China Country Handbook

This handbook provides basic reference information on China, including its geography, history, government, military forces, and communications and transportation networks. This information is intended to familiarize military personnel with local customs and area knowledge to assist them during their assignment to China.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is the community coordinator for the Country Handbook Program. This product reflects the coordinated U.S. Defense Intelligence Community position on China.

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KEY FACTS

Country Name.  
   Official Name. People’s Republic of China (PRC)  
   Short Form. China

Head of State. President Hu Jintao

Capital. Beijing

National Flag. Red with a large, yellow, five-pointed star and four smaller, yellow, five-pointed stars (arranged in a vertical arc toward the middle of the flag) in the upper hoist-side corner.

Time Zone. UTC (formerly GMT) +8 hours

Telephone Country Code. 86; International access code (00).

Population. 1.3 billion (2008 est.)

Languages. Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaisese), Minbei (Fuxhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages.

Currency. Renminbi (RMB) or yuan (Y)

Exchange Rate. Y7.03 = US$1.00 (March 2008)
U.S. MISSION

U.S. Embassy, Beijing

Address  Xiu Shui Bei Jie 3, Beijing, China 100600
Telephone [86] (10) 6532-3831
Fax [86] (10) 6532-6929
E-mail AmCitBeijing@State.gov
Hours Monday - Friday 0800-1700

U.S. Consulate, Guangzhou

Address  No 1 Shamian South Street, Guangzhou, PRC 510133
Telephone (86-20) 8121-8000
Fax (86-20) 8121-9001
E-mail GuangzhouACS@state.gov
Hours Monday – Friday 0830 – 1730

U.S. Consulate, Shanghai

Address  1469 Huai Hai Xhong Lu, Shanghai, PRC 200031
Telephone (86-20) 6433-6880
Fax (86-20) 6433-4122
E-mail ShanghaiIRC@State.gov
Hours Monday – Friday 0800 – 1130 and 1330 – 1530

U.S. Consulate, Shenyang

Address  52, 14th Wei Road, Heping District, 110003
from the U.S. PSC 461, Box 45, FPOAP 96521-0002
Telephone (86-24) 2322-0848
Fax (86-24) 2322-2374
E-mail ShenyangACS@state.gov
U.S. Consulate, Chengdu

Address
No. 4 Lingshiguan Road, Chengdu Sichuan, PRC 610041

Telephone
(28) 8558-3992, 8558-9642

Fax
(28) 8558-3520

E-mail
consularChengdu@state.gov

U.S. Consulate Hong Kong

Address
26 Garden Road, Hong Kong

Mailing
PSC 461, Box 5, FPO AP 96521-0006

Telephone
(852) 2523-9011

Fax
(852)2845-1598

E-mail
questions@hongkongACS.com

Hours
Monday – Friday 0830 – 1230 and 1330 – 1730

Travel Advisories

There are no travel warnings for China.

Entry Requirements

Passport/Visa Requirements

A valid passport and visa are required to enter China and must be obtained from a Chinese embassy or consulate before traveling to China. Americans arriving without valid passports and the appropriate Chinese visa are not permitted to enter and are subject to a fine and immediate deportation at the traveler’s expense. China has recently tightened its visa issuance policy, in some cases requiring personal interviews of American citizens and regularly issuing one or two entry visas valid for short periods only. Business travelers must obtain a formal invitation from a Chinese business contact.
Those traveling on official business for the U.S. government should obtain visa information from the agency sponsoring their travel. Tourist visas are issued only after receipt of a confirmation letter from a Chinese tour agency or letter of invitation from a relative in China.

For longer stays and more detailed information, contact the Visa Section of the Chinese Embassy, 2201 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20007 (202/328-2500) or nearest Consulate General: Chicago (312/803-0098), Houston (713/524-4311), Los Angeles (213/807-8018), New York (212/330-7409) or San Francisco (415/563-4857). Internet: www.china-embassy.org

**Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet**

Visits to Hong Kong require a passport and evidence of onward or return transportation. A visa is not required for tourist visits by U.S. citizens of up to 90 days. Visits to Macau require passports. A visa is not required for tourist visits of up to 30 days in Macau. Visits to Tibet and other remote areas not normally open to
foreigners require permits. Travel arrangements to Tibet can be made from outside of China, but once in China, travelers wishing to visit Tibet must join a group, which can be arranged by almost any Chinese travel agency. The travel agency will arrange for the necessary permits and collect any fees. The China government requires foreigners (including U.S. Citizens) wishing to visit Tibet to apply in advance for approval from the Tourist Administration of the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

**Restricted Areas**

Visitors to China should be aware that Chinese regulations strictly prohibit travel in “closed” areas without special permission. However, more than 1,200 cities and areas in China are open to visitors without special travel permits, including most major scenic and historical sites. To determine whether an area is open to travel without a permit, seek advice from the nearest U.S. or Chinese Embassy or Consulate, or the local Chinese public security bureau.

**Immunization Requirements**

Prior to deployment the routine immunization for all personnel should include hepatitis A vaccine, MMR, Tb, and influenza. For routine operational purposes, vaccination against typhoid should be administered to all personnel. Depending on the region of deployment, such as rural farming areas or areas of known outbreak of Japanese encephalitis, personnel may also need vaccination against Japanese encephalitis. As dictated by appropriate medical authority, considerations of other vaccines (e.g. HBV, rabies, and anthrax) may be appropriate. China is subject to chloroquine sensitive and chloroquine resistant strains of malaria.
Customs Restrictions

For stays in China less than 6 months, Chinese customs office permits 400 cigarettes and for stays of more than 6 months customs permits 600 cigarettes. Chinese customs will also permit 2 liters of alcoholic beverages, perfume sufficient for personal use. Items such as watches, radios, cameras, and calculators are permitted for personal use, but cannot be sold or transferred to others. Prohibited items include arms, ammunition, explosives, radio transmitter-receivers, poisonous drugs and narcotics, infected animal or plant products, and infected foodstuffs. Books, films, records, tapes, etc., which are detrimental to China’s politics, economy culture, and ethics (e.g. pornographic or religious content) are prohibited.

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Geography

China covers 9,596,960 square kilometers (3.7 million square miles) and is slightly smaller than the United States. China’s coastline is 14,500 kilometers (9,000 miles) long. Water accounts for 270,550 square kilometers (104,460 square miles) of China while the land area is 9,326,410 square kilometers (3,600,947 square miles). The terrain ranges from plains, deltas, and hills in the east, to mountains, high plateaus and deserts in the west. The highest point in China is Mount Everest at 8,850 meters (29,000 feet) located in the Tibetan-Qinghai plateau near Tibet’s southern border. The lowest point in China is Turpan Pendi (-154 meters) located in the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang in western China.

Borders

China borders Russia and Mongolia to the north; North Korea, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea to the east; the South
China Sea, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma (Myanmar) to the south and southeast; Bhutan, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to
the southwest; and Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to the west. China’s total land boundary is 22,143 kilometers.

**Border Disputes**

China has made progress in recent years toward settling long-standing territorial disputes with India, Russia, Vietnam, and

*China’s Great Wall*
Central Asia, but continues to have overlapping territorial claims with Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

China and India both have claims on two regions – Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Aksai Chin is in the disputed territory of Kashmir, at the junction of Pakistan, Tibet and India. India claims the 38,000 square-kilometer- (14,671 square-mile-) territory currently administered by China. In 2005, China and India drafted a resolve to end their extensive boundary and territorial disputes and begin a security and foreign policy dialogue to consolidate discussions related to the boundary, regional nuclear proliferation, and other matters. Recent talks and confidence-building measures have begun to defuse tensions over Kashmir, site of the world’s largest and most militarized territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China (Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas). India does not recognize Pakistan’s ceding historic Kashmir islands to China in 1964. The Arunachal Pradesh is an area contested between India and China. It is a state in India in the country’s northeast, bordering on Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma and China. It is under Indian administration, but China claims the 900,000 square-kilometer-area as part of Tibet.

China and Russia were in a dispute involving three islands on the rivers that form the border between the two countries. The contested islands included the Bol’shoi Ussuriiskii Island and Tarabarov Island at the juncture of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, near Khabarovsk, Russia and Bol’shoi Island on the Argun River. This dispute was resolved in October 2004. Each of the islands was split, with half of the territory going to each country, ending a century-old border dispute.
Certain islands in the Yalu and Tumen rivers are in an uncontested dispute with North Korea and a section of boundary around Mount Paektu is considered indefinite. The demarcation of the China-Vietnam boundary proceeds slowly and although the maritime boundary delimitation and fisheries agreements were ratified in June 2004.

**Maritime Disputes**

China asserts sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, as do Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei. The Spratly Islands comprise more than 100 small islands and reefs. They are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and potentially by gas and oil deposits. About 50 islands are occupied by military forces from China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam; there are no indigenous inhabitants. The 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” has eased tensions in the Spratlys but is not the legally binding “code of conduct.” In
March 2005, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a joint accord to monitor seismic activities in the Spratly Islands.

China occupies some of the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. The Paracel Islands are made up of 130 small coral islands and reefs divided into the northeast Amphitrite Group and the western Crescent Group, and are located in the South China Sea, about one-third of the way from central Vietnam to the northern Philippines. The Paracel Islands are disputed because of the productive fishing grounds and by potential oil and gas reserves.
China and Taiwan have also become more vocal in rejecting Japan’s claims to the uninhabited islands of Senkaku-shoto (Diaoyu Tai) and Japan’s unilaterally declared economic zone in the East China Sea, the site of intensive hydrocarbon prospecting.

**Bodies of Water**

The principal drainage features of the People’s Republic of China include large rivers, perennial and intermittent streams, wetlands, lakes, and canals. Annual rainfall is higher in the southeast than in the northwest; as a result, perennial rivers are less numerous in the northwest. China has more than 50,000 rivers with individual drainage areas exceeding 100 square kilometers. Because China’s terrain is high in the west and low in the east, most rivers flow from the west eastward into the Pacific, including the Hai He, Huang He (Yellow River), Huai He, Chang Jiang (Yangtze River), Min Jiang, Yangtze River
and Zhu Jiang. Most of the major rivers in China are navigable by larger vessels. The area drained by these rivers covers more than 5 million square kilometers or 63.2 percent of the country’s total area. The Ertix He (Irtysh-Ob River) is the only river in China that empties into the Arctic Ocean and drains 0.4 percent of the country. A few rivers, such as the Tarim He, have no outlet to the sea. These interior rivers flow into inland lakes or disappear in deserts and drain 36.4 percent of China. Most of the interior rivers are in the arid northwest. The interior rivers are fed by glaciers and melting snow from the Kunlun, Qilian, and eastern Tien ranges.

China’s water pollution and shortages have become more severe due to urbanization and industrialization. Among 600 Chinese cities, 110 are seriously affected by water shortages, which also include 26 cities along the Yangtze River, China’s longest. China’s per capita freshwater resources are 2,300 cubic meters, only a quarter of the world’s average level.

Three Gorges Dam
In 1994, China began construction on the Three Gorges Dam which will be the world’s largest hydroelectric dam. The dam budgeted at US$25 billion dollars will assist in controlling flooding along the lower reached of the Yangtze River. The project is seen as an important source of energy for China. The Three Gorges Dam will help meet China’s growing energy consumption. It will also improve navigation by deepening the river channel behind the dam to allow ships up to 10,000 tons of displacement to get upstream as far as Chongqing. However, the dam might flood more than 100 towns, forcing an estimated 700,000 people to relocate. Construction should be completed in 2009.

**Topography**

From east to west, the country is divided into three regions. The easternmost region, along the coast, is fertile with coastal plains, rolling hills, and river valleys. This region is crowded with most of China’s population and is noticeably worn bare by centuries of human occupancy. Further inland is the second region, the loess highlands of Inner Mongolia and the mountain ranges of Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. It also contains some of the world’s largest deserts including the Gobi and the Takla Makan, huge swamps such as the Qaidam basin, virgin forests and endless grass-covered steppes. The westernmost and highest region is the cold Tibetan-Qinghai plateau. This area includes the Himalayas and Mt. Everest, which form Tibet’s southern border. The second and third regions, known as Outer China, are less populated with hardly more than five percent of the total population.

**Vegetation**

The vegetation of China is diverse with varieties from temperate coniferous and deciduous forests to tropical rain forest and desert scrub. These varieties include all the natural vegetation types that
are known to grow in the northern hemisphere, with the exception of polar tundra. However, centuries of settlement and intensive cultivation have significantly altered the natural vegetation. Since 1980, the China government has been placing strong emphasis on a reforestation program. Although the success of this program is yet undetermined, the government claims that the country has a total of 133.7 million hectares of forests and that artificial forests make up 33 million of these hectares. Agricultural lands, primarily located in the eastern provinces, cover only 10 percent of the country. About half of these lands are irrigated. The most significant food crop is rice; nearly a third of all cultivated land is devoted to its production.

**Environment**

China’s economic growth has thrived at the expense of its environment. Seven out of 10 of the world’s most polluted cities are found in China. Most major cities such as Beijing, Xian, Lanxhou and Jilin are smothered in smog in the winter and summer. China relies on coal for 70 percent of its energy needs, which has lead to approximately 40 percent of the country being affected by acid rain. China’s rivers and wetlands also face extreme challenges from draining, reclamation, and pollution. It is estimated that China annually dumps three billion tons of untreated water including untreated industrial liquids, domestic sewage, human waste and chemicals into the ocean through its rivers.

Another problem facing China is desertification. The areas with the most serious erosion are the Gobi and other areas of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Tibet, and Gansu in Northwest China. This is mainly occurring in wind eroded areas in the northwestern and northern sections of China. Prevailing winds shift twice a year with winds from the northwest from November to April and winds
from the southeast from April through November. The soil known as loess is very fertile, but has a low tolerance for water. It will not hold moisture long and is prone to flooding. The winds pick up soil and sand particles creating sandstorms that move easterly toward areas such as Beijing. People in Beijing sometimes wear surgical masks to avoid breathing the particles.

Drought and other natural factors also contribute to China’s desertification. In 2006, the total degraded area in China was estimated at 8-10 million square kilometers. This destruction contributes to economic losses of more than RMB47 billion (US$6 billion) a year. Decades long efforts to control and manage desertification have not produced adequate results. Experts worry that the pace of degradation will only accelerate given growing climate changes and industrialization.
Climate

China’s climate is extremely diverse. It varies from tropical in the south to subarctic in the north. Winters in the north fall between December and March and are incredibly cold. Seasonal air mass movements and accompanying winds are moist in summer and dry in winter. The advance and retreat of the monsoons significantly affect the timing of the rainy season and the amount of rainfall throughout the country. Tremendous differences in latitude, longitude, and altitude give rise to sharp variation in precipitation and temperature within China. North of the Great Wall, into Inner Mongolia temperatures may fall below –40°C (–40°F). Summer in the north is around May to August. In the central area of the country summers are long, hot, and humid. High temperatures can be expected between the months of April and October. Winters in the central area are short and cold with temperatures dipping below freezing. In the far south, around Guangzhou, the climate is hot and humid from April to September and temperatures can rise up to 38°C (100°F). April to September is also the rainy season. Typhoons tend to hit the southeast coast between July and September. The northwest area of China is hot and dry in the summer. The desert regions can be scorching in the daytime with temperatures up to 47°C (117°F). In the winter, this region is cold, with temperatures around –10°C (14°F).

Phenomena

Natural disasters that occur in China include earthquakes, floods, landslides, typhoons, and droughts. Volcanoes and tsunamis pose relatively minor threats. Often one natural disaster causes another. For example, earthquakes often trigger landslides in China. Because of China’s dense populations in areas at risk, disasters often cause massive loss of life. In the past, when disasters have
Beijing and Hong Kong Weather

BEIJING
ELEVATION: 180 FT

TEMPERATURE

PRECIPITATION

HONG KONG
ELEVATION: 203 FT

TEMPERATURE

PRECIPITATION
Kashi and Shanghai Weather

KASHI
ELEVATION: 4,236 FT

TEMPERATURE

-20º to 120º F

PRECIPITATION

0 to 30 days

SHANGHAI
ELEVATION: 13 FT

TEMPERATURE

-20º to 120º F

PRECIPITATION

0 to 30 days

Extreme High
Average High
Average Low
Extreme Low

Snow
Rain

Kashi and Shanghai Weather
Lhasa and Hailar Weather
occurred, the effects of transportation system and agriculture disruption has resulted in large-scale starvation and millions of additional deaths.

**TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION**

**Transportation**

**Roads**

Highways are significant factors of economic growth in China. There are 1,447,682 kilometers (899,547 miles) of paved roads, with at least 29,745 kilometers (18,482 miles) of expressways. Unpaved roads account for 362,147 kilometers (225,027 miles) and are mostly in the western region of the country. Road conditions may vary depending on location. The roads in the eastern, more populated areas are generally better kept than those in more rural areas. China continues to invest and improve its road infrastructure to promote economic growth and support the increasing reliance on roads for freight and personal transportation. China plans to extend its road infrastructure to 3 million kilometers, (1,864,100 miles) with 85,000 kilometers (52,800 miles) of expressway by 2020.
Traffic in China is often chaotic; right-of-way and other courtesies are often ignored. Cars and buses in the wrong lanes frequently hit pedestrians and bicyclists. Pedestrians should always be careful while walking near traffic. Traffic and road conditions are generally not life-threatening if vehicle occupants wear seat belts. Most traffic accident injuries involve pedestrians or cyclists who are involved in collision or who encounter unexpected road hazards such as unmarked manholes. Child safety seats are not widely available.

The roads in China’s southwest, Tibet and the North West are hazardous due to precipitous drops, pot holes, dangerous road surfaces, and reckless drivers. The number of cars on China’s roads has increased rapidly since 1984. The increase is placing pressure on the government to replace old roads and build new highway systems. This is a timely process that has left many of China’s cities with inadequate roads to handle the increased traffic. Some cities such as Shanghai have expanded major arteries to accom-
modate increased traffic. Bottlenecks in urban transportation net-
works will be a growing problem throughout this decade and will
worsen as car ownership and usage expands.

Long-distance buses are one of the best means of getting around
China. Buses stop infrequently in smaller towns and villages.
Routes between densely populated cities have a larger and more
comfortable fleet of private buses. The shorter and more isolated
routes still rely on minibuses.

Bikes are an excellent, but dangerous method of getting around
China’s cities or patrolling tourist sights. Individuals who wish to
ride bicycles in China are urged to wear safety helmets. Bicycles
are now competing for road space with more than two million
cars. In some cities such as Beijing bicycle lanes, once some of the
nicest and safest in the world, have been transformed into motor
vehicle lanes or parking areas.

**Rail**

China has more than 110,000 kilometers (68,300 miles) of railroad,
which serves both passengers and cargo. Approximately 68,000
kilometers (42,253 miles) are on a standard track, 1.435-m gauge;
23,945 kilometers (14,878 miles) are on double track and 18,115
kilometers is electrified. Chinese People’s Republic Railways
(CPRR) operates most of China’s railways. The Ministry of
Railways controls 12 CPRR administrations, as well as most of the
country’s locomotive and rolling stock factories. The railway ad-
ministrations are Harbin, Shenyang, Beijing, Hohhot, Zhengzhou,
Jinan, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Liuzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou and
Urumqi. Sinotrans and China Ocean Shipping Company offer
limited rail service in conjunction with the Ministry of Railways
but rail cargo is essentially a monopoly of the ministry.
Construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway began in June 2001. The railway will traverse the Hoh Xil “no-man’s land,” cross the Kunlun Mountain Pass (4,767 meters, or 3 miles, above sea level), to enter the Northern Tibet Plateau, and then go on to Lhasa, capital of Tibet Autonomous Region. Out of the 1,510 kilometers (940 miles) of this route, 960 kilometers (600 miles) are more than 4,000 meters above sea level and 550 kilometers (340 miles) are in areas of frozen earth.

Thirty railway stations have been built, including the Tangula Mountain station, which will be the highest-altitude railway station in the world. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway opened July 2006 with the first passenger trains traveling across the “roof of the world.” This railway makes it possible to travel from Lhasa, Tibet to Beijing in 48 hours. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway is expected to double tourism revenue by 2010 and reduce transport costs by 75 percent.
Trains are typically crowded. Chinese trains sell four classes of accommodation: soft seat, soft sleeper, hard seat and hard sleeper. Short distance trains provide hard class seats. These seats are the least expensive and most crowded; the seats in this class force the passenger to sit upright and the compartment is noisy. Some inter-city trains also provide soft class seats, which are more comfortable, less crowded, smoke-free, and less available.

On long distance trains, soft class sleepers have comfortable, 4-berth compartments and full bedding. Hard class sleepers provide bunks in open-plan dormitory cars, usually arranged in bays of 6 (upper, middle and lower) on one side of the aisle, with pairs of seats on the other side of the aisle for daytime use. The soft sleepers cost twice as much as hard sleepers and are usually used only by the wealthy.

Subways are also convenient for city travel, but are only available in Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Tianjin.
Air

China has approximately 472 airports, of which there are 383 surfaced runways and 89 unsurfaced runways.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport Name</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>Elevation m (ft)</th>
<th>Runway Length x Width m (ft)</th>
<th>Surface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing Capital International</td>
<td>40° 04.5'N 116° 31.4'E</td>
<td>35 (116)</td>
<td>3,800 (12,467 ft)</td>
<td>Asphalt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou-Baiyun International</td>
<td>23° 11.1'N 113° 11.9'E</td>
<td>11 (37)</td>
<td>3,379 (11,089 ft)</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai International</td>
<td>31° 08.57'N 121° 47.54'E</td>
<td>3 (11)</td>
<td>4,000 (13,123 ft)</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumqi International</td>
<td>43° 54'N 087° 28'E</td>
<td>648 (2,126)</td>
<td>3,600 (11,811 ft)</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International airports in China include Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Urumqi. People can also enter into China by plane from Lhasa. Some civil airports are equipped to accommodate such planes as the Boeing 777s, 767s, 757s, and A340s. There are more than 750 domestic, 128 international, and 21 regional air routes.

The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) regulates China’s domestic and international airlines. China has approximately 25 major airlines. Among these airlines are Air China, China Northwest, China Southern, China Southwest, China Eastern, China Northern, China National Airlines Company, Greatwall, and airlines with city names such as Shanghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan Airlines. The United States has various carriers with flights to China, including Continental, United, Northwest, American, Delta, US Airways, and Midwest Airlines.
Maritime

China has ports in Dalian, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, and Shanghai. The China merchant marine has a total of 1,723 ships (1,000 GRT or larger).

China has more than 310 international shipping companies. China Ocean Shipping Companies (COSCO) and China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) are two of China’s largest shipping companies. COSCO owns and operates 550 modern merchant ships with a total carrying capacity of up to 30 million DWT including 13 fifth generation containers and 3 VLCCs. It operates in 1,300 ports in more than 160 countries and regions. COSCO is one of the leading carriers in international bulk shipping and listed as one of the top 10 container liner operators in the world. CSCL operates more than 50 domestic and international routes. Its vessels serve 152 ports in more than 75 countries and more than 30 ports domestically.

Boat travel in China has declined with improved bus and air transportation. However, several boating lines remain as shortcuts to the rather long overland routes. Among these are the Yantai-Dalian ferry and the Shanghai-Ningbo line. Inland waterway travel is available on the Yangzi River from Chongqing to Wuhan, on the West (Xi) River from Guangzhou to Wuzhou, on the Li River from Guilin to Yangzhou, and on the Grand Canal from Hangzhou to Suzhou.

Primary Port Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port Name</th>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>Berthing, dwt</th>
<th>Depth, m (ft)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dalian</td>
<td>38°55'N, 121° 41'E</td>
<td>Up to 175,000</td>
<td>6 to 17.5 (19.7 to 57.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingdao</td>
<td>36° 05'N, 120° 18'E</td>
<td>Up to 200,000</td>
<td>5.9 to 20 (19.4 to 65.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>31°15'N, 121° 30'E</td>
<td>Up to 150,000</td>
<td>4 to 11.4 (13.1 to 37.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhanjiang</td>
<td>21°12'N, 110° 25'E</td>
<td>Up to 300,000</td>
<td>5 to 18.4 (19.4 to 60.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenzhen</td>
<td>32° 00'N, 120° 48'E</td>
<td>Up to 60,000</td>
<td>6 to 14 (19.7 to 45.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiamen</td>
<td>24° 29'N, 118° 04'E</td>
<td>Up to 60,000</td>
<td>4 to 16.8 (13.1 to 55.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Communication

Radio and Television

China has approximately 370 AM stations, 260 FM stations, and 45 shortwave radios. Domestic radio broadcasting is controlled by the Central People’s Broadcasting Station (CPBS). Broadcasts are made in local dialects and minority languages. English language programs are also increasing.

There are 3,240 television broadcast stations in China. China Central Television (CCTV) operates 209, 31 of which are provincial broadcast stations, and nearly 3,000 are local city stations. The CCTV has two English channels. Major cities may have a second local channel. Most hotels have their own film channels. The total number of television sets in China is more than 428 million.

China has liberalized media markets from the censorship it faced years ago. However, China continues to censor radio and television stations for “national cultural safety” by banning programs that promote Western ideology and politics. Beijing also controls which movies are allowed into the country, and what content is allowed on domestically owned stations. Television broadcasts of foreign programming are restricted largely to hotel and foreign residence compounds. This programming experiences occasional censorship of topics including sensitive political issues.

Telecommunication

China maintains control of its telecommunications network through the Ministry of Information (MOI), created in March of 1998. Telephone use has rapidly increased in China. In 2005, there were 345 million main line phones and 383 million mobile cellular phones. These numbers are expected to hit 520 million
cellular phones by 2008 and 600 million by 2010. Domestic and international mobile services are increasingly available for private use; unevenly distributed domestic system serves principal cities, industrial centers, and many towns.

With the increasing use of mobile cellular phones in urban areas, the government has collaboration in censoring text messages. In July 2004, the government began censoring text messages distributed by mobile telephone. According to state media, the campaign was designed to stop the spread of pornographic messages by phone, as well as to block circulation of illicit news and information. All text messaging service providers were required to install filtering equipment to monitor and delete messages deemed offensive by authorities. In the first week of the campaign’s operation, the government reportedly fined 10 companies and forced 20 others to close for failure to comply.

To call from abroad, dial the international access code (00), the country code for China (86) then the local area code and the number. Another option is to dial the home country direct dial number (108) to connect with an operator there.

**Internet**

China is the second largest internet user after the United States. Millions of Chinese in urban areas use the Internet and send electronic mail within and outside the country, either through a home computer, or more likely, through popular internet cafes. In 2004, 22 percent of China’s 87 million users accessed the web at internet cafes. More than half of the internet users access the internet through broadband. Instant messaging has doubled to 87 million users. Blogs (online personal diaries) reach more than 30 million and search engines receive more than 360 requests a day.
However, as with other media, the China government monitors the internet and censors web sites deemed pornographic or otherwise politically incorrect. In 2004, more than 60 Chinese were imprisoned for the peaceful expression of their views over the internet. Companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! deny censored material to the user by displaying error messages in order to cooperate with the China government.

**Newspapers and Magazines**

The state has planned significant book publication projects and offers prizes for well-written books to promote the publishing industry. In 2003, there were more than 8,000 periodicals in China, with a total print run of 2.99 billion, or more than 2.3 copies per person. English language magazines include the Beijing Review, Beijing this Month, Chinese Literature, and Openings. English
language newspapers include the People’s Daily, the China Daily, the Guangzhou Ribao, the Mingo Bao Daily (Hong Kong-based), and the Beijing Scene (foreigner’s English paper in China). Newspapers were forbidden from reporting on stories about leadership changes or political reform unless the source was the official news agency, Xinhua.

**Postal Service**

China has an extensive and effective postal service for both domestic and international mail. Domestic mail requires 1-2 days; air mail and post cards require 5-10 days for delivery. In addition to local offices, there are branch post offices in almost all major tourist hotels. Post office staff checks the contents of packets and parcels before mailing and final packing should not occur until the parcel has received post office and/or Customs clearance. United Parcel Service (UPS), Federal Express, DHL and other foreign companies have established joint-ventures with Chinese organizations for express international mail. Although expensive, these private carriers are fast and relatively reliable.

**Satellites**

China has a domestic satellite system with 55 earth stations is in place. There are various satellite earth stations - 5 Intelsat (4 Pacific Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean region) and 1 Inmarsat (Pacific and Indian Ocean regions). There are several international fiber-optic links to Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Russia, and Germany that have enabled satellite communications.

**CULTURE**

China is the world’s oldest living civilization in terms of culture continuity. China also has the largest population in the world.
Statistics

Population 1.3 billion (est. 2007)
Age structure percent of total population
  0 – 14 years 20.4%
  15 – 64 years 71.7%
  65 years and older 7.9% (2007 est.)
Population growth rate 0.60%
Gender ratio males per female
  At birth 1.11
  Under 15 years 1.13
  15 – 64 years 1.06
  65 years and older 0.91
  Total population 1.06 (2007 est.)

People

Population Patterns

China’s population is most dense where there is the most fertile soil, adequate growing seasons, and greatest economic opportunity. Approximately 75 percent of the population lives on 15 percent of the landmass. The population is most heavily concentrated in the eastern part of the country in the fertile river basins, where there are densities of 2,000 people or more per square mile. Approximately 30 percent of China’s population resides in China’s 570 cities.

Mainland China is not yet an urbanized society. Urbanites are estimated to account for only about 27 to 33 percent of the population. Cities have been undergoing remarkable growth and transformation since the early 1980s, reflecting trends in the economy at large. There are now more than 150 cities with at least 200,000 residents and thousands of smaller towns. Shanghai has
a municipal population of more than 13 million; Beijing, more than 11 million; and Tianjin, more than 9 million. These numbers include residents of surrounding counties that are under the city’s administrative control. With continued economic growth, economic specialization, and employment prospects that draw migrants to urban centers, these cities will continue to expand and to serve as a barometer of urban China.

Factors affecting the growth of China’s urban population are migration, natural increase, and boundary changes. The significant increase in the urban population seems to have resulted more from redrawing city boundaries than from rural migrants. However, the state’s dominant and the enormous disparity between urban and rural areas have contributed to the influx of rural migrants to China’s cities and the accelerating rate of urbanization in the country.

With a population officially just over 1.3 billion and estimated growth rate of about 0.6 percent (2006 est.), China is very concerned about its population growth and has attempted with mixed results to implement a strict birth limitation policy. China’s 2002 Population and Family Planning Law and policy permit one child per family, with allowance for a second child under certain circumstances, especially in rural areas, and with looser guidelines for ethnic minorities with smaller populations. In 2005, the birth rate was 13.25 births per 1,000 people, down even from the 15.95 births per 1,000 in 2001. Enforcement varies, and relies largely on “social compensation fees” to discourage extra births. Official policy opposes forced abortion or sterilization, but in some localities there are forced abortions. The government’s goal is to stabilize the population in the first half of the 21st century. Current projections are that the population will peak at around 1.6 billion by 2050.
The one-child policy attempts to limit population growth by rewarding families with single children and penalizing larger ones. It has perpetuated the preference for male children—many couples, given the option of only having one child, choose to have a boy. They do this through abortions or infanticide. Some families put their baby girls up for adoption or abandon them. Some attribute the one-child policy as the cause of an uneven ratio of men to women.

Due to this disparity, an abundance of unmarried Chinese men are unable to find a spouse. Many poor men, unable to compete with richer bachelors, have resorted to kidnapping or buying kidnapped brides from gangs. Many women in such situations commit suicide, the traditional form of protest for a powerless, humiliated person. As a result, more young, rural women commit suicide than any other demographic in China. Another problem attributed to the one-child policy is the graying population of China due to few young people and the rise of the median age.

The one-child policy has proven difficult to implement in the countryside, where tradition is strong and favors male children over female children. The birth of a son is a cause for celebration while the birth of a daughter is considered only a small happiness. Many rural families prefer increased productivity over decreased fertility and are willing to pay the fines established to have more children to support their livelihood. The one-child policy has been more successful in urban areas where couples are more removed from the influence of tradition and less likely to feel pressure from family to produce large families and male heirs.
People

Ethnic Groups

The Han majority accounts for 92 percent of the population in China. Within the Han is a variety of peoples separated along north-south, coastal-inland, and city-country lines. The minority population accounts for 8 percent of the population. This includes Zhuang, Uighur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other nationalities.

