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17 Dec 10

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS
COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLANNING DIRECTIVE
COPD INTERIM V1.0

17 DECEMBER 2010

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PREFACE

1.   Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) Interim Version 1.0 (V 1.0) is a complete rewrite of, and supersedes, ACO COPD trial version issued on 25 February 2010. It is issued cognisant of the fact that there is much on-going work which will have an influence on the COPD, such as: NATO's Strategic Concept; NATO Crisis Response System Manual; NATO's Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach; policy on operations planning with the rewrite of MC 133/3 Operational Planning System (MC133/4); MC guidance on the use of effects in operations; and harmonisation of definitions.

2.   While recognising that the COPD is not fully mature, there is a requirement for planners to have access to up-to-date processes from which to train and work to meet current and future operations planning needs. For example, the recent update of the ISAF OPLAN and planning for NATO support to flood relief efforts in Pakistan used the most current version of the COPD for their planning and gained NAC approval.

3.   This version of the COPD contains significant improvements from its predecessor, such as: better alignment with the 6 phase NATO Crisis Management Process; updated document templates (OPLAN/CONOPS/SPD); increased terminology standardization, inclusion of more detail on the role of StratCom; updated figures to better reflect refined processes; more explanation of mission command, to include assigned mission and objectives to subordinate commands; and updates to the Mission Analysis Brief to reflect changes in the process. The COPD has been restructured to meet the requirements of an ACO Directive and the chapter on Operational Art has been moved to an Annex with the intention of removing it completely once relevant doctrine has been promulgated.

4.   The COPD is Unclassified - Releasable to EU/PfP/ISAF so that it can be used across the NATO international military community to provide common understanding, principles and approach to operations planning and training. The COPD may also be useful to other actors, subject to approval, within NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach for the promotion of a common set of procedures for operations planning. Although an interim version, it is to be used during operations, exercises and training, such as the Operational Planning Course. This approach will further validate processes and allow improvements to be identified.

5.   A final version of the COPD, as an ACO Directive, will be published once policy has been finalized, and doctrine and process better harmonised.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

1.   After a change has been incorporated it is to be recorded below and the pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with security orders.

CHANGE NO.	SERIAL AND DATE	DATE ENTERED	SIGNATURE	RANK/ ORGANISATION

2.   Superseded letters promulgating changes to be recorded below.

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Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
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(Chapter 1 – Introduction)

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1-1. Background.

a.   **NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept** [1] described the evolving security environment in terms that remain valid. This environment continues to change; it is and will be complex, global, and subject to unforeseeable developments. International security developments have an increasing impact on the lives of the citizens of Allied and other countries. Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. Instability is likely to be the main source of risks or challenges for the Alliance over this period, due to: failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

b.   In an increasingly complex world, peace, security and development are more interconnected than ever. This serves only to highlight the need for close cooperation and coordination among international organisations and the requirement that they play their respective, complementary and interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management. The globalization of the world, through ever more effective means of transport, communication, multi-lateral agreements and political arrangements, has also led to the need to act and react rapidly. Time has therefore become another essential element of the ever more complicated decision-making process.

c.   It is in this environment that global and regional organizations are of particular importance, including the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. With, and in support of, such structures, the Alliance remains ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including non-Article 5 crisis response operations. Experience has demonstrated the increasing significance of: stabilisation operations; military support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts; and the military's capability to react quickly given the necessary political direction. But what is equally clear is the key role of the UN and relevant international organizations, as well as appropriate non-governmental organisations, in ongoing operations and future crises. It is this requirement that puts a premium on the need for close collaboration among all actors involved in an international response and on the need to recognize the interdependence of all the elements of the international community's efforts.

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[1] To be revised following publication of 2010 Strategic Guidance.

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d.   While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its cooperation, taking into account arrangements with partners and other non-NATO actors, in order to collaborate more effectively in the planning and conduct of operations to their ultimate conclusion. At NATO's Bucharest Summit (2008), Heads of State and Government endorsed a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO's Contribution to a "Comprehensive Approach". Building on work commissioned before the Summit, particularly on the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations, a range of activities continued at various headquarters to meet Heads of State and Government's intent. All these activities were underpinned by the need to enshrine a comprehensive approach in NATO's operational thinking, planning and execution.

1-2.   NATO'S Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.

a.   NATO recognises that that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. There is a need for more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis management procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a comprehensive approach to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management.

b.   The initiation of such an operation should lie in: the development of a shared understanding of overarching goals to resolve the crisis; facilitating the production of a broad multi-dimensional response on how to achieve the necessary objectives to reach the international "end state"; the delineation of lines of functional activities, where possible, and the responsibilities for them; identifying the effects to be achieved; and agreement in the leadership function for the overall international effort. For the Alliance, this includes the development of process and structures for effective co-ordination and co-operation with other actors, to allow each to complement and mutually reinforce the others' efforts, ideally within an overall strategy agreed by the international community and legitimate local authorities.

c.   Planning in a multi-dimensional environment generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Experience shows that not only may there be no formally appointed lead agency to provide overall coordination, but that those organisations capable of reacting quickly are very often military in nature. In addition, some institutions may not wish to have formalised relationships with others. Thus, a comprehensive approach emerges through the determination of various actors to play their part to resolve a crisis. Pragmatism is often the way forward, as imperfect as this may be in an otherwise rules-based society. In this regard, unless otherwise authorised, it is not for NATO to offer itself as the lead coordinator. It is, however, right for all levels to look for opportunities for interaction and to collaborate actively under principles of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding, and a duty to share. Moreover it is incumbent on NATO, especially in the planning and early execution stages of an operation, to

understand and to attempt to anticipate the needs and objectives of other potential contributors thus enabling subsequent coordination and cooperation.

1-3. Purpose.

a. Set within the context of a NATO contribution to a comprehensive approach, the purpose of this Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) is to outline the military procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, assessment, implementation and review of operations plans to enable a common approach to operations planning. This includes the associated documents which are required in order to execute the mission allocated to SACEUR and his subordinate joint force commanders.

b. The COPD provides a common framework for collaborative operations planning when defining NATO's Contribution within a comprehensive approach philosophy. It is deliberately detailed, to support training, while giving experienced planners, at the strategic (Chapter 3) and operational (Chapter 4) levels, the necessary tools to fully appreciate all elements of the most complex crisis and produce high quality operations plans. It also covers details for the preparation, approval, promulgation, distribution, implementation, review and administration of operations plans documents necessary to execute the tasks allocated to SACEUR and his subordinate commanders. Its processes attempt to cover all expected scenarios; however, as planners become more familiar with the concepts of the COPD, it should be used to guide rather than slavishly followed.

c. Design, planning and execution are human matters where commanders lead and staff support. Intuition, experience and military judgement remain paramount and this directive provides the processes and tools to support commanders' decision making at the strategic and operational levels. But the COPD is not an end in itself, merely a tool. Commander's guidance at every level provides staff with the vision of how a challenge is to be tackled and provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the broader context of the mission. For collaborative planning to work effectively, it is vital that planners, at each level, not only have a common understanding of the crisis situation and a common approach to developing the necessary plans to support NATO involvement, but also understand how the commander and staff operate at the next higher level so they are able to contribute to and influence the process.

d. Crises are dynamic and the planning process is iterative, influenced and crafted by the factors described earlier. Throughout the planning and execution process, there must be a continual review process to update the design, plan and execution of an operation. The detail provided in the COPD must not be mistaken as generating a requirement for a complex and detailed plan; rather, it is designed to help the planners develop a product of clarity and simplicity capable of providing the necessary guidance to execute the commander's vision.

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e.   A number of newly developed publications will complement the COPD most notably the BiSC Knowledge Development Handbook and BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook. In addition, the COPD draws on Allied Joint doctrine still under development.

1-4.   Application.

a.   The new planning process, as articulated in the COPD, sees SACEUR informing the decision-making process at HQ NATO and creating the right conditions for the operational level commander to achieve operations' objectives successfully. This directive emphasises the need, and method, to create a truly collaborative planning environment, in a spirit of transparency and plentiful dialogue. No formal SACEUR product will be developed without guidance from HQ NATO or significant input from the designated JFC and his subordinate commanders.

1-5.   Overview of Crisis Response Planning.

b.   The NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) is primarily designed to allow the relevant staffs and NATO Committees to co-ordinate their work and to submit comprehensive advice to the NAC in a timely and compelling way. In so doing, it facilitates grand strategic political decision-making by capitals, through the NAC, early in an emerging crisis, as well as throughout its life cycle. It also provides a procedural structure that allows SACEUR to undertake some prudent preparatory planning activities in light of a developing or actual crisis in a reasonable time frame and, subsequently, to provide strategic assessments and advice, including on operations planning and throughout the execution of a mission.

c.   In circumstances that will be difficult to predict, the NCMP ensures the Alliance is prepared to perform the whole range of its Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions. While every crisis is unique, the process by which the Alliance will address and, subject to decisions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence Planning Committee (DPC), aim to manage and resolve a crisis follows a predetermined path. Such a phased consultation and decision-making process should speed understanding of, and reaction to, an emerging crisis and aid decision makers and staff. Clearly each circumstance will dictate the exact steps, but the process provides a default template from which deviations may be made by informed decisions.

d.   In order to prepare for and conduct complex and multidimensional operations, it is necessary to develop comprehensive operations plans, which address all relevant factors, for the efficient and successful conduct of an operation. MC133/4, NATO's Operations Planning, sets out broadly how at the HQ NATO level the Alliance initiates, develops, coordinates, approves, executes, reviews, revises and cancels all categories of operations plans.

1-6.   The COPD.

e.   The COPD is applicable to all operations planning activities at the strategic and operational levels of command within the NATO Command

Structure and can be adapted to the component/tactical level in order to enhance collaborative planning activity. In that respect, each level should structure its planning organisation - Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) at SHAPE, Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) at the operational level and, Tactical or Maritime/Land/Air Component Planning Group at the tactical level - in a way that is compatible and allows for easy interface and collaborative planning.

f.　　The COPD is NATO Unclassified releasable to PfP/EU/ISAF[2] for distribution as widely as possible within the international military community to offer a set of common principles and an approach to operations planning and training. Commanders will remain in charge of their planning process in their own headquarters. They may adjust the process outlined herein in order to adapt it to the situation, while noting the common benefit of similar procedures to enhance collaboration vertically and laterally.

1-7.　Other Planning Development in COPD.

a.　　This directive examines a number of issues not covered previously in the codification of the planning process, including: civil-military interaction in a comprehensive approach; a systems approach to knowledge development; operations assessment; and the process for planning at the strategic-level, to inform NAC decision makers and give subordinate commanders the direction and detail they need to carry out their own planning. Thus the directive addresses all aspects of operations planning from the political military (HQ NATO), military strategic (Chapter 3) and operational levels (Chapter 4). It clarifies the differences in responsibilities between the strategic and operational levels, while emphasising the need for collaborative planning across all levels throughout the process.

b.　　Crucially, the directive incorporates ACO's current thinking on the application of effects in the planning and conduct of operations. This is not a revolution in the way we do business, but rather a normal evolution that can help to deliver a better understanding of what needs to be done. It is designed to compliment planners existing tools to help analyse and solve complex challenges and achieve the plan's objectives.

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[2] As described in C-M(2002)60 Management of Non-Classified Information.

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Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

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(Chapter 2 – Situation Awareness and Knowledge Development)

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CHAPTER 2

SITUATION AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT[1].

2-1. Introduction.

a.   The NATO crisis management process comprises a number of phases that are reflected in Allied Command for Operations (ACO) operations planning processes. The phases of the strategic and operational planning processes are described in Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter deals primarily with Phase 1 - Situation Awareness and knowledge development, which is evolving in support of the strategic and operational level processes and decision-making related to planning, execution and operations assessment.

b.   Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-making. However, this can often be isolated, residing with subject matter experts across (and external to) the organisation; it is not fused, de-conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner, nor is it often available in an electronically retrievable format. There is a need to fuse existing information, and the processes that are used to develop it, so that the decision-maker is presented with a clear "holistic understanding," as early as possible, to aid the decision-making process. The challenge is to make the relevant information available in a form that can be analysed and distributed in near real time and to develop a level of shared understanding that supports timely and effective decision-making.

c.   SHAPE has led on the development of the concept and the plan for implementation of an initial knowledge development capability. In addition, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Bi-Strategic Commands (Bi-SCs) have reissued their respective directives for implementing information/knowledge management in accordance with the revised NATO Information Management Policy.

d.   Elements of knowledge development and systems analysis thinking are already supporting existing operations and missions, with positive feedback to indicate these decision-support capabilities should be implemented in a more formal and coherent manner. While considered the key enabler for the operations planning process, with the importance of knowledge development to the execution and assessment of NATO operations, the implementation of knowledge development, including systems analysis capabilities, could be considered as an end in and of itself. The knowledge development capability in ACO continues to evolve and, therefore, this chapter reflects the current vision for knowledge development.

e.   Knowledge development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors

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[1] Knowledge Development Handbook, Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, Final Draft, dated Sep 09.

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within the engagement space.

f.   While there are many similarities between military intelligence process efforts and knowledge development, there are two significant differences:

(1)   First, NATO and national intelligence activities are focused primarily on actual or potential adversaries within a specific country or region. However, the ability for NATO to act effectively within a comprehensive approach[2] requires information and knowledge regarding the capabilities, interaction and influences of all key actors across a much broader operational environment. A knowledge development approach therefore utilises subject matter experts to analyse the different actors and systems in all the relevant of the six domains, as well as the specific aspects of the region and operations environment, in order to develop a much broader and more comprehensive understanding of the operations environment.

(2)   Secondly, knowledge development encompasses the deliberate use of non-military sources beyond the scope of military intelligence activities, including the acquisition of information and knowledge from International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private and commercial organisations as well as the full range of Governmental Organisations (GOs) and agencies. An essential aspect of knowledge development is therefore the fusion of intelligence with information from other sources in order to produce a comprehensive picture of the operational environment.

g.   There will be instances when a particular crisis not covered by NATO priorities will emerge. In this case, knowledge requirements will have to be identified early and obtained to support the development of situation awareness within the Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) and Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG). However, under normal circumstances, having areas of interest designated in advance of a crisis will allow for knowledge development in the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) domains on those designated areas.

h.   Knowledge development is an essential contributor to the entire planning process. It provides planners with the knowledge and understanding of the crisis and the operations environment needed to develop adequate solutions for solving a crisis. The purpose of knowledge development is to provide planners with analysed and validated set of knowledge ready for use. Knowledge development is a continuous process. Updates are constantly reviewed, validated, analysed, and incorporated.

i.   Advance preparation and education of planners is essential to manage the significantly expanded knowledge base and ensure development of the best possible understanding of the underlying causes of a conflict. The expanded role of knowledge in developing solutions to modern crises also brings the requirement for better management and retention of the knowledge developed on a specific crisis.

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[2] Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors.

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(1)   Knowledge development usually begins well before planning commences[3]. One could equate this essential aspect of operations planning as being the "Phase Zero" of any operation.

(2)   Modern crises are inherently complex and require that planners and commanders thoroughly understand the nature of the crisis and the engagement space. Knowledge development allows planners and commanders to face up to the task of delivering comprehensive plans that take into account all of the important aspects and values of the society within which the mission is to be conducted. From the perspective of staff organisation and procedures, planners can optimise the benefits that knowledge development brings to their activities if they strive to constantly update their own knowledge and understanding of all potential crisis areas. In that respect, headquarters should structure and organize their procedures to encourage planners to prepare themselves well in advance of a crisis by developing their own basic knowledge and understanding of potential crisis areas as a matter of course. As an example, this is critical at the strategic military level where planners must develop SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA) on which the initial NATO decisions to get engaged and to commit forces to the crisis area will rest. The SSA will also serve as the basic "knowledge" document upon which the subordinate commanders will also base their strategic appreciation and operational assessment.

(3)   Maintaining a knowledge base represents a unique challenge for NATO, where most of the military planning staff is composed of personnel who are assigned to a post for only a short period. As a result, maintaining corporate knowledge on any operation is critical. Using a cradle-to-grave approach can allow for a better retention of the corporate knowledge and expertise on a given mission and, thus, improve the quality of the related plans produced. This will require that strategic and operational planning groups become both users and generators of knowledge during an operation. During Phase 1 of the planning process at the strategic level, core members of the Strategic Operations Planning Group will develop their knowledge on SACEUR's strategic areas of interest and further refine it into coherent picture of the situation in each potential engagement space. Their knowledge will be regularly updated and validated, so as to serve as the foundation upon which they could eventually produce a SSA.

2-2.   Knowledge Development Organisation[4].

The proposed organisational structure required for successful integration of knowledge development should be flexible enough to allow for individual HQ requirements and will therefore vary accordingly. Increases in the magnitude of information requirements and the complexities of information gathering from organisations outside NATO's span of control require that the "network of knowledge" must be organised and managed in such a way that knowledge

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[3] There could be instances, such as humanitarian and natural disaster relief operations, when there could be no developed knowledge base when a decision is made to consider getting NATO involved. In such cases, planners will have to rely on other sources to provide answers about the disaster stricken region. These other sources will include the internet, the media, the government of the stricken country, and of course NATO's own Civil Emergency Planning capabilities.

[4] 3000/TI-387/TT-2841/Ser: NU 0035 BiSC Knowledge Development Concept, Jul 08.

development can be performed effectively, as shown in figure 2.1 below. This management function should be located within the NATO command structure in order to have appropriate tasking authority. Furthermore, it receives guidance/direction from SACEUR to begin research in a specific area of interest and then reaches out to the centres, and tasks them appropriately.

Figure 2.1 – Integration of Knowledge Development into the NATO Command Structure

a.   **Knowledge Management Centre (KMC).** The NATO KMC establishes a centralised knowledge base that contains, at a minimum, all data required to support NATO threats and types of NATO operations. The knowledge management staff has a deep understanding of the knowledge development process and tools, including the systems analysis process, and works in close collaboration with the NATO Knowledge Development Centre and Regional Knowledge Centres (RKC). The KMC develops and maintains knowledge requirements and manages the external connections to NATO nations, non-NATO Nations, IOs, NGOs, academia and all other external information providers. This function includes such activities as establishing and maintaining a network of contacts, accreditation of officially recognised external SMEs, and the establishment of protocols for information sharing with non-NATO bodies.

b.   **Knowledge Development Centre (KDC)**[5]. The KDC will provide a cross-cutting view across all domains of the operational environment utilising unrefined information accessed from all available sources, both from within and external to the NATO command structure. The KDC is responsible for merging gathered information/intelligence and fusing it using their matured knowledge development process. At the strategic level, this organisation has the capability to develop and understand the overall strategic picture. The KDC establishes a NATO knowledge base with the capability to reach back to the nations, to the various commands and strategic headquarters, and to external knowledge hubs, such as centres of excellence, academia, Subject Matter Experts (SME) and IOs/NGOs. It also provides a further knowledge

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[5] 2450/SHJ2PPE/RB/09-207115 dated Jun 09. Proposal to site a NATO funded centralized Knowledge Development Centre at RAF Molesworth.

development reach-back capability for the operational level Knowledge Centres.

c.	**Knowledge Centres (KC).** Within the NATO Command Structure, in addition to the strategic-level KDC, operational level KCs have been established within each Joint Force Command (JFC). These operational level KCs will, in future, exchange information and knowledge with the NATO KDC. However, in the interim they do provide knowledge in support of the planning/decision making process. Operational KCs should be focused on specific regions and/or topics, as directed by their Commanders. Each centre should include a Systems Analysis team, with expertise in specific regional areas. These analysts will be able to draw on the wider "network of knowledge" available through NATO and the wider international community by utilising the knowledge management function provided by the KMC.

d.	**Subject Matter Experts (SME) and Analysts.** Under normal circumstances, SMEs and analysts will conduct the initial intelligence and knowledge development analysis of SACEUR's area of intelligence interest. They will develop a knowledge base for the area of interest as a prudent approach to operations planning support, which will be maintained regularly. When the risk of a crisis developing increases in any of these areas, more emphasis will be placed on further developing knowledge on the emerging crisis. SMEs and analysts within the core elements of the SOPG (and later at the joint level with the core elements of the JOPG) will be responsible for adding granularity to the analysis provided by the KDC and regional KCs, to adapt it to the level of granularity that is required to support the commander's knowledge requirements.

e.	**Operations/Situation Centres.** Operations/situation centres contribute to continuous situation awareness by monitoring major events or incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the joint common operational picture of the area when possible.

**2-3.	External Coordination.**

a	**Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).** The IFC is a multi-national memorandum of understanding (MoU) intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides timely, actionable, full-spectrum intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations, especially NRF, as tasked by SHAPE.

b	**Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD).** The CEPD, in NATO HQ, maintains a civil expertise catalogue (CEC) covering a wide range of civil/commercial/technical expertise available to NATO in the following areas:

(1)	Movement and transport (Air/Land/Sea).

(2)	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

(3)	Medical.

(4)	Critical infrastructure.

(5)	Civil communications.

(6)	Food and agriculture.

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      (7)   Civil disaster response.

      (8)   Industrial preparedness.

c.   **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).** The EADRCC, headed by the director of the CEPD, maintains close coordination with the UN office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (UN-OCHA) and maintains a liaison officer at the United Nations.

d.   **Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC)[6].** The CFC is an information and knowledge management organisation supporting situational awareness needs of cooperating organisations (i.e. NATO forces, local government, tribal leaders, IOs, NGOs, etc.) working on the same crisis/conflict. The CFC works closely with civil and military actors to share, gather, fuse, organise, and disseminate, via the Civil-Military Overview (CMO) web site, all relevant unclassified information available to the participants to enhance their shared situational awareness. Established by ACT in Norfolk, VA, it provides a mechanism for exchanging information of operational relevance with many different civilian organisations in different sectors such as:

      (1)   Economic Stabilization.

      (2)   Humanitarian Assistance.

      (3)   Infrastructure and Social Well Being.

      (4)   Security.

      (5)   Governance and Participation.

      (6)   Justice and Reconciliation.

2-4.   The Knowledge Development Process.

KD is designed to support the entire operations planning process (OPP) including the planning, execution and assessment[7] of operations. In general, planning objectives and analysis of the environment are closely related. The contribution of systems analysis to the planning process is critical and includes the identification of key system elements that can be acted upon in order to achieve desired effects. In some cases, the system's expected reaction to some actions may show that certain military objectives, effects and courses of action (COAs) are not feasible and might require adjustment.

a.   The main activities of situation awareness are depicted in Figure 2.2. They apply to all areas of interest and are part of an ongoing knowledge development process.

b.   **Maintain Global Strategic Awareness.** SACEUR has the responsibility for monitoring areas of interest beyond NATO's territory and analysing regional instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues with potential military implications to assess potential risks and threats to NATO's security interests.

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[6] The CFC is an evolving capability. ACO Operational Requirement for a Civil Military Fusion Centre, the requirement and transition of responsibility from HQ SACT to SHAPE.

[7] Assessment in this sense implies operations assessment, which is defined as 'The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.' (Proposed definition).

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c.   **Determine SACEUR's Strategic Areas of Interest.** Taking account of the prevailing geo-political situation, SACEUR may designate areas of interest for approval by the Military Committee (MC) or the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Defence Planning Committee (DPC).

Figure 2.2 - Situation Awareness Main Activities

d.   **Develop a Systems Perspective of the Designated Area.**

(1)   **Assume Responsibility for an Area of Interest.** Once a designated area of interest is approved by the MC or NAC/DPC, SACEUR may also task an operational level commander to assume responsibility for monitoring the situation and developing knowledge about the area.

(2)   **Appreciate the Nature of Threats and Challenges.** At the operational level, planners should review available intelligence related to the region and provide guidance for knowledge development based on the scale and scope of threats and challenges to the NATO's stated security interests. These threats and challenges may include:

(a)   Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results.

(b)   The spread of weapons of mass destruction.

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(c)   Instability from failed and failing states.

(d)   The misuse of emerging technologies.

(e)   The disruption of the flow of vital resources.

(3)   **Identify the Main Actors in the Area.** Typically there will be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions and influences contribute to or mitigate potential risks or threats to NATO's interests in the area. Each actor has its own interests and acts in pursuit of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. These actors can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements that interact in accordance with their attributes with other systems to influence their behaviour in pursuit of their interests. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences. Once these main actors are identified, contact with actors that can facilitate the knowledge development process should be initiated if possible. Actors may be:

(a)   Nation states and non-state entities.

(b)   Organisations including governmental, security forces, International organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs), as well as commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

(c)   Groups including political interest groups, social power and influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups usually linked to the above individuals.

(d)   Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders, and opinion formers.

(4)   **Gather Additional Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and Systems in the Area**.   Drawing on knowledge provided by the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC), knowledge development by the JOPG's ensure that their information and knowledge are at the appropriate level of granularity to support operational level planning. Gaps in knowledge will be identified and transmitted back to the IFC for further development through the KMC.

e.   **Develop Information/Knowledge Requirements.**

(1)   **Determine knowledge requirements** based on a specific need to understand a situation, a system, or an element of a system to make a decision. Based on the initial understanding of the situation and its potential for development, the staff determines specific requirements for knowledge to support the operational level assessments and decision-making during the different phases of the NATO crisis response process. These requirements may include further knowledge about the capabilities and behaviour of different actors, their relationships and influences, as well as key factors within the strategic environment. Knowledge requirements may be structured as one or more questions regarding the information needed to provide adequate understanding.

(2)   **Determine the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** Based on the initial analysis, staff should advise the Commander on critical information that he requires in order to to make timely decisions, as required, for mission accomplishment. This critical information should identify potential changes in the situation and eventualities that would mandate an operational decision or strategic guidance. At this stage, CCIRs should focus on recognising changes in the capabilities or behaviour of specific actors that might lead to an unacceptable situation developing regarding NATO's interests.

(3)   **Develop Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).** PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority for the conduct of planning and decision-making. Based on the CCIR, the Intel staff will develop detailed PIR and initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the IFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO intelligence Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process.

(4)   **Develop other information sources.** Knowledge development elements must collect information and knowledge from all sources. In addition, it is highly likely that international, governmental and non-governmental organisations are already engaged in the area of interest. They represent a potentially vast source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area related to humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, including logistics, transportation and communications infrastructure.

(5)   **Coordinate requirements between the strategic and operational levels.** It is important that knowledge elements at each level coordinate their collection requirements with the next level up through liaison elements to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

f.   **Develop and Maintain Information and Knowledge about Designated Areas.**

(1)   Implement information collection and management. Knowledge development requires close coordination with the Information Management (IM) staff to ensure effective and efficient collection and management of information within a HQ. This requires clearly established procedures for:

(a)   Assigning information proponents, authorities and responsibilities to different staff elements.

(b)   Creating and managing shared information space where all relevant information, knowledge products and automated information displays can be pulled from NATO Secret and/or mission secret wide-area networks.

(c)   Setting up Action/Information Groups (AIG) for automated message distribution on the NATO secret and/or mission secret wide-area networks to push information to those who need it.

(d)   Sharing geo-spatial information using available core and functional service as well as establishing gateways to access national databases.

(e)   Archiving and sharing key authoritative documents including relevant UN, NAC and other strategic level documents.

(2)   Develop information capabilities and procedures to share relevant information/knowledge with non-NATO entities.

g.   **Develop the Theatre Knowledge Base.** Knowledge development elements will orchestrate the further collection of information about assigned regions. These collection efforts require functional expertise from across the HQ as well as collaboration with external organizations to build up a repository of information about any given area and its main actors. This repository of information must be accessible through shared work spaces to support further analysis and planning. Therefore, it is imperative that information about the area is collected and stored in a manner that ensures that it can be managed and shared efficiently and effectively within the HQs, with other HQs and with relevant external actors, using common schemes.

h.   **Analyse the Systems in the Designated Area.**

(1)   **Application of a system analysis.** The complexity of a given situation depends on the number, composition and structure of the different systems and the ways they interact. The structural complexity of the system is directly proportional to the number of systems and system elements, while the system's interactive complexity is related to the freedom of action of each individual part and the number of linkages among the components. Complex systems that are able to learn and adapt in response to their interaction with other systems and changes in the operational environment can be considered complex adaptive systems. A system analysis will enhance the understanding of complex adaptive systems, as well as the nature of the problem, and supports the development of possible solutions.

(2)   **Examine complex adaptive systems.** A system analysis examines potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex adaptive systems to understand their behaviour, capabilities and interaction within the operational environment. This analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other critical factors, including the actors' capacity for adaptation, which provides insight into how they can be influenced. The following are basic steps in the system analysis:

(a)   Analyse and update the composition of the system and identify essential subsystems and system elements in its PMESII aspects.

(b)   Identify system strengths and weaknesses. This process will identify key system elements, which will assist centre of gravity determination, as well as its ability for adaptation during interaction with other systems.

(c)   Identify relations between system elements. Relationships between system elements will influence each system's strengths and weaknesses as it interacts with other systems. This will reveal potential vulnerabilities. It is important to identify those vulnerabilities that have potential for exploitation. Identify which system elements are associated with each system's vulnerabilities. Examining the key personalities, organisations, facilities,

features and materiel associated with the vulnerable system elements should begin to reveal whether they might be influenced by an action that could in turn create a desired effect on the system.

i. **Determine the Relationships and Influences That Define the Situation.** To assist in the understanding of how a particular system operates, systems analysis frequently uses influence diagrams to help visualise how key actors (individuals, groups and organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly important. Influence diagrams can be used to show where critical requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities exist and where the behaviour of system elements can be influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. These diagrams can also depict Objectives, criteria for success and decisive points/decisive conditions, as appropriate. An example of such a diagram is shown below in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 – Example Influence Diagram (TOPFAS)

Such a visual representation helps in understanding situations that may be complex in terms of structure, interactivity and adaptation. In addition to depicting the current system states, influence diagrams can be used to depict the possible solutions in terms of activity

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and influences that could produce desired system states. Amongst others analytical techniques, causal loops analysis supports this process.

j.   **Develop a Shared Understanding of Complex Systems.** System analysis contributes to a common enhanced understanding about the environment and the roles played by the different actors in creating effects and resulting conditions that characterise the current situation and its likely development. Brainstorming the likely actions of key actors helps to develop a common understanding of their capabilities and behaviour, as well as their potential vulnerability to different influences.

(1)   Different actors with resources that are available to them represent a system with its own internal dynamics and external linkages within one domain, or even crossing several domains. One could understand actors and resources that are linked as a system or even a system of systems with each having numerous system elements. Creating effects in one domain often influence conditions in another domain, in others systems or in its system elements.

(2)   These "interdependencies" are complex and multi-faceted which dictates that military commanders de-conflict or harmonize their own operations with those of other actors in order to avoid working at cross purposes, and to create synergies and efficiencies wherever possible. This multi-faceted aspect of modern crises adds a new complexity to planning for operations. It demands the involvement of the non-military instruments of power, most often controlled by states and international organisations. It also requires that military commanders and planners possess a clear understanding of these different instruments, how they operate, what are the possibilities to interact/coordinate with them and the nature of the different systems they seek to influence.

(3)   Other than for a partial ability to lever the political instrument of power, NATO provides a unique multi-national capability to intervene in modern crises. While commanders have primarily the military instrument at their disposal to contribute to resolving a crisis, NATO through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) can also use the political instrument through the office of the Secretary General; although NATO is not a supranational organisation, the member nations around the NAC table together represent a formidable influence in the international political, economic and social domains. On their own initiative, should they decide to act in a cohesive and coordinated manner in using their non-military instruments to support the NATO military effort in a crisis, the Alliance as a whole could yield tremendous influence and power.

(4)   Providing the NAC with a comprehensive assessment of the engagement space, providing the state of each system (or system element) and indications of what changes are needed in each system (or system element), will give national representatives the information necessary to allow their capitals to act in the non-military domains if they so desire.

(5)   Emerging from the political strategic level[8], operations planning is

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[8] In the NATO context, the NAC is the political strategic level, HQ NATO the political-military level and SHAPE military strategic level.

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implemented differently at various levels of decision-making. It requires specific practices and procedures for each level and the establishment of clear links between actions, effects, objectives and the end state and, where possible, the harmonization of political, military, economic and civil planning.[9] Planning in a multi-dimensional environment without overall coordination generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Pragmatism must be the way forward and it is important, that all levels pursue opportunities for interaction and collaboration under guiding principles of mutual respect, trust, transparency, understanding and duty to share.

k.   **Establish and Maintain Common Situation Awareness.**

(1)   **Share information, knowledge and a common operating picture.** The current operations/situation centre will provide continuous situation awareness by serving as an information hub for the flow of information between HQs as well as the central point for all incoming and outgoing reports. It develops and shares a Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP), which collates information layers from different automated information systems to provide a single portal for geo-referenced information in the area of interest. In addition, the current operations/situation centre publishes current reports and summaries on the shared work space.

(2)   **Monitor the situation in area of interest.** The current operations/situation centre will continuously monitor designated areas, paying close attention to Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIRs) established by the operational commander and SACEUR. They will be aware of the current activities of each actor in the area and will look for any changes that might impact the overall situation. They submit requests for information to gain a better understanding of the scope, scale and impact of changes on the overall situation.

l.   **Assess Indications and Warnings.**

(1)   **Identify indications and warnings.** Indications and warnings may be identified and reported by the current operations/situation centre monitoring the area, by watch teams in the SHAPE Strategic Operations Centre (SOC) or the NATO situation centre, as well as by nations. They are shared and assessed using the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS), which is designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO HQ and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO security interests.

2-5.   Knowledge Development Impact on Planning.

a.   There are particular elements of the planning process at the strategic and operational level to which knowledge development, when fully implemented, will make a significant contribution.   A selection of these is detailed below with some practical examples to show how knowledge development expressly adds value to the process.

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[9] Practices and procedures will be required for the political-military, military strategic and operational levels in terms of operations planning, crisis management and decision-making, as well as in terms of assessment.

b.   **Situation Awareness and Knowledge Development.** Situation awareness is significantly enhanced by the identification of key systems, sub-systems, components and actors that affect the potential operational environment and by the highlighting of key influences and relationships. Such analysis will also assist in defining CCIRs. System summaries are specific systems analysis products that provide a multi-dimensional dynamic overview of the operational environment based on a cross-domain system analysis. These summaries can also include identification of key system components (i.e. strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities) that may have potential for exploitation. These types of summaries can either be specific to each PMESII domain (e.g. political or military summary of an area of interest) or can provide an overview of the operational environment (e.g. daily/weekly summary) to include a condensed review of all of the PMESII domains.

c.   **Strategic Assessment and Option Development.** Knowledge development products, including systems summaries, can be used to support the development of SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA). Examples of other knowledge development contributions to the development of the SSA are:

(1)   Knowledge development provides updates to the dynamics of the situation and highlights the assessed aims of the key actors (individuals and organisations) and elements (networks, ethnic groups and their Diaspora).

(2)   Knowledge development enhances the factor-deduction-conclusion analysis by contributing an understanding of the dynamics operating within the operations environment and exposing different influences and interrelationships.

(3)   Knowledge development supports the establishment of the desired strategic effects by highlighting potential interactions and the dynamics that could result from the actions selected to achieve a desired effect.

c.   **Operational Assessment.** The operational assessment includes the generation of the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE). Knowledge development provides knowledge on key actors and components that have influence on the operational environment so that a thorough understanding of the relevant systems is achieved. For example, an insurgent group analysis goes beyond simple military capabilities to include sources of manpower, relations with and support from local communities, religious and other motivations, funding, etc.

d.   **Operational Orientation.**

(1)   Centre of Gravity (COG) analysis is enhanced by knowledge development based systems analysis which assists in identifying the critical capabilities required to support the COG, the critical cross-domain requirements needed to underpin these and the critical vulnerabilities of key actors within the operational environment, which may be exploited. For example, COG analysis could identify the support of the local population as the COG of an insurgent group, but a knowledge development based systems analysis could additionally expose the underlying reasons for that support in the form of financial assistance for reconstruction, provision of medical and educational facilities.

(2)   Operational Design. Systems analysis can provide a thorough understanding of the behaviour of the systems that make up the operations environment and assist in identifying genuine decisive points/decisive conditions and appropriate lines of operation.

e.   **Strategic/Operational CONOPS Development.** The strategic/operational CONOPS demand a wider understanding of potential actions of relevant actors, in response to Alliance operations, and in the full spectrum of cross-domain relationships. To achieve this wider understanding, wargaming should include RED and BLUE information, the representation of GREEN and WHITE actors, and non-military reactions to and impact of Alliance activities. For example, a knowledge development supported wargame can highlight the undesired effects of a proposed action such as the bombing of a bridge or broadcasting facility.

f.   **Strategic/Operational Plan Development.**

(1)   Knowledge development, through systems analysis, can help identify and/or propose strategic and operational effects, recognize desired effects, and aid in the development of actions to achieve those effects. For example, to achieve a particular desired effect, analysts can identify actors, systems, subsystems, etc. that when acted upon can help achieve that desired effect. Furthermore, knowledge development can help ascertain if non-military actions are a suitable alternative or could support military actions in achieving that effect.

(2)   Knowledge development supports and enhances threat assessment for plan development by considering the full impact of the presence of Alliance forces in theatre on the regional and local society and structures.   For example, regional criminal elements may react adversely to any impact on their activities stemming from Alliance security operations. Thoughtless use of rare local resources may trigger a withdrawal of cooperation or an increase in support for extremist groups by the local population.

(3)   Knowledge development requires the collection of a very broad range of information that needs to be accomplished systematically and in accordance with a plan, which, amongst others, fulfils the needs of the Commanders' Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs), and Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIRs).

g.   **Planning Operations Assessment at the Strategic and Operational Levels.** Knowledge development is a critical tool for developing a campaign assessment plan. A knowledge-based systems analysis is a powerful methodology for highlighting the key elements that will create a credible measure of effectiveness (MOE) of the fundamental causes and not the symptoms of a particular problem. Continued analysis of these elements and the resultant changes in the behaviour of the system provide a vital contribution to the operations assessment process. Additionally knowledge development can assist in developing appropriate measures of performance (MOP) for assessing mission efficiency.

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Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

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(Chapter 3 – Strategic Level)

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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC LEVEL

3-1.   Introduction.

This chapter describes the strategic level[1] operations planning process carried out by SHAPE as well the different products that are developed during each phase. Within NATO's operations planning there is a clear division of responsibilities for initiation, development, endorsement, approval, execution, revision and cancellation of operations plans. These responsibilities are divided between the NAC, the MC, SACEUR and subordinate NATO Commanders within the NATO military command structure. The NAC is the highest political authority within the Alliance and as such is responsible for the initiation and approval of all strategic operations plans developed in response to an actual or developing crisis. The MC is the senior military authority in NATO and is responsible to the Council for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance. It is the primary source of military advice to the Council and the Secretary General.

> a.   Chapter 3 covers the procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, promulgation, distribution, implementation, review and administration of operations plans documents necessary to accomplish the missions allocated to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and his subordinate commanders and to support development of the Political Military Estimate (PME) and, if appropriate, a Strategic Political/Military Plan (SPMP). Chapter 3 addresses all aspects of operations planning at the military strategic level (SACEUR) including the interaction with the political/military (HQ NATO - NAC/MC) level and links to the operational (JFC) levels (as detailed in chapter 4) in terms of the need for collaborative planning.

> b.   The process comprises six phases which are aligned with the NATO Crisis Management Process to harmonise the interface between SHAPE and HQ NATO. Due to the requirements for the separate approval of CONOPS and OPLAN, Phase 4 (at the strategic, operational and tactical level) is further divided into Phase 4a and Phase 4b as depicted in Figure 3.1. Phase 1 - Situation Awareness (covered in Chapter 2) will normally begin well in advance of a NATO response to a crisis and continues in support of all subsequent phases. The main activities for each phase at the strategic level are described in succeeding sections of this chapter.

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[1] The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national resources, including military, to achieve them. (AAP-6)

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
Figure 3.1 - Political Military, Strategic and Operational Level Processes

c.   The six phases of the strategic process are designed to develop strategic products for consideration by NATO military and political authorities in order to decide the strategic direction for NATO in response to a crisis within the framework of a comprehensive approach[2]. In accordance with the NATO Crisis Management Process, NAC consultation focuses on the following decisions that determine activities at the strategic level:

(1)   To initiate a formal assessment of a potential crisis as part of a comprehensive Political Military Estimate (PME).

(2)   To develop strategic response options.

(3)   To initiate operations planning by issuing a NAC Initiating Directive (NID).

(4)   To approve OPLAN and CONOPS.

(5)   To activate forces in preparation for deployment by issuing an NAC Force Activation Directive.

(6)   To execute an operation by issuing a NAC Execution Directive.

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[2] Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors.

(7)   To conduct Periodic Mission Reviews (PMR) by tasking SACEUR to provide strategic operations assessments of progress in achieving NATO strategic objectives and the desired end state.

(8)   To revise strategic and or operational aspects of an ongoing operation by tasking the SACEUR to provide strategic assessment and possible military options for the adaptation of operations according to strategic and operational conditions.

(9)   To plan for transition and termination of military operations by following normal procedures.

3-2.   Organisation for Strategic Planning and Direction.

a.   The activation of cross-functional organisations within SHAPE[3] provides the basis for collaboration and synchronisation of activities to maintain coherence in coordination with the political military and operational levels as well as with other non-NATO organisations. The maintenance of cross functional teams and seamless transition between planning and execution ensure continuity in situation awareness and knowledge development over time. The principal elements involved in crisis response operations are:

(1)   **Command Group (CG).** Regularly updated by Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) and other staff elements within SHAPE, CG assist and advise SACEUR in the accomplishment of his mission.

(2)   **Strategic Operations Centre (SOC).** When required by SACEUR the Strategic Operations Centre will activate a new watch team consisting of representatives from across SHAPE to develop and maintain situation awareness and knowledge about designated areas of interest. In the early phases of the planning process one member of this watch team will join the core SOPG before returning to become the Deputy Team Leader of Ops team 5.

(3)   **Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG).** The SOPG is a cross-functional staff organisation within SHAPE responsible, under the authority of DCOS Capabilities Plans and Policy (DCOS CPP), for all aspects of crisis response and advance planning. The SOP for the SOPG at SHAPE is published as SHAPE Directive 80-15.

(4)   **The Staff elements.** With SOPG as a focal point, all SHAPE divisions provide inputs to the strategic level process.

3-3.   Strategic Process and Products.

a.   The six phases of the strategic level process, as shown in Figure 3.2, are specifically designed to develop strategic level assessments, comprehensive planning products, directives and orders required by the political military and operational levels within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

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[3] Strategic operations planning responsibilities at SHAPE are detailed in ACO Directive 80-82.

Political Military Level | **Strategic Level SACEUR** | **Operational Level COM JFC**

Phase 1 Situation Awareness

Phase 1 Situation Awareness

MC tasker for SACEUR's Assessment

Strategic Warning Order

SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

Phase 2 Strategic Assessment

SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

Phase 2 Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options

MC tasker for MRO

Draft MROs

Operational Advice

Phase 3 Military Response Options

Military Response Options

Phase 3 Operational Orientation

Strategic Planning Directive

NID with MC Guidance

Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development

Strategic CONOPS

Operational CONOPS

Phase 4a Operational CONOPS Development

Strategic CONOPS

Provisional CJSOR

Draft Theatre Capability SOR

Crisis Establlishment

Provisional CJSOR, draft TCSOR, CE

NAC approved CONOPS with MC Guidance

Approved Operational CONOPS

Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development (Force Generation)

Strategic OPLAN

Operational OPLAN

Phase 4b Operational OPLAN Development

NAC FAD with MC Guidance

Activation Warning

Activation Request

NAC approved OPLAN, ROEREQ&TCSOR with MC Guidance

Strategic OPLAN

ROEREQ

Theatre Capability SOR

Approved Operational OPLAN

NED with MC Guidance

Phase 5 Execution Campaign Assessment/ OPLAN Review

ACTORD

Phase 5 Execution Campaign Assessment/ OPLAN Review

Tasker for Periodic Mission review

SACEUR's Mission Progress Report

Operational Assessment

NAC DS for Transition planning with MC Guidance

Phase 6 Transition

Strategic Planning Directive

Phase 6 Transition

Dis-engagement Planning and Execution

Figure 3.2 - Strategic Level Processes and Products

PHASE 1 - SITUATION AWARENESS
Section 1 - General

3-4.   Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness is to develop and maintain a level of awareness and understanding about any potential or actual crisis area to support the development of strategic assessments, planning products and directives. This phase will be supported by Knowledge Development (KD).

b.   **Overview.** Phase 1 - Situation Awareness, supported by KD, normally begins with a review of global strategic situation from MC 161 (NATO Strategic Intelligence Estimate) including potential risks and threats to NATO's security interests and designation of strategic areas of interest. It includes the development of information and knowledge requirements, the collection and fusion of information, knowledge and intelligence from all available sources, analysis, sharing, monitoring and continuous assessment of the implications of changes in strategic and operational conditions. KD is intensified as required to support strategic assessments, operations planning and execution as well as operations assessments at the strategic level.

c.   **Prerequisites.** The initiation of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness normally depends on the designation of specific areas of strategic interest by SACEUR, in accordance with his terms of reference. Taking account of the prevailing geo-political situation, SACEUR may designate an area of strategic interest, outside those covered by MC 161, for approval by the MC or the NAC.

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness are depicted in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 - Situation Awareness Main Activities

e.   **Products.** The main actions from Phase 1 - Situation Awareness include the following:

(1)   SACEUR's Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) are established for the area of interest.

(2)   ACO Directive 65-11, ACO Standing Procedures for Intelligence Production Management is updated to reflect SACEUR's current strategic areas of interest.

(3)   Encyclopaedic information about the area of interest is shared on NATO secure networks.

(4)   Knowledge development provides essential understanding about potential risks and threats to NATO's security interests in the area of interest.

(5)   Indications and warnings of potential risks and threats are provided to SACEUR and HQ NATO.

f.   **Desired Outcome of this Phase.**   Phase 1 - Situation Awareness must provide information and knowledge about the current and developing situation in a designated area of interest adequate to support the development of:

(1)   Indications and warnings and initial assessment of situation.

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    (2)   SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA).

    (3)   Development of Military Response Options (MROs).

    (4)   Development of the military strategic concept for operations in the area.

    (5)   Strategic direction for the conduct of operations.

    (6)   Operations assessment at the strategic level[4].

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

    (1)   **Capability, Plans and Policy Division (CPP).** In addition to leading the SOPG, CPP is responsible for recommending areas of strategic interest based on current intelligence estimates, strategic assessments and changing strategic conditions as well as the development of SACEUR's Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). They will also draw on MC 161 (NATO Strategic Intelligence Estimate). The SOPG provides a cross functional capability to lead for the SHAPE planning effort reporting through DCOS CPP to the CG.

    (2)   **Operations and Intelligence Division** (Intelligence Support Directorate) is responsible for directing and managing the intelligence production and knowledge development to satisfy SACEUR's critical information requirements. They allocate intelligence production and knowledge development tasks to the SHAPE staffs in their respective areas, to the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) and to JFCs.

    (3)   **Operations and Intelligence Division** (Civil Military Cooperation Directorate) is responsible for coordinating with cooperating civilian organisations and, through the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC), to develop awareness of non-military aspects of the situation including the activities of international, non-governmental and governmental organisations in the area of interest. Civil/military staff will also be responsible for developing the list of significant non-NATO actors with which SHAPE and the designated COM JFC will need to interact during the planning phases, as well as the levels of interaction required.

    (4)   **The Strategic Operations Centre (SOC)** is responsible for monitoring the area of interest using watch teams.

    (5)   **Knowledge Management Centre[5] (KMC).** The NATO Knowledge Management Centre, when established, will provide a centralised knowledge base that contains, at a minimum, all data required to support NATO threats and types of NATO operations.

    (6)   **Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).** The IFC is a multi-national Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) based intelligence organisation with

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[4] In this context assessment means measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision making.

[5] There are 3 levels of KD organisational structures currently envisioned: Knowledge Management Centre (KMC, at SHAPE), Knowledge Development Centre (KDC, at Molesworth) and Knowledge Centres (KC, at the JFCs). Envisioned to reside at SHAPE, the ACO KMC prioritizes and manages overall information requirements (KD Concept).

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intelligence analysts from participating member nations, which provides timely, actionable, full-spectrum intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations, especially NRF, as tasked by SHAPE Intel Staff. IFC produces baseline intelligence, including encyclopaedic information, analysis products, target products, orders of battle, and assessments, as tasked by SHAPE Intel Staff.

(7) **The Strategic Communications Working Group (SCWG)** is responsible for maintaining awareness of conditions in the strategic information environment, coordinating early media and engagement approaches with HQ NATO, and ensuring the implications of StratCom activities are considered in all aspects of the planning process. The SCWG will also assist the Operations and Intelligence Division and IFC to develop and implement a strategy for intelligence support to counter hostile information activities and propaganda.

h. **External Coordination.** Situation Awareness requires extensive development of a network of knowledge managers within organisations who are able to contribute information and knowledge about SACEUR's areas of interest. These may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) **HQ NATO.** The IMS NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) is the Alliances' strategic indicator-based system that provides warning to decision-makers of any developing threat, potential threat, risk or concern that could impact on the security interests of the Alliance.

(2) **Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC).** The SAC will help provide the SecGen and the Chairman of the MC with timely and comprehensive analysis, based on all relevant factors, with regard to potential and emerging crises, to support their possible consideration and/or discussion by Allies. The SAC will aim to provide a strategic forecast and assessment of the international environment and to identify any emerging crises in order to anticipate or, as the case may be, warn against developments which may affect NATO. In addition the SAC will provide an "interface" role between the intellectual, policy, and practical aspects of possible emerging challenges and NATO's crisis management structures and processes.

(3) **NATO Situation Centre (SITCEN).** The NATO SITCEN maintains country studies and the Intelligence Division develops intelligence products as tasked by the Military Committee.

(4) **International Staff (IS) Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy (PASP).** PASP provides a source of information and contacts related to regional, economic and security affairs, and relations with other international organisations and Partner countries including:

(a) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Enlargement Policy.

(b) Multilateral Policy, especially with the European Union.

(c) Russia and Ukraine Relations.

(d) Partnership for Peace.

      (e)   Regional Affairs and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

      (f)   Conventional Arms Control Policy.

      (g)   Defence and Security Economics.

      (h)   Political aspects of non-proliferation and arms control.

(5)   **Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD).** The CEPD maintains a database Civil Capabilities Expertise (CCE) of expertise available in a wide range of civil/commercial/technical areas, including:

      (a)   Movement and Transport (air/land/sea).

      (b)   Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

      (c)   Medical.

      (d)   Critical Infrastructure.

      (e)   Civil Communications.

      (f)   Food and Agriculture.

      (g)   Civil Disaster Response.

      (h)   Industrial Preparedness.

(6)   **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).** The EADRCC, a CEPD entity, is mandated to respond to civil emergencies, including natural and technological disasters, as well as requests for assistance in the event of a major chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident. Countries that have Council approval to use the EADRCC's mechanism include Allies, PfP Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and those in areas where NATO is involved militarily.

(7)   **HQ NATO Strategic Communications (StratCom).** There are several elements within HQ NATO which can provide information, contacts, trends and guidance related to the international, regional and local information environments, including those of NATO members and partners, and relations with NATO partners and external organisations. These elements include:

      (a)   Private Office of the SecGen.

      (b)   Public Diplomacy Division.

      (c)   NATO Spokesman.

      (d)   International Military Staff (Public Affairs/StratCom Advisor and Information Operations Officer).

      (e)   NATO Media Operations Centre.

(8)   **Joint Force Commands (JFCs).** Intelligence and knowledge for specific areas of interest will be developed in collaboration with JFC HQs, using common procedures for developing and sharing information.

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(9) **Terrorism Task Force/Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit.**

(10) **Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC).** CFC provides an information sharing hub for a wide range of participating military, international, governmental and non-governmental organisations. It may support the SOPG through established links between CFC and SHAPE staff.

i. **Other Relevant International Actors[6].** Within a comprehensive approach, SHAPE and other HQs may require specific authorisation to coordinate directly with other international organisations, such as the UN or International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as with cooperating governmental and non-governmental organisations to allow effective, thorough and inclusive planning to commence. In some cases coordination may be pre-authorised, for example through intelligence and information exchange Crisis Response Measures[7]. However, in other cases SACEUR will have to request authorisation from the NAC to increase his delegated level of interaction with these entities through the various phases of the planning process.

Section 2 - Process

3-5. Maintain Global Strategic Awareness and Determine SACEUR's Strategic Areas of Interest.

a. SACEUR has the responsibility for monitoring areas of interest beyond NATO's territory and analysing regional instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues with potential military implications to assess potential risks and threats to NATO's security interests. Taking account of the prevailing geo-political situation, SACEUR may highlight areas of interest to the Military Committee (MC).

b. DCOS Operations and Intelligence (OPI) will review the global geo-political situation in terms of possible threats and risks to NATO security interests including:

(1) Threats or acts of armed aggression.

(2) Proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(3) International terrorism/extremism.

(4) Instability from failed and failing states.

(5) Environmental and humanitarian disaster.

(6) Security of vital resources.

(7) Organised transnational crime and human trafficking and narcotics.

(8) Hostile information activities and propaganda directed at NATO.

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[6] Actor – A person or organization, including state and non-state entities, with the capability to pursue its interests and objectives. (Proposed definition to ratified)
[7] Annex J to Chapter 1 of the NATO Crisis Response Manual, dated Apr 09 (updated annually).
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c.   Recommendations for any changes in the designated areas of strategic interest or priorities for intelligence production and knowledge development within ACO are presented to SACEUR. Changes impacting HQ NATO and national intelligence production are forwarded to Military Committee (MC) or the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for approval.

3-6.   Develop a Systems[8] Perspective of the Area of Interest.

a.   The SOPG develops an initial systems perspective of the situation focusing on the potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors as well as other aspects of the strategic and operational environment relevant to the potential security risks and threats. Basic encyclopaedic information about the countries and other non-state actors in the area, available from the IFC and KMC or KDC, should allow the SOPG to develop an initial systems perspective across Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) domains:

(1)   Political - any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organization through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.

(2)   Military - the armed forces and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organizational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.

(3)   Economic - composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.

(4)   Social - the interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and non-hereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian etc.

(5)   Infrastructure - the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography etc.

(6)   Information - the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses information and communication media.

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[8] A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (Proposed definition to be ratified)

b.   Developing a systems perspective allows the SOPG to identify within each system the key personalities, organisations, facilities, features and materiel and how they interact with other system elements within the operational environment. System analysis support may include developing models of the different systems as networks to help visualise and understand linkages and influences between different systems and system elements. The systems perspective should help determine the depth of understanding and level of granularity required at this stage to appreciate the following:

(1)   The background to the situation and defining events.

(2)   The main state and non-state actors and their primary relationships.

(3)   Key PMESII factors influencing the situation.

(4)   Key personalities, organisations, facilities, features and materiel.

(5)   Critical gaps in available information and knowledge.

3-7.   Determine Information and Knowledge Requirements for Area of Interest.

a.   **Establish Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) for SACEUR.** On the basis of this initial systems perspective, the SOPG determines SACEUR's CCIRs for the conduct of a strategic assessment in the event of a potential crisis. These requirements focus on understanding the scale, scope and timeframe of the risk or threat to NATO's interests and how such a situation might be influenced by military and non-military means.

b.   **Establish SACEUR's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).** Based on its analysis of SACEUR's CCIRs, the Intelligence Support Directorate is responsible for the development of SACEUR's PIRs. PIRs for the area of interest provide the basis for tasking intelligence production within ACO as per ACO Directive 65-11. PIRs also support collection and coordination of intelligence requirements management with NATO HQs and nations.

c.   **Identify Other Priority Information and Knowledge Requirements.** In many cases NATO intelligence may not be the most appropriate source or means for collecting information and developing knowledge. Therefore, the SOPG must identify those other priority information and knowledge requirements about the area of interest as a basis for collection and management and engage with the appropriate agencies (KDC, CFC etc).

d.   **Establish Information Requirements about International Engagement.** It is highly likely that non-NATO entities are already engaged in the area of interest. These entities represent a vast potential source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area including cultural aspects, logistics, and transportation and communications infrastructure. Therefore, the SOPG should develop a comprehensive understanding of which entities are engaged in the area, including their role, capability disposition and relations to other actors. The Civil-Military Fusion Centre provides a mechanism for exchanging information of operational relevance with many different civilian organisations in different sectors such as:

(1)   Economic stabilization.

(2)   Humanitarian assistance.

    (3)   Infrastructure and social well-being.

    (4)   Security.

    (5)   Governance and participation.

    (6)   Justice and reconciliation.

3-8. **Develop and Maintain Information and Knowledge about the Area of Interest.**

a.   **Establish the Knowledge Management Network.** To develop a knowledge base for the area of interest, the SOPG requires a dedicated Information/Knowledge Management (IM/KM) officer to establish a shared knowledge repository on the NS WAN using WISE. It should provide a single point of access to all information and/or information links under the principle that information is posted only once. Core members of the SOPG must act as knowledge managers for their respective functional areas and work aggressively to develop and share knowledge within the SOPG and with counterparts in the NATO Crisis Management Organisation and operational commands. They have a shared responsibility to:

    (1)   Develop and share theatre encyclopaedic information and reference data.

    (2)   Share geo-spatial information and infrastructure information.

    (3)   Identify and share reliable sources of information.

    (4)   Identify experts with regional domain expertise.

    (5)   Share assessments from international, governmental and non-governmental organisation.

    (6)   Address critical gaps and inaccuracies in shared information.

    (7)   Refine information/knowledge requirements.

b.   **Develop the Knowledge Base.** The SOPG members working with the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) and other designated organisations must carry out research and collection of information about the area of interest to expand the knowledge base. Critical to this activity is the functional organisation of information based on a systems understanding of the principal actors and systems in the area related to the principal security interests in the area. In particular, the following functional areas should be expected to make a major contribution to developing and maintaining the knowledge base due to their unique information resources:

    (1)   Intelligence/Assessment. Develop and provide intelligence products including Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs), Intelligence Reports (INTREPs), Intelligence Assessments, Indications and Warnings, encyclopaedic information and reference data, as well as geo-spatial data, including imagery and target databases.

    (2)   Intelligence/Assessment and StratCom[9] should develop and provide reference information and assessments about government and civilian

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[9] Strategic Communications (StratCom). The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological .

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communications, the internet and all forms of media, including a combined strategic assessment of the information environment.

(3)   DCOS Support should provide reference information about civil logistic infrastructure (such as air and seaports, land lines of communication, the power grid, transportation, fuel, and industrial capacity, civil medical infrastructure) as well as local health problems (such as endemic diseases, infectious/contagious diseases, environmental health threats, environmental industrial hazards, bioterrorism related health disorders/biological warfare capabilities).

(4)   Civil Military Cooperation directorate should provide current information and initial assessments of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors as well as the activities of non-NATO entities in the area.

c.   **Exploit Area and Domain Expertise.** Given the likely complexity of operational environment and its unique regional characteristics it will normally be necessary to identify additional sources of area and domain expertise that may be able to contribute to knowledge and understanding. Typical sources include international, governmental and non-governmental organisations that may already be engaged in the area of interest as well as commercial organisations and academic institutions that have an area focus.

3-9.   Analyse Systems in the Area of Interest.

a.   **Application of Systems Analysis.** The complexity of a given situation depends on the structure of the different systems and the ways they interact. The greater the diversity among systems and systems elements the greater the structural complexity of the system. The greater the freedom of action of each individual part and the more linkages among the components, the greater is the system's interactive complexity. When complex systems learn and adapt in response to their interaction with other systems and changes in the operational environment, which is often the case with non-state actors, they can be considered to be complex adaptive systems.

b.   **Examine Potential Adversaries and Other Actors as Adaptive Complex Systems.** A systems approach to analysis examines potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex systems to understand their behaviour, capabilities and interaction within the operational environment and to assess their strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other critical factors, including their adaptability, that provide insight into how they can be influenced. There are four basic steps:

(1)   Identify the essential subsystems and/or elements of each system. Step one is to review and update each system by analysing its different PMESII aspects. This process should identify the significant elements of the system that provide its foundation and may help to determine centres of gravity. By examining the interdependencies within the system and with other systems the analysts should be able to identify system elements that strengthen or weaken its foundation. Those foundation elements that are most sensitive to changes as a

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Operations - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims. (PO (2009)0141, dated 29 Sep 09)

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result of the influence of other system elements are considered to be the "Essential Subsystems/System Elements" of the system.

(2)   Determine key system elements and influences. Step two is to analyse the composition of the subsystems to determine which system elements (nodes) and relationships are most influential in determining the capabilities and behaviour of the system/subsystem. Individual elements have a positive influence on the system/subsystem when they provide strength and a negative influence when they create a weakness.

(3)   Determine system vulnerabilities and adaptability during interaction with other systems. Step three is to analyse how the system behaves and adapts when it interacts with other systems. Examining each system's strengths and weaknesses as it interacts with other systems will reveal potential vulnerabilities. It is important to identify those vulnerabilities that have potential for exploitation. The identification of system strengths and weaknesses in step two and the analysis of system vulnerabilities will support centres of gravity analysis and the determination of strategic effects during strategic assessment and planning phases.

(4)   Determine critical elements and influences in system vulnerabilities. Step four is to identify which system elements (node) are associated with each system's vulnerabilities. Examining the key personalities, organisations, facilities, features and materiel associated with the vulnerable subsystems should begin to reveal whether they might be influenced by an action that could in turn create a desired effect on the system or a subsystem.

c.   **Develop a Shared Understanding of Complex Systems.** The core SOPG develops its knowledge and understanding about an area of interest through frequent collaboration with systems analysts. The core SOPG brainstorm to: gain an understanding of those actors interacting in the area of interest; to build a common understanding of their behaviour and capabilities; and to identify possible means of influencing vulnerable system elements. This should include:

(1)   The current state of the main actor systems.

(2)   The essential system elements/subsystems of each actor.

(3)   System strengths and weaknesses, including specific system elements.

(4)   System vulnerabilities including critical system elements and influences.

(5)   Key judgments regarding the potential to influence critical system elements and influences.

3-10. Establish and Maintain Common Situation Awareness.

a.   **Share Information, Knowledge and Common Operating Picture.** Having developed information and knowledge about the area of interest as well as the systems interacting within the operational environment, the SOPG is responsible for ensuring common situation awareness. Using the available core and functional services, the

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SOPG publishes its information on the NS WAN to allow SHAPE and other HQs to gain and maintain situation awareness. Key components should include:

(1)   Encyclopaedic information about the countries and non-state actors in the area of interest.

(2)   Assessments from non-NATO entities.

(3)   Systems analysis products.

b.   **Monitor the Situation in the Area of Interest.** The Strategic Operations Centre (SOC) watch team for the area of interest, under the supervision of Director Strategic Operations Centre, monitors the situation in the area of interest to identify any changes in the situation that might impact NATO security interests. In particular this will include reviewing the intelligence production by SHAPE, the JFCs and the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) for specific areas of interest, including:

(1)   Current intelligence summaries and reports.

(2)   Intelligence Assessments.

(3)   International political developments.

(4)   Developments and trends in the international media environment (in coordination with Public Affairs).

c.   Based on their understanding of the current state of systems in the area of interest the watch team will recognise any change in system capabilities, behaviour and interaction with other systems that might impact the overall situation. They submit requests for information through the knowledge development network to gain a better understanding of the scope, scale and impact of changes on the overall situation.

3-11. Assess Indications and Warnings.

a.   **Monitor Indications and Warnings.** Indications and warnings will likely be identified by SHAPE Strategic Operations Centre (SOC) watch teams, NATO HQs and/or nations monitoring specific areas of interest. They are assessed and shared using the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS). The NIWS is specifically designed to share information and assessments from nations, HQ NATO and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on the security interests of the Alliance.

b.   **Develop an Initial Assessment.** Indications and warning are brought to the attention of the director of the SOC who notifies the CG and tasks the designated watch team to provide a preliminary assessment of the implications. Depending on the situation and time available, the SOC will coordinate their preliminary assessment with the HQ NATO Situation Centre and the relevant staff in the operations divisions of the International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS). Based on SOC preliminary assessments, SACEUR will provide his initial advice to the SecGen to initiate formal assessment of the situation under Phase 2 of the NATO Crisis management process, with the NAC tasking SACEUR and senior civilian committees for their advice. SACEUR may at this stage consider activating the SOPG.

PHASE 2 - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Section 1 - General

3-12. Introduction.

a.　**Purpose.**　The purpose of Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment - is to develop and coordinate SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA), as a part of the overall Strategic Military Advice (includes MC advice) of an emerging or potential crisis for NAC consideration in support of the HQ NATO Political Military Estimate (PME) process.　It establishes the essential strategic conditions required to plan and conduct military operations as part of a comprehensive approach to achieve a clearly defined NATO end state and NATO strategic objectives.　In addition, Phase 2 will initiate collaborative planning at subordinate levels.

b.　**Overview.**

(1)　Phase 2 begins with a SACEUR decision to conduct a formal strategic assessment, based on his own authority, following staff advice and consultation, or following receipt of an MC tasker for a SSA.　It includes: formal activation of the SOPG and other ACO HQs as required (through a Strategic Warning Order); development of the SSA of the crisis; and coordination with HQ NATO, selected ACO subordinate HQs and external organisations, as required.　In addition, the decision to initiate the Political Military Estimate (PME) may include guidance and authorisation of CRMs [10] for declaration by SACEUR.

(2)　Phase 2 ends with submission of the SSA which is considered by the MC when providing their overall advice for NAC consideration.　The NAC will then issue a NAC Decision sheet requesting Military Response Options (MROs). Should time constraints dictate, the NAC may request that the SSA is submitted with the MROs, as detailed in Phase 3 of the planning process. SACEUR also may, in his SSA, also advise NAC to invoke fast- track decision making process.

c.　**Prerequisites.**　Phase 2 - SSA will start either on SACEUR's request to start prudent military planning when warranted by the deteriorating situation in one of his nominated areas of interests, or on the tasking from MC.

d.　**Main Activities.**　The main activities of Phase 2 – Strategic Assessment are depicted in Figure 3.4.

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[10] Pre-authorised CRM measures are listed in Annex J to Chapter 1 of the NCRSM.

