy received SAF. A CF unit was IVO of the spot, received SAF and requested CAS. The fire stopped before CAS was established and the convoys proceeded.

A CF unit in Mazar-e Sharif reported an IED found in SAMANGAN District. An EOD team moved to the spot and cleared the IED.

ANP found an IED 6 km S of Fayzabad and cleared the IED.

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A CF unit received SAF in SHIRIN TAGAB District, FARYAB Province. As the reinforcing units arrived on the spot the TIC was cold.

A CF unit Maimanah received information from the US Department of State that two (2) IEC Officers were attacked and killed by INS in DAH NOW Village, CHARBOLAK District on 15th SEP. The victims were the Identification officer Mullah Azid Muhammed and the Polling Center Manager Muhammed Alam.

17 SEP

There were eleven (11) events during the reporting period.

Within the last 24 hours, FOB GHORMACH was attacked with IDF from the southwestern direction. Additionally a CF platoon was attacked with SAF IVO FOB GHORMACH.

ANA found an IED 24 km NW of Mazar-e Sharif but was not able to disarm the IED at this place. They transported the IED to an ANA FOB IOT disarm the IED there.

A CF unit based in Mazar-e Sharif reported an IED strike against ISAF forces and ANA policemen 67 km W of Mazar-e Sharif. The patrol received SAF at 1617 and requested CAS. ANSF tried to capture the INS. One (1) INS was captured.

A CF unit near Mazar-e Sharif reported an IED strike against a convoy. One (1) vehicle was damaged. ANP found a second IED.

At 1730 two (2) CF platoons, partnered with ANP, were hit by an IED within the highway triangle 6 km NW of Pul-e Khumri and received SAF and IDF from up to 10 INS. One (1) vehicle was damaged. The unit returned fire and requested CAS. Two (2) WIA ISAF soldier were reported and brought to Pul-e Khumri.

A CF platoon conducted a patrol to SHAHABUDDIN Village IOT link up with the Arbakai as they discovered a possible IED placed on the main bridge which has to be used to move towards SHAHABUDDIN Village. The unit received SAF and RPG at 0733 and requested air support. CAS was established and dropped one (1) GBU 38 at 1019. During the BDA which was conducted later on, no civilian or enemy casualties or damage was observed. At 1120 a Blackhawk helicopter tried to supply the Arbakai and US forces IVO SHAHABUDDIN but had to abort the landing after receiving SAF. Six (6) surviving Arbakai from SHAHABUDDIN were picked up by another unit. The bridge was established and the units started to attack towards SHAHABUDDIN at 1614. They detected a suspected INS command post and prepared to attack.

A CF unit found a possible IED IVO IMAM SAHIB, northern KUNDUZ Province at 0746. The unit secured the area and an EOD team investigated and reduced the

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IED. The units discovered a 2nd IED and the EOD team reduced this IED, too. At 1255 an anti personnel mine detonated and injured one (1) ISAF Soldier. The soldier was recovered to Kunduz City within 44 minutes. A second soldier was hit by a second anti personnel mine.

A CF unit reported SAFIRE against a C 130 CARGO FLIGHT during a flight over CHAHAR DARAH, 7 km W of Kunduz City..

18 SEP

There were 34 events during the reporting period.

Incidents in the Maimanah Area of Operations:

FOB GHORMACH was attacked with IDF from the southwest at 1144. According to ANSF sources the rocket hit PETAW Village and injured one (1) local national. At 1950 INS attacked FOB GHORMACH again with IDF. The impact points were within 50m of the main gate.

The convoy of a CF unit was hit by an IED 24 km W of FOB QAISAR. EOD conducted post-blast analysis.

A CF unit based in Maimanah received SAF IVO TARTHA BAZAAR Village 28 km N of Maimanah. They returned fire with SAF and MORTAR (5x 81mm HE).

A CF advisory unit reported PKW and possible rocket fire 18 km WEST of FOB QAISAR and requested CAS. They returned fire. At 1437 the unit received fire 26 km W of FOB QAISAR again. Own forces returned fire.

Forces based in Maimanah were attacked with SAF and BM-1 rockets 50 km W of FOB QAISAR. CAS was established.

A CF platoon received SAF and RPG 19 km N of FOB QAISAR and requested CAS. While maneuvering, two (2) vehicles became stuck and recovery assets were requested. At 1854 INS engaged the unit with SAF and RPG. Two (2) ISAF Soldier were WIA and med-evaced to PRT MMN. One (1) of them DOW.

A CF unit received information about a possible location of an INS leader. One (1) platoon deployed to the location and cordoned the compound IOT support ANP. INS attacked the ISAF forces as they arrived at the compound and the ISAF forces returned fire. At 1451 ISAF forces confirmed two (2) INS KIA.

A CF platoon partnered with ANSF received SAF 23 km W of FOB QAISAR.

INS engaged a CF platoon 10 km S of FOB GHORMACH. ISAF forces returned fire.

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A CF unit based in Maimanah reported an INS attack against ANP IVO FEYZABAD, 46 km NE of Maimanah. INS fled when ISAF arrived at the spot.

At 1744 FOB GHORMACH was attacked with IDF.

Incidents in the Mazar-e Sharif Area of Operations:

A CF unit based in Mazar-e Sharif reported an IED strike 47 km NW of Mazar-e Sharif, requested CAS and a MEDEVAC HELICOPTER IOT recover one (1) wounded soldier.

A CF unit based in Mazar-e Sharif received information that ANP were surrounded in JAR QALA Village 25 km W of Mazar-e Sharif. ANSF reserve forces were sent to the scene, but ambushed in ANJA QALA Village. According to ANSF sources 2 ANP policemen were KIA.

At 1018 FOB DARZAB was attacked by INS with SAF. ANA returned fire with mortars. CAS was requested, conducted show of force and fired warning shoots.

Forces of PRT Mazar-e Sharif received SAF and RPG during an INS attack 38 km east of SHIBIRGAN.

A unit of PRT Mazar-e Sharif received SAF and RPGs 12 km S of SAR-E POL. One (1) vehicle was hit by an IED. The unit continued on its way to SAR-E PUL and arrived there at 1727.

A CF helicopter received SAFIRE 3 km NW of Pul-e Khumri.

Incidents in the Pul-e Khumri Area of Operations:

At 0733 ISAF forces were attacked by SAF and RPG IVO AKA KHEL Village. CF divided into two (2) groups, one (1) heading northern towards SHAHABUDDIN including ANA and trying to keep the LOC open. At 0830 attack helicopters arrived on the scene. At 0833 one (1) US soldier was WIA. At 0842 the enemy position IVO AKA KHEL was bombed, shortly after that the enemy ceased fire. At 0900 one (1) INS was KIA. At 0911 a second GBU was dropped on the enemy position IVO AKA KHEL. One (1) wounded ANA DOW during the transportation. The province governor ordered the province police chief to man the seized COP with ANP. At 1342 an EOD team started sweeping the seized COP.

According to ANSF sources PRT Pul-e Khumri reported a firefight in BURKA City.

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A CF unit informed PRT Pul-e Khumri about an ongoing firefight in WAZIRABAD Village, 3 km W of Pul-e Khumri. ANP left CPs, allowing the line of communication to be blocked.

A CF unit based in Pul-e Khumri reported an INS attack on a major line of communication IVO BAGHE SHAMAL Village.

A CF unit partnered with ANSF received massive RPG and SAF 7 km W of Pul-e Khumri along a major route. They also observed INS who were carrying their casualties from SHAHABUDDIN to DAHANAH-YE GHORI. The firefight ended at 1750.