Population Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>91.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manehu</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighr</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tujia</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouyei</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dia</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the 56 recognized minority groups live in the outer areas of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), and Yunnan. Many also live among the Han Chinese in the more affluent central and costal provinces due to better job opportunities. The minority groups are a diverse group of Uighurs and Tibetans, Koreans, Mongols, Turks, Kazaks, Russians, Tartars, Thais, Manchus, Miao, Hui and Zhuang. The Hui is one of the largest groups, accounting for more than 9 million members, and the Zhuang who account for 16 million.

The Chinese constitution provides the same rights to minorities as are given to the Han majority. Minorities are guaranteed a
quota for representation at the National People’s Congress, and are sometimes treated more leniently with regard to laws and regulations. For example, most minorities do not have to adhere to the one-child per family rule that is enforced on the Han majority. Their children can get into universities with lower examination scores than are required of Han students, and model members of minorities are chosen to fill prominent government posts. Beijing puts great emphasis on minority relations and promises to promote more minorities to leading positions.

Maintaining good relationships with some minorities has been a continuous problem for the Han Chinese. Minority separatism is a threat to the stability of China. The Tibetans and Uighurs have
volatile relations with the Han Chinese. Tibet and Xinjiang are still heavily garrisoned by Chinese troops due to violence and protests that have occurred in the region. These regions provide China with most of its livestock and hold vast untapped mineral deposits.

The Uighurs seek to create an independent nation state in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. They resent control over the land that they consider their homeland as well as the policy of China’s government to populate the area with Han Chinese and reduce the proportion of Uighurs in the overall population. The Chinese have attempted to assimilate the Uighur population into the Han Chinese culture by diluting their culture and identity, curbing their religious practices, confiscating their property, and discriminating against them in employment. As a result, the Uighurs believe their ethnic group’s language, religion, history and survival is at stake. The Uighurs have participated
in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults on government or organizations, poison, arson, and plotting riots for their cause.

The Tibetans want political independence for Tibet and religious freedom for its citizens. Tibet first fell under Chinese political control in the 18th century. In 1911, Outer Mongolia and Tibet seized the opportunity to break away from China. Two years later the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan people’s spiritual leader, declared Tibet an independent state.

Tibet was recognized by Great Britain, but China never accepted this declaration. In 1950, Tibet was liberated by the People’s Liberation Army, but was assured that it would be allowed to continue administering its internal affairs and that its social system would be left intact. The Chinese presence in Tibet grew and challenged Tibetan Buddhism. This led to rising tensions and a re-
volt in 1959 that sent the Dalai Lama into exile with his government to India. Tibetan opposition to the Chinese continued with demonstrations that were brutally crushed by the Chinese in 1989.

**Family**

Family is considered the center of Chinese social, psychological, and ideological lives. In China, families are typically small, due to the one-child policy, but traditionally family ties link the branches of the family over many generations. In traditional society, land ownership and family resources were passed from father to son. Parents arranged marriages as alliances between families rather than individuals. The eldest son was expected to take care of the parents.

Today in the urban economy married couples do not usually live with or near the man’s parents, but pay jointly for their own accommodations. The choice of marriage is left to the young; however, family values remain strong. The one-child policy has produced a generation of men who may never marry because of the male-to-female ratio. There are approximately 23 million more men than women. The one child policy has also created a rapidly aging population. The family structure is dwindling from 4-2-1, with one child responsible for the care of both parents and grandparents.
Roles of Men and Women

Men are highly valued due to the patriarchal society in China. Men are considered physically stronger, better educated, more experienced, more assertive, and dynamic. Generally, men are still seen as the unofficial head of the household. The women’s changing role has confused men’s roles to some extent. Some men feel threatened by it and long for traditional roles, while others accept the changes. In Chinese society, men should make more money than women, be better employed, and take care of women.

Marriage among females is near 100 percent. Women usually marry at a young age. Women are not equal to men, but of a lower class and hold jobs that are considered “female” jobs. Approximately 60 percent of service jobs such as secretaries, waitresses, and shop clerks are held by women. Only 22 percent of technical and scientific jobs are held by women. Many wives, rather than husbands, follow tradition by caring for children and doing housework as well as following socialist practice by keeping a full-time job. Because women are usually caregivers, shoppers, and accountants for their family, they must do some errands during the day; therefore, urban employers view them as unreliable.

The role of women is changing. The state has guaranteed equal employment opportunities for women and men. The state has worked adopted a series of policies and measures to ensure that women can equally participate in the economic development, enjoy equal access to economic resources and effective services, enhance their self-development abilities and improve their social and economic status. In the meantime, governments at all levels are working to adopt many favorable policies toward women, such as creating public-welfare jobs, opening employment service centers, sponsoring special recruitment activities and vocational training cours-
Education and Literacy Rates

Since the formation of the PRC in 1949, great strides have been made in basic-level education. Of the population 15 years of age and older, 91 percent is literate. In 2004 official figures show that 98.9 percent of primary school-age children are enrolled in school, and of these 98.1 percent go on to junior middle school. Entrance to high school (a further 3 years of study) is by examination—62.9 percent of students continue on to high school.

Many rural schools are inadequately funded, relying on fees paid by local families, and there is widespread truancy and absenteeism, despite a notional 9 years of compulsory education. Education in poor rural areas is inferior to that found in urban areas, and extremely poor families often have no choice but to take their children out of school because they cannot pay tuition.

University entrance is generally based on merit and is highly competitive; a national university entrance examination ranks all students. Less than 10 percent of all people attend college. Students generally pay tuition themselves or sign a contract with a state company that will sponsor them. In return, the student must work for the company for a few years after graduation. Top students may study abroad or work for multinational corporations.

Language

The different languages in China include Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects. There are
seven major Chinese dialects and many sub dialects. Each dialect is unique enough as to be unintelligible to Chinese of other provinces. Mandarin (or Putonghua), the predominant dialect, is spoken by more than 70 percent of the population. It is taught in all schools and is the official language. About two-thirds of the Han ethnic group are native speakers of Mandarin; the rest, concentrated in southwest and southeast China, speak one of the six other major Chinese dialects. Non-Chinese languages spoken widely by ethnic minorities include Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur and other Turkic languages (in Xinjiang), and Korean (in the northeast).
Beliefs

Beliefs are a significant part of life for many Chinese, however China is officially atheist. Chinese culture is primarily influenced by three streams of human thought: Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Although they have separate origins, all three have been inextricably entwined. Many Chinese practice all three beliefs simultaneously.

Taoism is considered to be the only indigenous Chinese religion. It encompasses various gods. The Taoist version of heaven is ruled by a bureaucracy of deities, similar to the Greek and Roman pantheons. Although the Jade Emperor rules heaven, there are hundreds of gods, each of whom people may beseech for help. Statues, pictures, or temples dedicated to these gods are erected in homes or villages, where worshippers leave incense and gifts, usually food, and where they pray. Often the supplicant makes a promise that he or she must fulfill if the request is granted.

Taoism teaches that yin and yang, the spiritual and material components of everything in existence, are in constant change. Yang, the force associated with light, heaven, and activity, mixes with yin, which is darkness, earth, and inactivity, to make up every being and object, and to create that object or person’s qi, or life energy. When a person dies, the yang part of his spirit flies to heaven, while the yin part resides with the corpse. If not properly cared for, the part of the spirit that remains becomes a “hungry ghost” and causes harm to its living descendents.

The Confucianism belief system has served as the backbone of, and in many ways has defined, Chinese culture for much of its history. Its flexibility has allowed it to adapt and remain pertinent over a period of more than 1,000 years. Harmony within relationships is the goal of Confucianism, which arranges society into five
hierarchal relationships. These five relationships include leader-subject, husband-wife, parent/father-child/son, older brother-younger brother, and older friend-younger friend. Confucian portrays an ideal society as a hierarchy, in which everyone knew his or her proper place and duties. Rulers and State had been taken for granted, but Confucianists held that rulers had to demonstrate their fitness to rule by their “merit.” Heredity was an insufficient qualification for legitimate authority. As practical administrators, Confucianists came to terms with hereditary kings and emperors but insisted on their right to educate rulers in the principles of Confucian thought. Traditional Chinese thought thus combined a hierarchical social order with an appreciation for education, individual achievement, and mobility within the rigid structure. Confucianism obligates the superior to treat the inferior lovingly, and in practice these relationships are codependent. These relationships institutionalize behavior through ritual to ensure that society is harmonious.

Confucianism also emphasizes moral education for males, and assumes that any man may become a good person if he is diligent in his studies. Confucianism does not address most spiritual issues, but it has codified ancestor-worship as part of the required rituals descendent must perform for their ancestors.

Buddhism came to China from India in the first century A.D. It became increasingly popular and the most influential religion after the 4th century. It has become as much a part of Han culture as native Chinese religions. Buddhists believe that after death, souls are reborn into humans, animals, or plants, and that they receive a better or worse situation according to their behavior in their past life. Because of this many Chinese, especially in rural areas, believe in destiny (yuanfen) as a repercussion of one’s behavior
in a former life. This belief emphasizes acceptance of hardship in this life through a belief that one has earned it.

Islam came to China in the 7th century along the Silk Road, and by the 14th century was integrated into Chinese society. Although many Muslims in China are ethnically Han, the China government classifies them as belonging to the Hui (Muslim) ethnic group because of their faith. Today, Han Chinese may convert to Islam without officially changing their ethnicity. Their version of Islam differs little from that found in other Muslim cultures. They worship in a mosque, called *qingzhenshi* in Mandarin Chinese, which literally means the “temple of pure truth.” The leader of the congregation, called imam in Arabic, is called the *ahong* among the Hui, a term that is derived from the Persian word for “teacher.”
Because Muslims believe that God’s word was revealed in Arabic, the Hui use Arabic words when reading the Qur’an, as well as in prayer and during religious services. They also use many words of Persian origin when referring to religious concepts.

Catholic influence reached China along the Silk Road in the 6th or 7th century, but vanished in the Tang Dynasty when the government persecuted it due to its foreign origins. Catholicism was again
introduced in the 15th century by the Jesuits. Although the Jesuits enjoyed the respect of the imperial court because of their scientific knowledge, they were not successful in promoting Christianity. In the mid-19th century, however, a large number of Protestant and Catholic missionaries arrived from Europe and the Americas. Although they were more successful in converting the Chinese, their converts became known as “rice Christians” because the Han believed they joined the church for handouts of food and to gain protection in legal matters.

Missionaries were at the forefront of medical and educational reforms in China and trained many of the intellectuals that would later become leaders. Foreign missionaries gained an unfavorable reputation, however, because of general Chinese ignorance about Christianity and popular anger at foreign imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Even today, Christianity has a negative connotation as a foreign faith. Despite this stigma, both Catholicism and Protestantism are gaining converts as African, European, and American missionaries are still active in China in underground or “house” churches. Because proselytizing is illegal in the PRC, however, such missionaries must use discretion.

The state does not allow foreigners to control any religious institutions. It has therefore forbid the Catholic Church from taking orders from the Pope. Instead, the China government established a Catholic Church that is independent of the Pope. There is at least one unauthorized church there that still takes orders from the Vatican, but its members are subject to arrest by Chinese authorities. Today, there are approximately 5 million Catholics, and 15 million Protestants.

Although China’s constitution affirms religious toleration, the government places restrictions on religious practice other
than officially recognized organizations. Only two Christian organizations—a Catholic church without official ties to Rome and the “Three-Self-Patriotic” Protestant church—are sanctioned by the China government. Unauthorized churches have sprung up in many parts of the country and unofficial religious practice is flourishing. In some regions authorities have tried to control activities of these unregistered churches. In other regions, registered and unregistered groups are treated similarly by authorities and congregations worship in both types of churches. Most Chinese Catholic bishops are recognized by the Pope, and official priests have Vatican approval to administer all the sacraments.

With the popular search for spiritual meaning that emerged in the 1980s, several new religions based on traditional beliefs appeared. Especially popular is *qigong* (pronounced “chee gong”), a practice founded in the 1950s based on Taoism. Advocates claim that practicing meditation and certain exercises can strengthen a person’s qi, or life energy, allowing *qigong* masters to perform supernatural feats such as flying.

*Falun Gong* (also called *Falun Dafa*), another new religious practice based on *qigong*, was created in recent years by Li Hongzhi. *Falun Gong* is a powerful mechanism for healing, stress, relief, and health improvements. It is complete with its own system of principles and empirical techniques. It has a set of five exercises, three of which involve physical movements and maneuvers while the other two exercises require remaining still for extended periods of time. *Falun Gong* is characterized by the cultivation of a *Falun* (law wheel), located at the “dantian” (lower abdomen). As an intelligent spinning body of high energy substance, the *Falun* automatically absorbs energy from the universe and relieves the body of bad elements. The rotation of *Falun* synchronizes with the rotation of the universe. It has the same characteristics as the
universe and is a miniature of the universe. The Taoist “Yin and Yang” and the Buddha’s “Dharma wheel” have their reflections in the Falun. Falun is constantly rotating, putting the practitioner in the state of cultivation for 24 hours a day. It gained several million followers but was banned by the government in 1999. Many of those arrested were sent to indoctrination prisons, called labor reform camps (laogai), where some have been tortured and killed. Today many Chinese see it as a dangerous cult, though an unknown number continue to practice it secretly.

Recreation

In urban areas leisure is divided among popular activities that include ballroom dancing, traditional fan dancing, taji quan (called taichi or shadowboxing in the west), qigong exercises, wushu (martial arts), basketball, and ping-pong. Among older Chinese, board games, such as Chinese Chess, are popular. Younger Chinese in urban areas enjoy video games and internet chat rooms.

Chinese who live in rural areas enjoy horse racing and horseback riding, polo, wrestling, yak racing, archery, tug-of-war, cycling, and soccer. In some rural areas and among certain ethnic groups festivals are an important part of leisure activities. For example, the Miao ethnic group participates in festivals where popular activities include professional dancing, ball tossing, dragon boat races, mountain climbing, horse races, cock fights, and bull fights.

Customs and Courtesies

Hong Kong and Macau differ from mainland China. Hong Kong and Macau are more modern, but still share some traditional Chinese culture. The following are specific to mainland China:
Status, ego, or self respect is a Chinese cultural foundation. People go to great lengths to avoid being made to look stupid or being forced to back down in front of others. In cases of disagreement, Chinese strive for a negotiated settlement that benefits both parties. Confrontation should be avoided.

When handling paper, use both hands to present and receive. This gesture shows respect.

People don’t often say what they think, but will tell you what they think you want to hear or what will save face for them.

Smiling doesn’t always indicate happiness. Some Chinese will smile when they are embarrassed or worried.

Guanxi (connections) are used to obtain goods or services. This enables individuals in a competitive society to get what they want. Exploiting guanxi can lead to corruption.

Negotiating over dinner is common for business deals. Invite the appropriate officials and business partners to dinner; proposals that seemed impossible hours ago may suddenly become possible.

Show respect for elders. People on public transportation should offer their seats to the elderly.

Rise when a host or hostess enters the room.

Dress conservatively.

Do not laugh at others’ mistakes — this is considered offensive.

Wait until invited by a host or hostess to begin eating or drinking.

It is not necessary to tip at restaurants. Gratuity is usually included in the bill.
Greetings

Chinese people nod or bow slightly when greeting others, though handshakes are common as well; it is advised to wait for a Chinese person to extend a hand first to be sure what social convention to use. Introductions tend to be formal and polite rather than familiar. An official title should always be used (e.g. Mr., Ms., Dr., General, etc.). Chinese wives do not take their husbands’ family name; therefore the correct title would be “Madam” and then her family name. When one formally visits a large group, the group may applaud in welcome. The usual response is to applaud in return.

Gestures

Chinese people do not like to be touched by strangers. This is especially important when dealing with older people or people in prestigious positions. In addition, one should avoid making exaggerated gestures or using dramatic facial expressions. Chinese people usually do not use their hands when speaking and may be distracted by a speaker who does. One should use the open hand to point at people, place, or object as it is considered less confrontational than using one’s index finger. Members of the same gender may be seen publicly holding hands, but public displays of affection among those of opposite genders are generally inappropriate.