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Political Military Level

Strategic Level SACEUR

Operational Level COM JFC

SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

MC tasker for SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

SACEUR Initiate Strategic Assessment Review NAC Political direction/guidance

Strategic Warning Order

Develop a strategic appreciation of the crisis

Assess International interests and engagement in the crisis

Analyse the principal actors and their roles in the crisis

Assess desired NATO end state and Political Military objectives

Assess potential risks and threats

Assess alternatives for strategic engagement

SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

Submit SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

COM JFC collaborative planning. Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options

MC tasker for MROs

Review political guidance and direction

May be combined and submitted as one document if directed by the NAC

Develop Military Response Options. Suitability, feasibility, acceptability

Military Response Options

Analyse, evaluate, compare strategic military response options

Coordination with JFC, HQ NATO IS/IMS/PDD, and NMRs - Force sensing, no commitment.

COM review Options. Provide Operational Advice

Military Response Options

Submit Military Response Options

Figure 3.4 - Strategic Assessment

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e.   **Products.** The two main products developed by SHAPE during Phase 2 are:

(1)   **Strategic Warning Order**. A strategic warning order will typically be issued to specific operational HQs following receipt of the MC tasker requesting the SSA, to alert those HQs to be prepared to support the strategic assessment process. A template is provided in Appendix 1 to Annex B to this directive.

(2)   **SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA).** The SSA (template at Appendix 2 to Annex B) will normally be issued as a separate document concluding with strategic approaches (broad choices for engagement). These alternatives should provide the NAC with the necessary background to then seek SACEUR advice on more specific and detailed MROs, as described in para 3-22. However, if a relevant, current contingency plan (COP) is available, SACEUR may recommend in his SSA that the Fast Track Decision-Making (FTDM) process be used.

f.   **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** SSA, as a part of the MC advice, must provide the NAC with a comprehensive assessment of both NATO and non-NATO actors and their potential contribution to a comprehensive approach. This should include, but not be limited to:

(1)   A fundamental understanding of the nature of the crisis, including its key PMESII domains. This includes conventional arms control related constraints or planning assumptions that might have an impact.

(2)   An initial list of significant non-NATO actors with which SHAPE and the designated JFC HQ will be required to interact at the early stages of planning, as well as the degree of interaction required for strategic and operational planning purposes, should NATO decide to get engaged in the crisis.

(3)   Alternative strategic approaches (ways) using different instruments available to the Alliance.

(4)   Strategic conditions required for operational success.

(5)   Recommendations on additional CRMs and Alert States[11].

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The SOPG should determine its requirements for liaison and coordination both internally and externally. It should consider the following:

(1)   **International Military Staff (IMS).** Intelligence Division Warning Secretariat. On behalf of IMS Director Intelligence, the Warning Secretariat is the manager and focal point of the NIWS and monitors system performance and implements policy and procedures for the operation of the system as approved by the system members. The Secretariat is responsible for informing the MC and

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[11] NATO Alert States (NATO Crisis Response System Manual). The declaration of Alert States and the implementation of measures may be decreed either by the national authorities within their territory and according to their national regulations, or by any NATO Commander when the situation/threat assessment dictates. It is recommended that the declaration of force protection and/or counter-intelligence CRMs should be considered.

other appropriate NATO Committees of all changes in the NATO warning problems and has the primary responsibility to engage the first phase of NATO Crisis Management Process.

(2)   **Strategic Analysis Element (SAE).** The DGIMS may establish an SAE with representatives from the IMS and the IS (CEPD) to assist the MC in developing its advice on the military implications of a crisis situation including potential risks and threats to the Alliance, as well as possible response options (Phase 3 of the NCRS). The SAE can play a useful role in coordinating military and non-military advice and in drafting the NAC Initiating Directive (NID).

(3)   **HQ NATO Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF).** A CMTF, composed of designated representatives from the IS and the IMS, may be activated by the Secretary General at the start of a crisis in accordance with HQ NATO's own crisis management procedures. It provides an executive level forum for cross-functional coordination at the political military level within NATO as well as with UN and other international organisations regarding NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach.

(4)   **StratCom Policy Board (SCPB).** StratCom falls under the direct authority of SecGen and the NAC. A standing SCPB has been established to act on behalf of SecGen and the NAC in accordance with the NATO StratCom policy, under the direction of Assistant Secretary General Public Diplomacy Division (ASG PDD). Membership on this board includes ASG PDD, a representative from SecGen's Private Office, the NATO Spokesman, IMS StratCom Advisor, representatives from SACEUR and SACT, and JFC representatives (as needed basis). The SCPB, informed by SecGen and the NAC, will provide agreed StratCom guidance. They may assist the CMTF with the development of a dedicated StratCom strategy for issuance with the NAC ID or issue it under their own authority, providing the basis for further Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations activities at an early stage in a crisis.

(5)   **Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC).** The CEPC provides advice to the NAC on the overall civil situation in a crisis and can call upon national experts from business and industry, as well as governments who comprise the various Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs) for Ocean Shipping, Inland Surface Transport, Civil Aviation, Food and Agriculture, Industrial Preparedness, Civil Communications Planning, Civil Protection, and Civil-Military Medical Issues. It is ideally suited to assist in assessing NATO's civil response to a crisis and stands ready to provide liaison, advice and support to SHAPE and JFCs as required.

(6)   **Relevant NATO Agencies.** NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency-NC3A, NATO CIS Service Agency- NCSA, etc.

(7)   **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).** The EADRCC is mandated to respond to civil emergency situations in the Euro-Atlantic area, and to function as a clearing-house mechanism for the coordination of requests and offers of assistance.

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(8) **United Nations, the European Union and the African Union.**

(9) **International, governmental and non-governmental organisations** as authorised and required to improve knowledge, share assessments and determine potential areas for cooperation.

(10) **Potential Host Nations** (HNs) as authorised and required to facilitate and support the assessment of options.

(11) Additionally, the SOPG will need to interact with the following organisations:

(a) **Joint Force Command (Joint Operational Planning Group).**

(b) **Knowledge Management Centre (KMC).** The NATO KMC will, when established, provide a centralised knowledge base that contains, at a minimum, all data required to support a comprehensive understanding of NATO threats and types of NATO operations.

(c) **Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).** The IFC is a multi-national memorandum of understanding intelligence organisation collocated with the Joint Analysis Centre (JAC) at Molesworth with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides SACEUR with timely, actionable, intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations, especially NRF, through SHAPE Intel staff.

(d) **Operational Planning and Liaison Element.** Designated ACO operational level commands will typically be tasked to deploy an Operational Planning and Liaison Element to SHAPE for collaboration and operational advice. The element is tailored to the requirement but should provide competent and authoritative operational advice to the SOPG.

Section 2 - Process

3-13. Initiate SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.

a. **Review NAC Decision Sheet and MC tasker.** DCOS CPP will lead the strategic assessment process and quickly review the tasking and determine any requirements for additional guidance and/or clarification. He should recognise from the outset whether this is an urgent situation requiring an immediate response or a developing situation requiring a more deliberate approach within the context of an overall strategy. However, this may have already been dictated through NAC guidance and MC tasker. His review should focus on understanding:

(1) The nature of the task and any guidance and direction.

(2) The time available.

(3) The political aim, desired end state and objectives, if stated.

(4) Potential military and non-military roles.

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   (5) Requirements for clarification.

   (6) Requirements for external coordination.

  b. **Determine Potential Requirements for Fast Track Decision-Making.** DCOS CPP or the SOPG, if assigned, must immediately assess whether the situation requires an urgent response and deployment of rapid deployable forces, as articulated in a current, relevant COP/GCOP. If so it may be necessary to recommend as soon as possible that the NAC invoke the Fast-Track Decision-Making process (FTDM)[12]. When the NAC decides that NATO should respond to the crisis, and that the FTDM process is required, it will issue political guidance, task SACEUR to urgently provide a strategic OPLAN and to conduct specific enabling activities. The SOPG will, as early as possible, develop a strategic plan based on the Contingency/Generic Contingency Plan (COP/GCOP), including a draft Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) with identified requirements and contributions.

  c. **SACEUR's Initial Guidance.** SACEUR's initial direction, drawn from early discussions with the NATO Sec Gen, nations and others will help guide the SOPG. DCOS CPP will advise SACEUR on the NAC Decision Sheet and any MC direction and guidance, nature of the problem and time available. An assessment of both military and non-military roles is essential and DCOS CPP should be prepared to advise on the following:

   (1) Activation of ACO crisis response organisations.

   (2) Deployment of a Strategic Military Assessment Team (SMAT)[13].

   (3) Operational HQs to be involved in the assessment process and the requirement to deploy Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams (OLRTs), as required.

   (4) Requirements for external coordination.

   (5) Timings for command group review of the draft SSA.

   (6) Issues to be clarified with HQ NATO and the Secretary General.

  d. **Review NATO Political Guidance and Policy Statements.** Given that most crises develop over time, it is likely that the NAC has developed a view and may have issued policy statements regarding a NATO position. The SOPG must quickly analyse NATO declarations and other official statements by the NAC and the Secretary General, including the latest press releases, to review and understand NATO's current position regarding the crisis and specific strategic issues.

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[12] See MC133/3 NATO Operational Planning (to be replaced soon by MC133/4 NATO Operations Planning) or the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (2010) for further details on FTDM.

[13] The concept of deploying a 'Strategic Military Assessment Team' to the crisis area is under consideration. If taken forward this may require coordination with National Military Representatives. It would always require arrangements with sponsors in the area, including the host nation and/or a national embassy. The make up of the team would be tailored to the particular crisis but consideration would be given to including SOF, INTEL, CIMIC, Strategic Transportation expertise etc. This would need to be coordinated and deconflicted with the OLRT, as required.

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e. **Selection of JFC.** The JFC will be selected on the basis of geographic location of the crisis, NRF responsibilities, current commitments or other relevant factor.

f. **Draft Warning Order**. The SOPG will draft SACEUR's Warning Order to subordinate commands. This should include key NAC and MC documents, request for operational advice during the planning process, provision of liaison and planning elements to SHAPE, deployment of OLRTs and other CRMs. The Warning Order will include the timeline for products to be provided to SACEUR. Standing up a JOPG will be under the direction of the nominated JFC

g. **Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).** CRMs cover a wide range of military capabilities and provide various measures for planning, preparing and activating national capabilities to meet NATO operational requirements. When the NAC decides to initiate Phase 2 of the NATO Crisis Management Process, the Council Decision Sheet authorises SACEUR to declare any of the pre-authorised CRM identified in Annex J to Chapter 1 of the NATO Crisis Response System Manual, without further consultation with, or requests being sent to, HQ NATO.

(1) The SOPG will review requirements for pre-authorised, requested and preventive CRMs, based on the situation and recommend selected measures for CG approval, including, at an early stage, CRMs for the deployment of an OLRT[14]. Throughout the process, the SOPG must monitor CRMs, noting the state of implementation, and provide advice on the implications of delays in implementation or the granting of authority for implementation of individual CRMs. In particular, the SOPG should review CRMs in the following areas:

A   Manpower

B   Intelligence

D   Force Protection

E   General Operations

I   Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)

L   CBRN Defence

J   Electronic Warfare

K   Meteorology/Oceanography/Hydrography

M   Logistics

O   Forces Readiness

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[14] Depending on the situation, SHAPE may have already alerted the designated JFC to be prepared to deploy its OLRT or may have received a request for the authorisation of the deployment of the OLRT from the JFC. Authorisation to activate and deploy an OLRT is given through CRMs and may already have been provided in the NID based on SACEUR's Strategic Assessment. If not, the requirement to deploy an OLRT should be considered by the SOPG with CRMs requested accordingly. Any guidance for tailoring the OLRT as well as its preparation and deployment should be developed by the SOPG, especially the use of deployable CIS, arrangements for initial entry, coordination with host nation and public affairs/PSYOPS.

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      P   Communications and Information Systems

      Q   Critical infrastructure and Services

      S   Strategic Communication/Public Affairs

(2)   Requesting CRMs. The following diagram illustrates the procedure for SACEUR to request the use of CRMs[15].

[1] Recommendation may include the appropriate moment when SACEUR should declare the CRM concerned.

Figure 3.5 - Procedure for SACEUR to Request Crisis Response Measures

3-14. Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis.

a.   **Determine the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem.** The SOPG reviews and updates the system perspective developed in Phase 1. Different perspectives provided by core and augmenting SOPG members contribute to a comprehensive understanding. Brainstorming and the use of mind mapping tools can be useful at this point. The aim is to identify the main conditions in the current situation that the NAC has deemed or might deem to be unacceptable, the principal actors and factors contributing to the problem and its resolution, including the main international actors and their role in the crisis.

b.   **Analyse the Strategic Environment.** The SOPG, supported by systems analysts from the IFC, review and update the analysis of the strategic environment (PMESII), developed during Phase 1. Briefings on the main systems and environmental conditions should identify critical gaps in information and knowledge. The aim is to identify: those key issues, factors and actors influencing the crisis; its possible causes and possible resolution within the engagement space and in relation with the rest of the international

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[15] More detailed explanation on the use of CRMs can be found in NATO Crisis Response System Manual, NCRSM, dated April 09.

environment; PMESII and the natural environment (including the influence of geography, hydrography, weather, and climate).

c. **Analyse Key Factors.** Throughout the strategic assessment process, the SOPG identifies the key factors that define the problem and which must ultimately be addressed when resolving it. They analyse these factors making deductions about strategic implications and drawing conclusions relevant for further analysis and planning. This is a continuing process that provides the foundation for developing and maintaining a current strategic appreciation of the situation. The SOPG will inevitably identify gaps in information that generate Requests for Information (RFIs).

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic implication.	The implications, issues or considerations derived from the fact(s) with strategic significance.	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.
• Military capability	• Threat to neighbours	• Deterrence required
• Poverty level	• Support for government	• Requires economic, civil actions
• Scale of ethnic violence	• Risk to stability	• Stability requirements
• Support for extremist	• Accessibility of populations	• Elements of StratCom strategy
• Access to media	So what is the significance of the factor?	So, what can or should be done?
What is the current state of affairs or trends?		

3-15. Analyse the Principal Actors and Their Role in the Crisis.

a. Typically, there will be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries (Red), partners (Blue) and others (Green), whose actions, in varying degrees have contributed to the conditions that characterise the crisis. Appreciating these actors' goals, capabilities and motivation will be key in understanding how to influence them. These actors can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support their goals. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences in the crisis.

b. **Establish Red and Green[16] Teams.** If possible the SOPG should establish standing "Red" and "Green" Teams to develop the perspectives of potential adversaries (Red), other non-aligned actors and non-NATO entities (Green). These teams then play a vital role, interacting with the SOPG throughout the process to challenge and validate

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[16] Red Team/Green Team - An organizational element comprised of individuals with knowledge of the operational environment and potential adversaries/non-aligned actors who provide an independent capability to challenge the validity of plans, orders and assessments from the perspective of adversaries and others.
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the SOPG's analysis and assumptions, and to ensure that the expected actions/reactions and capabilities of all actors are realistic.

c.   **Analyse the Capabilities and Behaviour of Each Actor**. Based on the analysis of the strategic environment, as well any analysis of the actors developed during Phase 1, the SOPG must identify those actors who will have the greatest influence in the current crisis. The SOPG must then understand the effects[17] caused by the actions of each actor to gain insight into how best to influence them. Building on the existing knowledge of each actor, the SOPG should:

(1)   **Review Essential Subsystems and/or Elements of Each Actor System.** By leveraging the analysis of external entities, the SOPG should be able to describe the network of interrelated systems and systems elements in the different PMESII domains that determine the capabilities and capacity of each main actor to act and to influence other systems and system elements in different domains. Actor systems may be comprised of:

(a)   Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders and opinion formers.

(b)   Groups including political interest groups, social power and influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups usually linked to the above individuals.

(c)   Organisations including governmental organisations, including the security forces, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs) and transnational organisations as well as commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

(d)   Nation states.

(2)   **Assess the Goals and Objectives of Each Actor.** The SOPG reviews the statements and actions of each actor to assess what they seek to achieve as well as the conditions they would desire as an end state to the crisis.

(3)   **Assess the Main Characteristics of Each Actor.** Consider the motivation of each actor including the influences of history, culture, values, beliefs and prevailing attitudes of their membership, as well as the personality traits, psychological profiles, motives and interests of key individuals. At this point it is also useful to begin to assess the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of military influences, as well as their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

(4)   **Assess the Capabilities of Each Actor.** The SOPG reviews key system elements and influences to identify strengths and weaknesses of each actor that

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[17] Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition to be ratified).

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influence their ability to achieve their goals and objectives. System network diagrams, including a geo-spatial view of each system, help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical dependencies. This will point to actors' Centres of Gravity as well as any deficiencies.

(5) **Assess the Main Actions[18] of Each Actor and their Potential Effects.** Actions are typically directed at some other actor, system or system element to achieve specific effects with the intent that the cumulative effect of these actions will create conditions required to achieve the actor's objective. However, actions may cause other undesired effects with different consequences. It is critical at this point the SOPG appreciates the relationship between each actor's capabilities, actions, effects and objectives as a basis for gaining insight into its behaviour.

(6) **Assess Possible Response to NATO Involvement.** Based on their understanding of the different actors, the SOPG should assess the likely response of each actor to a possible NATO response. This will provide an initial indication of who are the potential adversaries and partners and neutrals. It may also highlight relationships that are conditional.

(7) **Identify and Address Knowledge Gaps.** The analysis of actors will highlight gaps in knowledge. The SOPG should capture any additional requirements for information and knowledge and issue collection and analysis tasks.

d. **Analyse Strategic Centres of Gravity[19] (COGs).** The SOPG must determine the COGs of friendly and opposing actors and to determine what vulnerabilities can be exploited in opposing actors and what Alliance and friendly actors vulnerabilities must be protected. Based on the system (PMESII) analysis of potential adversaries, partners and others, the SOPG will examine the foundations of each actors/system that gives it strength and determine possible strategic COGs.

e. A strategic COG will represent the primary strength[20] for an actor to achieve its strategic objective. Further analysis of possible strategic COGs draws upon the systems analysis of the principal actors (opponent, partners, neutrals and alliance) to determine their capabilities (what it enables the actor to do), its requirements (what it needs to be effective) and, of most importance, its vulnerabilities (in what way can it be influenced). There is no set starting point. A COG may seem obvious for some actors; however, working through capabilities, then requirements and vulnerabilities (each of which may have a bearing on the other) may draw a different conclusion. Care must be taken to ensure that the SOPG focuses at the strategic level in their COG analysis. Having completed the process the SOPG must deduce what can be exploited and what can be protected.

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[18] Action. Can be considered the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect (s) in support of an objective.
[19] Centre of gravity - Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP 6)
[20] For example, the power of the regime, the will of the people, ethnic nationalism, an alliance etc.

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Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix	
Assessed Aim and Desired Outcome	
What is the actor's main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions?	
Centre of Gravity	**Critical Capabilities**
…is a principal source of strength of power for achieving one's aim.	…is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the COG it strength.
What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his strategic objectives?	What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system?
To be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend.	*To be influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend).*
A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.	*The key word is the verb - the ability to….*
Critical Vulnerabilities	**Critical Requirements**
…exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.	…are specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities.
What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?	What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to generate and sustain the COG's critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?
To be attacked in an opponent and protected in a friend.	*To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend.*
A noun with modifiers.	*Nouns, things.*
Conclusion	
Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space?	

3-16. Assess International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis.

a. **Assess International Legal Aspects.** Throughout the process the Legal Adviser (LEGAD) and International Affairs Adviser (INA) members of the SOPG will review, coordinating with HQ NATO legal staffs, the situation and any strategic issues to determine the legal aspects of the crisis based on international law, treaties and agreements, as well as relevant UN resolutions. The result should be a clear understanding of the legal basis for any possible NATO response, as well as any requirement for additional legal provisions or mandates.

b.   **Assess International Interests and Objectives.** The SOPG will analyse policy statements made by the international community regarding the crisis to determine specific interests of the international community and the level of consensus. As a minimum this review should consider statements by the UN, international organisations such as the G8 and EU, as well as other regional organisations. Direct coordination and liaison with any of these organisations should be considered in accordance with NAC guidance.

c.   **Assess International Commitments.** The SOPG, in coordination with LEGAD and INA, will identify the main non-NATO entities in the crisis area, including those engaged in humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education and general project funding. It is critical that the SOPG understands the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations as a basis for determining possible areas for interaction and/or cooperation. Therefore, the SOPG should review interaction of the main organisations to include:

   (1)   The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different geographical and functional areas.

   (2)   The nature, level and scope of commitments.

   (3)   Goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to achieving them.

   (4)   Potential future contributions.

   (5)   Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic (including medical) support as well as Public Information/Affairs aspects.

   (6)   Possible areas for cooperation and interaction.

   (7)   Priorities for coordination and liaison.

   (8)   Required degree of interaction with each significant non-NATO actor.

d.   **Assess the Information Environment.** The SSA will include an analysis from the strategic perspective as a basis for developing and evaluating possible activities and effects in the strategic information environment. It includes an assessment of potential target audiences, main actors in the information environment and their networks, aspects of opinion building, perception management and information flow, specific information systems and media. Additionally, it will provide the status of own and adversary information activities in coordination with the Intelligence directorate.

   (1)   **Audiences.** Potential target audiences[21] will be identified in broad terms for this assessment. Audiences can be divided into three main categories, which can be interrelated and overlapping in some instances:

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[21] Targeting of specified audiences by military Information Operations and Psychological Operations is subject to political approval. This will be achieved by submitting Annexes L and O (PSYOPS and Info Ops respectively) for NAC approval with the Strategic CONOPS.

(a) **Alliance Audiences.** Alliance internal and domestic audiences, as well as troop contributing partner nations, may be addressed by Alliance information activities. Identification of these as approved audiences will require political consent amongst Alliance member and partner nations.

(b) **International Community Audiences** include other countries and individual actors, in particular from neighbouring countries, local influential countries and non-NATO entities involved in the region, with whom the Alliance's messages should be coordinated. The selection of international audiences will have to be approved based on a sound analysis of their roles and stance related to the situation and mission (e.g., 'favourable', 'neutral', 'opponent' or 'sources of instability').

(c) **Local Audiences** covers the wider population of the host country, local media, formal and informal authorities, including the local government(s), affiliated opinion leaders and opinion formers, and other actors at the local level. As above, the identification of local audiences needs to be based on a sound analysis of their roles and stance related to the situation and mission.

(2) **StratCom requirements.** This assessment will also inform the subsequent development and proposal of StratCom requirements (requested direction and guidance) for NATO to include in their mission-specific StratCom strategy. These requirements will be detailed and submitted to HQ NATO as part of Phase 3 - Military Response Options.

e. **Assess the Media and Public Affairs Environment.** The media provides an important communication channel with audiences that have influence on NATO activities. Public Affairs activities will be conducted within the StratCom strategy established by HQ NATO. The resulting SACEUR's StratCom framework will be closely coordinated throughout the chain of command. Media attitudes may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately can influence political will in support of a mission. Info Ops, PAO, INA (within the context of the StratCom WG) should collaborate in developing an understanding of the level of media interest amongst different audiences (as categorised above) as well as any prevailing attitudes. This assessment will underpin future PAO efforts to communicate with target audiences to gain and retain strategic initiative. It includes a requirement to:

(1) **Assess Media Infrastructure and Assets for Production.** This assessment examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as well as the stance and credibility of content. Understanding the various media outlets is essential to inform any assessment of their potential impact and to assist the efficient dissemination of information.

(2) **Assess Prevailing Attitudes and Issues in the Region.** The analysis of media content helps to understand prevailing attitudes and key issues provides further insight into the different aspects of the crisis as well as potential support and opposition to a possible NATO response. This assessment provides the basis for determining requirements for Information Operations, and separately, PA, as

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well as the best use of resources to deliver relevant information to target populations. To determine attitudes in the potential Joint Operational Area (JOA), it may also be necessary to undertake surveys.

f.   **Assess Common Aims, Objectives and Desired End State Conditions.** Based on their appreciation of the international situation regarding the crisis, including its legal aspects, and drawing on engagement with the international community, the SOPG can then provide a summary for SACEUR of the most likely common aim and objectives of the international community at large as well as essential conditions that must be achieved. They should highlight any significant areas of disagreement.

3-17. Assess Potential Risks and Threats.

a.   **Assess Security Implications.** Those strategic issues that pose a potential risk or threat to NATO security interests are further developed by the Intelligence Support Directorate in a SHAPE Threat Assessment, which is based on a fused intelligence picture that addresses the combination of threat capability and intent. The Threat Assessment provides a general narrative, a specific threat statement and an assessed threat level.

3-18. Develop Necessary Assumptions. [22]

a.   There will be some gaps in knowledge and information that cannot be known at the time of planning, for example how the main actors will react to the involvement of NATO. In these cases the SOPG may find it necessary to make certain assumptions as a basis for further planning. Here the Red and Green teams can play a vital role. To be valid an assumption must be logical, realistic, and necessary for the planning to continue. They must never assume away problems that should be catered for in the planning such as dealing with adversary capabilities or assuming an unrealistic friendly capabilities and successes. Assumptions should be rigorously reviewed and kept to a minimum. While an assumption allows planning to proceed it is also a weakness in the structure of the plan. The SOPG will control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly reviewed. Any changes in assumptions have to be assessed as to their impact on the plan.

3-19. Assess the NATO End State[23] and NATO Strategic Objectives, and Determine Strategic Effects.

a.   **Understand the Political Context.** Normally given in the NAC Decision Sheet requesting Strategic Military Advice (SMA), it is often directly linked to the provisions of an international mandate or agreement providing legal authority for resolving the crisis. SACEUR contributes to this process by providing, through the MC, his assessment of the NATO desired end state and the corresponding objectives that will establish the ends for potential response options, which will use the different means and ways available to the

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[22] A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to complete an estimate of the situation as a basis for future decisions.
[23] End state - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's involvement. (Proposed definition).

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Alliance in cooperation with other national and international actors within a comprehensive approach.

b.   **The Desired End State and NATO Strategic Objectives.** A NAC request for advice may already include a provisional end state which describes conditions for a favourable, self regulating situation within the engagement space that satisfies overall NATO strategic objectives**.** The SOPG considers the NATO assessed end state and strategic objectives in the context of its analysis of the main actor systems and influencing factors, which define the problem and describe the strategic conditions required to establish an acceptable self-regulating solution. Achieving these conditions will require changes in actor systems, including their interaction and influence on the environment. If the NAC desired end state and strategic objectives are not provided, the SOPG will determine the proposed NATO desired end state and strategic objectives based on the analysis of the system and problem definition.

c.   **Determine Desired NATO Strategic Effects.** Through system analysis, the SOPG will determine the required changes in the system(s) to achieve the NATO strategic objectives. The desired changes in the conditions of these parts of system are reflected in desired NATO strategic effects. These effects can be created through the application of all instruments of power available to the Alliance.

3-20. Assess Alternatives for Strategic Engagement.

a.   **Consider Potential Strategic Ends, Ways and Means.** At this point the SOPG, working collaboratively with planning elements from the designated operational JFC, should consider:

(1)   What essential conditions must be attained to end the crisis or conflict on acceptable terms? (Ends)

(2)   How can military, political (diplomatic), civil, and economic instruments be used to create coherent effects that will achieve the conditions required to reach the desired end state? (Ways)

(3)   What political (diplomatic), military, civil, and economic instruments of power[24] are available to NATO and cooperating partners to create the desired effects? (Means)

b.   **Develop Strategic Approaches.** The SSA should identify broad strategic choices that define the Alliance's contribution to the overall international effort to deal with a crisis. This will be based on the potential NATO political aim, desired NATO end state and strategic objectives. These alternatives should provide sufficient SACEUR advice for the NAC to decide if the Alliance should become involved in the crisis, and, if so, provide the necessary direction (through the NAC Decision Sheet requesting options) for SACEUR to develop Military Response Options (MROs). Alternative strategic

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[24] Instruments of power as referred to in Annex A para 1-5.

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approaches[25] should provide a strategic vision for achieving NATO strategic objectives over the near, mid and longer term, considering:

(1)   Different levels of NATO's ambition[26] in contributing to the international effort to attain the conditions of a desired NATO end state, in terms of urgency and burden sharing with other international and regional organisations. Considering different levels of ambition may be done in two ways: articulating tiered alternatives of ever-increasing appetite for one end state. Alternatively, this could be done by describing alternatives with different proposed NATO end states for NATO participation in the resolution of the crisis.

(2)   Direct or indirect engagement in support of international organisations to enable the accomplishment of the NATO end state.

(3)   Identifying preventive options, a component of the NCRS which are, by design, broad in nature. They are the starting point for defining an appropriate Alliance response to the crisis, when these options by themselves are not enough to solve the crisis at its very early stages. A coherent approach to crisis management will require NATO to consider appropriate responses from a range of diplomatic, economic and military Preventive Options in the light of the prevailing circumstances, while exercising close political control at all stages.

(4)   Possibilities for leveraging different instruments of power to achieve strategic effects by:

(a)   Countering critical capabilities of potential adversaries by exploiting critical vulnerabilities in opposing centres of gravity and foundation systems, as well as critical system elements and influences.

(b)   Enhancing critical capabilities of potential friends by covering critical vulnerabilities in friendly centres of gravity and foundation systems, as well as critical system elements and influences.

(5)   Different risks to be accepted in terms of achieving NATO strategic objectives.

c.   **Determine Potential Use of Instruments of Power for each Strategic Approach.** The strategic approaches must provide the necessary information for

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[25] Alternatives proposed must be unambiguous and sufficiently detailed to provide decision makers with clear and realistic alternatives in response to a crisis.

[26] If levels of NATO ambition are to be described as tiered alternatives of ever-increasing appetite for one end state, the following framework can be used:

Appetite Level 1 (Core): This is the minimum necessary that NATO should do in response to a crisis, because no other actor or instrument of power alone can deliver the required effects needed to achieve the end state.

Appetite Level 2 (Balanced): What would be done by NATO in Appetite Level 1 is supplemented by what may possibly be done by other actors, but should really be done by NATO (for example for reasons of coordination or capabilities).

Appetite Level 3

(Enhanced): Reflects the aggregate of Appetite Level 1 and 2, plus other activities or contributions which ought to be done by other actors, but which could also eventually be done by NATO because of political or other considerations.

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SACEUR to develop Military Response Options (MROs) through the NAC Decision Sheet requesting options, should NATO decide to consider becoming involved in the resolution of the crisis. The SOPG will primarily develop military lines of engagement[27]; however, it will recognise logically that some NATO strategic objectives and desired effects can be achieved using military, political, economic or civil means, or some combination of these. Therefore, it may be possible to determine strategic lines of engagement that may help to coordinate and synchronise the application of different sources of power toward a common purpose. Strategic lines of engagement should provide a logical connection between broad response activities and strategic effects to a strategic objective(s) and the end state.

(1)   Based on their assessment of the strategic ends, ways and means, the SOPG should brainstorm and develop possible applications of available Alliance sources of power.

(2)   The SOPG may use the following matrix to assist in their brainstorming and subsequent analysis to help synchronise responses using different means.

Graduated Responses		
	Limited Response	**Moderate Response**	**Decisive Response**
Military	*Military Contacts* *Military Cooperation* *Military Assistance* *Intelligence* *Increased Readiness*	*Surveillance* *Exercises* *Activation/Deployment* *Peace Support* *Security Assistance* *Deter/Coerce*	*Use of Force* *Defeat/Destroy*
Political	*Diplomatic Support* *International Dialogue* *Confidence Building* *PAO Interest*	*Diplomatic Isolation* *Demarches* *High Level Visits* *PAO Support*	*Warnings* *PAO Repercussions*
Economic	*Economic Assistance* *Economic Incentives*	*Economic Support* *Economic Disincentives* *Economic Sanctions (Limited)*	*Economic Sanctions*
Civil	*Humanitarian Assistance* *Human Development*	*Judicial Reform* *Government Reform* *Social Reform*	

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[27] Strategic line of engagement - A logical line that connects diplomatic, military, economic and civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state. (Proposed definition)
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(3)   The SOPG should describe in broad terms the proposed employment of all relevant sources of power for each strategic approach as Lines of Engagement.

d.   **Assess Potential Means Available to the Alliance.** The SOPG, with advice from the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD), operational commands, and any cooperating external organisations, should develop a common appreciation of the different instruments of power available to the Alliance, as well as other cooperating non-NATO entities, that might be able to create strategic effects required to achieve one or more strategic objectives. As a minimum, this should include assessments of:

(1)   Diplomatic, civil and economic efforts by Civ/Mil, International Affairs Advisor (INA), and CEPD.

(2)   Readiness and availability of deployable forces including both the NATO Response Force (NRF) and other Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF) as well as deployable CIS, by SOC with advice from Force Generation (FG), support and CIS.

(3)   Partner forces operational capabilities by Military Cooperation Division (MIC).

(4)   Availability of strategic lift and transportation assets by DCOS Spt and CEPD.

(5)   Support by potential host nations in the crisis area by DCOS Spt and CEPD.

(6)   Availability of UN/IO logistics resources in the area by DCOS Spt and CEPD.

e.   **Determine Proposed Military Strategic Objectives**[28]. The SOPG determines proposed military strategic objectives that describe the strategic aims to be achieved with military power in each strategic approach as the basis for MRO development. It is critical that the SOPG recognises that the development of military strategic objectives is an iterative process, and objectives developed at this stage are likely to change or be refined later through the strategic assessment process and response option development.

f.   **Determine Desired Military Strategic Effects**[29]**.** Depending on the complexity of the systems and their ability to adapt to changes in the environment, effects may be difficult to create, predict, and measure, particularly when they relate to moral and cognitive issues, e.g. religion and the "mind of the adversary" respectively. Therefore, military strategic effects should be reviewed and adjusted based on continuous systems analysis and assessments.

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[28] Military strategic objectives establish the strategic purpose for military and non-military actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. They describe the goals that must be achieved to establish conditions required to attain the desired end state.
[29] Military strategic effects describe specific changes required in the capabilities, actions and behaviour of specific systems required to achieve military strategic objectives.
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3-21. Develop and Submit SACEUR's Strategic Assessment of the Crisis

a. **Coordinate Key Issues with HQ NATO.** In accordance with SACEUR's guidance, representatives of the SOPG, should identify and coordinate any key issues with their counterparts in the IS and IMS through the NATO Strategic Analysis Element (SAE) and CMTF. Particular attention should be paid to:

(1) International legal issues.

(2) Requirements for a StratCom strategy.

(3) Requirements for additional interaction at the strategic level with significant non-NATO actors.

(4) Issues requiring further political guidance.

b. **Seek SACEUR's Endorsement and Further Guidance.** The SOPG, should complete any required internal coordination, complete the draft SSA, provide any required briefings, and gain SACEUR's approval of the key assessments and strategic alternatives, as well as any key issues for coordination with the NATO SecGen. The assessment provides the basis for subsequent development of MROs. It is critical at this point that the SOPG Team Leader seeks any guidance required for the development of MROs.

b. Submit SACEUR's Strategic Assessment of the Crisis. SACEUR will submit his SSA, including his assessment of alternatives for strategic engagement, to the MC, who will in turn include SSA into their Strategic Military Advice (SMA) for further NAC considerations. There may be circumstances when, due to the urgency of the crisis, the NAC may task SACEUR to include possible MROs with his initial assessment. SACEUR would then submit, in one document his SSA and MROs.

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PHASE 3 - DEVELOP MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS
Section 1 - General

3-22. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 3 - MROs - is to develop options for NAC consideration in support of their Political Military Estimate (PME) process. These are courses of action that outline a potential series of increasingly ambitious steps using the different means available to the Alliance to achieve the agreed strategic effects, objectives and the desired end state.

b.   **Overview.** Phase 3 will normally begin with the NAC Decision Sheet requesting options to MC and a MC tasker for MROs to SACEUR. Given the complex interdependent nature of modern conflicts, MROs must be developed with an in-depth understanding of the comprehensive nature of the crisis, keeping in mind that actions in the military domain will also have direct or indirect effects in the non-military domains, and vice versa.

c.   Phase 3 will end with SACEUR submitting MROs to NAC (through MC). MROs have to reflect the graduated response available to the Alliance using different means to create coherent effects along different strategic lines of engagement for each strategic objective. In addition, MROs have to be coordinated with the nominated JFC.

d.   **Prerequisites.** Following submission of SSA to the NAC, through the MC, this phase will normally be initiated by the NAC Decision Sheet requesting options and the MC tasker to SACEUR for the development of MROs. The MC tasker would normally include the chosen strategic approach and level of ambition.

e.   **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 3 - MROs - are depicted in Figure 3.6.

Figure 3.6 - Military Response Options

f.   **Products.** The main product developed by SHAPE during Phase 3 is a set of
MROs outlining military strategic objectives, military strategic effects, strategic actions

and capability requirements, as well as possible complementary non-military effects and actions. A template is provided in Appendix 3 to Annex B.

g. **Desired outcome of this phase.** For this phase to be successful, it must provide the NAC with a series of possible distinguishable options for accomplishing strategic objectives that will achieve the desired endstate conditions.

h. **Organisation Role and Responsibilities.** The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase 3 are similar, but not limited to those in Phase 2 – SACEUR Strategic Assessment:

    (1)   SHAPE Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG).

    (2)   Strategic Analysis Element (SAE).

    (3)   HQ NATO Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF).

    (4)   NATO StratCom Policy Board (SCPB).

    (5)   Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC).

    (6)   Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

    (7)   Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).

    (8)   Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC).

Section 2 - Process

3-23. Review Political Guidance and Direction.

The SOPG initiates the development of the MROs by reviewing any guidance and direction from the NAC, MC and/or SACEUR regarding the overall NATO political aim, desired end state, strategic and military strategic objectives, political limitations and assumptions, as well as the acceptability or preference for any of the alternative strategic approaches.

a. **Analyse Possible NATO End State and Strategic and, if promulgated, Military Strategic Objectives.** The potential NATO strategic objectives and end state may be changed by the NAC during the political military estimate process. The SOPG will review and analyse the latest guidance and update the strategic design as required. The NATO strategic objectives to be achieved by military means, amongst other Alliance sources of power, will form the basis for the military strategic objectives.

b. **Assess Lessons Learned from Similar Previous Operations.** The SOPG should make every effort to incorporate lessons learnt from previous operations. The SHAPE historical office and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) should be consulted and asked to assist with historical analysis.

3-24. Develop Possible MROs.

Based the guidance received from the NAC, MC and/or SACEUR, the SOPG should brainstorm and develop distinguishable responses combining different ways and means to create the

desired military strategic effects that will achieve the military strategic objective(s), the NATO strategic objectives and ultimately the end state. While all MROs will be based on a single desired end state, the mission for each MRO may differ.

   a. **Develop Framework for MROs.[30]** Military Response Options (MROs) should be clearly distinguishable from one another and graduated to reflect NATO's level of ambition with respect to its participation in an emerging crisis. MROs will normally be based on SACEUR's strategic approaches with additional direction/guidance articulated in the NAC's request for the NMAs to develop response options. Each MRO may build on the previous one, to reflect greater levels of possible ambition; however, they will must continue to be based on the single NATO end state. While the number of options to be developed is not limited, three unambiguous and sufficiently detailed options is a good starting point to provide the NAC with clear and realistic options in response to a crisis.

   b. **Analyse the Strategic Military Mission.** Based on their appreciation of the assigned mission, the military strategic objectives and the military strategic effects that a military force must create, the SOPG may determine that different military missions are appropriate to each MRO.

   c. **Analyse and, if required, Determine Military Strategic Objectives.** Proposed military strategic objectives should be provided by the NAC, but at this stage it is still possible to offer alternatives. In developing military strategic objectives, the SOPG should, early in the enumeration of military contributions, consider what they can do in response to a crisis, such as: separate warring parties; enforce compliance with truce/peace agreements and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of illegally armed groups; train, mentor and assist local security forces; contribute to stability and reconstruction, assist in disaster relief and development assistance; and to contain, deter, influence coerce or destroy potential adversaries.

   d. **Determine the Military Strategic Effects to be Achieved by Military Means.** The SOPG analyses potential MROs along strategic lines of engagement to determine precisely the military strategic effects that must be created using military means, including essential support to envisaged non-military efforts, to achieve each strategic objective. By closely examining the critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities identified during the analysis of the COG, as well as the foundation systems, critical system elements and critical influences identified through systems analysis, the SOPG

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[30] A possible alternative intellectual framework is "what NATO **MUST** do", "what NATO **SHOULD** do" and "what NATO **COULD** do". In this framework, each MRO may build on the previous, therefore reflecting greater levels of ambition; however, they continue to be based on a single NATO end state. They must be unambiguous and sufficiently detailed to provide decision makers with clear and realistic options in response to a crisis. These may be understood as follows:
1. The **"MUST"** Option: It is the minimum necessary that NATO should do in response to a crisis, because no other actor or instrument of power alone can deliver the required effects needed to achieve the end state.
2. The **"SHOULD"** option: In addition to what must be done by NATO, supplemented by what may possibly be done by other actors, but should really be done by NATO (for example for reasons of coordination or capabilities).
3. The **"COULD"** option: Reflects the aggregate of the MUST and SHOULD options, plus other activities or contributions which ought to be done by other actors, but which could also eventually be done by NATO because of political or other considerations.

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should be able to clearly state the strategic changes in the capabilities of actors and systems that could be achieved using military means.

e.   **Determine Military Strategic Actions.** Next the SOPG states the military strategic actions that would likely create the desired strategic effect given our understanding of the actor/system. They must provide arguments to conclude that a certain military action directed at a specific actor/system or system element would have the potential to cause the desired effect in terms of changes in its actions, capabilities or condition.

f.   **Determine Required Complementary non-Military Actions.** In many cases the desired strategic effect cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by a combination of complementary military, political, economic and civil actions. The SOPG needs to recognize the right mix of non-military actions that must be taken to create the effect as well as those that would contribute to the overall synergistic effect of military action. Where possible this should be achieved, through liaison with interested significant non-NATO actors. Once identified, these complementary actions will need to be synchronised, or at least de-conflicted with NATO actions. Allies' use of conventional arms control instruments (coordinated by the NAC) should also be taken in to consideration.

g.   **Determine Required Complementary non-Military Actions.** In many cases the desired strategic effect cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by a combination of complementary military, political, economic and civil actions. The SOPG needs to recognize the right mix of non-military actions that must be taken to create the effect as well as those that would contribute to the overall synergistic effect of military action. Where possible this should be achieved, through liaison with interested significant non-NATO actors. Once identified, these complementary actions will need to be synchronised, or at least de-conflicted with NATO actions. Allies' use of conventional arms control instruments (coordinated by the NAC) should also be taken in to consideration.

h.   **Determine StratCom Strategy Requirements.** The SOPG, determines the principal requirements for StratCom to be addressed within the overall StratCom strategy promulgated by HQ NATO as part of the NAC ID or under separate cover. This includes determining:

(1)   Prioritised audiences.

(2)   Potential effects to be achieved through StratCom activities.

(3)   Possible effects in the information environment from military actions.

(4)   Requirements for policy guidance on methods to enable and promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military, governmental, and non-governmental) in the information environment including:

(a)   NATO-wide engagement strategy.

(b)   Approval of interagency information activities.

(c)   Harmonisation of information activities amongst Alliance members and with partners.

(d)   Determination of related information sharing requirements.

(5)   Required forces, assets and resources in support of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations activities, including but not limited to:

(a)   Staffing and funding of a dedicated Media Operations Centre.

(b)   Employment of NATO TV.

(c)   Policy towards embedding of commercial media.

(d)   Staffing and funding of a NATO SecGen SCR office and spokesman in theatre.

(6)   Requirements and provisions for linguistic, cultural and religious expertise.

(7)   Politically imposed StratCom-related constraints and/or restraints.

(8)   Themes to stress and themes to avoid from the political perspective.

i.   **Determine Force Capability Requirements.** With the advice of planning elements from the designated operational commands, the SOPG estimates the primary military capability that would be required to perform the mission and achieve the desired objectives and effects, taking into account the possible resistance by adversaries. They should describe these requirements in terms of the common operational capability codes used by NATO and nations in defence planning to facilitate force generation by nations.

j.   **Determine the Main Logistic and Support Requirements.** Logistic Directorate will provide advice on the main logistics and support requirements for each option to verify feasibility and to facilitate a rough financial estimate. Logistical assessments will include:

(1)   Strategic lift requirements and costs for NATO.

(2)   Theatre logistics requirements for establishing and operating staging bases, air and sea ports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD), storage and distribution of all classes of supply, maintaining lines of communications (LOCs), and developing infrastructure.

(3)   Logistic Support to non-NATO entities.

Budget estimates will be based on a rough order of magnitude appreciation of the financial implications of the different options based on experiences from other missions and database/models. Estimates will identify requirements for common funding in advance of mission approval as part of a package of enabling funding (Initial Enabling Budget Requirements).

k.   **Determine Preliminary Command Arrangements.** The SOPG determines the principal command arrangements required for each option. These will broadly address the following:

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(1)   Proposed theatre of operations[31] required for the conduct or support of the military option.

(2)   Proposed Joint Operations Area (JOA)[32] required for the conduct of operations.

(3)   Essential C2 structure in terms of required operational and component levels of command as well as requirements for forward deployment versus reach back.

(4)   Coordination and liaison requirements with international, governmental and non-governmental entities.

(5)   Rules of engagement required for the use of force.

l.   **Determine Legal Requirements.** LEGAD must review each option to ensure that critical legal requirements are included in the assessment to generate timely action by the NATO Office of Legal Affairs. Specific consideration should be given to requirements for:

(1)   Ensuring an appropriate legal basis for the option, including any additional UN mandates that may be required, especially regarding the use of force.

(2)   Initiating the exchange of letters with respective host nations.

(3)   Arranging country clearance for transit, over flight, staging and basing as required.

(4)   Negotiating Status of Force Agreements (SOFA) and Technical Agreements (TA) with host nations.

m.   **Determine non-NATO Interaction Requirements.** NATO may already have, within the comprehensive approach framework, standing agreements and frequent interactions with some of the international organisations involved in the engagement space. The SOPG will determine the list of significant non-NATO actors and the degree of interaction required with each at the strategic level (mutual awareness, de-confliction, synchronization of effects, coordination or mutual support, etc.). It is essential that HQ NATO be apprised of both the list of international organisations with which planners at the strategic and operational levels will be required to interact and the degree of interaction they estimate will be needed with each. This information should be provided to the MC as part of the assessment. Where necessary, a request should also be

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[31] Theatre of Operations - An operational areas, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations area. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (Proposed definition to be ratified)

[32] Joint Operations Area - A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations (AAP 6).

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included for authorisation to interact with organisations not already on an HQ NATO-approved list[33], or to interact to a degree not previously authorised by the NAC.

3-25. Analyse, Evaluate and Compare MROs.

a. **Analyse Military Response Options.** The SOPG with support from systems analysts and the Red and Green Teams should analyse each MRO. In comparing the different military options, the SOPG should consider:

(1) Inherent advantages and disadvantages in creating the desired effects and achieving the NATO strategic objectives in conjunction with other instruments.

(2) Likely costs compared with expected strategic benefits.

(3) Assessed risks and possibilities for mitigation.

(4) Potential impact on ongoing operations.

b. **Evaluate MROs.** The SOPG's evaluation of MROs includes a subjective assessment of the likely outcomes resulting from the application of the different means and ways within the strategic environment and the interaction with, and between, the different actors. It should also include an objective assessment of each strategic approach in terms of three basic criteria: suitability, feasibility and acceptability.

(1) **Suitability.** The MRO should seek to:

(a) Create the effects required to achieve NATO strategic objectives and to attain the end state;

(b) Avoid creating effects that would undermine the accomplishment of NATO strategic objectives;

(c) Avoid creating effects that would negate the effects sought by significant non-NATO actors who are working toward goals that support or help our own objectives or to achieve conditions that support the aims or goals of the international community;

(d) Cater for foreseeable reactions by the main actors and changes in the strategic environment.

(2) **Feasibility.** The strategic means are likely to be made available by nations, to accomplish the military and complementary non-military actions identified for the given military response option:

(3) **Acceptability.** The potential use of military force will be satisfactory to nations in terms of:

(a) International law.

(b) Moral constraints.

(c) Likely costs and potential risks compared with the expected strategic outcome.

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[33] Based on standing agreements, MoU etc with non-NATO organisations.

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c. **Assess Strategic Risks.** These relate to the possibility and consequences of failure in accomplishing a NATO strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The SOPG should assess strategic risks associated with each option by carefully examining the degree to which military ends, means and ways are balanced with objectives and the potential consequences resulting from potential deficiencies. The risk assessment matrix depicted below provides a tool for conducting a risk assessment in three steps:

(1)   First, the determination of the nature of risks in terms of the possibility something will go wrong and, if so, the severity of the consequences.

(2)   Second, the determination of what can be done to mitigate the risk by limiting the possibility and the consequences.

(3)   Third, reaching a conclusion as to the acceptability of the risk as a basis for recommending whether the option should be retained or eliminated.

Strategic Risk Assessment			
Sources	**Consequence for**	**Severity**	**Probability**
Actions of the opponent(s). Actions of friendly actors. Changes in strategic conditions.	Desired end state. NATO Strategic Objective Military Strategic Objective. Military Strategic Effect.	**Extremely high** - could result failure to accomplish mission. **High** - could result in failure to accomplish one or more objectives. **Moderate** - could result in failure to meet criteria for success. **Low** - minimal impact on mission accomplishment.	High. Moderate. Low.

Risk Management
 	
    Can we neutralise the source?
 	
    Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk?
 	
    Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence?
 	
    Can we reduce the probability of occurrence?			

Conclusion
 	
    Unacceptable - risk management cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level.
 	
    Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to:
 	
        Modify the desired end state and/or strategic objective.
 	
        Increase the availability of strategic means.
 	
        Adjust the ways that military and non-military instruments are applied.
 	
    Acceptable - no risk management actions required.			

d.   **Develop Recommendations.** Based on their analysis, the SOPG should develop their recommendations for SACEUR to present to the MC based on which MRO provides

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the best balance between probability for success, cost-effectiveness and acceptable risks. Recommendations should also address:

(1)   Preconditions for success. Those strategic conditions that must be created at the political level to posture for operational success.

(2)   Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

(3)   Requirements for Crisis Response Measures (CRM).

(4)   Partners' involvement. Whilst this is a political issue handled by the NAC, the SOPG should provide recommendations where this impacts on specific capability requirements or pre-operations training

3-26. Coordinate MROs.

a.   Prior to submitting the draft MROs to SACEUR for his endorsement and submission to the MC, the SOPG will ensure the document is coordinated with the following:

(1)   The designated COM JFC to ensure his concurrence with the proposed MROs, taking into account his operational advice.

(2)   HQ NATO.

(a)   NATO International Staff (IS) Ops, and International Military Staff (IMS) Ops through the Strategic Analysis Element (SAE)

(b)   NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), through the StratCom Policy Board (SCPB), to coordinate mission specific strategic political guidance on StratCom (StratCom Strategy) and master narratives authored by NATO PDD.

(c)   NATO ASG (Assistant Secretary General) Political Affairs and Security Policy, ASG Operations and ASG Public Diplomacy at senior executive levels, through the NATO Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF), if established.

(3)   National Military Representatives at SHAPE (NMRs), to gain an indication of potential force contributions for different options. DSACEUR should conduct informal discussions with nations on the possible availability of forces[34], based on an assessment of likely political will, as well as potential availability derived from usability reporting and known numbers of deployed forces. To inform political decisions, when SHAPE forwards potential strategic options to Council, they should include the rough costs, proposed funding arrangements and a judgement on the likelihood of being able to generate the necessary capabilities.

3-27. Submit MROs.

The SOPG will remain closely engaged with the Strategic Analysis Element to assist them in developing the Political Military Assessment including the drafting of MC considerations,

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[34] Key issue on availability of forces will be the expected duration of the operation.

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conclusions and recommendations. They will also assist the Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF) and/or the Operations Policy Committee (OPC) in drafting the NAC Initiating Directive (NID), the release of which concludes the Political Military Estimate (PME) process that spans Phase 2 and 3 of the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) at the political military level. However, at this point the SOPG may wish to begin drafting a Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) in anticipation of the NAC's decision, to accelerate the process when time is a critical factor.

PHASE 4A - STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) DEVELOPMENT

Section 1 - General

3-28. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4a - Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development is to establish SACEUR's concept for the conduct of the operation for NATO-led military operations, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, based on an overall strategic concept accepted by the NAC to achieve the NATO strategic objectives and conditions required to attain the desired end state.

b.   **Overview.** Phase 4a begins with the receipt of the NAC Initiating Directive (NID) with MC guidance or SACEUR's direction to proceed with contingency planning for a potential future crisis. Phase 4a is divided into two distinct parts: first, issuing a Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) to the designated operational level Commander; and second, development of the Strategic CONOPS, based on the selected response option, including coordination of operational requirements with designated operational commands and political military coordination with HQ NATO. Phase 4a ends with MC endorsement and NAC approval of the Strategic CONOPS and the release of the Provisional Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) to nations.

c.   **Prerequisites.** Phase 4a requires: a NID with MC guidance or SACEUR's direction to proceed with contingency planning; military/intelligence estimate; systems understanding of the environment; and generic NATO policy on the type of anticipated crisis operations. It also requires provisional commitment of nations to provide the required force contributions, host nation support and transit, as required.

Figure 3.7 - Strategic Planning Directive and Strategic CONOPS Development

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 4a - Strategic CONOPS development are depicted in Figure 3.8.

e.   **Products.** The main products developed by SHAPE during Phase 4a are:

(1) **The Strategic Planning Directive** (SPD) is issued to provide authoritative direction to SHAPE and ACO subordinate commands and to direct the JFC's full planning effort. It is a precursor to the Strategic CONOPS. The SPD draws on the previous documents issued by the NAC/MC, SACEUR's Strategic Assessment and the selected MRO, if applicable. The format is provided in Appendix 4 to Annex B. Whilst similar in format to the Strategic CONOPS, the content of the SPD should focus on SACEUR's intent and in providing direction to the operational Commands for the development of operational requirements.

(2) **The Strategic CONOPS** describes SACEUR's concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation, including essential operational requirements, support and C2. The format is based on the template in Appendix 5 to Annex B. The Strategic CONOPS is submitted through the MC to the NAC for approval. It draws on operational aspects through input from the JFC:

(a) **Provisional Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).** The provisional CJSOR provides nations with an early indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to implement the military strategic concept. It is developed in parallel with the CONOPS by the designated JFC based on the requirements of component commands and it includes preliminary deployment information based on the joint commander's required force flow into the theatre.

(b) **Provisional Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR).** The provisional TCSOR identifies capabilities required to support the entire theatre, which should be eligible for common funding.[35]

(c) **Provisional Manpower Requirements/Crisis Establishment (CE).** The crisis establishment identifies personnel required to fill the force C2 requirements.

(d) **CRM Requirements** for implementing additional crisis response measures with justification, state of implementation and risks. This is a continual process with the SOPG monitoring CRMs noting the state of implementation and any associated implications.

(e) **Target sets.** Target sets and, where appropriate, illustrative target categories of time sensitive targets (TST) for each phase of the operation[36].

(f) **ROE.** Specific measures to be implemented with the aim to increase readiness or prepare the deployment of forces.

f. **Desired outcome of this phase.** For this phase to be successful, the following must be satisfied:

(1) Designated JFC(s) are able to complete their Orientation and issue timely guidance to subordinates.

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[35] MCM-0155-2005, Review of Arrangements for Funding NATO Operations, dated Sep 05.
[36] MC-471/1, NATO targeting policy, dated 15 Jun 07.

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(2)   SHAPE and the JFC HQ collaborate effectively in the development of strategic and operational level CONOPS based on clear strategic direction and operational requirements.

(3)   The MC endorses and NAC approves the Strategic CONOPS, including the way in which military strategic means will cooperate and interact with other non-military means within an overall strategy.

(4)   The strategic direction and guidance are sufficient to allow the designated JFC to proceed, in close cooperation with SHAPE, with the development of his OPLAN.

(5)   The provisional Statement of Requirements (SORs) provided to nations adequately describes the required force capabilities and flow into the theatre, including preliminary deployment information, as well as requirements for theatre capabilities and manpower for deploying HQs.

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase 4a are the same as described for Phase 2 and 3. In addition, the NATO CIS Support Agency (NCSA), if not already engaged, should be tasked to provide a liaison to the SOPG.

h.   **External Coordination.** It is essential at this point that arrangement for liaison and coordination is established, as authorised by the NAC, with relevant non-NATO actors.

Section 2a - Process – Strategic Planning Directive

3-29. Initiate Strategic Planning.

a.   **Review NAC Initiating Directive (NID) and MC Guidance.** With receipt of the NID and MC guidance, the SOPG reviews the NAC's political direction and any MC guidance regarding the selected option to confirm those aspects that were derived from SACEUR's Strategic Assessment and evaluate the impact of any changes regarding:

(1)   The NATO desired end state and strategic objectives.

(2)   Political limitations and assumptions (including arms control instruments).

(3)   The legal basis and mandate for the operation.

(4)   The overall comprehensive strategic approach.

(5)   The list of significant non-NATO actors with which SACEUR is authorized to interact during the planning phases of the operation, including the degree of interaction authorized for each.

(6)   The military mission and military strategic objectives.

(7)   The StratCom strategy and mission-specific guidance for Alliance Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations activities.

    (8)   Public Information.

    (9)   Participation of partners and other non-NATO Nations.

    (10)   Authorisation to declare specific Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).

b.   **Update the Planning Milestones and Work Plan.** The NID will typically establish deadlines for the submission of planning products and may also establish other critical timings related to crisis management. Therefore, the SOPG must update its planning milestones and adjust its work plan within SHAPE as well as with subordinate commands and other organisations to make the best use of available time. This quick assessment should help set deadlines for the following as a minimum:

    (1)   Release of Strategic Planning Directive

    (2)   Submission of the JFC's initial concept of operations (CONOPS), CJSOR, TCSOR and Crisis Establishment.

    (3)   Further requests for authorisation to implement specific CRMs as required to prepare and activate specific capabilities

c.   **Establish Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning.** The NID should establish the provisional command structure and requirements for liaison coordination with non-NATO entities. On this basis the SOPG should specify precisely those governmental and non-governmental organisations with which collaboration and coordination is assessed to be crucial and call for any other expertise they may require, such as from NCSA and the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Directorate. Liaison will be required with the following:

    (1)   NATO Crisis Management Tasks Force (CMTF)/Strategic Analysis Element (SAE).

    (2)   Designated international, regional and governmental organisations.

    (3)   Host nation governments and governments of transit countries.

    (4)   Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

Given the nature of NATO information security policy, it is essential that DCOS OPI develop a suitable means for sharing information with relevant international actors.

d.   **Activate and Deploy the OLRT.** Depending on the situation, SHAPE may have already alerted the designated JFC to be prepared to deploy its OLRT. Authorisation to activate and deploy an OLRT is normally given through CRMs and may already have been provided in the NID based on SACEUR's Strategic Assessment. If not, the requirement to deploy an OLRT should be considered by the SOPG and CRMs requested accordingly. Any guidance for tailoring the OLRT as well as its preparation and deployment should be developed by the SOPG, especially the use of deployable CIS, arrangements for initial entry, coordination with host nation Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

3-30. Develop SACEUR's Initial Strategic Intent and Guidance.

a.   **Update the Selected Military Response Option.** Based on their review of the NID and any additional MC guidance, the SOPG should update the selected military

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response option as a basis for developing the SPD. Any issues that require clarification or further guidance are coordinated with HQ NATO through the SAE or CMTF, as appropriate, or presented to the SHAPE CG with recommendations.

b. **Establish SACEUR's Strategic Intent.** SACEUR will have been involved in consultation at the political military level, including discussions with the NATO Secretary General, Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), Military Committee Chiefs of Staffs, NAC Permanent Representatives and possibly ministers and heads of state and government. SACEUR will have a unique understanding of the political military factors that will set the strategic context for the operation.

c. It is of critical importance for SACEUR to clearly articulate his strategic military intent, including the military strategic effects that military forces are to realise, or contribute to, in collaboration with other cooperating international, governmental, and non-governmental organisations to achieve the desired end state. Within the SOPG, prepare advice for SACEUR and seek his strategic vision for the operation. Specific areas to be developed in SACEUR's strategic intent could include:

(1) An assessment of the intentions of adversaries.

(2) Any conditions that military forces must achieve to accomplish NATO strategic objectives and attain the desired end state.

(3) Strategic lines of engagement.

(4) The strategic main effort[37].

(5) Cooperation with other instruments of national or international power.

(6) Critical desired and undesired effects.

(7) Strategic actions to be carried out concurrently or sequentially.

(8) Any political decisions that may be required to deal with contingencies.

(9) Acceptance of risks.

(10) Limitations (any additional constraints or restraints).

(11) Criteria for strategic success.

d. **Develop SACEUR's Strategic Guidance.** The SOPG should also seek initial SACEUR guidance for the further development of the military strategic concept. This guidance should include, among others, the following:

(1) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

(2) Use of the NRF.

(3) CRMs to be requested.

(4) Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

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[37] The primary focal point of an operation established by a commander within his area of responsibility for the deliberate concentration of effects using available resources where and when he deems it necessary to achievement of his objective. (Proposed definition)

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(5)   ROE and the Use of Force.

(6)   Targeting guidance.

(7)   StratCom Framework.

(8)   Public Affairs Guidance.

(9)   Civil-Military interaction and inter-agency coordination.

(10)   Involvement of Partners.

(11)   Critical Timings.

3-31. Review Strategic Design.

a.   **The Strategic Design** provides the overall context for engaging military forces to achieve NATO strategic objectives within a comprehensive approach. The strategic framework is provided in the SPD as a basis for operational planning. It will be further developed by the SOPG collaboratively with the designated JFC during Phase 3 to ensure that all essential strategic conditions are addressed in the Strategic CONOPS when it is subsequently forwarded through the MC to the NAC for approval.

b.   **Describe Military Contribution to Strategic Lines of Engagement.** The SOPG analyses the military strategic objectives in relation to the strategic lines of engagement (see below). It then describes the military strategic effects to achieve those objectives, which are realised through military action, in conjunction with other non-military actions, to achieve NATO strategic objective(s) and the end state.

c.   **Determine the Main Phases of the Strategic Design.** The main phases of the strategic design should reflect the graduated strategic responses for the option agreed by the NAC and the political military level decision points to transition from one phase to the next. However, this does not preclude the possibility for a phase to overlap with another. Each phase should have a clear purpose in creating desired military strategic effects along different lines of engagement and to establish conditions required to achieve the military strategic objectives. The following political military decisions will influence the main phases of the strategic framework:

(1)   Activation of forces in preparation for deployment (NAC Force Activation Directive).

(2)   Authorisation for pre-deployment of enabling forces (Activation Pre-Deployment)

(3)   Execution of an operation including the deployment and employment of forces (NAC Execution Directive).

(4)   Execution of subsequent graduated responses, a branch or sequel plan (NAC Execution Directive).

(5)   Transition and eventual termination of military operations (NAC Execution Directive).

d.   **Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.** Operations assessment planning must remain an integral part of operations planning at strategic and operational

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levels from the outset. Therefore, the SOPG should provide initial guidance to direct the development of operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements. Initial guidance should be provided in the Strategic Planning Directive and developed for Strategic CONOPS. In principle, operations assessment at the strategic level will focus on the following:

(1)   Progress toward the desired end state. This is a qualitative judgement by SACEUR based on available evidence that sustainable conditions are being established, which are leading to a favourable, self-regulating situation.

(2)   Accomplishing military strategic objectives. For each military strategic objective, the SOPG will develop criteria for success that more precisely describes the observable conditions in the theatre of operations that must exist or cannot exist for the objective to have been successfully accomplished.

(3)   Creating military strategic effects. Measures of effectiveness[38] (MOE) are developed by the SOPG for each effect to describe desired specific changes in the behaviour or capabilities of a system or subsystem, which will be used to help establish if desired effects are or are not being created. Operations assessment activities focused on specific MOEs provide useful feedback in assessing whether actions directed at specific systems are creating the effects desired and suggest how actions might need to be adapted to realities on the ground.

(4)   Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are captured and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and strategic success.

3-32. Contribute to the Implementation of NATO's StratCom Strategy.

a.   **Review Strategic Political Guidance.** The NAC will provide mission-specific strategic political guidance on StratCom activities (in the form of a StratCom strategy) as part of the NAC ID or under separate cover. This StratCom strategy will include a Public Diplomacy approach, a PA approach and an InfoOps/PSYOPS approach in accordance with the NATO StratCom policy, to contribute to the achievement of NATO's strategic objectives.

b.   **Develop the Initial Framework for Implementing the StratCom Strategy.** Reflected in the strategic framework and further amplified in respective Annexes to the Strategic CONOPS, ACO's StratCom Framework will detail how ACO intends to implement the military aspects of HQ NATO's StratCom strategy. Within the planning phases of the SOPG, the SCWG will contribute to the implementation of NATO's StratCom strategy by: determining StratCom aims, themes and messages; and developing StratCom tasks matched to audiences that contribute to achieving the desired strategic effects and objectives. They will also determine limitations, operations assessment criteria and provide advice and coordination regarding other military

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[38] Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) - A metric used to measure a current system state. (BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook).

activities affecting the information environment at, and below, the strategic level, including appropriate interagency interfaces. This initial framework is sent as an annex to the SPD (or under separate cover) in order to solicit operational level feedback for inclusion in the StratCom direction and guidance to follow in the Strategic CONOPS, as well as to allow the operational level to begin planning on agreed aspects of the framework immediately.

3-33. Develop and Issue SPD.

a. **Provide Initial Strategic Direction.** Coordinating instructions articulate the requirements and missions for subordinate commands and provide guidance as required to plan and conduct operations. The SOPG develops the SPD, based on SACEUR's initial intent and guidance as well as requirements derived from the strategic framework. Therefore, at this point it is critical to direct the JFC to determine operational requirements that must be reflected in the military strategic concept. The SPD provides the top down guidance needed to generate bottom up requirements which can then be incorporated into the Strategic CONOPS for MC endorsement and NAC approval. Typical areas to be addressed include:

(1) **Missions and objectives for Subordinate Commanders.** Based on the military strategic objectives assigned by the NAC, SACEUR's mission and the strategic design, SACEUR will assign missions and operational objectives to subordinate commanders as a basis for their planning.

(2) **Critical Timings.** The SOPG will provide planning deadlines and key planning events, such as force generation and deployment conferences, as well as critical timings related to the activation of forces, the pre-deployment of enabling forces, initial entry, transfer of authority, etc.