INS forces engaged a platoon IVO IMAM SAHIB 57 km N of Kunduz City.

At 1745 civilians requested medical help for 8 year old child. According to the reports the child has been wounded by a BM-1 rocket fired by INS. ISAF treated the child at Pul-e Khumri and transported him to a hospital. The child died at 2240.

Incidents in the Kunduz Area of Operations:

INS fired seven (7) rounds of IDF from western and eastern directions against Camp Kunduz between 0703 and 1017. Two (2) impacts IVO of Camp Kunduz were detected; one (1) in front of the main gate and one (1) at the airfield. No casualties and damages were reported. At 1208 PRT Kunduz reported a rocket attack against Kunduz City. The impact point was IVO the ARINA Hotel in Kunduz City. Two (2) civilian were WIA.

At 0935 a CF platoon received SAF and returned fire. One (1) INS was KIA. At 1035 a sniper team engaged three (3) INS. Three (3) INS KIA in PALAW KAMAR were reported. The provincial offices received RPG and mortar fire. One (1) CIV was WIA by INS and treated by ISAF Forces. HILL 431 was attacked by INS with RPGs, ISAF forces returned fire and the INS withdrew. At 1345 ANA received heavy mortar fire. At 1555 the provincial offices received direct impacts of heavy IDF. CAS was requested. The mortar fire was accurate. IOT defend the own positions the unit engaged the INS with 20mm fire. During the incident 12 INS were KIA.

At 0847 INS attacked the ALIBAD District Center with one rocket and 15 to 20 INS moved toward the polling station. A CF unit responded to the event with a scout platoon and the ANP QRF. ANSF engaged INS IVO the polling station. According to unconfirmed information 2 ANP policemen were KIA.

During the movement from Kunduz to OP N along HWY 1 a CF unit received SAF north of BAGHLAN City. The unit broke through and arrived at OP NORTH at 1413. Two (2) German vehicles were damaged but operable.

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INS fired IDF IVO IMAM SAHIB hospital.

At 0740 INS fired one (1) BM-1 rocket on a partnered CF unit and ANA convoy 39 km NW of Kunduz City. CAS was requested. One (1) ANA soldier was WIA.

Incidents in the Fayzabad Area of Operations:

A CF unit based in Fayzabad gained information from the OCC-P that the polling station in FARMAQOLI Village was attacked by INS. The polling station will be opened after the ANP have taken over INS positions. Additionally ANP had to conduct an OP IOT ensure access to the polling station in KHUMBUK. The situation in TAGAB District was critical. According to ANSF sources two (2) Taliban leaders were detained by ANSF and two (2) INS were KIA.

19 SEP

There were two (2) events during the reporting period.

At 0245 a CF unit in Maimanah reported that a recovery vehicle was stuck and requested support. At 0817 INS gathered around the spot and the recovery unit received SAF and RPG and requested CAS. One (1) INS was KIA.


At 0814 one round of IDF was fired at the Aliabad District Center. No damage or casualties were reported. At 0934 local nationals reported that six (6) children were KIA and one (1) was WIA as they were playing with an UXO in ALIABAD Village 14 km S of Kunduz City. At 118 J2 PRT KDZ reported the 7th child DOW. The UXO was an unexploded INS rocket which had been fired recently.

RC – WEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-W AOR

An overall increase in intimidation tactics and targeting of IEC assets and parliamentary candidate is pervading the overall AOR. In HERAT Province, the most affected area is still SHINDAND District, where INS are willing to maintain their stronghold with IEDs emplacements. In addition, it is possible that new group was established east of HERAT, possibly related to incoming election period. In FARAH Province the threat of VBIED or SVBIED is probable and the steady level of threat reporting leads to the assessment that INS are planning further actions. In BADGHIS Province, the INS activity is focused in BALA MORGHAB area and in MUQUR District. In GHOR Province the usual stable situation may be disrupted by IED emplacements performed by LBP/INS. In addition, tribal/ethnic conflict and latent dissatisfaction toward GIRoA effectiveness typical for the latter province will as well hamper the security situation of the area.

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Graph 2: This graph shows the number and types of attacks by day from 13 – 19 SEP 2010 (note the dramatic increase on 17 and 18 SEP)

13 SEP

IED explosion in BALA BOLUK District. On 131254 Sep10 1 x RCIED exploded while an ANA convoy drove past. The explosion occurred on the RTE 517, SHEWAN area, IVO SAYKH LALA.

Demonstration in HERAT City: PRT HERAT reported that at 1221:47 SEP10, a group of about 50 people was moving to downtown HEART, demonstrating calmly. At 22:07 the PRT reported that, according to the ANP LNO, several groups of protesters continued gathering in different points. The ANP shot some warning rounds in the northwestern part of the city to scatter the crowd. It was reported to the PRT that the reason for the demonstration was an invitation from a local TV station (SOCKI TV) that invited people to go on the roofs and shout their support for the Holy Quran.

14 SEP

SAF and RPG fire in YEKKEH TUT, KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: A CF unit reported that at 1319:50 SEP10 they received SAF and RPG fire approximately 300 m West from a CF base. TF RAIDER returned fire with small and crew-served weapons and moved towards the source of the fire in the village of YEKKEH TUT. Contact ended as they approached.

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PPIED find in GULISTAN in District: On 131030 SEP, a CF unit was moving through Gulestan and found a possible IED. The IED was believed to be a displaced A/T MINE.

RCIED find in BALA BOLUK District: On 140709 SEP10 the ANP found 1 x RCIED close to GARNI Village. At 10:45 the EOD team confirmed 1xIED, composed of 1 x JUG 40 lbs (18 kg) of HME.

15 SEP

SAF in YEKKEH TUT, KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: According to a CF unit, at 1418:30 SEP10, dismounted troops from a nearby CF base started receiving MG + RPG fire from south and east. The troops returned fire and started returning to the base. 2 x TRUCKS were moved to provide cover for the dismounts. A single ANA soldier was killed in the fire fight.

VBIED strike in HERAT City: At 1419:15 SEP10, 1 x EXPLOSION occurred in HERAT City. According to the regional ANSF coordination center, the explosion was

caused by 1 x VBIED (an IED in a motorbike), that exploded when an ANP FORD RANGER passed by. The motorbike was parked in front of the Governor's Palace and near the football field in the city. As a result, 1 x ANP FORD RANGER was destroyed, 1 x WIA ANP Officer, 1 x WIA ANP Soldier and 11 x WIA LN (all lightly injured).

SAF in PUSTH-E ROD District: On 150935 SEP10 a CF unit on a dismounted patrol with the ANSF in the DUKIN Village area, started receiving SAF from a big group of INS. Fire was returned and CAS was requested.

2 x IED find in PUSHT-E ROD District: On 151235 SEP10, a CF unit found 2xIED in the PUSHT-E ROD area: the first was composed of 3 x ROCKET in a daisychain but the composition of the second was unreported.

IED strike in BALA BOLUK District: According to a CF unit, on 151349 SEP10 the back of one truck was struck by 1 x IED. The blast resulted in a damaged CF vehicle and one lightly wounded CF soldier.

Search operation in DEHESHK Village in PUSH RUD District: On 14 SEPT 10 during a search of suspected insurgent homes by the ANSF, NABI JAN was arrested. The follow material was found in his home:

- 10 x 107 mm. artillery cases
- different sizes of knives
- one motorbike
- one car Toyota corolla grey color reported as TB CDR ADAM KHAN's car
- 20 meters of detonation cord (likely used to make directional IED)

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- 10 kg of refined OPIUM
- Some launch charges.