Visiting

Visitors are expected to be punctual; lateness or cancellation is a serious affront. Compliments are appreciated by hosts, but will be politely denied for modesty’s sake. Shoes are removed when visiting religious buildings (temples, shrines, or mosques) and may also be removed in private homes.
Gift-giving is against the written law, but the acceptance of such practice is increasing. Gifts should be wrapped in “lucky” colors of red, yellow, or pink, and the recipient should open it in private. The colors of white, black, should be avoided because they symbolize death. Fruit, flowers, boxes of chocolates, imported good are good gifts, but money is considered insulting. If one is given a gift, one should not open it in the presence of the giver. If one is treated to a banquet, one should reciprocate at a later time.

**Clothing**

Chinese today most often wear Western-style clothing. The “Mao suit,” a blue cotton pantsuit, is sometimes worn in rural areas. Chinese clothing is more formal than American dress. Flip-flops and shorts are not common.

Travelers to China can wear what is customary for them. Areas such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Beijing are fashion-conscious. Shorts and T-Shirts are respectable summer wear. Flip-Flops and sandals are okay. If traveling in the north of China during winter, prepare properly for the weather.

**Food**

Rice is the staple of the Chinese diet. Diet differs in each geographical region, depending on the culture and available food.

Cuisine in northern China, is influenced by the Mongol field Kitchens with such cuisines as the Mongolian barbecue and Mongolian hotpot. Mongolian hotpot is a large communal cooking and serving that usually includes meat and vegetables. Wheat or millet is a popular staple used in steamed dumplings and spring rolls. Other popular foods include pancakes, spring onions, fermented bean paste, freshwater fish, and chicken.
Cuisine along the eastern coast contains an abundance of fish, such as the silver carp. This area is home to the best soy sauces and rice wines. Eastern cuisine popularized the use of a wok in stir frying. Some popular dishes include braised duck and pigeon, steamed turtle and chicken, hot and sour fish soup, stewed pork, and fried eel.

Cuisine found in the western region is spicy due to the use of red chili. In this region, fresh ingredients are available year round, however not in the abundance or variety found in the east or south of the country. Pork, poultry, legumes, soybeans, mushrooms, garlic, ginger and onions are all popular ingredients.

Dishes found in the southern Canton region are more exotic. Dog, cats, raccoon, monkeys, lizards, and rats are all used in various dishes. In this region, texture is prized as well as freshness.

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT

Disease Risks to Deployed Personnel

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) assesses China as INTERMEDIATE RISK for infectious diseases, with an overall disease risk that will adversely impact mission effectiveness unless force health protection measures are implemented.

The following is a summary of the infectious disease risks in China. More detailed information is available online at http://www.afmic.detrick.army.mil.

Foodborne and Waterborne Diseases

Sanitation varies with location, but typically is well below U.S. standards. While Beijing and Shanghai approach Western sanitation standards, local food and water sources (including ice) may
be contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and viruses to which most U.S. service members have little or no natural immunity. Diarrheal diseases can be expected to temporarily incapacitate a high percentage of personnel within days if local food, water, or ice is consumed. If personnel are unvaccinated, hepatitis A and typhoid fever can cause prolonged illness in a smaller percentage. Consuming unpasteurized dairy products or raw animal products increases the risk of diseases such as brucellosis and Q fever; rare cases may occur in the absence of countermeasures.

**Vector-borne Diseases**

Ecological conditions support populations of arthropod vectors, including mosquitoes, ticks, and sand flies, particularly during warmer months. Japanese encephalitis (JE), dengue fever, and malaria are the major vector-borne risk in China. Malaria, JE, and Lyme disease each could potentially affect a small number of personnel (less than 1 percent per month attack rate) in the absence of countermeasures. In addition, there are a variety of other vector-borne diseases occurring at low or unknown levels, which as a group may constitute a potentially serious operational risk.

**Water-contact Diseases**

Operations or activities that involve extensive water contact may result in personnel being temporarily debilitated with schistosomiasis (in areas south of 35 degrees north latitude) and leptospirosis in some locations. In addition, bodies of surface water are likely to be contaminated with human and animal waste. Activities such as wading or swimming may result in exposures to enteric diseases such as diarrhea and hepatitis through incidental ingestion of water. Prolonged water contact also may lead to the
development of a variety of potentially debilitating skin conditions such as bacterial or fungal dermatitis.

**Sexually Transmitted Diseases**

Carrier rates for hepatitis B are high. HIV/AIDS also occurs at increasing levels. Though the immediate impact of these diseases on an operation is limited, the long-term health impact on individuals is substantial. Gonorrhea, chlamydia, and other sexually transmitted diseases such as chancroid, herpes, lymphogranuloma venereum, syphilis, and venereal warts that often are common in CSWs may affect a high percentage of personnel who have unprotected sexual contact.

**Aerosolized Dust/Soil-contact Diseases**

Rare cases of severe hantavirus hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome could occur among personnel exposed to dust or aerosols in rodent-infested areas. Clusters of cases could occur in groups exposed to areas with very heavy rodent infestation.

**Animal-contact Diseases**

The risk of rabies in China is assessed as well above the risk in the United States. Dogs are the main source of human exposures. Additionally, rare cases of naturally occurring anthrax could occur among personnel exposed to animals, animal products, or undercooked meat.

**Respiratory-borne Diseases**

In the 2008 WHO publication on Global Tuberculosis Control, China was classified as a high-burden country, one of the 22 countries that account for 80 percent of the new tuberculosis (TB) cases
worldwide. Annual incidence of active TB cases in 2003 was estimated at 99 per 100,000 (compared to the U.S. rate of approximately 6 per 100,000). Prolonged contact with the local population may result in conversion rates to tuberculosis skin testing (TST/PPD screening) that may be elevated over U.S. military baseline.

In addition, deployed U.S. forces may be exposed to a variety of common respiratory infections in the local population, including influenza, pertussis, viral upper respiratory infections, viral and bacterial pneumonia, and others. U.S. military populations living in close-quarter conditions are at risk for substantial person-to-person spread of respiratory pathogens.

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza cases have been identified in birds and humans in China. Extremely rare cases of human H5N1 avian influenza could occur in operational forces involved in poultry culling, in the absence of appropriate personal protective measures. The risk to operational forces not exposed to infected poultry or contaminated environments remains negligible. In the event that H5N1 avian influenza gains the ability to efficiently spread directly from person to person, widespread community transmission would be difficult to contain, given the amount of travel that occurs throughout Asia. If global spread results, a significant number of operational forces worldwide eventually could be affected.

Medical Capabilities

The quality of health care in China varies significantly from one region to the next. Private facilities, particularly in urban centers such as Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities, provide the country’s best quality care. Rural health care falls short of Western standards as well as Chinese standards. Trained physicians and pharmacies are available in most provincial hospitals.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) in Beijing operates China’s largest health-care network and is responsible for directing policy, implementing and coordinating health institutions, and supervising preventive services, medical education, and medical facilities. Historically, China’s military medical capability has been superior to that in the civilian sector, but recent demobilization efforts have outsourced certain medical assets to civilian authorities. The impact that this has had on the military or civilian healthcare system is unknown. China’s Center for Disease Control and some nongovernmental organizations also participate in enhancing the overall health system.

MOH hospitals are classified into three levels. Each level is further subdivided into three or four classes. Level III is the national level; these hospitals have more than 500 beds and provide health care, public health, teaching, and research services. There are about 1,000 level-III hospitals and about 13,000 level-II hospitals. Western-style medical facilities with international staffs are available in Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and a few other large cities. Many other hospitals in major Chinese cities have so-called VIP wards that often have well-trained, English-speaking staff. Cultural and regulatory difficulties may impede care in more remote facilities. Rural clinics are usually reluctant to accept responsibility for treating foreigners, even in emergencies.

Although China reportedly has 1.4 million doctors, their qualifications vary widely. China’s elite medical professionals have been Western-trained and often speak English, but they are limited in number and cannot meet the needs of China’s immense population. Previously, doctors underwent generic training; however, in the past decade, specialty training has become a priority. Overall, the quality of doctors is below Western standards.
Much of China’s pharmaceutical supply is suspect. Pharmacies often provide medications with the wrong dosages, past expiration dates, mislabeled contents, or improper handling. Except for joint venture companies that produce drugs for export, manufacturing procedures do not adhere to Western manufacturing practice standards.

Despite new regulations and shutting down illegal blood stations, China’s blood banks still lack adequate storage, appropriate testing equipment, properly trained personnel, and reliable donor pools.

The quality of China’s emergency medical services is fair. Beijing has been reorganizing its emergency medical response system but still lacks the equipment and personnel to support a modern program. The ambulance service is generally unreliable, lacks sophisticated medical equipment, and rarely has personnel with medical training. Air medical evacuation assets are extremely limited, expensive, and usually reserved for VIPs and dignitaries; however, the aircraft tend to have adequate medical staff onboard during evacuations. If necessary, SOS International, Ltd, provides medical evacuation and medical escort services in Beijing, Nanjing, Shekou, and Tianjin, as well as 24-hour Alarm Centers in Beijing and Shanghai. For medical emergencies anywhere in mainland China, U.S. personnel can call the Alarm Center in Beijing at (86-10) 6462-9100 or Shanghai (86-21) 6295-0099. China’s equivalent to dialing 911 is 110 for police, 119 for fire, 120 for ambulance/rescue, and 122 to report a traffic accident.

**Key Medical Facilities**

**PLA General Hospital (aka PLA 301 Hospital)**

*Coordinates* 39-54-09N 116-16-10E  
*Location* 28 Fuxing Road, Fengtai District, Beijing  
*Telephone* (86) 10-68182255
**Type**  
Military; 1,500 beds

**Capabilities**  
Full range of medical and surgical specialties; cardiology, emergency medicine, orthopedic surgery, ear/nose/throat (ENT), computer tomography (CT) scanner, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), ultrasound, x-ray, blood bank, cardiac care unit (CCU), emergency room-24 hours, helipad, intensive care unit (ICU), laboratory, operating room, pharmacy.

**Comments**  
Probably the best People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general hospital. Provides outpatient and inpatient treatment to senior PLA and political leaders.

**Peking Union Medical College Hospital (Capital Hospital)**

**Coordinates**  
39-54-37N 116-24-34E

**Location**  
1 Shuaifu Yuan Street, Wangfujing District, Beijing

**Telephone**  
512-7733, 512-5625 emergency 512-7733

**Type**  
Civilian/public, 1,200 beds

**Capabilities**  
Full range of medical and surgical specialties; OB/GYN, CT scanner, hemodialysis unit, MRI, radioisotope facility, ultrasound, x-ray, ambulance, blood bank, CCU, emergency room-24 hour, ICU, lab, operating rooms, pharmacy, trauma unit.

**Comments**  
The hospital is technologically strong; its staff is competent and has a good background in English. It is one of the best hospitals practicing Western medicine in China and a top hospital in Beijing and nationwide. It has a separate clinic for foreigners.

**Sino-Japanese Friendship Hospital**

**Coordinates**  
39-58-21N 116-25-12E

**Location**  
Yinghua East Road, He Ping Li District, Beijing

**Telephone**  
422-1122
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Government; 1,300 beds</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Full range of medical and surgical specialties; dentistry, oncology, CT scanner, hemodialysis unit, MRI, ultrasound, x-ray, ambulance, blood bank, burn unit, emergency room-24 hours, helipad, ICU, lab, operating rooms, pharmacy, trauma unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>Well-equipped state-of-the-art teaching facility. The U.S. Embassy health unit routinely uses its x-ray services and recommends this facility for care in an emergency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hua Shan Hospital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinates</th>
<th>31-13-05N 121-26-15E</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>No. 12 Urumqi Zhong Road, Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>86 21 6248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Civilian; 1,000 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Full range of medical and surgical specialties; cardiology, dentistry, dermatology, endocrinology, gastroenterology, hematology, infectious diseases, nephrology, nephrology, neurology, nuclear medicine, occupational medicine, oncology, physical medicine and rehabilitation, radiology, anesthesia, neurosurgery, oral surgery, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, ENT, thoracic surgery, urology, CT scanner, EEG, MRI, ultrasound, endoscope, lithotripter, surgical laser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments</td>
<td>One of the largest and oldest Western hospital in southern China. A major medical teaching facility. Best hospital in the city. Recommended for use by Embassy personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Second Military Medical University Number 2

**Coordinates** 31-14-05N 121-27-46E  
**Location** 415 Fengyang Road, near intersection of Nanjing and Chengdu Roads, Shanghai  
**Type** Military; 980 beds  
**Capabilities** Full range of medical and surgical specialties; emergency medicine, gastroenterology, hematology, infectious diseases, nephrology, orthopedic surgery, urology, CT scanner, MRI, oxygen, x-ray, blood bank, emergency room-24 hours, helipad, lab, operating rooms pharmacy, trauma unit.  
**Comments** One of the largest and best known hospitals in China. Treats high-ranking cadres of the PLA.

### United Family Hospital

**Coordinates** 39-58-22N 116-28-46E  
**Location** 2 Jiang Tai Lu, Chaoyang District, Beijing  
**Telephone** 86 10 6433 3960  
**Type** Private; 50 beds  
**Capabilities** Full range of medical and surgical specialties; cardiology, dentistry, dermatology, emergency medicine-24 hours, pediatrics, physical medicine and rehabilitation, psychiatry, public health, radiology, anesthesia, OB/GYN, orthopedic surgery, ENT, pediatric surgery, urology, ECG, ultrasound, ambulance, blood bank-24 hours, ICU, laboratory, operating rooms, pharmacy, respiratory therapy.  
**Comments** The level of care is on par with Western standards. Open source indicates this hospital is the first and remains the only foreign-invested full service international-standard hospital operating in Beijing.
Dynastic Period

China is the world’s oldest continuous major civilization; records date back 3,500 years. Successive imperial dynasties developed a system of bureaucratic control that gave the agrarian-based Chinese an advantage over neighboring nomadic and hill tribe cultures. Chinese civilization was further strengthened by the development of a Confucian state ideology and a common written language that bridged distinct localities and dialects. Whenever China was conquered by nomadic tribes, as it was by the Mongols in the 13th century, the conqueror sooner or later adopted the ways of the “higher” Chinese civilization and staffed the bureaucracy with Chinese.

Following a series of dynasties, the last imperial dynasty, the Qing (Ch’ing), began in 1644, when the Manchus overthrew the Ming dynasty. The Manchus continued their conquest over the next half-century and gained control of peripheral regions such as Xinjiang, Yunnan, Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan. The success of the early Qing period was attributed to the Manchus’ military prowess in combination with Chinese bureaucratic skills.

The 19th century saw the Qing dynasty’s eventual decline. Internally, China was beset by large-scale rebellions, economic recession, and an explosive population growth. It was during this time China faced the Taiping rebellion (1851-64). The consequences of this rebellion were devastating. During the Taiping rebellion, which lasted 20 years, almost 30 million people died as a direct result from the conflict. Externally, the Qing faced encroaching Western powers. The Sino-British Opium Wars and subsequent military defeats against foreign powers showed the impotence of the Chinese military and exacerbated domestic dissatisfaction. Although the
Qing emperor and other leaders promoted adoption of Western technology to strengthen China, they were prevented by dominant conservative bureaucrats who feared an erosion of their political power from such reforms. In 1900, the Boxer Uprising occurred. This was a Chinese nationalist revolt against foreigners, who were considered representative of alien powers, and Chinese Christians. The Qing dynasty continued its decline until 1911 when it was finally overthrown.

While the Chinese entered into conflict with Europe and European culture during the Opium War and after, it was also disturbed by a number of rebellions in mid-century.

**Early 20th Century China**

In 1911, reformist bureaucrats, military officers, and students overthrew the Qing dynasty. However, the resultant Republic of China did not last. The first Chinese president, military leader Yuan Shikai, attempted to name himself emperor, but his death in 1916 left the republican government weak and dependent on other military leaders.