(3) **CRM requirements.** The SOPG should initially direct subordinate commands to develop and justify requirements for the implementation of additional CRMs. As these are generated, the SOPG will include these in the Strategic CONOPS. Operations staff will initiate requests as required. Throughout the planning process, the SOPG must keep account of the CRMs requested and their state of implementation. Where CRMs have only been partially implemented, or delayed, the SOPG must assess the associated risks to the mission.

(4) **SACEUR's CCIRs.** SOPG leads with advice for the development of CCIRs, which will be based on possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions at the strategic level. SACEUR's CCIRs should guide subordinate commands in developing their own CCIRs, Priority Intelligence requirements (PIRs) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(5) **Targeting Guidance.** Based on the NID and any specific national guidance available as well as SACEUR's initial intent and guidance, the SOPG, with advice from Ops/Intel staff (to include Information Operations) and the LEGAD, should provide initial targeting guidance and direct subordinate commands to further determine: the target sets that may be illustrated by example target categories; and, as far as possible, categories of Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs), which could need to be engaged due to the threat that they pose to, or the

opportunity that they would present for, the success of the NATO mission. JFC input will be reflected in the Strategic CONOPS for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

(6)   **Development ROE.** Following their development of targeting guidance, the SOPG should provide initial guidance in the Strategic Planning Directive on the use of military force, including lethal and non-lethal measures. Subordinate commands use this guidance to develop their ROE requirements and justification. The SOPG in turn develops the required ROE into the Strategic CONOPS and provides amplification in Annex E – Rules of Engagement.

(7)   **StratCom.** Based on the framework for implementing the StratCom strategy, as described above, direction to subordinate commands should be given to generate requirements or focus their operational planning. This paragraph provides a general StratCom overview and may refer to specifics contained in an Annex to the SPD (or issued under separate cover). Direction and guidance will cover military support to Public Diplomacy, PA and InfoOps/PSYOPS.

(8)   **CIMIC.** Specific direction to subordinate commands should be given to generate requirements or focus their operational planning regarding civil-military interaction.

(9)   **Force Protection.** The SOPG develops guidance and direction for force protection, focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.

(10)   **Partner Involvement.** In accordance with the NID and SACEUR's initial guidance, the SOPG must provide initial guidance on the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing. These provisions for partner participation will be developed and subsequently described in the Strategic CONOPS.

(11)   **Operations assessment at the Strategic Level.** Operations assessment planning is integral to operations planning. The SPD should provide initial guidance to direct the development of operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements. These will be developed for the Strategic CONOPS. Comment on progress toward the desired end state, accomplishing NATO strategic objectives, measures of effectiveness (MOE) and guidance for capturing strategic lessons should be included.

(12)   **Exit Criteria.** Exit criteria are those self-sustaining conditions that must have been established with respect to specific systems in the engagement space to satisfy international norms and allow operations to be terminated. They are developed and used as a basis for planning the transition and exit from the theatre. Transition planning must ensure that favourable conditions can be sustained as military forces are withdrawn from the theatre.

(13)   **Service Support.** Brief guidance to the overall logistic, movement and host national support (HNS) concepts. Broad order costings should also be included.

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(14) **Military Police.** The SOPG develops guidance and direction for Military Police Operations, focusing on detention and strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.

(15) **Command and Signal.** The SPD provides guidance on the proposed Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area, and requests operational advice on whether they meet requirements. The SPD should give broad order guidance on Command authority in terms of transfer and delegation. Finally, guidance should be provided on external liaison and the conduct of combined operations.

(16) **Communications and Information Concept.** Broad guidance to the JFC on NATO communications systems, networks, support and interaction with external agencies.

b. **Forward Strategic Planning Directive to the JFC.** The SPD, based on SACEUR's intent, provides direction for the JFC, and other supporting commands, to guide the development of the Operational CONOPS. Once SHAPE issues the SPD and the JFC has completed its mission analysis, the SOPG should consider sending a small planning element to the JFC to collaborate during operational concept development to ensure harmonisation between the Operational and Strategic CONOPS.

Section 2b - Process – Strategic CONOPS

3-34. Initiate Development of the Strategic CONOPS.

Unlike the Strategic Planning Directive forwarded to the JFC, the Strategic CONOPS will be submitted to the NAC for approval. It draws on NAC guidance, SACEUR's Strategic Assessment and the selected military response option to provide a full appreciation of the strategic environment. The remainder of the document follows a similar structure to the SPD and incorporates the JFC's main operational requirements for the successful conduct of operations, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces.

Figure 3.8 - Strategic CONOPS

3-35. Coordinate Operational Requirements.

a.   **Collaborate with Operational Command.** Close collaboration is required to ensure that the nominated JFC has as much flexibility as possible in its operational design and concept development within SACEUR's strategic framework. It also ensures

that operational requirements are understood and appropriately reflected in SACEUR's Strategic CONOPS. Collaborative planning tools such as VTC and operational functional services such as Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Systems (TOPFAS) should be used to the extent possible.

b. **Coordinate the development of the Provisional Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).** The development of the CJSOR during crisis response planning is perhaps the most critical step in the development of an executable OPLAN. The CJSOR is presented to the nations by SACEUR and represents his estimate of the minimum military requirement for forces to conduct the operation within acceptable risks. However, it must be developed based on input from the JFCs and their Component Commanders who will conduct the operation.

c. **The CJSOR** ultimately determines the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to accomplish agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment. Therefore, it is critically important that, within the SOPG, the Force Generation team lead in the coordination of the CJSOR with the JFC. The minimum essential information that must be confirmed in the provisional CJSOR are:

(1) Force/capability requirement, including strategic and theatre reserve and any detailed capability requirements.

(2) Echelon that indicates size.

(3) Commander's Required Date.[39]

(4) Required destination.

(5) Priority of arrival.

(6) Command authority to be transferred to the gaining NATO Commander.

d. **Coordinate TCSOR.** At this phase in the planning process, DCOS CPP (Capability Management Directorate) will seek to identify which theatre capabilities meet criteria established in current eligibility guidelines, and which capabilities may require an exceptional decision by the MC and Senior Resource Board (SRB) to attract common funded support. TCSOR requirements are provisionally identified during the development of the Strategic CONOPS and fully coordinated at the conclusion of the Force Generation process. This coordination requires:

(1) Estimating the cost for TCSOR theatre enablers, which are expected to be provided by nations.[40]

(2) Estimating the cost for TCSOR capabilities for which no potential national source is known, which will require outsourcing approval by the MC and SRB.

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[39] Commander's required date - The latest date, calculated from G-day, established by the theatre commander, on which forces are required to be complete in their final destination and organized to meet the commander's operational requirement. (AAP-6). G-day - The day on which an order, normally national, is given to deploy a unit. (AAP-6).
[40] Based on PO (2005)98.

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e.   **Coordinate Manpower Requirements.**   Manpower planning in the SOPG is led by DCOS Spt with contributions from other directorates to identify personnel to fulfil the force C2 requirements by NATO Command Structure (NCS) HQs, NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs, Multinational HQs, NATO Nations and Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTC) including Partner Nations. The product of the manpower planning is the Crisis Establishment (CE).

3-36.   Develop the Strategic Logistic Support Concept.

a.   **Determine the Theatre Logistics Architecture**.   Within the SOPG, the support staff will further develop the theatre logistics architecture based on the NID and SACEUR's initial intent and guidance.   The principal aspects that must be established include:

(1)   Strategic lines of communications.

(2)   Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs).

(3)   Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB), if required.

(4)   Possibilities for host nation support.

(5)   Theatre lines of communications.

b.   **Develop Logistic Roles and Responsibilities.**   Support staff continue to lead in the development of the logistics support concept in coordination with nations during an Initial Logistics Planning Conference which is conducted as early as possible to:

(1)   Inform nations about the strategic logistic concept, including movements, the provision of supplies and medical support.

(2)   Evaluate key factors influencing logistical support.

(3)   Review the proposed logistic C2 structure.

(4)   Determine optimal methods of logistic support arrangements including:

(a)   Multinational joint theatre logistics.

(b)   Host nation support.

(c)   Lead nation and role specialised nation.

(d)   Multinational integrated logistic units.

(e)   Multinational logistics units.

(f)   Multinational integrated medical units.

(g)   Multinational medical units.

(h)   Contractor support.

c.   **Coordinate Host Nation Support (HNS) Arrangements.**   Based on the results of the Initial Logistics Planning Conference, the support staff and LEGAD ensure that essential legal arrangements are in place to allow the support staff to initiate requests for HNS, to summarise requirements and outline the scope of the desired arrangements.

d.   **Coordinate the Deployment and Sustainment Concept.** Within the SOPG and working closely with the designated JFC, support staff continue to lead in the development of the Strategic Logistic Concept as part of the Strategic CONOPS, including the following:

     (1)   Movement concept.

     (2)   HNS concept.

     (3)   Supply and Maintenance concept.

     (4)   Infrastructure Engineering concept.

     (5)   Medical Support concept.

     (6)   Contractor Support.

     (7)   Funding.

     (8)   Manpower.

3-37. Develop the Concept for Command and Control.

a.   **Develop the Concept for Command and Control Arrangements.** The SOPG must review the NID, MC guidance and SACEUR's initial intent/guidance to determine the command and control structure required to conduct the mission within the constraints of the theatre logistic architecture and the communications means available. It is, therefore, important to provide clear guidance and direction on these issues in the SPD, including the JOA and TOO, and allow the JFC to develop his C2 requirements based on his operational concept. These will then be reflected in the Strategic CONOPS for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

b.   **Develop the Communications Concept.** The communications concept developed in the SOPG by CIS staff describes in principle the CIS support for the operation, based on SACEUR's strategic framework and the operational requirements developed by the designated JFC.

c.   **Communications Concept.** Since the C2 structure and the size of the HQs will vary according to the mission, the deployable CIS (DCIS) architecture will be adapted to support C2 arrangements based on operational information exchange requirement (IER) - who needs the information, what the information is, where it comes from and how the information exchange occurs. CIS for the operation will use the existing NATO General Communications Segment (NGCS) and DCIS, as well as nationally provided systems. Communications will be grouped into three levels:

     (1)   **Level 1 - Theatre/StratCom.** Theatre communications will link SHAPE, JFCs, Deployable Joint Staff Elements (DJSEs), CCs and other headquarters when required. Theatre communications link forward deployed HQs and subordinate Commands that are in direct support of the operation. These links are characterised by high volume information flow, security and timeliness in support of command, control, intelligence and support of the forces.

     (2)   **Level 2 - Land, Air, Maritime Communications.** Force-level communications between CCs and their subordinate formations are a CC

responsibility. However, they can have access to secure and non-secure common-user NATO SECRET WAN and NATO UNCLASSIFIED WAN services, recognised air, maritime and common pictures, and intelligence imagery/data systems. Transport of information will occur over NATO or National UHF and SHF SATCOM, commercial SATCOM, UHF tactical SATCOM (TACSAT), HF and U/VHF radio, microwave, and landlines (commercial and military).

(3) **Level 3 - Deployed Unit/National Unit Communications.** Communications within national units are the responsibility of, and organic to, the units themselves. Level 3 CIS will consist primarily of terrestrial links, UHF/VHF or HF radio, as conditions permit and the nations can provide.

3-38. Coordinate and Submit Strategic CONOPS.

a. **Maintain Coordination with HQ NATO.** DCOS CPP must ensure that the SOPG maintains close collaboration and cooperation with HQ NATO IS/IMS through the CMTF and SAE, as applicable. Depending on the nature of the crisis, SHAPE may establish a planning element at HQ NATO to facilitate daily coordination on key issues.

b. **Maintain Coordination with the nominated JFC.** Throughout the CONOPS development, the SOPG will collaborate with the JOPG to ensure that the operational requirements are reflected in the Strategic CONOPS. Normally, the Strategic CONOPS should not be sent to NAC for approval before elements of the operational concept are developed enough to be included.

c. **Coordinate Strategic Military Requirements in NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.** The civil and economic instruments of power reside with nations, including Alliance members, and coordination of these efforts will most likely be carried out under the auspices of the UN or other international organisations such as the EU. Coordination must be made at the political level of NATO to ensure that the efforts of the Alliance are harmonised with non-military efforts. This includes executive level coordination with the CMTF, as well as working level contacts in the SAE. It is also essential that the development of the Strategic CONOPS is synchronised with those plans of significant cooperating non-NATO actors and that this interaction has the support of the NAC. Key areas for confirmation:

(1) Non-military support to military operations.

(2) Military support to non-military efforts.

(3) Logistics support.

(4) Arrangements for military and non-military coordination.

d. **Seek SACEUR's Endorsement.** DCOS CPP will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the Strategic CONOPS for review by the CG and SACEUR's endorsement.

e. **Forward Strategic CONOPS for approval.** Once the CONOPS has been endorsed by SACEUR, it will be forwarded through the MC to the NAC.

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f.   **Forward the Provisional CJSOR to Nations.** DCOS CPP will ensure that the provisional CJSOR is forwarded to nations for information through their National Military Representatives at SHAPE. Formal transmission of the CJSOR will be directed once the NAC issues a Force Activation Directive, which authorises SACEUR to issue an Activation Warning to nations for the forces required in the CJSOR. Details are discussed in the next section.

g.   **Assist the SAE in Developing MC Considerations.** Once the Strategic CONOPS has been forwarded to the MC, DCOS CPP should ensure that the SOPG is proactive in providing any assistance required by the IMS and the SAE in developing MC considerations, conclusions and recommendations.

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PHASE 4B - STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND FORCE GENERATION

3-39. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4b – Strategic Plan development and Force Generation (FG) is first to identify, activate and sustain the forces and capabilities required to implement the Strategic CONOPS and accomplish the mission within acceptable risks. Second, it specifies for MC endorsement and NAC approval the sequence of the strategic activities and operations, including the deployment, employment, sustainment and C2 of NATO-led forces for the accomplishment of the agreed NATO mission, as well as the possible necessary interaction required with cooperating non-NATO entities.

b.   **Overview.**   Phase 4b involves two parallel processes that are interrelated and must be harmonised to ensure that the plan being developed is adequately resourced in terms of the capabilities being generated. Immediately following SACEUR's submission of the Strategic CONOPS, pending NAC approval, Phase 4b begins with plan development to further coordinate the arrangements required to implement the CONOPS. Following NAC approval of the CONOPS and the issue of a NAC Force Activation Directive, FG can be formally initiated by SACEUR to coordinate force activation with member nations, partner and other non-NATO nations designated by the NAC, as required, on behalf of the subordinate command. Plan development and FG are iterative. They are conducted in parallel at the strategic and operational levels to: indentify and confirm national commitments; to balance the force package against mission requirement; and to assess risks from any critical shortfalls. The activation and pre-deployment of enabling forces may also be included. Plan Development ends with a viable strategic plan endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC. FG concludes following the issue of the NAC Execution Directive (NED) with SACEUR ordering the activation of forces and the transfer of authority to the gaining NATO Commander.

c.   **Prerequisites.** Although informal coordination with nations will begin during Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment and Phase 3 – Military Response Options, the formal initiation of FG requires the following:

(1)   NAC guidance on the participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations.[41]

(2)   NAC approval of Strategic CONOPS.

(3)   NAC Force Activation Directive and MC guidance.

(4)   A provisional CJSOR based on the force/capability requirements established by the designated operational Commander.

(5)   Updated status of forces available to NATO.

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[41] The NAC may indicate the desirability for participation by Partners and other non-NATO nations in the Initiating Directive or in the Force Activation Directive.
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d.   **Main Activities.** Figure 3.9 depicts the main activities of FG and how they relate to other phases.

Figure 3.9 - Force Generation Main Activities

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e.   **Products.** The principal outputs from Phase 4b are:

(1)   **Requests for CRMs**. CRMs requests are forwarded by SACEUR through the MC for NAC approval to implement measures required to ensure that capabilities are ready and available to meet potential operational requirements.

(2)   **Activation Warning (ACTWARN) message and Provisional CJSOR.**[42] The ACTWARN is issued by SACEUR to inform nations about the forces required to implement the approved Strategic CONOPS based on the provisional CJSOR.

(3)   **Activation Request (ACTREQ) message and Draft CJSOR.**[43] The ACTREQ is issued by SACEUR to nations to confirm their force contributions to the force package based on the draft CJSOR.

(4)   **Allied Force List (AFL).** The AFL establishes the force package for the operation based on confirmed national contributions.

(5)   **Activation Pre-deployment (ACTPRED) Message.** The ACTPRED message authorises the pre-deployment of enabling forces and TOA to SACEUR, as well as the release of initial NATO common funding.

(6)   **Risk Assessment.** The Risk assessment provides an assessment of strategic and operational risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities.

(7)   **Allied Disposition List (ADL).** The ADL establishes the lines of communications, entry points, arrival sequence, timings, final destination and TOA for each element of the force package entering the theatre.

(8)   **Activation Order (ACTORD) message.** The ACTORD initiates the TOA for national forces to SACEUR, authorises the deployment of NATO forces and the release of necessary NATO common funding.

f.   **Desired outcome of this phase.** FG needs to ensure provision of an adequate force package to provide the right forces, at the right place, at the right time and in the right sequence in accordance with the operational concept. While this depends on nations' decisions, which will be influenced by political considerations, activities by SHAPE should focus on the following additional criteria:

(1)   Force/capability requirements are balanced with the mission, can be supported from forces available to NATO and reflect the level of political will.

(2)   Nations receive force/capability requirements, including planned employment, command relations and preliminary deployment information, to allow timely decisions.

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[42] The provisional CJSOR is developed during Phase 4a – Strategic CONOPS Development and issued to nations during Phase 4b - Strategic OPLAN Development (Force Generation) with the ACTWARN, following the release of the NAC Initiating Directive.

[43] The draft CJSOR reflects national force offers. It is issued with the ACTREQ to nations to formally commit forces to the force package.

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(3)   Information related to national contributions clearly establishes the forces capabilities and command authority to be provided as well as any caveats on force employment.

(4)   Critical shortfalls in force/capabilities required for mission success are identified and filled through force balancing or reported through the MC to the NAC with an assessment of the risks and suggested mitigation possibilities.

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** During Phase 4b, SHAPE FG staff play a central role, under the direction of the SOPG Team Leader, in coordinating force/capability requirements with nations as well as the designated JFC. Close coordination with the SHAPE Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) is required to ensure that deployment information for each force is coordinated with the JFC and provided to nations. The Bi-SC Military Cooperation Division (MIC), collocated with SHAPE, provides a means for coordinating potential force contributions with partners and other non-NATO nations, as authorised by the NAC.

h.   **External Coordination**. External coordination is required with member nations as well as with partners and other non-NATO nations, in accordance with NAC guidance.

3-40. Review Force Requirements, Force Availability and Possible Contributions.

a.   **Update the Status of Forces Available to NATO.** Once the NAC directs SACEUR to develop MROs, it will also issue a request to nations to update the status of their available forces within a given time period (dependent upon the urgency of the situation). The SHAPE FG staff should follow-up on the progress of the nation's activities to update the status of forces available to NATO. Force data should be validated and saved in the NATO common database of forces available to SACEUR. This update should include the following:

(1)   Reminder to nations that updates on the status of land, air and maritime forces available to NATO be submitted in the form of Order of Battle Land, Air and Maritime messages to SACEUR.[44]

(2)   Advise commanders of the NRF on stand-by and the NRF to prepare to update their NRF readiness reporting.[45]

(3)   Request the Military Cooperation Division (MIC) at SHAPE to update Partner Operational Capabilities.

(4)   Request SHAPE support staff to update core logistics database as required.

(5)   Validate and update the common force database of forces available to SACEUR and ensure that it is made available to the SOPG and designated JFCs.

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[44] MC 53/3, Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, authorises SACEUR to request periodic national order of battle reports in peacetime and accelerated order of battle reporting by national authorities during periods of crisis or conflict. Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-20 Volume III establishes the operational information requirements, reporting templates and procedures.
[45] Details of the NRF Readiness Reporting Procedures are laid down in SHAPE COS letter Reference, 1120/SHOPJ/0050/03-99689; Subject, Readiness Reporting Procedures for the NATO Response Force (NRF), dated Nov 03. These procedures were endorsed by the MC in IMSM-0450-04, SC - Readiness Reporting System for the NATO Response Force, Jun 04.

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b. **Review and Refine Force/Capability Requirements.** The development of force/capability requirements is an iterative process that commences with the development of MROs. Requirements, initially stated as force capabilities, are refined during subsequent phases of planning by the JFC and designated component/subordinate commands in terms of specific force types. The SOPG reviews the development of these requirements against the current readiness and availability of forces for NATO to ensure that they remain within realistic limits for the anticipated duration of the operation.

3-41. Coordinate NATO CRMs.

a. **Review Requirements for CRM.** The SOPG should continuously review requirements for CRM to enhance NATO's preparation and readiness, in particular:

A   Manpower

B   Intelligence

D   Force Protection

E   General Operations

I   PSYOPS

L   CBRN Defence

J   Electronic Warfare

K   Meteorology/Oceanography/Hydrography

M   Logistics

O   Forces Readiness

P   Communications and Information Systems

Q   Critical infrastructure and Services

S   StratCom/Public Affairs

b. **Process CRM Requests and Track Implementation.** Based on their appreciation of requirements identified during planning, as well as any requests from the designated JFC, functional area representatives within the SOPG should develop requests within their areas of responsibility and provide the necessary operational justification for MC endorsement. Upon NAC approval, SACEUR issues a Declaration Message and nations respond with an NCRS Implementation Report reflecting national implementation decisions. The SOPG Strategic Operations Centre representative should use the automated NCRS Tracking Application to assist with tracking the status of implementation by nations.

3-42. Initiate Force Activation.

a. **Contribute to the Preparation of the NAC Force Activation Directive.** The SOPG should provide advice and input to the MC in the drafting of Force Activation Directives to ensure that the following requirements are adequately addressed:

(1)   Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

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(2)   Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate with Partners and other non-NATO Nations for force contributions.

(3)   Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate host HNS arrangements.

(4)   Specific guidance on the deployment of forces and Transfer of Authority[46] (TOA).

b.   **Finalise the Provisional CJSOR.** The SOPG will validate the JFC CJSOR inputs and develop SACEUR's provisional CJSOR for approval and release by DSACEUR. The provisional CJSOR represents the most cost effective force package required to accomplish the mission within acceptable risks.

c.   **Issue the ACTWARN.** The SOPG should assist the FG representative in drafting the ACTWARN message to ensure that it provides the essential information required by nations to determine national force contributions.[47] It should also establish arrangements for coordinating national contributions including the scheduling of a FG conference, if required, and the submission of national FORCEPREP messages. The ACTWARN, provisional CJSOR, CE and TCSOR are transmitted using the Allied Information Flow System (AIFS) and the AIFS Integrated Message System (AIMS) to establish the release authority by SACEUR and confirm receipt by nations.

3-43. Coordinate National Offers and Request Forces.

a.   **Review National Force Offers.** Nations should acknowledge receipt of the ACTWARN and, depending on the circumstances, respond with either informal force offers or a formal FORCEPREP identifying force commitments to fill specific serials on the CJSOR. National offers and commitments are consolidated and reviewed against the overall requirements, as a basis for developing and coordinating proposals with nations to eliminate redundancies and fill shortfalls.

b.   **Conduct Formal Coordination with Nations.** Formal bilateral coordination with nations will be required to clarify and confirm offers and commitments as well as to discuss proposed adjustments. The SOPG must determine the requirements and scheduling of conferences for multilateral coordination of forces, manpower and theatre capabilities required for the operation.

c.   **Prepare and Conduct a FG Conference.** The purpose of the FG conference is to establish national commitments to provide the forces, capabilities and manpower called for in the provisional CJSOR. The conference is prepared by the SOPG FG representative and chaired by DSACEUR. It requires participation from potential Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), as well as the designated JFC and his subordinate/component commands. The SOPG must decide whether it is appropriate to include members, partners and other non-NATO nations in a single conference or to conduct separate conferences.

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[46] Transfer of Authority. Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command. (AAP-6).
[47] Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-20, Volume III, Section 14 (ACTWARN).

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d.   The FG conference typically begins with a review of the concept of the operations, as approved by the NAC, and then addresses the force capability requirement described in each serial of the CJSOR to confirm which nation(s) will commit to providing the required force capabilities. The opportunity for negotiation, both in and out of session, requires that the SOPG prepare any issues with DSACEUR in advance. The conference result is a draft CJSOR with national commitments for each serial, which sets the stage for the Initial Logistics and Movements Conferences that are typically convened immediately following the FG conference. Coordination of required manpower and theatre capabilities can be accomplished during the conference or separately.

e.   **Issue the Activation Request (ACTREQ).** Based on national commitments established in the draft CJSOR, the FG representative prepares the ACTREQ requesting nations to formally commit to the force package in the draft CJSOR, and to identify the forces that they intend to provide by sending a force preparation (FORCEPREP) message initially, followed by the required ORBAT force data to SACEUR by a specified date. The ACTREQ should also provide instructions for confirmation of manpower and theatre capabilities. The SOPG should provide input as required to the ACTREQ, including the following:

(1)   Deployment requirements.

(2)   Command Relationships (related to Transfer of Authority (TOA)).

(3)   ROE (in effect for the deployment phase).

(4)   Preparations.

(5)   Public Affairs Guidance.

3-44. Activate Enabling Forces for Pre-Deployment.

a.   **Review Requirements for the pre-Deployment of Enabling Forces.** When there is an urgent requirement to establish an early NATO presence in the theatre, the NAC may authorise the pre-deployment of enabling forces[48] as soon as they are available and prior to the NAC approval of the OPLAN and NAC Execution Directive. This requirement should have been identified during the development of strategic response options and addressed in the NAC Initiating Directive or during operational orientation by the designated JFC. In any case SACEUR should ensure that requirements are reflected in the Force Activation Directive, addressed in the ACTWARN, coordinated with nations during the FG conference and, finally, included in the ACTREQ. Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling forces typically include:

(1)   Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

(2)   Special operations.

(3)   CIS.

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[48] Enabling forces – those forces required at beginning of an expeditionary operation to establish conditions required for the early and rapid entry of the main force into the theatre of operations and deployment within the JOA. (Proposed definition to be ratified).

      (4)   Security of lines of communications, entry points and lodgement areas.

      (5)   Reception, staging and onward movement of forces.

      (6)   PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS.

      (7)   Civil-military cooperation.

      (8)   Logistics and contracting support.

b.   **Request Enabling Forces for pre-Deployment.** Based on commitments coordinated with nations and specific requirements established in the ACTREQ, contributing nations should respond by identifying in their Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) messages those enabling forces they are prepared to deploy into the theatre in advance of an Activation Order.

c.   **Direct Activation Pre-deployment (ACTPRED).** Once the NAC has authorised SACEUR to deploy enabling forces to the theatre, the SOPG prepares the ACTPRED message for approval and release by SACEUR.

3-45. Assess Force Contributions and Balance the Force Package.

a.   **Process National Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) Messages.** Nations respond to the ACTREQ with FORCEPREP messages which provide detailed information regarding the forces they will contribute to the force package, including the readiness status, planned command relationships and any caveats on employment. They should also provide updated ORBAT force data.

b.   **Prepare and Issue the Draft Allied Force List (AFL).** The SOPG's FG representative will consolidate the nations' force contributions as reported in their FORCEPREP messages and produce the AFL for the entire force package. It should be reviewed by the SOPG to identify shortfalls and issued to the designated JFC for assessment. The force package data will be used during plan development and therefore must adhere to NATO information standards so that it can be shared among different HQs and used with automated operations and logistics functional services.

c.   **Balance the Force Package.** Based on their assessment of the impact of any capability shortfalls, the SOPG may initiate further bilateral coordination or recommend a further force balancing conference to address shortfalls with nations. The aim of force balancing is:

      (1)   To balance the force package against the mission requirements within acceptable risks.

      (2)   To balance the operational, support and C2 elements to allow efficient and effective employment.

Therefore, a deliberate cross-functional review of the entire force package with the designated JFC and subordinate/component commands may be required to identify any issues and develop recommendations for DSACEUR's consideration and presentation to the TCNs. The resulting force balancing decisions may require additional ACTREQ and FORCEPREP messages, as well as changes to the Allied Forces List (AFL).

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d. **Assess Strategic and Operational Risks from Shortfalls in Critical Capabilities**. The COM JFC should provide his assessment of the operational risks resulting from any critical shortfalls following force balancing. The SOPG must also assess the strategic risks related to capability shortfalls and the strategic risks associated with potential lack of progress in the non-military domains. The SOPG will then provide their recommendations to DSACEUR as to whether these risks are acceptable along with the possibilities for mitigation. If risks are not acceptable with mitigation, then SACEUR must be prepared to refer those considered to be unmanageable to the MC and eventually the NAC as a precondition for approval of the OPLAN.

3-46. Coordinate Integration of Non-NATO Forces.

a. **Review Requirements for Integrating Forces from Partners and non-NATO Nations.**[49] The NAC ID should provide an initial indication of the NAC's[50] desire to allow participation by partners and other non-NATO nations and may authorise SACEUR to coordinate directly with designated nations. The subsequent NAC Force Activation Directive (FAD) should clearly state those partners and other non-NATO nations to be included in the force activation process and the degree of Information and Intelligence Sharing (I&IS). These nations are kept informed through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Bi-SC MIC at SHAPE. They are notified of requirements by the ACTWARN and ACTREQ messages and may be invited to attend FG and force balancing conferences.

b. **Review and Advise on Initial Force Offers from non-NATO Nations.** The FG representative informs the SOPG and the JFC of initial offers received from non-NATO nations. The SOPG should consider these offers and develop advice to DSACEUR to recommend:

(1) MC initial certification of forces and inclusion of nations in the FG process, or

(2) Force evaluation and certification, as a prerequisite for further consideration, or

(3) If force offers are not to be further considered at this point.

c. **Arrange for Certification of non-NATO Force Contributions.** The SOPG must assess the specific requirements for the evaluation and certification of non-NATO force offers and develop arrangements for the conduct of evaluations by ACO or member nations. These evaluations should determine the suitability and acceptability of these force offers and provide the basis for SACEUR's recommendation to the MC to finally certify these forces as part of a NATO-led force. To the extent possible, the existing Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F) Programme should be used as the basis for certifying Partner forces. Arrangements will be

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[49] Refer to MC 567.
[50] Offers by partners and other non-NATO nations must be certified initially by SACEUR and determined by the NAC to be politically acceptable as preconditions for a formal invitation by the NATO Secretary General to contribute to the operation.

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documented in Annex GG of the strategic plan. Certification should take account of the following:

    (1)   Suitability of the force to meet specific CJSOR capability requirements.

    (2)   Interoperability with NATO forces, including communications security.

    (3)   Readiness for deployment to the theatre and employment in the JOA.

    (4)   Sustainability by the contributing nation.

d.   **Establish Coordination and Liaison with ACO HQs.** Once non-NATO force offers have been certified formal letters of agreement will be signed between NATO and the respective nations. The SOPG should be prepared to assist in specifying any particular requirements regarding the participation of these non-NATO nations in the operation, including any command and control, legal, financial and information security arrangements. In addition, the SOPG should coordinate the required provision of liaison officers to SHAPE and ACO subordinate HQs, as required.

3-47. Integrate Forces with OPLAN Development.

a.   **Review Requirements for Integrating Force.** FG will typically be conducted in parallel with OPLAN development at both the strategic and operational levels. The Allied Forces List (AFL) provides information regarding force capabilities and limitations, including any caveats on employment, as well as their support requirements. Operational planning by the JFC will focus on the deployment and logistical support of forces within the theatre and their operational employment within the JOA. Strategic planning will focus on the strategic aspects of deployment, C2, intelligence, cooperation with other non-military means, sustainment and communications.

b.   **Coordinate the ADL.** The ADL establishes the time-phased flow of the force package's force components into the theatre and to the final destination in their designated areas of operations, including air and sea ports of debarkation as well as the transfer of command authority to the gaining NATO force Commander. It provides the basis for all deployment, sustainment and C2 planning for the operation and is included in Annex A of the strategic plan. The ADL requires multi-level cross-staff coordination including the following functional areas:

    (1)   Operations.

    (2)   Movements.

    (3)   Logistics.

    (4)   Communications and information systems.

    (5)   Legal.

c.   **Issue the Coordinated ADL.** The coordinated ADL should be approved by DSACEUR and released to nations as well as ACO subordinate commands as a common basis for strategic and operational level plan development. Ideally, the ADL should be issued as an electronic data file based on common information standards to allow rapid processing using automated functional services for operations and logistics planning.

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d. **Maintain Configuration Control of the ADL.** The SOPG must establish and maintain configuration control of the ADL by coordinating and validating proposed changes that may result from further force balancing actions as well as planning with nations and ACO subordinate commands. Changes must be published in revised versions of the ADL and transmitted using the Allied Information Flow System (AIFS)/AIFS Integrated Message Systems (AIMS) to confirm receipt.

3-48. Activate Forces for Deployment.

a. **Issue the ACTORD.** Once the Strategic OPLAN is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the NAC can issue an Execution Directive to initiate the execution of the operation. This provides the authority for SACEUR to issue an ACTORD message to all participating nations and commands, which initiates TOA of national forces to SACEUR, the deployment of NATO forces and the release of NATO common funding. The SOPG assists the SOC in the preparation of the ACTORD to ensure that any critical information is included, such as:

(1) Deployment of forces will be coordinated by the AMCC and conducted in accordance with SACEUR's Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP).

(2) Specifying conditions for TOA of forces to SACEUR on arrival in theatre.

(3) Release of common funding.

(4) Rules of engagement within the theatre.

(5) Public affairs/media policy/military information campaign in effect.

b. **Process ORBATTOA Messages from TCNs.** Upon receipt of the ACTORD, nations should respond by sending an ORBATTOA message to SHAPE to transfer the requested command authority to SACEUR and delegate authority to the gaining command. The SOC will pass ORBATTOA messages to the gaining JFC and track TOA to ensure that all forces are brought under NATO command authority.

PHASE 4B (Continued) - STRATEGIC OPLAN DEVELOPMENT

3-49. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of this part of Phase 4b - Strategic OPLAN Development is to specify, for MC endorsement and NAC approval, the sequence of strategic activities and operations, including the deployment, employment, sustainment and C2 of NATO-led forces for the accomplishment of the agreed NATO mission and the possible interaction required with cooperating non-NATO actors.

b. **Overview.** Phase 4b continues after SACEUR's approval of the Strategic CONOPS, pending NAC approval, and the identification of the force package. It includes further development and coordination of the arrangements required to implement the strategic concept, including legal agreements, deployment, force protection, information strategy, sustainment, C2, training support and certification, campaign assessment and the termination of military operations in the theatre. ACO Functional Planning Guides (FPGs) provide detailed guidance for functional planning and the development of respective annexes. Phase 4b ends with MC endorsement and NAC approval of the Strategic OPLAN.

c. **Prerequisites.** The following are required to initiate Phase 4b - Strategic OPLAN Development:

(1) Strategic CONOPS, pending NAC approval.

(2) AFL[51] with any caveats.

(3) SACEUR's guidance for mitigating risks from capability shortfalls.

(4) Arrangements for collaboration with contributing and host nation(s), HQ NATO and operational commands.

(5) Response to SACEUR's ROE request.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities for Phase 4b are depicted in Figure 3.10.

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[51] The draft CJSOR with national force commitments is sufficient to allow plan development to proceed pending receipt of the Allied Force List issued by SHAPE.

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
Figure 3.10 - Strategic OPLAN Development Main Activities

e.   **Products.** Depending on the planning category, the output will be a strategic plan with the required annexes, as follows:

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(1)   The product of Crisis Response Planning is an executable Strategic OPLAN, with supporting legal agreements.

(2)   The product of Advance Planning may be a strategic level -

(a)   Contingency Plan (COP),

(b)   Generic Contingency Plan (GCOP), or

(c)   Standing Defence Plan (SDP).

f.   Plans are prepared in accordance with the instructions and format for the plan main body and annexes/appendices as outlined in Annexes B and C.

g.   **Desired outcome of this phase.** Given the planning category and urgency of the planning requirement, Phase 4b - Strategic Plan Development must meet the criteria for timeliness and adequacy as follows:

(1)   Timeliness.

(a)   Planning products are produced in time to allow subordinates to initiate and complete required planning and preparation.

(b)   Essential strategic planning aspects are covered in the plan.

(c)   Planning and execution are integrated incrementally as required.

(2)   Adequacy.

(a)   The legal framework, including an international mandate and status of forces agreements, as well as arrangements with host nations and nations allowing transit, are established and satisfy mission requirements.

(b)   Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum military requirements for mission accomplishment within acceptable risk.

(c)   Ensures the flow of forces into the theatre supports the operational Commander's scheme of manoeuvre.

(d)   Command and control arrangements, including liaison and coordination with NATO and non-NATO actors, as well as CIS and ROE, allow effective integration and employment of forces to accomplish military strategic objectives. This includes the establishment of mechanisms to share information with relevant non-NATO actors while preserving operations security.

(e)   Provisions for theatre support and sustainment meet operational requirements.

(f)   Contingency planning requirements have been identified and prioritised to cover assessed risks.

h.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The SOPG is responsible for accomplishing the main activities in Phase 4b - OPLAN development. The SOPG will adjust its liaison and planning elements with other HQs as required, and will typically be supported by the following:

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(1)   AMCC, for deployment planning.

(2)   Allied Logistics Centre (ALC), for logistics planning.

(3)   Bi-SC MIC, for coordination with partners and other non-NATO nations as authorised by the NAC.

i.   **External Coordination.** The SOPG requires coordination with the following:

(1)   NATO IS and IMS planners, including CMTF and/or MC SAE when activated.

(2)   The supported JFC and supporting commands.

(3)   Troop contributing nations, including members, partners and other non-NATO nations in accordance with NAC guidance. This may be accomplished through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and or the MIC.

(4)   Cooperating non-NATO entities as designated or authorized by the NAC, including international, governmental and non-governmental organisations.

(5)   IFC for intelligence support through DCOS OPI.

3-50. Initiate OPLAN Development.

a.   **Review Strategic Planning Requirements.** The focus of the SOPG should be on integrating and synchronising military actions, including those of the supported JFC and other supporting NATO commands and agencies, with non-military actions by NATO and non-NATO actors within a comprehensive approach. The aim must be twofold:

(1)   First, to ensure that required strategic resources, capabilities and supporting activities are coordinated and arranged to allow operational success by the designated JFC within the JOA.

(2)   Second, to ensure that these activities are synchronised with supporting and/or supported activities by other relevant actors within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

b.   Responsibilities must be clearly established for operations in the theatre that are external to the JOA, including rear areas, the communications zone and strategic lines of communications, as required. Therefore, the SOPG should focus on strategic and theatre-level planning requirements associated with, but not limited to, the following:

(1)   Coordination of military activities in theatre with supporting/supported activities by non-NATO actors within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

(2)   Employment of strategic resources – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, deterrence, StratCom, targeting, theatre and strategic reserves, civil-military interaction, etc.

(3)   Command and Control – delegation and transfer of authority, areas of responsibility, coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, operations assessment at the strategic level, etc.

(4)   Force preparation and sustainment – training, evaluation and certification, theatre logistical support, capability development, force rotation, etc.

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(5)   Strategic deployment – movements architecture, coordination and de-confliction of transportation resources, operation of strategic lines of communications (LOCs) and ports of debarkation, etc.

(6)   Force Protection - strategic lines of communications, staging areas, theatre entry points and the communications zone, etc.

c.   **Provide Guidance and Direction.** The SOPG Team Leader should review any issue raised in SACEUR's review of the Strategic CONOPS and the JFC's operational CONOPS. He should seek command guidance as required and convene the SOPG to accomplish the following:

(1)   Establish the schedule for strategic plan development to include:

(a)   Submission, review and coordination, and revision of initial drafts.

(b)   External review and coordination with other HQs.

(c)   Final staffing for SACEUR's approval.

(2)   Review the status of political military developments at the MC and NAC.

(3)   Review the strategic concept.

(4)   Confirm strategic planning requirements.

(5)   Review requests from the supported JFC and supporting commands.

(6)   Address issues raised by SACEUR.

(7)   Review coordination required with relevant non-NATO actors, including security issues linked to information, knowledge and intelligence sharing.

(8)   Establish arrangements for handing over the plan to Operations staff for execution.

d.   **Review the Status of Planning.** Plan development at the strategic level depends on critical planning actions by HQ NATO and participating nations, as well as input from the designated JFC and relevant non-NATO actors. It requires that close coordination and liaison be maintained with these different HQs and nations, especially during the FG process in order for the SOPG to remain abreast of developments and raise issues requiring further attention. Critical areas that directly impact on plan development, particularly during crisis response planning, include:

(1)   **Legal Arrangements.** Legal requirements for the operation should have been identified with the strategic military response options and further specified in the Strategic CONOPS. The LEGAD representative in the SOPG must be proactive in working with the NATO Legal Advisor to ensure that these previously identified essential legal arrangements are being put in place and report the status to the SOPG.

(2)   **StratCom.** The StratCom strategy was developed at HQ NATO by the StratCom Policy Board (SCPB) and issued with the NAC ID (or under separate cover). It provides political level direction and guidance required to ensure coherent military StratCom planning. It is adapted in the military planning and

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execution guidance contained in the StratCom Framework developed by the SCWG at SHAPE and issued to the JFC. Any changes in the StratCom strategy by HQ NATO must be immediately noted and incorporated in the Strategic OPLAN. Any considerations resulting from JFC's review of the StratCom Framework equally must be immediately noted, evaluated, and incorporated into the strategic plan as appropriate. Additionally, NAC approval of StratCom guidance in the main body of the CONOPS and the PSYOPS and Info Ops annexes is critical to moving forward with pre-deployment tasks.

(3)   **Targeting.** The SOPG should update the status of NAC targeting guidance (and caveats) and approval of the target sets and illustrative target categories identified by SACEUR in his Strategic CONOPS to allow detailed planning to proceed in line with political guidance.

(4)   **ROE.** The ROE request should have accompanied the Strategic CONOPS to support the JFC requirements for the potential use of force in the accomplishment of the mission. The SOPG should review the status of the ROE authorised by the NAC and delegated to the JFC.

(5)   **Planning by Subordinate and Supporting Commands.** The SOPG should be updated on the status of planning by the designated JFC and supporting commands, with particular attention to:

(a)   The status of CONOPS/plan development.

(b)   Coordination of supporting/supported requirements.

(c)   Issues and concerns for SACEUR and/or HQ NATO.

(d)   Requirements for additional assistance, expertise and/or liaison for their planning.

(e)   Coordination with designated relevant non-NATO actors.

e.   **Planning with Relevant non-NATO Actors.** Plan development will likely require detailed coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, as authorised by the NAC. It is important to review planning requirements, the current status of planning and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate coordination, including the delineation of responsibilities between SHAPE and the designated JFC.

f.   **Review the Status of FG.** FG activities will be ongoing in parallel with other planning activities. FG representatives should update the SOPG on progress in filling the provisional CJSOR to facilitate plan development and the timely identification of force balancing issues and associated risks. As they become available, FG products should be shared within the SOPG and other planning groups to track the status of national commitments in the draft CJSOR, the identification of forces in the AFL, and the resolution of force shortfalls.

g.   **Arrange for OPLAN Handover.** During OPLAN development, the SOPG should be reinforced by staff from the SOC, who will assume responsibility for execution. Arrangements should be made to ensure continuity between planning and execution across all functional areas. This must balance the requirements for those who developed

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the plan to oversee its execution with the need to continue planning during the conduct of operations.

3-51. Develop International Legal Arrangements.

a. **Confirm Legal Requirements for the Operation.** The further development of the plan and its eventual execution require that international legal provisions are in place. These typically include the SOPG review of the following:

(1) The international mandate.

(2) Status of forces with host nations in the theatre.

(3) Legal agreements on transit, basing and support of forces and the use infrastructure and facilities.

b. **Review the International Mandate for the Mission.** The mandate for the mission may already exist in the form of a UN Security Council Resolution. However, it may be the case that a new UN Resolution may be required to authorise the use of force not covered under Article 51[52] of the UN Charter. The SOPG Team Leader must monitor progress in establishing the required mandate with the International Affairs Advisor (INA) and LEGAD, and be prepared to assist in drafting and/or reviewing draft resolutions to ensure they cover the essential requirements for the use of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

c. **Establish or Review Status of Forces Agreement(s) (SOFA).** SOFAs are required with individual countries to establish the legal status of forces as they enter and operate within the theatre. Where there is no recognised legal government, a UN mandate must establish the legal status. On behalf of NATO, SOFAs are negotiated by the HQ NATO Legal Advisor based on operational requirements developed by the SOPG LEGAD in coordination with the designated JFC. They should be in place prior to entry into the theatre of NATO-led forces. In lieu of a formal SOFA, an "exchange of letters" with respective political authorities must as a minimum provide for the following:

(1) Transport of arms and ammunition.

(2) Carrying of individual weapons.

(3) Use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum.

(4) Control of airspace.

(5) Use of lethal and non-lethal force.

(6) Legal responsibility of the TCNs.

d. **HNS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).** An MOU is the foundation document in the HNS planning process. The MOU represents the formal establishment of overarching principles for the provision of HNS between the SC, the TCN(s) and the HN, and establishes the basis for follow-on HNS documents. The MOU must be negotiated by

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[52] Article 51 in Chapter VII of the UN Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

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SHAPE with the respective host nation(s) on behalf of the JFC and TCNs following the SOFA or exchange of letters. It should support the operational needs of the JFC and therefore requires SOPG input. The process is led by DCOS Spt in coordination with LEGAD and Provost Marshal.

e. **Develop follow-on HNS Agreements.**

(1) Technical Agreement (TA). TAs will be developed at the JFC level to amplify the concept and procedures for the provision of HNS common to all participants.

(2) Joint Implementation Arrangement (JIA). JIAs will be developed at the tactical level and they will include financial obligations, serving as the fundamental "contracts" between the HN and TCNs for provision of specific HNS.

3-52. Synchronise Military and non-Military Activities within a Comprehensive Approach.

a. **Confirm Interaction with other NATO and Relevant non-NATO Actors.** Depending on the degree of coordination authorised and achieved with other NATO and relevant international actors, it is critical that the SOPG confirm more precisely the specific areas for interaction and activities which, based on a common agreement of the purpose, require synchronisation. The CMTF and EADRCC may provide suitable venues for coordination. Alternatively, the SOPG will have to develop arrangements for scheduling coordination conferences or providing facilities at SHAPE for collaboration.

b. **Coordinate Supported/Supporting Relationships with other NATO and Relevant International Actors.** The SOPG must establish in principle the complementary supported and supporting relationships and agree the nature of the support to be provided as well as any mechanisms for coordination. It may be necessary to develop memoranda of understanding or letters of agreement to establish a more formal basis for cooperation in the theatre.

3-53. Plan for the Employment of Strategic Resources.

a. **Review Planning Requirements for Employment of Strategic Resources.** Recognising that the designated JFC is responsible for the employment of joint forces within the JOA, strategic level planning should focus on integrating and synchronising the employment of strategic resources external to the JOA and in support of the JFC that will allow operational success. Planning must be closely coordinated with the supported JFC as well as contributing nations, supporting commands and non-NATO entities as required. Planning should address, but should not be limited to, the following:

(1) Strategic and theatre level intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

(2) Strategic containment, deterrence, coercion or attack.

(3) StratCom.

(4) Targeting.

(5) Integration of non-military instruments.

(6) Theatre and strategic reserves.

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b. **Plan Strategic and Theatre Level Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).** In any operation, especially an expeditionary operation, there will be a requirement to improve situation awareness within the theatre. This leads to requirements for the advance deployment of ISR sensors, such as NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW), to the theatre, as well as requesting the deployment or positioning of national capabilities required for the development of theatre intelligence. The SOPG should review and update SACEUR's Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and refine Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRS) with the supported JFC to plan and, if need be, request activation and pre-deployment of ISR assets. Planning must provide for C2, support and protection of ISR once deployed.

c. **Plan Strategic Enabling, Containment, Deterrence, Coercion or Attack.** The SOPG is responsible for planning the integration and synchronisation of NATO military activities with non-military actions by NATO and cooperating relevant international actors to implement SACEUR's strategic concept. These activities in principle will be external and complementary to operations by the supported JFC within the JOA and therefore require close coordination with the JFC planners, particularly with regards to C2 and support within the theatre. They are typically developed to isolate the JOA from adverse influences and to achieve favourable conditions for the theatre among nations adjacent to the JOA as well as others engaged in the theatre.

(1) Strategic integration and synchronisation of military and non-military actions may be required to:

(a) Enable – provide assistance and support to:

(i) Nations adjacent to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to provide operational support to NATO operations and to prevent attacks by illegally armed groups and the flow of arms from their territory.

(ii) International organisations and nations external to the theatre for post-conflict security sector reforms, stabilisation and reconstruction.

(b) Contain – prevent threats or acts of aggression or armed violence in adjacent areas from spreading within the theatre and into the JOA.

(c) Deter – to convince potential opposing forces that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains.

(d) Coerce – threaten or actually employ force to enforce sanctions required to compel adversaries to comply with the international mandate as a condition for subsequent operations in the JOA.

(e) Destroy/neutralise – employ lethal and non-lethal force to eliminate the military capacity of an adversary to carry out the international mandate.

d. **Develop Strategic Targeting.** The SOPG develops strategic targeting requirements and identifies priority targets as an integral part of planning the strategic

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activities. Targets are selected from available databases[53] based on an understanding of key elements and nodes in specific systems that must be influenced to further attack or exploit critical vulnerabilities in the COG of an adversary. It requires that the SOPG identify high-value targets and select those that offer the greatest payoff in terms of creating the required strategic effects. Coordination with nations is required to develop a single integrated database for the theatre that supports the development and maintenance of Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) by the supported JFC and prioritised strategic targets by SHAPE.

e. **Plan Strategic/Theatre Reserves.** The strategic concept should have identified the requirement for strategic or theatre reserves that typically remain on call out of the theatre. Further planning will be necessary with the supported JFC to determine more precisely the level of readiness required for deployment based on possible contingencies. These requirements and arrangements for activation as well as in theatre reconnaissance and rehearsals should be addressed with contributing nations.

f. **Integrate Military and non-Military Instruments.** The SOPG must confirm the actions of other cooperating entities that should be integrated and synchronised with NATO military actions within the theatre. On this basis the SOPG should establish suitable mechanisms on behalf of the supported JFC for coordination and the exchange of information in theatre.

3-54. Plan StratCom.

a. **Review Requirements for StratCom.** StratCom must be an integral component of planning based on the mission-specific StratCom strategy adopted by the NAC. NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy (ASG PDD) oversees the formulation of the StratCom strategy through the SCPB, which includes representation from SecGen's Private Office, PDD, NATO Spokesman, IMS StratCom, both StratCom and JFCs (as needed). Therefore, it is critically important that the SOPG be proactive in providing the necessary planning support in line with the strategic concept and in coordination with the supported JFC. Planning for StratCom, supported by the SCWG should include the following:

(1) Review NATO strategic and military strategic objectives and effects and assess the impact of military actions on the information environment.

(2) Further develop narratives, themes and master messages for different audiences.

(3) Determine StratCom aims and match to audiences and targets for StratCom effect.

(4) Establish responsibilities and arrangements for military support to Public Diplomacy, PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS.

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[53] Knowledge development should identify available information sources and databases that provide the level of detail required to support targeting, including national databases such as the U.S. Modernised Integrated Database (MIDB), which may be combined to produce a single Integrated Database (IDB) for the theatre.
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(5)   Develop criteria for the assessment of StratCom activities and the impact of military activities on the information environment.

(6)   Coordinate StratCom activities with non-military and non-NATO entities.

(7)   Ensure limitations are taken into account.

(8)   Assess risks to achievement of the StratCom strategy and develop mitigation actions.

(9)   Identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and/or political importance, including but not limited to Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and counter-propaganda.

b.   **Review NATO Strategic and Military Strategic objectives and desired effects.** NATO strategic and military strategic objectives and desired effects are developed to ensure that NATO achieves its end state in an operation. NATO's actions must be clearly understood to gain support from governments, populations and other groups in the theatre as well as to influence the actions of adversaries. StratCom must continually analyse the objective and desired effects in light of current strategic conditions to ensure that StratCom activities are coherent and integrated with military actions and contribute to desired effects for each phase of the operation.

c.   **Further develop narratives, themes and master messages for different Target Audiences.** Based on their understanding of the different perspectives and biases of the different audiences, StratCom should develop an over-arching, resonating narrative, upon which themes and master messages can be based. StratCom must then refine the themes and master messages depending on the strategic conditions, taking into account target audience receptiveness, susceptibility and vulnerability to different historical, social, cultural, and religious references. This may include the necessity to establish agreed terminology to be used by all actors in the information environment when referring to adversaries and local populations. Red and green teams as well as systems analysts and other experts from the KD team may be able to assist.

d.   **Determine StratCom aims and match to audiences and targets in conjunction with an over-arching engagement strategy.** The Alliance (and its Partners if applicable) must act in close concert in the delivery of agreed themes, messages and actions based on a planned and coordinated design to deliver specific StratCom aims. Where possible, other international actors, opinion formers and elites should be integrated into this approach through a coordinated engagement strategy at all levels within the wider local, regional and international public to promote support for NATO actions.

e.   **Develop criteria for the assessment of StratCom activities and the impact of military activities on the information environment.** To assess the effectiveness of activities and messages in achieving the StratCom aims and contributing to the desired effects, StratCom must develop operations assessment criteria and measures of effectiveness within the larger cadre of the overall operations assessment effort. These should be closely coordinated with SHAPE strategic effects, Info Ops, PA and planning for the conduct of operations assessment at the strategic level.

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f. **Establish responsibilities and arrangements for military support to PD, PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS.** On the basis of coordination with NATO IS and IMS, the supported JFC, and relevant cooperating non-NATO actors, StratCom, must clearly establish responsibilities and coordination mechanisms for the conduct of military activities in support of PD, PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS within the theatre.

g. **Coordinate StratCom activities with relevant non-military and non-NATO actors.** To promote coherence in StratCom among the non-military and relevant cooperating non-NATO actors, StratCom should arrange a suitable venue in consultation with the NATO SCPB, to coordinate and harmonise the principal aspects of StratCom activities in the theatre and within the wider international community. In particular, arrangements and mechanisms must be agreed that will allow regular coordination of information activities during the subsequent phases of the operation and in response to urgent information requirements as a result of events on the ground.

h. **Ensure limitations are taken into account.** There will likely be restraints and constraints imposed by political-level guidance and conditions in the JOA. These must be taken into account to ensure the StratCom effort remains focused and does not exceed the level of ambition of the nations.

i. **Assess risks to StratCom strategy achievement and develop mitigation actions.** Risks to achievement of the StratCom strategy can take many forms, including but not limited to message incoherence, information fratricide and rising expectations. These risks must be evaluated and mitigation actions planned against them.

j. **Identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and/or political importance.** There is a need to identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and/or political importance, including, but not limited to, civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and counter-propaganda. Mechanisms are required to address issues of political and/or strategic sensitivity to prevent an erosion or loss of NATO's credibility and prevent the development of a gap between what NATO says and does and the perception of NATO at all levels. These mechanisms can take many forms, but two important issues are CIVCAS and propaganda. Responsive, thorough mechanisms for identifying, investigating and releasing information on all credible CIVCAS claims caused by NATO forces must be implemented and coordinated at all levels. Equally, implementation of a proactive counter propaganda mechanism coordinated at all levels is a must. Failure to do either of these mechanisms will result in a rapid loss of NATO's credibility in the theatre and perhaps even within the wider international community.

3-55. Plan for Command and Control.

a. **Review C2 Planning Requirements.** NAC approval of the Strategic CONOPS will confirm command responsibilities, the main components of the command structure, and the definition of the JOA and the theatre of operations. FG will have identified the HQs and C2 assets provided by nations to meet C2 requirements. Further planning within the SOPG, the supported JFC and other supporting commands will typically identify additional requirements and refinements in command and control arrangements for the operation. The SOPG will have to ensure that the C2 is adequate for the

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multinational nature of the forces from all contributing nations and articulates arrangements for coordination with non-NATO entities.

b.   **Refine Responsibilities for Theatre level Activities and Functions.**   Plan development requires further coordination between strategic and operational levels to establish planning responsibility for theatre activities and functions external to the JOA. On this basis, the SOPG should coordinate and further develop the command responsibilities and arrangements, including liaison and coordination requirements, with the supported JFC.

c.   **Establish Arrangements for Coordination with Cooperating non-NATO Entities.**   Coordination with cooperating non-military and non-NATO entities should include agreement regarding the arrangements and mechanisms to be established for coordination and the exchange of information to synchronise actions in theatre. Typically the key issues to be developed within the SOPG will be related to the following:

(1)   Physical arrangements and facilities in theatre required to host a coordination centre, including the possibilities to collocate with a leading, relevant, non-NATO actor.

(2)   Developing the required memoranda of understanding and letters of agreement for the release and sharing of mission specific information, knowledge and/or intelligence with non-NATO entities in accordance with NATO information security policy.

d.   **Plan for CIS Support.** The strategic concept should have included a CIS concept based on known C2 requirements and CIS constraints. CIS planning, led by DCOS Spt in close coordination with NCSA, will refine and implement the concept based on: the actual CIS capabilities available, including bandwidth and CIS capabilities in the force package; and the further definition of C2 requirements across different functional areas.

e.   **Plan for Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.** C2 plan development should also include planning for the conduct of strategic level operations assessments and contributions to periodic mission reviews.   Planning for operations assessment is led by DCOS CPP with support from different functional areas, available systems analysts and operational analysts, as required, and should include the following:

(1)   Refining criteria for success developed during the development of the strategic concept.

(2)   Developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs), including thresholds and rates of change.

(3)   Determining data collection requirements.

(4)   Establishing requirements for operations assessments and reporting by ACO subordinate commands based on either the periodic analysis of trends or event driven estimates to address unexpected changes in the situation.

(5)   Coordinating requirements for the exchange of information with relevant, cooperating, non-NATO actors regarding specific operations assessment criteria or MOEs.

(6)   Establishing responsibilities for collection, reporting, coordination with relevant non-NATO actors and analysis.

f.   **Plan for KD and the Application of Lessons Learned (LL).** Plan development should address arrangements for continuing knowledge development, capturing lessons regarding the effectiveness of military and non-military actions, and most importantly, ensuring that LL are applied deliberately to improve capabilities. The SOPG must ensure that mechanisms are in place to collect, fuse, analyse, validate and share critical information required to build knowledge and to gain the understanding required for strategic operations assessments and support to decision-making. Details are provided in Annexes LL - Lessons Learned and NN - Knowledge Development.

3-56. Plan Force Preparation and Sustainment.

a.   **Review Strategic Requirements for Force Preparation and Sustainment.** The purpose of planning for force preparation and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and conduct operations are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes the following main areas:

(1)   Resource management and capability development.

(2)   Mission training and certification of HQs, personnel and forces.

(3)   Logistical support to the force in theatre.

(4)   Rotation of HQs, personnel and forces.

b.   **Resource Management and Capability Development.** The preparation and sustainment of a NATO-led operation requires the provision and management of NATO resources as well as the development of capabilities to meet theatre requirements.

(1)   FG focuses on identifying national contributions to fill requirements for forces, HQs, personnel and certain theatre capabilities.

(2)   Other resources requirements, in particular NATO common funding and the acquisition of new capabilities, including some of those identified in the TCSOR, are developed and managed by the Capabilities Management Directorate (CAM) in close coordination with the SOPG.

(3)   Budget requests and capability requirements are developed and coordinated by CMD through the Crisis Management Resource Board (CMRB). Particular attention should be given to detailing requirements to support enabling and initial entry operations, such as establishing communications, operating ports and facilities, and contracting local services such as interpreters and security. Details are provided in Annex FF - Financial Support.

c.   **Plan for Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The SOPG should ensure that mission training, validation and/or certification requirements for HQs, personnel and forces deploying to the theatre have been developed by subordinate commands. Keeping in mind that contributing nations will be required to review the Strategic OPLAN, the SOPG should ensure that essential information related to pre-deployment training and certification is included in Annex BB -

Training and Mission Rehearsals. In addition, the SOPG should coordinate the following on behalf of the supported JFC and other supporting commands:

(1)   **Mission Rehearsal Training and Exercises** with ACT and its training centres to plan and conduct mission-specific collective training and exercises for deploying HQs and forces as required.

(2)   **Evaluation and certification** of HQs and forces with the Operational Planning Directorate (OPD) and nations according to existing readiness evaluation programmes for NATO forces, as well as with MIC and partner nations in accordance with the Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and feedback (OCC E&F) Program.

(3)   **Pre-deployment Training** with ACT and the various schools and centres under its control as well as nations to ensure that augmentation and rotating personnel receive mission-specific individual training.

(4)   **Support for In-Theatre Training** with ACT and nations, including the host nation(s) as required to establish the capabilities to conduct training in-theatre.

d.   **Plan Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre.** The concept for logistics, included in the strategic concept, described how joint multinational logistical support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During plan development, support staff coordinates detailed planning required with TCN and HNs on behalf of the supported JFC and other supporting commands to ensure that supplies and services will be delivered to the force to meet operational requirements for each phase.

e.   Logistical conferences arranged by the SOPG will be required to confirm logistical arrangements, especially with the HN(s) and TCNs, to ensure that they meet operational needs and allow a sufficient build-up of logistical resources, including stockpiles for Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) and critical munitions. Any shortfalls in HN support may require the activation and deployment of additional logistical units. With the possibility of significant operational impact, the following areas must be closely coordinated with planning for other areas and the resulting details articulated in the strategic plan Annex R - Logistics:

(1)   Logistical standards. Logistical standards must reflect the expected operational tempo and demands for each phase based on estimates from the supported JFC and supporting commands.

(2)   Host Nation Support. The level and scope of HN support must be confirmed based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to specific facilities, infrastructure and logistical operating units, especially ground transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN to coordinate with HN(s) within guidelines established by SACEUR.[54]

(3)   National Responsibilities. National responsibilities for specific logistical functions under framework, lead or role specialisation nation arrangements must be confirmed in particular for critical logistical activities such as POL distribution.

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[54] Refer to AJP-4.5 (A) Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures, May 05.

(4)   Theatre Engineering. Critical theatre engineering requirements such as the improvement of the APOD/SPODs, LOCs, and facilities must be identified and prioritised against operational requirements.

f.   **Plan for the Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces.**   The SOPG should anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its termination and develop initial plans[55] for the following:

(1)   Rotation of HQs and forces through FG considering the likely tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time as well as national rotation requirements.

(2)   Rotation of personnel augmentation in deployed HQs based on an approved Crisis Establishment (CE) in accordance with NATO personnel management policy.[56] The CE will be maintained electronically and include the CE structure, job descriptions and sources identified for each CE post.

3-57. Plan for Force Deployment.

a.   **Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces.** The strategic deployment of forces into a theatre of operations and onward movement into and within the JOA constitute a strategic manoeuvre and must be planned as an operation requiring the expertise of operations, movements and logistical planners. Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities required for mounting, embarkation, debarkation, reception, staging and onward movement to the final destination in the JOA. It requires close coordination with:

(1)   AMCC.

(2)   TCNs.

(3)   HNs.

(4)   Port operating organisation.

(5)   Gaining commands.

Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed regarding the status of forces, understandings/agreements with the HN(s), and arrangements for transit and over-flight. Details of the deployment of forces are articulated in Annex S – Movements to the strategic plan.

b.   **Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture.** The design, development, implementation and control of the strategic movements architecture from ports of embarkation to the ports of debarkation in the theatre is a SHAPE responsibility, coordinated closely with the supported JFC. Responsibilities for onward movement into the JOA must be delineated. The SOPG must confirm as early as possible the strategic lines of communications and confirm with the HN(s) the availability and capabilities of the following:

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[55] Long-term responsibility for planning rotation of forces will fall to FG.
[56] See AAP 16 D.

      (1)   APOD/SPODs and other key transportation nodes such as railheads.

      (2)   Staging areas and reception facilities.

      (3)   Lines of communications (LOC) into the JOA.

c.   **Finalise the Force Flow.** Based on detailed planning for the employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL force package, the SOPG must confirm the final force flow with the supported JFC and release the ADL. Specific deployment requirements must be established for each force in the AFL according to the final force flow including the following:

      (1)   Strategic lines of communication and entry points into the theatre.

      (2)   Final destination in the JOA.

      (3)   Commander's required date for the full operational capability of the force for employment at final destination in the JOA.

      (4)   Priority for sequence of movement.[57]

      (5)   Command authority to be transferred.

d.   **Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for Deployment Operations.** The SOPG must confirm specific requirements and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of deployment operations with the supported and supporting commands as well as with the HN(s) for the following critical activities:

      (1)   Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for deployment.

      (2)   Security of entry points, staging/reception areas, and LOCs within the theatre.

      (3)   Operation of port facilities and reception areas.

      (4)   Operation of staging areas.

      (5)   Control of onward movements into the JOA.

e.   **Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP) with Nations.** The ADL is released by SACEUR and establishes the required flow of forces into the theatre on behalf of the supported JFC. It provides the operational basis for the AMCC to coordinate with nations on behalf of SACEUR for the strategic deployment of HQs and forces to their required destination, including the coordination of strategic lines of communication, modes of transportation and strategic lift. On this basis, each TCN develops DDPs for its forces for coordination and de-confliction by the AMCC, who will create a multinational DDP (MNDDP) that will best achieve the required flow of forces into the theatre once an activation order is issued.

f.   Deployment planning is coordinated with nations at the strategic level but requires close involvement of the supported JFC and other supporting commands in a series of Movement Planning Conferences, as follows:

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[57] Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.

(1) **Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC).** The IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN and will provide the first step on the deployment planning cycle. The JOPG representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan reflects the operational Commander's intent. IMovPC should review and confirm the following:

(a) Overall concept of operations.

(b) HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and railheads.

(c) Requirement for sharing logistical and infrastructure resources with relevant non-NATO actors operating in the JOA.

(d) Required force flow based on the ADL.

(e) Movement control organisation network and point of contact register.

(2) **Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC).** The purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The main activities of the MMovPC are:

(a) Review the DDPs.

(b) Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-confliction with cooperating relevant non-NATO actors operating in the JOA, as required.

(c) Start the strategic air and sea assessment and identify national shortfalls.

(d) Confirm HN support agreements and MOUs as well as resources and throughput capabilities.