INS threaten people not to participate in the elections in PASABAND and TAYWARAH: INS threatened LNs not to vote during the elections. INS announced, that if they find people who voted, they will cut off their fingers. People were threatened in CHARDAR and DUSANG areas in TEY WAREH DT, DAHANE ESKEWCHA and UDKAL , KHANA BEGI , KAKURI areas in PASABAND District.

16 SEP

IED find in ZEERKOH Valley: On 151610 SEP10, SHINDAND NDS informed CF about a possible IED near BAKT ABAD Village. They went to the spot and found a PPIED. According to the information provided by the US personnel, the IED was composed of a main charge of approximately 2kg of explosive (plastic bottle), placed in the middle of the road, activated by a pressure plate system.

INS harass OP CHEROKEE, MURGHAB District: At 151848 SEP 10, a CF unit reported that an ANA CP posted next to OP CHEROKEE (Hasid Khan Village in the Bala Morghab area) started receiving SAF from SINI Village.

INS attack CF Base LUDINA Village, MUQUR District: At 161100 SEP 10, CF reported their new base in the LUDINA area started receiving SAF + RPG fire from the northwest hills.

SAF against CF Patrol: A CF unit reported that that, on 152230 SEP, their patrol received SAF at 22:30. They returned fire and the INS broke contact.

UXO + IED turn-in by NDS in CHAGHCHARAN: At 141830 SEP 10 the NDS in CHAGHCHARAN got information about an IED IVO BADGAH Village found by local ANP officer. At 20:00 an NDS officer brought the found items to the NDS HQ in CHAGHCHARAN: 1 x IED (pressure cooker with wires going out) and 2 x 107MM ROCKET.

17 SEP

RCIED explosion in YAKA TUT, KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: According to a CF unit, at 170850 SEP10 another CF unit had audio and visual of an explosion on a major route. A patrol including ANA engineers was sent to the spot. At 0931 the CF unit reached the explosion site: a dirty trail on the eastern side the route. The area was cordoned, the explosion crater was checked, tactical questioning was conducted and the area was scanned with ANA mine detectors for other possible devices. The blast site was about 3 FT deep and 5-6 FT wide. Some parts were recovered, including a wire 2-3 FT away from the blast site. According to the evidence, the explosion seems to

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have been caused by a RCIED, with the wire leading from the RC to the blast site.

IED find in KUSHK-E KOHNAH District: At 161550 SEP10 a CF unit found an IED. At 1745D* ANA EOD disarmed the device.

INS attack a CF Base IVO SANGATESH Village, MUQUR District: At 161702 SEP10, a CF unit based in Badghis reported that another CF unit started receiving fire (SAF and RPG) from enemy positions. They returned fire with 12,70MM and 7,62MM MG fire over the origin of fire. A DY65 (Mirage) was assigned to support. At 1737 the CAS was in the zone and carried out searching missions IOT identify INS presence in the zone without finding any evidence. One of the origins of fire was from one former ANA Observation Post close to the FOB (NW) that had been abandoned by that unit two weeks ago.

INS attack FOB BERNARDO DE GALVEZ IVO LUDINA, MUQUR District: At 171045 SEP10, a CF unit based in Badghis reported that the CF base IVO LUDINA Village received 3 x BURST of MG fire from a northwest direction.

INS attack a CF Base IVO JAWJAR Village, MURGHAB District: At 161719 SEP10, a CF unit based in Badghis reported that a CF base started receiving heavy MG fire from an enemy position; they returned fire with own weapons. The CF mortar platoon in the base performed a fire mission in support with 7 x 120mm HE mortar round and the enemy position was suppressed.

IED found IVO COP IMPALA, MURGHAB District: At 161715 SEP10, CF elements, during the performance of a dismounted patrol, found a PPIED in. ANA EOD disposed the disposal.

MINE explosion in GHULCHIN area, QADIS District: According to the Operational Coordination Center in Qaleyeh Naw, at 162000 SEP10, 1 x VEHICLE hit 1 x mine where a fire fight against ANA and ANP had been declared before, near GULCHIN. BDA: 2xVEHICLE damaged, 1xKIA LN, 1xWIA LN.

IED found IVO MURGHAB Center School, MURGHAB District: At 171043 SEP10, a CF unit reported that the ANP in BALA MURGHAB found 1xVBIED during a patrol and cordoned the area. The VBIED was composed of: 1xMOTORBIKE + what seemed to be a battery charger for laptops with a 12 V battery + 1xYELLOW CONTAINER with HME. The VBIED was emplaced in the BALA MURGHAB bazaar area, near the clinic, a boy's school and right next to the ANA HQ, which was evacuated. An EOD Team was sent to the spot. At 1235, the CF unit detained a trigger man in possession of a remote control IVO the Great Mosque. The individual was held until being handed over to the ANP. The detainee was taken to FOB COLUMBUS, where he was put under custody of the ANA and the NDS at 14:45. He was holding the following material:

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- 1xCELL PHONE with camera (he had been taking pictures with it);
- 1xREMOTE CONTROL;
- 1xBLOCK OF NOTES.

INS KIDNAP LNs in AB E KAMARI and MUQUR Districts: According to the OCC-R, at 161800 SEP10, 2 x LN workers for the IEC (Independent Electoral Committee) in AB-E KAMARI and up to 17 x LN (7 of them being employees for the IEC too) were kidnapped. They are:

- ABDUL AGH, son of ABDUL RAHIM (Head of AB-E BAREEK polling station);
- ABDUL HAMIID, son of ABDUL KARIIM (Head of the AB-E BAREEK female polling station). They were taken by armed militants of NOOR MOHAMMAD, a suspected TB CDR and moved to the MOMA MADZAY area of SANGATESH.

The 7 IEC employees abducted in MUQUR are:

- ABDUL NABI, son of Mullah TOTI (Head of RUBAT Polling Station);
- ABDUL AZIZ (Head of MIRANZAI polling station);
- BRAKAT (Head of MIRANZAI female polling station);
- FAZEL (Registration);
- ZIAUL-HAQ (Registration);
- ABDUL RASHID (Guide);
- BAAZ GULL (ballot box controller).

They were taken by armed militants of Mullah MANAN-E DIWANA and moved to SOOT KHEEL, from where they were moved to GHULOGHAY Village. According to the reports received on 17SEP10, the abducted are of Pashtun ethnicity, some of them are relatives of INS, they would not be kidnapped but only held, and they could be released soon.

INS attack a CF Base IVO JAWJAR Village, MURGHAB District: At 170905 SEP10, a CF unit reported a CF base started receiving SAF from grid. Ground "troops in contact" event was opened and fire was returned. At 0928 TIC was declared and a CT31 (M-2000D MIRAGE) was assigned to support; 2 x 60mm HE mortar round and 7 x 120 mm HE mortar round were fired. At 1045 the situation was calm and TIC was closed. At 1132 the same base started receiving SAF again. TIC was opened again and fire was returned. At 1135, fire support mission was performed: 3x120mm HE mortar round. At 1141 started receiving SAF from a new position. At 1145 fired 1x60MM HE MORTAR ROUND at the enemy.

IED cache find in PUSTH-E ROD District: As reported, on 171219 SEP10 CF found, IVO RANJ Village, a house full of IED making material:

- blasting caps;
- wires;
- detonation cord;
- homemade shrapnel;

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The people in the house were detained by the ANP and turned over to the NDS.