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, whose revolutionary ideas inspired the first revolution, established a base of support in southern China in the early 1920s and set out to unite the fragmented nation. With Soviet assistance, he organized the Kuomintang (KMT or the “Nationalist Party”) along Stalinist lines and allied himself with the fledgling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ostensibly, both parties were to work for China’s reunification. Sun’s death in 1925 led to the rise of military leader Chiang Kai-Shek in the KMT, who was successful in bringing most of south and central China under the KMT’s rule. In 1927, Chiang betrayed the CCP and assassinated many of its leaders. Continued KMT persecution forced the
CCP to flee in what became known as the “Long March” to northwest China’s Yan’an city in Shaanxi province; the CCP established a guerrilla base in Yan’an. It was during this Long March that many of communist China’s first generation of leaders would emerge — notably Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung).

Although the KMT and the CCP agreed to unite in 1937 to oppose the Japanese invaders, their struggle continued throughout the 14-year long Japanese invasion (1931-45). The end of WWII marked the resumption of civil war. Although the United States supported the KMT with military aid and airlifted KMT troops to occupy strategic cities, incompetence and corruption in the KMT prevented it from effectively controlling China. By 1949, the CCP had occupied most of China and forced the KMT to flee to Taiwan.

**The People’s Republic of China**

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China. With significant aid from the Soviet Union, China undertook a massive economic and social reconstruction. Simultaneously, the CCP’s authority intruded into almost every facet of Chinese life. The CCP maintained control through its large and loyal military force and a responsive government apparatus.
The “Great Leap Forward”

In 1958, Mao broke from the Soviet model and announced a new economic program called the Great Leap Forward. This program aimed to rapidly raise industrial and agricultural production by taking advantage of China’s massive human capital. Large communes were formed, and each family was to contribute to production by having small, “backyard steel furnaces” and working on the communal farm.

The results were disastrous. Agricultural output declined drastically as farmers gave up farming time for industrial production. The furnaces turned useful metal tools into scrap. Within a year, starvation became more prevalent in even fertile agricultural areas. From 1960 to 1961, the combination of poor planning during the Great Leap Forward and bad weather resulted in a famine that killed nearly 30 million.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

In the early 1960s, State President Liu Shaoqi and his protégé, Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, adopted pragmatic economic policies to resuscitate China’s economy from the disastrous Great Leap Forward. These policies relied on market mechanisms and the use of professionals and were contrary to Mao’s revolutionary vision of absolute socialism and egalitarianism. Although the policies improved economic growth and raised standards of living, Mao became increasingly dissatisfied with China’s new direction. In 1966, as the CCP Chairman, Mao launched a massive political attack on Liu, Deng, and other pragmatists. Beginning with government-sponsored student protests, this movement, known as the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” was novel in that a faction of the Chinese communist leadership sought to rally popular opposition in an ideological attack against other communist leaders.
In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and his “closest comrade in arms,” National Defense Minister Lin Biao, charged Liu, Deng, and other top party leaders with dragging China back toward capitalism. Radical youth organizations, called Red Guards, attacked party and state organizations at all levels, seeking out leaders who would not bend to the radical wind. In reaction to this turmoil, some local People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders and other officials maneuvered to outwardly back Mao and the radicals while actually taking steps to rein in local radical activity. China became even more isolated internationally as diplomats were recalled to undergo “political re-education,” and those that remained incited communist revolutions in foreign countries.

Gradually, Red Guard and other radical activity subsided, and the Chinese political situation stabilized along complex factional lines. The leadership conflict came to a head in September 1971, when Party Vice Chairman and Defense Minister Lin Biao reportedly tried to stage a coup against Mao; Lin Biao allegedly later died in a plane crash in Mongolia.

In the aftermath of the Lin Biao incident, many officials criticized and dismissed from 1966-69 were reinstated. Chief among these was Deng Xiaoping, who reemerged in 1973 and was confirmed
in 1975 in the concurrent posts of Politburo Standing Committee member, PLA Chief of Staff, and Vice Premier.

The ideological struggle between more pragmatic, veteran party officials and the radicals re-emerged with a vengeance in late 1975. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and three close Cultural Revolution associates (later dubbed the “Gang of Four”) launched a media campaign against Deng. In January 1976, Premier Zhou Enlai, popular political figure, died of cancer. On 5 April, Beijing citizens staged a spontaneous demonstration in Tiananmen Square in Zhou’s memory, with strong political overtones of support for Deng. The authorities forcibly suppressed the demonstration. Deng was blamed for the disorder and stripped of all official positions, although the retained his party membership.

**The Post-Mao Era**

Mao’s death in 1976; his demise started a scramble for succession. Per Mao’s will, former Minister of Public Security Hua Guofeng was quickly confirmed as Party Chairman and Premier. A month after Mao’s death, Hua, backed by the PLA, arrested and incarcerated Jiang Qing and other leaders for plotting a coup against the government. After extensive deliberations, the CCP leadership reinstated Deng Xiaoping to all of his previous posts at the 11th Party Congress in August 1977. Deng then led the effort to place government control in the hands of veteran party officials who opposed the radical excesses of the previous two decades.

The new, pragmatic leadership under Deng Xiaoping emphasized economic development and avoided mass political movement. At the pivotal December 1978 Third Plenum (of the 11th Party Congress Central Committee), the leadership adopted economic reform policies aimed at expanding rural income and incentives, encouraged experiments in enterprise autonomy, reduced central
planning, and promoted direct foreign investment in China. The plenum also accelerated the pace of legal reform, culminating in the passage of several new legal codes by the National People’s Congress in June 1979.

After 1979, the Chinese leadership adopted more pragmatic approaches in almost all fields. Artists, writers, and journalists were encouraged to criticize society’s ills, although open attacks on party authority were not permitted. In late 1980, Mao’s Cultural Revolution was officially proclaimed a catastrophe. Hua Guofeng, who favored Mao’s economic policies, was replaced as Premier in 1980 by reformist Sichuan party chief Zhao Ziyang. Hua’s position as the CCP’s General Secretary was given to an even more reformist Communist Youth League chairman Hu Yaobang in 1981.

Reform policies greatly improved living standards, especially for urban workers and farmers who took advantage of opportunities to sell goods in the open market. Literature and the arts blossomed, and Chinese intellectuals established extensive links with scholars in other countries. Reforms also brought out socioeconomic problems such as inflation, massive urban migration, and prostitution. Political dissent also increased as people took advantage of the loosening political atmosphere to stage protests against the slow pace of reform.

In 1986, student protests were large enough to confirm the party elders’ fear that reform was leading to social instability and that, if not stopped, would return China to the chaotic days of the Cultural Revolution. The party elders suppressed the demonstrators and removed party leaders such as Hu Yaobang who advocated radical reform. Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang became the new premier and general secretary, respectively.
Student Movement, Tiananmen Square

Deng’s second protégé, Zhao Ziyang was a reformer. However, the policies of rapid economic and political reform he had championed were attacked by conservatives. His proposal in May 1988 to accelerate price reform led to widespread popular complaints about rampant inflation and gave opponents of rapid reform the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influence. This precipitated a political debate that escalated through the winter of 1988-89.

The death of the popular reformer, Hu Yaobang, on 15 April 1989, coupled with growing economic hardship caused by high inflation and rampant corruption, provided the basis for large-scale protests by students, intellectuals, and dissatisfied urbanites.
University students and other Beijing citizens camped at Tiananmen Square to mourn Hu’s death and to protest those who slowed reform. Their protests called for an end to official corruption and for defense of freedoms guaranteed by the Chinese Constitution. The demonstration grew despite government efforts to contain it. At the height of the protest movement, students staged hunger strikes and refused to be dissuaded by top government officials. Protests also spread through many other cities, including Shanghai and Guangzhou.

Fearing social instability, Beijing declared martial law on 20 May 1989, and the demonstrations were declared “counter revolutionary.” On the evening of 3 June and early morning of 4 June, military units were brought into Beijing, and armed force was authorized to clear the demonstrators from the streets. There were no official estimates of casualties, but most observers believe that they numbered more than 200. Despite international outrage, the central government proceeded to eliminate the remaining sources of organized opposition.

Following the conservative resurgence in the protest’s aftermath, economic reform slowed until given new impetus by Deng Xiaoping’s dramatic visit to the special economic zones in southern China in early 1992. Deng’s renewed propulsion for a mar-
ket-oriented economy received official sanction at the 14th Party Congress later in the year as a number of younger, reform-minded leaders began their rise to top positions. Deng and his supporters argued that managing the economy in a way that increased living standards should be China’s primary policy objective, even if capitalist measures were adopted. Subsequent to the visit, the Communist Party Politburo publicly issued an endorsement of Deng’s policies of economic openness. Though not completely eschewing political reform, China has consistently placed overwhelming priority on the reform and opening of its economy.

**Third Generation Leaders**

Deng’s health deteriorated in the years prior to his death in 1997. During that time, President Jiang Zemin and other members of his generation such as Li Peng and Zhu Rongji gradually assumed control of the day-to-day functions of government. This “third generation” leadership governed collectively with President Jiang at the center. In March 1998, Jiang was re-elected president during the 9th National People’s Congress. Premier Li Peng became the chairman of the National People’s Congress. Former Vice Premier Zhu Rongji was selected to replace Li as premier. Under Jiang, the leadership was less of a dictatorship and more of an oligarchy ran by a few elites. Decisions were the outcome of debate and compromise between Jiang and other senior leaders, most importantly the former premier, Li Peng.

The third generation of China’s leaders was firmly committed to economic reform and opening to the outside world. It has identified reform of state industries as a government priority, and seems intent on privatization of unprofitable state-owned enterprises. The leadership has also reduced government bureaucracy, the
number in its active military force, and the commercial enterprises that the government owns.

**Fourth Generation Leaders**

President Jiang retired as CCP general secretary at the party’s 16th National Congress in November 2002 and as state president at the annual meeting of the full NPC in March 2003. He was replaced in both positions by Hu Jintao. At the same time Li Peng and Zhu Rongji also retired, and were succeeded as head of the NPC and premier by Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao.

Hu Jintao made rapid progress in consolidating his position as China’s “core” leader. In the early months of 2003, China faced the highly contagious disease, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The government initially attempted to cover up the disease, but was undermined when news of the disease spread. The government came clean and SARS quickly became the government’s top priority. On 24 June, the World Health Organization declared China SARS-free and only a handful of cases have been reported since. China’s success in October 2003 in becoming only the third country in the world to undertake a manned space mission boosted the regime’s popularity.
Hu Jintao has worked to modernize the military. Hu had little military experience before taking the CMC chair in September of 2003, but wasted no time imposing his stamp on the PLA as well as the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP). Hu is directly responsible for security, military and foreign affairs. The energetic leader has taken more of a hands-on-approach to defense matters than his predecessor. Hu masterminded a series of changes in military establishment and earmarked more funds for the procurement of weapons. Hu has moved the PLA from a defense force whose primary purpose was to prevent other countries from occupying China, to a military that is becoming a regional power.

**Taiwan**

In 1949 nationalist Kumintag (KMT) regime was driven out of China and into Taiwan by the communist forces. In recent years relations between Taiwan and China have been tense. China maintains a “one China” policy viewing Taiwan not as a sovereign nation, but as an integral part of China. Taiwan, which has its own flag and local government, has gradually moved toward formal independence. China has taken various attempts to keep Taiwan in line such as increasing the number of short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and increasing interdependence. The KMT regime ran the Republic of China until 2000 when Chen Shui-bian, a member of the opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was elected president. President Chen Shui-bian has pushed for Constitution changes. President Chen Shui-bian has stated that the new constitution will not include contents concerning sovereignty, territory, and unification/independence. In this process of preparing the new constitution, people of every sector of society, including
opposition parties, academic society, and legal community, are to be involved. China remains wary of any use of political referendums though Taiwan’s government has not indicated that it will pursue a referendum on independence.
**Chronology of Key Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st-16th</td>
<td>China’s first dynasty, the Xia, established</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th – 2nd Century B.C.</td>
<td>China’s first historic dynasty, the Shang, forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D. 1911</td>
<td>Dynastic period ends with the Qing Dynasty</td>
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<tr>
<td>1839-42</td>
<td>Opium War</td>
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<tr>
<td>1851-64</td>
<td>Taiping Rebellion</td>
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<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Boxer Uprising</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911-15</td>
<td>Provisional Republican Government of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 May 1919</td>
<td>May Fourth Movement—intellectuals against the traditional Confucian philosophy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915-28</td>
<td>Warlord era and the rise of the Kuomintang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Japan invades China, sets up a puppet state in Manchuria, and continues the invasion</td>
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<td>1934-35</td>
<td>Long March of the CCP</td>
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<td>1945-49</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Founding of the People’s Republic of China; Nationalists flee to the island of Taiwan and contend it is the sole representative of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950-53</td>
<td>Korean War; PRC sends “volunteer” armies to counter UN/U.S. offensive</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Great Leap Forward</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Sino-Indian border clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>China detonates its own atomic bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Cultural Revolution begins and ends in 1976 with the death of Mao Zedong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Sino-Soviet border clashes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1976 Chairman Mao Zedong dies
1979 U.S. recognizes the PRC; only unofficial relations with Taiwan, and passes the Taiwan Relations Act
1979 Sino-Vietnamese border clashes
1979-89 Acute cycles of economic overheating and stagnation; rising economic inequalities
June 1989 Student protests and Tiananmen Square Massacre
1992 Deng Xiaoping revives economic reform with a trip to southern China, promoting rapid economic growth
1 July 1997 Hong Kong reverts to China
20 Dec 1999 Macau reverts to China
June 2001 China, Russia and four Central Asian states launch the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Nov 2001 China joins the World Trade Organization
Nov 2002 Vice-President Hu Jintao is named head of ruling Communist Party
March 2003 Hu Jintao is elected president
March – April 2003 China and Hong Kong are hit by the pneumonia-like SARS virus
June 2003 Hong Kong is declared free of SARS. The World Health Organization lifts its SARS related travel warning for Beijing
Oct 2003 China’s first manned spacecraft is sent into space
Aug 2005 China and Russia conduct first joint military exercise
Oct 2005 China conducts its second manned space flight
China’s national government is communist, and does not tolerate opposition to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) monopoly on political power. Although the PRC’s constitution allows for multiple political parties, they are organized under an umbrella ruled by the CCP. This concept of channeling dissenting opinions through internal organs of the CCP is called “democratic socialism” and strengthens the CCP’s political power. The CCP has more
than 70 million members. There are eight minor political parties in China, but their role in the government is minimal.

The CCP is authoritarian in structure and ideology. Nevertheless, China’s population, geographical vastness, and social diversity present significant obstacles. With the onset of economic reform and openness in the 1980s, central government leaders must increasingly build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the population at large.

The influence of people and organizations outside the formal party structure has increased, particularly in the economic realm. This is readily apparent in the rapidly developing coastal region. Nevertheless, the CCP sees to it that non-party members do not create autonomous organizations that could challenge party rule. Party control is the tightest in central government offices and in urban economic, industrial, and cultural settings; it is considerably less controlling in the rural areas.

The government’s primary organs are the National People’s Congress (NPC), the president, and the state council. The president and vice president are elected by the NPC. The term of office for the president and vice president is 5 years. No more than two consecutive 5-year terms can be served. The president, in accordance with decisions taken by the NPC, appoints and removes the premier, the vice premiers, state counselors, ministers, and other high ranking officials.

The NPC is the highest organ of state power. It meets annually for approximately 2 weeks to review and approve major new policy, directives, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. These initiatives are presented to the NPC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the CCP Central
Committee. Although the NPC generally approves State Council policy and personnel recommendations, various NPC committees hold active debates in closed sessions, during which changes may be made to accommodate alternate views. When the NPC is not in session, its permanent organ, the Standing Committee, exercises state power.

After the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders tried to develop a legal system to restrain abuses of official authority and revolutionary excesses. Since 1979, when the drive to establish a functioning legal system began, more than 300 laws and regulations have been promulgated, most in the economic arena. In 1982, the NPC adopted a state constitution that emphasized the rule of law under which even party leaders are theoretically held accountable.
Legal reform continued in the 1990s, with legislation designed to modernize and professionalize the nation’s lawyers, judges, and prisons. The 1994 Administrative Procedure Law allows citizens to sue officials for abuse of authority. In addition, criminal laws were amended to introduce significant reforms, to include abolishing the crime of “counterrevolutionary” activity.