(3) **Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC).** The aim of the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted Multi-National NDDP agreed by all HQs, TCNs and the HN(s). The MNDDP will form the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

3-58. Plan Force Protection.

a. **Review Strategic Requirements for Force Protection Planning.** Force protection planning at the strategic level should focus on requirements and measures to be taken to protect the NATO forces from assessed risks and threats to strategic lines of communications and the theatre of operations, especially with respect to the possible use WMD, including theatre ballistic missiles, from within or beyond the theatre. Close coordination is required with the supported JFC and supporting commands as well as TCNs and HN(s). Details are provided in Annex J - Force protection. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces in transit, choke points, air and sea ports as well as reception and staging areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be vulnerable to attack. Force protection comprises four areas:

(1) Protective Security.

(2) Active Defence.

(3) Passive Defence.

(4) Recuperation.

b. **Protective Security.** The SOPG should establish requirements for protective security of strategic activities, facilities and deployment operations. Coordination is required with the supported JFC and supporting commands, as well as TCNs and HN(s), for the specific protective measures to be taken to address the specific risks and threats, especially from WMD.

c. **Active Defence.** Based on the assessed threat of attack from beyond the JOA and or the theatre, the SOPG should provide guidance regarding defensive measures to deter, prevent, neutralise, or reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including defence against surface, sub-surface, air, rocket and missile attack. The SOPG should coordinate any requirements to establish supporting command relations for the provision of active defence measures including:

(1) Counter-air operations.

(2) Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

(3) Port and harbour defences.

(4) Defence of strategic lines of communication.

(5) Defence of staging, lodgement and rear areas as well as other vital areas.

(6) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence.

(7) Counter terrorism.

d. **Passive Defence.** Force protection planning should also develop passive defence measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of conventional and CBRN attacks on forces and facilities during deployment and entry into the theatre and to limit the potential consequences. Passive defence guidance should specify measures to limit the exposure of HQs, personnel, forces and facilities and deal with such attacks to ensure their survival and ability to continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness. Passive defence guidance should also specify requirements, including training requirements, to prepare HQs, personnel and forces deploying into a potential CBRN environment to sustain operations under CBRN conditions.

e. **Recuperation.** Planning for recuperation is primarily the responsibility of the supported JFC but may require the coordination of strategic resources to deal with risks and threats with more serious potential consequences. Close coordination with the supported JFC and supporting commands, as well as possibly with the HN(s), will be required to identify contingency recuperation measures that may be required to assist with the recovery from the effects of a major attack, especially from a CBRN attack or Release Other Than Attack (ROTA) and Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) attack. In particular, the SOPG should confirm organisational responsibilities and command authorities at strategic and operational levels to ensure timely and effective recuperation action.

f. Strategic planning for recuperation should consider requirements to generate additional capabilities for:

(1)   Damage Control (DAMCON).

(2)   Rescue operations, including search and rescue /combat search and rescue (SAR/CSAR).

(3)   Mass casualty handling.

(4)   Decontamination.

3-59. Coordinate OPLAN for Approval and Handover.

a.   **Complete Strategic Coordination.** Final coordination of the Strategic OPLAN requires that responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for all essential strategic activities called for in the plan. This typically requires a deliberate review by the SOPG with representatives from NATO IS/IMS, possibly through the SAE, the supported JFC, supporting commands and representatives from cooperating relevant non-NATO actors if feasible[58], as well as HN(s) and TCNs as required.

b.   **Conduct Final Operational Risk Assessment.** Based on the outcomes from strategic coordination of the plan, the SOPG should conduct a final assessment of strategic risks, including in particular any risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities or gaps in coordination with relevant non-NATO actors that might put the operation at risk. The assessment is presented to SACEUR with recommendations regarding any risks considered to be unacceptable at this point, which should be brought to the attention of the MC and ultimately the NAC.

c.   **Final Presentation to SACEUR.** The coordinated OPLAN and final risk assessment are presented to SACEUR and the Command Group, with any significant issues and risks that might jeopardise the mission highlighted. SACEUR may require an OPLAN review with his subordinate commanders and senior representative from cooperating relevant non-NATO actors to further ensure strategic synchronisation at his level.

d.   **Complete Political Military Coordination.** DCOS CPP should arrange through the CG to back-brief the MC on the final OPLAN, focusing on the main strategic and operational aspects, including any strategic issues requiring further coordination by the MC and any significant or unacceptable strategic or operational risks.

e.   **Forward OPLAN for Approval.** Following political military coordination, SACEUR should direct any further changes required in the plan. Once these are coordinated and incorporated in the plan, the SOPG forwards the completed plan, including the main body and all required annexes, to the MC for their endorsement and NAC approval.

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[58] In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.

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PHASE 5[59] - EXECUTION/OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL/OPLAN REVIEW

3-60. Handover of the OPLAN.

a. **Introduction.** During OPLAN development, the SOPG should have been reinforced by staff from the SOC, who will assume responsibility for execution. Once the OPLAN is approved, it should be handed over for execution in anticipation of a NAC Execution Directive. Throughout the execution phase responsibility for the OPLAN remains with DCOS CPP. In addition, as operations assessment is a DCOS CPP led activity, assigned staff must remain actively engaged with execution to monitor the validity and update the OPLAN as appropriate.

b. **Execution.** Execution requires the command and control of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To accomplish this, harmonisation is needed between military and civil actors. The operational level will focus on its effects and their part in creating the desired strategic effects. The tactical level will generally concentrate on the tasks necessary to accomplish its mission, which will ultimately lead to the realisation of operational and strategic effects. Responsibility for determining and monitoring effects resides at the military strategic and operational levels. Key to execution of any operation will be the ability to measure progress and to adapt quickly at the relevant level to changes in the engagement space.

c. **Operations assessment at the strategic level.** Operations assessment of the engagement space involves monitoring and assessing the outcome of all actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated effects (details are in Chapter 5). From a military standpoint, OPLANs require continuous operations assessment in order for informed adjustments to be made. Progress of actions, creation of effects and achievement of objectives towards the accomplishment of the end state are all assessed via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision process. This operations assessment process applies to all levels. The collector may be a non-NATO asset, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors. Operations assessment and Knowledge Development are closely related through system analysis which provides the backdrop for operations assessment to understand how to measure effects and actions.

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[59] Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further.

PHASE 6[60] - TRANSITION

3-61. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 6 – Transition – is to develop and coordinate an OPLAN for the handover of responsibility to the UN, other international organisations (e.g. EU) or indigenous actor in the crisis area and withdraw NATO forces in a controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a destabilising influence in the region.

b. **Overview.** When planning for the deployment of forces into a crisis area, commanders and their staff at the strategic and operational levels aim to create positive effects in order to achieve objectives and eventually the desired end state. Modern conflicts are complex in nature involving interdependent actors with both convergent and divergent interests and objectives. The deployment of NATO forces introduces them into an already complex system and, over time, creates inter-dependencies with other actors, and systems (economic, civil, political) present in the engagement space.

c. Eventually, through the creation of positive effects, the NATO end state will be achieved and forces will need to be withdrawn. Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well in advance and may involve a large number of non-NATO actors in order to minimize the negative effects that the departure of NATO troops may have on the overall stability of the theatre.

d. **Prerequisites.** Throughout the execution phase of an operation, commanders and their staff will conduct periodic assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects. Based on these assessments, and on evaluation of progress toward achieving objectives and desired end state, the OPLAN will be adjusted accordingly. Ultimately, measures of effectiveness and indicators of progress will lead SACEUR to conclude that the end state is in sight.

e. SACEUR must then recommend, through his mission progress report to the NAC, potential options for the handover of the mission to either the UN or other appropriate authorities, and, thus, the disengagement of NATO forces. The NAC should then issue an initiating directive that authorizes SACEUR to initiate planning for the disengagement of NATO forces and the eventual handover of responsibilities.

f. **Main Activities.** The main activities in the disengagement planning process are to:

(1) Standardize the planning process and procedures within the Alliance for the handover of responsibilities between NATO forces and other international actors.

(2) Minimize the risks and negative effects on a stabilized crisis that could result from the disengagement of NATO forces.

(3) Provide for political military coordination with relevant non-NATO actors within the engagement space.

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[60] Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further.

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(4)   Provide for political military oversight and control of the disengagement planning.

(5)   Enhance strategic military advice to political military authorities.

(6)   Enhance interoperability and collaboration between strategic, operational and tactical level headquarters.

(7)   Enhance the Commander's ability to direct and guide development of the OPLAN.

(8)   Maximise logical and creative thinking by staffs to enhance the Commander's decision making.

(9)   Evaluate the products of the disengagement planning process.

g.   **Design of the Withdrawal Planning Process.** At the strategic level, from the moment that a NAC Execution Directive is issued for a mission, SACEUR and his staff enter into an iterative loop, where they repeatedly review the various stages of assessment and planning for the ongoing mission. A periodic mission review reporting process, fed by the JFC's own mission assessment and SACEUR's assessment at the strategic level of how well or poorly the mission is progressing in relation to NATO objectives and the end state. This process allows for development of recommendations for the NAC on amendments to the OPLAN, the adoption of new strategic approaches and, if necessary, for a re-posturing of deployed NATO forces or capabilities. Eventually, once conditions described in the end state are in sight, NATO will need to start planning for the handover of responsibilities and the disengagement of NATO forces.

(1)   **Operations assessment.** This is an ongoing process of assessing progress toward objectives and the end state along the various lines of engagement.

(2)   **Options.** Once operations assessments indicate that the end state is in sight and that the level of stability achieved is sustainable without the current level of NATO forces in theatre, SACEUR may recommend to the NAC that he be authorized to develop options for NATO disengagement (total or partial). SACEUR may also decide to initiate the development of such options prior to briefing the NAC. In such cases, options will be presented at the same time as the operations assessment itself. This may result in a NAC decision sheet tasking the SACEUR to develop one specific option into an OPLAN. It should be noted that the options tabled will clearly state the level of interaction with non-NATO actors required during the strategic and operational planning steps.

(3)   **CONOPS Development.** CONOPS development determines how to disengage NATO forces from the mission most effectively and efficiently. It focuses on analysing the different interdependencies that were created over the duration of the mission between the deployed NATO forces and possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused by the withdrawal of forces.

(a)   Mitigation measures will in most cases involve international or national actors developing transition plans and for the NATO forces to adjust their handover of responsibilities to these actors in a way that allows

them as much as possible to minimize the negative impacts on stability during this critical phase of the operation.

(b)   The selected military response option will provide the basis for the development of the strategic concept and a supporting statement of the required comprehensive activities required to establish the preconditions for success. The development of the CONOPS will require close collaboration of the JFC, especially in coordinating with non-NATO actors for local risk mitigation measures and for a theatre-level handover concept.

(c)   SACEUR will obtain NAC approval for his Strategic CONOPS for the transition. Approval of the Strategic CONOPS will include authorization for SACEUR to initiate a "Force De-activation" process with troop contributing nations. It should be noted that the overriding factor in the decision to repatriate troops should be the need to maintain stability in the theatre and to give sufficient time for a proper handover to take place. In cases where the handover will take place over a long period of time, it may be necessary to re-tool or re-role elements of the NATO forces in theatre.

(4)   **OPLAN Development.** OPLAN development will further amplify the schedule of strategic effects required (preconditions for success) and the general flow of forces out of theatre. It will also identify critical requirements such as strategic lift capabilities required. Upon approval of the strategic disengagement OPLAN, NAC will issue a NAC Execution Directive.

(5)   **Execution and Operations Assessment.** Throughout the disengagement phase, it will be necessary to monitor execution closely and to assess the developing impacts of the departure of NATO forces. An operations assessment process, similar to the process used throughout the execution phase of the operation will be used, with particular emphasis on measuring negative effects. These operations assessments will allow changes to the OPLAN where necessary.

h.   **Process Controls.** The disengagement planning process is designed to identify and mitigate to the maximum extent possible the negative risks and effects resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows commanders to coordinate, in detail, the transfer of authority to non-NATO actors, while still allowing the Commander and his staff enough freedom to develop ideas and concepts while ensuring necessary political and military control over the entire process. In enabling a coordinated and deliberate transition, the detailed systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary.

i.   This systemic analysis should place a particular emphasis on the interdependencies that involve the presence of NATO forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all relevant non-NATO actors be identified early and that proper liaison and coordination be implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and contribute where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the withdrawal of NATO forces. The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to execute OPLANs, is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally through the MC to SACEUR.

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j.	**Political Controls.** The NAC maintains political control of the withdrawal planning process by:

(1)	Issuing an initiating directive.

(2)	Approving a strategic disengagement CONOPS.

(3)	Approving strategic effects and endorsing the preconditions for success.

(4)	Authorising force de-activation.

(5)	Approving a strategic disengagement OPLAN.

(6)	Authorising force redeployment.

(7)	Authorising execution.

k.	**Military Controls.** NATO military commanders maintain control of the operational planning process by:

(1)	Issuing initiating instructions and planning directives.

(2)	Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3)	Approving subordinate CONOPS.

(4)	Approving subordinate OPLANs.

(5)	Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when authorised).

l.	**Collaborative / Parallel Planning.** The development of strategic and operational disengagement OPLANs requires collaboration and continuous coordination at the Political/Military (North Atlantic Council / Military Committee and Nations) and at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with relevant non-NATO actors.

m.	**Coordination with Participating Nations**. Coordination with participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should include the early exchange of information with host nations to facilitate comprehensive planning by the host nation as well as with troop-contributing nations to co-ordinate detailed OPLAN development. The North Atlantic Council will issue a force de-activation directive specifically authorising SACEUR to negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in order to ensure a coordinated and deliberate forces disengagement that will contribute to preserving stability in the theatre.

n.	**Coordination with the Civil Environment.** Early liaison and coordination between Allied Headquarters and civil authorities and agencies, which can assist in maintaining stability and mitigating the negative effects created by the departure of NATO forces from the theatre, is essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes establishing, during the initiation of planning, effective means for coordination and liaison, initially at the strategic level, with national governments, international organizations and non-governmental organisations. Planning by the JFC must provide for effective cooperation with these same civil organisations within the joint operations area.

o.	**StratCom Framework.** A well planned and executed StratCom Framework will be critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces from a crisis area. The

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framework will address StratCom aims with specific respect to targeting: audiences in the host country to re-assure them about the stability of the situation; the international community to underline NATO's accomplishments; potential de-stabilizing actors to demonstrate NATO's resolve to continue supporting a climate of stability in the host country; and the populations of NATO member and non-NATO partner nations to inform them about the success of the mission.

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Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V1.0
(Chapter 4 – Operational Level)

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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4-1. Introduction.

a.   This chapter describes the operational level planning[1] process carried out by the Joint Force Command (JFC) HQs during the different phases of a NATO response to a crisis or as an integral part of prudent military planning to prepare Alliance to meet a future operational situation. It also describes the planning products that are developed during each phase. The entire process comprises six phases which are closely aligned with the political military and military strategic level planning activities within the NATO Crisis Management Process as depicted in Figure 4.1. Due to the requirement for separate NAC approval of a strategic CONOPS and OPLAN, Phase 4 is further divided into Phase 4a and Phase 4b.

b.   Phase 1 – Situation awareness, supported by Knowledge Development for a particular area of interest, ideally begins at HQ NATO and SHAPE well in advance of a NATO response to a crisis and continues in support of all subsequent phases. It must be recognised that the planning effort at each headquarters will be conducted under different circumstances, with differing levels of guidance, different amount of time and information available and that each commander will approach the problem in his own way and style. Thus this chapter provides a common and collaborative approach to the process to act as a guide and ensure all issues are considered. Driven by the Commander, planning is a combination of process and art. The main activities for each phase are described in succeeding sections in this chapter.

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[1] Operational level - The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.(AAP 6)

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
Figure 4.1 - Strategic and Operational Level Crisis Response Planning

c.   The six phases of the operational planning process are designed to allow close collaboration between military strategic and operational levels during the different phases of the NATO Crisis Management Process in accordance with political decisions made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The close alignment of military strategic and operational level processes ensures that operational considerations are reflected in strategic decisions and that strategic conditions are established for operational success. The different phases support the operational Commander's decision-making related to:

(1)   Developing and maintaining an appreciation of the operational environment in a potential or actual crisis area.

(2)   Contributing to the development of military response options within a comprehensive approach[2].

(3)   His mission and essential actions.

(4)   Designing the operation in terms of operational objectives, lines of operation and decisive points/decisive conditions.

(5)   Activating and preparing required forces for deployment.

(6)   Directing the synchronisation of joint and combined operations in cooperation with non-military and other non-NATO efforts.

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[2] Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors.

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       (7)   Providing operational and theatre operations assessments of progress in achieving operational and military strategic objectives and the end state.

       (8)   Providing operational advice for adapting operations to meet changes in strategic and operational conditions.

       (9)   Planning for transition and termination of military operations.

4-2. Operational Process and Products.

    a.   The six phases of the operational level process as shown in Figure 4.2 are specifically designed to develop the operational level assessments, planning products, directives and orders required by the strategic and component levels. The processes and products are described in the following sections within this Chapter.

Strategic Level SACEUR

Operational Level COM JFC

Phase 1 Situation Awareness		Phase 1 Situation Awareness	Operational Warning Order
Phase 2 Strategic Assessment	Strategic Warning Order / SACEUR Strategic Assessment	Phase 2 Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options	Draft Operational Advice
Phase 3 Military Response Options	Draft MROs / Operational Advice / Strategic Planning Directive	Phase 3 Operational Orientation	Tactical Advice / Operational Planning Directive
Phase 4a Strategic CONOPS Development	Strategic CONOPS / Operational CONOPS / Provisional CJSOR, Draft TCSOR, CE	Phase 4a Operational CONOPS Development	Operational CONOPS / Component CONOPSs SOR, CE / Approved Component CONOPSs
Phase 4b Strategic OPLAN Development (Force Generation)	Approved Operational CONOPS / Strategic OPLAN / Operational OPLAN / Approved Operational OPLAN	Phase 4b Operational OPLAN Development	Operational OPLAN / Component OPLANs / Approved Component OPLANs
Phase 5 Execution Campaign Assessment/ OPLAN Review	ACTORD / Operational Assessment	Phase 5 Execution Campaign Assessment/ OPLAN Review	ACTORD / Tactical Assessment
Phase 6 Transition	Strategic Planning Directive	Phase 6 Transition	Operational Planning Directive

Disengagement Planning and Execution

Figure 4.2 - Operational Level Process and Products

4-3.   Organisation for Operational Planning and Execution

a.   The organisational structure of the JFC provides for the integration of functional expertise to carry out the main operational level processes. These staff elements collaborate within the JFC HQ as well as with their counterparts in SHAPE and subordinate commands during all phases of operations. Typically, operational level HQs

will be organised around three main directorates in the JHQ Main: the Operations Directorate (OD), the Knowledge Management Directorate (KMD), and the Resources Directorate (RD). The operational level staff of the JHQ Forward Element (FE) should concern itself with the following areas: Knowledge Development, Theatre Engagement and Joint Coordination.

(1) **The Operations Directorate (OD).** The OD is designed to act as the core planning and execution capability of the HQ around which the comprehensive analysis, planning, synchronisation, execution and operations assessment of assigned operations or tasks takes place. The OD is composed of five elements: Joint Plans Branch, Joint Effects Management Branch, Joint Synchronisation & Execution Branch, Join Assessment Branch and Situation Centre/Joint Operations Centre.

(2) **Joint Plans Branch (JPB).** The Joint Plans Branch leads the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) which is a cross-functional working group and is responsible for managing and development of operational plans. Joint Plans Branch plans kinetic and non-kinetic actions in close coordination with cooperating relevant international actors. It includes planners, subject matter experts, and liaisons representing all the required functional areas and disciplines, depending on the type and level of operation being conducted and taking into account political, economic, civil and military instruments. It is responsible for the coordination and production of plans throughout a given operation, to include the continued development of:

(a) Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

(b) Statement of Requirements (SOR).

(c) Operation Plan (OPLAN).

(d) Branches.

(e) Sequels.

The Joint Plans Branch is supported by the other Branches in the Operations Directorate and the other Directorates through their participation in the JOPG.

(3) **Joint Effects Management (JEMB).** The Joint Effects Management Branch ensures that military effects are consistent with the political, economic and civil efforts within a comprehensive approach. It provides a focal point for coordination of efforts by cooperating military and non-military organisations as well as strategic communications to accomplish military strategic objectives and establish the conditions required to achieve the desired end state. Within the JOPG, the Joint Effects Management Branch will normally provide core planners, whose contributions will include: developing a comprehensive understanding of the operational design; contributing directly to the development of the effects; and supporting the JOPG's broader understanding and implications of the other potential non military actors. They will also normally play an important role in the development of the courses of action.

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(4)   **Joint Synchronisation and Execution (JSEB).** The Joint Synchronisation and Execution Branch coordinates and synchronises execution and adjustments of joint operations by components and other subordinate commands by recommending mid-term priorities for targeting and resource allocation and by issuing orders and supporting products. It will normally provide a staff member to the JOPG in order to build up a comprehensive understanding of the plan in order to support a smooth transition to execution. This individual will compliment the JOPG's plan owner (normally a Joint Plans Branch member) who will also move across with the plan for a limited period to assist with the transition. A thorough understanding of the synchronisation of the plan and the relationships between each element of the operational design (tasks, decisive points/decisive conditions, objectives, effects) is important to the Joint Synchronisation and Execution Branch.

(5)   **Situation Centre (SITCEN)/Joint Operational Centre (JOC).** The Situation Centre/Joint Operational Centre provides continuous situation awareness including a Joint Common Operational Picture of the area of operations by monitoring all lines of operations, and major events or incidents. It is the central point of information flow for all incoming and outgoing reports and orders through the HQ. The SITCEN/JOC needs to monitor the development of the planning process and understand how the components will execute their elements of the plan. They will also require a clear understanding of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and any decision points.

(6)   **Joint Assessment (JAB).** The Joint Assessment Branch monitors the operation and leads the operational-level campaign assessment of effects and associated actions within the theatre to measure the progress towards achievement of operational and military strategic objectives and the conditions required to attain the desired end state. To this end, the Joint Assessment Branch will be core members of a JOPG helping to develop the effects and their supporting tools of measurement. The JAB will need to ensure that the operational design and supporting effects are not only capable of being measured but relate directly to the achievement of the objectives.

(7)   **The Knowledge Management Directorate (KMD).** The KMD is the lynchpin in the development of the Commander's and staffs' common situation awareness. It takes and processes information and intelligence, by gathering, fusing and analysing data and intelligence and translating this into actionable knowledge and products for the planning and execution staffs. It is comprised of subject matter experts on all Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) domains. It provides inputs to both parts of the JHQ, but primarily to the JHQ Main Joint Plans Branch, Joint Synchronisation and Execution Branch, and JHQ FE Joint Coordination Centre, as required, in order to establish accurate situation awareness for subsequent planning and execution. It is also responsible for leading the internal joint lessons identified/lessons learned process. The KMD consists of three branches: Knowledge Centre; Joint Policy Application and Lessons Identified/Lessons

Learned Branch; and Exercise & Preparation Branch (not addressed here). Within the JOPG construct, the KMD contributes throughout the process by leading the development of the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment, and providing the Commander and staff with a firm information and analysis basis on which to develop the plan. Their contribution continues with full participation in teams formed to look at potential enemy and neutral organisations, operational design, course of action development and wargaming.

(8) **The Resources Directorate (RD).** The Resources Directorate provides subject matter expertise and services in support of planning and operations. The RD is responsible to the Chief of Staff for identifying, implementing and sustaining resource requirements in coordination with military and non-military actors in support of operations. They will achieve this primarily through the medium of the Resources Coordination Board (RCB). The RD consists of the following branches: Logistic Resources Branch, Communication and Information System Branch, Engineer Branch, Human Resources Branch and Medical Branch. The various elements of the Resources Directorate all contribute to the JOPG not only though subject matter expertise but also as general planners where their individual experience and knowledge can play a vial role in the development of both the operational design and the courses of action.

All SMEs will normally conduct specialist estimates as early in the planning process as possible to help contribute to the JOPG. In addition, they will contribute to CONOPS and OPLAN development through contributions to the main documents and/or the development of annexes

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PHASE 1 - SITUATION AWARENESS

Section 1 - General

4-4. Purpose.

The purpose of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness, supported by Knowledge Development, is developing and maintaining a level of understanding to support operational assessments and decision-making in the provision of operational level advice to SACEUR during the planning for and conduct of operations.

a. **Overview.** Phase 1 begins with SACEUR's designation of an area of interest[3] and assignment of responsibilities for situation monitoring. It includes the development of information and knowledge requirements about the area, as well as continuous monitoring to identify changes in the situation. Phase 1 contributes to the identification of indications and warnings and is intensified to support operational assessments, operational planning, execution and operations assessments. The JFC needs to be involved as early as possible in the planning process. This may include the potential requirement to request the deployment of an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) through SACEUR and assigning a JOPG.

b. **Prerequisites.** The initiation of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness typically depends on the SACEUR's assignment of an area of interest in advance of a crisis.

c. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 1 - Situation Awareness are depicted in Figure 4.3.

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[3] SACEUR has responsibility for monitoring areas of interest beyond NATO's territory, and analysing regional instabilities, military capabilities and transnational issues with military implications, to assess potential risks and threats to NATO's security interests.

Figure 4.3 - Situation Awareness

d. **Products.** The main outputs from Phase 1 - Situation Awareness include the following:

(1)   Operational Commander's Requests for Information.

(2)   Initial judgments about the situation in the area in terms of risks and threats.

(3)   Conditions, trends and tendencies in the area that indicate a change in the situation.

(4)   Assessment of NATO indicators and warnings.

e. **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** Information and knowledge about a designated area of interest is adequate to support:

(1)   Initial assessment of indications and warnings.

(2)   Identify potential requirement for an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).

(3)   Initiate preparations for or assign a JOPG, to focus operational appreciation and advice for the COM JFC.

(4)   Operational planning.

(5)   Execution and synchronisation of operations.

(6)   Campaign assessments.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1)   The core of the Joint Operations Planning Group is responsible for developing information and knowledge requirements.

(2)   The Knowledge Centre Subject Matter Experts (SME's) are responsible for adding granularity to analysis of any product provided to adapt it to the level that

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is required for operational level planning, and to support the Commander's intelligence and information requirements through a Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE). In addition, they will need to answer intelligence and information requirements determined by JOPG.

(3)   The Situation Centre (SITCEN) contributes to continuous situation awareness by monitoring major events or incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the Joint Common Operational Picture of the area when possible.

g.   **External Coordination.**

(1)   **SHAPE** contributes to situation awareness and knowledge development at the operational level by sharing strategic information and intelligence products for selected areas and tasking the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) to provide intelligence analysis products to designated operational commands. The JFC liaison element to the SOPG (a JOPG experienced planner) should regularly update JFC about the progress of the assessment process within the SOPG and direct further work to be conducted at JFC level to achieve the level of granularity required to conduct operational level planning.

(2)   **Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).** The IFC is a multi-national Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides timely, actionable, full-spectrum intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations, especially NRF, as tasked by SHAPE DCOS Operations and Intelligence. Normally this information would come to the JFC through SHAPE KMC and the JFC's own KC.

(3)   **Knowledge Management Centre (KMC)[4].** The NATO Knowledge Management Centre, at SHAPE, establishes a centralized knowledge base that contains, at a minimum, all data required to support NATO threats and types of NATO operations. The KMC will draw on the Knowledge Development Centre as described in Chapter 2.

(4)   **Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD).** The CEPD maintains a Civil Expertise Catalogue (CEC) covering a wide range of civil/commercial/technical expertise available to NATO in the following areas:

(a)   Movement and transport (air/land/sea).

(b)   Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

(c)   Medical.

(d)   Critical infrastructure.

(e)   Civil communications.

(f)   Food and agriculture.

---

[4] Envisioned to reside at SHAPE, to establish policy, ACO KD priorities and manage overall information requirements (KD Concept).

      (g)   Civil disaster response.

      (h)   Industrial preparedness.

(5)   **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)**. The EADRCC (NATO and EAPC), headed by the Director of the CEPD, maintains close coordination with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) regarding disaster and maintains a liaison officer at the United Nations.

(6)   **CIMIC Fusion Centre (CFC).** CFC is a standing provisional organisation, established by ACT, to provide an information sharing hub for a wide range of participating international, governmental and non-governmental organisations. It provides a mechanism for exchanging information of operational relevance with many different civilian organisations in different sectors such as:

      (a)   Economic Stabilization.

      (b)   Humanitarian Assistance.

      (c)   Infrastructure and Social Well-Being.

      (d)   Security.

      (e)   Governance and Participation.

      (f)   Justice and Reconciliation.

(7)   **NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).** Contracted support options need to be considered for most of the operations. NAMSA can provide contractor's support for the operations to guarantee efficient logistic support and to optimise the utilisation of military logistics assets that should be employed. Contracted support will be based on a Logistic Support Agreement between SHAPE and NAMSA.

Section 2 - Process

4-5.   **Develop a Systems Perspective of the Designated Area.**

a.   **Assume Responsibility for an Area of Interest.** SACEUR may designate areas of interest for approval by the MC or the NAC/Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and task a COM JFC[5] to assume responsibility for monitoring the situation and developing knowledge about the area.

b.   **Appreciate the Nature of Threats and Risks.** The JFC planners should review available intelligence related to the region and provide guidance for knowledge development based on the scale and scope of threats and risks to the NATO's stated security interests:

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[5] These taskings may be formally established in ACO Directive 65-11, ACO Standing Procedures for Intelligence Production Management.

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    (1)   Threats or acts of armed aggression.

    (2)   Proliferation and delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

    (3)   International terrorism/extremism.

    (4)   Instability from failed and failing states.

    (5)   Environmental and humanitarian disaster.

    (6)   Security of vital resources.

    (7)   Organized transnational crime, human trafficking and narcotics.

c.   **Identify the Main Actors[6] in the Area.** Typically there will be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions and influences contribute to, or mitigate, potential risks or threats to NATO's interests in the area. Each actor has its own interests and acts in pursuit of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. They can be viewed as systems[7], comprised of different elements that interact in accordance with their attributes with other systems to influence their behaviour in pursuit of their interests. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences. Actors may be:

    (1)   Nation states and non-state entities.

    (2)   Organisations including governmental, security forces, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organisations (PVOs), as well as commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

    (3)   Groups including political interest groups, social power and influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups usually linked to the individuals above.

    (4)   Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders and opinion formers[8].

d.   **Gather Further Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and Domains in the Area.** Drawing on knowledge provided, the Knowledge Centre SME's then ensure that their information and knowledge are at the appropriate level of granularity to support operational-level planning. This includes localized, collected, organised and shared geospatial information to provide the additional necessary information about the operational environment,[9] and the characteristics of the main state and non-state actors focusing on the following major domains where applicable:

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[6] Actor - A person or organization, including state and non-state entities, with the capability to pursue its interests and objectives. (Working definition)

[7] System - A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (Working definition)

[8] Opinion Formers – Trendsetters whose actions, attitudes, and pronouncements generally exert direct and indirect influence on those of the others.

[9] The operational environment can be seen as a system of systems in which different actors interact within the operational environment in pursuit of their interests. They develop strategies and allocate resources to carry out actions to gain power that enables them to influence others and achieve their objectives.

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(1)   Political - Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organisation through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.

(2)   Military - The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organisational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.

(3)   Economic - Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.

(4)   Social - The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.

(5)   Information - The entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media.

(6)   Infrastructure - The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.

e.   **Conduct an Initial Analysis of the Systems in the Area in Consultation with the SOPG.** The knowledge element adds to the initial analysis of the main actors and their interaction within the strategic environment over time to gain a common understanding of the:

(1)   Background to the situation, its origin, causes and defining events.

(2)   Interest of the main state and non-state actors and the relationships.

(3)   Dynamics of the current situation.

(4)   Key Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) factors influencing the situation.

(5)   Requirements for additional collection and analysis.

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4-6.   Develop Information / Knowledge Requirements.

a.   **Determine Knowledge Requirement (KR)[10].** Based on the initial understanding of the situation and its potential development, the staff determines specific requirements for knowledge to support operational level assessments and decision-making during the different phases of the NATO Crisis Response Process. These may include the need for further knowledge about the capabilities and behaviour of different actors, their relationships and influences, as well as key factors within the strategic environment. KR may be structured as one or more questions regarding the information needed to provide adequate understanding. KRs drive collection and analysis by the Knowledge Centre (KC) in the HQ, as well as requirements for external support.

b.   **Determine the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** Based on this initial analysis the staff should advise the Commander on critical information he may require for future operational assessments and decisions. At this stage CCIRs should focus on recognising changes in the capabilities or behaviour of specific actors that might lead to an unacceptable situation regarding NATO's security interests.

c.   **Develop Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).** Based on the CCIR, the Intelligence staff will develop detailed PIRs and initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the IFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO intelligence Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process.

d.   **Develop other Operational Information Sources.** Given certain constraints and restrictions placed on intelligence activities, knowledge centre must collect information and knowledge from other sources for a complete picture. In addition, it is highly likely that international, governmental and non-governmental organisations are already engaged in the area of interest. They represent a potentially vast source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area related to humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, including logistics, transportation and communications infrastructure.

e.   **Coordinate Requirements with SHAPE.** It is important that the KC SME's coordinates its collection requirements with the KMC at SHAPE to avoid redundant efforts and to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

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[10] Knowledge Requirement - A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system to make a decision. (Working definition)

PHASE 2 - OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION OF SACEUR's STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS

Section 1 - General

4-7.   Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 2 is twofold: first, to understand the strategic situation, the nature of the problem and NATO's desired end state, and NATO strategic and military strategic objectives, through SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA); and second, to provide operational advice to SACEUR on his Military Response Options (MROs).

b.   **Overview.** Phase 2 at the operational level spans Phase 2 and 3 at the Strategic level (SSA and MROs) and it is divided into two steps. The first step begins with SACEUR's warning order and/or directions to initiate prudent military planning. It includes the activation of the JOPG[11], deploying a liaison/planning element to SHAPE (a JOPG experienced planner), and the conduct of of an operational appreciation of the SSA. Phase 2 continues, in the second step, with the request from SACEUR to provide operational advice on the draft MROs. If, however, the NAC requests SACEUR to submit the SSA and MROs as a single document, then the two steps of Phase 2 are merged accordingly. Phase 2 ends with the provision of the operational Commander's advice to SACEUR, including any urgent requirements for the implementation of Crisis Response Measures such as the authorisation to deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) or other measures that may be required if SACEUR recommends the Fast Track Decision-Making process.

c.   **Prerequisites.** Phase 2 is initiated, during the early stages of a developing strategic situation that requires strategic assessment, based on the following:

(1)   SACEUR's Warning Order.

(2)   SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.

(3)   Draft Military Response Options.

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 2 - Operational Appreciation of the SSA are depicted in Figure 4.4.

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[11] Activation of the JOPG is at the Commanders's discretion and will not always be tied to formal tasking from SACEUR.

Strategic Level SACEUR	Operational Level COM JFC	Tactical Level Components

Figure 4.4 - Operational Appreciation of SSA and Assessment of MRO

e.   **Products.** The main output from Phase 2 – Operational Appreciation of the SSA and assessment of MROs is the Operational Commander's advice. An illustrative example is provided in Appendix 1 to Annex D.

f.   **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** The outcome of Phase 2 – Operational appreciation of the situation is for operational input/advice to be submitted on potential NATO MROs to ensure that:

(1)   Military strategic objectives are clearly defined and attainable within the means and ways likely to be provided.

(2)   Strategic preconditions for operational success are clearly articulated, including operational requirements for the legal framework, information strategy, theatre of operations, etc.

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(3)   Strategic risks and operational consequences, as well as their possible mitigation, have been clearly stated.

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1)   JOPG. The JOPG, as guided by the Commander, plays the leading role in the development of the operational appreciation of the SSA. It is responsible for the analysis and operational evaluation of MROs and to provide the operational Commander with an assessment of their viability to establish conditions required to accomplish the military strategic objectives and the desired end state.

(2)   Knowledge. The Knowledge Centre SME's directly supports the JOPG in understanding the nature of the crisis as well as the actions, capabilities and behaviour of the main actors/systems and influencing factors that account for the current situation and its development.

(3)   Joint Effects Management. The Joint Effects Management Branch (JEMB) is represented in the JOPG to assess the consistency of military effects with the political, economic and civil efforts within a comprehensive approach. The JEMB initiates the Effects Working Group (EWG) to support the JOPG with the development and design of effects, and to provide commander with the Commander Approved Effects List (CAEL).

(4)   Joint Synchronization and Execution. The Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch (JSEB) helps maintain, through the Joint Coordination Board, the joint campaign on the planned path, and periodically produces a Joint Coordination Order (JCO) or FRAGO in close coordination with JPB and JEMB, as and when required. For that reason and in order to understand the nature of the crisis and the proposed resolution, the Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch is represented in the JOPG from the beginning of the process.

h.   **External Coordination.**

(1)   SHAPE. The focus of this phase is to provide an operational appreciation during the development of the SSA and MROs. The JFC would normally maintain a deployed planning element with the SOPG during this phase.

(2)   Subordinate Commands. The affiliated, component commands and other subordinate commands maybe required to contribute to the development of operational advice. In which case, they should be alerted to any requirements for liaison or planning support to the JOPG.

Section 2 - Process

Step 1. Appreciation of SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.

4-8.   Initiate an Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis.

a.   **Activate Operational Crisis Response Organisations.** On receipt of SACEUR's Warning Order and/or direction to initiate prudent military planning, the JFC Director of Operations will direct the following actions, as required:

(1)   Activate the JOPG.

(2)   Issue warning orders to subordinate commands and request planning/liaison elements.

(3)   Deploy a planning/liaison element to SHAPE, if not already deployed.

(4)   Establish liaison with other HQs, organisations, and agencies.

(5)   Alert the OLRTs for possible deployment.

(6)   Update information on Area of Interests (AOIs).

b.   **Initiate the Estimate Process[12].** Upon receipt of the SSA, the Director of Operations must assess the urgency of the situation and determine requirements for immediate action. He should quickly review the request and specifically:

(1)   The precise task to be accomplished and any guidance.

(2)   The time available.

(3)   The political aim, desired NATO end state, and NATO strategic and military strategic objectives, if stated.

(4)   Potential military and non-military roles.

(5)   Requirements for external coordination.

(6)   The need for additional guidance and/or clarification.[13]

c.   **Provide Advice on Potential Requirement for Fast Track Decision-Making.[14]** In an urgent situation, requiring the early deployment of forces to a crisis area, and when

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[12] Military Estimates are revised and updated as information becomes available to meet the requirements during the planning and conduct of operations. They are developed from an analysis of factual information and necessary assumptions to appreciate a situation and possible courses of action, as well as to evaluate the impact of operational factors and possible opposing actions to assess risks and reach a decision. Running estimates are developed and kept up to date for each functional area.

[13] Functional Planning Guides (FPGs) provide planning guidance in specific functional areas to operations planners. The intent of these guides is to supplement the planning information available in MC 133, approved NATO doctrine and MC documents.

[14] MC 133/3 (Under revision, to be replaced by MC133/4), NATO's Operational Planning System, 18 Aug 05 describes the Fast-Track Decision Making (FTDM) process that may be invoked by the NAC to enable a timely implementation of a NAC decision for the deployment of rapidly deployable forces. MCM-0147-2006, 3 Oct 06, Practical Modalities to Initiate the Force Activation Process When the Fast-Track Decision Making Process Is Used; provides procedures for implementation.

the relevant COP/GCOP is available, the SSA may include advice on the need to initiate the Fast Track Decision-Making Process (FTDM). In this case the SSA and MROs may be woven together and COM JFC will be requested to provide advice on a potential activation of FTDM. If the NAC decides to proceed with FTDM, the JFC will be required to:

      (1)   Issue warning orders to subordinates.

      (2)   Conduct a rapid mission analysis based on a revised commander's estimate.

      (3)   Consider the readiness and availability of deployable forces.

      (4)   Conduct hasty planning to adapt the COP/GCOP to the situation and mission requirements.

      (5)   Tailor the illustrative CJSOR to the mission, based on the requirements of components.

d.   **Develop the Commander's Initial Guidance**. It will always be advisable to seek the Commander's initial guidance, as he may well have been involved already in discussions with SACEUR, subordinate commanders and others. The JOPG should seek to confirm with the Commander the following:

      (1)   The inclusion of operational staff in the strategic assessment team.

      (2)   The Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) and subordinate HQs to be involved in the assessment process.

      (3)   Requirements for external coordination.

      (4)   Timings for command group review of the operational assessment.

      (5)   Issues to be clarified with SACEUR.

      (6)   Specific focus areas for staff analysis:

          (a)   Military strategic objectives, criteria for success.

          (b)   Strategic preconditions for operational success.

          (c)   Critical capability requirements.

          (d)   C2 arrangements.

          (e)   Strategic and operational risks.

          (f)   ROE considerations.

          (g)   Requirements for additional NATO Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).

e.   **Develop Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE)[15].** JFC must initiate the CPOE process to ensure that products are available to

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[15] Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE) is a coordinated analytical process to develop an integrated understanding of the main characteristics of the operational environment including its land,

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support subsequent operational planning beginning in Phase 3 – Operational Orientation - as well as to contribute to the operational assessment of potential response options, if required.

4-9.   Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis.

a.   **Understand the Need to Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis.** For the SOPG to be able to develop an operational assessment of MROs and to initiate operational planning, they require a thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for all operational level activities, subject to political guidance/constraints, information and time available.

b.   **Review Available Knowledge and Assessments.** The JOPG should establish the extent to which SHAPE and/or its own/other operational HQs may have already developed a knowledge base for the area and strategic assessments of the crisis. This will determine whether the immediate task is to review an existing assessment or to develop an initial strategic appreciation in parallel with knowledge development. In the event that a knowledge base has been developed by another HQ, the Commander should request the temporary deployment of the knowledge element from that HQ to transfer the required knowledge and information. In any case, the Commander and his staff must quickly gain a common understanding of the nature of the crisis, the main actors, their interrelationships and the main influencing factors as described in the following paragraphs.

c.   **Understand the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem.** Based on SACEUR's development of his strategic assessment, and interaction with the SOPG, the first step for the JOPG, supported by the knowledge centre, is to review and update the main structural features and relationships that define the situation and the current "system" state to establish:

(1)   The main actors influencing the problem and its resolution, including potential adversaries and friends, as well as the main non-NATO actors engaged in the crisis.

(2)   The unacceptable conditions in the current situation in terms of international norms that characterise the crisis.

(3)   The main political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII) factors contributing to the crisis.

(4)   The historical background and events leading to the crisis.

(5)   Current trends, the likely course of future events and potential outcomes.

(6)   Potential strategic risks and threats to NATO security interests.

(7)   Critical issues requiring urgent attention.

(8)   Uncertainties and gaps in knowledge.

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air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the PMESII systems of adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint operations. (Working definition).

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d. **Understand the Key Strategic Factors Contributing to the Crisis.** On this basis, the JOPG needs to identify and understand those actor systems and factors influencing the crisis and its likely causes, as well as changes required to improve the overall situation, to include:

(1)   The strategic environment, including the influence of geography, hydrography, weather, and climate.

(2)   Political aspects, including stability, governance, representation, political interest groups, administration, international relations and diplomacy.

(3)   Military/security aspects, including the security situation and stability, internal and external threats, the armed forces, internal security forces, paramilitary forces and illegally armed groups, strategic capabilities, WMD, the provision of arms and sustainment.

(4)   Economic aspects, including vital national resources and assets, production, trade and commerce, distribution, consumption, inflation and debt.

(5)   Social aspects, including justice, the rule of law, social support systems, health, education, welfare, development, cohesion, power and influence groups, displaced persons and refugees.

(6)   Infrastructure aspects, including utilities, energy, transportation nodes, networks and means, communications, industry and public facilities.

(7)   Information aspects, including national intelligence, mass communications and media, information activities by different actors and social groups as well as their receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability to messages, Communication and Information Systems (CIS), Command and Control Systems (C2S).

e. **Understand the Main Actors and their Role in the Crisis[16].** It is critical for the JOPG to understand the effects caused by the actions of each actor, as well as the attributes of each actor's systems to gain insight into how it might be possible to influence them. Building on the existing knowledge about each actor in the knowledge base as well as insights from red and green teams, the JOPG should review and understand the following:

(1)   **Political Goals and Objectives.** Review the actions and statements of each actor and its main elements to understand what they seek to achieve as well as their desired end state.

(2)   **Main Characteristics**. Consider each actor's motivations including the influences of history, culture, values, beliefs, and prevailing attitudes, as well as the personality traits, psychological profiles, motives, interests of key individuals.

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[16] There may be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions have contributed to the current crisis and may influence its future development. Each actor in the crisis has interests and acts in pursuit of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. They can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support their goals. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences in the crisis.

4-21

At this point it is also useful to consider the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of external influences.

(3) **Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses.** Review the key system elements and influences to identify main attributes, strengths and weaknesses of each actor to achieve its goals and objectives. System network diagrams, including a geo-spatial view of each system, help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical dependencies. This will point to the main sources of power, as well as any deficiencies that must be considered during the analysis of centres of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities

(4) **Relationships with other Actors.** Each actor will have a variety of relationships with other actors that enhance or detract from its power and influence in accomplishing its goals. Understanding the nature and basis of these relationships and how they may evolve may provide insight into how they might be influenced.

(5) **Strategies and the Use of Power.** It is essential for the JOPG to understand the main tenets of each actor's strategy, and the instruments of power on which it depends, to appreciate the possible implications for NATO's actions.

(6) **Actions and Effects[17].** It is critical at this point to appreciate the relationship between each actor's capabilities, actions and resultant effects to gain insight into how they might be influenced, using different instruments of power to establish conditions that would improve the overall situation.

(7) **Possible Response to NATO Involvement.** Based on an understanding of the different actors, consider the likely response of each actor to possible NATO responses. This will provide an initial indication of potential adversaries, partners and neutrals. It may also highlight the strengths of these relationships including those that may be conditional.

(8) **Knowledge Gaps.** The analysis of actors will highlight gaps in knowledge. The JOPG should capture any additional requirements for information and knowledge that will be submitted to the knowledge centre branch for production. Any critical gaps in knowledge may be considered for inclusion in the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

f. **Assess Potential Risks and Threats.** Based on their understanding of the situation, the JOPG should assess potential risks or threats to NATO security interests, including any issues requiring urgent attention.

4-10. Appreciate the Level and Scope of International Engagement.

a. **Review International Legal Aspects.** The JOPG, with advice from Legal Advisor (LEGAD) and Political Advisor (POLAD), will review the legal aspects of the crisis in

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[17] Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Working definition).

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terms of applicable international law, treaties and agreements, as well as relevant UN resolutions. The result should be a clear understanding of the legal basis for possible NATO military operations, as well as any requirement for additional legal provisions or mandates.

b. **Review International Commitments.** Drawing on its own CIMIC expertise, as well as, input from knowledge and joint effects elements, the JOPG needs to identify the relevant international actors operating in the area that could contribute to the resolution of the crisis, including those IOs, GOs and NGOs engaged in humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, arts, sciences and general project funding. It is critical that the JOPG understands the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations to determine:

(1)   The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different geographical and functional areas.

(2)   The nature, level and scope of commitments.

(3)   The goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to achieving them.

(4)   Potential future contributions.

(5)   The relevant international actors with which interaction is required, as well as the degree of interaction required with each.

(6)   Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic (including medical) support.

(7)   Possible areas for cooperation and mutual support with early identification of supporting/supported roles.

(8)   Priorities for coordination and liaison.

c. **Review the International Media[18] and Public Opinion.** Within the JOPG, Information Operations (InfoOps), Public Affairs (PA), PSYOPS and POLAD, including StratCom policy from the NAC, should collaborate in developing an understanding of the level of media interest among different audiences, as well as, any prevailing attitudes. This understanding will underpin future PA efforts to communicate with target audiences to gain and retain strategic initiative. It includes:

(1)   Assess media infrastructure and assets for production. This assessment examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as well as the credibility of contents. Understanding the various media outlets is essential to inform any assessment of their potential impact and to assist the efficient dissemination of information.

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[18] Media attitudes may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately can influence, positively or negatively, popular and political support of NATO activities and eventual mission success.
The analysis of media content: helps to understand prevailing attitudes and key issues; and provides further insight into the different aspects of the crisis, including potential support and opposition to a possible NATO response.

(2)   Assess prevailing attitudes and issues in the region. This assessment provides the basis for determining requirements for information operations, as well as the best use of resources to deliver relevant information to target populations. To determine attitudes in the potential Joint Operational Area (JOA), it may also be necessary to undertake surveys, and review Media interest and public opinion.

4-11. Understand the Desired NATO End State, Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives.

a.   **Understand the NATO Strategic//Military Strategic Context.** The JOPG must be prepared to conduct their analysis in a dynamic collaborative process with SOPG.

b.   **Understand the Desired End-State[19].** The JOPG analyses the end state in the context of the main actors and system to understand strategic and operational conditions required to establish an acceptable self-regulating solution. This should identify the changes required in the capabilities and behaviour of specific actor and system states and their interaction as well as their influences within the strategic environment.

c.   **Understand NATO Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives[20].** It is critical that the JOPG recognises that the development of military strategic objectives is an iterative process throughout the strategic assessment and option development that must ensure that military strategic objectives are balanced with the means and ways available for their achievement.

d.   **Understand Military Strategic Effects[21].** It is necessary for the JOPG to clearly understand desired strategic effects, listed in the SSA in order to develop operational advice to SACEUR.

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[19] End State - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's involvement. (Working definition)

[20] Military Strategic Objectives - Military Strategic Objectives establish the strategic purpose for military actions by the Alliance within a comprehensive approach. They describe the goals that must be achieved to establish conditions required to attain the desired end state.

[21] Military Strategic effects describe specific changes required in the capabilities, actions and behaviour of specific systems required to achieve strategic objectives. They describe the change required in the physical or behavioural state of a system or system elements that would directly contribute to conditions required to achieve the strategic objective. Therefore, strategic effects establish criteria for determining success and the termination of operations.

Step 2. Assessment of Military Response Options

4-12. Analyse Military Response Options.

a.   **Analyse the Military Response within a Comprehensive Approach.** Military Response Options (MROs) are developed by SHAPE. Throughout Phase 2 of the process, the designated JOPG will collaborate with the SOPG in the development of MROs[22] by providing an analysis of these options and providing operational advice to SACEUR on each of the options developed. The JOPG should use support from system analysts and red team to help in the evaluation process. The COM JFC must ensure that the military ends, means (forces available) and ways are balanced and those strategic preconditions for success, including the contributions of non-military efforts, have been addressed. He does this by asking key questions to his staff, such as:

(1)   Will the achievement of the military strategic objective(s) establish the conditions required to attain the desired end state?

(2)   What military operations (actions) must be conducted to create the effects required to achieve military strategic objectives?

(3)   What are the essential military capabilities (resources) required to conduct the military operations successfully?

(4)   Are the military strategic objectives achievable with the means likely to be available and ways acceptable to political authorities?

(5)   Are the necessary strategic conditions in place to ensure operational success and effective cooperation with other instruments?

(6)   What are the operational risks and how can they be mitigated?

b.   **Assess the end state.** A single provisional end state applicable to all options, agreed by the NAC and stipulated in the MC request for MROs, provides the description of the required conditions that must be established at the end of a strategic engagement. The JOPG must provide the operational view on the viability of achieving this end state with each option.

c.   **Assess the Mission.** SACEUR's Mission will be normally given by the NAC; however, as part of the MRO process, SACEUR can recommend a potential mission associated with a specific MRO. The mission should, among other things, include the objectives that SACEUR must achieve in order for the NATO to reach the NATO strategic objectives.

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[22] Military Response Options are courses of action that outline a potential series of increasingly ambitious steps using the different means available to the Alliance to achieve the agreed strategic effects, objectives and the desired end state. They include different components of the NATO Crisis Response System including preventive options, crisis response measures, counter surprise, counter aggression and NATO security Alert States.

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d.   **Assess the Military Strategic Objectives.** Potential military strategic objectives, listed in the SSA, will be further developed for each military response option. JOPG must provide advice on the operational feasibility of achieving those objectives.

e.   **Assess the Effects to be Achieved by Military Means.** The JOPG analyses the military strategic effects that must be created using military means, including essential support to non-military efforts and support to be received by non-military means, along strategic lines of engagement to achieve each military strategic objective. The JOPG must ensure that the changes in the capabilities, actions and/or influences of specific actor/systems could be achieved using military means or a combination of military and non-military means.

f.   **Assess Military Actions[23].** These military actions[24] must logically:

    (1)   Lead to achievement of the military strategic objectives.

    (2)   Cover the range of actions that could potentially create effects required to change the capabilities and behaviour of specific actors/systems.

    (3)   Be feasible in terms of strategic power projection, operational reach and sustainment.

    (4)   Avoid creating effects that would undermine the achievement of the NATO strategic objective(s).

g.   **Assess Force Capability Requirements.** With the advice of planning elements from the designated subordinate and component commands, the JOPG should assess adequacy of the primary military capabilities[25] described in the option to conduct the military actions and achieve the desired effect, taking into account the possible opposition. In addition, the JOPG should assess (not in order of priority):

    (1)   The capability of the NATO Response Force (NRF) to meet urgent requirements.

    (2)   The readiness and availability of other Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF).

    (3)   The need to incorporate partner capabilities.

    (4)   Impact on force generation for the option and other operations over time.

h.   **Assess ROE Requirements.** JOPG has to identify specific ROE requirements from the operational aspect and provide advice for each military response option on the use of military force, including lethal and non-lethal measures.

i.   **Assess the Use of Complementary non-Military Means.** The COM JFC must be satisfied that proposed complementary non-military efforts would:

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[23] Terminology under review.
[24] The essential military actions identified for each option establish the basis for the employment of military forces and generation of force capabilities.
[25] Capability requirements are stated using NATO common operational capability codes to facilitate force generation by nations and harmonisation with NATO defence planning.

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> (1)   Create required effects in conjunction with prescribed military tasks[26].
>
> (2)   Be politically acceptable by NATO and non-NATO authorities.
>
> (3)   Allow required coordination with military efforts at appropriate levels of command.

j.   **Assess the Main Resource Requirements.** The JOPG with advice from designated subordinate and component commands must assess the main logistics and financial estimates for each option to verify feasibility in terms of:

> (1)   Strategic lift requirements and costs for NATO (nations will have to calculate for themselves as strategic movement is national responsibility).
>
> (2)   Theatre logistics requirements and force support engineering for establishing and operating staging bases, air and sea ports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD), storage and distribution of fuel, establishing and maintaining lines of communications (LOCs), and developing infrastructure.
>
> (3)   Medical requirements.
>
> (4)   Logistic support potentially required to support relevant international actors in extreme situations.
>
> (5)   Infrastructure requirements.
>
> (6)   DCIS deployment and sustainment (e.g. satellite costs) and service provision.
>
> (7)   Budget estimates.

k.   **Assess Provisional Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area.** With advice from designated component commands, the JOPG should provide advice on whether the provisional JOA and TOO, as determined by SACEUR, will be sufficient to achieve the military strategic objectives.

l.   **Assess Preliminary Command and Control (C2) Arrangements.** The JOPG with advice from designated subordinate and component commands must ensure that the principal command arrangements for each option meet potential operational requirements:

> (1)   Assigned theatre of operations provide for the conduct or support of the military option.
>
> (2)   Assigned joint operations area provides space for the conduct of operations.
>
> (3)   C2 structure is adequate for operational level including necessary component, regional, and/or functional commands.
>
> (4)   C2 provide flexibility to deploy forward and to reach back as required.
>
> (5)   Rules of engagement are appropriate for potential use of force.

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[26] In many cases desired strategic effects cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by political, economic and civil actions, possibly in conjunction with military means.

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m. **Review Strategic and Assess Operational Risks.** Based on the SSA, the JOPG should develop its own assessment of operational risks.

(1)   Strategic risk can be understood as the probability of failure in achieving a military strategic objective within an acceptable cost. Therefore, the JOPG should review the assessment of strategic risks by carefully examining the degree to which military strategic objectives, concepts and resources may be in or out of balance.

(2)   Operational risks are based on probability of an operational failure and the consequences. The JOPG should review the main strategic factors related to time, space, forces/actors and information within the theatre to identify risky situations and their possible consequences on mission accomplishment.

n. **Assess CRMs Requirements.** CRMs requirements for different MROs will most likely be similar, nevertheless, JOPG must provide advice for declaration of pre-authorised CRMs and recommendations for CRMs requests.

o. **Assess Strategic Communication/Information Strategy Requirements.** The JFC must ensure that the principal requirements for strategic communication have been identified within an overall information strategy and adequately cover:

(1)   Prioritised target audiences.

(2)   Effects to be achieved through information activities.

(3)   Requirements for policy guidance on methods to enable and promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military, governmental, and non-governmental) in the information environment.

p. **Assess Requirements for Interaction with Relevant National and International Actors**. The JOPG should assess the requirements and arrangements for effective interaction with relevant national and international actors, including:

(1)   Arrangements for in-theatre coordination with cooperating civilian organisations.

(2)   Liaison requirements with local, international, governmental and non-governmental entities.

(3)   Support from NATO Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

q. **Assess Possible Partner and Non-NATO Nations Participation.** A final decision on Partner and non-NATO Nations' participation will rest with the NAC; nevertheless, SACEUR will, at this early stage of the planning process, provide his views on possible partner and non-NATO nations' participation and the JFC can contribute with operational views on this issue.

r. **Assess Preconditions for Success.** JOPG should provide operational guidance on those strategic conditions that must be created at the political level in order to achieve operational success.

4-13. Provide Operational Advice.

a.   **Develop Conclusions.** The JOPG draws together its conclusions from its assessments, evaluation and comparison of the different options as to their adequacy, merits and potential for operational success. In drafting their conclusions, they should focus on the key operational questions raised above in paragraph 4.12.a

b.   **Identify Critical Operational Requirements.** The JOPG may have identified specific operational requirements that are critical for operational success and must include these in the Commander's operational advice, including in particular, but not limited to:

> (1)   Preconditions for success.
>
> (2)   Mission essential force capabilities.
>
> (3)   Critical in-theatre support and infrastructure.
>
> (4)   Essential C2 arrangements and CIS enablers.
>
> (5)   Pre-deployment of enabling forces.
>
> (6)   Deterrence operations.
>
> (7)   Rules of Engagement (ROE) considerations.
>
> (8)   Information strategy.
>
> (9)   Relevant national and international actors with which interaction will be required and the degree of such interaction.
>
> (10)   Additional Crisis Response Measures (CRM), in particular to prepare and deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), as well as other enabling elements.

c.   **Consider Lessons Learned from Previous Similar Operations.** The JOPG should make the effort to determine from the outset what lessons have been learned from previous operations that should be reflected in the Commander's operational advice.

d.   **Determine Key issues for SACEUR.** Throughout the process, the JOPG will have been collaborating with the SOPG and raising significant issues as they arise. However, in addition the JOPG should assist the Commander in identifying those specific issues that should be raised directly with SACEUR.

PHASE 3 - OPERATIONAL ORIENTATION
Section 1 – General

4-14. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 3 – Operational Orientation is to determine the operational problem that must be solved, the specific operational conditions that must be created, the key operational factors that will influence the achievement of those conditions, and any limitations on the Commander's freedom of action for the development of the overall operational design.

b.   **Overview.** Phase 3 - begins with receipt of SACEUR's Strategic Planning Directive (SPD), following a NAC decision and MC guidance to initiate planning for a military response to a crisis. It includes a completion of the CPOE, a thorough review of the SPD, a detailed analysis of the mission and operational factors that will influence mission accomplishment, the development of an overall operational design, and the formulation of the Commander's initial intent. It concludes with the Commander issuing planning guidance to the JOPG for the development of courses of action and issuing the Operational Planning Directive (OPD) to subordinate commanders to initiate planning.

c.   **Prerequisites.** The following document has been issued:

(1)   SACEUR's SPD.

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 3 – Operational Orientation are depicted in figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5 - Operational Orientation Main Activities

e. **Products.** The main outputs from Phase 3 - Operational Orientation are:

(1) Warning orders to subordinate commands.

(2) Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE).

(3) Mission Analysis Brief (MAB).

(4) Operational Planning Directive.

(5) Commander's Guidance to his staff for COA development.

(6) Requests for Rules of Engagement (ROE), RFIs and implementation of additional NATO Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).

f. **Desired Outcome of the Phase.** Operational Orientation is successful when:

(1) The operational problem is clearly defined in the context of the strategic situation, together with the sustainable conditions that must be created to solve

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the problem bounded by NATO's desired end state and military strategic objectives.

(2)   Operational objectives are understood.

(3)   The analysis of key factors has led to deductions and conclusions regarding operational requirements for further analysis and planning.

(4)   The analysis has determined centres of gravity for the main actors, as well as critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities.

(5)   Effects, lines of operations and decisive points/decisive conditions have been developed as a basis for developing courses of action (COAs).

(6)   Initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) have been determined.

(7)   The Commander's planning guidance, to provide his initial intent and direction for developing COAs, has been issued.

(8)   The Operational Planning Directive to subordinate commanders has been issued.

(9)   Requests for information (RFI), rules of engagement requests (ROEREQ) and requests for the implementation of crisis response measures (CRM) have been forwarded to SHAPE.

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The JOPG is responsible for Phase 3 - Operational Orientation, supported by the Knowledge Centre, Joint Assessment Branch, Joint Effects Management Branch and other branches within the JFC when required.

h.   **External Coordination.**

(1)   SHAPE. The exchange of liaison and planning elements with SHAPE during the Operational Orientation should ensure common understanding of the situation, end state, objectives and intent.

(2)   Subordinate Commands. Liaison and planning elements from subordinate command should be integrated with the JOPG and provide feedback to their commander as required.

(3)   Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC). Depending on the situation, the IFC may deploy an intelligence support team to the designated JFC to provide direct intelligence support and facilitate intelligence reach back to the IFC.[27]

(4)   Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD). The CEPD is prepared to deploy a liaison element to the supported JFC and can draw on additional experts from its Civil Expertise Catalogue (CEC) available in a wide range of civil/commercial/technical area identified in paragraph 4-4 g. (4).

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[27] MC 534 Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) Concept, dated Dec 05.

(5)   Designated relevant national and international actors (including IO/GO/NGOs). Given NAC authorisation for direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors, the JFC will arrange for their participation in the operational planning as required.

Section 2 - Process

4-15. Initiate Operational Orientation.

a.   **Determine Planning Requirements Milestones.** Upon receipt of the SPD, the JOPG will review SACEUR's direction and guidance. This initial review focuses on determining planning requirements and milestones required to manage planning efforts and identifying key issues for consideration in the Commander's initial guidance. In particular, the JOPG must assess the time[28] available for planning, including force generation, based on the earliest possible deployment of forces and the requirement for fast track decision-making. On this basis, the JOPG will recommend adjustments to the planning process that may be required to complete essential planning phases and steps that ensure adequate time for planning and preparation at lower levels of command.

b.   In particular the JOPG must confirm:

(1)   Authorisation to deploy an Operational Liaison/Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).

(2)   Requirements to support Fast Track Decision-Making process, if initiated, and the status of related contingency plans.

(3)   Authorisation for direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors.

(4)   Theatre reconnaissance and coordination, including the Commander's visit to the theatre.

(5)   Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling and initial entry forces.

(6)   Any issues for immediate clarification with SACEUR.

c.   **Develop and issue the Commander's Initial Guidance.** It is critical that the JOPG engage the Commander as early as possible in the process and obtain his initial guidance to provide focus for the initial phases of the planning process. The head of the JOPG, with core planners, should assist the Commander by summarising the following for his consideration and guidance:

(1)   Principal characteristics of the operation.

(2)   Key military actions.

(3)   Key issues and areas of specific attention.

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[28] As a guide, each HQ should plan to use not more than one third of the time available to reach its decisions on the course of action to be taken to leave time for subordinates to develop their plans and prepare their forces.

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(4)   Coordination and liaison requirements.

(5)   Command group activities that could impact planning.

(6)   Time critical requirements.

(7)   Deployment of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).

(8)   Planning milestones, including specifically when the Commander will be available to validate the mission analysis, to review COA development and to decide the COA to be developed.

d.   **Establish Liaison/Co-ordination.** The JOPG should make arrangements to receive liaison/planning elements from the SOPG, subordinate commands and the Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD), as well as direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors authorised by the NAC. They must ensure that the required memoranda between NATO and the relevant national and international actors are in place for the release of NATO classified information.

e.   **Issue Warning Orders to Subordinates.** The Commander should approve the release of warning orders to his subordinates as soon as possible in order that they can begin any required preparations for planning and possible deployment. The warning order should provide minimum essential information regarding the nature of the mission and the earliest possible deployment of forces.[29]

f.   **Direct the Preparation and Deployment of the OLRT.** As authorised, the Commander should direct the preparation and deployment of the OLRT.[30] This will require the JOPG to carefully consider organisation and priority tasks for liaison, coordination and information gathering to help build an operational picture of the environment. Experience has highlighted the need for deployable expertise to cover Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOM-I), Force Protection (FP), legal issues with the host nation and contracting for host nation support (HNS).

4-16. Review the Strategic Context.

a.   **Framing the Problem.** The JOPG begins its operational orientation by framing the problem within the strategic context established by the SSA and the strategic direction provided by SACEUR. It requires a thorough understanding of the current situation and the system states that constitute the problem, as well as the desired end state, NATO strategic and military strategic objectives that establish criteria for a solution. The operational problem will be defined within this framework as a part of the mission analysis.

b.   **Review the Current Situation.** Normally the designated JFC will have collaborated with SOPG in the development of the strategic assessment of the crisis and

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[29] STANAG 2014, Formats for Orders and the Designations of Timings, Locations and Boundaries, 17 Oct 00 Annex D provides a Warning Order Format.
[30] SHPPP/2100/8/04 – 100507, Subject: SACEUR's Guidance for the Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), 26 Apr 04.

the MROs, and, thus, will share a common understanding of the situation. The review should establishing the following:

(1)   The nature, scale and scope of the problem and its causes.

(2)   The key strategic (PMESII) factors contributing to the crisis.

(3)   The main actors and their role in the crisis, including their interests, capabilities, interrelationships, interdependencies, strategies, use of power, actions and effects, as well as possible reactions to NATO involvement.

(4)   Potential risks and threats to NATO's interests.

(5)   International legal aspects, including international law and treaty obligations.

(6)   International engagement in the crisis.