IED emplacement discovery on RTE 515 in BAKWAH District: On 171052 SEP10 ISR discovered 6xLN emplacing an IED near RTE 515. The individuals were seen entering an isolated house. Then some of them came in a white car and moved through RTE 515.

Explosion in FARAH City: According to the OCCP, on 171330 SEP10 an explosion occurred in FARAH City, approx. 500 m. from the OCCP. The first report considers it a TDIED (time-delayed).

Explosion IVO CF Base in BAKWAH District: As reported by CF, on 171328 SEP10 an explosion was seen near a CF base.

Threatening pamphlets in MUQUR District: Insurgents delivered threatening pamphlets amongst population from MIRANZAI and FIRUZAI Villages, trying to prevent population from voting on 18 SEP 10.

18 SEP

HERAT Province Election Day Events:

- **0114 Military Training Team – IDF fire, OBEH DISTRICT:** According to the 207 Corps report, INS fired some rockets against 4/1/207 Kandak in SHANAN.
- **0800 CF - IED FIND, KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI):** IED was found on 180730 SEP10, during mounted patrol at polling sites. IED was made of HME. It was a pressure plate IED with HME.
- **0803 CF - SAF/RPG TF GHOST, KUSHK-E KOHNAH:** A CF dismounted patrol was receiving SAF/RPG fire in BAZAAR-E KOHNA 180800 SEP10. Unit returned fire and enemy withdrew, however, unit is expecting another attack.
- **0907 - From at 0847- INS presence in ANDRASKAN District:** INS in BARGHANA Village are threatening people not to go to vote in ZARDA LOOQ.
- **0933 RC W JOC – IEDs and SAF in KEK District:** In KUSHK-E-KOHNA, in JOYE SULTANI, elders won't allow ANP to reach the village due to a mine field. Due to a mine field, elections commission transferred the election polling site.
- **0934 RC W JOC – IED in KEK District:** Reported that in KUSHK-E-KOHNA 2 LN were KIA due to a motorcycle RCIED strike.

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– **0935 RCW BTL CPT – SAF in GULRAN District:** INS (around 60) presence was reported from GULRAN with intention to disrupt the election process. ANA Commando going to be deployed there. BDA reported: 1 ANA KIA, 4 ANA WIA.

– **1019 CF – IED explosion in KSK District:** IED exploded in ruins at YAKA TUT on 180800 SEP10. ANA unit deployed in and around the ruins to clear and treat casualties if needed. 3 ANA were injured in the event.

– **1046 OCCR-W – SAF in KUSHK RABAT-E-SANGI District:** INS attacked SHARA KHALIL ABP CP.

– **1059 CF - SAF against CF in KEK District:** A CF dismounted patrol was receiving SAF and RPG fire on 181040 SEP10.

– **1127 CF - Explosion against ANA vehicle JAMBARAN Village, SHINDAND District:** CF received information about explosion against ANA vehicle at 181055 SEP10, IVO JAMBARAN Village. The explosion was due either to a mine or hand grenade. No casualties reported. ANSF have situation under control.

– **1134 CF, Explosion ZEERKHO VALLEY -** At 181140 SEP10 an explosion hit a civilian vehicle. ATT BDA from ANSF is: 6 KIA and 5 WIA (all LN). According to Traffic Police, it seems that a 2nd explosion took place IVO first POI at about 1150; a Toyota Corolla was hit by an explosion that caused 1x KIA and 1x WIA (all LN).

– **1141 RC W JOC – SAF against several locations in KEK District:** It was reported at 1140 that the following locations are under attack: 1. KHAJEH GHALANDAR 2. JOYE SULTANI 3. KHAJEH SHAHAB

– **1148 LNO POLICE HQ – INS presence in KEK District:** INS took two closed Polling Centers, in KHOSE SHOEB Village and KHOSE KALANDER Village.

– **1154 OCCR – SAF against Polling stations in KEK District:** In KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District 3 PS's located in CHEHEL DOKHTARAN have been attacked by INS. IEC fled from the PS's, ANP is anaging the situation and recovered electoral ballots.

– **1252 CF - IED explosions in ZEERKOH Valley:** Traffic Police reported an explosion IVO KUSHE Village on 181252 SEP10. Following information revealed that 3 CIV on motorcycles blew up on 3 mines (probably anti-personnel mine) IVO ZIARAT. BDA is 1 LN KIA, 2 LN WIA for the moment.

– **1316 CF - Possible INS gathering in ANDRASKAN District:** ANP, NDS and Sub Governor reported about INS movements towards the area of CHAHAK, NAGAL, HUMESH. Last report speaks about 25 INS on motorbikes, moving to the area IOT emplace mines/IED's and burn ballots during their

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transportation tonight. ADRASKAN requested support from CF. CF is deploying forces in the area, but suggests to employ ANA unit from 4/1 Kandak set in ADRASKAN.

- 1511 PRT HERAT - Attack on Polling Center in GULRAN District: At 181454 SEP10 HRT PHQ reported that polling center of KHOJANI (GULRAN District) is under INS attack. ANP is in lack of forces. Later PHQ reported that INS are withdrawing from polling center.

- 1544 Police HQ REPORTS - Attack on Polling Centers in OBEH and KEK Districts: At 1400 polling center in JONOWA VILLAGE, OBEH District was under attack / polling center in KHVAJEH MOWRY Village KUSHK-E KOHNAH District is under attack. The ANP commander is in the polling center.

IED strike in HERAT City: At 171812 SEP 10 a VBIED (reportedly a bicycle with explosives) blew up in HERAT City, near EKHTIAR ADEEN mosque. 3 LN have been injured, and taken by ANP to HERAT hospital.

Direct fire in SIAHWASHAN, NIZAM-E SHAHID District: At 172150 SEP 10 the polling center beside ANP CHARKUCHEGHI CP in SIAHVASHAN Village was attacked with RPG (3 rockets) and small arms. The attack ended around 2205 without casualties, and only minor damages to the structure.

IDF attack on SHINDAND Airfield: On 172142 SEP 10, one explosion was heard from a CF compound. According to the information gathered, the POO was KUSHKAK Village. INS launched one rocket toward SHINDAND Airfield. The shot hit the ground inside the airport perimeter, near a watching tower. There is no report of casualties for ANSF and CF.

Attacked convoy in SHINDAND District: On 171238 SEP 10, ADRASKAN NDS informed CF about a blast near NAGAL Village. As reported by NDS, a civilian truck was involved in an IED explosion while it was delivering ballot papers to polling centers situated along Road 509. ADRASKAN ANP personnel, who were escorting the aforementioned truck, said that the driver and two LNs were WIA (one individual lost two legs, one individual lost one leg). ANP cordoned the area. The three WIA were evacuated to HERAT. On 171355 SEP 10, CF were sent to CHAHAK Village and linked up with one ANP unit. Then they together reached the location of the event. In addition, according to the information reported by the Intelligence Officer of ADRASKAN ANP, two of three individuals wounded in the IED blast died while they were transported to HERAT clinic facility. They were the elders of two villages of the lower FARSI valley: DEH KHAR and MASK.

INS attack against a CRF Base near LUDINA Village, MUQUR District: At 171712 SEP 10 a CF base in LUDINA area received harassment fire. At 171740 SEP 10, the INS elements withdrew from the area.