The Chinese constitution and laws also provide for fundamental human rights, including due process, but these are often ignored or not enforced. There is a shortage of lawyers in the PRC.
Local Level

China has 31 governments at the provincial level, 22 of which are provinces; 4 are city governments (Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Shanghai); and 5 are autonomous regions. The autonomous regions consist mostly of ethnic minorities.

Provincial governments implement local laws, regulations, and decisions of the provincial people’s congress. Provincial governments have the power to exercise unified leadership over
the work of governments in cities, counties, townships, and towns under their jurisdiction.

**Politics**

**Foreign Relations**

Since its establishment, the PRC has worked vigorously to win international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. By the early 1970s, the PRC was recognized diplomatically by most world powers. Beijing assumed the China seat in the UN in 1971 and became increasingly active in multilateral organizations. Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, and the United States in 1979. Today, 167 countries have established diplomatic relations with Beijing; 23 have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

**Asia**

In recent years, China has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Closer to home, China has made efforts to reduce tensions in Asia. China has contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula by hosting and participating in the Six-Party Talks, and has cultivated a more cooperative relationship with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, which includes Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam). China’s move to play a greater leadership role in Asia and the success of its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia are examples of a new, more mature diplomacy that China has adopted. China is also working hard to strengthen ties with countries in South Asia, including India. China has likewise improved ties with Russia. Presidents Putin and Jiang signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. China also joined with the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to establish
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. The SCO is designed to promote regional stability and cooperate to combat terrorism in the region.

China still has numerous border and maritime disputes, including with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, with a number of countries in the South China Sea, and with Japan and India. Beijing has resolved many of these disputes, most notably the 1997 agreement with Russia that resolved almost all outstanding border issues with Russia, and a 2000 agreement with Vietnam to resolve some differences over their maritime border. However, disagreements remain over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea that comprise 130 small coral islands that are occupied by China. In 1997, China announced plans to open the Paracel Islands for tourism.

**North Korea**

North Korea is one of China’s traditional allies—PLA soldiers fought alongside North Korean forces in the Korean war of the early 1950s. However, China has become increasingly impatient with its neighbor’s provocative behavior and condemned North Korea’s nuclear bomb test in October 2006 as a flagrant violation of the wishes of the international community. Since 2003 China has supported efforts to reduce nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula through the six-party talks. The six-party talks include China, Russia, the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and North Korea. China’s participation is seen as one aspect of its efforts to adopt a more prominent role in regional diplomacy, but it also reflects improving ties with South Korea and the United States.

**Japan**

China’s relationship with Japan is fragile. The tension between China and Japan is based on the atrocities committed by the
Japanese army during its invasion of China in the 1930s. Beijing claims that Japan has never made proper amends for these acts. The relationship was further strained due to repeated visits by Japan’s former Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, to the Yasakuni Shrine. The shrine honors Japan’s war dead, including 14 people judged as war criminals. In 2005, anti-Japanese riots broke out after Japanese officials approved a school textbook said to play down wartime atrocities. Chinese leaders refused to meet Japanese leaders in 2005.

There is also a growing military and economic rivalry between China and Japan. Japan is concerned with China’s military build up and natural resource competition. Tokyo and Beijing have been quarreling over undersea gas deposits and ownership of some islets in East Asia. China is also concerned by a tightening U.S. – Japan security alliance and U.S. encouragement of a greater regional and global role for Japan.

**United States**

In 1979, the United States recognized the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China. In April 1979, President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act, which provided a domestic legal framework for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan. Since then, the United States has maintained unofficial relations with Taiwan.

Following its withdrawal of Taiwan recognition, the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Despite this, the United States continued to provide for Taiwan’s defense by selling U.S. military equipment to Taiwan. The United States remains committed to preserving Taiwan’s security.
The United States also has good political and economic relationships with Taiwan. It supports Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood. The United States has encouraged Taiwan’s expanding trends toward democracy.

Relations between the United States and China are relatively positive, but have been strained by several events. In May 1999, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade sparked protests in various cities and at U.S. Embassies. In April 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft flying over international waters south of China. The damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. After extensive negotiations, the crew of the EP-3 was allowed to leave China 11 days later, but the U.S. aircraft was not permitted to depart for another 3 months.

The United States has direct investment in China in a wide range of manufacturing sectors, and U.S. companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and foreign-owned enterprises in China. Cumulative U.S. investment in China is valued at US$48 billion. Total two-way trade between China and the U.S. grew from US$33 billion in 1992 to more than US$230 billion in 2006. The United States is China’s second largest trade partner. U.S. exports to China have been increasing rapidly and imports from China totalled US$287 billion in 2006.

The United States encourages China to be a responsible partner in the global system but has concerns about China’s human rights abuses. Reported abuses include arbitrary and lengthy incommunicado detention, forced confessions, torture, and prisoner mistreatment, as well as severe restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, privacy, and worker rights.
China offered strong public support for the war on terrorism and has been a partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan, and contributed US$150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction. China also pledged US$25 million to Iraq reconstruction. Shortly after the terrorist attacks, the United States and China began a counterterrorism dialogue, and the fourth round of that dialogue was held in Washington in June 2004.

**Outlook**

China will likely continue to focus on diplomatic, economic, cultural and military linkages regionally and globally. U.S.-China relations will likely fluctuate between periods of tension and cooperation. Concerns over Taiwan independence, trade, human rights, and a lack of transparency in China’s military modernization program will complicate the relationship. However, Chinese cooperation on the North Korea nuclear issue and the global war on terrorism will bolster relations. China’s future relationship with Japan hinges on the direction of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the potential for Japanese military changes, and lingering resentment over Japan’s actions during World War II. China will likely continue to portray Japan as a regional pariah to reduce Japanese influence in the region. Robust trade and increased diplomatic exchanges will enable China’s relations with South Korea to prosper. Through trade and regional institutions, China will continue to expand its presence in Southeast Asia. While China is not seeking to directly confront the United States in Southeast Asia, its interests may run counter to U.S. priorities in the region. As China seeks to meet its resource needs and diplomatically isolate Taiwan, it is expected that it will become more active in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.
ECONOMY

Economic Statistics

GDP US$7.043 trillion (2007 est.)
  Growth Rate 11.4%
  Per Capita US$5,300 (PPP)
Inflation Rate 4.7%
Debt US$363 billion (external)
Unemployment
  Urban Areas 6.1%
  Rural Areas 20%
Imports US$917.4 billion
Exports US$1.221 trillion
Labor Force 803.3 million

Resources

Industry

Industry and construction account for about 49 percent of China’s GDP. Major industries are mining and ore processing; iron; steel; aluminum; coal, machinery; textiles and apparel; armaments; petroleum; cement; chemicals; fertilizers; consumer products including footwear, toys, and electronics; automobiles and other transportation equipment, including rail cars and locomotives, ships, and aircraft; and telecommunications.

China has become a preferred destination for relocating global manufacturing facilities. Its strength as an export platform has contributed to incomes and employment in China. The state-owned sector still accounts for about 40 percent of GDP. In recent years, authorities have been giving greater attention to the management
of state assets — both in the financial market as well as among state-owned-enterprises.

**Agriculture**

China is one of the largest producers and consumers of agricultural products. Roughly half of China’s labor force is engaged in agriculture, even though only 10 percent of the land is suitable for cultivation. Its cropland area is only 75 percent of that in the United States, but China still produces about 30 percent more crops and livestock than the United States. Intensive cultivation has made China among the world’s largest producers of rice, potatoes, sorghum, millet, barley, peanuts, tea, and pork. Major non-food crops include cotton, other fibers, and oilseeds. China hopes to further increase agricultural production through improved plant stocks, fertilizers, and technology.

**Energy**

In 2003, China surpassed Japan to become the second-largest consumer of primary energy, after the United States. China is also the third-largest energy producer in the world, after the United States and Russia. China’s electricity consumption is expected to grow by more than 4 percent each year through 2030, which will require more than US$2 trillion in electricity infrastructure investment to meet the demand. China expects to add approximately 15,000 megawatts of generating capacity a year, with 20 percent of that coming from foreign suppliers.

China has become a significant oil consumer. In 2007, China consumed 6.9 million barrels of oil per day and produced 3.7 million barrels of oil per day. With China’s expectation of growing future dependence on oil imports, the country has been acquiring interests in exploration and production abroad. China’s oil companies have
acquired oil concessions in Azerbaijan, Canada, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan, Indonesia, Iran and Iraq.

Coal makes up the bulk of China’s energy consumption. As China’s economy continues to grow, China’s coal demand is projected to rise significantly. Beijing would like to shift China’s current energy mix toward greater reliance on oil, natural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power. Beijing also plans to increase China’s natural gas production, which currently accounts for only 3 percent of China’s total energy consumption. China’s natural gas consumption is expected to more than double by 2010.

Due in large part to environmental concerns, Beijing would like to shift China’s current energy mix toward greater reliance on oil, natural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power. China has abundant hydroelectric resources; for example, the Three Gorges Dam, will have a total capacity of 18 gigawatts when fully online (projected 2009). In addition, the share of electricity generated by nuclear power is projected to increase from 1 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2030.

Science and Technology

Science and technology have always been a priority for the PRC. The expansion of China’s technology capability has been attributed to technology transfers from neighboring economies. Many of China’s manufacturers are aware of the importance of technology in production. Some manufacturing companies are oriented toward high-tech and knowledge-based industries. However, due to China’s large labor force, most of these jobs will not use these technology resources and will continue to concentrate on labor-intensive industries. Chinese science strategists see China’s greatest opportunities in newly emerging fields such as biotechnology and
computers, where there is still a chance for China to become a significant player. China has a small but growing space program that has become a focus of national pride. The program put an astronaut into orbit in 2003 and 2005, and has plans for a trip to the moon by 2020.

**Foreign Investment**

China’s investment climate has changed significantly in 24 years of reform. In the early 1980s, China restricted foreign investments to export-oriented operations and required foreign investors to form joint-venture partnerships with Chinese firms. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) grew quickly during the 1980s, but stalled in late 1989 in the aftermath of Tiananmen. In response, the government
Three Gorges Dam

introduced legislation and regulations designed to encourage foreigners to invest in high-priority sectors and regions.

Since the early 1990s, China has allowed foreign investors to manufacture and sell a wide range of goods on the domestic market, and authorized foreign-owned enterprises, now the preferred form of FDI. However, the government’s emphasis on guiding FDI into manufacturing has led to market saturation in some industries, while leaving China’s service sectors underdeveloped. China is now one of the world’s leading recipients of FDI, receiving US$64 billion in 2004, for a cumulative total of US$563.8 billion.

As part of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China undertook to eliminate certain trade-related investment measures and open up specified sectors that had been closed to foreign investment. New laws, regulations, and administrative measures to implement these commitments are being issued. Remaining barriers to foreign investment include opaque and inconsistently enforced laws and regulations, and the lack of a rules-based legal infrastructure.

While many countries are turning to China for investment, many local companies in China are investing abroad. These sectors range from automotive to computers. For example, the Chinese computer manufacturer, Lenovo, purchased the U.S.-based IBM personal computer business in May of 2005. The most notable investment is in the energy sector. Chinese firms have sought stakes in an array of foreign oil companies. The largest deal to date is China National Petroleum Corporation’s takeover of Canadian-owned PetroKazakhstan in 2005. Despite an increased backlash against foreign mergers and acquisitions, annual inflows of foreign direct investment in 2006 rose to $63 billion. By the end of 2006, more than 5,000 domestic Chinese enterprises had established direct investments in 172 countries and regions around the world.

**THREAT**

**Crime**

Although China is generally a safe country, there has been an increase in petty and violent crimes in recent years. Pocket picking occurs mostly in tourist areas, markets, airports and stores where foreigners visit and shop. Violent crimes against foreigners, including sexual assaults and robberies at gun point, have been reported in urban areas where bars and nightclubs are located. Robberies have occurred in western China and more recently in Beijing, as well as along remote mountain highways near China’s border with Nepal. Throughout China, women outside hotels in tourist districts are used to lure tourists into hotels under the
pretense of companionship or sex while their accomplices are lying in wait to rob them.

There have been reported instances of mobs attacking foreigners in the bar districts of Beijing. Also, there have been reports of disputes between Chinese citizens and foreigners that have escalated into violence against foreigners. U.S. citizens should use common sense and avoid bar districts late at night.

China has a large volume of counterfeit currency and travelers are sometimes asked by locals to exchange money at a good rate, often leaving the traveler with counterfeit currency. It is illegal in China to exchange dollars for RMB, except through official channels such as banks, hotels and exchange offices. Foreigners who exchange currency through unofficial means may be charged with breaking foreign exchange laws. Reports of taxi drivers using counterfeit notes to make change for a fare have become common. U.S. personnel should only carry enough cash sufficient for their daily needs and keep their valuables in secured locations. Proof of U.S. Citizenship should be readily available if questioned by Chinese officials. Passports are a target of theft and used for illegal purposes and U.S. personnel should carry photocopies, not only of their passports but also of their airline tickets and driver’s license. The originals should be secured separately.

**Travel Security**

U.S. personnel should always be vigilant when traveling and be aware of their environment. U.S. personnel are potential targets for terrorist attacks overseas and transportation systems. Places where Westerners congregate are the most likely places for a terrorist attack. Unusual or suspicious activity should be reported to the local police and U.S. Embassy.
Although terrorism in China is rare, there have been a few bombings in China, mostly the result of commercial disputes. According to China government figures, there were 74,000 incidents of social unrest in 2006. Most of the incidents are small-scale disputes with the government over land seizures, social issues, or environmental problems but have occasionally been larger and have become violent. These disputes do not typically involve foreigners.

U.S. personnel should be aware that foreign visitors will likely be monitored or placed under surveillance while in country. Personal possessions in hotel rooms may be searched and hotel phones and fax machines may be monitored.

Taking photographs or recording images of military or security interests may result in detention. Traveling near military installations and near certain borders is restricted and should be avoided.

There are restrictions on certain religious activities including handing out non-authorized Christian material and preaching or speaking about religion. U.S. persons have been detained or expelled for being involved in this type of evangelism. If convicted for this offense, penalties may range from 3-5 years in prison.

In the major cities, most tourist facilities are modern and well equipped. However, in the smaller provincial cities and rural areas, the facilities are frequently below international standards. Outside the major cities, road quality and driving standards are generally poor, leading to serious accidents. Public transportation systems do not meet the same standards as those found in the United States. Overcrowded ferries have sunk and piracy has been reported in the South China Sea. Smuggling and petty theft has occurred on the Trans-Siberian express trains.
The border areas of Siberia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Laos, and Burma are poorly policed and there is a risk of attack from armed bandits in these and other remote areas of China. If traveling to Tibet, U.S. personnel should be aware of the political sensitivities concerning Tibetan independence and should not become involved in any demonstrations or photograph/videotape such demonstrations calling for Tibetan independence.

**Terrorism**

An accurate picture of the terrorist threat in China is difficult to assess due to the lack of available information and the fact that most of the information the United States does receive comes from the China’s government, which has been accused of exaggerating and redefining the threat. In December 2003, China issued its first “terrorist” wanted list, blaming several Uighur separatist groups for a string of bombings and assassinations throughout China, and called for assistance from the international community to eradicate the Uighur separatist groups.

The Uighur ethnic group, a Turkic Muslim minority numbering approximately 9 million, resides predominantly in western China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Their goal is to establish an “East Turkestan” state in Xinjiang, but they are viewed by China as a direct threat to its sovereignty and internal stability. In 1944, the Uighurs in Xinjiang declared independence and established the East Turkestan Republic during the Japanese occupation of China, only to have the Communist Chinese take control of the region years later. Beijing promised the Uighur population eventual autonomy. In 1955 the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was established. Shortly after, Beijing began a colonization program of immigrating Han Chinese into Xinjiang. The area was discovered to be rich in gas and oil deposits, and Beijing was unwilling to give
up control of the region. Through their immigration efforts and a crackdown on “antisocial elements,” the percentage of Uighurs’ in Xinjiang dropped from 75 percent in 1942 to roughly 48 percent in 2005. The China government has blamed several ethnic Uighur groups operating in central Asia and Xinjiang for various attacks. Some of the most notable groups are the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM); the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), also known by the Turkish acronym SHAT; the Uighur Youth Congress; and the East Turkestan Liberation Organization. There are credible reports that Uighurs fought alongside the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, but China claims that at least 1,000 Uighurs trained in Afghanistan with al Qa’ida.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) reportedly has ties to al Qa’ida, Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a known terrorist group fighting for an Islamic Turkish state in Uzbekistan. They reportedly received training and funds from al Qa’ida. In 2002, Chinese officials persuaded U.S. authorities to place the ETIM on the U.S. Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations based on the reported al Qa’ida connections. The ETIM has been implicated in several attacks within the Xinjiang region and elsewhere in China, but conclusive evidence as to their level of involvement has been difficult to obtain. The East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) has been blamed for small-scale attacks and assassinations of Chinese officials, both in China and central Asia. They reportedly have indirect ties to al Qa’ida but the nature and type of relationship is not fully known.