(7)   International media and public opinion related to problem and the potential involvement of NATO.

c.   **Review Strategic Direction for Solving the Problem.** SACEUR's SPD and the NAC Initiating Directive (NID) with MC guidance establish the boundaries of the problem to be solved and conditions that must be achieved to attain an acceptable end state. The JOPG must study these directives and update, as required:

(1)   Operational objectives and the results expected from the employment of military force.

(2)   Changes required in the behaviour and/or capabilities of specific systems of different actors.

(3)   Sustainable conditions that must be achieved as part of the desired end state.

d.   **Collect and Review Historical Analysis and Lessons Learned.** Many situations have historic precedents that share similarities with other recent situations. NATO is in possession of studies and analysis reports (through the Joint Analysis Lessons Learnt Centre – JALLC), developed by its bodies or contracted to independent organisations, about many areas and operations in the past. They may provide lessons that are instructive in understanding the current strategic context and how to deal with it. Consulting specific historical studies outside NATO can also be worthwhile.

4-17. Understand the Operational Environment and the Main Actors.

a.   **Update Estimates and Comprehensive Preparation of Operational Environment (CPOE).** The Commander and staff should continue to develop their estimates of the situation based on available information. The CPOE helps set the scene for the operational orientation, which ensures that the Commander and his staff begin the phase with a common understanding of the planning problem. Staff estimates are continually updated by the planning staff using Knowledge development (KD) to ensure the JOPG maintains current information on, and understanding of, the operating environment. The JOPG should provide guidance for the development of CPOE products required to support the mission analysis.

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b.   **Definition and Analysis of the Operational Environment.** CPOE products should describe the main characteristics and allow the JOPG to further assess the potential impact of the operational environment on accomplishment of the mission.

Characteristics	Operational Impact
Theatre geometry	Possible access, staging, entry, operating areas, bases and distances, lines of communications, sustainment, etc.
Geographical/oceanographic characteristics	Observation, obstacles, movement/mobility, key terrain, littorals, choke points, international sea lanes.
Meteorological characteristics	Visibility, ground mobility, air operations, maritime operations, risks to exposed personnel.
Population demographics	Human development, population movement, displaced populations/refugees, dependence on humanitarian aid, populations at risk, unemployment.
Political situation	Credibility, popularity, effectiveness of governments to provide for the basic needs of the populace, opposition, stability, status of forces agreements, rule of law.
Military and security situation	External/internal threats, surrogates and proxy forces, illegally armed groups, extremism/terrorism, operational areas, military dispositions, police, military activity.
Economic situation	Availability of money, food, energy, raw materials, industry, services.
Socio-cultural situation	Social cohesion/conflicts, dominant groups, extremism.
Health and medical situation	Risk of famine, diseases, epidemics, environmental hazards, available medical support.
Infrastructure situation	Possible points of entry, theatre infrastructure (e.g. adequacy of transportation and communication nodes and networks), utilities, POL storage and distribution, host nations support.
Information and media situation	Control/bias/manipulation of media, public access to information, use of propaganda, robustness of communications.

c.   **Evaluation of Adversaries, Friends and Neutrals.** During Phase 2 – Operational Appreciation and Assessment of Options, under the guidance of the Commander and in collaboration with the SOPG, the JOPG continues to develop its initial understanding of the main actors and their role in the crisis. Based on the CPOE and support from the red and green team, the JOPG must determine more precisely those opposing, friendly and neutral actor systems they must influence to establish the conditions required to contribute to the achievement of the military strategic objectives based on the following:

    (1)   Goals and objectives of each actor. Review the political goals and likely desired end-state for each actor and assess likely military strategic objectives to be achieved by the use military force/violence.

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(2)   Primary and supporting instruments of power. Review the systems that contribute to main instruments of power that each actor seeks to leverage to influence other actors and systems.

(3)   System interaction, interdependencies, influences and vulnerabilities. Review the strengths and weaknesses of the main actors and systems in terms of the capacity to influence other actors and systems and to be influenced based on their vulnerabilities and interdependencies. Identify critical system relationships, nodes and linkages.

(4)   Military capabilities. Given the current order of battle and disposition of the different actors, assess the strengths and weaknesses of each actor to achieve its objectives, in particular its capabilities and capacity to use force in time and space.

(5)   Assess possible actions. Based on strategy, operational doctrine and recent operations (the assessed NATO strategic and military strategic objectives, and the military means available), assess the full range of possible adversarial actions and evaluate them in terms of the most likely and most dangerous. Also, assess the likely response across the spectrum by each actor to a possible NATO military response. Courses of action will be further developed based on the Commander's guidance.

4-18. Analyse the Mission.

a.   **Plan the Conduct of the Mission Analysis[31]** The JOPG must carefully plan mission analysis to meet potential deadlines and also to ensure that all the steps within the process are met with the required emphasis. Throughout the process the Commander is personally engaged in the mission analysis and validates the result. He should clarify any issues with SACEUR and seek his endorsement as necessary.

(1)   The mission analysis should answer the following questions:

(a)   What conditions must be established to achieve operational objectives.

(b)   What effects are required to achieve these objective and what systems must be changed to create these effects using military means?

(c)   What are the essential actions to be accomplished to achieve these effects?

(d)   What are the operational implications of time, space, forces/actors, and information?

(e)   What capabilities, support and preconditions are required?

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[31] The purpose of mission analysis is to establish precisely the operational results to be achieved and to identify critical operational requirements, limitations on freedom of action and inherent risks. It is driven by the strategic assessments, direction and guidance, and further influenced by operational estimates, the CPOE, as well as advice from subordinate commands and cooperating organisations.

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(f)   What limitations have been or are likely to be imposed on the use military force?

(g)   What are the (plausible) assumptions that have to be made in place of unknown facts to allow planning to proceed?

(h)   What are the outline requirements for cooperation with civilian organisations?

(i)   What operational risks can be identified at this stage?

To answer these questions, the JOPG will analyse the relevant facts related to the strategic context and the operational environment, make deductions about mission implications and draw conclusions related to the mission requirements that must be addressed in planning and/or further analysis. This process may be more familiar to planners as an operational estimate[32]. Planners can also use the Factor/Deduction/Conclusion table below to guide their thought process.

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic implication. What is the current state of affairs or trends?	The implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance. So what is the significance of the factor?	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis. So, what can or should be done?
Example – Force/Actors: Missile threat from country A, who has what and where.	*Freedom of movement denied.*	*Increase force protection and/or counter strike to neutralise the threat*
Example - Time factor: Government A will collapse in 6 months.	*Collapse of Government A is threatening to destabilise country B with a consequential impact on regional security.*	*Government A needs to be supported through political and security means.*
Example - Space: SLOCs are extended and potentially vulnerable to attack.	*SLOCs need to remain unhindered to ensure force flow sufficient to meet deployment requirements.*	*SLOCs need protection.*

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[32] The Operational Estimate. The Operational Estimate is a military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and its output is a decision about a course of action. Guided and energised by the Commander, the Operational Estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is, essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action. It can be used by SMEs in their preparations in order to effectually contribute to the JOPG. A template is presented at Annex F Appendix 3.

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b.   **Analyse the Assigned Mission.** As a part of the Mission Command approach, the mission and operational objectives are assigned by a higher commander. Throughout the orientation phase, the JFC must continually consider the mission as they determine other operational requirements.

c.   **Analyse the Assigned Operational Objectives.** The JOPG must analyse the different actor systems within the operational area. This helps in analysing operational objectives and identifying those specific systems that must be changed. The culmination of this work will be a mission analysis brief to the Commander (Annex F, Appendix 1).

d.   **Determine the Actor Systems to be Influenced.** The SPD will identify the strategic effects and actions required to contribute to the achievement of the military strategic objectives. These effects represent changes in the physical or behavioural state of a system or system element. The JOPG must examine these actor systems/system elements in more detail to determine precisely which systems/system elements can be influenced by military means. This is critical to determining the operational effects required to achieve the operational conditions. It should also identify requirements for contributions by non-military means and for possible military contribution to required non-military effects.

e.   **Determine Mission Essential Actions.** The JOPG will extract the actions specified and implied in SACEUR's SPD. Throughout the process, the JOPG will also identify any additional actions required to achieve the operational conditions identified above. In addition, their analysis of the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE), in particular the evaluation of adversaries, may identify other essential actions and tasks to be completed by subordinate commanders. They will recommend to the Commander those tasks that are considered critical to achieving the required outcomes of the operation. The Commander will designate these as his "mission essential actions". Mission essential actions are reflected in the mission and establish the operational requirement for the allocation of military capabilities and the prioritisation of training, exercises, and evaluations.

f.   **Assess the Impact of Time, Space and Information.** The mission analysis should consider the operational impact of time, space, and information on the accomplishment of the desired outcomes and help in developing necessary assumptions about the situation and identifying operational requirements, limitations and risks. The JOPG will consider the effects of the operational environment on the main actors as well as NATO forces as they interact in time, space and information sphere. These deductions and conclusions are critical to setting the boundaries and the "realm of the possible" within which solutions must be developed. The type of insights the Commander requires, include:

(1)   Time.

(a)   What are the likely consequences of current trends in the crisis compared to NATO's capability to project forces into the area?

(b)   What are the time imperatives for the deployment and employment of forces?

      (c)   What are the operational risks and opportunities if time imperatives cannot be achieved?

      (d)   Is there a point in time when a specific condition will decide the success or failure of the operation?

   (2)   Space.

      (a)   Are the lines of communication into and within the theatre adequate, secure and sustainable?

      (b)   Can key terrain and vital areas be effectively secured and what are the risks if they cannot be?

      (c)   Are the required operating areas within the operational reach of forces within the theatre?

      (d)   What are the implications of deploying forces to required operating areas in terms of speed, mobility, vulnerability, supportability and control?

      (e)   Are there critical areas where specific conditions will decide the success or failure of the operations?

   (3)   Force.

      (a)   Are the force capabilities and capacities ready to meet mission requirements?

      (b)   Can the required force capabilities be projected and prepared for employment to required operating areas within the required time scale?

      (c)   Can the required force capabilities be sustained in required operating areas?

      (d)   What are the risks to the force and the mission?

   (4)   Information.

      (a)   Is the StratCom policy sufficiently robust for the mission?

      (b)   Are global and local communication links sufficient to support the information strategy?

g.   **Develop Assumptions[33].** There will be some gaps in knowledge and information that cannot be known at this point, such as the current conditions in the area or the reaction of main actors to the involvement of NATO. In these cases, the JOPG may find it necessary to make certain assumptions as a basis for further planning. To be valid, an assumption must be logical, realistic and necessary for planning to continue. Assumptions are often the reason on which a plan can fail and must be avoided unless absolutely necessary. The Head of the JOPG must control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly reviewed. Any changes in assumptions have to be assessed as to their impact on the OPLAN.

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[33] Assumption - A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to complete an estimate of the situation as a basis for future decisions. (Working definition)

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h.   **Determine Critical Operational Requirements.** During the mission analysis the JOPG considers the impact of the operational environment and the main actors on the accomplishment of the required operational mission. They analyse the main CPOE products and update available estimates and advice to identify critical operational requirements including:

(1)   **Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.** These must capture military requirements, sustainment and strategic support required to accomplish the mission. The JOPG will ensure that these requirements can be supported by SHAPE.

(2)   **Strategic Communication Requirements.** The JOPG must identify specific target audiences and key leaders as well as the basic messages that may be required to accomplish operational and military strategic objectives and mitigate risks**.**

(3)   **Preconditions for Success.** The JOPG must identify any essential conditions that are beyond the influence of the JFC that must be established to allow operational success. These may include arranging transit, over-flight and staging areas as well as legal agreements of the status of forces and host nation support. They will also include the changes needed in the non-military domains to address the current crisis in a sustainable manner.

(4)   **Information and Knowledge Requirements.** The mission analysis will highlight gaps in information and knowledge as well as critical information required for subsequent command decisions. The JOPG will identify these as a basis for developing requests for information (RFI) to SHAPE and the knowledge centre, to develop requests for intelligence through Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM), and to establish the Commander's Critical Information Requirements[34] (CCIRs). Once approved by the Commander, CCIRs are provided to SHAPE, subordinate and supporting commands, as well as cooperating civil organisations. The two key elements of CCIRs are Priority Intelligence Requirements[35] (PIR) and Friendly Force Information Requirements[36] (FFIR).

(5)   **Crisis Response Measures (CRM).** The mission analysis will highlight operational requirements that may call for the implementation of CRMs by SACEUR and nations to ensure that necessary preparations are being made and that capabilities will be ready and available.

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[34] Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) '[c]omprise information required by the commander to make timely decisions as required for mission accomplishment. They identify potential changes in the situation and eventualities that would mandate an operational decision or strategic guidance.' (AJP-2).

[35] Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) are '[t]hose intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making.' (AAP-6).

[36] Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs) is the '[i]nformation the Commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the Commander's ability to accomplish the mission'. (AJP-01(C)).

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i.   **Determine Requirements for Interaction with Relevant International and National Actors.** The analysis of systems/system elements that must change will identify those that may not be influenced by military means. The need to use other, non-military means to create desired effects must be captured during mission analysis and will need to be addressed with cooperating organisations during planning. Requirement for interaction with relevant international and national actors can stem inter alia from the following areas:

(1)   Complementary non-military activity in support of military action.

(2)   Complementary military actions in support of non-military activity.

(3)   Mutual support.

(4)   De-confliction of critical activities.

j.   **Limitations on Operational Freedom of Action.** Mission analysis should also seek to identify any limitations on the Commander's freedom of action in accomplishing the mission. Limitations include constraints[37] and restraints[38]. They may be imposed by international law, the mandate, or by NATO political or military authorities. However, they may also be determined by operational factors that will dictate the time, place and forces to be used. These need to be identified as they may impact other requirements and pose risks to mission accomplishment.

k.   **Operational Risks.** During the mission analysis, the JOPG should identify any risks to the accomplishment of the required operational objectives result from the operational environment or the capabilities and actions of the main actors in the JOA. Risks have two aspects – first what are the chances that something will go right or wrong and second, what is the level of impact on the operation. At the operational level risks typically relate to time, space, forces/actors and information factors within the theatre. The risk assessment matrix depicted in the table at paragraph 4-30 a.(4) provides a possible way of capturing and assessing risks. Once risks have been identified, the JOPG must consider ways to mitigate each risk (e.g. WMD, increased FP or deployed CBRN), which may highlight additional tasks, capability requirements and limitations resulting from consideration of:

(1)   How can we reduce our exposure?

(2)   How can we reduce the probability of occurrence?

(3)   How can we limit the scale and severity of the consequences?

4-19. Analyse Centres of Gravity.

a.   **The Nature of Centres of Gravity[39].** Based on the mission analysis, the JOPG should have a clear understanding of the operational objectives that must be achieved as

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[37] Constraint - a requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.
[38] Restraint - a requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.
[39] Centre of gravity - Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP 6).

well as capabilities and range of actions of adversaries and other actors. On this basis the JOPG can now complete their own analysis of centres of gravity.

(1)   **Operational Centres of Gravity** are typically a dominant capability which allows the actor to actually achieve operational objectives. Therefore, depending on his mission requirements, the Commander may have to analyse both strategic and operational centres of gravity. The centre of gravity may change if strategic/operational conditions or objectives change.

b.   **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** This analysis has to be conducted for each of the main actors. Centre of gravity analysis draws upon the systems analysis of the main actors and systems to determine their critical capabilities (what it enables the actor to do), their critical requirements (what it needs to be effective) and critical vulnerabilities (how can it be influenced).

Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix	
Assessed Aim and Desired Outcome	
What is the actor's main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions?	
Centre of Gravity	**Critical Capabilities**
…is a principal source of strength of power for achieving one's aim.	…is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the COG it strength.
What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his strategic objectives?	What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system?
To be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend. *A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.*	*To be influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend).* *The key word is the verb - the ability to….*
Critical Vulnerabilities	**Critical Requirements**
…exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.	…are specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities.
What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?	What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to generate and sustain the COG's critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?
To be attacked in an opponent and protected in a friend. *A noun with modifiers.*	*To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend.* *Nouns, things.*
Conclusions	
Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences could be exploited to change the capabilities and behaviour of the actor and improve conditions in the operational environment?	

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c.   This analysis is supported by Red and, resources permitting, a Green team to provide their respective point of view. Of critical importance is that the analysis leads to conclusions about what can be exploited in the opponent and what must be protected in friendly and neutral actors. These key insights should contribute to the development of the main ideas for the campaign and should be captured as key deductions.

4-20. Analyse Operational Objectives and Determine Criteria for Success and Operational Effects.

a.   Based on the mission analysis, the Commander and the JOPG should share a clear understanding of the operational conditions that must be established and sustained, as well as which actors and systems must change. The evaluation of the main actors/systems and analysis of their centres of gravity provide additional insight into what changes in the behaviour and capabilities of specific actors/systems may be required. On this basis, the JOPG analyses the operational objectives and determine criteria for success and operational effects.

(1)   **Operational Objectives.** Operational objectives, assigned by SACEUR, establish the conditions to be achieved in the operational area required to accomplish military strategic objectives and contribute to the desired end state. They provide the focus for the employment of military force to influence strategic and operational centres gravity to achieve changes required in the operational behaviour or capabilities of specific actor systems.

(2)   **Criteria for Success[40].** Criteria for success provide tests for determining when the objective has been achieved. They establish standards for sustainable and self-regulating conditions and system states that must exist as well as any conditions system states that cannot exist in order for the objective to be met. They are critically important to the campaign assessment process and decisions related to transition and termination of operations.

(3)   **Operational Effects[41].** Based on the criteria for success for each objective and its previous analysis of each actor's systems, the JOPG is able to determine the likely changes required in specific actor's systems/system elements. The changes are stated as effects.

(4)   **Develop Measures of Effectiveness[42] (MOE).** Based on knowledge of the systems, the JOPG simply states the recognisable benchmark changes that would be visible if our actions were effective and conversely those that may be visible if our actions are ineffective or negative. For example our actions may be considered effective if "the frequency of armed attacks against ethnic minorities

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[40] Criteria for Success – conditions that must exist for an objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist.
[41] Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition)
[42] Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) - A metric used to measure a current system state. MOE are used during the conduct of operations to help determine "are we doing the right things." They describe how the system capabilities and behaviour should change if our actions are effective.

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has declined…" MOE can be refined later during the planning process and execution.

4-21. Develop the Operational Design.

Figure 4.6 - Basic Principles of Operational Design

a.   Operational design provides the critical link between operational problem to be solved and the required operational objectives. It applies operational art[43] in transforming the unacceptable operational situation at the start of the campaign[44] by establishing decisive points/decisive conditions[45] along different lines of operations. These lines of operations will lead to the accomplishment of operational, military strategic objectives, NATO strategic objectives and attainment of the desired end state, as shown in Figure 4.6. The operational design provides a conceptual overview of the entire campaign and is fundamental to:

(1)   Communicating the Commander's vision of the operation and his initial intent.

(2)   Providing the common basis for the development of courses of actions.

(3)   Synchronisation and coordination of the campaign over time.

(4)   Assessing progress of the campaign.

(5)   Adapting and adjusting OPLANs to deal with foreseen and unforeseen events.

(6)   The Joint Assessment Branch will contribute to the process of developing the Op Design. This will ensure that preconditions for conducting operations assessment in execution are met. The Op Design is the key reference for assessing progress or delay of the campaign.

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[43] Operational art - The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AAP 6)
[44] Campaign - A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)
[45] Doctrine identifies two similar operational design elements; the decisive condition and the decisive point. An operational design would normally use either the decisive condition or the decisive point construct, but not both. Decisive points may be of more use when designing the operational design for a more traditional force-on-force operation.

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b. **Determine Decisive Points/Decisive Conditions.** For each operation to be successful it is necessary to determine the sequence in which specific conditions must be established to focus the effort required to accomplish one or more operational and military strategic objectives. When specific sustainable conditions are determined to be critical to gaining or retaining freedom of action or to the accomplishment of the objective, they may be designated as decisive points/decisive conditions. The conclusions drawn from centre of gravity analysis should highlight changes in the critical capabilities and influences of specific actors that would be decisive to our success on a given line of operations. Identifying decisive points/decisive conditions is critical to the overall design in terms of:

(1) Establishing the nature and sequence of joint operations along each Line of Operation (LOO).

(2) Prioritising the effects to be created.

(3) Determining the force/capability requirements for each LOO over time.

(4) Synchronising and coordinating operations on different LOO

c. **Determine Lines of the Operation[46]**. Lines of operation link effects and decisive points/decisive conditions to an objective. The determination of lines of operations will shape the development of the OPLAN as well as the conduct of operations. It is therefore critical that alternatives are developed and presented to the Commander focusing on:

(1) The purpose of each line of operation.

(2) Critical vulnerabilities to be exploited or protected.

(3) Decisive points/decisive conditions required to retain freedom of action and progress in the accomplishment of operational objectives.

(4) Required interaction with non-NATO entities.

d. **Determine Branches[47] and Sequels.** JOPG may be able to, at this early stage, identify requirements for possible branches and sequels and amend their operational design accordingly. It will be COA wargaming, however, that provides further opportunity to develop the branches and sequels to mitigate possible risks in achieving operational objectives.

e. **Develop Requirements for Strategic Communication.** Given the desired effects and resulting decisive points/decisive conditions to be established, the JOPG should at this point ensure that requirements for strategic communication are developed for each line of operation. This should be expressed in terms of the message to be communicated to the main actors.

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[46]Line of operation (LOO). In a campaign or operation, a logical line(s) linking effects, decisive points and/or decisive conditions to an objective. (Working definition)
[47] Branch - A contingency option built into the base plan executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve the original objective. (Working definition)

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f.   **Evaluate Alternatives and Develop the Operational Design.** The JOPG should discuss alternatives to the operational design with the Commander and provide their recommendations. The Commander must decide the lines of operation as well as the decisive points/decisive conditions he sees along each line of operations. He will use lines of operations to designate and shift his main effort[48] during the course of the operation and use decisive points/decisive conditions as "intermediate objectives" to coordinate joint operations in cooperation with relevant national and international actors. Therefore, the Commander may seek advice from his subordinate commanders and executive-level representatives of cooperating relevant national and international actors.

g.   **Develop Tentative Missions for Subordinate Commanders.** Once the operational design is developed, the JOPG will develop tentative missions and tactical objectives for the subordinate commanders. The mission will be further refined, in collaboration with subordinate commands, during the CONOPS development.

4-22. Estimate Initial Force/Capability and C2 Requirements.

a.   **Estimate Initial Force/Capability Requirements.** The JOPG should conduct a high level troops-to-tasks analysis to identify the major force/capabilities required for the operation. The process is simply to update the estimate of required operational capabilities based on the mission analysis[49] and to compare it with the force capability requirements provided in the SPD. This will allow identification of any significant differences that may reflect an imbalance between required objectives and the means likely to be available. Significant issues may constitute an operational risk and should be brought to the attention of the Commander as well as to SACEUR, if required.

b.   **Estimate C2 Requirements.** The JOPG operations and communications staff should work together with the component/subordinate command liaison to establish the basic C2 requirements based on the mission analysis and operational factors, including:

   (1)   **Main Considerations.** C2 requirements are driven by several factors determined during the mission analysis and operational design:

      (a)   The geographic dispersion of forces in the theatre and the JOA.

      (b)   The different lines of operations and the nature and purpose of military actions in concert with relevant national and international actors.

      (c)   The size and functional composition of the deployed force.

      (d)   Critical liaison and coordination requirements.

      (e)   Span of control.

      (f)   CIS points of presence.

      (g)   The possibilities for C2 reach back.

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[48] Main effort - The primary focal point of an operation established by a commander within his area of responsibility for the deliberate concentration of effects using available resources where and when he deems it necessary to achievement of his objective. (Working definition)
[49] The mission analysis identified critical operational capabilities requirements. The process of developing the operational design will have identified additional requirements as well as the general sequence and operational areas for employment.

(2) **Analyse Theatre of Operations[50] and Joint Operations Area[51].** The first step is to analyse the TOO and JOA designated by SACEUR. Conclusions from the analysis will help JOPG to determine operational requirements inter alia entry points, LOCs, operations area, force requirements, logistic, etc.

(3) **Determine Required C2 Functions and Locations.** The next step is to assess what actions will be accomplished, where and by what kind of forces.

(4) **Determine Geographical and Functional Areas of Responsibility.** Based on these considerations, the Commander can make preliminary estimates about his requirements to organise his command structure based on geographical and functional areas of responsibility.

(5) **Determine Critical Liaison and Coordination Requirements.** The location of international and governmental authorities in the area may require a permanent high level C2 presence which will influence C2 requirements.

(6) **Span of Control.** Following military principles, the Commander will want to balance the advantages and disadvantages between a relatively flat organisation and a multilevel hierarchy.

(7) **CIS Points of Presence.** Depending on the theatre location and communication infrastructures, the Commander may have to rely on deployable CIS that will have a limited number of points of presence, which in turn will limit the number of deployed HQs locations.

4-23. Conduct Theatre Reconnaissance and Coordination.

a. **Direct Coordination and Collection by the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT).** The JOPG should provide prioritised coordination and collection requirements to confirm critical aspects of the mission analysis and key assumptions. The early deployment of the OLRT, once authorised, provides a means to conduct required coordination and reconnaissance in the theatre. This requires that the Commander designate a single authority for direction and tasking of the OLRT, as well as to establish and maintain effective communications for the exchange of information. The exact timing of OLRT deployment will depend on the situation but almost certainly it will be one of the first requests that the COM JFC makes to SACEUR at the start of the planning process.

b. **Plan and Conduct the Commander's Theatre Reconnaissance.** Ideally, the Commander should visit the theatre with his component commanders and key staff to conduct high level coordination and gain firsthand insights into the operational environment. This should be incorporated in planning milestones to confirm the mission

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[50] Theatre of operations (TOO) - An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations area. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time (Working definition)
[51] Joint operations area (JOA) - A temporary area defined by the SACEUR, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-6)

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analysis and to provide better knowledge and understanding of the operational environment for COA development.

4-24. Conduct Mission Analysis Brief, Issue the Commander's Planning Guidance for COA developments, issue Operational Planning Directive and Submit Requests to SHAPE.

a.   **Validate the Mission Analysis and the Operational Design.** The JOPG must validate the results of the mission analysis and the operational design, including the risk assessment within the HQs and ultimately, with the Commander, through the Mission Analysis Brief. Every effort must be made by the JOPG to engage the Commander during the mission analysis and operational design, and in drafting the Commander's intent. In any case, the Commander must approve or take ownership of the:

(1)   Assigned mission and operational objectives.

(2)   Operational objectives, criteria for success and operational effects.

(3)   The operational design in terms of lines of operations and the sequence of required decisive points/decisive conditions in different phases of the operation.

(4)   Tentative missions to subordinate commanders.

(5)   The most likely and most dangerous courses of action of opponents, in broad terms, to be developed as a basis for planning.

b.   **Confirm the Commander's Initial Intent.** The initial intent should reflect the Commander's vision of how the operation should unfold in terms of the general outline, the nature, sequence and purpose of main operational activities leading logically to the achievement of the operational objectives. The intent should:

(1)   Establish the purpose of the main operational activities in terms of the conditions he intends to achieve.

(2)   Indicate whether the main operational activities are being conducted concurrently or sequentially.

(3)   Establish the main effort.

(4)   Identify risks accepted or not accepted.

(5)   Conclude by relating the Commander's intent to the military strategic objectives and the end state.

(6)   Endure throughout the campaign and serve as a guide that allows mission command and initiative by subordinates.

c.   **Issue Guidance for COA Development**. The Commander should provide sufficient guidance to the JOPG to allow them to work efficiently and effectively in developing COAs within the time available. The level of detail will typically depend on the nature of the mission, the operational circumstances, especially the time available, and the experience of the JOPG. On this basis the Commander may:

(1)   Specify opposing actions to be considered and opposing COAs to be developed.

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      (2)   Establish his criteria for COA development and selection.

      (3)   Describe in broad terms the COAs he wants developed.

      (4)   Direct the JOPG to focus its efforts on developing a single COA due to the urgency and nature of the situation.

d.   **Issue Operational Planning Directive.** COM JFC will issue the operational planning directive to subordinate commanders to provide them with operational output from the mission analyse brief and to provide the necessary direction to formally initiate planning at the tactical level.

e.   **Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE.** The JOPG should develop requests, requirements and issues that require action at the strategic level. These typically include:

      (1)   Requests for additional Crisis Response Measures (CRMs).

      (2)   ROE requirements (if not identified in SPD).

      (3)   RFIs

      (4)   Preconditions for success. It is critically important that the Commander clearly states those conditions that must be created at the strategic or political levels (in the PMESII domains) to allow for operational success.

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PHASE 4A - OPERATIONAL CONOPS DEVELOPMENT
Section 1 – General

4-25. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4a – Operational Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development is to determine how best to carry out operations that will accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently in accordance with the Commander's intent. This is a collaborative planning effort between the SOPG and JOPG to produce a coherent strategic level CONOPS for submission to the NAC and subsequent approval of the Operational CONOPS by SACEUR.

b.   **Overview.**

(1)   CONOPS development begins with a review of the Commander's planning guidance as a basis for updating staff estimates and developing courses of action (COAs). Tentative COAs are initially described in broad terms and tested for viability. Viable COAs are coordinated with subordinate commanders, refined through analysis, evaluated by means of wargaming and compared among themselves and against opposing COAs, to determine relative advantages and disadvantages. The results are presented with a recommendation to the Commander for his decision. On the basis of the Commander's decision and any further guidance, the JOPG refines the selected COA and produces a coherent operational level CONOPS and a Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).

(2)   It concludes with the Commander's approval of the CONOPS and CJSOR for submission to SACEUR for approval.

c.   **Prerequisites.**

(1)   Commander's approved mission analysis and operational design.

(2)   Commander's planning guidance including his initial intent and guidance for COA development and selection.

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities for Phase 4a – CONOPS Development are depicted in Figure 4.7.

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
Figure 4.7 - Operational Concept of Operation Development Main Activities

e.   **Desired Outcome of the Phase.** CONOPS development is successful when:

(1)   Joint actions are synchronised in time and space and harmonised with cooperating relevant national and international actors to create operational effects that set decisive points/decisive conditions.

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(2)   The sequence of operations along clearly defined lines of operations set decisive points/decisive conditions that retain freedom of action and lead to accomplishment of operational objectives.

(3)   Capabilities required for the conduct and sustainment of joint actions are identified along with the Commander's Required Date (CRD) and final destination and are within the force levels set for the operation.

(4)   Operational aspects of time, space, forces/actors and information are balanced sufficiently within acceptable risks.

f.   **Products.** The main outputs from Phase 4a - Operational CONOPS development are:

(1)   Operational CONOPS.

(2)   Proposed target sets and, as appropriate, target categories.[52]

(3)   Rules of Engagement Request (ROEREQ).

(4)   Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR).

(5)   Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR).[53]

(6)   Manpower Requirements/Crisis Establishment (CE).

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The JOPG remains responsible for Phase 4a - Operational CONOPS development, supported by the Knowledge Development Centre, Joint Assessment Branch, Joint Effects Management Branch and others branches. Operational analysts should support the analysis of COAs using operational analysis techniques to model and analyse possibilities.

h.   **External Coordination.**   Liaison and planning elements from SHAPE, subordinate commands, Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC), Civil Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD), NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA) and cooperating relevant national and international actors should remain in place from Phase 3 - Operational Orientation. Close coordination with the Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) at SHAPE will be required beginning in Phase 4a to assist in developing movement requirements and for assessing the feasibility of COAs.

Section 2 - Process

4-26. Prepare for Operational CONOPS Development.

a.   **Review of the Commander's Planning Guidance (CPG).** The JOPG begins CONOPS development by first reviewing and discussing the CPG. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring a common understanding of the Commander's intent, mission

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[52] In accordance with MC-471/1 – NATO Targeting Policy, 15 Jun 07.
[53] This can only be completed once the CJSOR has been created and agreed and even then it can only be a proposal that has to be agreed by the NAC

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essential actions and the operational design, as well as his guidance with respect to opposing Courses of Actions[54] (COAs), the development of own COAs and the acceptance of risk.

b.   **Review the Results from Theatre Reconnaissance and Coordination.** It is critical that JOPG update the results of the mission analysis based on information gained from the OLRT and possible visits by the Commander to the theatre. This should have been reflected in the mission analysis brief.

c.   **Gather Planning Information.** The JOPG should gather any additional planning information it will need to develop and analyse COAs, including the following: ORBAT, and port, airfield, road and rail data.

d.   **Develop Opposing COAs.** Based on the Commander's planning guidance, the intelligence staff should begin developing the most likely and most dangerous opposing courses of action, including combined COAs for multiple opponents based on the likelihood that they will cooperate or act for a common purpose. This activity is part of the CPOE and must take into account the effects of the operational environment.

e.   **Arrange for Wargaming of the COAs.** As part of the evaluation process, the JOPG should war game each own COA with the Commander against the most likely and most dangerous opposing COAs. The conduct of a wargame requires advance consideration and preparation. The JOPG should consider the following in planning for the wargame:

      (1)   Time available.

      (2)   Availability of the Commander.

      (3)   Critical events to be wargamed.

      (4)   Involvement of subordinates, supporting commands and cooperating relevant national and international actors.

      (5)   Type of wargame – staff estimate, map exercise, operational analysis etc.

f.   **Review and Update Estimates.** The Commander and staff should update their estimates focusing on the factors most likely to affect COA development. Estimates should identify the governing factors for each functional area based on the mission analysis and the effects of the operational area. The result should be a clear understanding of those mission requirements that can, in principle, only be accomplished one way and those for which clear choices are possible.

4-27. Analyse Opposing COAs and Factors Influencing COA Development.

a.   **Assess Opposing Forces COAs.** Before developing own COAs, the JOPG must appreciate the COAs open to opposing forces. The JOPG will present their estimate of opposing COAs including the most likely and most dangerous courses of action for each opponent and combined COAs for multiple opponents as appropriate.

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[54] Course of action (COA) - In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6).

(1)   Analysis of the different stages of enemy COAs provides the JOPG with a more dynamic understanding of the opponents' capabilities that may be available to pre-empt or counter our actions, as well as the inherent risks posed by his actions. The development of own COAs must be able to cater for possible opposing actions and identify how it may be possible to influence opponents' decision-making though strategic communications, as well as military and non-military actions under different conditions:

(a)   Prior to any public announcement of NATO intervention.

(b)   After a public announcement of NATO intervention until the initial entry of NATO forces.

(c)   After the initial entry of NATO forces until the full build up of forces.

(d)   After the full build up of forces.

(2)   Analysis should also provide insight into the opposing forces including the following:

(a)   Decision points [55].

(b)   Critical Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities.

(c)   Critical C2 nodes and decision makers.

(d)   High value targets[56].

(3)   The JOPG should consolidate its appreciation of opposing COAs using the *factor – deduction – conclusion* method to capture those key requirements for further analysis and planning (see para 4-18.a).

b.   **Assess/Confirm the Actions of Others in the Theatre.** Prior to developing own COAs, the JOPG must also develop a common understanding of the actions of cooperating relevant national and international actors, as well as considering the actions of any non-cooperating actors in the theatre to avoid adversely impacting their actions or own COAs, and to enhance interaction with them. Ideally representatives from cooperating relevant national and international actors should be represented in the JOPG and confirm their activities, especially where cooperation and mutual support may be required. The result of this should be a common understanding of the planning requirements to be accommodated in COA development.

c.   **Analyse Other Factors Influencing COA Development.** COA development is about how to accomplish the mission according to the Commander's intent and the operational design. The JOPG will already have significant understanding of the

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[55] Decision point - A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action. (AAP 6)
[56] High-value target - A target the opposing commander requires for the successful completion of his mission. The loss of a high-value target would be expected to seriously degrade critical capabilities. (AD 80-70).

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operational factors that will impact how operations can be conducted, in particular conclusions from its analysis of *time – space – force/actors – information*. They should review these now, with the aim of drawing out those key conclusions that will influence how COAs are developed, focusing on:

(1)   What are the common requirements? There will be certain constraints that will limit the possibilities for certain mission essential tasks and other activities. For example it could be that entry into the theatre will be constrained by the use of specific ports or the requirement to establish a forward operating base for operations in a specific area, etc. These common elements for all COAs should be established prior to COA development to save time and avoid unnecessary work. They can be challenged at any point.

(2)   What are the main operational activities? Operations typically have a number of predominant operational challenges or characteristics which are pivotal to the overall conduct of operations - a critical event, phase or geographic area. Identifying these as the main focus for developing alternatives will be useful in focusing the efforts in COA development.

(3)   Where are there principal alternatives? The JOPG should begin COA development with a clear idea as to where there are major choices in how operations are developed.

4-28. Develop Own Courses of Action.

a.   **Review the Purpose and Conduct of COA Development.**

Typically, the JOPG will form teams to brainstorm possible COAs and to develop a range of tentative COAs. Tentative COAs will be tested for viability and selected for review with the Commander, further developed and evaluated through analysis and wargaming, as a basis for recommending a COA.

b.   **Develop Tentative COAs.** JOPG teams develop tentative COAs in the form of a main idea, illustrated by a sketch and a brief outline of the sequence of main actions by different forces, to outline how they will create the effects and required decisive points/decisive condition. Every attempt should be made to consider as many COAs as possible. This provides more flexibility in how forces might be employed to accomplish the mission and will quickly highlight similarities and fundamental differences that can be further developed. Tentative COAs should answer the following questions:

(1)   What is the sequence and purpose of the main joint actions required to create the required decisive points/decisive conditions?

(2)   What effects are intended by the main actions?

(3)   What system/system elements are actions directed at?

(4)   What are the main forces/capabilities required to carry out the main joint actions and create the desired effects?

(5)   What complementary non-military actions are required?

(6)   What message must be communicated to the main actors?

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c.   **Consolidate and Synthesise Related COAs.** This step is required to merge the best aspects from similar COAs into a limited number of COAs that should be considered by the JOPG in the time available.

d.   **Analyse and Test Tentative COAs for Viability.** The next step for the JOPG is to test each COA to determine if it is or can be adjusted to be viable. A COA that cannot pass that test should be rejected. This test has six criteria:

(1)   **Suitability.** Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the planning guidance?

(2)   **Acceptability.** Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, casualties suffered and levels of risk?

(3)   **Feasibility.** Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be available and the operational environment?

(4)   **Exclusivity.** Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate its comparative advantages and disadvantages?

(5)   **Completeness.** Is the COA complete? Does the COA answer the when, who, what, why and how questions?

(6)   **Compliance with NATO Doctrine.** Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine to the extent possible?

e.   **Update the Commander on Potential COAs.** It is important before the JOPG commits to developing a set of COAs to review proposed COAs with the Commander to ensure that they meet his expectation. This provides an early opportunity for the Commander to influence further COA development by ruling out or adding any COAs and focus effort.

f.   **Review the Commander's COA Selection Criteria.** It is critical at this point that the JOPG review with the Commander his criteria for COAs development and selection. They should reflect what the Commander considers to be most important based on the strategic direction, lines of operations, decisive points/decisive conditions, known risks, etc. Any criteria proposed by the JOPG must be approved by the Commander.

g.   **Further develop COAs for Wargaming and Evaluation.** Once COAs are accepted by the Commander, the JOPG further refines them by adding the level of detail required for further analysis, wargaming and evaluation. Key requirements are to refine:

(1)   Outline concept of operations describing:

(a)   The logical sequence and main purpose of operations to be achieved in clearly defined phases[57].

(b)   When, where and in what sequence operations will be carried out to create desired effects and resulting decisive points/decisive conditions.

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[57] Phase - A clearly defined stage of an operation or campaign during which the main forces and capabilities are employed to set conditions required to achieve a common purpose. (Working definition)

(c)   The main and supporting efforts.

(d)   Effects to support decisive points/decisive conditions and mission essential joint actions to support those effects.

(e)   Operational reserve.

(f)   Strategic communication messages.

(g)   Required non-military actions.

(2)   Missions and objectives for subordinate commands. These must be developed in conjunction with subordinate commanders; their development is a collaborative process but led by the JOPG and the operational level commander.

(3)   Task organisation - force/capability requirements two levels down (i.e. one level below components/subordinate commands) based on an initial "troops-to-tasks" analysis for mission-essential tasks for each components/subordinate commands, as well as any significant changes in the task organisation between phases.

(4)   Operational graphic - illustrates the spatial aspects of the COA by phase, using map sketches or overlays and standard NATO military symbology.

(5)   Operational timeline - depicts the sequencing of key actions by subordinates for each phase of the operation, including other key events and opposing actions.

4-29. Analyse COAs.

a.   **Analyse COAs.** COA analysis provides an opportunity for the JOPG to examine each COA from different functional perspectives to identify inherent advantages and disadvantages as well as to determine key aspects to be evaluated in wargaming such as:

(1)   Decision points/decisive conditions for own actions.

(2)   High pay-off targets[58].

(3)   Risks.

(4)   Required branches and sequels.

b.   **Conduct Troops-to-Tasks[59] Analysis.** Troops-to-tasks analysis seeks to determine the military capabilities and capacities required to implement the COA by focusing on mission essential tasks and other tasks during each phase of the operations, under conditions expected within the operational environment. It adds essential detail to the task organisation required to estimate deployment feasibility and to conduct the wargame. Eventually it forms the basis for the statement of requirements. Inputs are required from subordinate commands who will better appreciate what is required as well

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[58] High-payoff target - Target of significance and value to the enemy (opposing force), the destruction , damage or neutralization of which may lead to disproportionate advantage to friendly forces. (AD 80-70)
[59] Terminology subject to change.

as what is available. However, the process must be led and coordinated by joint planners to optimise the joint force employment and preclude duplication of effort. A typical sequence of analysis is:

(1)   Determine the optimum employment of joint capabilities for each mission essential task and desired effects for each phase.

(2)   Establish the most effective/efficient mix of component capabilities.

(3)   Determine the most effective/efficient theatre level support capabilities to support the joint force and the supplemental support capabilities required by component

(4)   Determine the most effective/efficient C2/CIS capability requirements.

(5)   Update the task organisation

(6)   Prepare a draft Joint Troops-to-Task List focusing on the required capabilities, priorities by phase and the general geographical area in the JOA.

(7)   Assess, in coordination with cooperating relevant national and international actors, potential requirements for support relevant national and international actors in accordance with the Commander's planning guidance.

c.   **Assess Force Availability.** Availability of forces is dealt with by Force Generation (FG) at SHAPE. The JOPG should liaise with FG to check the task organisation for each COA to assess whether the required force/capabilities are likely to be available and ready given the warning time for the operation.

d.   **Prepare a Transportation Feasibility Estimate.** Movement experts in the JOPG should develop an estimate of the feasible deployment of the main forces based on their assumed readiness to forecast their potential arrival in the theatre and the JOA. The deployment can be modelled using tools provided by operations and logistics functional services. The estimated arrival of forces should be used as a basis for their employment in the wargame. Deployment issues should be addressed to the Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) at SHAPE.

e.   **Wargame COAs.** Wargaming is necessary to evaluate the potential of the COA to accomplish the mission against opposition foreseen in the different opposing COAs as well as to identify and correct deficiencies. However, the real value is in allowing the Commander and staff to synchronize actions and to visualise the conduct of operations and gain insight into implications of opposing capabilities and actions as well as conditions in the operational environment. It should help them anticipate possible events and to develop the mental agility to deal with them. The wargame should also help identify potential risks and opportunities that may require for branches and sequels to counter or exploit such situations as well as decision points for the Commander to take action. As a minimum, each own-force COA should be wargamed against the "most likely" and "most dangerous" opposing COAs.

(1)   **Wargame Options.** There are three basic wargame options:

(a)   Wargame operations by phases - play out critical actions by phase against the objectives of each phase.

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(b)   Wargame operations to set decisive points/decisive conditions - play out critical actions for setting decisive points/decisive conditions.

(c)   Wargame operations in segments of the operational environment - play out critical actions in specific operating areas.

(2)   **Preparing the Wargames.** This involves:

(a)   Determining the desired outcomes.

(b)   Deciding on the method and scope.

(c)   Determine participants including subordinate commands, friendly, neutral and opposing players (red team).

(d)   Organising referees, expert arbitrators and recorders.

(e)   Preparing the operational situation.

(f)   Acquiring the tools for manual or computer assisted simulation and analysis.

(g)   Preparing a suitable venue.

(h)   Establishing rules.

(3)   **Conducting Wargames.** The conduct of the wargame is determined largely by the desired outcomes, selected method and the scope. Typically, wargames will include:

(a)   Setting Conditions. An introduction to set the strategic and operational conditions affecting the operation, including political considerations, threat conditions, environmental conditions, civil conditions, information and media conditions etc.

(b)   Game Turns. A series of "game turns" considering the action - reaction - counter-action of opponents, starting with the opponent deemed to have the initiative.

(c)   Assessment. An assessment of probable results and outcomes typically follows each game turn and is used to set conditions for the succeeding game turns.

(4)   **Recording Results.** Observations and conclusions drawn from the wargame should be recorded in line with the purpose. Typically, these include:

(a)   Refinements to the COA and correction of deficiencies.

(b)   Additional force/capability requirements.

(c)   Synchronisation requirements.

(d)   Significant risks and opportunities encountered against opposing COAs.

(e)   Branches and sequels required.

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       (f)   Decisive points/decisive conditions and supporting Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

       (g)   Other lessons learned.

f.   **Synchronise COAs.** The synchronisation matrix provides a useful tool for recording the conduct of the wargame and significant results that may need to be addressed in the CONOPS. It can be a great help in achieving coherence across the different forces and functions and visualising how the different elements can be harmonised to create synergies. The synchronisation matrix for the selected COA is refined during OPLAN development and included in the OPLAN in Annex A – Concept of Operations as an appendix.

	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	
Political Events				
Opposing Actions				
Indications & Warnings				
Decisive Points/Decisive Conditions				
Desired Effects				
Mission Essential Actions				
LCC Action				
MCC Action				
ACC Action				
SOTF Action				
Reserve Priorities				
Target Priorities				
Strategic Communications				
Civil-Military Interaction				
Service and Support				
Risks				
Cdr's Decision Points				
CCIR/PIR/EEFI				

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4-30. Compare COAs and Select a COA for Concept Development.

a.   **Compare COAs.** COAs are compared in three different contexts: first, by comparing their inherent advantages and disadvantages; second, by comparing their performance/risks against opposing COAs; and third, by comparing them against the Commander's COAs selection criteria. A final risk assessment should highlight any risks to the accomplishment of the operational objectives. Based on these different comparisons the JOPG should be able to recommend the COA with the highest probability for success within acceptable risks. Examples of how these comparison can be developed and presented are illustrated below:

(1)   **Compare COAs Advantages and Disadvantages.** The JOPG consolidates the advantages and disadvantages found during the initial analysis of COAs as well as those revealed during wargaming. The process of comparing these should seek consistency across the different COAs.

COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Advantages	Advantages	Advantages
Disadvantages	Disadvantages	Disadvantages

(2)   **Compare Friendly and Opposing COAs.** Based on the results of wargaming, the JOPG should rate how well each own COA coped with the most likely and most dangerous opposing COAs. They should indicate the expected effectiveness, likely costs and potential risks for each combination.

	Own COA 1	Own COA 2	Own COA 3
Opposing Most Likely COA	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:
Opposing Most Dangerous COA	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:	Effectiveness: Costs: Risk:

(3)   **Compare COAs against Commander's Selection Criteria.** The development of COAs should have been guided by the Commander's COA selection criteria. Therefore, all COAs should meet these criteria. However, COAs will differ as to how well they satisfy the different criteria. The JOPG should compare these differences using whatever method (narrative, one word descriptors, numerical rating, rank ordering or +/0/-) the Commander prefers.

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Commander's Selection Criteria	Own COA 1	Own COA 2	Own COA 3
Criteria 1	High/Moderate/Low	High/Moderate/Low	High/Moderate/Low
Criteria 2	High/Moderate/Low	High/Moderate/Low	High/Moderate/Low

(4)   **COA Risk Assessment.** The JOPG should be constantly looking for risks and finding ways to mitigate them as they develop COAs. The COA risk assessment provides the Commander with comparison of the risks for each COA against specific operational objectives (operational objectives, decisive points/decisive conditions, desired effects, etc.), as well as how those risks could be mitigated, including requirements for branches and sequels.

Operational Risk Assessment			
Source	**Consequence for**	**Severity**	**Probability**
Actions of the opponent(s). Actions of friendly forces. Operational environmental factors.	Overall mission. Line of operation. Decisive Points. Decisive Conditions. Desired effect.	**Extremely high** - could result failure to accomplish mission. **High** - could result in failure to accomplish one or more objectives. **Moderate** - could result in failure to meet criteria for success or exceed time, space, forces/actors limits. **Low** - minimal impact on mission accomplishment.	High. Moderate. Low.
Risk Management			
Can we neutralise the source, and if so how? Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk and if so how? Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence and if so how? Can we reduce the probability of occurrence and if so how?			
Conclusion			
Unacceptable - risk management cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level. **Conditionally acceptable** - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to: Modify force disposition/posture/composition. Adjust current operations. Prepare branch plan or sequel. **Acceptable**, no risk management actions required			

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b.   **Commander's COA Decision Brief.** The JOPG presents its comparison of COAs to the Commander with a coordinated staff recommendation. This is typically accomplished by means of a decision briefing to the Commander, possibly with his subordinate and supporting commanders, but could also be provided as a written staff estimate or decision paper. An example COA Decision Briefing format is outlined at Appendix 2 to Annex F. The Commander should coordinate with his subordinate commanders and solicit their advice, especially during time-compressed Crisis Response Planning.   The Commander may select a COA with or without modification or may direct that additional COA(s) be investigated. The essential results of the Commander's COA decision are:

(1)   Clear direction on the COA to be developed as well as required branches and sequels.

(2)   Additional guidance and milestones for the development of the CONOPS.

(3)   Issues to be raised with SHAPE.

(4)   Priority issues requiring liaison, coordination or reconnaissance in the theatre.

(5)   Coordination with relevant national and international actors.

4-31. Produce the CONOPS.

a.   **The CONOPS[60].** The CONOPS brings together the output from operational planning to this point as depicted in Figure 4.8. The format is essentially the same as the main body of the OPLAN and provides the basis for the further development of the OPLAN. The main work for the JOPG is to develop paragraphs 3 through 6 of the CONOPS to articulate details of Operations design, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Signal, as well as the essential annexes. A CONOPS template is at Appendix 3 to Annex D. The full list of Annexes to support the CONOPS main body is at Annex E. Once approved by the COM JFC, the draft operational CONOPS is forwarded to SOPG for incorporation into strategic CONOPS. SHAPE will ensure that it is harmonised with the development of the strategic CONOPS. When the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC, the final operational CONOPS is submitted to SACEUR for his approval. The CONOPS is also issued to subordinate and supporting commands as a basis for their concept development.

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[60] Concept of operations (CONOPS) - A clear and concise description of what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources.

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
Figure 4.8 - CONOPS Development

b. **Refine the Commander's Intent.** The **"**Commander's Analysis" should provide the critical link between the mission analysis, the Commander's intent and his selected course of action. It summarises the main conclusions that the Commander has drawn from own his mission analysis (operational objectives, factors, assumptions, requirements, limitations on his freedom of action, and risks), centres of gravity analysis, and the design of the operation (lines of operations, decisive points/decisive conditions, and main effort). The Commander established his initial intent, based on his mission analysis and his design of the operation, to guide COA development. Since then, he has continued to refine his estimate of the situation leading to his COA decision and must now refine his intent accordingly to ensure absolute clarity as to the critical aspects of the operation including:

(1)   The purpose the operation, its main phases/activities.

(2)   The main effort.

(3)   How the entire campaign/operation will achieve the operational objectives and contribute to the accomplishment of military strategic objectives.

(4)   Acceptance of risk.

c. **Describe the Conduct of Operations.** The operation should be described from the perspective of the COM JFC, encompassing the employment of joint forces with respect to:

(1)   Joint manoeuvre, including the initial entry into and the deployments within the JOA.

(2)   Joint fires, including the use of lethal and non-lethal fires against priority targets.

(3)   Strategic communications within the theatre and the JOA.

(4)   Interaction with cooperating and non-cooperating relevant national and international actors.

d.   **Assign Missions to Subordinate Commands.** The JFC should assign missions[61] (including objectives) to subordinate commanders and allow them the freedom of action to determine the 'how' in the spirit of 'Mission Command'. The missions for each subordinate commander for each phase of the operations should have been confirmed during wargaming and captured in the synchronisation matrix, which should then appear in the OPLAN in Annex A Appendix A-1.

e.   **Develop Coordinating Instructions.** Specific requirements, direction and priorities for different operational functions confirmed during wargaming should be established as "coordinating instructions" to synchronise activities across all commands. Required functional details will be developed during OPLAN development in respective annexes. Items of command interest should be stated in the CONOPS, including:

(1)   Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

(2)   Crisis Response Measures.

(3)   Rules of Engagement and the use of Force.

(4)   Targeting. Joint fires, including targeting guidance and priorities for defence of High Value Asset/Area (HVA/A)

(5)   Force protection.

(6)   Information operations/strategic communications.

(7)   Public Affairs, including media policy, master themes and messages.

(8)   Civil-Military co-operation.

(9)   Inter-agency Coordination.

(10)   Partner Involvement.

(11)   Exit Criteria.

(12)   Rear area operations.

(13)   Environmental protection.

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[61] "Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the **objectives** to be achieved…" (AJP-01(C))
" *Mission* designates the **objective(s)** to be achieved by military operations or actions, delegating the authority for execution to a subordinate, giving extensive latitude in accomplishing the mission"

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(14)   Critical timings.

(15)   Other issues may include for example, CBRN defence and Military police operations.

f.   **Describe the Concept for Service Support.** The theatre logistics and military engineering are integral parts of the CONOPS and must be described within the context of the overall operation. Details will be provided in Annex R – Logistics, Annex S – Movements, Annex EE – Engineering and Annex QQ – Medical. As a minimum Annex R should describe arrangements for:

(1)   Staging and entry into the JOA.

(2)   Main and forward logistical bases.

(3)   Petroleum, oils, lubricants (POL) supply and distribution.

(4)   Theatre engineering support and infrastructure priorities.

(5)   Provisions of common funding.

(6)   Development of the theatre infrastructure framework.

g.   **Describe Command and Control, and Communications Information Systems Support.** The description of C2 arrangements should establish the key aspects for establishing command authorities, relationships and liaison required by the task organisation. In the CONOPS, the details can be provided in Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships, and as a minimum should establish the following:

(1)   The chain of command.

(2)   The delegation and transfer of command authorities.

(3)   The theatre of operations, JOA and areas of operations.

(4)   Liaison and Coordination.

(5)   Location/co-location of primary HQs based on CIS limitations.

(6)   Reporting.

h.   **Develop Required Annexes.** The details for most of the different aspects of the operation will be developed during Phase 4b – OPLAN Development. However, a limited number of annexes are specifically required with the CONOPS to provide necessary inputs to SACEUR for incorporation into his strategic CONOPS. Unless otherwise directed, the following annexes are normally submitted with the CONOPS[62]:

(1)   B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships, including the proposed Task Organisation, Command Structure and Transfer of Authority.

(2)   D - Intelligence.

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[62] Also required annexes for the NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS as in accordance with the draft MC 133/4.

(3) E - Rules of Engagement, including proposed profiles and ROE for land, air and maritime operations.

(4) L - Physiological Operations.

(5) O - Information Operations.

(6) P - Electronic Warfare.

(7) R - Logistics.

(8) T - Environmental Support.

(9) X - Public Affairs.

(10) AA - Legal.

(11) GG - Non-NATO Force Procedures.

(12) II - Joint Fires, specifically sets and, as appropriate illustrative target categories and, as far as possible, categories of time sensitive targets (TST)[63].

(13) JJ - NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), specifically requested implementation of specific crisis response measures.

(14) OO - Campaign Assessment.

(15) QQ - Medical.

(16) XX - Record of Changes.

(17) ZZ - Distribution.

4-32. Develop Force/Capability Requirements.

a. **Develop the Provisional CJSOR.** The provisional CJSOR, including preliminary deployment information, must be developed in parallel with the CONOPS to ensure that it is ready to be released with the CONOPS. It will be presented to the nations as SACEUR's statement of the military requirement for forces to conduct the operation within acceptable risks. It is based on input from the COM JFC and his subordinate commanders. It must balance the ends and the means to ensure the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to accomplish agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks, and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment.

b. Critical elements of information required by nations to determine their contributions and prepare them for deployment include:

(1) Required capability and any special capabilities.

(2) Commander's required date for the force to be available for employment.

(3) Final destination.

(4) Level of command authority required.

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[63] For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes, refer to ACO Directive 80-70 (Annex G).

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c. **Prepare a Proposed Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR).** The provisional TCSOR identifies capabilities required to support the entire theatre and which should be, in principle, eligible for common funding.[64] Based on their troops-to-tasks analysis, the JOPG should identify any functional capabilities required to support the entire joint force and/or the theatre that would be eligibility for common funding as well as the required timeframe. Given that funding and acquisition may take time, they should identify interim solutions.

d. **Prepare Manpower Requirements/Crisis Establishment List.** The Crisis Establishment List template identifies personnel required to fill the required crisis establishments for the activated HQs. It is developed by personnel management staff members of the JOPG.

e. **Develop Recommendations for Implementation of Additional Crisis Response Measures (CRM).**   Based on its assessment and the time available to generate forces, theatre capabilities and manpower, the JOPG should consider the need to recommend to SACEUR additional specific CRMs that call on nations to review, prepare and activate national assets to meet NATO requirements. In particular, they should review CRMs in the following areas:

A   Manpower.

B   Intelligence.

E   General Operations.

J   Electronic Warfare.

K   Meteorology/Oceanography/Hydrography.

M   Logistics.

O   Readiness.

P   Communications and Information Systems.

4-33. Forward the CONOPS and Requirements to SACEUR.

a.   The JOPG will coordinate the CONOPS and the provisional CJSOR with subordinate and supporting commands, as well as with SHAPE, to ensure that they are harmonised with the development of the Strategic CONOPS. Once approved by the COM JFC, they are forwarded to SACEUR for his approval. SACEUR forwards his Strategic CONOPS to the MC and simultaneously issues the provisional CJSOR and Crisis Establishment List to nations through their National Military Representatives (NMRs) at SHAPE. This allows nations to consider the concept together with the capabilities required for its implementation. When the JFC CONOPS is approved by SACEUR (following approval of the Strategic CONOPS by the NAC), it will provide the basis for Phase 4b - Plan Development. The provisional CJSOR provides the basis for force generation.

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[64] MCM-0155-2005, Review of Arrangements for Funding NATO Operations, 29 Sep 05.

PHASE 4B - OPERATIONAL PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Section 1 – General

4-34. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4b - Operations plan development is to: develop the arrangements and further specify the required activities to implement the concept of operations; to specify the conduct of operations, including the deployment, employment and sustainment of forces; and to provide a basis for planning by subordinate/supporting commands and subsequent adaptation, as required, to meet changes in the operational environment.

b. **Overview.**

(1) Plan development begins as soon as the CONOPS is approved by the Commander but must address any issues resulting from SACEUR's review. It is an iterative, collaborative process that focuses on synchronising and coordinating the deployment, employment, protection, support and sustainment of the joint force during different phases of the operation within a single plan. Parallel, collaborative planning with subordinate and supporting commands, as well as with cooperating relevant national and international actors[65], ensures that the activities of all forces and operational functions are synchronised and coordinated to create the effects required to achieve the operational objectives and contribute to the accomplishment of military strategic objectives and the desired end-state.

(2) Plan development concludes with approval and promulgation of the OPLAN as required by the different planning categories. The synchronisation of operational oPLAN and tactical level plan development is critical throughout the process.

c. **Prerequisites.** The following are required to conduct Phase 4b – Operational Plan development:

(1) CONOPS approved by the Commander.

(2) Allied Force List (AFL).[66]

(3) Draft Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR).

(4) Response to COM JFC ROE request.

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[65] The exchange of information with relevant national and international actors will be subject arrangements to release of NATO classified information. Such arrangements will be defined well in advance of an operation and authority to NMAs to release information will be determined by the degree of interaction authorized by the NAC.
[66] The draft CJSOR with national force commitments is sufficient to allow plan development to proceed pending receipt of the Allied Force List issued by SHAPE.

d.   **Main Activities.** The main activities for Phase 4b are depicted in Figure 4.9:

Figure 4.9 - Operational Plan Development Main Activities

e.   **Products.** Depending on the planning category, the following products are developed:

(1)   The product of crisis response planning is an executable OPLAN.

(2)   The product of advance planning is one of the following:

(a)   Contingency Plan (COP).

(b)   Generic Contingency Plan (GCOP).

(c)   Standing Defence Plan (SDP).

f.   **Desired Outcome of the Phase.** Phase 4b - Operational Plan development must meet criteria for timeliness and adequacy given the planning category and urgency of the planning requirement as follows:

(1)   Timeliness.

(a)   Planning products are produced in time to allow subordinates to complete required planning and preparation.

(b)   Critical operational planning requirements are covered in the OPLAN.

(c)   Planning and execution are integrated incrementally as required.

(2)   Adequacy.

(a)   The legal framework, including an international mandate and status of forces agreements, as well as arrangements with host nations and nations allowing transit, are established and satisfy mission requirements.

(b)   Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum military requirements for mission accomplishment with acceptable risk.

(c)   The flow of forces into the theatre supports the operational Commander's scheme of manoeuvre.

(d)   Command and control arrangements, including liaison and coordination with external organisations, as well as CIS and ROE, allow effective integration and employment of forces to execute tasks and accomplish objectives.

(e)   Provisions for theatre support and sustainment meet operational requirements with acceptable risks.

(f)   Contingency planning requirements have been identified and prioritised to cover assessed risks.

g.   **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The JOPG remains responsible for Phase 4b - Operational Plan development, supported by the Knowledge Development Centre, Joint Effects Management Branch and other branches when required. In addition, the Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch (JSEB) should be engaged as required to: monitor the force activation process; to facilitate OPLAN handover; to begin preparing execution orders; and to integrate planning and execution in response to an urgent crisis.

h.   **External Coordination.** Liaison and planning elements from SHAPE, subordinate commands, IFC, CEPD, and designated relevant national and international actors should remain in place to support OPLAN development. Close coordination will be required throughout this phase with the Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) to assist in deployment planning with nations as well as with the host nation(s) via the OLRT.

Section 2 - Process

4-35. Initiate Plan Development.

a.   **Provide Guidance and Direction.** The Chief of the JOPG should review any issues raised in SACEUR's review of the JFC CONOPS, seek any guidance from the Commander as required and employ the JOPG to accomplish the following:

(1)   Establish the schedule for JFC OPLAN development to include:

(a)   Submission of initial drafts.

(b)   Review and coordination of initial drafts.

(c)   Submission of revised drafts.

(d)   Review and coordination with other HQs.

(e)   Submission of coordinated drafts for final staffing for the Commander's approval.

(2)   Review the status of strategic planning by SHAPE.

(3)   Establish inputs required from subordinate/supporting command, as well as cooperating relevant national and international actors.

(4)   Task specific JOPG members to address issues raised by SACEUR.

(5)   Establish arrangements for OPLAN handover.

(6)   Review the CONOPS and refine the synchronisation matrix.

(7)   Issue further direction and guidance.

b.   **Review the Status of Strategic Planning.** Plan development by the JFC depends on a number of critical strategic level planning actions. The presence of the SHAPE planning liaison should allow the JOPG to keep abreast of developments and raise issues requiring attention by SHAPE. Critical areas that directly impact on the ability of the JFC to complete its OPLAN development, particularly during crisis response planning, include:

(1)   **Force Generation (FG).** Immediately following the NAC's approval of SACEUR's Strategic CONOPS and release of a Force Activation Directive, SACEUR would have initiated the force activation process to identify national force contribution to fill the provisional CJSOR[67]. The JOPG should monitor this process to track the following:

(a)   Release of the Activation Warning (ACTWARN) for forces in the provisional CJSOR.

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[67] MC 133/3 (to be replaced by MC133/4), Annex C - NATO's Force Activation & Deployment Procedures; refers to the "provisional CJSOR" as the product delivered by SACEUR to provide nations an indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required. The "draft CJSOR" is produced by SACEUR following a force generation conference and reflects nations' force offers and details the proposed force package for the operation. The Allied Force List is issued by SACEUR to confirm nations' commitments to the force package based on national Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) messages.

(b)   Conduct of the Force Generation Conference - presentation of the CONOPS and the filling of the provisional CJSOR.

(c)   Release of the draft CJSOR with national commitments.

(d)   Release of the Activation Request (ACTREQ) requesting national confirmation forces commitments in the draft CJSOR.

(e)   Receipt of nations' Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) messages identifying forces to fill commitments.

(f)   Release of the Allied Force List confirming force package for the operation.

(2)   **Preliminary Deployment Planning.** Typically SHAPE and national movement planners will meet soon after the force generation conference to review and coordinate strategic movements based on the force flow in the provisional CJSOR. Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) and JFC movement planners must participate in this initial meeting. The main issues include:

(a)   Designation of air and sea ports of debarkation (APOD/SPODs) in theatre as well as staging areas and responsibilities for their operation.

(b)   Designation of air and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs/SPOEs) and responsibilities for their operation.

(c)   Allocation and coordination of strategic air and sealift.

(d)   Commander's Required Dates (CRD).

(3)   **Legal Arrangements with the Host Nation(s).** SHAPE will coordinate with the HQ NATO Legal Advisor to initiate the exchange of letters with host nations and to negotiate Status of Forces Agreements as a basis for developing host nation support agreements/understandings. These are essential for planning with the host nation(s).

(4)   **Development of the Information/Communications Strategy.** The information/communications strategy is developed at HQ NATO by the Information Strategy Working Group (ISWG) with advice from SHAPE. It provides critical information required for JFC planning with respect to Target audiences as well as master themes and messages.

(5)   **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** The ROE Request should have accompanied the JFC CONOPS to establish ROE required for the use of force to accomplish the mission. SACEUR's CONOPS would have included proposed ROEs based on the JFC requirements and justification. The JOPG should review the status ROEs authorised by the NAC and delegated to the JFC.

c.   **Review the Status of Planning by Subordinate and Supporting Commands.** Plan development by the JFC must provide for the integration of the joint force as well as the coordination and synchronisation of actions by subordinate and supporting commands. It is therefore important for the JOPG to remain fully informed as to the

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status of planning by subordinate and supporting commands through regular updates by their liaison/planning elements related to:

>   (1)   The status of COA/CONOPS development.