INS attack Polling Center in ACHESKA Village, MUQUR District: At

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180959 SEP 10, OCCP-BAGDHIS reported that ANSF started receiving fire at 0900 in ACHESKA Village. ANP forces in the village are 8 and INS forces are 40 with light weapons (AK, MG, RPG). The INS target is the school polling center.

INS attack Polling Center in GULCHIN Village, QADIS District: According to OCCR-W, at 180755 SEP 10, the MEER GHAS school polling center, in GULCHIN Village was under attack of INS forces (UNK number) with light weapons (AK, MG, RPG). ANP was fighting the INS. At 1100, the fight was ongoing and the situation was getting worst; heavy fire was received, and up to 50xTB led by ABDUL HAKIM and ABDUL HAY were concentrating. The ANSF requested CAS. At 1300, GULCHIN was about to fall. They were running out of ammo. ANSF requested a Show of Force and air resupply of ammunition.

INS attack Polling Center in KUMURI Village, MUQUR District: IAW the OCCR-W information, since 180750 SEP 10, KUMURI Village was under attack by the INS established in the mountains surrounding the village firing at the villagers when they were trying to enter the polling center at KUMURI Clinic. QRF was requested to support the ANP. At 1030 insurgents stopped the incident. At 1223 INS attacked again.

INS attack OP MAHL SHAL IVO KUMURI Village, MUQUR District: A BADGHIS unit deployed in the MAHL SHAL received two MG bursts.

INS attack on CF Base near SANGATESH Village, MUQUR District: At 181231 SEP 10, two groups of insurgents attacked a CF base in SANGATESH from two positions, located at western and eastern hills. INS fired with SAF and RPGs. CF returned fire with SAF, 12,7 mm machinegun, and mortar fire. At 1307 insurgents stopped firing. At 1450 insurgents harassed FOB again with SAF and RPG from western hills.

INS attack CF Base near LUDINA Village, MUQUR District: At 181327 SEP 10, a small insurgent group harassed FOB with SAF from eastern position. At 1511 INS attacked with RPG from eastern hills.

INS attack against ANSF in BALA MURGHAB, MURGHAB District: At 180840 SEP 10, ANA in BALA MURGHAB received SAF from unknown number of INS. The unit returned the fire.

INS attack CF Base IVO AKAZAI Village, MURGHAB Village: At 180840 SEP 10, CF reported that a CF base was receiving an attack with SAF from an unknown number of INS.

Rocket attacks against CF base, MURGHAB District: At 180700 SEP 10, CF reported that 2 x explosions were heard near their base. 2xROCKETS were fired and hit Bala Murghab. CF performed a mortar fire support mission with 3x120mm HE mortar round. At 0725 the 2nd mortar fire support mission was performed with 9x120mm HE mortar rounds. At 0741, another explosion was

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heard near the new bridge. The evaluation was that the rocket was targeting FOB COLUMBUS. At 1110 3xROCKET impacted IVO the north area of FOB COLUMBUS (1 of them impacted 600 m. northeast of the FOB). At 1158 the 3rd mortar fire support mission was performed with 4x120mm HE mortar round.

INS attack CF base IVO LUDINA Village, MURGHAB District: At 181517 SEP 10, CF reported that COP IMPALA started receiving SAF from enemy.

INS attack CF base IVO AKAZAI Village, MURGHAB Village: At 181515 SEP 10, CF reported that COP VICTOR started receiving SAF from enemy.

IED blast In FARAH City: CF LNO at OCCP in FARAH City reported that, on 180700 SEP 10, a civilian truck exploded while an ANP patrol was passing.

Ambush against CF CONVOY in BAKWAH District:

On 171920 SEP 10 CF convoy was moving toward CAMP LAVAREDO when it received fire from unknown positions IVO DEWALAK Village, BAKWA District. INS ceased fire and changed fire position, about 50-80 meters southern than the first site. After about 10 min, INS started fire again.

DF / IED FIND in PUSH-E ROD District: On 171526 SEP 10 ANSF with received SAF. They returned fire with US support (2 long range marksman). At 1528 ANSF found a PPIED.

Rocket Attack Near TAPEH Village in PUSHT-E ROD District: According to reporting received at the Farah OCCP, on 17 September 2010, ANSF reported a rocket landed near TAPEH Village in PUSHT ROD District.

Rocket attack to ANA CP in KHA-E SAFAYD District: As reported by CF LNO at OCCP, on 180850 SEP 10 2 x ROCKET were fired against an ANA CP.

ROCKET attack against CF bases in BAKA BOLUK District: As reported by CF, at 180912 SEP 10 2xROCKET impacted IVO FOB TOBRUK/FOB LEIMBACH. The possible point of origin of the rockets was located in DOWLATABAD vicinity (the second rocket was seeing flying over the FOBs from East to West). At 1002, 2 x more ROCKETS were fired against the FOBs. The probable points of origin of the rockets was TAPA Village. At 1150 3xROCKET were fired against the FOBs. Only one of them completed flight and impacted IVO FOB perimeter; the other 2 rockets were not successfully launched.

IDF IVO CF base in GULISTAN District: On 181022 SEP 10, FOB ICE heard an explosion on the southwest side of the base. CF estimated that two 82mm mortar rounds were shot.

Mine strike in TAYWARAH District: On 180947 SEP 10 OCC-P reported that in TEY WAREH District an ANA patrol drove onto a mine. 1xWIA.

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SAF in PASABAND District: 180910 SEP 10 OCC-P reported that in PASABAND ANA and ANP (60 PAX) were in contact with INS, 2xWIA, 1xVEHICLE destroyed. INS 20-30 PAX.

19 SEP

IED strike in IVO SHINDAND airfield, SHINDAND District: At 19 0710 SEP an ANP vehicle moving along HWY1 was hit by an IED about 1km south of Shindand Airfield. Exploitation suggests a possible RCIED on the side of the road.

IED strike in KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: At 181800 SEP 10 a CF unit was hit by a PPIED detonation, resulting in 1xWIA CAT B (US) and 2xMRAP damaged. The wounded soldier was treated and then MEDEVAC to HERAT. While recovering a vehicle, they found a secondary IED. ANA EOD was tasked to dispose of it.

INS attack IVO BURIDA Village, MURGHAB District: At 191030 SEP 10, CF reported elements on mounted patrol between LUDINA and BURIDA, BALA MURGHAB northern area, received SAF and RPG fire (4 rockets).

MINE discovery in GULISTAN District: On 19 1201 SEP the ANA were moving along HWY1 and found a fresh crater in the road, with 2xmines in the blast hole. RC (W) requested EOD support from RC (SW).

RC – SOUTHWEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-SW AOR

During the past 7 days, there were four hundred and fifty-six (456) INS kinetic events in the RC (SW) AO.

There were two (2) IDF attack in Reg-e Khan Neshin.

There was one (1) cache find, three (3) detainments, thirteen (13) IED finds, six (6) DF attacks, two (2) IED attacks, and one (1) UXO find in Garm Ser.

There were five (5) DF attacks, one (1) IED attack, one (1) IED find, one (1) UXO find, and one (1) detainment in Nawah-ye Barakzai.

There were seven (7) detainments, one hundred and fifteen (115) DF attacks, thirteen (13) IED attacks, nine (9) IED finds, two (2) SAFire attacks, and one (1) IDF attack in Marjeh.

There were three (3) IDF attacks, three (3) DF attacks, two (2) IED attacks, and two (2) UXO finds in Khash Rod.

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There was one (1) DF attack in Washer.

There were six (6) IED attacks, three (3) UXO finds, two (2) IED finds, two (2) IDF attacks, and one (1) DF attack in Now Zad.