Although no Uighur separatist groups have targeted U.S. interests, there is concern over their possible links to al Qa’ida, and al Qa’ida-affiliated groups, who have the potential to influence the Uighur groups into conducting such attacks in the future. China’s govern-
ment closely monitors Uighur activity, which primarily focuses on issues concerning the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but the potential for attacks throughout China will continue.

**Intelligence Services**

**Ministry of State Security**

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) was created in June 1983 by the Central Committee to centralize foreign intelligence and counterintelligence functions. The MSS is headed by the Minister of State Security, who reports to the Central Committee. It conducts counterespionage operations in China, and human intelligence and limited signals intelligence operations inside and outside the PRC. The MSS centers its collection operations on regional adversaries with which China has shared borders, including Russia, India, Vietnam, and nations that are militarily, politically, or economically important to China.

**Other Intelligence Services**

- First Bureau: Domestic Bureau – recruits people with overseas connections to work for the Ministry of State Security.
- Second Bureau: Foreign Bureau – is responsible for operations abroad; outlines collection priorities, receives analysis, and reports to higher levels any intelligence collected by its operatives.
- Third Bureau: Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan Bureau – is responsible for operations in these areas; conducts agent operations and recruits people with connections in these areas.
- Fourth Bureau: Technology Bureau – studies and develops intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence techniques.
- Fifth Bureau: Local Intelligence Bureau – is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of local departments and
bureaus of the Ministry of State Security at the provincial and municipal levels.

- Sixth Bureau: Counter-intelligence Bureau – works against overseas Chinese pro-democracy organizations and organizations perceived as potentially destabilizing China’s government.

- Seventh Bureau: Circulation Bureau – checks, verifies, prepares, and writes intelligence reports and special classified reports based on first-hand intelligence obtained from open or secret sources.

- Eighth Bureau: China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) – collects open-source reporting.


- Tenth Bureau: Scientific and Technological Information Bureau – collects economic, scientific, and technological intelligence.


**Host Nation Intelligence Threat**

Precautions should be taken if traveling with classified or sensitive information. The U.S. embassy requires that U.S. citizens traveling with classified or sensitive materials contact the Regional Security Officer to make arrangements for the transport of these materials. All non-U.S.-government facilities should be considered technically monitored. The China government monitors telephone calls, e-mail, and internet usage. Hotel rooms are frequently searched. If you suspect you are being monitored or are approached by someone who asks you for classified or sensitive information,
give a detailed report to the Regional Security Officer or available embassy security personnel.

**Foreign Intelligence Threat**

China hosts some foreign embassies with hostile intentions toward the U.S. government. The most likely threat comes from the following embassies: Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Russia.

**ARMED FORCES**

The PLA formed as a communist guerrilla force in the 1930s that engaged the enemy primarily with hit-and-run tactics codified in Mao’s theories on guerrilla warfare. During World War II, as the PLA grew and received military aid and instructions from the Soviet Union, the force became more conventional and capable of engaging sizable enemy units. By 1949, the PLA was strong enough to win the civil war against the Chinese Nationalists and drove the Nationalists to Taiwan.

As the PLA grew, its doctrine changed from one based on guerrilla tactics to the People’s War doctrine, a concept espousing the use of large numbers of troops to overrun enemy positions. Evidence of this doctrinal change was the PLA’s performance in the Korean conflict. The PLA’s success in Korea in fighting combined UN forces, many of whom were U.S., gave the PLA confidence in the People’s War doctrine.

The PLA gained additional war fighting experience from smaller engagements. Its conflict with Taiwan over the “offshore islands” of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1958, border conflicts with India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1979, and incursion into Vietnam in 1979 account for the major lessons learned in regional wars. Additionally, China engaged in naval battles in
the 1970s and 1980s to contest sovereignty over Paracel and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

The 1980s marked a transformation of the PLA. As China opened itself to the outside world, senior PLA officers touring foreign military establishments realized the significant technological and doctrinal challenges for the PLA. Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-91 proved that high-technology weaponry can inflict devastating losses on a large, heavily equipped military, and thus the PLA began seeking the capability to use highly technical weaponry in local conflict.

China developed a high-technology warfare concept based on the belief that localized conflicts along China’s periphery constituted
the greatest possible threat. As the Soviet Union collapsed and other Asian countries’ economies and militaries grew, China’s leaders realized that local conflict would be relatively short, intense, and require the use of high-technology weaponry. China is still testing and refining this new doctrine.

**Organization**

**State and Party Central Military Commissions**

The state and party Central Military Commissions (CMCs) lead the armed forces. The CMC consists of the chairman, who is commander-in-chief of the armed forces; an executive vice chairman; two vice chairmen; and four other members.

The party CMC, elected by the party Central Committee, exercises de facto, authoritative policymaking and operational control over the military. The same people lead both the state and party CMC, but the membership of the party CMC below the top leadership may include regional commanders and service chiefs. Although parallel leadership blurred the distinction between the two groups, the party CMC retains its position in charge of military affairs.

Under the two CMCs are the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission (NDSTIC); neither has operational control over the PLA. The MND provides military modernization and administrative support for the PLA. It is responsible for planning, manpower, budget, foreign liaison, and training materials, but has no policymaking or implementation authority. The NDSTIC is responsible for military research and development, weapons procurement, and coordination of the defense and civilian economic sectors.
Operational Control of the PLA

Operational control of the PLA runs from the CMCs to the PLA’s four general departments: the General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and the General Equipment Department. Below the department level runs parallel chains of command for operational, political, and logistic matters, each with its own separate communications facilities. Military policy originates in the party Politburo or the party CMC, becomes an operational order at the General Staff Department level, is relayed through the military regions, and arrives at a main-force unit. Orders to regional forces also pass through the military district (provincial) level.

General Staff Department (GSD). The GSD carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and implements military modernization plans. Led by the chief of general staff, the department serves as the headquarters for the ground forces and contains directorates for the air, naval, and missile forces. The GSD includes functionally organized subdepartments for artillery, armored units, engineering, operations, training, intelligence, mobilization, surveying, communications, quartermaster services, and politics. Navy Headquarters controls the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters generally exercises control through the commanders of the military regions. Nuclear forces are directly subordinate to the GSD. The GSD exercises operational control of the main forces, and the military region commanders control the regional forces and, indirectly, the militia.

General Political Department (GPD). The GPD is responsible for ideological indoctrination, political loyalty, morale, personnel records, cultural activities, discipline, military justice, and provides the party structure for the PLA. The GPD director is the
head of a system of political commissars assigned to each echelon in the PLA. One of the primary tasks of the political commissar is supervising party organization through party committees at the battalion level and above or through party branches in companies. Most high-ranking officers are party members.

**General Equipment Department (GED).** Created on 5 April 1998, the GED is the product of a merger of the former Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), GSD Armament Department, and elements of the General Logistics Department (GLD). The GED is responsible for armament modernization.

**General Logistics Department (GLD).** The GLD, headed by a director, is responsible for production, supply, transportation, housing, pay, and medical services. Historically, much of this support came from the civilian populace, and before the GLD was established, political commissars organized such support. In 1985, the CMC reorganized the GLD, cut its staff by 50 percent, and turned some facilities over to the civilian sector.

**Rank Structure**

Since the PLA was formed in 1927, it has switched several times between using and not using rank and rank insignia. In keeping with communist egalitarianism, the PLA at times avoided the use of hierarchy or rank. Its present comprehensive rank and rank insignia system was established in 1988.

PLA officers are divided into 3 categories and 10 ranks. Currently, the highest officer rank is general.

Enlisted personnel are divided into three categories and seven ranks. In 1985, to strengthen the noncommissioned officer (NCO)
corps and retain technical specialists, the PLA redesignated 76 officer billets as volunteer or draftee NCO billets. Most of the billets went to volunteer NCOs. In 1988, the Central Military Commission (CMC) promoted volunteer NCOs to the ranks of senior and specialist warrant officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Rank</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Officers</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Major General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Field officers</td>
<td>Senior Colonel</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior officers</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
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**Army**

**Mission**

The PLA ground force is responsible for defending national sovereign territory and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The PLA is responsible for defending mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and China’s claims in the Spratlys.

**Organization**

The PLA ground force comprises the following:

- 7 military regions – Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, and Shenyang
- 28 military districts
- 4 garrisons – Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Tianjin
18 integrated group armies (GA) with the following assets:
- 18 motorized infantry divisions
- 7 mechanized infantry divisions
- 8 armor divisions
- 23 motorized infantry brigades
- 5 mechanized infantry brigades
- 10 armor brigades (2 amphibious mechanized infantry divisions, 1 amphibious armor division, 1 amphibious infantry brigade and 2 amphibious armor brigades)
- 3 artillery divisions and 14 artillery brigades
- 4 army aviation regiments

Note: 9 infantry divisions are designated as regional rapid-reaction (RR) forces.

Non-group Army assets include the following:
- 7 special reconnaissance daduis (SOF regiments)
- 1 airborne corps, with 3 airborne infantry divisions
- Independent forces
- 1 short-range ballistic missile brigade

Airborne strategic rapid reaction forces are manned by AF personnel. Reserve units are organized by province to form about 18 infantry divisions.

**Facilities**

China’s ground forces are divided into seven military regions, each comprising military districts (MD) organized as follows:
- Northeast – Shenyang military region
  - Changchun, Jinzhou, and Lianyang GA HQs
  - Heilungkiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and Waichangshan MDs
North – Beijing Military Region
- Shijiazhuang, Zhangjiakou, and Baoding GA HQs
- Beijing Garrison, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, and Shanxi MDs

East – Nanjing Military Region
- Xuzhou, Huzhou, and Xiamen GA HQs
- Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Anhui MDs

South – Guangzhou Military Region
- Huizhou and Liuxhou GA HQs
- Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan MDs

South-West – Chengdu Military Region
- Chongqing and Kunming GA HQs
- Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Xizang MDs

West – Lanzhou Military Region
- Baoji, Lintong GAs
- Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang MDs

Center – Jinan Military Region
- Kaifeng, Xinxiang, and Weifang GA HQs
- Shandong and Kaifeng MDs

**Paracel Islands.** In early 1994, China deployed additional aircraft to its newly constructed 2,600-meter (8,230-foot) airstrip on Woody Island. These aircraft join patrol boats, helicopters, and marines previously stationed there. From Woody Island, China can extend limited air coverage to the Spratly Islands to the south.
**Military Regions**

**Spratly Islands.** Improvements to islands claimed by China continued in 1995-96 with at least US$11.5 million worth of living quarters upgrades, coastal defense pillboxes, fresh water tanks, and electrical generators. China-occupied islands within the Spratly Islands group include: Elided Reef, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Pearson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. A man-made harbor and meteorological observation station has been constructed at Yongshu reef. Small boat shelters have also been constructed on Meiji reef.

**Hong Kong Garrison** is a combination of select ground, naval, and air force units. The total force comprises about 20,000 troops including mainland logistic and reserve forces. Of the total, only
about 10,000 are actually garrisoned within the borders of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The ground forces portion takes the form of a reinforced Brigade composed of three infantry regiments, an armor regiment, an artillery regiment, and an engineer regiment. The air and naval assets are based at the regimental level and are directly subordinate to the garrison command. One new rifle type used by the PLA Hong Kong garrison resembles a Bullpup design with the magazine to the rear of the trigger housing, similar to the French FA-MAS and British Enfield SA80.

The Macau Special Administrative Region, separate from Hong Kong SAR and located on the west side of the Pearl River delta, is also garrisoned with troops assigned to the Hong Kong Garrison Command. About a battalion of motorized infantry is stationed in the Macau SAR on any day. No PLA air or naval assets are stationed in Macau.

**Personnel**

The PLA has been downsizing and reorganizing its combat and support structures since 1996, when the total force had approximately 3 million members in uniform. On 1 September 2003, the government announced that it would further reduce the PLA by 200,000 troops in an effort to create a leaner, more balanced force. Current estimates of ground force strength vary from a high of 2.5 million to a low of 2 million.

The 1984 Military Service Law and the 1985 “Regulations for Conscript Work” stipulates that all citizens between the ages of 18 to 22, irrespective of gender, nationality, profession, and family can be drafted. Almost 10 million men reach conscription age each year but fewer than 10 percent serve in active duty forces; many receive deferments and some do not meet enlistment criteria.
Some women are inducted. The seven military regions and the People’s Armed Forces Department are responsible for meeting conscription quotas in their areas. Much of their quotas are met by volunteers; the balance of their quotas is filled through the draft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Lie Bing</th>
<th>Shang Deng Bing</th>
<th>Yi Ji Shi Guan</th>
<th>Er Ji Shi Guan</th>
<th>San Ji Shi Guan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Equivalent</td>
<td>Private First Class</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>NCO First Class</td>
<td>NCO Second Class</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Equivalent</td>
<td>NCO Fourth Class</td>
<td>NCO Fifth Class</td>
<td>NCO Sixth Class</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Xue Yuan</th>
<th>Shao Wei</th>
<th>Zhong Wei</th>
<th>Shang Wei</th>
<th>Shao Xiao</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Equivalent</td>
<td>Officer Cadet</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Zhong Xiao</th>
<th>Shang Xiao</th>
<th>Da Xiao</th>
<th>Shao Jiang</th>
<th>Zhong Jiang</th>
<th>Shang Jiang</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Equivalent</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Senior Colonel</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>General</td>
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</table>

Army Rank Insignia
The PLA has approximately 2.3 million active personnel, 750,000 of whom are conscripts. Officers are drawn from military academy graduates, civilian cadres, and technical personnel recruited by nonmilitary units in the PLA. NCOs, such as the chief warrant officer (CWO) or the master sergeant, may become officers by exemplary performance and by completing 2 years of service as CWO. The Army has roughly 900,000 reservists.

In October 1998, the PLA announced it would reduce the length of initial military service from 3 to 2 years in the Army and from 3 or 4 years to 2 years in the Navy and Air Force. By doing this, the PLA intends to attract more highly educated youths to volunteer for military service.

Some of the incentives offered to attract higher quality recruits include providing demobilized servicemen jobs at state-owned
industries and offering tuition-free education and training. Other enticements include incentive pay to college graduates, employees of the CCP, Taiwanese immigrants, and ethnic minorities. The PLA also seeks to improve housing and soldiers’ welfare benefits.

To increase the quality of its personnel, the PLA decentralized its command structure by creating NCO billets with duties previously performed by junior officers. The creation of chief warrant officers and technical warrant officers in 1988 was part of the PLA’s effort to encourage the retention of high quality draftees with a career track that may eventually allow them to become officers.

**Doctrine**

Prior to 1985, Chinese military strategy was based on an inevitable, protracted ground war with the Soviet Union. PLA strategists came to reject that strategy in favor of the belief that future wars would be short, intense, and geographically limited. This doctrinal shift arose for a number of reasons. Lessened tensions and détente between the United States and the USSR, the Reagan-era defense buildup, emergence of Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” and the Soviet military’s poor performance in Afghanistan reduced Chinese military concerns over a Soviet invasion. The Iran-Iraq conflict; conflict in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Kuwait; and operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM strengthened Chinese strategists’ realization of the need for high technological capabilities and a quick, mobile, and lethal force structure. In the second half of the 1980s, the PLA began to implement this new strategy by cutting one million personnel, reducing the number of military regions from 11 to 7, and restructuring the PLA’s 36 army corps into combined-arms group armies. Ground forces were de-emphasized, and force modernization efforts were directed at navy and air force programs. The PLA also instituted higher
education requirements for officers and new cadre and regulation and training reforms to create a professional officer corps with over 90 percent possessing college or technical education.