>   (2)   Coordination of supporting/supported requirements.

>   (3)   Issues and concerns.

d.   **Review the Planning with Relevant National and International Actors.** JFC planning may require further detailed coordination with a number of different cooperating relevant national and international actors. It is important to review the planning requirements, the current status of planning and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate coordination, including the lead within the JOPG. In particular, planning requirements should be addressed for the host nation(s) as well as cooperating international and regional organisations in the theatre.

e.   **Arrange for Plan Handover.** During OPLAN development, the JOPG should be reinforced by staff from Situation Centre (SITCEN) and Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch (JSEB) that will be responsible for execution. Arrangements should be made to ensure continuity between planning and execution across all functional areas. This must balance the requirements for those who developed the OPLAN to oversee its execution with the need to continue planning during the conduct of operations.

4-36. Plan for the Employment of Joint Forces.

a.   **Review the Planning Requirements for the Employment of Joint Forces.** The Operational CONOPS provided a description of how the operation will be conducted and was supported by a provisional CJSOR that established the force requirements. Planning development must now refine the employment of joint forces with subordinate/supporting commands within the constraints of the actual force package for the operation, adding the required level of detail regarding C2 and assessing the impact of any critical force shortfalls.

b.   **Confirm the Task Organisation.** Given the expected or actual force package based on the draft CJSOR and eventually the Allied Force List, the JOPG should review and confirm the task organisation with subordinate/supporting commands to identify any critical shortfalls that would prevent them from accomplishing assigned missions. This review should look at each phase of the operation to understand more precisely the impact. The Task Organisation is depicted schematically and described in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships.

c.   **Synchronise Forces and Functions for Each Operational Phase.** Based on their review of the task organisation, the JOPG should confirm and, as required, revise the current task allocation and synchronisation of activities to achieve desired effects and resulting decisive points/decisive conditions required for each phase of the operation. Working together with subordinate/supporting commands, the JOPG may be able to reallocate or reschedule tasks to compensate for force shortfalls. On this basis, the JOPG should update the "Conduct of Operations" and "Missions to Subordinate and Supporting Commands" in paragraph 3 of the OPLAN main body and develop respective Annexes to the OPLAN. The refined synchronisation matrix is included in the OPLAN

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Annex A - Concept of Operations. Specific areas to be develop for each phase of the operation include:

(1) **Implementation of the Joint Scheme of Manoeuvre.** The JOPG should confirm the flow of forces into the theatre, including the conduct of initial entry operations and the operational deployment within the JOA. In addition to confirming the timing and sequence of arrivals, this detailed review should confirm movement priorities and points of entry required to produce the Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is included in OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations.

(2) **Develop Supported and Supporting Relationships.** The JOPG should review supported and supporting relationships with subordinate/supporting commands to confirm precisely the support required by the supported Commander designated for each phase and/or line of operation. Missions to supporting commanders should be specified in the OPLAN main body (paragraph 4 a). Supporting/supported relationships are detailed in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationship. Resulting tasks are detailed in OPLAN Annex C - Forces, Missions/Tasks and reflected in respective component annexes as well as subordinate/supporting OPLANs.

(3) **Plan for Joint Targeting and the Employment of Joint Fires.** A major coordinated effort by specific members of the JOPG will be required to synchronise joint targeting and the use of lethal and non-lethal means to create the desired effects and resulting decisive points/decisive conditions to be achieved in each operational phase. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex II - Joint Fires. This activity should seek to achieve coherence and synergy in the use of all means available to the JFC in accordance with the Commander's intent including coordination of:

(a) Intelligence support to targeting (OPLAN Annex D - Intelligence).

(b) Maritime strike operations (OPLAN Annex F - Maritime Operations).

(c) Strategic air operations and anti surface force air operations (OPLAN Annex H - Air Operations)[68].

(d) Direct action by special operations (OPLAN Annex - K Special Operations).

(e) Psychological operations (OPLAN Annex L - Psychological Operations).

(f) Information operations (OPLAN Annex O - Information Operations).

(g) Electronic warfare (OPLAN Annex P - Electronic Warfare).

(h) Civil-military co-operation (OPLAN Annex W - Civil-Military Co-operation).

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[68] For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes refer to ACO Directive 80-70 (Annex G).

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   (i) Military engineering contribution to the joint fires and targeting process (OPLAN Annex EE – Military Engineering)

  (4) **Review Rules of Engagement.** Given the current status of ROE approved for the operation, the JOPG must ensure that they meet mission requirements, including likely contingencies, and provide further requests with justification as required. ROE profiles and ROE for land, air and maritime forces are provided in OPLAN Annex E - Rules of Engagement.

 d. **Plan for the Build up and Use of Reserves.** Plan development must provide for reserves as required to cover contingencies based on the force package.   Further consideration may have to be given to where reserves are positioned, under whose authority and any conditions for their employment. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations.

 e. **Plan for the Implementation of Information/Communications Strategy.** Working in close cooperation with SHAPE, the JOPG must harmonise information operations, psychological operations and public affairs to achieve coherence within their focus areas regarding specific audiences, themes and messages. Planning must be coordinated closely and in collaboration with the development of joint targeting and the employment of joint fires. Details are provided in OPLAN Annexes O - Information Operations, L - Psychological Operations and X - Public Affairs.

 f. **Plan for Cooperation with Relevant National and International Actors.** Given the main areas of cooperation established in the CONOPS, the JOPG must now develop the practical arrangements required to cooperate on the ground within the theatre and the JOA**.** These should be described in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships and OPLAN Annex W - Civil-Military Co-operation. As a minimum this should specify the following:

  (1) The delegation of authority for coordination of specific activities.

  (2) Mechanisms and arrangements for coordination and information sharing in accordance with relevant security policy for release of information.

4-37. Plan for Command and Control.

 a. **Review C2 Planning Requirements.** The CONOPS describe the C2 arrangements required to conduct the operation. Based on the force package and further planning by subordinate/supporting commands, the JOPG must now further develop specific aspects of the C2 arrangements. Details to be included in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships.

 b. **Further Specify Authorities and Responsibilities.** Unity of command and freedom of action require that authority is clearly delegated for critical functions and/or geographical areas. The result must be that a single designated authority is established with responsibility for each joint function and geographical area of responsibility within the JOA and the theatre.

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c.   **Refine and Coordinate Areas of Operations[69] (AOO).** Subordinate/supporting commanders must confirm that their respective AOOs are sufficient to accomplish their assigned missions and protect their force.

d.   **Confirm C2 Locations and Communications Connectivity.** The JOPG must coordinate and confirm the locations of the different HQs and C2 facilities deploying to the theatre. This should consider initial locations, collocation and any subsequent changes within the constraints of deployable CIS. The location of the forward deployed joint HQ is critical to determining the location of other HQs that typically will collocate with it. Any changes need to be reflected in the ADL.

e.   **Plan for Transfer of Authority (TOA).** The JOPG should confirm the level of authority required for the employment of each force in the force package against each nation's FORCEPREP message and further establish precisely when, where and under what conditions TOA should occur. This information should be included in the Activation Order (ACTORD) and provide the basis for nations' Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages.

f.   **Plan for the Exchange of Liaison Elements.** Every operation confirms the importance of the exchange of liaison officers/elements to facilitate collaboration. While the use of enhanced network capabilities may improve real time collaboration, liaisons still play an important role. Therefore, the JOPG must clearly establish the requirements for the exchange liaison including effective dates and ensure that manpower requirements are filled.

g.   **Plan for Knowledge Development, Intelligence and the Application of Lessons Learned.** The Commander must build into the OPLAN arrangements to develop knowledge and intelligence about the operational environment and the effectiveness of the force in conducting operations. This must be established in the OPLAN as a command responsibility and provisions made for the sharing of knowledge and lessons identified. The JFC must put into place the mechanisms to collect, fuse, analyse, validate and share critical information required to build knowledge, intelligence and to gain understanding required for operational success. Details are provided in OPLAN Annexes D - Intelligence, LL - Lessons Learned and NN - Knowledge Development.

h.   **Plan for Campaign Review**. The Commander will periodically require a formal review of the progress of the campaign. The review may require regular data collection and reporting across the theatre, including from and to military and non-military sources and may have resource implications. Therefore, the JOPG should plan for the conduct of campaign assessment during OPLAN development. Details on the conduct of the campaign assessment will be articulated in Annex OO. Requirements will be different for each operation but should consider requirements to look back at trends to assess

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[69] Area of operations - An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (AAP-6).

operational effectiveness, as well as the need to look forward to anticipate eventualities that pose risks and/or present opportunities that may require branch and/or sequel plans.

i.   Planning for the preparation and conduct of the campaign review should establish requirements, responsibilities and procedures that must be established to assess:

(1)   Success in and risks to achieving operational and military strategic objectives based on corresponding criteria for success.

(2)   Success in and risks to achieving decisive points/decisive conditions on lines of operations.

(3)   Effectiveness of actions in achieving desired effects based on measures of effectiveness.

4-38. Plan for Force Preparation and Sustainment.

a.   **Review Planning Requirements for Force Preparation and Sustainment.** The purpose of force preparation and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and conduct operations are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes the following main areas:

(1)   Mission training and certification of HQs, personnel and forces.

(2)   Logistical and engineering support to the force in theatre.

(3)   Financial support.

(4)   Rotation of HQs, personnel and forces.

(5)   Identification and application of lessons learned.

b.   **Plan for Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The JOPG should establish mission training and certification requirements for HQs, personnel and forces deploying to the theatre with the details included in OPLAN Annex BB - Training and Mission Rehearsals. These should be based on mission essential tasks and conditions in the operational environment, including force protection requirements, as well as cultural aspects. Requirements and arrangements to be implemented should be established for:

(1)   Augmentation training.

(2)   Pre-deployment training support.

(3)   Certification of forces.

(4)   In-theatre training support.

c.   **Plan Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre.** The logistical concept that was developed during concept development described how joint multinational logistical support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During OPLAN development detailed planning and coordination is required with TCNs and HN(s) as well as subordinate/supporting commands to ensure that supplies and services can be delivered to the force to meet operational requirements for each phase. Logistical conferences will be required to confirm logistical arrangements, especially with the HN(s) to ensure that they meet operational needs and allow a sufficient build up of logistical resources,

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including stockpiles for POL and critical munitions. Any shortfalls in HN support may require the activation and deployment of additional logistical units. The following areas have significant operational impact and must be closely coordinated with other planning and with the details provided in OPLAN Annex R - Logistics:

(1)   **Logistical Standards.** Logistical standards must reflect the expected operational tempo and demands for each phase. Experts from subordinate/supporting commands must assist in refining operational requirements for fuel and munitions.

(2)   **Host Nation Support.** The level and scope of HN support must be confirmed based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to specific facilities, infrastructure and logistical operating units, especially ground transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN to coordinate with HN(s) within guidelines established by the JFC.

(3)   **National Responsibilities.** Logistic execution by framework, lead or role specialised nations must be confirmed for critical logistical activities such as POL distribution.

(4)   **Theatre Military Engineering.** Critical theatre engineering and infrastructure requirements such as the improvement of the Air/Sea Ports of Debarkation (APOD/SPODs), Lines of Communication (LOCs), Communication and Information Systems Surveillance Radar Station (CIS RLS) and facilities must be identified and prioritised against operational requirements.

d.   **Plan for Theatre Medical Support.** Theatre medical support must meet the requirements of TCNs in different operating areas. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex QQ.

e.   **Plan for Financial Support.** It is critical that NATO common funding is made available as early as possible to meet requirements eligible for common funding. The JOPG should identify and prioritise operational requirements for each phase of the operation.   Particular attention should be given to detailing requirements to support enabling and initial entry operations, such as establishing communications, operating ports and facilities, contracting local services such as interpreters and security. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex FF - Financial Support.

f.   **Plan for the Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The JOPG should anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its termination. They should develop requirements and initial plans to replace HQs and forces considering the likely tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time.

4-39. Plan for Force Deployment.

a.   **Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces.** The strategic deployment of forces into a theatre of operations and onward movement into and within the JOA constitutes the initial operational manoeuvre and must be planned as an operation requiring the expertise of operations, movements and logistical planners. Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities required for mounting, embarkation, debarkation, reception, staging and onward movement to the final

destination in the JOA. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex S - Movements. It requires close coordination with the Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC), troop contributing nations (TCN), the host nations(s) (HN), port operating organisation, and gaining commands. Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed regarding the status of forces and understandings/agreements with the HN(s) as well as arrangements for transit and over-flight.

b.   **Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture.** The design, development, implementation and control of movements architecture within the theatre is a JFC and Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) responsibility. The logistic element of an OLRT plays a critical role in reconnaissance of movement infrastructure and coordination with the HN, as well as with relevant international actors operating in the area, for the use of facilities and LOCs. The JOPG, in close coordination with the OLRT/JLRT must confirm with the HN, as early as possible, the availability and capabilities of the following infrastructure:

(1)   APOD/SPODs and other key transportation nodes such as railheads.

(2)   Staging areas and facilities required for operational entry into the JOA.

(3)   Reception areas and facilities.

(4)   Lines of communications (LOC) to and within areas of operation.

c.   **Finalise the Force Flow.** Based on detailed planning for the employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL force package, the JOPG must make any final revisions to force flow in the ADL. Specific deployment requirements must be established for each force in the force package identified in the AFL, according to the final force flow, including the following:

(a)   Strategic lines of communication and entry points into the theatre.

(b)   Final destination in the JOA.

(c)   Commander's Required Date for the full operational capability of the force.

(d)   Priority[70] for sequence of movement.

(e)   Command authority to be transferred.

d.   **Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for Deployment operations.** The JOPG must establish specific requirements and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of deployment operations. Depending on the ability of the HN(s) to provide adequate support for these operations, the JFC may have to establish the required capabilities or contract for them. Critical aspects to be developed include:

(1)   Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for deployment.

(2)   Security of entry points, staging/reception areas, and LOCs within the theatre.

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[70] Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.

(3)   Operation of air and sea port facilities and reception areas.

(4)   Operation of staging areas.

(5)   Control of onward movements into and within the JOA.

e.   **Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans with Nations.** The Allied Disposition List (ADL) serves as the COM JFC principal means for establishing his required flow of forces into the theatre. It provides the operational basis for the Allied Movement Coordination centre (AMCC) to coordinate with nations on behalf of SACEUR for the strategic deployment of HQs and forces to their required destination, including the coordination of strategic Lines of Communication (LOC), modes of transportation and strategic lift. On this basis each TCN develops a Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP) for its forces for coordination and de-confliction by the AMCC into a Multinational DDP (MNDDP) to best achieve the required flow of forces into the theatre. Based on the MNDDP and the scheduled arrival of forces, the JOPG can further plan for the Receptions, Staging, Onwards Movement and Integration (RSOM&I) and sustainment operations. Deployment planning is typically conducted with nations at the strategic level, but heavily reliant on operational requirements provided by the JOPG representatives during a series of Movement Planning Conferences, as follows:

(1)   **Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC).** The IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN and will provide the first step on the deployment planning cycle.   JOPG representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan reflects the Commander's intent.   IMovPC covers:

(a)   Confirmation of the overall concept of operations.

(b)   Confirm HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and railheads.

(c)   Establish or confirm possible requirement for sharing logistical and infrastructure resources with relevant international actors operating in the JOA.

(d)   Review and confirm the required force flow based on the ADL.

(e)   Establish the movement control organisation network and point of contact register.

(2)   **Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC).** The purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The main activities of the MMovPC are:

(a)   Review the Detailed Deployment Plans (DDPs).

(b)   Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-confliction with cooperating relevant international actors operating in the JOA, as required.

(c)   Start the strategic air and sea assessment and identify national shortfalls.

(d)   Confirm HN support agreements and MOUs as well as resources and throughput capabilities.

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(3)   **Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC).** The aim of the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP) agreed to by all HQs, TCNs and the HNs. The MNDDP will form the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

4-40. Plan for Protection of the Force.

a.   **Review Requirements for Force Protection Planning.** Force protection planning should develop requirements and measures to be taken to protect the HQs, personnel and forces from assessed risks and threats. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex J - Force protection. Specific measures should be developed to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations for each phase of the operation. It requires close coordination with the HN(s), TCNs and supporting/subordinate commands. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces in transit, choke points, air and sea ports as well as reception and staging areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be vulnerable to attack. Force protection comprises four areas:

(1)   Protective Security.

(2)   Active Defence.

(3)   Passive Defence.

(4)   Recuperation.

b.   **Protective Security.** The JOPG should establish requirements for protective security for joint activities, facilities and operations as well as directions to subordinate/supporting commands for specific protective security measures to be taken based on the assessed risks and threats in the following domains: physical security, personnel security, security of Information, INFOSEC, operational security and industrial security. Coordination with HN(s) and military engineers is essential to establish practical arrangements for interaction with local and national law enforcement, Information and Intelligence Sharing (I&IS), environmental health & safety, fire protection, medical, road/traffic, recreational safety, etc, as arranged in status of forces agreements and memoranda/agreements of understanding.

c.   **Active Defence.** Based on the assessed threat of attack, the JOPG should determine the required defensive measures to deter, prevent, neutralise, or reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including defence against surface, sub-surface, air, rocket and missile attack. The JOPG must coordinate with subordinate commands for the provision active defence measures including:

(1)   Counter-air operations.

(2)   Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

(3)   Port and harbour defences.

(4)   Defence of key areas for staging, lodgement, rear area activities and other vital areas.

(5)   Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence.

d.   **Passive Defence.** Force protection planning should also develop passive defence measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of conventional and CBRN attacks on HQs, forces and personnel and limit the potential operational, tactical, physiological and political consequences. Passive defence includes the preparation of HQs, personnel, forces and facilities to limit their exposure and to deal with such attacks to ensure their survival and ability to continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness.   All deployed HQs, personnel and forces operating in a potential CBRN environment must be prepared to sustain operations under CBRN conditions. Required training in passive defence measures should be specified.

e.   **Recuperation.**   Based on the assessment of threats and the potential consequences of possible attacks, the JOPG should develop recuperation measures to enable HQs, forces and facilities to recover from the effects of an attack, restore essential services and allow operations to continue with the minimum of disruption.   In particular, operations in a CBRN environment require the capability for recuperation from a CBRN attack, or from the effects of Release Other Than Attack (ROTA) and Toxic Industrial Material (TIM). The centralisation of recuperation capabilities requires clearly designated organisational responsibilities and command authority to ensure timely and effective recuperation action. Recuperation planning should include requirements for:

(1)   Damage control.

(2)   Post-attack reconnaissance and assessment.

(3)   Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Disposal (EOR/EOD).

(4)   Fire fighting.

(5)   Rescue operations, including search and rescue/combat search and rescue (SAR/CSAR).

(6)   Mass casualty handling.

(7)   Decontamination.

4-41. Coordinate Plan for Approval and Handover.

a.   **Complete Operational Coordination.** Final coordination of an OPLAN at the operational level requires that responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for the essential operational and functional activities called for in the OPLAN. This typically requires a deliberate review by the JOPG with representatives from supporting/subordinate commands as well HN(s) and TCNs as required, and, if relevant and feasible[71], representatives from relevant international actors operating in the JOA. The Commander is briefed on the outcome. In addition, the Commander may direct OPLAN review/rehearsal which may be conducted as a theatre map exercise, sometimes referred as a "rock drill", to step through the critical aspects of the operation to ensure synchronisation. In any case the final coordination should examine each phase of the operation in terms of:

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[71] In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.

(1)   Operational deployments.

(2)   Employment of joint forces to achieve desired effects and resulting decisive points/decisive conditions, as well as measures of effectiveness and criteria for success.

(3)   Contingencies.

(4)   C2 responsibilities, authorities and relationships.

(5)   Sustainment and support.

(6)   Force protection measures.

(7)   De-confliction with non-NATO entities operating in the JOA.

(8)   Operational risks especially resulting from shortfalls in required capabilities.

(9)   Strategic requirements.

b.   **Conduct final Operational Risk Assessment.** Based on the outcomes from operational coordination of the OPLAN, the JOPG should conduct a final assessment of operational risks, including in particular any risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities. The assessment is presented to the Commander with recommendations regarding any risks considered to be unacceptable at this point, which should be brought to the attention of SACEUR, the MC and ultimately the NAC.

c.   **Complete Strategic Coordination.** The Commander should arrange to back brief SACEUR on the final OPLAN focusing on the main operational aspects as described above as well as specific strategic requirements for confirmation and/or coordination by SHAPE and any significant or unacceptable operational risks.

d.   **Forward Plan for Approval.** Following the strategic coordination, the Commander will direct any further changes required in the OPLAN. Once these are coordinated and incorporated in the OPLAN, the JOPG forwards the completed OPLAN, including the main body and all required annexes, to the Commander for his approval and submission to SACEUR.

e.   **Handover the Plan.** During OPLAN development, the JOPG should have been reinforced by staff from the Situation Centre (SITCEN) and Joint Synchronization and Execution Branch (JSEB) who will assume responsibility for execution. Once the OPLAN is approved, the OPLAN should be handed over for execution in anticipation of a NAC Execution Directive and SACEUR's Activation Order (ACTORD).

PHASE 5[72] - EXECUTION, CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT/OPLAN REVIEW

4-42. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose**. Phase 5 is the execution of the developed and approved operational plan. Execution requires the command and control of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To accomplish this, the operational plan has to not only sit within the strategic plan but also within the comprehensive political approach adopted by the Alliance and any other contributors. It is often the case that military planning is conducted before, or more rapidly than, civilian preparation and though it is recognised that the military's structure and procedures enable this rapid reaction it is equally essential to recognise that harmonisation between military and civil actors is essential. The strategic level will have defined the parameters and levels of liaison and interdependent planning for its subordinates and it is within these guidelines that the operational level must interact with civilian and multinational agencies and structures. Even at the beginning of execution planners and the JOPG will need to consider the impact of emerging information on the OPLAN and any adaptations or changes that have to be made.

b.   The operational level will focus on its effects and their part in achieving the desired strategic effects. The tactical level will generally concentrate on the tasks/actions necessary to accomplish its mission, which will contribute to the realisation of operational and strategic effects. Responsibility for determining and monitoring effects resides at the military strategic and operational levels. Key to execution of any operation will be the ability to measure progress and to adapt quickly at the relevant level to changes in the engagement space.

c.   **Operations assessment.** Operations assessment of the operations environment involves monitoring and assessing the outcome of all actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated effects (details are in Chapter 5). From a military perspective, OPLANs using effects will require continuous operations assessment in order for informed adjustments to be made. Progress of actions, creation of effects and achievement of objectives towards the accomplishment of the end state are all assessed via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision making process. This operations assessment process applies to all levels. The collector may be a non-NATO asset, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors. Operations assessment and knowledge development are closely related through system analysis which provides the backdrop for operations assessment to understand how to measure effects and actions.

d.   **Outcome**. Throughout the execution of the operation, commanders and their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness of

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[72] Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further.

their actions in creating the desired effects. Based on these operations assessments, and on evaluation of progress toward achieving objectives and desired end-state, the plan will be adjusted accordingly. Ultimately, measures of effectiveness and indicators of progress, reported by the COM JFC to SACEUR will lead to the conclusion that the end state is in sight. SACEUR must then recommend through his mission progress report (Periodic Mission Review (PMR)) to the NAC potential options to either review his OPLAN or prepare for the handover of the mission to either the UN or the appropriate national authorities and, thus, the disengagement of NATO forces.

e.   **Implementation and Adjustment.** In order to enable the implementation of the OPLAN the JOPG will normally provide one of its key planners (plan owner) to help the transition of ownership of the plan to JSEB. Thus as well as having had membership of the JOPG and the key execution documents (including: syncronisation matrix and the tool developed by the JOPG to support the understanding of the interrelationships and ownership of objectives, effects, decisive points/decisive conditions and other elements of the operational design (sometimes called the operational design support matrix)) the JSEB begins the operation with direct planning support and a clear understanding of the vision of the OPLAN.   During execution there are a number of tools available to the operational level to amend and adjust the plan:

     (1)   Fragmentation Order (FRAGO). Though normally the main tool of the components this is also available at the operational level to provide specific direction to subordinates on an issue already in the OPLAN or agreed at the strategic level. It permits a rapid reaction giving a minor adjustment or development of the OPLAN.

     (2)   Joint Coordination Order (JCO). Normally the main tool of the operational level and used to provide detailed direction and guidance to subordinates on activities such as transitioning between phases of an operation and normally covering a number or related or unrelated issues. The process of staffing and issuing a JCO is a deliberate process and normally requires a number of days. The planning staff should be fully involved in the JCO development. Again the JCO focuses on adjusting/expanding/adapting something already in the plan but could include a modification or correction that is with existing guidance of the strategic level.

     (3)   Plan Revision. A plan revision can be initiated by the outcome of a PMR but a single major event could equally provide the catalyst. Normally the NAC/ HQ NATO provides guidance to the strategic level which leads to the need to change the strategic OPLAN. This in turn initiates a parallel plan review at the operational level. Though the operational level Commander will decide if the revision published by the strategic level requires a revision of the operational level plan this will normally be the case. This process can take a number of months involving all levels of the operation.

     (4)   Branches and Sequels. Developed by the planning staff but normally within the JOPG process, branches and sequels are designed as contingencies (pre-planned options) that deal with the inability to achieve a decisive point/decisive condition or to take advantage of a positive rapid development in

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the operation. Typically they are developed immediately after the OPLAN and sit "on the shelf" ready for use and regularly reviewed.

PHASE 6[73] - TRANSITION

4-43. Introduction.

a.   **Purpose**. The purpose of Phase 6 - Transition - is to review, develop and coordinate a tailored OPLAN for transition, including the handover of responsibility to the UN, other international organisations (e.g. EU) or indigenous actor in the crisis area, so that NATO forces can withdraw in a controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a destabilising influence in the region.

b.   **Overview**. When planning for the deployment of forces into a crisis area, the JFC aims to create positive effects in order to achieve objectives and eventually the desired end-state. Through the creation of effects, the NATO end-state will be achieved and forces will need to be withdrawn. Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well in advance and may involve a large number of non-NATO actors in order to minimize the negative effects that the departure of NATO troops may have on the overall stability of the theatre.

c.   **Prerequisites**. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, the COM JFC and his staff will conduct periodic assessments of progress. Through the Periodic Mission Review (PMR) process SACEUR will advise the NAC that the end-state is in sight and planning for transition is required. Once the NAC issues a NID, this will start formal transition planning with a return to Phase 2.

d.   **Main Activities**. The main activities of the disengagement planning process are to:

(1)   Standardise the planning process and procedures within the Alliance for the handover of responsibilities between NATO forces and other international actors.

(2)   Minimize the risks and negative effects on a stabilized crisis that could result from the disengagement of NATO forces.

(3)   Provide for operational level coordination with relevant non-NATO actors within the engagement space.

(4)   Provide for operational level oversight and control of the disengagement planning.

(5)   Enhance operational military advice to SACEUR.

(6)   Enhance interoperability and collaboration between strategic, operational and tactical level headquarters.

(7)   Enhance the Commander's ability to direct and guide development of the OPLAN.

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[73] This phase will remain under review pending clear policy guidance from HQ NATO, MC133/4 etc. Possible link to Stabilisation and Reconstruction but care needed.

(8)   Maximise logical and creative thinking by staffs to enhance the Commander's decision-making.

(9)   Evaluate the products of the disengagement planning process.

e.   **Design of the Transition.** A periodic mission progress reporting process allows for development of recommendations for the NAC on amendments to the OPLAN, the adoption of new strategic/operational approaches and, if necessary, for a re-posturing of deployed NATO forces or capabilities. Eventually, the end-state will be in sight and NATO will need to start planning for the handover of responsibilities and the disengagement of NATO forces.

(1)   **Operations assessment**. This is an ongoing process of assessing progress toward objectives and the end-state along the various lines of operation.

(2)   **Options**. Once the operations assessments indicate that the end-state is in sight and that the level of stability achieved is sustainable without the current level of NATO forces in theatre, SACEUR may recommend to the NAC that he be authorised to develop options for NATO disengagement (total or partial). SACEUR may also decide to initiate the development of such options, including operational advice, prior to briefing the NAC. In such a case, options will be presented at the same time as the assessment itself. This would result in a NAC decision sheet tasking SACEUR to develop one specific option into an OPLAN. It should be noted that the options tabled will clearly state the level of interaction with non-NATO actors required during strategic and operational planning.

(3)   **CONOPS**. During Concept development, it will be determined how to disengage NATO forces from the mission in the most effective and efficient manner. It focuses on analysing the different interdependencies that were created over the duration of the mission between the deployed NATO forces and possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused by the withdrawal of forces.

(a)   When planning for handover, the JFC will need to engage with other international or national actors to develop a transition OPLAN and for the NATO forces to adjust their handover of responsibilities to these actors in a way that allows them, as much as possible, to minimize the negative impacts on stability during this critical phase of the operation.

(b)   SACEUR will obtain NAC approval for his strategic disengagement concept, from which the strategic disengagement planning directive will be derived and issued to the operational Commander. Approval of the strategic concept will include authorization for SACEUR to initiate a "Force De-activation" process with troop contributing nations. It should be noted that the overriding factor in the decision to repatriate troops should be the need to maintain stability in the theatre and to give sufficient time for a proper handover to take place. In cases where the handover will take place over a long period of time, it may be necessary to re-tool or re-role elements of the NATO forces in theatre.

(4) **OPLAN Development**. OPLAN development will further amplify the preconditions for success and the general flow of forces out of theatre. It will also identify critical requirements such as strategic lift capabilities required. Upon approval of the strategic disengagement OPLAN, NAC will issue a NAC Execution Directive.

(5) **Execution and Operations Assessment**. Throughout the disengagement phase, it will be necessary for the JFC to monitor execution closely and to assess the developing impacts of the departure of NATO forces. An operations assessment process, similar to the process used throughout the execution phase of the operation will be used. These assessments will allow changes to the OPLAN where necessary.

f. Disengagement planning is designed to identify and mitigate to the maximum extent possible the negative risks and effects resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows commanders to coordinate, in detail, the transfer of authority to non-NATO actors, while still allowing the Commander and his staff enough freedom to develop ideas and concepts while ensuring necessary political and military direction over the entire process.

g. In effecting a coordinated and deliberate transition, detailed systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary. This systemic analysis should place a particular emphasis on the interdependencies that involve the presence of NATO forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all relevant non-NATO actors be identified early and that proper liaison and coordination be implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and contribute where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the withdrawal of NATO forces. The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to execute OPLANs is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally through the MC to SACEUR.

h. **Political Controls.** The NAC maintains political control of the withdrawal planning process by:

(1) Issuing an initiating directive.

(2) Approving a strategic disengagement CONOPS.

(3) Approving strategic effects and endorsing the preconditions for success.

(4) Authorising force de-activation.

(5) Approving Strategic OPLAN for disengagement.

(6) Authorising execution.

i. **Military Controls.** NATO military commanders maintain control of the operational planning process by:

(1) Issuing initiating instructions and planning directives.

(2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

(3) Approving subordinate CONOPS.

(4) Approving subordinate OPLANs.

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(5)   Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when authorised).

j.   **Collaborative / Parallel Planning**.   The development of strategic and operational disengagement OPLANs requires collaboration and continuous co-ordination at the Political/Military (North Atlantic Council / Military Committee and Nations) and at strategic, operational and tactical levels with relevant non-NATO actors.

k.   **Co-ordination with Participating Nations**.   Co-ordination with participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should include the early exchange of information with host nations to facilitate comprehensive planning by the host nation as well as with troop-contributing nations to co-ordinate detailed OPLAN development. The North Atlantic Council will issue a force de-activation directive specifically authorising SACEUR to negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in order to ensure a coordinated and deliberate forces disengagement that will contribute to preserving stability in the theatre.

l.   **Co-ordination with the Civil Environment**.   Early liaison and co-ordination between Allied Headquarters and civil authorities and agencies, which can assist in maintaining stability and mitigating the negative effects created by the departure of NATO forces from the theatre, is essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes establishing, during the initiation of planning, effective means for co-ordination and liaison, initially at the political-military level, with national governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organisations. Planning by the Joint Force Command must provide for effective cooperation with these civil organisations within the joint operations area.

m.   **Strategic Communication Plan**. A well planned and executed strategic communication strategy will be critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces from a crisis area. The aim of strategic communication strategy will be: in the host country, to re-assure the target audience about the stability of the situation; within the international community, to underline NATO's accomplishments; towards potential de-stabilizing actors, to demonstrate NATO's resolve to continue supporting a climate of stability in the host country; and towards the population of NATO countries, to inform about the success of the mission.

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CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT[1]

5-1.   Introduction.

NATO operations take place in dynamic environments in which the political, economic, social, military, infrastructure and information domains are constantly changing. Commanders need to have the feedback process of *operations assessment* to inform on progress being made in creating desired effects and towards achieving objectives, which in turn allows for adjustments to be made to the plan, and inform the decision-making process for the military and political leadership. Operations assessment also provides an important input in the knowledge development process, which builds up and maintains a holistic understanding of the situation and operating environment.

Operations assessment can only provide indications of trends in a system's behaviour given certain actions. Thus, success in operations still heavily relies on a commander's intuition, experience and judgement.

5-2.   Definitions and Use of Terms.

a.   In this chapter, operations assessment has the following definition: The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making. (Proposed definition to be ratified).

b.   Measure of effectiveness (MOE): A metric used to measure a current system state.

c.   Measure of performance (MOP): A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions.

d.   At this point it is necessary to warn the reader that the word 'assessment' has multiple uses and meanings in NATO. 'Assessment' is used in the following contexts that are different from the use considered in this chapter:

(1)   Assessment of the crisis situation (NATO Crisis Response System Manual).

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[1] Recent terminology harmonization activities have seen 'Assessment', as was used in previous iterations of this chapter, changed to 'Operations Assessment' with the following definition: 'The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.' (Proposed Definition).

(2)   SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (Chapter 3 of the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)).

(3)   Uses in intelligence.

(4)   Initial assessment (Chapter 3 of the COPD).

e.   At the strategic level, the term "operations assessment" refers to the development and conduct of the measurement of progress and results of the post-NAC execution directive activities (the campaign and specific operations) on the engagement space. At the strategic level of command, it is a function that involves varying combinations of: continual measurement of strategic effects and progress towards the achievement of objectives in a military context; continual measurement of strategic progress and results in non-military domains; measurement of strategic progress and results of activities of non-military organisations; an overall evaluation of progress towards the NATO end-state; and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support strategic decision-making for the strategic military commander, and informs the North Atlantic Council.

f.   Operations assessment at the operational level, more often called the 'joint' level in NATO, can be divided into two areas: campaign assessment; and operational assessment.

(1)   **Campaign Assessment.** Campaign assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of all effects and objectives specified in the operational level military plan (campaign). Furthermore, the assessment of desired and undesired effects across all the PMESII domains will be considered, where they impact significantly on the operational level military plan, or where they are explicitly stated in the military plan. It seeks to answer the question: "Are we accomplishing the military mission by creating all the effects and achieving the objectives?[2]"

Its assessments are the basis for periodic assessment reports and inputs to all other branches and directorates resulting in a recommendation to the Commander to develop direction & guidance to amplify/modify the campaign/OPLAN.

(2)   **Operational Assessment.** Operational assessment is a short to mid-term review of decisive points/decisive conditions leading towards effects along particular lines of operation, and the assessment of any special events or situations that may arise outside of the standing military plan. This process supports campaign assessment by validating current operations, feeding the Commander's decision cycle and

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[2] It may be that the operational plan has to contain effects in the economic, political or social domains, in the local or *regional* context, that are outside of the military mission. The strategic level will retain the theatre-wide / international assessment of PMESII domains.

recommending modifications/changes through FRAGOs or the need to initiate a new joint coordination order.

At the operational level, the process is based on the overall analysis of metrics measuring progress of planned actions (MOP), the creation of desired effects, and the achievement of planned decisive points/decisive conditions and objectives (MOE), for the whole military mission.

At the tactical level, the focus is on measuring the achievement of planned actions, tasks or activities using MOP, for each particular component. In some special cases, the tactical level may measure the achievement of decisive points/decisive conditions and creation of operational effects using MOE.

For each operation, duties and responsibilities may be shared and exchanged between levels, which will be defined in the operations assessment annexes of plans.

g. Risk Assessment: The continuous monitoring of strategic and operational risks at the corresponding level of command.

5-3. Overview of Operations Assessment in Military Operations.

a. The purpose of operations assessment is to support the decision-making process in three areas:

(1) Operations assessment determines the progress of plan execution (actions / tasks).

(2) Operations assessment determines the effectiveness of those executed actions by measuring the achievement of results (creation of desired effects and achievement of decisive points/decisive conditions, desired objectives, and the end-state).

(3) Operations assessment draws conclusions about past situations, in some cases makes forward looking estimates about future trends, and makes recommendations; e.g. to move on to the next phase of a plan or make adjustments to the plan based on these conclusions.

b. Operations assessment can be applied to specific operations, events or topics either within or outside the military plan. Operations assessment may consider a range of timescales from short-term changes to long-term changes over years. There are many ways in which the responsibility for the level and timescale of operations assessment can be divided, depending on the particular context, the level of command and the needs of the Commander.

c. At any level and any timescale, in general, there are two types of operations assessment that will be undertaken typically during an operation: 'historic' and 'predictive'. 'Historic' assessment during an operation provides the Commander with an evaluation of completion of actions, and progress

toward the creation of the desired effects and achievement of decisive points/decisive conditions, objective(s) and ultimately the end-state. This assessment utilises historical data to identify trends up to and including the current state. 'Predictive' assessment builds on the historic assessment and helps extrapolate current trends to the future, thus identifying potential opportunities and risks for the Commander. In addition to past events, predictive assessment is based on known future events/plans/intentions/actions and assumptions to develop a forecast of the future situation.

d.   Operations assessment supports and continuously interacts with the other three areas of military operations: Knowledge Development, Planning and Execution.

(1)   **Knowledge Development (KD).** KD is critical during planning of operations, but has a strong link to operational execution and operations assessment. A systems understanding is critical to the initial development of the operations assessment process and throughout the operations assessment cycle the KD process should feed, as well as benefit from, operations assessment activities. The products produced from the operations assessment process will add to the understanding of the operational environment and this information will be fed back into the knowledge base. KD and operations assessment processes will be interdependent by the virtue of their common linkages to the knowledge base.

(2)   **Planning.** Operations assessment has a critical linkage to planning: those staff involved in planning and operations assessment must work collaboratively to determine that the tasks, actions, effects and objectives defined in the plan are measurable, and a component of the plan must consider the resources and actions necessary to perform the operations assessment. The primary purpose of operations assessment is to support decision-making by providing the necessary recommendations to adapt a plan based on the results from execution.

(3)   **Execution.** Execution refers to overall processes and techniques of leading and managing an operation. This involves the preparation of orders and FRAGOs, command and control of military actions, and de-confliction or collaboration with non-military actors. Although the leadership and management of operations may vary greatly depending on the situation, scale and personnel, a common component is the necessity for ongoing feedback on the progress of tasks and actions, creation of desired effects and the achievement of objectives. Operations plans are not presumed to be foolproof; during their execution, they will require continuous operations assessment-informed adjustments. Continuous assessment is an essential element of plan execution.

5-4.   The Operations Assessment Process.

a.   The operations assessment process involves four major steps which are described in detail in the BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook:

(1)   Designing the operations assessment and support to planning.

(2)   Developing the data collection plan.

(3)   Data collection and treatment.

(4)   Analysis, interpretation and recommendations.

b.   This chapter of the COPD focuses on the first two stages: designing the operations assessment, and developing the data collection plan. See the BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook for details.

c.   **Use of term 'Operations Assessment Staff'.** This chapter has been written to support the development of operations assessment during planning. At the strategic level, the Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) is responsible for operations assessment. At the operational level (JFC), a specific operations assessment branch exists and, at the tactical level, the Operations Planning Group (OPG) is responsible for operations assessment. To allow this chapter to apply equally to all three situations, the term *operations assessment staff* is taken to refer to those staff involved in planning billets that are responsible for operations assessment, or to the staff in operations assessment branches.

5-5.   Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.

a.   In the complex, multi-dimensional and asymmetric military operations of today and of the future, "success" is becoming increasingly hard to define. In previous years, the battle-damage assessment paradigm focused on military targets: numbers of enemy killed, bridges destroyed, or quantifiable measures about the status of enemy military forces. Experience demonstrates that many extra factors must now be considered, as winning militarily may not necessarily lead to success in every domain.

b.   At both the political and military strategic levels, the engagement space must be examined from a comprehensive perspective, across all PMESII domains, to ensure that all influences, actors and interdependencies have been considered. Activity in the military domain affects – and is affected by – the activity and situation in the non-military domain. Operations assessment at the strategic level must therefore assess progress in the non-military domains in addition to considering military progress and results. A successful military campaign does not necessarily mean that the NATO end-state will be successfully achieved, as there may be many factors outside the military domain that are required for success. Although NATO does not have all the

instruments of power[3] to deal fully with all PMESII domains, a comprehensive strategic-level operations assessment can identify those areas which need to be raised at the North Atlantic Council.

5-6.   Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities at the Strategic Level.

a.   **SOPG.** At the Strategic level, SHAPE has the overall responsibility for operations assessment in NATO. SHAPE may seek outside expertise for certain aspects of the operations assessment function; however, responsibility lays with the SHAPE SOPG with support of SHAPE staff divisions where necessary. At the strategic level, operations assessment personnel in the Strategic Plans Directorate have the following specific responsibilities:

(1)   Considering the operational level operations assessments received from the Joint Headquarters and other areas of NATO, to produce the strategic level operations assessments on ongoing military operations for SACEUR

(2)   Producing for SACEUR the strategic level operations assessments on all other domains

(3)   Producing the operations assessments required at the NATO HQ level.

b.   **Knowledge Development Staffs.** As operations assessment at the strategic level considers political, economic and social issues, the practice of operations assessment may be enhanced by the use of subject matter experts to better define and analyse the non-military aspects of a system. Operations assessment staff should seek experts on the political, economic and cultural features of the area in which NATO forces are operating. These may be sourced from: NATO organisations, including: KD centres, the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) or Civil Emergency Planning (CEP); or non-NATO organisations, including: academia, think-tanks, international organisations, or private contractors.

c.   Operations assessments at the strategic level should use openly available data sources from international organisations such as the United Nations, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund and the Red Cross. All these organisations have well-developed Monitoring and Evaluation[4] capabilities, and have detailed reports and subject matter expertise on many conflict areas. See the BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook for more information on non-military monitoring and evaluation techniques, and advice on using external SMEs and contracted support.

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[3] See Chapter 1

[4] *Monitoring and Evaluation* is the equivalent term to "Assessment" that is generally used by international organisations.

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5-7. Characteristics of Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.

a. **Process Overview.** In NATO, planning is initiated as a top-down process that begins with the North Atlantic Council issuing a decision sheet tasking the NATO Military Authorities to provide an assessment of the crisis situation. In response to the decision sheet and the associated tasking, SHAPE will produce the SACEUR Strategic Assessment, informing the North Atlantic Council decision process and eventually serving as a baseline assessment for operations planning (Phase 2 of the Strategic Planning Chapter in the COPD).

b. Once the decision has been made to initiate strategic planning, planners will begin developing the strategic military plan (Phase 4a/4b in the Strategic Planning Process). Operations assessment experts in the SOPG will develop the design of the operations assessment which includes metrics to measure progress and effectiveness and a data collection plan.

c. **Strategic Operations Assessment Design.** The design of the strategic operations assessment describes the means by which progress towards the strategic effects, objectives and the end state will be measured, as well as progress in the various non-military PMESII domains in the engagement space. This design should commence during the initial phases of planning. It contributes to the process of defining system state changes and actions by ensuring that these can indeed be observed and measured. Furthermore, the process of determining metrics increases understanding of the corresponding effects and objectives.

d. The strategic OPLAN considers strategic military effects and objectives that are required to achieve the end-state, in combination with non-military effects and objectives. Strategic lines of engagement link together various effects in a logical sequence. Operations assessment staff must structure operations assessment around the strategic lines of engagement to determine the impact that progress on NATO lines of engagement has on non-NATO lines of engagement, and vice-versa.

e. **Comprehensive Nature of the Engagement Space**. Success cannot be defined in military terms alone. A comprehensive operations assessment of the strategic engagement space and the progress towards the NATO end-state must consider all the aspects of the PMESII domains within the region and the engagement space. Although NATO does not have the instruments of power to act directly in many of these domains, operations assessment at the strategic level must consider[5]:

(1) Progress and effectiveness of NATO military operations.

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[5] Assessment in the listed non-military domains is gauged against requirements for progress stated in SACEUR's strategic assessment.

(2)   Development of political processes, governance, and civil institutions.

(3)   Security and rule of law.

(4)   Economic development.

(5)   General well-being of native populations.

f.   **Intended Audiences and Users.** Strategic level operations assessments may be produced for a variety of different purposes and audiences:

Primary Audience	Focus of Operations Assessment	Intended Use
SHAPE	Strategic overview of ongoing military operations Amalgamation of operational level operations assessments	High level decision-making and necessary plan adjustments
SHAPE, North Atlantic Council, Military Committee, Host Nations	Comprehensive operations assessment in all PMESII domains	Briefing the NAC Informing NATO political decision-making and strategic communications.
Joint HQs	Strategic implications of progress and effectiveness of operational level missions	Decision-making on necessary plan adjustments for the operational level

g.   **Development of Metrics and Data Collection Plans.** Metrics are the means by which progress and effectiveness can be measured and are divided into MOP and MOE; however, at the strategic level, typically only MOEs will be used. Metrics are normally developed during the initial phases of planning in parallel with development of objective and effects, but may be refined as necessary during the course of an operation, depending on the specific outcomes and situation. In a similar method to the determination of planning elements (effects / objectives), metrics should be based on systems analysis of key nodes and leverage points. The relevance and importance of individual metrics will vary with the phase of the operation and should both respond to, and inform SACEUR's priorities and the NAC decision-making.

h.   The strategic operations assessment design will incorporate the use of three sets of metrics:

(1)   A set that measure the achievement of the elements in the strategic plan: strategic effects and objectives, decisive points/decisive conditions, and the NATO end state;

(2)   When required, a set received from the operational level, that measure creation of effects and achievement of objectives and performance of actions in the operational plan, some of which are directly linked to strategic elements;

(3)   An independent set that may not be directly tied to elements in the strategic plan, but consider the broader PMESII aspects of the engagement space. The progress towards military strategic objectives, for example, will not always be revealed by an amalgamation of MOEs from the operational level. These independent MOE may capture standard data produced by international organisations such as the United Nations.

i.   **Timescales.** In general, operations assessment at the strategic level will consider longer timescales than operational and tactical levels. Currently, NATO produces a Periodic Mission Review (PMR), which is the formal operations assessment of strategic progress and results required by the NATO Crisis Response System. For the ISAF mission, the reporting cycle to the NAC is semi-annual. However, depending on the specific context, situation and commander, the timescales may change, or different strategic operations assessment products will be required.

5-8.   Summary – Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.

a.   Operations assessment at the strategic level is much more than a simple aggregation of lower level operations assessments, and success at the strategic level cannot be reached only by the achievement of military strategic objectives. The strategic engagement space is a complex, interdependent system of systems including: regional and international powers and political institutions, regional, national and international economies, social and cultural influences, international organisations and non-governmental organisations, humanitarian aid organisations, reconstruction and development agencies, and military forces, both NATO and national.

b.   NATO's instruments of power are military and political; however, the strategic Commander requires an understanding of how NATO military operations interact with non-military domains, how the activities of non-military organisations contribute to or hinder progress towards the NATO end state, and how the state of various critical social and economic indicators change.

c.   Operations assessment at the strategic level focuses on the overall progress of NATO military operations and the general state of critical PMESII

domains, but considers relevant non-NATO actors. If cooperative planning is conducted with specific non-NATO organisations, cooperative operations assessment should occur.

d.   In some cases, it may be necessary for strategic level operations assessment to take an expanded view and consider two separate missions as a whole when interdependencies exist between the two operations. As an example, the humanitarian assistance mission in Pakistan and the ongoing ISAF mission in 2005, where the former operation, if properly synchronized and coordinated with the NATO mission in Afghanistan, could have had positive strategic impact on the latter.

5-9.   Operations Assessment at the Operational and Tactical Level

a.   The primary focus at the operational and tactical levels of command is the execution of the military campaign and the creation of effects and the achievement of the operational objectives and decisive points/decisive conditions, defined in the plan. The campaign is planned by the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) and assessed by the Joint Assessment Working Group (JAWG).

b.   Plans will need continual adjustment, based on the circumstances of the operation, to be effective. The primary purpose of operations assessment at the operational and tactical levels is to increase the effectiveness of the execution of military operations. By continually monitoring and analysing the implementation of actions, creation of effects and accomplishment of decisive points/decisive conditions and objectives, the intention of operations assessment is to guide the commander in making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. Operations assessment aims to provide confirmation of the plan design, by demonstrating that the planned actions are indeed creating the desired results, and to improve understanding of the workings of the engagement space. Operations assessment also plays an important role in providing situational awareness relative to the plan.

5-10. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities at the Operational Level

a.   **Joint Assessment Branch. (JAB).** At the operational level, the Commander of the Joint HQ owns the operational level operations assessment. The Joint Assessment Branch takes responsibility for development of the operations assessment annex in the OPLAN (Annex OO), and the conduct of operations assessments during execution. At the operational level, operations assessment personnel in the JAB have the following specific responsibilities:

(1)   Acting as the focal point for operations assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development.

(2)　　Working with the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) during development and revision of the OPLAN.

(3)　　Considering the tactical level operations assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO.

(4)　　Producing the operational level operations assessments on ongoing military operations considering the tactical level operations assessments.

(5)　　Contributing to strategic operations assessments, as required.

(6)　　Monitoring the operational level risks.

b.　　**Operations Assessment Staff at Tactical Level.** At the Tactical level, the Commander owns the tactical level operations assessment. The operations assessment staff takes responsibility for development of the operations assessment annex in the OPLAN, if required, and the conduct of operations assessments during execution. At the tactical level, operations assessment staff have the following specific responsibilities:

(1)　　Acting as the focal point for operations assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development.

(2)　　Working with the Operations Planning Group (OPG) during development and revision of the OPLAN.

(3)　　Considering the tactical level operations assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO.

(4)　　Producing the tactical level operations assessments on ongoing military operations considering the operations assessments of their subordinate commands.

(5)　　Contributing to operational level operations assessments as required.

5-11.　Operations Assessment Process at the Operational and Tactical Level.

a.　　It is essential that operations assessment personnel are involved from the beginning of the decision cycle of plan, execute, monitor, and assess to ensure that the plan is measureable.

b.　　Members of the Joint Assessment Branch are an integral part of the JOPG and support the planning in the different syndicates. The syndicate developing the operational design must contain JAB expertise. The operational design is the key reference document for the plan and operations assessment process. The operational design consists of operational objectives nested within the military strategic objectives, related operational effects and decisive points/decisive conditions. The operational effects and

decisive points/decisive conditions form the basis for the development of the operations assessment annex.

c.   In order to achieve an overall coherent operations assessment plan, the operations assessment development must be conducted as a top down approach throughout all levels of command. Consequently, the operations assessment products at strategic level, especially the strategic design with its objectives and effects, and the strategic operations assessment design must be taken into consideration at the operational level.

d.   Both the planning process and the development of operations assessment products are interdependent. They both must be derived from the operational design. It should be a key goal of the JAB to develop the operations assessment annex in parallel whilst the JOPG finalises the rest of the OPLAN.

e.   When the main body of the operational OPLAN is drafted, the operations assessment annex must be developed using the expertise of all JOPG areas. The development of MOEs can be given to the relevant SME or subordinate command to ensure maximum validity and coherence. The interdisciplinary development of the operations assessment annex will ensure that the plan is measurable in execution and discrepancies between the plan and reality can be discovered and recommendations for plan adjustment identified.

f.   During execution, periodic meetings of the Assessment Working Group ensure that the plan is on the correct track or identify and provide potential plan adjustments to the Commander. The Assessment Working Group (AWG) must have an interdisciplinary make-up in order to maintain coherence.

g.   Beyond the AWG, interactions with the Knowledge Centre provide key data and analysis for the JAB. In turn, the JAB provides feedback to systems analysis and knowledge development to help ensure a common perspective.

h.   The AWG will provide the appropriate data for the Assessment Board briefing to the Commander. The Assessment Board is the formal forum to seek Commander's endorsement of the operations assessment provided. The Assessment Board should culminate in a recommendation to the Commander.

i.   The operations assessment products, such as the operations assessment brief to the Commander, will be the initiation of potential staff actions and plan adjustments (e.g. FRAGO, Joint Coordination Order, development of branches and sequels, plan review) and adjustments of the operations assessment annex if required.

5-12. Summary – Operations Assessment at the Operational and Tactical Levels.

a.   It is essential to recognise that operations assessments at all levels are not isolated, but need to be considered in a holistic way in order to understand

the whole theatre of operations and beyond. Care must be taken to ensure that operations assessment is not done simply to satisfy itself. Operations assessment is done to monitor and validate the plan during execution and be a significant part of the decision-making process. Without operations assessment, decision makers will find it more difficult to get the appropriate feedback (plan-execute-monitor-assess).

b.   The operational level is the pivotal point in the overall coherent NATO operations assessment process, as it acts as the interface between the strategic/political requirements and tactical operations.

c.   A common understanding of operations assessment requirements and procedures throughout all levels of command is to be achieved and continuously maintained via appropriate operations assessment liaison structure, information exchange, meetings and exercises. Operations assessment is a headquarters responsibility.

5-13. Interrelations between Levels of Command.

a.   **NATO Headquarters and SHAPE:** TBD.

b.   **SHAPE and Joint Force HQ:** The strategic level initiates the overall operations assessment process as a top-down approach and gives guidance to the operational level regarding structure of the plan and reporting procedures. The operational level, as the pivotal point in the overall coherent NATO operations assessment process, requires that guidance from the strategic level in order to ensure consistency. Clear reporting guidance from the Strategic Command supports the operational commander's reporting requirements. In order to maximise collaborative work, strategic and operational levels must exchange a limited number of their own planning and operations assessment staff.

c.   **Joint Force HQ and Component Commands:** During planning, liaison or planning experts of the component commands support the JOPG and ensure the synchronisation of planning efforts between the levels of command. The operational design and the operations assessment annex will be the leading references for tactical level planning and operations assessment.

d.   The JAB personnel located in JHQ Main and the operations assessment cell personnel located in the JHQ Forward Element (FE) in theatre are one integral entity. Lead of operations assessment execution remains with JHQ Main, JHQ FE provides in-theatre perspective.

e.   Permanent information exchange and close coordination between the JAB at the operational level and operations assessment SMEs at the tactical level is crucial to create a coherent campaign operations assessment. This includes the use of collaborative tools amongst others, VTC, telephone conferences and JCHAT. During execution, reporting requirements in

response to the operations assessment annex will ensure appropriate data collection within each level of command. Tailored reporting requirements support the operational commander to comply with his reporting requirements to the strategic level. In addition to this, the operational level may use tactical level operations assessments to provide coherence to the overall operational level operations assessment. When the operations assessment of effects are delegated from the operational level down, the tactical level will be responsible for providing overall operations assessments for these effects.

Focus and Responsibilities of Operations Assessment				
Level	**Military Considerations**	**Non-Military Considerations**	**Audience / Users**	**Geography**
Strategic	▪ Creation of the effects and achievement of end state and objectives in strategic military plan ▪ Progress of overall mission and status strategic military assets ▪ Capture of overall operations assessments from operational / tactical levels ▪ Engagement of internationally recognised subject-matter experts on region	▪ Achievement in political, economic, civil, social domains in theatre, regardless of whether they are explicitly stated in the strategic military plan ▪ Achievements of key non-military national government, international, and non-governmental organisations, in theatre, regardless of whether they are explicitly stated in the plan ▪ Tracking of international organisation's monitoring and evaluation in region (e.g. United Nations reports, World Bank, IMF, OSCE) ▪ Monitoring of key international conditions and situations that may impact upon strategic military mission (e.g. international trade embargos, world oil prices, international public opinion)	▪ SACEUR / SHAPE ▪ NAC ▪ NATO Nations' Defence Ministries ▪ Operational Level Commander ▪ Host Nation Government ▪ IO/NGO HQs ▪ International Media	▪ International ▪ Regional ▪ Joint Operation Area (JOA)
Operational	▪ Creation of the effects and achievement of objectives and decisive points/decisive conditions in operational military plan ▪ Capture of operations assessments from tactical level ▪ Coordination of overall data collection effort ▪ Hiring of external contractors required to support data collection / polling etc.	▪ Measurement of key conditions and situations in non-military domains that impact on the operational military mission ▪ Achievements of non-military organisations whose goals are specified in the military plan (either through collaborative planning or through estimation)	▪ Joint Force Commander / JFC ▪ Tactical Commander ▪ SOPG ▪ Local IO / NGO partners ▪ Local host nation government ▪ Local and regional media	▪ Regional ▪ JOA

| Tactical | ▪ Achievement of decisive points/decisive conditions as appropriate

▪ Achievement of tasks / actions / mission

▪ Data collection for the tactical / operational level operations assessments | ▪ Data collection activities as assigned by higher commands | ▪ Tactical Commander

▪ JOPG | ▪ JOA |

5-14. Operations Assessment Design and Support to Planning

a.   The strategic operations assessment design and the operational OPLAN operations assessment annex describe the means by which one assesses the plan and/or the chosen aspects of the engagement space. Development of the operations assessment design/annex (as applicable) must take place during initial planning. As with the rest of the plan, the operations assessment design/annex will need continuous revision throughout the course of an operation.

b.   The first stage of operations assessment is supporting the development of plans to ensure that the plan is measurable. Within the planning process, there is an explicit link between formulating desired future system state changes (end-state, objectives, and effects) and selecting metrics to measure actual systems states at a particular point in time. Appropriate metrics may be qualitative or quantitative, subjective or objective, as long as it is possible to define them in sufficient detail that operations assessments are produced consistently over time. There are two types of measurement in operations assessment: measurement of results (change in system state), which uses MOE, and measurement of activity (action accomplishment), which uses MOP.

c.   **Measurement of Results**: While the planning staff is responsible for writing the desired objectives, decisive points/decisive conditions and effects, they must work in conjunction with the operations assessment staff, who will draft the associated measures of effectiveness (MOE). The process of drafting MOEs ensures that: a) where possible, progress toward those system states can actually be measured; and b) that the meaning of the system state is unambiguous. This interactive process may require modification of currently drafted system states; extreme cases may require drafting completely new effects, decisive points/decisive conditions or objectives.

d.   Monitoring an MOE over time determines whether or not results are being achieved, as defined in the plan. If there are elements within the plan developed to support other involved non-NATO entities, these items must be considered as well. In addition monitoring an MOE determines the likelihood of important operational risks occurring.

e.   The operations assessment staff may also be called upon to monitor important Operational Risks. These are undesired events or situations that

may arise independent of the actions of own forces – i.e. the presence or activities of own forces do not affect whether or not these eventualities arise. Measures for operational risks may be formulated in the same manner as for MOE (para 5-16) and included in the data collection matrix.

f.   **Measurement of Activity**: This stage of operations assessment measures activity of importance in the engagement space, whether of NATO forces (termed 'actions') or other actors, using Measures of Performance (MOP).

5-15. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).

a.   A Measure of Effectiveness is defined as a metric used to measure a current system state. The MOE will help answer the question "Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?" This may require multiple MOE per intended system state to fully capture the changes. MOE must be repeatedly measured across time to determine changes in system states.

b.   An MOE must:

(1)   Describe one system element or relationship of interest.

(2)   Be observable, such that it is measurable consistently over time.

(3)   Describe how the element is expected to change.

(4)   Be as specific as possible (ensure you are measuring only and exactly what you want).

(5)   Be sensitive to change in a period of time meaningful to the operation.

(6)   Be culturally and locally relevant.

c.   Additionally, an MOE should:

(1)   Be reducible to a quantity (as a number, percentage, etc.).

(2)   Be objective.

(3)   Cost-effective and not burdensome to the data collectors.

d.   The setting of explicit targets for each metric to judge the achievement of results is done through the use of four mechanisms:

(1)   Acceptable Condition (AC): A target level for the metric at which a desirable situation has been achieved.

(2)   Rate of Change (ROC). The change measured in a metric over time during an operation.

(3)   Threshold of Success (TOS): A tipping point at which a positive trend becomes unstoppable and most likely irreversible.

(4)   Threshold of Failure (TOF): A tipping point at which an unrecoverable situation is reached.

e.   Conditions, Rates and Thresholds may change throughout the phases of the operation, and must be meaningful in the context of the operation, accounting for appropriate regional or international standards. However, the Commander must approve any change of values.

5-16. Developing MOE.

a.   Examples of MOE may be found in the BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook. Some considerations for the planning staff, those planning staff responsible for operations assessment, and operations assessment staff during MOE Development include:

(1)   While drafting end state, objectives, effects or decisive points/decisive conditions, ensure that they can be measured and that their description is written in a manner that can be measured.

(2)   Consider data sources for proposed MOE – even if the element can be measured, inability to capture the required data again ensures that attainment will never be recognized. Whenever feasible, plan to use multiple independent data sources to guarantee availability of data and to improve the reliability of the operations assessment.

(3)   Selection of MOE will require significant input from KD or related systems analysis functions. This input provides deeper insight to ensure that the chosen MOE is actually related to the system element in question.

(4)   The relevance and importance of individual MOEs will vary with the phase of the operation and should both respond to, and inform Commander's priorities and decision-making.

(5)   Independent measurement of progress toward the effects, decisive points/decisive conditions, objectives and end state is important. To avoid the trap of assuming causality this will require different MOE, collected on different levels and different time scales for each type of plan element.

5-17. Measures of Performance (MOP).

a.   Once the hierarchy of end state, objectives, effects and decisive points/decisive conditions have been approved by the Commander, the planning staff begins development of the actions necessary to achieve those system states and must remain involved in crafting the required MOP. However, the key consideration here is ensuring that the MOPs are directly tied to the action – not to the other elements of the plan.

b.   The MOP enables a more rigorous execution analysis, intending to answer "Are the actions being executed as planned?" If, during execution,

progress towards the achievement of desired effects is not made as expected, one possibility is that actions are not being carried out as planned.

c.   An MOP is defined as the criteria used to evaluate the accomplishment of actions. Each level (operational and subordinate levels) will normally develop MOP for the actions they will execute. Each MOP must:

(1)   Align to one or more actions.

(2)   Describe the element that must be observed to measure the progress or status of the action.

(3)   Have a known deterministic relationship to the action.

d.   It is important to note the key difference between MOE and MOP: The MOP measures the status of own-force actions, but does not measure the changes that result from those actions. Results of actions, or changes to the system, are measured by MOE. In essence, you have direct control over items measured by the MOP, but no direct control over items measured by an MOE. An alternative point of view is that MOP measure the amount of effort being input into a situation, while MOE measure the outcome or impact by looking for the changes that result.

e.   As with MOE, the threshold of success and failure that indicate the level of achievement of the related action must be included. In general, it is appropriate to shift thresholds or to have planned for different thresholds as phases of the operation change; however, the Commander must approve any change of threshold values.

f.   Again, as with MOE, rates of change (ROC) can be used to demonstrate the level and rate of change of activity that is envisioned within the plan to be undertaken by own forces. Examples of MOP may be found in the BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook.

5-18. Developing Data Collection Plan.

a.   Once the MOE have been established, the operations assessment staff (with input from the Planning Staff) is responsible for indicating the methods of data collection and the sources of data in order to monitor the status of each MOE. The majority of MOP data will probably be organic – it will be generated, captured, and reported by units within the command structure, while some might be reported by external non-military organisations.

b.   This process would likely be coordinated in the operations assessment staff using a data collection matrix that should indicate for each MOE or MOP:

(1)   The type of data (including units of measurement).

(2)   The source of data.

(3)   The method of collection.

(4)   The party responsible for its collection.

(5)   The format in which it should be recorded.

(6)   The required frequency of recording (including start and end times).

(7)   The frequency of reporting.

(8)   Any other necessary information.

c.   The creation of the data collection matrix will clarify the 'measurability' of the selected MOE and MOP – forcing further revision of the metrics should it be identified that some are either un-measurable, or that the effort required to capture the data outweighs the benefit of measuring.

d.   When drafting the plan and creating orders, the planning staff will include the data collection requirements specified by the operations assessment staff.

e.   Attention must be paid to plan synchronization. Collection of data for MOP related to actions not yet scheduled or undertaken may not be necessary; likewise reporting of progress towards effects not yet scheduled may yield erroneous results. In general, collection of data for MOP should commence when the action(s) start, and stop after the action is assessed as complete.

f.   One exception for MOE data collection is establishment of the baseline. Once the operations assessment plan is written, and prior to commencement of the operation, all levels of command must start the operations assessment process. This should be a continuous process to monitor changes in the system prior to execution. The compilation of data will establish the baseline, which is the capture of current system status just prior to any attempt by own forces to modify the system. This will by definition include assessment of effects prior to execution of any actions.

5-19. Causality; A Cautionary Note.

a.   Operations assessment is about measuring progress of implemented military actions and the effectiveness – or results – of those actions. By carefully designing metrics to allow activity (MOP) and results (MOE) to be measured, and then collecting data, operations assessment staff will compare the completion of actions with the level of achievement of results.

b.   It may be tempting or seem appropriate to assume that when all associated actions are complete, the effect must be created; or when all effects are created, the objective is achieved; or when all objectives are achieved, the end-state must therefore be attained. Completion of all assigned actions may not lead to creation of the desired effect for many reasons: unknown or unaccounted for actors in the theatre; an unknown linkage with a different system causing an adverse (unwanted) impact; or perhaps not all required actions were identified in the original plan.

c.   In general, avoid the temptation to assume causality.[6] Rather than trying to identify and demonstrate how changes in the environment can be "attributed" to particular actions (implying causal relations), it may be more constructive to talk about how activities might or might not have contributed to the creation of effects or objectives.

d.   The use of words like "correlation" and "contribution" are much more in line with the realities of what can be accomplished by planning and operations assessment staffs. Current thinking in academia on statistical theory and assessment of complex programs is of the view that causality is extremely challenging to infer, in all but the simplest of cases[7].