There were two (2) detainments, twenty-one (21) IED finds, thirteen (13) DF attacks, eight (8) IED attacks, and two (2) UXO finds in Musa Qal'ah.

There were four (4) DF attacks, one (1) IDF attack, and one (1) detainment in Kajaki.

There were two (2) cache finds, two (2) detainments, forty-seven (47) DF attacks, eleven (11) IED finds, seven (7) IED attacks, four (4) IDF attacks, one (1) SAFire attack, one (1) UXO find, and two (2) complex attacks in Sangin.

There were fifty-nine (59) DF attacks, sixteen (16) IED attacks, fourteen (14) IED finds, and five (5) IDF attacks in Nahr-e Saraj.

There were ninety-eight (98) DF attacks, four (4) IED attacks, one (1) IED find, and two (2) SAFire attacks in Nad 'Ali.

There were nineteen (19) DF attacks and one (1) IED attack in Lashkar Gah.

IEDs were still used in a primarily defensive manner, but because of the massive decline in the use of direct fire attacks, they accounted for the plurality of the kinetic events (47%). Direct fire events, normally by far the most popular insurgent tactic, accounted for 45% of all events in RC-SW. This decrease in direct fire events is attributed to the departure of many insurgents from the battlefield as they celebrated the Eid holiday and took a break from fighting. It is expected that direct fire events and kinetic events in general will return to their normal levels next week, especially with the approaching elections.

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


Figure RC-SW 1: These charts show the level of significant events in RC-SW over the last two weeks.




Figure RC-SW 2: This chart depicts the level of significant events in the Marjeh over the last week.

During the past 24 hours, there were thirty-three (33) INS kinetic events in Marjeh District. There were twenty-eight (28) DF attacks, five (5) IED attacks, and one (1) detainment.

Throughout the week, INS continued to utilize harassing SAF attacks against static CF positions and dismounted patrols. The amount of attacks returned to normal as expected after a significant decrease during Eid. Throughout Marjeh, CF were subject to multiple attacks, primarily consisting of DF attacks. INS continued attacks against CF patrols with sporadic SAF. Approximately four INS attacked CF in 2/6's and 2/9's AO with medium machine gun fire and SAF, both resulting in CF casualties. Insurgents will likely continue to attack CF in smaller sized forces, as it is more difficult to target them compared to a larger group.





Figure RC-SW 3: This chart depicts significant events in the Central Helmand River Valley over the last four weeks.

RC – SOUTH:

1. General Assessment of RC-S AOR

In the past seven days, there were approximately 354 SIGACTs in RC-S, of which two thirds (222 events) took place in the districts around Kandahar City (Panjwa'i, Zharay, Arghandab and Maiwand) or in the city itself. Over all, this was a rise over last week's 290 or so attacks. This increase is, of course, attributed to Election Day (on which, over 200 attacks occurred). However, recent operations in Malajat by ANSF seem to have had an effect on kinetic activity.

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There seems even to have been a lull in the assassination and intimidation campaign by insurgents within the city of Kandahar itself, though this is likely temporary and will resume (and likely intensify) now that the elections proceeded with some level of success.

Although the vast majority of the above mentioned activity took place in Kandahar Province, the level of violence in both Zabul and Uruzgan remains at high levels (though this also decreased over the last week). Insurgents continue to target CF and ANSF convoys along HWY 1 in Zabul with IEDs and some small arms fire. This is also the case in Uruzgan, though IEDs seem more to be used in this area to protect insurgent havens and cache sites.

In Uruzgan this week there were thirty-five events, which is a significant increase and reversal from last week when events decreased dramatically due to the religious holidays. This past week, twelve of forty total events took place on 18 SEP (with ten of these being direct fire events). Indeed, over 23 events took place with 48 hours of the elections. In a significant shift from the recent past, the most frequent type of attack used this past week was direct fire and not IED emplacements. In a suggestion that INS were operating in a higher than usual operations tempo, there were no events recorded on 19 SEP.

In the provinces around Kandahar City, direct fire, indirect fire and IEDs remain the primary means of attack for INS in contesting advances into INS support zones. This will continue to occur specifically in the areas of Tabin, Chahar Qolbah-e Olya / Sofla and the Kalacheh. HME factories in Takia and Babur continue to supply the many IEDs available, but the significant decrease in events this week suggests that material for bomb making is stockpiled at a larger than usual rate, allowing a much greater number of IED emplacements in the week leading to the election. In southern Arghandab the IED engagement area southeast of Deh-E Kochay remained active. We expect this area to remain active in the near future (this is where several of last week's casualties were incurred).

In Zharay, INS continue to target HWY 1 between Howz-E Madad and the Maiwand border. This area will remain an INS attack zone targeting PSC's. Reporting continues to indicate this week that there are ongoing preparations throughout Zharay, especially around Pashmul, of INS planning and reinforcing defensive positions. Attacks on CF were centered around the central Pashmul area this past week. It is also assessed IDF attacks will increase as INS are conducting reconnaissance operations. Intimidation of LN's will continue to increase the TB's support base throughout Zharay, particularly around proposed election sites.

RC – EAST:

1. General Assessment of RC-E AOR

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In RC-East this week kinetic activity increased by 171% (526 this week, 194 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 143% (526 this week, 216 last year). The increase in kinetics can be attributed to the election process that was held within RC- East. Although there were numerous attacks against polling sites, the overall the election process was deemed successful within RC East. However, reporting throughout RC-E continue to highlight INS' plans to conduct attacks that will disrupt the election process. Although the Election Day concluded, the election process still remains vulnerable to INS and criminal influence as they attempt to sway the population at a local level and infiltrate in the GIRoA through changing the ballots as well as targeting ballot transit vehicles. Multi-discipline reporting confirms that current top threat areas in RC-East are concentrated in a) North-East Paktika, b) C. Konar, c) Khowst.

Overall, in Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa and Bamyan area, kinetic activity has remained at normal op-tempo levels throughout the region. Recent reporting this week has indicated INS' intent to focus attacks towards BAF to garner opportunities for an effective IO campaign. Also, reporting indicates INS conducted continuous attacks during Election Day. They may also continue to target candidates, pending the outcome of the election. INS' continue to target CF along MSR Vermont in order to disrupt CF FoM throughout Kapisa Province.

In Parwan Province, kinetic activity continues to remain at normal op-tempo levels despite the elections on 18 September. Reporting indicates INS are continuing to show intent to conduct complex attacks against BAF. It is likely that INS will attempt to conduct harassing attacks targeting BAF, possibly as a probing attempt to gain knowledge of CF TTPs. Additionally, there has been a continued threat to election candidates throughout the province. While there was not a significant amount of kinetic activity in Parwan on Election Day, it is possible INS will attempt to target post election logistics in order to affect the outcome. Also, in the past week, during the elections, a suicide bomber located near a polling site was arrested by ANP in Charikar District (non-KTD). INS in Parwan are currently increasing their cohesiveness with neighboring INS factions, while fragmenting some local factions of insurgency. Recent CF OPS IVO Qal'eh-ye Jala Village may cause INS in the area to lose some local populace support and in turn, possibly lose a critical facilitation/transit point and safe haven. The local populace, specifically in eastern Parwan, is pleased with the removal of MSK. In the next week, we will likely continue to see indications of INS intent, preparation and OPS pertaining to the overall trends as well as the INS' desire to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks targeting ANSF/CF.

In Kapisa Province, kinetic activity continues to remain at normal op-tempo levels despite the elections on 18 September. The most likely INS COA remains ambushes targeting ANSF/CF convoys/patrols, IED emplacement along MSR Vermont, and IDF conducted against the FOBs/COPs in the area IOT disrupt ANSF/CF FoM and security OPS. Reporting has indicated that INS are

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operating in a more cohesive manner throughout Kapisa; however, multi-disciplined reporting indicates that INS in Kapisa are continuing to combat local Arabakais. The INS cohesiveness is likely due to similar goals of disrupting ANSF/CF operations while INS are likely attempting to maintain control by eradicating local militias. Also, initial reporting during, and after the election period, indicated INS in Kapisa continually attacked ANSF/CF and polling stations. The majority of the attacks consisted of DF, with some IDF IVO FOB Kutschbach and the Tagab Bazaar. The attacks appeared to be mostly harassment in nature IOT disrupt security efforts and deter LNs from voting. There were no spectacular attacks conducted, but there are indications that INS may conduct spectacular attacks in the coming week. It is likely we will continue to see DF, IDF, and possibly IED attacks focused on ANSF/CF and LNs as INS attempt to continue to disrupt the election process. It is likely INS OPS within Kapisa will continue to increase as INS attempt to destabilize local government, discredit GIRoA, disrupt ANSF/CF OPS, and continue to expand their support areas. Furthermore, locals in Kapisa feel GIRoA/CF cannot adequately provide for the local populace through security and development projects. In the next week, we will likely continue to see indications of INS intent, preparation and OPS pertaining to the overall trends as well as the INS' desire to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks targeting ANSF/CF.

In **Panjshir Province**, due to the stable security situation, ethnic cohesiveness, and recent economic growth, Panjshir has the potential to qualify for transition status in the near future. Governor Keram cited the importance of roads and electricity for future development, and also emphasized that secure provinces should not be neglected by the donors. While Panjshir is a secure province, GIRoA has failed to adequately staff ANP positions in Panjshir, which could cause security issues in the future. Overall, Panjshir continues to stand out as a secure province in eastern Afghanistan, reinforcing its reputation as a likely candidate for an upcoming transition.

In **Bamyan Province**, reporting continues to indicate INS' intent to conduct an attack against FPB Kiwi, FPB Romero, and the NZPRT convoys. While TB may continue to plan for attacks against CF, they will likely face problems with the local populace. Reporting suggests TB are losing local national support in areas that were previously considered safe havens. Additionally, recent reporting indicates INS' intent to further exploit the cross-border seam between Bamyan and Baghlan by potentially conducting attacks against FPB Romero and the NZPRT. INS from TWB will likely continue to exploit cross-border seams in the form of OPS targeting ANSF/CF in Bamyan.

In the Paktiya, Paktika and Khost area, reporting over the last 7 days indicated an elevated threat to the election process. INS elements intended to target various district centers to undermine GIRoA's legitimacy. Additionally, sporadic reporting also highlighted a threat to the movement of ballots. However, INS' failed to conduct any large scale attacks which would severely disrupt the

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election process. This could be attributed to the strong security posture throughout the region. Issues like representation in the National Assembly and failure of/untimely delivery of ballot boxes could be a reason for low voter turnout in certain parts of the region. Multi-Discipline reflections showed INS frustrations over a high voter turnout on 18 Sep 2010. Ongoing threat to the Parliamentary Elections remains to be the possibility of the selection of INS affiliated candidates, corruption and criminal activities.

In **Khowst Province**, INS indicated high intent to conduct IDF attacks against population centric polling sites. Single source report highlighted the movement of INS CDR from Logar Province to Tirezayi District, Khowst Province to rejuvenate the IED cell operating in the region. It is likely that due to the advent of the CDR from Logar, we will see facilitation of IEDs/IED materials from North Waziristan Agency, Pakistan. INS' were unable to conduct successful attacks against polling centers that would disrupt the elections. However, HQN affiliated candidate(s) participated in the elections and it remains to be seen whether they were elected to the National Assembly. If so, HQN elements will be able to assert pressure on ANSF to further their organizational goals.

In **Paktya Province**, HQN elements were active in NE districts of the province with the intent to disrupt the parliamentary elections. Reporting over the last four weeks established an influx of HQN elements in the region with the intent to disrupt security. However, combined strong security postures by the ANSF, CF and Arbakai/Chalvesti resulted in failure of INS affiliated large scale attacks. Certain regions of NE Paktya did not intend to participate in the elections due to low representation in the National Assembly. Zormat District was a high point of contingency for GIRoA and CF elements due to a strong INS stronghold in the region. INS in Zormat printed fake election cards to undermine the legitimacy of the elections. It is likely that INS' pre-election efforts will materialize during the post phase of the election process in the form of kinetic targeting of local populace in NE Paktya.

In **Paktika Province**, INS' continue to maintain safe havens in Naka and Sar Hawza Districts. The threat to the elections in Paktika was suicide and IDF attacks. However, INS' failed to disrupt the elections in Paktika due to a strong security posture in the province. In Bermel District, the Shkin Arbakai played a key role in enhancing security efforts by ANSF/CF. However; the INS posed a significant IED threat along ASR Audi to the movement of ballots. Ongoing threat to elections in the Province remains to be election of corrupt officials.

In **Ghazni Province**, INS continued to target candidates of the parliamentary elections, failing in an attack to kill a candidate campaigning in Qarabagh (KTD). In this case, the local villagers protected the candidate from the TB, indicating a possible shift in local support. Additionally, INS in Andar (KTD) may be trying to preserve this support by warning locals of VOIEDs emplaced along roads leading to polling sites, likely in an effort to portray an interest in CIVCAS while still

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targeting voters travelling to polling sites. Aside from the overall threat to the elections from INS, there were also reports early on of potential fraud and corruption as candidates were reportedly paying locals for votes. This could shed negative light on GIRoA's handling of corrupt politicians and discredit efforts to provide an effective form of governance in the province. Overall, reports indicate that INS efforts to disrupt the elections were effective and will likely use the opportunity to create an IO campaign to further delegitimize GIRoA and garner local populace support.

In Logar and Wardak, reporting highlighted INS intent to disrupt the parliamentary elections. Although the voting phase of the elections is over, the election process as a whole is not, presenting a threat while election officials tally ballots. As reporting continues to indicate that the TB may be losing more support from the local populace, INS likely feel that the most important way of maintaining support from locals is to further discredit GIRoA by disrupting the election process. Although most attacks across RC-East as a whole were ineffective, INS were still able to show their capabilities and strong intent of conducting attacks against the election process. The primary pre-election threat, however, was intimidation of the local populace. Campaigners and Locals were warned early on that if they were caught in the election process they faced body mutilation. Although, If the elections are portrayed as successful in AO Bayonet it is possible that INS will try to significantly increase operations in an attempt to show GIRoA incompetence.

In Logar Province, reporting has indicated that HiG CDRs in Baraki Barak (non-KTD) have issued a warning to TB CDRs to leave the area or face death. This is similar to the very early stages of the conflict that erupted between the HiG and TB in Nerkh District, Wardak Province. If a conflict such as the one in Nerkh erupts in Baraki Barak, we could see a significant decrease in kinetic activity, as INS focus will be on the opposing group rather than on CF. However, this is less likely due to the fact that SL will likely force a resolution much faster IOT prevent the conflict from reaching levels they did in Nerkh. Despite this emerging conflict, reporting primarily revolved around the disruption of the elections, with indications of possible IDF attacks against FOBs/COPs and potential polling sites.