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[6] *Adapted* from "Assessing Progress in Military Operations: Recommendations for Improvement", produced by United States Joint Forces Command for Multinational Experiment 6. (Version 0.5, 24 Jul 09).
[7] See, for example, Sobel, M.E. (2000), Causal Inference in the Social Sciences. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 95(450), 647-651. Posovac, E&Carey, R. (2007). *Program Evaluation: Methods and cases* (7th ed.).

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CHAPTER 6

FORMATS

6-1. Introduction.

A standard format for planning documents will ensure that all important aspects connected with the conduct of military operations are considered in a familiar uniform pattern and that adequate background material is provided for expeditious decisions to be taken. Planning documents should adhere to the instructions contained in ACO Directives AD 35-4, Preparation of documents, and AD 70-1, ACO Security Directive. Unless directed otherwise by HQ NATO, OPLANS are to adhere to the formatting guidelines of this directive.

6-2. Physical Elements.

Planning documents (e.g. CONOPS/OPLAN) should consist of the following elements:

    a.   Document Cover.

    b.   Letter of Promulgation.

    c.   Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages.

    d.   Record of Changes.

    e.   Main Body.

    f.   Annexes, to include Appendices, Tabs and Enclosures, as applicable.

6-3. Document Cover.

    a.   Covers must conform to the following colour scheme that is used to identify the security classification of the material covered:

        (1)   <u>Red</u>: COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) material.

        (2)   <u>Blue</u>: NATO SECRET (NS) material.

        (3)   <u>Green</u>: NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) material.

        (4)   <u>Yellow</u>: NATO RESTRICTED (NR) material.

        (5)   <u>White</u>: NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) material.

    b.   The formats for the document covers are provided in Annex G.

6-4. Letter of Promulgation.

    a.   Planning documents will be forwarded with a "Letter of Promulgation" (see Annex H for format), which should include the following as applicable:

        (1)   Key references (e.g., NAC Initiating Directive, higher level related OPLAN, CONOPS, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive).

        (2)   Purpose of document.

        (3)   Conditions under which the document is effective (e.g. "effective for

planning purposes", "for exercises", on concurrence of the approving commander or appropriate authorities).

    (4)   Date of approval (and reference) of the approving authority.

    (5)   Document's effective date ("upon receipt" is not to be used).

    (6)   Further planning and implementation instructions.

    (7)   Peacetime practice instructions (if required).

    (8)   Request for comments from Nations and NATO commanders.

    (9)   Request for approval by the approving authority.

    (10)   Plan Synopsis Paragraphs (if required):

        (a)   Extract of situation.

        (b)   Commander's mission.

        (c)   Extract of commander's concept of operation.

b.   "Major Changes" to documents must be issued with a letter of promulgation. Editorial changes and other non substantive amendments are issued under cover of a military letter.

c.   The letter of promulgation is the first page(s) after the document cover.

d.   Each page of the letter of promulgation will be numbered "i", "ii", "iii", etc. The total number of pages of the attached document must be specified (see format) and includes all pages less the document cover and card stock separators inserted to facilitate the use of the plan.

e.   In situations of urgency, planning documents and substantive amendments thereto may be promulgated by message action. This procedure will follow the procedure prescribed above as closely as circumstances permit.

6-5.   Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages.

A list of effective pages is mandatory for documents classified NATO SECRET and above. However, the list of effective pages may be combined with the table of contents, provided it includes the effective page count (start and end page numbers).

6-6.   Record of Changes.

A sample format for record of changes is at Annex I. Superseded letters of promulgation and letters promulgating minor changes constitute the historical record of the document development and review, and are to be recorded at the bottom of the record of changes.

6-7.   Concept of Operations / Plan Main Body.

Strategic concept (CONOPS) describes the course of action in broad terms. The plan main body, on the other hand, details a fully developed course of action. The format of the CONOPS and plan main body listed in annexes B and D follows the same structure and should be honoured where possible. Additional paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, as well as changes to sub-paragraphs are permitted to meet the needs of the particular situation.

Dependent on the operational requirement, the operational level OPLAN with contain

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annexes as described in Annex E to COPD.

6-8. Annexes / Appendices.

    a.   A list of annexes will be placed at the end of the main body.

    b.   Annex / appendix numbering will follow the list of annexes / appendices provided in Annex E.

    c.   Where possible Annexes and appendices should conform to the basic six-paragraph OPLAN format as outlined in Annex B (strategic level) and Annex D (operational level). Where the basic six-paragraph format is inappropriate, different paragraphs must be used to meet the needs to the particular situation.

    d.   Under certain circumstances annexes may be published separately; however, the document should indicate how the annex is published.

6-9. Functional Planning Guides.

A sample format for Functional Planning Guides is in annex J.

6-10. Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation Procedures.

Consultation, approval, promulgation and activation procedures are described in more details in annex K.

6-11. Review, Revision and Cancelation Procedures.

Procedures for periodic review, revision, and cancelation of plans and operations planning documents are described in annex N.

6-12. Plans Identifications and Nicknames.

Details in annex O.

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(Chapter 7 – Glossary of Terms)

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CHAPTER 7
GLOSSARY OF TERMS[1]

Key Term	Definition	Source
Action[2]	The process of doing something to achieve an aim.	Collins Oxford English Dictionary, 11ed.
Actor	A person or organization, including state and non-state entities, with the capability to pursue its interests and objectives.	Proposed Definition
Area of Interest (AI)	The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.	AAP-6
Area of Operations (AOO)	An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.	AAP-6
Adversary	A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.	AAP-6
Assessment[3]	A considered process of appraisal to support decision-making.	Proposed Definition
Assumption	A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to complete an estimate of the situation as a basis for future decisions.	Proposed Definition
Branch	A contingency option built into the base plan executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal in order to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve the original objective.	Proposed Definition
Campaign	A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.	AAP-6

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[1] Proposed/working definition will undergo a harmonization process with current/emerging doctrine to ensure unified terminology where appropriate.

[2] For the purposes of the COPD, action can also be thought of as the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective.

[3] See also Operations Assessment. The current AAP-6 definition for assessment is 'The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems. Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.'

Key Term	Definition	Source
Centre of Gravity (COG)	Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.	AAP-6
Comprehensive Preparation of Operational Environment (CPOE)	CPOE is a coordinated analytical process to develop an integrated understanding of the main characteristics of the operational environment including its land, air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the PMESII systems of adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint operations.	Proposed Definition
Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR)	Comprise information required by the commander to make timely decisions as required for mission accomplishment. They identify potential changes in the situation and eventualities that would mandate an operational decision or strategic guidance.	AJP 2
Commander's Required Date	The latest date, calculated from G-day, established by the theatre commander, on which forces are required to be complete in their final destination and organized to meet the commander's operational requirement.	AAP-6
Concept of Operations	A clear and concise statement of what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources.	Proposed Definition
	A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. AAP-6	AAP-6
Course of Action (COA)	In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.	AAP-6
Decision Point (DP)	A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action.	AAP-6
Decisive Condition (DC)	A combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.	AJP-01(D) Proposed Definition.
Decisive Point (DP)	A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment	AAP-6
Desired Effect	Desired effects are those that have a positive impact on the achievement of the objectives.	Proposed Definition
Effect	A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes.	Proposed Definition
Enabling Forces	Those forces required at beginning of an expeditionary operation to establish conditions required for the early and rapid entry of the main force into the theatre of operations and deployment within the JOA.	Proposed Definition

Key Term	Definition	Source
End State	The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's involvement.	Proposed Definition
Engagement Space	That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most common in NATO are the following six PMESII domains (recognizing this list is not exhaustive): political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information.	Proposed Definition
Friendly Force Information Requirement (FFIRs)	Information the Commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the Commander's ability to accomplish the mission.	AJP-01 (C)
G-day	The day on which an order, normally national, is given to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a national one.	AAP 6
High-payoff target	A high-value target, identified through war gaming, whose loss to the opposing force will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action.	AD 80-70
High-value target	A target the opposing commander requires for the successful completion of his mission. The loss of a high-value target would be expected to seriously degrade critical capabilities.	AD 80-70
Intended Effects	Intended effects are predetermined effects, anticipated to result from the actions taken.	Proposed Definition
Joint Operations Area (JOA)	A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations.	AAP-6
Knowledge Development (KD)	A process that collects and analyses information, integrates isolated data into a useable body of information based on an understanding of systems, and makes it available so it can be shared.	Proposed Definition
Knowledge Requirement (KR)	A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order to make a decision.	Proposed Definition
Line of Operations (LOO)	In a campaign or operation, a logical line(s) linking effects and decisive points to an objective.	Proposed Definition
Main Effort (ME)	The primary focal point of an operation established by a commander within his area of responsibility for the deliberate concentration of effects using available resources where and when he deems it necessary to	Proposed Definition

Key Term	Definition	Source
	achievement of his objective.	
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)	A metric used to measure a current system state.	BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook
Measure of Performance (MOP)	A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions.	BiSC Operations Assessment Handbook
Mission	A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.	AAP-6
Mission-Essential Task	A task the commander designates as essential to mission accomplishment.	MC-458-1
Objective	A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved.	Proposed Definition
Operational Art	The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.	AAP-6
Operational Level	The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.	AAP-6
Operational Pause	An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation.	AJP-01(D)
Operational Objective	A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved by a campaign or operation that will contribute decisively to desired end state.	Proposed Definition
Operations Assessment	The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.	Proposed Definition
Phase	A clearly defined stage of an operation or campaign during which the main forces and capabilities are employed to set conditions required to achieve a common purpose.	Proposed Definition
Preconditions for Success	Those strategic conditions that must be created at the political level in order to allow operational success.	Proposed Definition
Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)	Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making.	AAP-6

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Key Term	Definition	Source
Sequel	Sequels are options for subsequent operations within a campaign or the following phase(s) of an operation. They are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the JFC with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo and ultimately achieve his objective.	AJP-5 SD1
Strategic Communications (StratCom)	The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.	PO (2009)0141 Dated 29.SEP
Strategic Line of Engagement	A logical line that connects diplomatic, military, economic and civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state.	Proposed Definition
System	A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole.	Proposed Definition
Transfer of Authority (TOA)	Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command.	APP-6
Theatre of Operations (TOO)	An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations area. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time.	Proposed Definition
Undesired Effects	Undesired effects are those that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives.	Proposed Definition
Unintended Effects	Unintended effects are those that are not anticipated or envisioned to be associated with the objectives and actions taken. These effects may be desired or undesired.	Proposed Definition

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(Chapter 8 - Abbreviations)**

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CHAPTER 8

ABBREVIATIONS

AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACOS	Assistant Chief Of Staff
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ACTORD	Activation Order
ACTPRED	Activation Pre-deployment
ACTREQ	Activation Request
ACTWARN	Activation Warning
ADAMS	Allied Deployment and Movement System
ADL	Allied Disposition List
AFL	Allied Forces List
AIG	Action Information Groups
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AMCC	Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre
AOI	Area Of Interest
AOO	Area Of Operations
AOR	Area Of Responsibility
APIC	Allied Press Information Centre
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
APOE	Airport of Embarkation
ASC	Allied Submarine Command
ASG	Assistant Secretary General
ASUW	Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWNIS	Allied World-wide Navigation Information System
BICES	Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System
C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CAEL	Commander Approved Effects List (CAEL)
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CC	Component Command(er)
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCIRM	Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CE	Crisis Establishment
CEIR	Commander's Essential Information Requirements
CEPD	Civil Emergency Planning Directorate

CFC	CIMIC Fusion Centre
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CM	Crisis Management
CN	Contributing Nation
CNA	Computer Network Attacks
COA	Course Of Action
COG	Centre Of Gravity
COMMZ	Communications Zone
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Contingency Plan
COPD	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
COS	Chief of Staff
CPG	Commander's Planning Guidance
CPIC	Coalition Press Information Centre
CPOE	Comprehensive Preparation of Operational Environment
CRD	Commanders Required Date
CRM	Crisis Response Measures
CRO	Crisis Response Operation
CRP	Crisis Response Planning
CTS	Cosmic Top Secret
DAMCON	Damage Control
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plan
DJSE	Deployable Joint Staff Element
DOA	Desired Order of Arrival
DP	Decisive Point
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
DPQ	Defence Planning Questionnaire
DRC	Defence Review Committee
DRR	Defence Requirements Review
DSACEUR	Deputy SACEUR
DTG	Date Time Group
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
EROEC	Expected Rate of Change
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWG	Effects Working Group

FD	Final Destination
FFIR	Friendly Force Information Requirement
FG	Force Generation
FINCON	Finance and Contracting
FMovPC	Final Movement Planning Conference
FORCEPREP	Force Preparation
FP	Force Protection
FPG	Functional Planning Guide
FTDM	Fast Track Decision-Making
GBAD	Ground Based Air Defence
GCOP	Generic Contingency Plan
GOP	Guidelines for Operational Planning
GRF	Graduated Readiness Force
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence Collection
HVA/A	High Value Asset/Area
HVT	High Value Target
ID	Initiating Directive
IFC	Intelligence Fusion Centre
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IMovPC	Initial Movement Planning Conference
IMS	International Military Staff
INA	International Affairs Advisor
InfoOps	Information Operations
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
INTREP	Intelligence Report
IOs	International Organisations
IPM	Inventory of Preventive Measures
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JAG	Joint Analysis Group
JCOP	Joint Common Operating Picture
JEMB	Joint Effects Management Board
JFC	Joint Force Command(er)
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JOPG	Joint Operations Planning Group
JPTL	Joint Prioritised Target List
KC	Knowledge Centre
KD	Knowledge Development
KDC	Knowledge Development Centre

KMC	Knowledge Management Centre
KR	Knowledge Requirement
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LL	Lessons Learned
LN	Lead Nation
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOCE	Linked OPS-INTEL Centres Europe
LOO	Lines of Operations
M&T	Movement and Transportation
MA	Military Assessment
MAB	Mission Analysis Brief
MC	Military Committee
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METOC	Meteorology and Oceanography
MMovPC	Main Movement Planning Conference
MNDDP	Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
MOT	Modes of Transportation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MRO	Military Response Option
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NC	NATO Confidential
NC3A	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NCRS	NATO Crisis Response System
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NCSA	NATO CIS Support Agency
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NID	NAC Initiating Directive
NIWS	NATO Intelligence Warning System
NMA	NATO Military Authorities
NNTCN	Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nation
NPS	NATO Precautionary System
NR	NATO Restricted
NRF	NATO Response Forces
NS	NATO Secret
NSA	NATO Standardization Agency
NTL	NATO Task List
NU	NATO Unclassified
OC	Operational Commander
OCA	Offensive Counter Air
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team

OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPFOR	Opposing Force
OPG	Operations Planning Group
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPP	Operations Planning Process
OPORD	Operational Order
OPP	Operational Planning Process
OPR	Office Of Primary Responsibility
OPWG	Operational Planning Working Group
ORBAT	Order of Battle
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA	Public Affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PAR	Post Attack Reconnaissance
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PI	Public Information
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
PM	Provost Marshal
PME	Political Military Estimate
PMEC	Political Military Economic Civil (Instruments of Power)
PMESII	Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure Information (i.e. Systems within the Engagement Space)
PMR	Periodic Mission Review
PNS	Plan Numbering System
POC	Point of Contact
POD	Port of Debarkation
POLAD	Political Advisor
PS	Planning Situation
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVO	Private Volunteer Organisation
RDL	Representational Disposition List
RFI	Request for Information
RFL	Representational Force List
RFLPWG	Representational Force List Production Working Group
ROC	Rate of Change
ROE	Rules Of Engagement
ROTA	Release Other Than Attack
RSN	Role Specialist Nation
RSOM I	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
S/APOD	Seaport / Airport of Debarkation
S/APOE	Seaport / Airport of Embarkation
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SAE	Strategic Analysis Element
SC	Strategic Command
SCEPC	Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SCIR	SACEUR Critical Information Requirements
SCPG	Strategic Commanders Planning Guidance
SDP	Standing Defence Plan
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SMAT	Strategic Military Assessment Team
SME	Subject Matter Experts
SN	Sending Nation
SOC	Strategic Operations Centre
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOR	Statement Of Requirement
SOPG	Strategic Operations Planning Group
SPMP	Strategic Political Military Plan
SPOD	Seaport of Debarkation
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SSA	SACEUR's Strategic Assessment
STANAG	NATO Standardization Agreement
StratCom	Strategic Communications
SUPLAN	Supporting Plan
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TBMD	Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TCSOR	Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements
TIM	Toxic Industrial Material
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
TOA	Transfer of Authority
TOF	Threshold of Failure
TOCA	Transfer of Command Authority
TOO	Theatre of Operations
TOPFAS	Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Systems
TOR	Terms Of Reference
TOS	Threshold of Success
TST	Time Sensitive Targets
VTC	Video Teleconference
WAN	Wide Area Network
WISE	Web Information Services Environment
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

OPERATIONAL ART IN THE ALLIANCE CONTEXT

1-1.   Introduction.

a.   Operational Art[1] is the orchestration of an operation, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. Although developed to address bi-polar, force-on-force operations, the concept is equally applicable to contemporary operations in which crisis resolution does not necessarily hinge on military success. It embraces a commander's ability to take a complex and often unstructured problem and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed planning and practical orders. It is realised through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of operational design management. It is equally applicable at all levels of command: strategic, operational and tactical. This chapter should be read in conjunction with appropriate Allied Joint Publications.

b.   Operational art involves considerations at the operational level that should reflect more than just the employment of procedures and techniques based on knowledge of doctrine and manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated relationships between all the factors influencing the planning and execution of an operation:

(1)   It includes the effective use of planning tools and seeks to ensure that Commanders use forces, space, time and information effectively through the design of campaigns and operations. Such a design provides a framework to help Commanders order their thoughts and understand the conditions for success.

(2)   It should take account of the full range of potentially simultaneous military operations, across the spectrum of conflict, with predominant campaign themes shifting over time. This aids Commanders and staffs in understanding that:

(a)   All major operations are combinations of tasks some of which may be executed simultaneously.

(b)   Operations change over time and therefore plans will need to be adapted.

(c)   Operations conducted over one phase of a campaign directly impact on subsequent phases.

(3)   It also requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends and an understanding of the inherent and effective synergy that flows from properly coordinated joint operations.

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[1] As defined in AJP-01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine, dated Mar 07. Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, operations and battles.

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    c.   Operational art is applied throughout the operations planning process, in:

        (1)   Formulating the overarching idea and intent for an operation and envisaging how operations will unfold.

        (2)   Determining necessary links between the tactical employment of forces and the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

        (3)   Establishing critical lines of operations as a basis for sequencing and synchronising actions and effects.

        (4)   Designing ways to achieve the end-state with available means and acceptable risks.

1-2.   Opposing[2] Forces/Actors[3]-Adversaries.

Regardless of the situation, the underlying premise for operations planning is that military operations are required to counter threats from opposing forces or to contain violence and hostilities. This pertains to both Article 5 Collective Defence and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response and encompasses conventional, unconventional and asymmetric threats. Our opponents, including political leaders, the population and the military, possess their own "will", influenced by their own culture, perspectives and vital interests, to pursue goals in opposition to our own. It is therefore imperative during all operations planning to attribute to our opponents and opposing factions the potential to willingly oppose our operations with their full potential when their aims conflict with our own.

1-3.   Ends, Means and Ways.[4]

Operational art seeks to balance "ends, means and ways" in planning and conducting operations. It requires that a strategic/operational level commander and his staff appreciate the strategic framework and answer four basic questions:

    a.   What strategic objectives must be achieved in order to attain the end state and what military effects must be created in the operations area to achieve the strategic objectives? (*Ends*)

    b.   What available military capabilities and other resources should be applied, within established limitations, to best produce these conditions? (*Means*)

    c.   How should actions be arranged in time and space to establish these conditions? (*Ways*)

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[2] The term "opposing forces" is used, as in AJP-01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine, dated Mar 07, to refer to adversaries of the Alliance in a conflict. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. The term "opposing factions" will be used to refer to parties to a conflict when the Alliance is not a party.

[3] A person or organization, including state and non-state entities, within the international system with the capability or desire to influence others in pursuit of its interests and objectives. (proposed definition to be ratified.

[4] At the strategic level, planners will consider *ends – ways and means* in that sequence. Through a preliminary force gathering process aimed at estimating the level of forces that nations may be willing to commit to an operation, the strategic level will provide the designated joint commander with a cap on forces and resources to support the option selected by the NAC. Consequently, at the joint level, planners should consider *ends – means and ways*, in that sequence.

d.   What risks are involved and how can they be mitigated.

1-4.   Conceptual Basis for Planning Within a Comprehensive Approach[5].

a.   **Operations Planning** allows NATO to contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis resolution led by the international community or the host nation. Operations planning focuses on ensuring that military efforts are harmonized with those of other actors involved in attempting to resolve the crisis. From a military perspective, planning remains based on a single NAC-approved end state. It is HQ NATO's responsibility to ensure that the end state will support the (generally) agreed international aims and objectives.

b.   **Objectives[6] are Derived from the End State[7].** In this regard, the NATO end state of an operation or mission, and associated NATO strategic objectives, are identified and defined politically by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), informed by military advice from Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the advice of the Military and other Committees in HQ NATO. Operations planners must ensure cohesion between effects that result from actions that influence the behaviour and capabilities of actors in order to achieve objectives and the NATO end state.

c.   **The Operations Environment (Engagement Space).[8]** The operations environment is the composite of conditions, circumstances and influences which affect the employment of Alliance capabilities and have impact on a commander's decisions. Modern crises are characterized by complex interdependencies; conflicts are underpinned by a combination of historical, political, military, social, cultural and economic issues. These issues are generally interdependent and, consequently, the solutions required to address these issues are of a varied nature. At the strategic level NATO currently recognizes six (6) domains within an operations environment, though other may be included in future. They are:

(1)   **Political.** Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organisation through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.

(2)   **Military.** The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organisational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of

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[5] Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors.

[6] Objective - A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved. (Proposed definition)

[7] End state - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's involvement. (Proposed definition)

[8] That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most common in NATO are the following six PMESII domains (recognizing this list is not exhaustive): political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information. (Proposed definition)

a country.

(3)   **Economic.** Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.

(4)   **Social.** The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society's structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.

(5)   **Infrastructure.** The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.

(6)   **Information.** The entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media.

d.   Through an analysis of the goals, strength, weaknesses and interdependencies of the main actors within these six domains, knowledge is developed about the behaviour of the main actors within the operations environment. That knowledge is then used by decision makers at all levels, to gain a thorough understanding of the behaviour and capabilities of different actors and their interactions in order to determine how they might be influenced in ways that achieve the Alliance's strategic objectives and end state, thereby contributing to the international community aims.

e.   From a NATO perspective, the military and, to a certain extent through the political forum of the NAC, the political instruments can be coordinated to achieve the NATO end state. Debate and action in the NAC could also harness strategic effects belonging to sovereign nations which can utilise their civil and economic instruments towards a common purpose.

f.   Cascading from the political strategic level, the use of these instruments must be planned and, where feasible, de-conflicted and harmonized with the non-NATO instruments that are being levered by relevant non-NATO actors inside the operations environment. This will facilitate the harmonization of NATO's military and non-military, and possibly political, planning with non-NATO political, civil and economic planning, whenever possible. In the same way that NATO will operate at a number of levels, so such coordinated action will take place at a number of levels within the international, governmental and non-governmental (IO/GO/NGO) actors concerned, for example at the institutional and regional HQs and field office levels.

1-5.   Instruments of Power.

a.   Conditions in each of the six system domains of the operations environment are influenced by the application of one or a combination of the four instruments of power. Therefore, in order to achieve a lasting solution, modern operations require the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of power. As a military and

political Alliance of 28 sovereign nations, NATO exercises control over only the military (primarily) and the political (partially) instruments of power.

b.   The other instruments are controlled by international organisations and states or NGOs and, consequently, the Alliance must often coordinate or de-conflict its own actions and plans with the relevant non-NATO actors involved. Furthermore, in most cases, the Alliance will be involved in a supporting role in order to provide a degree of stability and security that allows the other instruments to work and operate in the operations environment in order to create acceptable conditions in the other 5 domains. It must be emphasized that the six PMESII domains (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information) in the operations environment are not the same as the four instruments of power. The four instruments of power are:

(1)   **Military**. The military is NATO's main instrument. It refers to the application of military power, including the threat or use of lethal and non-lethal force, to coerce, deter, contain or defeat an adversary, including the disruption and destruction of its critical military and non-military capabilities. It can also refer to the constructive use of military forces for stabilization and reconstruction or as a tool in helping solve complex humanitarian disasters and emergencies.

(2)   **Politica**l. The political instrument refers to the use of political power, in particular in the diplomatic arena cooperating with various actors, to influence an adversary or to create advantageous conditions.[9] NATO has the political instrument at its disposal. In addition, NATO member nations could combine their tremendous political power and influence on the international scene, speaking and acting as one and with the same purpose, to achieve significant effects.

(3)   **Economic**. The economic instrument generally refers to initiatives, incentives and sanctions designed to affect the flow of goods and services, as well as financial support to state and non-state actors involved in a crisis. The aggregation of the economic instruments of NATO nations could act as a significant lever, provided that nations would use their economic instruments in a way that supports the achievement of the NATO and assumed international community end states.

(4)   **Civil**. The civil instrument refers to the use of powers contained within areas such as the judiciary, constabulary, education, public information and civilian administration and support infrastructure, which can lead to access to medical care, food, power and water. It also includes the administrative capacities of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The civil instrument is controlled and exercised by sovereign nations, IOs and NGOs. Nonetheless, through interaction and enhanced mutual understanding, NATO can work with those that have access to the civil instrument of power in order to coordinate with them, and possibly adjust our own activities to create synergies with theirs.

c.   Changing conditions from an unacceptable to an acceptable state will require the creation of effects that are necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state. This central idea of planning determines the combination and

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[9] The NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), dated APR 09, refers to "diplomatic" options for dealing with a crisis.

sequencing of actions in time and space using available resources with the greatest potential to create effects required to achieve objectives and the desired end state.

(1)   Other than for a partial ability to lever the political instrument of power, NATO provides a unique multi-national capability to intervene in modern crises. While commanders have primarily the military instrument at their disposal to contribute to resolving a crisis, NATO through the NAC can also use the political instrument through the office of the Secretary General; although NATO is not a supranational organisation, the member nations around the NAC table together represent a formidable influence in the international political, economic and social domains. On their own initiative, should they decide to act in a cohesive and coordinated manner in using their non-military instruments to support the NATO military effort in a crisis, the Alliance as a whole could yield tremendous influence and power.

(2)   Providing the NAC with a comprehensive assessment of the operations environment, including the state of each system (or system element) and indications of what changes are needed in each system (or system element), will give national representatives the information necessary to allow their capitals to act in the non-military domains if they so desire.

(3)   Emerging from the political strategic level[10], operations planning is implemented differently at various levels of decision-making. It requires specific practices and procedures for each level and the establishment of clear links between actions, effects, objectives and the end state and, where possible, the harmonization of political, military, civil and economic planning.[11] Planning in a multi-dimensional environment without overall coordination generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Pragmatism must be the way forward and it is important, that all levels pursue opportunities for interaction and collaboration under guiding principles of mutual respect, trust, transparency, understanding and duty to share.

1-6.   Design Principles.

The following general design principles are applicable when considering the design of NATO operations in today's modern strategic environment:

a.   **Commanders lead and staff support.** Informed processes and tools guide and enable the preparation of a commander's decision making, but they are not an end in themselves. A commander's intuition, experience and military judgement remain paramount. Operational art, guided by the commander, remains an essential aspect of operations planning.

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[10] In the NATO context, the NAC is the political strategic level, HQ NATO the political-military level and SHAPE military strategic level.
[11] Practices and procedures will be required for the political-military, military strategic and operational levels in terms of operations planning, crisis management and decision making, as well as in terms of operations assessment.

b.   **Strategic Coherence.** Coherence of actions, effects, objectives and end state throughout NATO and across all relevant actors is essential and must be maintained.

c.   **Systems Based Understanding of the Environment.** The engagement space is an environment in which all actors and entities interact. In order to support the commander's decision making process, we need to understand, but only to the best extent in the time available, the complexity of the operating environment and the linkages, strengths, interdependencies and vulnerabilities therein. The process undertaken to understand the environment is continuous from commencement of planning through operation termination.

d.   **Consultation and Compatibility.** Our planning and execution should be conducted with an expectation of the application of an interdependent, Comprehensive Approach by the international community, being cognisant of, and interacting with, other actors. The harmonization of the contributions of the various instruments of the Alliance and non-NATO actors, as applicable, must be facilitated. A culture of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding must be encouraged to allow collaboration and cooperation across all areas of shared interest. Operational language and processes must be kept simple and easily understandable.

e.   **Flexibility and Adaptability.** The operating environment of a particular modern crisis is complex and continually changing. Adversaries possess a 'will' and are thus unpredictable, complex and adaptive. Thus, no planning process can guarantee prediction. Plans must allow flexibility and adaptability within the mission and agreed political and resources framework.

f.   **Continuous Operations Assessment.** Continuous operations assessment is required to guide operation execution to the desired end state. Operations assessment must consider both performance and effectiveness criteria. Commanders and their staffs must consider the impact and required resources when developing operations assessment matrices to adequately balance benefit with effort.

1-7.   Knowledge Development.[12]

a.   Using an approach in which systems in the operations environment are analysed (i.e. through a system analysis), knowledge about the different political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information domains of the strategic environment will be developed in order to understand the behaviour and capabilities of key actors and their interaction within the operations environment and to facilitate informed decisions that are specific to each of the phases of the planning process.

b.   The knowledge development process is continuous, adaptive, networked and inextricably, wherever useful, linked to systems analysis. It relies on human expertise and the exploitation of information technology to enhance common situation awareness and understanding during the conduct of planning, execution and operations assessment. Knowledge development departs from a traditional approach, with each

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[12] Knowledge development is in more detail described in chapter 2 of this directive.

level of command collecting and analyzing at its own level but concentrates on collaboration and sharing of information to provide a common understanding of a crisis. It envisages one pool into which different staffs "dip" as required to suit their information and intelligence requirements. It also moves away from traditional analytical foci on military matters. Analysis and operations assessment staff must develop a holistic view and approach, looking at the operations environment as a system of systems, and the systems within it (e.g. political, cultural, economic, religious, tribal).

1-8. Operations Planning.

a.   **General.** Operations planning is oriented towards the achievement of an Alliance end state and strategic objectives established by NATO's political military authorities and carried out within the political limitations and resource constraints set by these authorities. Operations planning at the political military level seeks to translate political-strategic guidance into military strategic direction for the operational commander, and to set at the strategic level the conditions necessary for the operational commander to conduct his planning and execute his operation. At the operational level, planning seeks to transform strategic direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions, carried out by joint forces to achieve operational objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. The aggregation of operational objectives contribute to the attainment of strategic objectives.

b.   Strategic planning begins with an in-depth study and analysis of the crisis and its root causes, within the constraints of the time available, to develop as thorough an understanding as possible. An analysis of the various actors and systems at play within the operations environment, their motives, strength and weaknesses, interactions and their inter-dependencies, will contribute to the identification of the best possible strategic approach. This process will provide planners with a range of options and alternatives to the crisis, one of which will then serve as the basis for the development of strategic planning direction and then, through a collaborative planning process, to the development of a strategic concept of operations (CONOPS) and operations plan (OPLAN).

c.   At the operational level, the process begins with a review of the situation based on the strategic analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of "*what*" must be accomplished, under what "*conditions*" and within what "*limitations*". Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining "*how*" operations should be arranged within an overall operations design. The operations design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as the detailed plan.

1-9. Military Estimate Process and Plan Development.[13]

a.   In principle the development process for all operations plans, follows a similar two-stage procedure. The first stage comprises the military estimate process. This involves mission analysis, which is followed by identification of the various Courses of Actions (COAs) available to the Commander for accomplishment of the mission. He selects the preferred COA and develops a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), to provide a clear and concise statement of how he intends to accomplish the assigned mission, including

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[13] AJP-01(D) Study draft

achievement of the desired military end state. The CONOPS is then forwarded to the initiating/superior authority for approval.

b.   The second stage involves the development of the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD), Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operations Plan (OPLAN), and, where appropriate, a campaign plan, on the basis of an approved CONOPS.

1-10. Mission Analysis.

a.   The purpose of mission analysis is to establish precisely the results to be accomplished and to identify critical requirements, limitations on freedom of action and inherent risks. The mission analysis is driven by the strategic assessments, direction and guidance and further influenced by estimates from subordinate commands and cooperating organizations. The commander is personally engaged in the analysis and validates the results. He should clarify any issues with his superior commander and seek endorsement as necessary. The mission analysis, when completed, should answer the following key questions:

> (1)   What sustainable conditions must be established to achieve strategic objectives and attain the desired political end state?

> (2)   What military impacts are required to achieve these conditions and what systems must be changed to create the necessary effects using military means?

> (3)   What are the essential tasks to be accomplished to achieve these effects?

> (4)   What are the implications of the factors of time, space, forces and the sphere of information?

> (5)   What capabilities, support and preconditions are required?

> (6)   What limitations have been or are likely to be imposed on the use of military force?

> (7)   What are the plausible assumptions that have been made in place of unknown facts in order to allow operations planning to proceed?

> (8)   What are the requirements for cooperation with international and/or inter-governmental and/or non-governmental and/or other civilian organisations within a comprehensive approach?

> (9)   What are the inherent risks?

b.   In order to answer these questions the JFC and the core of his planners will analyse the relevant facts that must be addressed. One of the main steps will be the COA development and selection, which will later be addressed in detail.

1-11. Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

a.   CONOPS development occurs in two stages; summarisation of the commander's analysis and refining of his intent, and then CONOPS description and requirements development.

b.   CONOPS development will be based on an initial 'Commander's Analysis'. This provides a critical link between the mission analysis, the commander's initial intent and

his selected COA. The 'commander's analysis' summarises his main conclusions, his Centre of Gravity (COG) analysis and design of the operation. The commander's intent details his direction on command of the operation and gives sufficient freedom for the subordinate commander to exercise mission command. The CONOPS should detail the purpose of the operation, its phases and activities, main effort, how the entire campaign or operation will achieve the operational objectives and contribute to the accomplishment of strategic objectives and finally what are the inherent risks.

1-12. Commander's Intent - Amplifying Aspects

a. Visualisation. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualisation embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. The commander must transmit this vision to subordinates in clear and simple terms through the concise statement of a mission's overall purpose, the desired end state, and any essential information on how to get to that end state; the mission must be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own OPLANs and/or orders.

b. Focus on results. The commander's intent defines the desired end state at operational level in relation to the factors of the mission, e.g. the adversaries' characteristics, operating environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results anticipate transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to achieve those results.

c. Unifying concept. The commander's intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions departing from the original plan.

d. Enabling mission command. In stating the intent, the commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the larger context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular CONOPS. It enables the flexibility to adapt subordinate commanders' actions to achieve success. By focusing on the desired end state rather than sequential events, it allows commands to operate with increased speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster and with greater agility than the adversary. This keeps the adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently. The desired end state focus supports the initiative of commanders at all levels by freeing them to focus themselves on the desired results.

e. Command involvement. Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers the intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants, and the provision of a hard copy provides subordinates with the foundation of their own planning.

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1-13. Operations Design

The development of an operations design is fundamental to operations planning. It represents the formulation of an overarching idea for the operation, based on a general estimate of the situation and the mission analysis, and embodies the commander's intent. The design guides the development of the CONOPS and detailed planning documents.

    a.   **The Desired End State.** Before designing an operation or campaign it is necessary to clearly identify a single Alliance desired end state. This end state is the political and/or military situation that needs to exist when an operation has been terminated. The end state must be established as the basis for initiating operations planning. The ability to plan and conduct operations for conflict resolution will depend on SACEUR's ability to understand a clear and unambiguous desired end state:

        (1)   The Alliance end state is established by the NAC, based on advice from SACEUR and the relevant NATO committees prior to the initiation of operations planning. It describes a range of conditions desired by the NAC within the six domains of the operations environment (PMESII) at the conclusion of the campaign or operation in the area of operations. The end state will give a clear indication of the relative importance of the military operations as well as requirements to integrate military operations with, or in support of, other elements of international power and influence.

        (2) SACEUR will provide any necessary amplification on the Alliance's end state in his strategic planning guidance, including criteria for measuring success, when necessary to ensure clarity. SACEUR, the Joint Force Command (JFC) and components must share a common understanding of the desired end states throughout the planning process.

The desired opposing force end state must be presumed based on political analysis and intelligence assessments and utilising the information gained during the knowledge development process.

    b.   **Objectives.** Joint multinational operations must be directed towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end state. In simplest terms an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level but should emerge from those established at the higher level.

        (1)   **NATO Strategic Objectives**. These will represent the Alliance's overall political aims based on common vital interests and the desired Alliance (political) end state. They are determined through political consultation and establish a clear purpose toward which the Alliance will direct its collective efforts and resources in a crisis or conflict situation.

        (2)   **Military Strategic Objectives.** They establish the overall aims of the campaign for the designated JFC and other supporting commands with respect to opposing forces and strategically important areas, and are defined with due regard for other non-military strategic objectives and the desired end state identified in the overarching political mandate. This allows SACEUR, in co-ordination with the

JFC, to develop military strategic objectives in concert with the objectives of other agencies involved in the operation and to clearly appreciate the part that each will play in achieving the desired political end state.

(3) **Operational Objectives.** The JFC will be given operational objectives to be achieved by him and his subordinate/component commanders in operations in the JOA. Operational objectives often describe conditions to be achieved at decisive points/decisive conditions in terms of force (e.g. expel, defeat, destroy, contain, annihilate, neutralise, isolate), space (e.g. seize, secure defend, control or deny and/or time (e.g. gain time for build up of own forces). This helps define the purpose of the tasks to be accomplished by his subordinate/component commands.

(4) **Opposing Force Objectives.** These will be deduced from the presumed desired end states along the same lines as for the Alliance.

c. **Centres of Gravity.**[14] One of the most important steps in developing an operations design is to determine centres of gravity for both opposing and friendly forces, actors and systems. It is necessary to determine the Alliance own centre of gravity and those of friendly actors, and assess their vulnerability to be attacked by opposing forces in order to provide for their protection. They are defined as the characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force, an actor or group of actors derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.[15] In simple terms, a centre of gravity is a principal source of strength or power for the achievement of one's aim. The essence of operational art is to determine an opponent's COG and how best to neutralise it in order to prevent him from achieving his objectives whilst ensuring the protection of one's own COG in order to achieve one's own objectives.

d. **Determining Centres of Gravity.** This is achieved through the knowledge development process and supported with system analysis. This process, if done correctly, will allow planners to determine their opponent's and other actors' critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities that need to be considered in designing the theatre strategy, campaign or operations. Analysing their capabilities will help determine the primary source of strength or power or focal point for creating the conditions or effects required to achieve their objectives. These critical capabilities may constitute a single or multiple centre(s) of gravity. If the objectives or available sources of power change during a campaign or operation, the centre(s) of gravity may change as well.

e. **Centres of Gravity** exist at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and are directly related to the achievement of objectives.

(1) **Strategic COGs** provide the power, will or freedom of action to achieve strategic objectives. They may be found in the power of a regime, the will of the people, ethnic nationalism, economic strength, the armed forces or a coalition structure.

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[14] Centre of gravity - Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6).
[15] AAP-6.

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(2) **Operational COGs** are likely to be the physical means for achieving operational and strategic objectives, such as a mass of offensive forces, air power, maritime power projection capabilities, weapons of mass destruction etc. They may be concentrated in a specific geographic area or dispersed. In the later case, determining the ability to keep a centre of gravity from forming or concentrating its effects could be decisive in defeating it.

(3) **Tactical COGs** tend to be specific capabilities at specific points that provide freedom of action and the means for achieving tactical objectives.

f.   It is important to appreciate which opponents will act according to their own interests, perspectives and values that are likely to be significantly different from our own. Asymmetric situations are a consequence of significant differences in the ends, ways and means possessed by opposing forces.

g.   In a crisis response operation when there is not a clearly designated adversary, it may be useful to determine centres of gravity for the different factions as well as international organizations and non-governmental organizations that must be protected rather than neutralised or destroyed. In a complex situation involving many opposing factions and no primary source of power, it may be possible to determine an abstract centre of gravity such as the popular will to tolerate ethnic violence or confidence in international security commitments.

h.   **Critical Capabilities, Requirements and Vulnerabilities.** Having determined the critical capabilities that constitute centres of gravity for opposing and friendly forces the next step is to determine the "critical path" to them. This requires further analysis of the essential conditions, components and resources that are required to generate, apply and sustain the power or strength of the centres of gravity as well as any vulnerabilities.

(1) **Critical Capabilities.** Centres of gravity rarely consist of a single element. More typically they constitute complex systems, structures or organisations whose power and strength comes from a number of critical capabilities that provide the primary capacity for achieving specific objectives.

(2) **Critical Requirements.** The critical capabilities that constitute a centre of gravity are usually interdependent and function together synergistically to provide freedom of action, balance and power. They ultimately depend on specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities. Critical requirements are those that will degrade or completely eliminate a critical capability if not met.

(3) **Critical Vulnerabilities.** A critical vulnerability exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss. The ability to exploit critical vulnerabilities provides the potential to achieve significant or even decisive results disproportionate to the military resources applied.

i.   A strategic centre of gravity will represent the primary strength[16] for an actor to achieve a strategic objective. There is no set starting point for this analysis; it draws

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[16] For example the power of the regime, the will of people, ethnic nationalism, an alliance etc.

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upon the systems analysis of the principal actors (opponent, partners, neutrals and alliance) to determine their capabilities (what it enables the actor to do), its requirements (what it needs to be effective) and, of most importance, its vulnerabilities (in what way can it be influenced).

j.   Operational centres of gravity are typically a dominant capability that allows the actor to actually achieve operational objectives. Therefore, depending on his mission requirements, the commander may have to analyse both strategic and operational centres of gravity. Centres of gravity may change if strategic/operational conditions or objectives change.

Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix	
Assessed Aim and Desired Outcome	
What is the actor's main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions?	
Centre of Gravity	**Critical Capabilities**
…is a principal source of strength of power for achieving one's aim.	…is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the COG it strength.
What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his strategic objectives?	What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system?
To be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend.	*To be influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend).*
A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.	*The key word is the verb - the ability to….*
Critical Vulnerabilities	**Critical Requirements**
…exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.	…are specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities.
What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?	What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to generate and sustain the COG's critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?
To be attacked in an opponent and protected in a friend.	*To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend.*
A noun with modifiers.	*Nouns, things.*
Conclusion	
Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and behaviour that would lead to improve conditions in the operations environment?	

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k.　Effects[17.]　Effects play a crucial role because they provide a focus for actions and contribute to the accomplishment of objectives and the end state. Actions are designed to create effects that contribute to changes in the capabilities, behaviour or opinions (perceptions) of actors within the operations environment, and to changes to the strategic environment. Effects can be grouped into two categories physical and non-physical. Although all physical effects will lead to some form of non-physical effect, their primary purpose will be to influence the capabilities of actors, while non-physical effects are principally directed towards an actor's behaviour (also referred to as the cognitive domain). This change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), which results from one or more actions, or other causes, may be categorised:

　　(1)　**Desired Effects** are those effects that have a positive impact on the achievement of objectives.

　　(2)　**Undesired Effects** are those effects that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives. In turn, these have to be mitigated.

　　(3)　**Intended effects** are pre-determined effects that are anticipated to result from the actions taken.

　　(4)　**Unintended effects** are those effects that are not anticipated or envisioned to be associated with the objectives and actions taken. These effects may be desired or undesired.

l.　Use of effects in operations planning helps in prioritizing efforts to achieve NATO's objectives and in the efficient allocation of resources. However, planners should remember that a proper effects determination is only possible through a sound understanding of the crisis situation, the main actors to be influenced and the cultural aspects of the environment within which an operation will be taking place. Effects must be measurable, should be limited in number and cannot be divided.

m.　For ease of understanding, effects should be stated in a way that clearly represents a change in the behaviour of a significant actor, a change in capabilities, or a change in a system's state. Planners should also remember that non-kinetic effects may have a very long lead time. A thorough understanding of the operations environment will allow planners to determine which effects will be created rapidly and which not. Misunderstanding the lead times needed to create various effects could lead to frequent unnecessary adjustments to the plan.

n.　**Decisive Condition (DC).**[18] Having determined centres of gravity the next step in designing an operation is to determine decisive conditions that must be established to contain or neutralise an opponent's centres of gravity and to protect one's own. Decisive conditions are logically determined from critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities

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[17] Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition)
[18] AJP-01 (D) defines a decisive condition as 'a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.'

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and can be a place, a precise moment or a distinctive characteristic or quality upon which a centre of gravity depends to maintain its freedom of action and power. However, to be "decisive" it must have the possibility to determine the outcome of the campaign or operation.

(1) **Decisive conditions** can be a place, a precise moment, a distinctive characteristic, or quality upon which a COG depends to maintain its freedom of action and power. The ability to establish favourable decisive conditions allows the commander to retain freedom of action, maintain momentum and gain the initiative. Decisive conditions for opposing forces as well as our own must be determined together with the operational conditions or effects which need to be established. Failure to establish or retain favourable decisive conditions may place the Alliance's centre of gravity at risk.

(2) **Designating Decisive Conditions as Intermediate Objectives.** These should be designated by the commander, within the campaign or operation and be allocated resources to achieve desired conditions or effects to secure, protect, control, deny, destroy or neutralise them. Operational art is applied in determining the condition or effects to be created at decisive conditions when, in what sequence and using what resources. This will help in determining the most promising approach and line of operation to adopt, as well as possible alternatives.

o. **Decisive Point (DP).** In addition to decisive conditions, doctrine identifies another similar, more traditional, element of operational design; the decisive point. A decisive point is defined as 'a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment.'[19] An operational design would normally use either the decisive point or decisive condition construct; decisive points may be of more use in the operational design of more traditional force-on-force operations.

p. **Measurement in Operations Assessment and Criteria for Success.** Establishing objectives requires the commander to make basic decisions about conditions to be achieved or effects to be created at decisive points/decisive conditions. Developing measures of effectiveness, performance and criteria for success provide useful measure for determining progress and successful achievement of the objective.

(1) **Criteria for Success.** To be created for each objective by the Commander. They must be measurable with respect to the essential physical, cybernetic or moral conditions. Criteria for success are representative of what successful achievement of the objective would look like. Perceptions can only be measured with a degree of accuracy by talking to individuals, with very specific questions to allow the strategic level planners to assess how well the mission is progressing.

(2) **Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).** The purpose of a measure of effectiveness is to describe the specific changes in the behaviour or capabilities of a system or subsystem to be able to establish that desired effects are or are not

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[19] AAP-6

being achieved. Therefore, the Commander should determine measures of effectiveness for each effect in order to be able to determine if operations are creating the desired effects or any undesired consequences that might jeopardise accomplishment of his objective or mission. Measures of effectiveness are critical because their use in evaluating progress may influence future decisions regarding the conduct of operations and the allocation of resources.

(3)   **Measures of Performance (MOP).** Their purpose is to evaluate the execution of (own) actions. Each level (operational and subordinate levels) will normally develop measures of performance for the actions they will execute. MOP must:

(a)   Align to one or more own-force actions;

(b)   Describe the element that must be observed to measure the progress of status of the action;

(c)   Have a known deterministic relationship to the action.

The threshold of change to system elements and/or relationships that indicates completion of the related action must be included, but is not the measure of performance itself. The threshold may be changed throughout the operation.

q.   **Operational Geometry.** Having identified centres of gravity, decisive points/decisive conditions and lines of operation, the geographic aspects of the operational design should be used to analyse the "geometry" of the joint operations area or theatre of operations. In particular, this analysis should consider the "operational reach" of Allied joint forces based on the range at which different forces can prudently operate or sustain effective operations. This will inevitably highlight requirements for staging areas, forward operating bases and additional points of entry as well as the need to divide command and control responsibilities within the joint operations area between components.

Figure A.1 - Operations Environment (Engagement Space)

r.   **Operations Geometry – Strategic Level.** In an exercise similar to operational level operational design, the strategic level planning staff organizes actions and strategic effects along strategic lines of engagement to the strategic objective(s) to the end state. A strategic line of engagement is 'a logical line that connects diplomatic, military,

economic and civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state[20]. In a theoretical sense, if there was a universally accepted expression of an end state to a particular crisis by an organization that has control of all four instruments of power a strategic operations design could be expressed as shown in Figure A-2.

Figure A.2 – Theoretical International Strategic Operations Design

A NATO strategic operations design for a given operation, using NATO instruments of power, may look like that shown in Figure A-3. Figure A-3 is NATO centric; in other words, it does not adequately represent relationships, support to and support from other actors, in pursuit of the achievement of NATO strategic objectives and eventually the end state.

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[20] COPD proposed definition.

Figure A.3 – Theoretical NATO Strategic Operations Design

s.   **Sequencing and Phases.** The next major step in the design of an operation or campaign is to determine the character and sequence of major operations.

(1)   **Sequencing** is the arrangement of actions designed to achieve desired conditions or effects at decisive points/decisive conditions within a major operation or campaign in an order that is most likely to produce the desired effect on opposing centres of gravity. Although simultaneous action on multiple lines of operation may be ideal, lack of resources usually forces the commander to sequence his actions; a commander may choose to sequence his actions in order to reduce overall risks to a more acceptable level. This process assists in thinking through the entire operation or campaign in terms of available forces, resources and time, and helps to determine different operational phases.

(2)   **Phases** represent distinct stages in the progress of the operation leading to the attainment of specific conditions or effects at decisive points/decisive conditions required for subsequent stages and ultimately the successful accomplishment of the overall objective. Phases are sequential but may overlap and may be contingent on the successful completion of a preceding phase. This should be clearly recognised in the operations design. The commander may designate a main effort in each phase. However, the aim in phasing an operation or campaign must be to maintain continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses.

t.   **Synchronisation, Synergy and Leverage**. Operational planners throughout this part of the design process consider how to best synchronise the operations using all available means in order to achieve the greatest effect with a given expenditure of

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resources or a desired effect with the least expenditure.

(1) **Synchronisation** is the arrangement of actions and their effects in time, space and purpose to achieve maximum advantage and most favourable conditions. Operational planners will therefore make full use of all effects available to them, e.g. precision attack, decisive manoeuvre, information and psychological operations as well as civil-military cooperation to achieve desired conditions and effects. The primary benefit from synchronisation is the ability to produce synergy and gain leverage by the imaginative creation and exploitation of desired conditions and effects throughout the operations area using different resources.

(2) **Synergy** is the result of a number of individual physical, cybernetic and moral effects which when combined produces a total impact on the adversaries or factions that is greater than the sum of those individual effects.

(3) **Leverage** is achieved when the resulting impact of an action is more than proportionate to the effort applied. Leverage can be achieved by focusing Allied joint force strengths, against opponent's weaknesses when aiming at decisive points/decisive conditions.

u. **Simultaneity and Depth.** One of the first considerations is to determine the extent to which joint forces can conduct simultaneous operations at decisive points/decisive conditions throughout the depth of the area of operations. This is largely a function of the availability of military resources and their operational reach. The intent should always be to achieve synergy by combining the effects of simultaneous actions and to overwhelm the opponent's ability to respond effectively with so many actions occurring at one time.

v. **Manoeuvre.** The operations design should exploit opportunities for manoeuvre by joint forces. The purpose of manoeuvre is to seek a position of advantage in respect to opposing forces from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre may be employed to create desired conditions or effects at decisive points/decisive conditions or directly at the opposing centres of gravity. Manoeuvre exploits opportunities to attack an opponent from unexpected directions thus threatening his physical as well as his moral strength and potentially producing results disproportionately greater than the forces committed. The key is to find ways for forces to dominate time and space.

w. **Operational Tempo.** The joint force should seek to exploit friendly capabilities to control the timing and tempo of operations with the goal of remaining at least one step ahead of an opponent to gain and maintain the initiative.

(1) **Tempo** is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the opposition, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of a joint force to make the transition from one operational posture to another. This requires that the commander anticipates opposing actions and prepares well in advance, as well as maintaining the ability to decide and act rapidly in concentrating military capabilities and massing effects at decisive points/decisive conditions in time and space.

(2) We cannot allow our opponents to anticipate our actions and must retain

the ability to become unpredictable by masking our true intentions, through operational security and deception. The ability to dictate the operational tempo provides freedom of action and is key to bringing an opponent to his culmination point while preventing the premature culmination of our own operation.

x. **Culmination.**[21] Culmination is that point in an operation when the force can no longer successfully continue it current operation. Sequencing and phasing should be designed to ensure that operations by opposing forces culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that our own operations achieve their objective well before any culmination. The art is to achieve the objective of the operation before reaching the culminating point. Therefore, the operations design should determine ways to speed the opponent's culmination while precluding our own. Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications.

(1) In the offence, the attacking force reaches its culminating point when it can no longer sustain its offensive action and must transition to the defence or risk counter attack and defeat.

(2) In the defence, the defending force reaches its culminating point when it can no longer hold and is forced to disengage or withdraw or face defeat.

y. **Operational Pause.**[22] Rather than risk culmination before the objective of the operation has been achieved, the commander may be forced to accept an operational pause in the design of his operation or campaign. An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of a major operation or campaign, usually at the conclusion of an operational phase, but prior to achieving the overall objective, to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation and ultimate attainment of the objective. While an operational pause is preferable to premature culmination, the commander must continue certain operations to retain the initiative. Operational art seeks to ensure that logistical considerations form an integral part of the operations design in order to minimise the requirement for pauses in the operation.

z. **Anticipating Branches and Sequels.** The final and essential step in the operations design process is to anticipate eventualities that may occur during the course of a major operation or campaign and determine alternative lines of engagement at the strategic level and at the operational level lines of operations and sequences of action that still achieve the overall objective. It must be recognised that for every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not achieve the desired effects or expected changes of conditions. Favourable outcomes may present opportunities to be exploited and conversely outcomes that are worse than expected may pose risks that

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[21] AJP-01(C) Allied Joint Doctrine, dated Mar 07, para 0436, i, states "Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. A defending force reaches its culminating point when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter offensive or defend successfully. Every effort should be made to avoid a joint force reaching its culminating point, while influencing the adversarial force in such a way that it reaches its culmination first."

[22] An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation. AJP 1(C), dated Mar 07.

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can be mitigated.

aa.   Our ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends first on anticipating such situations and second on developing contingency options for effectively dealing with them. Commanders must anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that options are provided in their operational planning in order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the enemy. This is achieved by developing "branches" and "sequels" within the overall operations design based on continuously exposing the operations design to 'what if' situations, which could possibly occur during or after each phase of the operation or campaign.

(1)   **Branches.** Branches are contingency options, within a particular phase of an operation, planned and executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal within that phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve his original objective for that phase.

Figure A.4 - Branches and Sequels

(2)   **Sequels.** Sequels are options for subsequent operations within a campaign or the following phase(s) of an operation. They are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo and ultimately achieve his objective.

1-14. Execution.

Execution requires the command and control of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To accomplish this, harmonisation is needed between military and civil actors. The JFC will focus on operational effects and their part in achieving the desired strategic effects.

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The tactical level will generally concentrate on the tasks necessary to accomplish its mission, which will ultimately lead to the realisation of operational and strategic effects. Responsibility for determining effects resides at the military strategic and operational levels. Key to execution of any operation will be the ability to measure progress and to adapt quickly at the relevant level to changes in the operations environment.

1-15. Operations Assessment.

Assessment of the operations environment involves monitoring and assessing the outcome of all actions taken across the whole operations environment and all associated effects. From a military standpoint, plans that use effects require continuous operations assessment in order for informed adjustments to be made. Progress of actions, creation of effects and achievement of objectives towards the accomplishment of the end state are all assessed via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision process. This operations assessment process applies to all levels. The collector may be a non-NATO asset, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors. Operations assessment and knowledge development are closely related through system analysis which provides the backdrop for operations assessment to understand how to measure effects and actions.

1-16. Crisis Resolution and Transition.

NATO commanders must clearly understand the desired end state and set criteria for termination of the campaign. Appropriate and well-conceived termination criteria are the key to ensure that successful military operations result in conditions that allow conflict resolution on terms favourable to the Alliance. In the event that termination criteria are not clearly articulated, the JFC should request through the Strategic Commander further guidance or clarification, as appropriate.

    a.   **Planning for Crisis Resolution and Transition.** Crisis resolution and transition is a key consideration in the design of an operation and must be integrated in the operational planning process. The NATO Commander and his staff must examine the desired end state and assess whether it is likely to eliminate or sufficiently reduce sources of further crisis. On this basis they must determine what constitutes an acceptable end state; i.e., what military conditions must exist to justify a cessation of military operations. In formulating his plan, the NATO Commander should ensure that the following considerations are addressed:

        (1)   Is there a clear, concise statement of termination criteria that support the desired end state?

        (2)   Are all of the instruments of power available to achieve desired effect (military, political, economic, civil)?

        (3)   Will the International community provide diplomatic and economic support that contributes to achieving the desired end state?

        (4)   What is the NATO strategy for crisis termination? Is early termination more desirable than continued military operations?

        (5)   How can military operations contribute to future long-term stability while avoiding sowing the seeds for future crisis?

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1-17. Termination

Alliance operations inherently have both political and military goals; as such, exclusively military lines of activity will invariably not achieve the desired end-state. While every campaign or major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point military action is no longer the main effort. Some key considerations for the Commander in planning for termination are:

a.   A clear idea of the conditions that should exist, and how to measure them, before the end-state can be said to have been achieved is required.

b.   What structures, capabilities and postures are required next?

c.   How to change the organization and focus of the staff? Too early and there a danger that they lose focus, too late and a period of instability may occur as readjustment takes place.

d.   How to avoid a resumption of hostilities?

e.   In what state should the indigenous forces or warring factions be left?

f.   How will responsibilities be transferred to indigenous or follow-on forces, or other organizations?

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ANNEX B TO
COPD V1.0
DATED 17 Dec 10

STRATEGIC PLANNING DOCUMENTS TEMPLATES

1.   This Annex provides standard templates in Appendices 1 through 5 that provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the following documents[1]:

a.   Appendix 1 - Warning Order.

b.   Appendix 2 - SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.

c.   Appendix 3 - Military Response Options.

d.   Appendix 4 - Strategic Planning Directive.

e.   Appendix 5 - Strategic CONOPS/OPLAN main body.

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[1] Refer to ACO Directive 35-4 'Preparation of Documents' and SHAPE Grammar Mama for further details on formatting.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
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DATED 17 Dec 10

Appendix 1 to Annex B - Warning Order

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref:	insert file ref # - insert tasker #	**Tel:**	+32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)
		Tel:	+32-(0)65-44 + ext
		NCN:	254 + ext
Date:	Month Year	**Fax:**	+32-(0)65-44-3545 (Registry)

1.   TO:

2.   SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER FOR …

3.   REFERENCES:

4.   **Background.**   The situation on/in … is deteriorating and calls for … The UN Security Council assesses that … As a consequence, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) has requested NATO to consider …, acting under …of the UN Charter. In light of the NAC assessment at Reference XX … the IMS issued guidance at Reference YY … requesting SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA) assessment.

5.   **Joint Headquarters.** I intend to designate JFC … as the joint planning HQ for this potential crisis. JFC …………is to:

    a.   Provide operational advice on potential military response options to be developed at SHAPE, including…

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(1)   Recommendations on measures focussing on a deterrence and prevention posture, in particular in the field of military presence, surveillance and intelligence gathering.

(2)   Recommendations on the necessity and feasibility to conduct other operations, taking into account the availability of NATO and non-NATO forces, and the preparatory planning activities necessary for their conduct.

(3)   Identification and advice to the SOPG of those non-NATO entities with which NATO-led forces will need to interact.

(4)   Initiate prudent military planning and deploy an OLRT on order.

b.   Provide an update on his assessment daily. This should include advice on readiness for forces including OLRT.

c.   Provide a liaison officer to the SOPG by E+1.

d.   Be prepared to coordinate with EADRCC.

6.   **Crisis Response Measures.** CRM … are herewith declared.

7.   **SACEUR Strategic Assessment.** The SSA is due to the MC by …

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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX B TO
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DATED 17 DEC 10

Appendix 2 to Annex B –SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES

EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref:	insert file ref # - insert tasker #	**Tel:**	+32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)
		Tel:	+32-(0)65-44 + ext
		NCN:	254 + ext
Date:	Month Year	**Fax:**	+32-(0)65-44-3545 (Registry)

TO:

SUBJECT: SACEUR's STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FOR …

REFERENCES:

1.   **Strategic Situation.**

       a.   **Background.**   In Reference A, SHAPE was requested to provide a strategic assessment of the situation, causes, possible response options, security, stability, humanitarian assistance, NATO, non NATO…

       b.   **Assessment of the Crisis.** The main aspects, causes and symptoms (e.g. humanitarian issues, international law, and instability), support from others, and means to effect the crisis.

       c.   **Main Actors.** The main actors (including state and non-state actors) shaping events in the region are: … The assessed strategic centre of gravity…How to change

       d.   Actor XX capabilities and/or actions, using military and non-military means and ways, the effects to be created and the actions required to produce these effects. Draw

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also on the NAC Decision Sheet.

    (1)   Actor 1. Role, strategic objectives, primary power, key relationships, dependencies, vulnerabilities, required changes in capability, limits and actions should include Strategic Military Analysis examples.

        (a)   Improve capacity for national defence and internal security.

        (b)   Develop and implement national policy on socio/economic integration of the population.

        (c)   Promote confidence of population in political process and rule of law.

        (d)   Comply with the provisions set forth in UNSCR.

        (e)   Facilitate humanitarian efforts.

        (f)   Centre of Gravity and associated considerations, strengths, vulnerabilities etc.

    (2)   Actor 2.

    (3)   Actor 3.

e.   **Key Factors.** The key natural, political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information and other significant factors influencing the crisis and the interaction of the main actors include:

    (1)   Factor….

    (2)   ….

Factor	Deduction	Conclusion
A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic implication.	The implications, issues or considerations, derived from the fact(s) with strategic significance.	The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.
▪ Military capability.	▪ Threat to neighbours.	▪ Deterrence required.
▪ Poverty level.	▪ Support for government.	▪ Requires economic, civil actions.
▪ Scale of ethnic violence.	▪ Risk to stability.	▪ Stability requirements.
▪ Support for extremists.	▪ Accessibility of population.	▪ Elements StratCom.
▪ Access to media.	▪ So what is the significance of the factor?	▪ So, what can or should be done?
▪ What is the current state of affairs or trends?		

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    f.   **Potential Threats and Risks.** The major threats and risks to international interests and the potential consequences from not taking action or taking action: ethnic violence, regional instability, interruption to LOCs/energy. Potential for collateral damage to civilians, infrastructure and cultural sites.

        (1)   …...

    g.   **Urgency.** The most urgent aspects of the crisis are:

        (1)   Immediate risk. Risk to DPRE/military intervention/interruption to energy supplies….

        (2)   Increased risk….

2.   **Assessment of International Interests (and Objectives).**

    a.   **Likely Common International Interests.** UN Security Council resolutions clearly set out the intentions of the Security Council and mandates to achieve … Safe access, halt violations of international law, end, protect, etc.

        (1)   UN.

        (2)   Other international organisations …

    b.   **International Legal Aspects.**

        (1)   International Agreements. What, when and summary.

        (2)   United Nations Mandates.

        (3)   United Nations Charter.

        (4)   United Nations and other international conventions.

    c.   **Assessment of the Information Environment.** Overall appreciation of the information environment within the theatre and in the international community related to the theatre.

        (1)   Audiences.

        (2)   Assessment of Key Actors.

        (3)   Perceptions.

        (4)   Any additional factor analysis to consider.

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    d.   **Media Interest/Attitudes.** Critical media-related Infrastructure in the Area of interest, general attitudes and trends in the media, and local audience accessibility are:

        (1)   International Media.

        (2)   Regional and local Media in potential JOA.

        (3)   NATO nations internal media – (Contentious issues only).

    e.   **Potential International Contributions and Areas for Cooperation.** Based on current commitments, international contributions to resolve the crisis likely will be: political/diplomatic, humanitarian, military (NATO), neighbouring nations.

    f.   **Political Limitations.** The most likely political limitations are: [To be further discussed.]

        (1)   Authorisation on military intervention, limited and proportional force, limited to JOA?, damage limitation, interference with international sea lanes, etc…

    g.   **Assumptions[1].**

        (1)   UN will provide the mandate, terrorist groups will, involvement by sympathetic nations cannot be ruled out, etc….

3.   **Potential NATO Interests.**

    a.   **NATO Policy Considerations and Strategic Interests.** The declaration of the NATO heads of state and government ….

        (1)   ….

    b.   **Provisional NATO End State.** A region that is …., with the following specific conditions:

        (1)   ….

    c.   **Provisional NATO Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives.** Achieving the desired end state would be supported by the following objectives:

        (1)   ….

            (a)   **Desired Strategic Effects.** In order for NATO to achieve these objectives, its actions, in concert with those of other cooperating

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[1] Assumption - A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to complete an estimate of the situation as a basis for future decisions. (Proposed)

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organisations, must achieve the following effects. For ease of documentation this may be grouped under objectives or actors.

d.   **Possible Strategic Approaches**. Considering the nature of the problem these approaches, taking account of all instruments of power, should provide sufficient SACEUR advice for the NAC to decide if the Alliance becomes involved in the crisis. These should be based on different levels of ambitions, which are not solely military driven, and with sufficient clarity to allow NAC to provide the necessary follow on direction to SACEUR to develop MROs. The use of different instruments of power could be considered in conjunction with NATO military means, including….

Suitability – the strategic approach will logically create the strategic effects required to achieve strategic objectives and the desired end state.

Feasibility - the strategic means, including different instruments and expeditionary capabilities are adequate to carry out the required actions over time.

Acceptability – the strategic approaches is consistent with legal and moral obligations and the potential benefit justifies the expected costs and risks.

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Appendix 3 to Annex B – Military Response Options

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

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TO:

SUBJECT:　　　　MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR …

REFERENCES:

1.　　**Introduction**.　Based on the references, this document provides possible military response options to address a given crisis.　They should be distinct in 'how' they reach the end state rather than simply state how much force or what capabilities are required.　Quantative information is important and necessary for NAC's decision-making and required for each MRO, though it should not be the primary method for distinguishing between options.

2.　　**Considerations/Factors.**

　　a.　　**Provisional NATO End State.**

　　b.　　**Provisional NATO Strategic Objectives.**

3.　　**Military Response Options.**　Brief introduction of each option, which will be expanded at the Annex.

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4.   **Broad Order Force Requirements and Force Generation Issues.** Include indication of regional support if appropriate. Any limitations on what military force can achieve.

5.   **Deployment.**

6.   **Possible Graduation and Sequencing**. A rough estimate of time required to accomplish the military strategic objectives.

7.   **Strategic Communications Strategy Requirements.**

8.   **Sustainment and Costs**. Host Nation Support.

9.   **Conclusion.**

10.   **Recommendation.** SACEUR recommends Option X, based on …

    a.   Most effective option in meeting NATO potential objectives and desired end state against cost/risk etc.

    b.   Inherent advantages and disadvantages in creating the desired effects and achieving the strategic objectives in conjunction with other instruments.

    c.   Likely costs compared with expected strategic benefits.

    d.   Assessed risks and possibilities for mitigation

    e.   Potential impact on ongoing operations.

    f.   The military option that provides the best balance between probability for success, cost-effectiveness and acceptable risks.

11.   **Points of Contact.**

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ANNEXES:

A.   Options Matrix[1]
B.   Assessment of Response Options (if required)
C.   Force Generation Options (if required)
D.   Strategic Communications Approach (if required)
E.   Cost Estimate (if required)

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[1] While the example shows all three options in one table for ease of comparison, a separate appendix for each option may also be used.

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Potential Military Response Options

Option 1 -	Option 2 –	Option 3 –
Mission: NATO, in close cooperation with the cooperating organisations, conducts type of military operations in specified areas to create specific strategic military objectives to achieve end state. Improve/maintain. Expected response from opposing forces/actors.	Mission: Contain, improve	Mission: Enforce…..
a. Military Strategic Objectives. (1) … .	a. Military Strategic Objectives. (1) … .	a. Military Strategic Objectives. (1) … .
b. Military Strategic Effects. (1) Complies with, cooperates with, resumes, stops, disarms, improves, increases, is deterred from…. (2)	b. Military Strategic Effects. (1) …. (2)	b. Military Strategic Effects (1) …. (2) ….
c. Military Actions. (1) Conduct, provide, protect, be prepared to, establish, disarm, assist….	c. Military Actions. (1) ….	c. Military Actions. (1) ….
d. Force/Capability Requirements. (1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS, CIMIC Logs etc….	d. Force/Capability Requirements. (1) …. (2) ….	d. Force/Capability Requirements. (1) …. (2) ….

Option 1 -	Option 2 –	Option 3 –
e. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.	e. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.	e. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.
f. ROE Requirements.	f. ROE Requirements.	f. ROE Requirements.
g. Complementary Non-Military Actions and Effects. (1) Diplomatic incentives to influence…. (2) Economic …. (3) Civil ….	g. Complementary Non-Military Actions and Effects. (1) Diplomatic …. (2) Economic …. (3) Civil ….	g. Complementary Non-Military Actions and Effects. (1) Diplomatic …. (2) Economic …. (3) Civil ….
h. Resource Implications. (1) Strategic Lift. (2) Sustainment. (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs. (4) Medical.	h. Resource Implications. (1) Strategic Lift. (2) Sustainment. (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs. (4) Medical.	h. Resource Implications. (1) Strategic Lift. (2) Sustainment. (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs. (4) Medical.
i. Provisional Theatre and JOA. (1) Theatre of Operations: (2) JOA:	i. Provisional Theatre and JOA. (1) Theatre of Operations: (2) JOA:	i. Provisional Theatre and JOA. (1) Theatre of Operations: (2) JOA:
j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements. (1) Designated JFC, CC's etc…..	j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements. (1) …	j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements. (1) ….

Option 1 -	Option 2 –	Option 3 –
k. Strategic and Operational risks.	k. Strategic and Operational risks.	k. Strategic and Operational risks.
l. CRM requirements. Pre-authorised, requiring authorisation and subsequent delegation. Int, Logs Readiness, provisional of national assets, Manpower, Counter-Intelligence and Security – CDA, Force Protection, Operation of HQ, PsyOps, EW, Metoc, CBRN, C4I- Critical Infrastructure and Services, Public Information.	l. CRM requirements.	l. CRM requirements.
m. StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance. (1) …	m. StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance. (1) ….	m. StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance. (1) ….
n. International Coordination / Liaison. (1) UN, Governments, local national 'Unions' e.g. AU….	n. International Coordination / Liaison. (1) ….	n. International Coordination / Liaison. (1) ….
o. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.	o. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.	o. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.
p. Preconditions for Success. Legal, alliance commitment, transfer of command authority, ROE etc	p. Preconditions for Success.	p. Preconditions for Success.

Assessment of Military Response Options.

Option A -	Option B –	Option C –
a. Advantages. (1) Minimum forces, non escalatory, meets immediate security requirement…. (2) ….	a. Advantages. (1) …. (2) ….	a. Advantages. (1) …. (2) ….
b. Disadvantages. (1) Flexibility to cope with deterioration situation, credibility. Long term solution…. (2) ….	b. Disadvantages. (1) …. (2) ….	b. Disadvantages. (1) …. (2) ….
c. Impact on Current Operations. (1) Demand on limited assets, e.g. strategic lift…. (2) ….	c. Impact on Current Operations. (1) …. (2) ….	c. Impact on Current Operations. (1) …. ….
d. Risks. (1) Aggression not curtailed, failure of UN/IC to meet … resulting in…. Particularly at the political level, collateral damage etc	d. Risks. (1) …. (2) ….	d. Risks. (1) …. (2) ….

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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX B TO
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Appendix 4 to Annex B – Strategic Planning Directive

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS

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EN EUROPE

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TO:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTIVE

REFERENCES:

1. **Situation.**

    a. **Strategic Conditions /Environment/Integrated Strategic Approach.** (Given as assessment of the crisis). The main aspects of the crisis are drawn from the NAC ID and SSA to re-emphasise to the JFC in a broad overview the key issues, especially any emerging issues. NATO will contribute to international efforts with cooperating nations in the region. Highlight key actors but refer to detail as submitted to the NAC is SSA. Legal basis and requirements.

    b. **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.**

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    (1)   NATO End state. (Given from NAC ID)

    (2)   NATO Strategic Objectives[1]. (Given from NAC ID)

    (3)   Strategic Risk Assessment. The strategic risks currently identified in this operation and possible mitigation.

c.   **NATO Centre of Gravity.**

d.   **Political Guidance.**

    (1)   Political Constraints.

    (2)   Political Restraints.

e.   **Political Assumptions.**

2.   **Mission.** (Given from NAC ID) When authorised by the NAC, SACEUR, in close cooperation with …[UN/other Govs/IOs] will direct the deployment of a [NATO-led] [multi-national force] to [country/region] and conduct…operations in the JOA, considering relevant UN resolution [international law], to establish a secure environment for… to enforce [UN sanctions etc], deter, safeguard, counter, etc.

3.   **SACEUR'S Intent.** (Refined from selected option – Core of the SPD)

a.   **Aim.**

b.   **Military Strategic Objectives.**

c.   **Main Effort.**

d.   **Preconditions For Success.** Conditions that must exist for an objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist.

e.   **Strategic Lines Of Engagement.**

f.   **Strategic Sequence Of Effects And Actions.**

g.   **Cooperation With Non-Military And Non-NATO Efforts.**

h.   **Risk Management/Analysis**.

4.   **Execution.**

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[1] MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning (subject to approval from the NAC) outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level.

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a.   **Strategic Framework.** NATO-led operations will be planned and conducted within the following strategic framework to facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as Alliance political control (note: phases are illustrative).

(1)   Preparation and Enabling. (e.g. Early Deployment). This begins with the NAC initiating directive. Preparation will…

(a)   Desired Effects.

1/   Embargo enforced, conditions set for arrival of main force, IO initiated.

(2)   Strategic Shaping and Deterrence. (Deployment and Shaping). This phase begins with a NAC execution directive. It includes…

(a)   Desired Effects.

1/   External security effective, terrorist cells disrupted…

(3)   Implementation and Enforcement. (Safe and Secure Environment). This stage will be initiated by NAC execution directive to … It includes…

(a)   Desired Effects.

1/   Insurgency collapse, threat to IO/NGOs no longer extant…

(4)   Strategic Stabilisation and Consolidation. (Handover and Redeployment).This stage is …

(a)   Desired Effects.

1/   Country x self-sufficient for national defence and internal security…

(5)   Transition and Exit. (Security Disengagement and Capability Relocation).

(a)   Desired Effects.

b.   **Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.**

c.   **Force and Theatre Capability Requirements.** (Given) The following provisional force capability requirements should be used as a basis for planning…

d.   **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1)   SACEUR's Critical Information Requirements. (SHAPE determines).

(a)   Enemy forces changes in readiness, emerging information on key

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leaders and disposition…

(2)   Crisis Response Measures. (SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements. If numerous create Annex). Pre-authorised, additional declared by NAC/IMS, SACEUR recommended for NAC approval. Must include implementation reporting requirements, degree of implementation and associated risks...

(3)   Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. (SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements). Legitimacy, non-escalatory…

(4)   Targeting. (SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements). JFC is to, in accordance with AD 80-70, develop target sets and, as appropriate, illustrative target categories, including, as far as possible, time-sensitive targets (TSTs) that would need to be targeted to counter threats and exploit opportunities to accomplish NAC agreed strategic military objectives. Proposed target sets and illustrative target categories for engagement using non-lethal and lethal means should be forwarded to SHAPE for submission through the MC to the NAC for approval and amplifying guidance or caveats. JFC will develop and maintain target lists, to include TST, based on approved target sets and SACEUR's targeting guidance.

(5)   Force Protection. The protection of the Force is a crucial consideration with implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as public support, political cohesion and other areas that may be exploited by the adversaries.

(6)   Strategic Communications. (SHAPE provides guidance and requests JFC recommendations). General statement introducing the Strategic Communications Framework and addresses how ACO will implement NATO's Strategic Communications strategy. Makes reference to the full Initial Strategic Communications Framework at Annex to the SPD….

(7)   Public Affairs. Public Affairs (PA) plan is to be developed in accordance with NID, NATO StratCom strategy, SACEUR's StratCom Framework and pertinent NATO policy setting out the PA mission and specific PA objectives of NATO's engagement in the region …

(8)   Civil-Military Co-operation. (SHAPE provides guidance)… Assist local authorities and international civil presence to ensure freedom of movement and secure environment.

(9)   Inter-agency Coordination. (SHAPE provides guidance)…Level XX Interaction is authorised with the XXXX.

(10)   Partner Involvement. (SHAPE provides guidance). Partner participation Partner participation should be authorised for sustainment of operations as well as to provide special capabilities for intelligence, logistics.

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(11)   Assessment. (SHAPE provides guidance for the assessment at the strategic level). Criteria to be used at all levels and phases of the operation.

(12)   Critical Timings. (SHAPE provides guidance).

(a)   Conferences, CONOPs to be submitted by, FG conference, OLRT deployment, NLT deployment date…

(13)   Exit Criteria. (If possible SHAPE provides guidance). Exit criteria are those self-sustaining conditions that must have been established with respect to specific systems in the engagement space to satisfy international norms and allow operations to be terminated. They are developed and used as a basis for planning the transition and exit from the theatre while ensuring that favourable conditions can be sustained as military forces are withdrawn from the theatre.

5.   **Service Support.**

a.   Logistic Concept.

b.   Logistic Standards and Requirements.

c.   Movement Concept.   (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)…

d.   Host Nation Support Concept. (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements.

e.   Finance.

6.   **Command and Signal.**

a.   **Command and Control**.

(1)   Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area.

(a)   The theatre of operations includes (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)…

(b)   The provisional joint operations area (JOA) includes (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)…

(2)   Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from SACEUR (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)...

(3)   Command Authority.

(a)   Transfer of Authority.

(b)   Delegation of Command Authority.

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        (4)   Liaison and Coordination. (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)…

        (5)   Conduct of Combined Operations.

   b.   **Communications and Information Concept.**

        (1)   NATO communications and information systems will be extended to link ….

        (2)   The main Networks and IEGs, DCIS for each PoP, required AIS, back up communications, alternative networks …

        (3)   NATO satellite coverage will ...

        (4)   Connectivity with external organisations

        (5)   OPSEC direction/ security conditions (Alfa…Gamma…etc).

        (6)   NATO CIS Support Agency (NCSA) will …(address also, NC3A).

        (7)   IEGs will provide to (PfPs forces, Host Nation, coalition unit's ships, etc)…

        (8)   Host nation's CIS infrastructure utility (Leased Lines, GSM, ADSL, DSM etc) …

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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX B TO
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DATED 17 DEC 10

Appendix 5 to Annex B – Strategic CONOPS/OPLAN main body

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

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TO:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

The framework below supports the development of strategic level CONOPS/COP/SDP/OPLAN. It may be adapted for use at the operational level of command or below, as detailed in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.

1.   **Situation.** This introductory paragraph describes: the political/military situation leading to the requirement for the applicable planning product. It draw on SACEUR's Strategic Assessment, Strategic Political Military Plan (SPMP) (if available), NID and SPD to highlight the key factors in a broad overview, specifically addressing any emerging issues; details of NATO's contribution to international efforts and role with cooperating actors in the crisis area; and the legal basis for involvement.

   a.   **Political Environment.**

   b.   **Strategic Environment.** The main aspects of the crisis.

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       (1)   Opposing Actors. Brief Introduction to the main actors to allow a full appreciation of the crisis.

       (2)   Friendly and Cooperating Actors. This should include the UN and as appropriate Governments including those providing host nation support, International and Non-Governmental Organisations (IO/NGOs).

       (3)   Neutral Actors.

  c.   **Information Environment.**

  d.   **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.**

       (1)   NATO End State.

       (2)   NATO Strategic Objectives[1].

  e.   **NATO Centre of Gravity.**

  f.   **Political Guidance.**

       (1)   Political Constraints.

       (2)   Political Restraints.

  g.   **Political Assumptions.**

  h.   **Legal Basis.** The legal and legitimate basis for NATO's involvement.

  i.   **Participation of Non-NATO Contributing Nations.**

2.   **Mission.** Clear, concise definition of the nature of the operation, identification of the military commander responsible for the conduct of the operation, the location of the operation and, if appropriate, the likely timeframe for the operation.

3.   **Strategic Planning Direction/Design.**

  a.   **SACEUR's Intent.** A broad statement of SACEURs intent covering, but not limited to, the issues below.

       (1)   Main Effort. The primary focal point of an operation established by a commander within his area of responsibility for the deliberate concentration of effects using available resources where and when he deems it necessary to achievement of his objective.

       (2)   The Strategic Aim.

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[1] MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning (subject to approval from the NAC) outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level.

      (3)   Strategic Centre of Gravity.

      (4)   Military Strategic Objectives.

      (5)   Strategic Lines of Engagement.

      (6)   Strategic Effects and Actions.

      (7)   Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO Efforts.

      (8)   Preconditions for Success. This should include for example broad legal arrangements, coordinated Strategic Communications strategy, transfer of command authority transferred, timely provision of forces, ROE, and Intelligence.

      (9)   Criteria for Success.

      (10)   Constraints and Restraints.

      (11)   Risk Assessment and Risk Management.

b.   **Strategic Planning Assumptions.** NAC agreed assumptions as a basis for planning.

c.   **Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area**. Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations area.

d.   **Strategic Framework.** NATO-led operations will be planned and conducted within the following strategic framework to facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as Alliance political control. This may be sub-divided into Phases and include effects and actions (and sequencing) for the Joint Force Commander. [Note: phases are illustrative.]

      (1)   Preparation and Enabling. This begins with the NAC initiating directive. Preparation will …..

           (a)   Desired Effects.

           (b)   Actions for COMJFC.

      (2)   Strategic Shaping and Deterrence. This stage begins with a NAC execution directive. It includes ….

           (a)   Desired Effects.

           (b)   Actions for COMJFC. Conduct show of force, safeguard SLOC's, provide security for…., conduct PsyOps/IO etc.

      (3)   Implementation and Enforcement. This stage will be initiated by NAC execution directive to … It includes…

        (a)   Desired Effects.

        (b)   Actions for COMJFC.

    (4)   Strategic Stabilisation and Consolidation. This stage is …

        (a)   Desired Effects.

        (b)   Actions for COMJFC.

    (5)   Transition and Exit. (Security Disengagement and Capability Relocation).

        (a)   Desired Effects.

        (b)   Actions for COMJFC. Handover military missions, coordinate redeployment, etc.

4.   **Execution.**

    a.   **Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.**

    b.   **Force and Theatre Capability Requirements.** (Given) The following provisional force capability requirements should be used as a basis for planning, e.g. NRF.

    c.   **Coordination of Requirements.** General overview supported by detailed Annexes where appropriate.

        (1)   SACEUR's Critical Information Requirements. (SHAPE determines) Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions at the strategic level. SCIR should guide subordinate commands in developing their Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

        (2)   Crisis Response Measures. SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements… SOPG should initially direct subordinate commands to develop requirements for implementing additional crisis response measures and provide justification. As these are generated, the SOPG will include these in the strategic CONOPS. SDC will initiate requests as required.

        (3)   Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements. Following from their development of targeting guidance, SOPG, should provide initial guidance in the SPD on the use of military force including lethal and non-lethal measures.

        (4)   Targeting. SHAPE provides guidance and request JFC requirements… Based on the NID and SACEUR's initial intent and guidance, SOPG should provide initial targeting guidance and direct JOPG to further determine the target sets and, as appropriate, target categories, and, as far as possible, categories of time-sensitive targets (TSTs) that would need to be engaged due to the threat that

they would pose to, or the opportunity that they would present for, the success of the NATO mission. JFC input will be reflected in the strategic CONOPS for MC endorsement and NAC approval[2].

(5)   Force Protection. The SOPG develops guidance and direction for force protection, focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.

(6)   Strategic Communications Framework. SHAPE provides direction and guidance inclusive of JFC recommendations from SPD as appropriate... Based on the concept for implementation of the Strategic Communications strategy as detailed in the revised StratCom Framework. This paragraph outlines the specific direction provided to subordinate commands and describes how StratCom contributes to achievement of the desired strategic effects with reference to Annexes L, O and X (PSYOPS, Info Ops and PA respectively). This is meant to be a concise overview, not a reproduction of the entire StratCom framework, as the framework will have already been submitted to the JFC and it is not intended to submit the framework to the NAC. The direction and guidance contained in the framework will also have been taken into account in the individual PSYOPS, Info Ops and PA annexes.

(7)   Civil-Military Co-operation. SHAPE provides guidance and will provide any specific direction to subordinate commands to generate requirements or focus their operational planning regarding civil-military interaction as discussed above.

(8)   Inter-agency Coordination. SHAPE provides guidance…

(9)   Partner Involvement. SHAPE provides guidance on Partner participation In accordance with the NID and SACEUR's initial guidance. The SOPG must provide initial guidance on the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing. These provisions for partner participation will be developed and subsequently described in SACEUR's strategic CONOPS.

(10)   Operations Assessment. SHAPE provides guidance to direct the development of operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements. As provisions for the conduct of campaign assessments are developed, they are reflected in the strategic CONOPS. In principle strategic operations assessments will focus on the following:

    (a)   Progress toward the desired end state.

    (b)   Accomplishing strategic objectives. For each strategic military objective, the SOPG will develop criteria for success that more precisely describe the observable conditions in the theatre of operations that must

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[2] For items to be included in the SACEUR targeting guidance and Targeting Annexes, refer to ACO Directive 80-70 (Annex G)

exist or that cannot exist for the objective to be successfully accomplished.

(c)   Creating strategic effects. Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) - A criterion used to evaluate how a system's behaviour or capabilities have been affected by strategic actions. Used to assess progress towards effects, objectives and end state.

(d)   Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are captured and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and strategic success.

(11)   Exit Criteria. Exit criteria are those self-sustaining conditions that must have been established with respect to specific systems in the engagement space to satisfy international norms and allow operations to be terminated. They are developed and used as a basis for planning the transition and exit from the theatre while ensuring that favourable conditions can be sustained as military forces are withdrawn from the theatre.

(12)   Critical Timings. (SHAPE provides guidance).

(a)   JFC CONOPS with provisional CJSOR due, force generation conference, OPLAN to SACEUR, ready to deploy, etc….

(b)   …

(13)   Environmental Protection. (SHAPE provides guidance).

5.   **Service Support.**

Determine the theatre logistics architecture. The SOPG will further develop the theatre logistics architecture based on the NID and SACEUR's initial intent and guidance. The principal aspects that must be established include:

- Strategic lines of communications.
- Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
- Intermediate staging bases, if required.
- Main logistical bases and forward logistical bases.
- Possibilities for host nation support.

a.   **Logistic Concept**. TBC with SHAPE support staff…

b.   **Logistic Standards and Requirements**. TBC with SHAPE support staff…

c.   **Movement Concept**. SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements.

d.   **Host Nation Support Concept**. SHAPE provides guidance and request

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operational requirements.

e. **Supply and Maintenance Concept.**

f. **Military Engineering Concept**.

g. **Medical Support Concept**.

h. **Finance**.

i. **Manpower**.

6. **Command and Signal.** The SOPG must review the NID as well as SACEUR's initial intent and guidance to determine the C2 required to conduct the essential military activities within the theatre, within the constraints of the theatre logistical architecture and the communications means available in the region and provided by deployable CIS. It is therefore important to provide clear guidance and direction on these matters in SACEUR's SPD and allow the JFC to develop the necessary operational C2 requirements based on the JFC's operational concept. These will then be reflected in strategic CONOPS for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

a. **Command and Control**.

(1) Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from SACEUR (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)...

(2) Command Authority.

(a) Transfer of Authority.

(b) Delegation of Command Authority.

(3) Liaison and Coordination. SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements…

(4) Conduct of Combined Operations.

b. **Communications and Information Concept.**

(1) NATO Communications and Information Systems will be extended to link

(2) The Main Networks and IEGs, DCIS for each PoP, required AIS, back up communications, alternative networks, etc.

(3) NATO Satellite Coverage.

(4) Connectivity with external organisations.

(5) OPSEC Direction/ Security Conditions. (Alfa…Gamma…etc).

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    (6)   NATO CIS Support Agency (NCSA) will … (address also, NC3A).

    (7)   IEGs will provide to (PfPs forces, Host Nation …coalition unit's ships, etc).

    (8)   Host Nation's CIS Infrastructure Utility. (Leased Lines, GSM, ADSL, DSM etc).

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ANNEXES:

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STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL CONOPS – REQUIRED ANNEXES[1]

Annex	Title	Appendix
B	Task Organisation and Command Relationships	B-1: Task Organisation
		B-2: Command Structure
		B-3: Transfer of Authority
		B-4: Liaison
		B-5: Coordination Matrix
D	Intelligence	D-1: Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Interest
		D-2: Intelligence Estimate
		D-3: Collection, Co-ordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM)
		D-4: Intelligence Support, Architecture
		D-5: Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
		D-6: Counter Intelligence, Security[2]
		D-7: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
		D-8: Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)
		D-9: Intelligence Support to Targeting
E	Rules of Engagement	E-1: ROE Planning Profiles
		E-2: ROE for Land Operations
		E-3: ROE for Air Operations
		E-4: ROE for Maritime Operations
		E-5: ROE for Open Sources
		E-6: ROE Release Authority Matrix
L	Psychological Operations	L-1: PSYOPS Task Organisation
		L-2: PSYOPS Themes and Objectives

---

[1] A full list of OPLAN Annexes is at Annex E.

[2] CJ2X Concept.

Annex	Title	Appendix
O	Information Operations	O-1: Information Operations Objectives
		O-2: Information Operations Themes and Messages
		O-3: Information Operations Synchronisation
P	Electronic Warfare	P-1: EW Reports
R	Logistics	R-1: Multinational Logistics Arrangements
		R-2: Personnel Administration
		R-3: Medical Support
		R-4: Maintenance, Repair and Recovery
		R-5: Supply
		R-6: Service Support
		R-7: Real Estate Management
		R-8: Host Nation Support
		R-9: Mission Essential Equipment
T	Environmental Support	T-1: Geographical
		T-2: Meteorological and Oceanography
X	Public Affairs	X-1: Background and public environment analysis
		X-2: PA organization
		X-3: PA approach, goals and associated objectives by phase, audience identification, master messages
		X-4: Guidelines for release of information, media registration and ground rules, imagery support and casualty reporting
		X-5: Appendices to include: news releases, media advisories and other products as appropriate (fact sheets, backgrounders,) talking points, Qs and As, templates (news releases, media advisories, Response to Query)
		X-6: Organization of the NATO Media Information Centre (NMIC)
AA	Legal	AA-1: Guidance on Law and Order
GG	Non-NATO Force Procedures.	

Annex	Title	Appendix
II	Joint Fires	II-1: Detailed Joint Fires Concept
		II-2: Targeting Guidance
		II-3: Joint Targeting Process
		II-4: Fire Support Coordination Measures
JJ	NATO Crisis Response Measures (CRM)	
OO	Operations Assessment	
QQ	Medical	
XX	Record of change	
ZZ	Distribution	

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ANNEX D TO
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OPERATIONAL PLANNING DOCUMENT TEMPLATES

1.   This Annex provides standard templates in Appendices 1 through 3 that provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the following documents:

      a.   Appendix 1 - Operational Advice.

      b.   Appendix 2 - Warning Order.

      c.   Appendix 3 - Operational CONOPS/Plan Main Body.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
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Appendix 1 to Annex D - Operational Advice

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: Operational Advice (Example)

REFERENCES: A. Draft Military Response Options

1.   **Introduction**. Based on Reference A, this document provides operational advice and recommendations to SACEUR on the draft Military Response Options.

2.   **Operational Commanders advice.** JFC Commanders' concurrence with SACEUR's options based on the conclusions highlighted in an annex to this document.

3.   **Conclusions.** Conclusions from the assessment, evaluation and comparison of the different options as to their adequacy, merits and potential for operational success. These conclusions can draw on the key operational questions:

   a.   Will the achievement of the military strategic objective(s) establish the conditions required to attain the desired end state?

   b.   What military operations (actions) must be conducted to create the effects required to achieve military objectives?

   c.   What are the essential military capabilities (resources) required to conduct the military operations successfully?

   d.   Are the military objectives achievable with the means likely to be available and ways acceptable to political authorities?

   e.   Are the necessary strategic conditions in place to ensure operational success and effective cooperation with other instruments?

   f.   What are the operational risks and how can they be mitigated?

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4.   **Initial operational requirements.** Those specific operational requirements that are critical for operational success, including but not limited to:

   a.   Preconditions for success.

   b.   Mission essential force capabilities.

   c.   Critical in-theatre support and infrastructure.

   d.   Essential C2 arrangements and CIS enablers.

   e.   Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

   f.   Deterrence operations.

   g.   Rules of Engagement (ROE) considerations.

   h.   Information strategy.

   i.   Relevant national and international actors with which interaction will be required and the degree of such interaction.

   j.   Additional Crisis Response Measures (CRMs), in particular to prepare and deploy on Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) or other enabling elements.

5.   **Specific areas/concerns to be addressed to SACUER.**

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ANNEXES:

A.   Options Matrix

DISTRIBUTION:

1. **Operational Analysis of draft Military Response Option 1:**

Military Response Option 1	Operational Analysis	Operational Advice
Mission.		
a. Military Strategic Objectives.		
b. Military Strategic Effects. (1) …		
c. Military Actions. (1) …		
d. Force/Capability Requirements. (1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS, CIMIC, Logs etc…. (2) …		
e. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.		
f. ROE Requirements.		
g. Complementary Non-Military Actions and Effects. (1) Diplomatic …. (2) Economic …. (3) Civil ….		
h. Resource Implications. (1) Strategic Lift (2) Sustainment (3) Budget Requirements (4) Medical, etc		

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Military Response Option A	Operational Analysis	Operational Advice
i. Provisional Theatre and JOA. (1) Theatre of Operations: (2) JOA:		
j. Preliminary C2 Arrangements. (1) Designated JFC, CC's etc…. (2) … .		
k. Strategic and Operational risks.		
l. CRM requirements. Pre-authorised, requiring authorisation and subsequent delegation. Intel, Logs, Readiness, Manpower, Counter-Intelligence and Security, Force Protection, Operation of HQ, PsyOps, EW, METEO, CBRN, C4I- Critical Infrastructure and Services, Public Information.		
m. StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance.		
n. International Coordination / Liaison. (1) UN, Governments, local national 'Unions', e.g. AU….		
o. Partner and Non NATO Nations Participation.		
p. Preconditions for Success. (1) … .		

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
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Appendix 2 to Annex D - Warning Order[1]

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: Warning Order

REFERENCES: A.

1.   **Background.** The situation on/in … is deteriorating and calls for …UN Security Council assesses that …As a consequence, UN Secretary General (UNSG) has requested NATO to consider …, acting under …of the UN Charter. In light of the NAC assessment at Ref XX, ….IMS issued guidance at Ref ... requesting SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.

2.   **Designation of Headquarters.** I intend to designate the following HQs for this crisis:

        a.   xxx.

        b.   xxx.

3.   **Crisis Response Measures.** CRMs … are herewith declared.

4.   **HQ Updates**. HQs are to provide updates daily. This should include advice on readiness, etc.

5.   The JFC CONOPs is due by xxxxx.

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ANNEXES:

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[1] Illustrative, Commander driven requirement.

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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX D TO
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Appendix 3 to Annex D – Operational CONOPS/OPLAN Main Body

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES: A.

1.   **Situation.**

  a.   **Political Environment.**

  b.   **Strategic Environment.**

   (1)   Opposing Actors.

   (2)   Friendly Forces and Co-operating Actors.

   (3)   Neutral Actors that influence JFC mission.

  c.   **Information Environment.**

  d.   **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.**

   (1)   NATO End State.

   (2)   NATO Strategic Objectives[2].

   (3)   Military Strategic Objectives.

  e.   **Strategic Centres of Gravity.**

   (1)   Friendly Actors' Strategic Centre of Gravity.

   (2)   Opposing Actors' Strategic Centres of Gravity.

---

[2] MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning (subject to approval from the NAC) outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the political military level.

    f.   **Effects and Action.**

        (1)   Effects to be achieved and actions to be taken by JFC.

    g.   **Planning Assumptions and Limitations. (Political and Military Strategic).**

    h.   **Legal Aspects.**

    i.   **Intelligence and Threat Assessment.**

2.   **Mission.**

    a.   Mission to JFC as directed in Strategic OPLAN para 4.

3.   **Operations Design.**

    a.   **Commander's Intent.**

    b.   **Main Effort.**

    c.   **Operational Objectives.**

        (1)   Operational Objectives to be achieved.

    d.   **Centres of Gravity.**

        (1)   Own COG.

        (2)   Opposing actors' COG.

    e.   **Scheme of Operations.**

    f.   **Effects.**

        (1)   Desired Operational Military Effects to be achieved.

        (2)   MOE.

    g.   **Forces and Resources.**

    h.   **Cooperation with Others Actors.**

    i.   **Preconditions for Success.**

    j.   **Criteria for Success.**

    k.   **Risk Management.**

        (1)   Xxxx**.**

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4. **Execution.**

    a.   **Subordinate Commander Missions and Objectives.**

        (1)   COM LCC will…in order to…

        (2)   COM MCC will…in order to…

        (3)   Xxxx.

    b.   **Subordinate Commander Operational-Level Military Actions.**

        (1)   Actions that subordinate commanders have to conduct in order to create the desired operational effects. OPLAN also lists tasks in support of requested actions.

    c.   **Co-ordinating Instructions.**

        (1)   Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

        (2)   Crisis Response Measures.

        (3)   Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force.

        (4)   Targeting.

        (5)   Force Protection.

        (6)   Information Strategy.

        (7)   Public Affairs.

        (8)   Civil-Military Co-operation.

        (9)   Inter-agency Coordination.

        (10)   Partner Involvement.

        (11)   Strategic Campaign Assessment.

        (12)   Exit Criteria.

        (13)   Critical Timings.

        (14)   Environmental protection.

5. **Service Support.**

    a.   **Logistics Concept.**

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    b.   **Logistics Standards and Requirements.**

    c.   **Movements Concept.**

    d.   **Host Nation Support (HNS).**

    e.   **Military Engineering.**

    f.   **Medical Support.**

    g.   **Finance.**

    h.   **Manpower.**

6.   **Command and Signal.**

    a.   **Command and Control.**

    b.   **Transfer of Forces.**

    c.   **TOO and JOA.**

    d.   **Liaison and Co-ordination.**

    e.   **Communications and Information Concept.**

    f.   **Reporting.**

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OPLAN ANNEXES

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
A	Concept of Operations	A-1: Synchronisation Matrix A-2: Allied Disposition List (ADL) A-3: Reserves
B	Task Organisation and Command Relationships	B-1: Task Organisation B-2: Command Structure B-3: Transfer of Authority B-4: Liaison B-5: Coordination Matrix
C	Forces, Missions/Tasks	C-1: Allied Force List (AFL) C-2: Task List
D	Intelligence	D-1: Areas of Intelligence Responsibility and Interest D-2: Intelligence Estimate D-3: Collection, Co-ordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) D-4: Intelligence Support, Architecture D-5: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) D-6: Counter Intelligence, Security [1] D-7: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) D-8: Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) D-9: Intelligence Support to Targeting
E	Rules of Engagement	E-1: ROE Planning Profiles E-2: ROE for Land Operations E-3: ROE for Air Operations E-4: ROE for Maritime Operations E-5: ROE for Open Sources E-6: ROE Release Authority Matrix

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[1] CJ2X Concept

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
F	Maritime Operations	F-1: Maritime Air Operations
		F-2: Anti-Submarine Operations (ASW)
		F-3: Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
		F-4: Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)
		F-5: Mine Warfare
		F-6: Submarine Operations
		F-7: Naval Cooperation and Guidance to Shipping
		F-8: Land Based Air Support of Maritime Operations
		F-9: Allied World-wide Navigation Information System (AWNIS)
G	Land Operations	G-1: Key Points and Rear Area Security
		G-2: Cover and Deception
		G-3: Area Damage Control
		G-4: Aviation Support for Ground Ops
H	Air Operations	H-1: Counter Air Operations
		H-2: Strategic Air Operations
		H-3: Anti Surface Force Air Operations
		H-4: Supporting Air Operations
		H-6: Air Space Control
		H-7: Air Bed down
		H-8: Data Link Coordination
I	Amphibious Operations	
J	Force Protection	J-1: Active Defence
		J-2: Passive Defence
		J-3: Protective Security
		J-4: Recuperation

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
K	Special Operations	
L	Psychological Operations	L-1: PSYOPS Task Organisation
		L-2: PSYOPS Themes and Objectives
		L-3: PSYOPS Approval Process
		L-4: PSYOPS Support Requests
		L-5: PSYOPS Information Coordination
M	Arms Control	
N	Nuclear Operations	
O	Information Operations	O-1: Information Operations Objectives
		O-2: Information Operations Themes and Messages
		O-3: Information Operations Synchronisation
P	Electronic Warfare	P-1: EW Reports
Q	Communications and Information Systems	Q-1: Strategic Communications Architecture
		Q-2: Maritime Communications
		Q-3: Land Communications
		Q-4: Air Communications
		Q-5: VTC
		Q-6: Formal Message Traffic
		Q-7: Crypto/Key Mat
		Q-8: Safety Frequencies
R	Logistics	R-1: Multinational Logistics Arrangements
		R-2: Personnel Administration
		R-3: Maintenance, Repair and Recovery
		R-4: Supply
		R-5: Service Support
		R-6: Real Estate Management
		R-7: Host Nation Support

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
		R-8: Mission Essential Equipment
		R-9: Logistic Reporting
		R-10: Logistic Visibility
S	Movements	S-1: M&T C2 Structure
		S-2: Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)
		S-3: Designated APOD Data
		S-4: Designated SPOD Data
		S-5: Road, Waterway and Rail Network
		S-6: Movement Reporting
T	Environmental Support	T-1: Geographical
		T-2: Meteorological and Oceanography
U	Operations in a NBC Weapons Environment	U-1: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence
		U-2: Bases and Facilities
V	Search, Rescue and Recovery	V-1: Search and Rescue
		V-2: Combat Search and Rescue
		V-3: Evasion and Escape
		V-4: Recovery
W	Civil-Military Cooperation	W-1: Civil Assessment
		W-2: CIMIC Structure
		W-3: Key Civil Organisations
		W-4: CIMIC Sites of Significance
X	Public Affairs	X-1: Background and public environment analysis
		X-2: PA organization
		X-3: PA approach, goals and associated objectives by phase, audience identification, master messages
		X-4: Guidelines for release of information, media registration and ground rules, imagery support and casualty reporting

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
		X-5: Appendices to include: news releases, media advisories and other products as appropriate (fact sheets, backgrounders,) talking points, Qs and As, templates (news releases, media advisories, Response to Query)
		X-6: Organization of the NATO Media Information Centre (NMIC)
Y	Conflict Termination and De-escalation (Transition Strategy)	
Z	SPARE	
AA	Legal	AA-1: Guidance on Law and Order
BB	Training and Mission Rehearsals	BB-1: Mission Essential Tasks
		BB-2: Augmentation Training
		BB-3: Pre-deployment Training
		BB-4: In-Theatre Training
CC	Command Information Management	CC-1: Command Information Management
		CC-2: Records
		CC-3: IER Reports
		CC-4: Historian Support
		CC-5: Visual Information and Combat Documentation
DD	Space Operations	DD-1: Space Surveillance and Reconnaissance
		DD-2: Navigation Aids
EE	Military Engineering	EE-1: Military Engineer Task Organisation
		EE-2:Military Engineering Support to Infrastructure
		EE-3: Military Engineering Support to Environmental Protection
		EE-4: Mobility and Counter-Mobility
		EE-5: Military Engineering Support to Explosive Ordnance Disposal
		EE-6: Military Engineer Capabilities Analysis

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
FF	Financial Support	FF-1: Funding Support
		FF-2: Contracting Support
GG	Non-NATO Force Procedures	
HH	Rear Area Operations	
II	Joint Fires	II-1: Detailed Joint Fires Concept
		II-2: Targeting Guidance
		II-3: Joint Targeting Process
		II-4: Fire Support Coordination Measures
JJ	NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS)	
KK	Operational Analytical Support	
LL	Lessons Learned	
MM	Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings	
NN	Knowledge Development	NN-1: KD Responsibility and Interest
		NN-2: System analysis
		NN-3: Information acquisition, Co-ordination of KD Requirements Management.
		NN-4: Knowledge Support, Architecture
		NN-5: Support to KD.
OO	Operations Assessment[1]	

---

[1] Annex OO for the operational OPLAN is Campaign Assessment.

ANNEX	TITLE	APPENDIX
PP	Military Police	PP-1: Mobility Support PP-2: Security Function PP-3: Detention Function PP-4: Police Function
QQ	Medical	
RR-XX	SPARES	
YY	Miscellaneous	YY-1: Definitions and Abbreviations YY-2: Bibliography and References
ZZ	Distribution	

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OPERATIONAL BRIEFING AND ESTIMATE TEMPLATES[1]

APPENDICES:

a.   Appendix 1: Mission Analysis Briefing-Outline format.

b.   Appendix 2: COA Decision Briefing-Outline format.

c.   Appendix 3: Operational Estimate.

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[1] Illustrative, Commander driven requirement.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
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Appendix 1 to Annex F – Mission Analysis Briefing-Outline Format

1. **Introduction.**

    a. **Aim of Brief.**

    b. **Outline.**

2. **Review of Situation**.

    a. **Strategic Conditions.**

        (1) NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.

        (2) Military Strategic Objectives.

        (3) Strategic Risk Assessment. *The strategic risks currently identified in this operation and possible mitigation.*

        (4) NATO Centre of Gravity.

        (5) Political Guidance (Constraints/Restraints).

        (6) Political Assumptions.

        (7) Main conclusion from CPOE

    b. **Opposing Force Situation.**

        (1) Order of Battle and Current Disposition.

        (2) Objectives and Desired End-State.

        (3) Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses.

        (4) Centre of Gravity and Decisive Points/Decisive Conditions.

        (5) High Value Targets.

        (6) Likely Intentions.

        (7) Potential COAs.

    c.   **Friendly Forces and Neutrals.**

        (1)   Objectives of each actor.

        (2)   System interaction, interdependencies, influences and vulnerabilities.

        (3)   Primarily and supporting instruments of power.

        (4)   Possible Actions.

    d.   **Civil-military Situation.**

    e.   **Information and Media Situation.**

    f.   **SACEUR's Intent.**

        (1)   Mission.

        (2)   Intent.

        (3)   Military Strategic Objectives.

        (4)   Strategic Effects and Actions.

        (5)   Strategic Limitations.

        (6)   Strategic Preconditions for success.

        (7)   Strategic Assumptions.

3.   **Mission Analysis.**

    a.   **Key Factors and Deductions.** *(Time, Space, Forces/Actors and Information).*

    b.   **Planning Assumptions.**

    c.   **Critical operational requirements.**

    d.   **Requirements for interaction with relevant International and National Actors.**

    e.   **Limitations.**

4.   **Operational Analysis and Operational Design.**

    a.   **Mission.**

    b.   **Operational Objectives.**

    c.   **Criteria for Success.**

    d.   **Effects.**

    e.   **Measures of Effectiveness.**

    f.   **Centres of Gravity.** (Critical Capabilities and Vulnerabilities).

    g.   **Possible Lines of Operations.**

    h.   **Possible Approaches.**

    i.   **Decisive Points/Decisive Conditions.**

    j.   **Operational Effects and Actions.**

    k.   **Assessment on Required Branches and Sequels.**

    l.   **Termination.**

5.   **Commander's Critical Information Requirements.**

    a.   **Priority Intelligence Requirements.**

    b.   **Essential Elements of Friendly Information.**

    c.   **Friendly Force Information Requirements.**

6.   **Requirements for Specific Precautionary Measures.**

7.   **Initial Force Estimate.**

    a.   **Forces Available for Planning Purposes.** (If given).

    b.   **Estimate of Forces Required.**

    c.   **Preliminary C2 Arrangements.**

8.   **Risk Assessment.**

9.   **Critical Timings.**

    a.   **Operational Timings.**

    b.   **Planning Milestones.**

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10. **Proposed Planning Guidance.**

    a.   **Proposed Initial Intent.** This summary should provide the Commander's Intent for how the operation/campaign should unfold. It is an important focussing statement ("road map"). The Intent should endure throughout the operation/campaign

        (1)   Conditions he wants to create.

        (2)   Main operational actions to be conducted concurrently or sequentially.

        (3)   Establish the (initial) Main Effort for the operation.

        (4)   Risk to be accepted/not accepted.

        (5)   Relating his intent to the strategic objectives and end-state.

    b.   **Guidance to Planning Staff.**

    c.   **Direction to Subordinate Commanders.**

11. **Conclusion.**

12. **Approvals.** Seek approval of**:**

    a.   **Operational Analysis and Operational Design.**

    b.   **Tentative Missions for Subordinate Commanders.**

    c.   **Preconditions for success.**

    d.   **Proposed Planning Guidance to staff.**

    e.   **ROE requirements.**

    f.   **Additional CRMs.**

13. **Additional COM Guidance.**

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX F TO
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Appendix 2 to Annex F – COA Decision Briefing-Outline Format

1. **Introduction.**

    a. **Aim.**

    b. **Outline.**

    c. **General Introductory Comments.**

2. **Commander's Planning Guidance Highlights.**

    a. **Higher Commander's Direction.**

        (1) Intent.

        (2) End-state.

        (3) Objectives.

        (4) Effects.

        (5) Actions.

        (6) Mission.

        (7) Key Imposed Limitations.

    b. **Own Operational Design.**

        (1) Mission.

        (2) Centre of Gravity.

        (3) Decisive Points/Decisive Conditions.

        (4) End-State and Criteria for Success.

        (5) Objectives.

   (6) Effects.

   (7) Actions.

   (8) Key Assumptions.

3. **Situation Analysis.**

4. **Opposing Force COAs.**

  a. **General Description.**

  b. **Potential Operational Timeline.**

  c. **Analysis (Advantages and Disadvantages).**

  d. **Assessment of "Most Likely" and "Most Dangerous" COAs.**

5. **Own Forces COAs.**

  a. **Common Points Applicable to all COAs.**

  b. **Specifics for each COA.**

   (1) Intent.

   (2) General CONOPS. (Including Sequencing/Phasing Description, map sketches).

   (3) CONOPS by Phase. Including, for each phase:

    (a) Start and End Points, and purpose of the phase.

    (b) Sub-sequencing as necessary.

    (c) Key actions of each Subordinate Command.

    (d) Key capabilities required for the phase, if appropriate.

   (4) Task Organisation.

   (5) Operational Timeline.

   (6) Logistic Support Concept (if not a common point).

   (7) Military Engineering Concept.

(8)   Command and Control Arrangements including Areas of Operations (if not a common point).

6.   **Comparison of COAs.**

    a.   **War Game Results.**

    b.   **Advantages and Disadvantages.**

    c.   **Comparison to Commander's Selection Criteria.**

    d.   **Additional Matrices Showing Comparative Evaluation.** (Including an estimate of casualties).

    e.   **Recommended COA.**

    f.   **Branch Plan Requirements for Recommended COA.**

7.   **Unresolved Critical Issues.**

8.   **Way Ahead.**

9.   **Commander's Guidance Required.**

    a.   **Operational Analysis and Operational Design.**

    b.   **Proposed Planning Guidance.**

10.   **Additional Guidance.**

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Appendix 3 to Annex F – Operational Estimate.

1.   Operational Estimate[1,2]. Already defined in Chapter 4 Phase 3 Operational Orientation, the Operational Estimate is a military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. The Operational Estimate is used to identify military COAs to accomplish the mission and select a preferred option for CONOPS development. The use of the estimate differs from that of operations assessment in that its requirement is triggered by one or more CCIRs and is, therefore, based on indicators and warnings. Development of the estimate will provide insights into both risk and opportunity and must developed in a PMESII perspective. As it is a tool for guiding a Commander's thought process when dealing with ill-structured, time-sensitive problems, it is the Joint Planning Branch rather than the Joint Assessment Branch that must understand and be capable of supporting this process.

2.   An outline of an estimate process is provided below:

   a.   Analysis of Mission:

      (1)   Intent of higher HQ?

      (2)   Objectives to be accomplished?

      (3)   Imposed limitations?

      (4)   What has changed?

      (5)   What has to be analysed and decided?

   b.   Analysis of the Operational Environment:

      (1)   Geographical factors.

      (2)   Demographic factors (the population).

      (3)   International Organisations.

      (4)   Information factors.

   c.   Analysis of Opponent(s):

      (1)   Identified forces, force disposition, force deployments.

      (2)   Deducted opponent intent, objectives.

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        (3)   Analysis of opponent's relative combat power.

        (4)   Analysis of opponent COAs related to his forces, to time and to space.

        (5)   Analysis of impact on own operations.

    d.   Analysis of own Situation:[1]

        (1)   Own forces disposition, committed, uncommitted, availability of reserves?

        (2)   Relative combat power of own forces?

        (3)   Suitability of own forces for evolving operational requirements (new mission)?

        (4)   Analysis of potential own COAs (related to own forces, to time and to space).

    e.   Comparison of own COAs and Opponent COAs. Comparison of relative combat power of own and opponent forces related to:

        (1)   Time (when?).

        (2)   Space (where?).

        (3)   Consequences for own COAs.

    f.   Comparison of own COAs. Advantages/Disadvantages of own COAs related to mission accomplishment.

    g.   Decision on COA Selection.

---

[1] The estimate is discussed in AJP-01(D). It is expected that more detail on the estimate will be promulgated in AJP-5 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning.' Once AJP-5 is promulgated, this template will be revisited or deleted as appropriate.

[2] The same estimate principles are used by SMEs in their preparations in order to effectually contribute to the JOPG.

FORMAT FOR DOCUMENT COVERS

1. **Cover format for a single-command document**

   a. CTS number for CTS documents.

   b. Originator's abbreviated title, as per AAP-1.

   c. Plan number as per Annex M to this chapter.

EXAMPLE:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

[FULL TITLE OF ORIGINATORS HEADQUARTERS]

[LOCATION]

[FILE NUMBER](a)   **[DATE]**

SHIELD

____(b)____   **[PLAN TYPE]**   ____(c)____

"[NICKNAME]"

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

BELGIUM

7320/SHCPPSPL/ABC/10   2 NOV 10

SACEUR OPLAN 10417

AMBER FOX

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

2. **Cover format for Joint-Commands documents**

    a.   CTS number for CTS documents.

    b.   "SC", "JFC", etc.

    c.   Plan number as per Annex M to this chapter

<div style="border:1px solid black;">

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

[FULL TITLES OF ORIGINATORS HEADQUARTERS]
(SPONSORING HQ ON TOP)

[LOCATION]

[FILE NUMBER](a)   **[DATE]**

SPONSOR'S SHIELD(S)

JOINT____(b)____[PLAN TYPE]____(c)____

"[NICKNAME]"

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX H TO
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DATED 17 DEC 10

FORMAT FOR LETTER OF PROMULGATION

NOTE: The following formatted example applies to all NATO command levels for Letters of Promulgation. The letter must clearly state the status of the attached document (e.g. "Draft", or "Final Plan" as appropriate).

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: Insert file reference	**Tel:**	+32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)
	Tel:	+32-(0)65-44 + ext
	NCN:	254 + ext
Date: Insert date	**Fax:**	+32-(0)65-44-3545 (Registry)

TO: See Distribution or enter Single Action Addressee here

SUBJECT: SUBJECT OF LETTER

REFERENCES: A. Insert details of reference
                        B.

1.   **Promulgation.** This letter promulgates SACEUR's Strategic plan XXXX for xxyy. As per reference A, this plan has been approved by the North Atlantic Council. This Strategic plan is effective as of dd mm yy.

a.   Planning: (specific planning instructions as applicable).

b.   Implementation: On separate order, subjects to transfer of operational command or control of forces required from national authorities to SACEUR.

c.   Supporting Plan: (if applicable).

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      d.   Review: Guidance for future review.

2.   **Plan Synopsis.**

      a.   Extract of Situation – derived from the Plan.

      b.   Mission – verbatim as in the Plan.

      c.   Extract of SACEUR Strategic Concept – derived from the Plan.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

See Annex ZZ of attached Plan

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

FORMAT FOR RECORD OF CHANGES

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

RECORD OF CHANGES

1**.**   After a change has been incorporated it is to be recorded below and the pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with security orders.

CHANGE NO	SERIAL AND DATE	DATE ENTERED	SIGNATURE	RANK/ ORGANISATION

2.   Superseded letters promulgating changes to be recorded below.

REFERENCE	DATE	TITLE

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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ANNEX J TO
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DATED 17 DEC10

FORMAT FOR FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDES

1.   **Functional Planning Guides (FPGs).** FPGs provide function-specific guidance to NATO military planning staffs on the planning factors to be taken into consideration during the development of an operations plan. These planning guides will assist planners in optimising the effects of the synchronised application of the combined capabilities inherent in a joint force. They also provide function-specific guidance on matters such as airspace and water space management[1].

2.   The format of FPGs guides should consist of an introduction, main body with annexes to support functional contribution to the planning process and instructions for preparations of relevant annexes to the strategic concept and strategic plan.

   a.   The introduction should clearly describe the purpose of the FPG; furthermore, it should assist planners in integrating functional knowledge into the operations planning process and help them identify the main inputs and products.

   b.   The main body of FPGs should follow the format of the main activities, as outlined in Chapter 3. It is recognised that it will not always be possible for functional experts to participate in all steps of the planning process; therefore, the guides must identify where in the six phases of the planning process their contribution is needed. In addition, there should be sufficient detail for developing functional estimates and concepts and to prepare the functional expert to be an active member of the SOPG.

   c.   Instructions for the preparation of relevant annexes to the strategic concept should include an outline of the appropriate annex. It should also include key reference material concerning NATO policy and doctrine to focus a new planner's contribution to the planning process.

3.   Current FPGs based on the old 5 phase planning process from 2005 Guidelines on Operational Planning (GOP) should be updated to reflect the new six phase operations planning process, Comprehensive Approach and the use of effects in the planning and conduct of operations.

4.   An example of the layout of the FPG main body is at the Appendix 1 to this annex. Additional information is in ACO Directives AD 35-4 (Preparation of Documents) and AD 30-1, (Preparation of Bi-SC Directives).

APPENDIX:

1.   Example of layout of main body: Main steps of Phase 2-Strategic Assessment.

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[1] MC 133

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Appendix 1 to Annex J – Example of layout of main body: Main steps of Phase 2-Strategic Assessment.

1.   **Initiate SACEUR'S Strategic Assessment.**

     a.   Review NAC Decision Sheet and MC tasker.

     b.   Determine potential requirements for Fast Track Decision-Making.

     c.   SACEUR's initial guidance.

     d.   Review NATO political guidance and policy statements.

     e.   Selection of the JFC.

     f.   Draft Warning Order.

     g.   CRMs.

2.   **Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis.**

     a.   Determine the nature, scale and scope of the problem.

     b.   Analyse the strategic environment.

     c.   Analyse key factors.

3.   **Analyse the Principal Actors and Their Role in the Crisis.**

     a.   Establish Red and Green teams.

     b.   Analyse the capabilities and behaviour of each actor.

     c.   Analyse strategic centres of gravity.

4.   **Assess International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis.**

     a.   Assess international legal aspects.

     b.   Assess international interests and objectives.

     c.   Assess international commitments. .

     d.   Assess the information environment.

e.   Assess media and public affairs environment.

f.   Assess common aims, objectives and desired end-state conditions.

5.   **Assess Potential Risks and Threats.**

a.   Assess security implications.

6.   **Develop Necessary Assumptions.**

7.   **Assess the NATO End State, Strategic and Military Strategic Objectives.**

a.   Understand the political context.

b.   Advise NAC on the desired end state and strategic objectives.

c.   Analyse potential military strategic objectives

d.   Determine desired strategic effects.

e.   Identify required non-military effects.

8.   **Assess Alternatives for Strategic Engagement.**

a.   Consider potential strategic ends, ways and means.

b.   Determine potential strategic lines of engagement.

c.   Assess potential means available to the Alliance.

d.   Develop strategic alternatives.

e.   Coordinate key issues with HQ NATO.

f.   Seek SACEUR's endorsement and further guidance.

9.   **Submit SACEUR's Strategic Assessment of the Crisis.**

CONSULTATION, APPROVAL, PROMULGATION AND ACTIVATION PROCEDURES

1.   **Introduction.**

a.   The consultation procedures for advance and crisis response planning are essentially the same. However, crisis response planning may require expedited consultation due to the amount of time available based on the ongoing crisis situation.

b.   Commands and Nations participating in an operation, or with co-ordinating interests, must be consulted at an early stage during the initiation of a strategic plan and at further appropriate stages in its progression to approval.

c.   All strategic plans, be they for contingency or for actual operations, will be developed using a collaborative process involving all levels of planning. While this Annex refers to strategic level plans, the joint level will develop an operational level version of every strategic plan developed at SHAPE, is requested. Approval of a strategic level plan provides SACEUR with the necessary authority to approve the operational version of that plan.

2.   **Consultation Process.**

a.   **Contingency Plans (COPs).** COPs will be developed in accordance with the COPD (Chapters 3 & 4). Ideally, for any iteration of an strategic or operational COP, 60 days should be allowed between issue and expected responses. The following versions of a plan are produced:

(1)   Initial Draft. An initial draft of the strategic COP will be forwarded to relevant NATO commanders for comment.

(2)   Draft. Taking into account the comments on the initial draft, a draft of the strategic COP will be forwarded to the relevant NATO Commanders, involved Nations and the IMS, for comment. Pending the nature of the comments, it might be necessary to forward an additional draft(s), which then will be identified as second, third, draft, etc.

(3)   Coordinated Draft. Comments on the draft(s) will be incorporated, as appropriate, and the coordinated draft strategic COP will be submitted for approval. Once approved, the final strategic COP is released.

b.   **Strategic Plan.** In general terms, the consultation process for a strategic plan should be identical to that for strategic COPs. However, there is a clear recognition that operations plan development is usually time constrained and, therefore, the process may need to be compressed.

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c. **Standing Strategic Defense Plans (SDP).** Consultation as required.

d. **Primary Planning Tools.**

(1) The COPD. The consultation process is identical to that for COPs.

(2) Functional Planning Guides (FPGs). Once the FPG has been produced, either as an initial draft, or as a draft revision, the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) will forward it to SHAPE DCOS Capabilities, Plans and Policy, who will distribute the document for review, comment, approval and notation in accordance with the procedures as detailed for strategic COPs.

e. **Exercise Operations Plans.** For NATO exercises, operations plans should be developed in accordance with the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. However, depending on exercise specifications and objectives, the approval and consultation processes described in this chapter may be abbreviated.

3. **Approval Procedures.** The approval authority is detailed in MC 133. Strategic COPs and operations plans are approved as follows.

a. All strategic level COPs will require MC approval while strategic plans and SDPs will require NAC approval. All subordinate Joint COPs, OPLANs and SUPLANs require approval of the initiating authority.

b. The initiating authority must approve the CONOPS (strategic or operational), developed during the concept development phase as a pre-requisite for the full development of a COP / SDP / OPLAN. Approval, however, is not a pre-requisite for plan development. The planning does not need to stop while awaiting CONOPS approval.

4. **Promulgation Procedure.** Letters of Promulgation must accompany the release of all iterations of plans, concepts, and planning guides. Details and a format are included at Annex H.

5. **Activation Procedure.** The force activation procedures are detailed in MC133/3[2].

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[2] To be replaced by MC133/4

ANNEX L TO
COPD V1.0
DATED 17 DEC 10

REVIEW, REVISION AND CANCELLATION PROCEDURES

1.   Periodic review, revision, and possible cancellation of plans and operations planning documents must occur. This is done to evaluate and confirm their continued suitability, feasibility and viability. Each commander will:

a.   Maintain a current status of his plans as well as those of his immediate subordinate commanders and forward that status whenever it changes for incorporation in the ACO List of Plans and Planning Tools.

b.   Develop procedures to facilitate the conduct of comprehensive and partial reviews of plans.

c.   Determine follow-up action to be taken as a result of such reviews, including changes to the command's own plan or operations planning documents, or recommendations for changes to superior commander's planning and other basic documents.

2.   **Review**. Review must occur when:

a.   There is a significant alteration to the situation.

b.   A period of 24 months has elapsed since initial approval or the last comprehensive review.

c.   Any related plan or operations planning document is superseded or when a "Major Change" to it is issued.

d.   For the purposes of operations planning, a "Major Change" is:

(1)   For a COP, SDP or operations plan, whenever there is a significant change that alters the basic concept or affects the force proposals/commitments to the plan.

(2)   For other operations planning documents, whenever a change alters the basic thrust or concept contained in the document.

(3)   The review will dictate the degree of revision required or cancellation of plans as appropriate.

3.   **Revision.**

a.   Purely editorial changes and other non-substantive amendments may be issued by the originator when appropriate and without approval or justification.

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b.   Major changes will require approval in accordance with the procedures detailed for newly developed plans.

4.   **Cancellation.** Cancellation of a plan or operations planning document requires the authority of the original approving authority. The promulgation letter of new draft plans or operations planning documents is to list those plans and other documents that the new document supersedes. Should a command decide that a plan should be deleted, the following guidelines will apply:

a.   Draft Letter of Intent. Notice of intention to delete a plan should be given to all agencies involved in the original consultation process. The Letter of Intent should include the rationale for plan deletion and allow at least 60 days for response.

b.   Statement of Cancellation. If no major objections to the plan's cancellation are raised, a letter directing cancellation of the plan should be issued to all agencies on the plan's distribution list. The letter should provide the effective date of cancellation.

c.   Registration. For the registration procedures for valid plans, the distribution list for both letters must include SHAPE DCOS Capabilities Plans and Policy.

d.   SUPLANs and Operational Orders (OPORDs). Cancellation of a plan is automatic authority to cancel its SUPLANs and OPORDs.

e.   Archive Copy. The originating command for a plan that is cancelled shall retain at least one copy of the plan as an archive copy. That copy should be clearly marked as "Cancelled" effective date of cancellation by DTG of Cancellation Letter. Retain as an archive copy.

PLANS IDENTIFICATION AND NICKNAMES

1.   **General.**   For identification, management and security reasons, a NATO identification system of plans is established.

    a.   All or some of the following elements will identify each plan:

        (1)   A plan number.

        (2)   A letter suffix to the plan number for SUPLANs.

        (3)   The plan originator, category and date.

        (4)   A Nickname.

        (5)   A descriptive title.

    b.   SHAPE Capabilities Plans and Policy Division is the focal point for registering all plan numbers and Nicknames.

2.   **Plan Number**. Each Commander's plan will be assigned an unclassified plan number comprising 5 digits. SHAPE Capabilities Plans, and Policy Division will allocate the plan number. Also a plan number will be allocated to selected plans of special interest to SACEUR developed by authorities other than NATO Commanders. The plan numbering system is described in detail in Annex M to the COPD.

3.   **Plan Originator, Category and Date.**

    a.   The plan originator is identified:

        (1)   For ACO plans by the short title defined in AAP-1 (NATO Military Organisation and Command).

        (2)   For Bi-JFC or Bi-CC plans by the words "Bi-JFC" or "Bi-CC", as applicable, followed by the sponsor's short title, as defined in AAP-1, in parenthesis.

        (3)   For national plans by the issuing commander's short title, proceeded by the letters identifying the nation (e.g., UKCICC).

    b.   The plan or document category is identified by the originator as an FPG, COP, OPLAN, SDP, SUPLAN or National Plan, as appropriate. For NATO exercises and other training events, the term "EXOPLAN" should only be used for operational plans that address the exercise-relevant support aspects of the event as specified in the EPG. Operational Plans developed during exercises or those developed to support the training scenario should be named as "OPLANs" with page markings to clearly indicate they are 'exercise' OPLANs in accordance with ACO Security Directive 70-1

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c.   The date of a plan is the one appearing on the front cover of the most recent edition.

4.   **Nicknames.** The purpose of the Nickname is to provide an unclassified and easy reference. The definition, usage and allocation of Nicknames are described below.

a.   **Definition.** A Nickname comprises two separate English language words which are intended for unclassified and repeated use as an easy reference to an event, an operational plan, an exercise, a headquarters (including site) or a specific project.

b.   **Usage.**

(1)   Hyphenated words are not to be used as Nicknames.

(2)   The abbreviation NATO is not to be included in a Nickname.

(3)   Nicknames should have a robust connotation; undignified or frivolous usage should be avoided.

(4)   A Nickname is NATO UNCLASSIFIED when used on its own. However, the subject or material to which it relates may be classified. Therefore, whenever a Nickname is used in a context that reveals the connection, or discloses classified information, a suitable classification must be imposed.

(5)   The second word is not to be the same as the first word.

c.   **Allocation.**

(1)   NATO commanders may originate and use Nicknames at their discretion. No accounting is required, but the originating commander is responsible for informing all interested authorities. He must also ensure the selected Nickname does not conflict with other short titles, well-known phrases or existing Nicknames. The plan originator will designate a Nickname, while adhering to paragraph 4.c. (3) below.

(2)   There will be no allocation of block letters. This allows for greater flexibility in selecting Nicknames for operations at all levels.

(3)   SACEUR will designate the Nickname for new operations, with the same Nickname designation process used throughout subordinate plan development (COP / SDP / OPLAN). This procedure is designed to link all appropriate plans to a specific campaign/operation. The second word will remain the same throughout each subordinate plan (e.g., SACEUR OPLAN / Strategic Guidance is designated "Operation JOINT GUARDIAN", COM JFC Naples OPLAN is designated "Operation DISCREET GUARDIAN", and COMKFOR OPLAN is designated "Operation DECISIVE GUARDIAN").

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5. **Descriptive Title.** The plan originator will allocate to each plan a short, properly classified title, which is descriptive in nature (e.g., "Employment of 20th IT Division in S Norway"). This title, which constitutes the official one, must appear in the promulgation letters and in the heading of the first page of the plan.

APPENDIX:

1. Plan Numbering System (PNS).

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Appendix 1 to Annex M – Plan Numbering System (PNS)

1.   **General.** Plans are allocated a plan number consisting of 5 digits and, if appropriate, decimals and suffix letters. The plan number, which is unclassified, includes:

   a.   Plan originator characters.

   b.   Plan category/subject characters.

2.   **Numbering System.** A five-digit number identifies plans:

   a.   The first two digits identify the originator of the plan[3].

   b.   Followed by three digits that identify the specific category of a plan.

   c.   Commanders subordinate to Component Commanders (CC) will use the same number as the corresponding CC plan.

   d.   In order to conform to the five-digit plan numbering format, National plans will include one or more zeros in front of the plan number allocated by the Nation. (e.g.: a National plan number 210 would be re-numbered 00210.)

3.   **Plan ID Numbers.** For the current command structure, the following numbers will be used:

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[3] Since the old Plan ID number system is well embedded into the mindset of all working in the NATO environment, the ID numbers for the originators of plans in the current command structure are not changed. Planners, however, should also bear in minds that ID originators numbers of already terminated NATO operations (e.g. SFOR) are not to be used.

Command	Plan ID No.	Remarks
SACEUR	10XXX	
COM JFC Brunssum	30XXX	
COM AC Ramstein	24XXX	
COM MC Northwood	27XXX	
COM FC Heidelberg	31XXX	
COM OP 1 (ISAF)	38XXX	
COM OP 2	35XXX	
COM OP 3	34XXX	
COM JFC Naples	40XXX	
COM AC Izmir	45XXX	
COM MC Naples	43XXX	
COM FC Madrid	41XXX	
COM OP1 (KFOR)	32XXX	
COM OP 2	37XXX	(SFOR) not to be used.
COM OP 3	36XXX	
COM JFC Lisbon	79XXX	
COM OP 1	33XXX	
COM OP 2	39XXX	
HIGH READINESS FORCES	60XXX	
SPARE	96XXX	Others not listed
SPARE	97XXX	Others not listed

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4.   **Plan Category, Subject Characters**. The third, fourth and fifth digits of the plan number will identify the plan category or subject area as listed below. The characters "XX" indicate the originator digits described above.

Joint Operations	XX100-XX499
Land Operations	XX500-XX599
Air Operations	XX600-XX699
Naval/Amphibious Operations	XX700-XX799
Standing Defence Plans (SDPs)	XX800-XX899
Spares	XX900-XX999

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