In Wardak Province, HiG INS continue to show intent to attack CF infrastructure in Nerkh (non-KTD). Plans such as these are likely an attempt by the HiG to re-establish dominance in Nerkh District, which has come under challenge from the TB due to the infighting that is beginning to die down in the district. These attacks are probably also aimed at shifting CF focus away from areas that INS feel are necessary to continue operations and shape an atmosphere of insecurity. This in total portrays CF/ANSF as ineffective at providing security in the region and allows INS to maintain a greater support base. As with the rest of GLW, reporting for Wardak Province was primarily based around the disruption of the parliamentary elections and a threat still exists as the voting process may

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be over, but the votes still have to be counted with as little fraud and corruption as possible.

In the Nuristan, Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar area, the majority of reporting centered around elections that occurred on 18 Sep 2010. Reporting of intimidation was high, and coordination for attacks was highest in Konar Province. The attacks were predominately harassing in nature, with large scale attacks reportedly planned but not engaged. Threats to the election process continue, with ballot boxes needing to be transported to Kabul. Numerous reports indicate INS intent to attack trucks transporting ballot boxes; however the threat is not limited to the INS. Attacks against ballot boxes and candidates may also be linked to criminal activity and political corruption.

In Nangarhar Province, INS primarily focused on attacks against polling stations, and intimidation of local nationals to prevent elections from occurring. Separate reporting corroborates INS using locals on FOB Khogyani to act as an early warning network for INS. Additionally, reporting indicates that INS are losing initiative in W Nangarhar due to CF operations and some CDRs are planning to leave for Pakistan soon. The reporting did not associate the planned migration with CF operations, however due the weather not effecting the migration; it is possible that CDRs are migrating early to avoid being targeted. In the coming weeks kinetic activity will likely begin to decline, and INS will continue to maintain a defensive posture against CF operations.

In Nuristan Province, reporting indicates INS planning to resume operations that had slowed due to Ramazan. Significantly, reporting of fighters travelling from Konar continues, with limited reporting indicating that E Nuristani fighters are also beginning to migrate to W Nuristan. The primary target for INS continues to be FOB Kalagush and patrols leaving the FOB.

In Konar Province, reporting has been dominated by elections. Attacks occurred throughout the province and were primarily harassing in nature. While Konar had approximately 79 SIGACTs occur on the 18 Sep 2010, it is unlikely INS expended all of their weapons capabilities for the elections. Therefore it's likely that there may be a short term decrease in attacks; however INS will be capable of continuing attacks at the previous op-tempo in the near term. Reporting also indicates INS facilitation operations have continued along the border, with INS also preparing a defensive posture in Sarkani District in response to CF operations. Over the next week, there will likely be a slight decrease in attacks, while INS regroup and continue planning for attacks.

In Laghman Province, election-threat reporting circulated primarily around intimidation of locals to deter voting, in addition to planned disruption of ballot boxes. Initial reporting indicates voter turnout was possibly limited due to the intimidation, however overall locals were willing and able to vote. Further reporting indicates an attack on Dowlat Shah DC within the next two weeks with

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multiple INS groups involved in the attack. Due to the relative isolation of the DC and the neutral-to-hostile local sentiment, INS will likely be able to conduct an effective attack with ease if CF at COP Najil are deterred from responding. In the coming weeks INS will likely continue to target CF FoM along HWY 7, MSR Iowa, and MSR Nebraska and conduct facilitation operations from Nangarhar through to Kabul and Kapisa Provinces.

RC – CAPITAL:

1. General Assessment of RC-C AOR

The number of significant events in RC-C decreased over the period of 13 - 19 2010, with five events recorded (a decrease of one event from the last reporting period). Of course, this remains a low level of violence and RC-C remains a relatively secure environment. Also, these events were nearly all related to the elections of 18 September. That said, the number of events this Election Day decreased substantially when compared to the presidential election in 2009 (sixteen versus three events).

During the period of 13 – 19 SEP 2010, the following events took place:

- At 150740 SEP 2010 KCP reported that approx. 500 people gathered on HW1 to protest Koran burning in Florida. KCP reported that the police tried to disperse the demonstrators when they threw stones at them. ANP replied with warning shots, demonstrators attacked the police. As a result of the disorder one demonstrator was killed and 13 people were injured (one of them is police) and evacuated to the Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital. KCP reported that during the demonstration police didn't shoot at the crowd. The reason of the KIA and the other casualties is the shooting of unknown people who infiltrated the crowd. The aim of the unknown people was to sew disorder. KCP reported that as a result of the demonstration 40 X ANP is slightly wounded, 13 X CIV wounded and 3 X CIV killed.
- At 2300 15 SEP, 1 x grenade was thrown at the Deputy Minister of Administration. Minister and 1 x Driver/Security guard were wounded. 2 x suspects detained.
- At 161240 SEP 2010 KCP reported that 1 x ANA HMMWV of CAP DIV was hit by a road side bomb near Abdel Rawof Khan, Musahi District. Driver was injured and vehicle was slightly damaged.
- At 171330 SEP 2010 KCP reported that an ANP ranger truck hit an IED in Qeshlaq-e Olya village in Musahi. The strike caused 1 X ANP DOW and 1 X ANP WIA.
- At 180300 SEP 2010, a single 700 mm rocket landed approximately .2 miles from the US Embassy in central Kabul. No casualties or significant damage resulted from the impact.

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- At 180829 SEP 2010 KCP reported that the ANP discovered 1 x IED near Ahbibia High School. ANP attempted to render the device safe and the IED detonated. 1 x NDS Officer was wounded in the blast.

Insurgent inability to successfully execute a major attack during recent events such as Mujahedeen Victory Day (28 April 2010), Consultative Peace Jirga (2-4 June 2010), Kabul Conference (20 July 2010), Independence Day (19 August 2010) or the Parliamentary Elections on 18 September has resulted in some loss of prestige and some loss of self-confidence among insurgent supporters, and a loss of initiative. This could intensify pressure on INS groups for planning a major, spectacular attack in the near future, perhaps to coincide with the announcement of the election results or the seating of the new Parliament.

Despite the general security success for ANSF, the security situation in KABUL downtown remains sensitive but under control, and due to its status as the seat of power and center of CF and IC presence in Afghanistan, will remain a primary insurgent target.

Recent reporting indicates some INS groups and suicide bombers have entered Kabul. However, the threat of further IEDs, rocket attacks and suicide attacks remains somewhat unlikely as no specific threat warnings exist. The usual targets (Presidential Place, GIRoA Ministry Buildings, KAIA, ISAF/CF, ANSF bases, main hotels and convoys) are mentioned.

These reports suggest that the Haqqani Network out of Miram Shah, Pakistan has infiltrated suicide bombers into the outlying Kabul Province districts (Paghman and Musahi especially).

On the other hand, INS maintain the capability to conduct a complex attack in KABUL City especially inside PD 2, 5, 8 to weaken the GIRoA legitimacy and to attract international media attention. Therefore isolated actions, mainly conducted by TB or HQN assets in KABUL and surroundings, remain distinct possibilities.

It is assessed that INS watch for opportunities to attack ANSF and ISAF in order to demoralize the public and discredit GIRoA and ISAF. Also, they will continue to try to create the perception that GIRoA members and relatives are corrupt and unable to govern and unable to cope with the population preoccupations of security. For this purpose the relaxing of security measure after the elections may provide INS with a golden opportunity to strike.

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