Since 1985, the PLA has been modernizing to form a highly mobile force capable of conducting all weather, day/night, joint operations. The resultant force composition likely will include a select high-technology force capable of limited force projection operations and a light infantry force operating under the doctrine of “People’s War Under Modern Conditions” for defense of the mainland.

The new doctrine, refined in early 2002-2003, reflects the PLA’s desire to address modern warfare in the context of a “Local War Under High Tech Conditions,” emphasizing precision strikes, non-linear, multidimensional battlefields, electronic and information warfare, air power, and air defense.

Tactics
The tactics, techniques, and procedures for most of the army will continue to operate under the People’s War doctrine until the PLA is capable of widespread force modernization. It will have a limited role in force projection operations. In local wars, it will be the defensive force. Its main mission will be to defend the borders and mainland against attack and ensure internal stability.

Logistics and C4ISR
Two of the main problems for the Chinese army in a local war are logistics and C4ISR. The PLA logistics system was designed to be redundant and to fight a war on interior lines. Each military region has its own system of depots and supply and is not designed to quickly support a force projection operation; distance and differences in local region organization hamper the effectiveness of relocating units from their home regions. The Chinese believe
they can support an operation for no longer than 30 days under the current system and have experimented with mobile logistics brigades to overcome this deficiency. The C4ISR in China is redundant and secure through a series of satellites and fiber optic cable, but does not extend into possible threat countries. This weakens the control normally exercised over subordinate units, forcing individual commanders below division level to exercise more initiative than they are accustomed to using.

**Individual and Collective Training**

In addition to active forces, the PLA trains and maintains more than 1.2 million reservists who have a military obligation until age 45. Most of the approximately 1 million reserves are assigned to the ground forces where they are organized by province. Because of the high conscription rates, emphasis is first placed on individual skills, then gradually work up to collective and unit missions. The PLA trains regularly in large-scale operations, usually during the fall, after a series of smaller spring and summer exercises. Emphasis in the past 5 years has been on combined and joint training, integrating ground, naval, and air forces in a large-scale exercise following individual service work-ups.

**Equipment**

**Ground Combat Vehicles**

**Tanks**

Type 98 (also Type 99 and ZTZ-99)
Type 85 IIM/Type 85 IIA (Type 96)
Type 80/Type 80 II (Type 88B)
Type 79
Type 69 I/Type 69 II (mod Type-59 type) MBT
Type 63 light amphibious (including Type 63A)
Type 62 light
Type 59/Type 59 II MBT

**Armored Vehicles** (many are in storage)

WZ 501/WZ 501A AIFV
Z 504 HJ-73B tank destroyer
WZ 551 Wheeled IFV
WZ 551 HJ-8 tank destroyer
YW 534 APC
YW 531 (YW 531C/YW 531D/YW 531E)
YW 531 HJ-8 tank destroyer
YW 309 ICV
YW 307 ICV
WZ-523 Wheeled APC
Type 77-2 amphibious (Russian BTR-50PK)
Type 85 (YW 531H)
Type 90 APC

**Artillery** (many reported to be non-operational)

155-mm WA 021 towed gun/howitzer
130-mm Type 59-1 towed
122-mm Type 60 towed (Russia D-74)
100-mm Type 73 towed anti-tank (Russia T-12)
100-mm Type 59 towed anti-tank/field gun (Russian BS-3)
100-mm Type 86 towed anti-tank
85-mm Type 56 towed
76-mm Type 54 towed anti-tank (Russian ZIS-3)
57-mm Type 55 towed anti-tank (Russian ZIS-2)
Howitzers

155-mm x 52-cal SP
152-mm Type 83 SP
152-mm Type 54 towed (Russia D-1)
152-mm Type 66 towed gun/howitzer (Russian D-20)
152-mm Type 83 towed/SP
122-mm D-30 towed
122-mm Type 85 SP (Type YW 531 chassis)
122-mm Type 83 towed
122-mm Type 54 towed (Russian M30)
122-mm Type 54-1 self-propelled (Type YW 531C chassis)

Air Defense Guns

100-mm Type 59 towed (copy of Russian KS-19M2)
85-mm Type 72 towed (copy of Russian KS12)
57-mm Type 80 self-propelled
57-mm Type 59 towed (copy of Russian S-60)
57-mm S-60 towed
37-mm M1986 twin self-propelled
37-mm Type 88 twin self-propelled
37-mm Type P793 twin towed
37-mm Type 74 twin towed
37-mm Type 65 twin towed
37-mm Type 55 twin towed
35-mm GDF-003 twin towed
35-mm Type 90 twin towed (GDF-003 produced in China)
25-mm PGZ 95 gun-missle self-propelled
25-mm Type 85 twin towed
14.5-mm Type 75 and 75-1 towed (Russian ZGU-1)
14.5-mm Type 80 towed (copy of Russian ZGU-1)
14.5-mm Type 58 twin towed (copy of Russian ZPU-2)
14.5-mm Type 56 quad towed (copy of Russian ZPU-4)
12.7-mm Type 54 and 54-1 (copy of Russian M38/46)
12.7-mm Type 77 heavy machinegun
12.7-mm Type W-85 heavy machinegun

Mortars

160-mm Type 56 towed (Russian M1943)
120-mm Type YW 381 self-propelled
120-mm Type 85 self-propelled
120-mm Type 55 towed/self-propelled (Russian M1943)
82-mm Type 53 towed/self-propelled (Russian 1937)
82-mm Type YW 304 self-propelled
82-mm Type 85 self-propelled

Multiple Rocket Launchers

315-mm Type PMH90-315-2 self-propelled
300-mm Type A100 self-propelled
130-mm Type 82
130-mm Type 70 self-propelled
130-mm Type 63
130-mm Type 63-I
122-mm Type 89 self-propelled
122-mm Type 85 self-propelled
122-mm Type 81 self-propelled (Russia BM-21)
107-mm Type 63-1 towed
107-mm Type 63 towed
107-mm Type 81 self-propelled
Recoilless Guns
82-mm Type 65 (Russian B-10)
75-mm Type 52/56 (US M20)

Antitank Missiles
HJ-73 (Hong Jian 73) Red Arrow 73 (Russian AT-3 Sagger)
HJ-8 (Hong Jian 8) Red Arrow 8

Surface-to-Air Missiles
Hong Nu 5A/C (HN 5A/C) (Russian SA-7 variant)
HF-61A (Hong Qian 61) twin self-propelled
HQ-7 (also known as the FM-80/90) self-propelled quad-launcher
(Crotale derivative)

Army Aviation
Helicopters
Mi-8/17 Hip C/H/L (Russian)
Z-9 Harbin (SA365N Dauphin 2)
SA342 Gazelle (w/HOT ATGW) (French)
S-70C (US UH-60A Black Hawk) (may be non-operational)
AS 332L (Super Puma)
Z-11
Z-8

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
ASN-104/ASN-105
ASN-206
NPU D-4
Chang Hong 1
PLA Air Force (PLAAF)

Mission
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) mission is to provide air defense, medium-range nuclear weapon delivery, attack, close air support, anti-aircraft missile and gun defense for China as well as air support for the PLA group armies. The Navy maintains a separate air force.

Organization
The PLAAF is organized into three administrative levels: headquarters air force (HqAF); military region air forces (MRAFs); and command posts/bases. Depending on the type of unit, operational units are organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, groups, squadrons, battalions, companies, platoons, squads, and flights. Operational units can be directly subordinate to HqAF, the MRAF headquarters, a command post, or a base.

The MRAFs are divided into 7 military air districts with 45 aircraft divisions and 7 independently operating air defense zones. Each division has two to three regiments containing either 72 to 90 bombers or 60 to 120 fighters.

Combat air divisions are likely structured with three regiments, each with three squadrons. Each squadron has three flights (four to five aircraft each), and one maintenance unit. The combat air division may also have some transport and training units.

The PLAAF air defense forces may contain 16 artillery divisions with 100 surface-to-air missile units and 28 independent air defense regiments.
**Personnel**

The PLAAF has approximately 400,000 active personnel, including the strategic and air defense forces.

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<th>Senior Colonel</th>
<th>Major General</th>
<th>Lieutenant General</th>
<th>General</th>
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Air Force Rank Insignia
**Operations**

China has committed a small number of medical and logistic troops to the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PLAAF has not contributed to this operation, but China’s commitment represents a small beginning that could increase. It is possible that China will consider a commitment of transport aircraft to fulfill logistic requirements.

**Capabilities**

China’s 5-year plan, implemented in 2000, introduced new joint doctrines under the larger “Peoples War Under High Tech Conditions.” It also initiated a strong commitment to new multi-role fighters, modern weapons and modern support aircraft, to include AWCS, tankers, ELINT/SIGINT platforms and transports, new air defense missiles, and the expansion of airborne troop units. There has been some indication that the PLAAF may exploit new space reconnaissance capabilities to better enable new precision strike weapons. The PLAAF is devoting greater resources to modern air defense systems and to airborne troops to better enable offensive operations.

China’s Soviet 1950s-era fighters and bombers like the J-6 and H-5 are rapidly declining in use. The PLAAF will rely heavily on foreign systems, especially from Russia to achieve modernization goals. The PLAAF will likely be open to future cooperative opportunities with Europe, should it end its 1989 arms embargo. Reports in April 2005 that China was prepared to purchase 210 Dassault Mirage-2000 fighter bombers, plus a package of weapons and spares, have been denied by Dassault sources, but other sources contend France is prepared to sell these fighters as soon as the embargo is lifted.
By 2002-2003 reforms and upgrades in China’s domestic aerospace sector began to reveal new weapons development capabilities. By the late 1990s, the aerospace sector began to exhibit the benefits of broader PLA-industry reforms that stressed greater competition and integration with the civil high-tech sector. With help from Russia, and after absorbing Western design and manufacturing technology, Chinese companies have began to produce competitive weapons like the Chengdu J-10 multi-role fighter, the JH-7A attack fighter, and the PL-12/SD-10 active-guided AAM. China is also developing a new AWACS, ELINT and tanker aircraft, in addition to new SAMs. Chinese firms are demonstrating an increasing competence in developing critical combat aircraft subsystems like turbofan engines and radar.

China may soon have three indigenous 5th generation fighter programs underway. These programs will stress stealth, modern phased array radar technology and internal weapons carriage; one by Shenyang and two by Chengdu. The PLAAF may purchase Russian Tupolev-Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE bombers recently offered for sale – which it tried to buy in the early 1990s – as well as develop a new indigenous long-range strike aircraft. The PLAAF also appears to have a strong interest in developing UACs for both non-combat missions like reconnaissance and for some combat missions. While the PLA has established some momentum in its modernization program, it still faces the following obstacles:

- Increasing costs to retain quality personnel in a more competitive labor market;
- Integration of the new aircraft;
- Logistic support to sustain sortie rates associated with high-tempo modern warfare;
- Training in terms of pilot capability and flight time;
- Joint service training
Training

All aviation basic and primary training is carried out by the PLAAF. PLAAF training has been developed, according to reports from the General Staff Headquarters, to include combat maneuvers with aircraft of different types and to increase operational training with live munitions/weapons, including bombs. Other priorities are in-flight refueling and long-range offensive air and task force protection roles.

Training and education in the PLAAF is currently based on the ‘5-3’ tier system. This includes five tiers of specialized training and education for officers: secondary specialized; specialized college or equivalent; university or equivalent; master’s degree program; and doctoral program. There is also a three-tier system of professional military education for officers. Conscripts and volunteers are assigned to training units. For the first time, new pilots are expected to graduate from PLAAF academies with college degrees.

Significant changes have been introduced in pilot training. Fighter and ground-attack pilot training was traditionally a three-phase process: basic flight school (20 months), flying academy (28 months) and operational unit training (4 to 5 years). In the mid-1980s the PLAAF began to experiment with an additional fourth phase. For graduates of ground-attack flying programs, phase three became a 1-year aircraft ‘conversion program at newly organized ‘transition training bases.’ In 1988 each military region was authorized to establish a transition training base. The goal is to eventually eliminate the need for operational fighter divisions to dedicate one of their three regiments to training.
## Equipment

### Fixed-Wing Aircraft

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<td>JH-7A</td>
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<td>J-8 I (J-8A/E)</td>
<td>Interceptor</td>
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<td>J-8 II (J-8B)</td>
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<td>J-8 IV (J-8D)</td>
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<td>J-8F</td>
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<td>J-8H</td>
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<td>Su-27SK (FLANKER-B)</td>
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<td>(FLANKER-B) (J-11)</td>
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<td>Su-30MKK (FLANKER)</td>
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<td>J-III A (JD)</td>
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<td>J-7 IV (J-7E)</td>
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<td>Y-5 Utility</td>
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<td>JL-9 Trainer</td>
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<td>CJ-6 Trainer</td>
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**Rotary Aircraft**

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**Unmanned Aerial Vehicles**

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<td>Y-8E</td>
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### Air Defense Systems

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Navy

Organization

Within the PLA’s Navy, there are three naval fleets subordinate to the National Naval Headquarters: North Sea (NSF), East Sea (ESF) and the South Sea Fleets (SSF). Each fleet contains three naval districts or independent sectors. The three fleets contain elements of all main combatant types (submarines, destroyers, frigates, patrol craft, and mine sweepers) and are centrally controlled from Beijing through the respective fleet HQ. Fleet commanders serve as deputy commanders of the associated military region.

The NSF, headquartered in Qingdao, is responsible for the Yellow Sea, Bo Hai Gulf, and Korea Bay. The ESF, headquartered in Ningbo south of Shanghai, is responsible for the East China Sea from Jiangsu Province south through Fujian, including the Taiwan Strait. The SSF, headquartered at Zhanjiang, is responsible for the South China Sea area along the Guangdong and Guangxi coastlines to include the Gulf of Tonkin, Hainan Island, the Spratly (Nansha) Islands and the Paracel (Xisha) Islands.

Strategy

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA[N]) follows strategic level guidance known as “Offshore Defense” that is the maritime component of the PLA’s operational strategy known as “Active Defense.” “Active Defense” essentially means to attack after being attacked; however, operationally it consists of offensive and counter-attack operations. “Offshore Defense” was promulgated in 1985 after Deng Xiaoping determined that evolving threat conditions on the periphery of China and the international strategic and military dynamic demanded a reshaping of the PLA. Instead of using the navy in a coastal defense capacity intended to support
land operations on the mainland, the PLA(N) was to take on a more strategic role by defending China’s national interests and operating farther out to sea.

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<td>Liu Ji Shi Guan</td>
<td>NCO Sixth Class</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>U.S. Equivalent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Xue Yuan</td>
<td>Officer Cadet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shao Wei</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhong Wei</td>
<td>Lieutenant Junior Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang Wei</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shao Xiao</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang Xiao</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Xiao</td>
<td>Senior Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shao Jiang</td>
<td>Rear Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhong Jiang</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang Jiang</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Navy Rank Insignia
The PLA(N)’s doctrine is in the process of development as it incorporates newer, more modern platforms into its fleet.

**Personnel**

The PLA(N) consists of approximately 255,000 personnel including 25,000 PLA(N) Air Force (PLANAF) personnel, 37,000 Maritime Border Defense Force personnel, and 49,000 naval reserves. In addition, the South Sea Fleet contains two Marine Brigades of approximately 5,000 personnel each.

**Equipment**

**Destroyers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LUYANG I DDG</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUYANG II DDG</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVREMNENNYY DDG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUHAI DD</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LUHU DD</td>
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<td>LUDA I DD</td>
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<td>LUDA IV DD</td>
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**Frigates**

<table>
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### Guided Missile Patrol Boats

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### Patrol Craft

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### Mine Warfare

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### Amphibious

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<tr>
<td>YUHAI LSM</td>
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<tr>
<td>YUDENG LSM</td>
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<td>YUBEI LCU</td>
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<td>YUNNAN I/II LCM</td>
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Intelligence Collection

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<td>DONGDIAO AGI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>YANBING AGI</td>
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<tr>
<td>YUAN WANG 4 AGM</td>
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Submarines

XIA SSBN
HAN SSN
SONG SS
KILO 877 and 636
MING SS
ROMEO SS
Modified ROMEO SSG
GOLF SSB
Type 093 SSN
Type 094 SSBN

Missiles

Surface-to-Surface
Shangyou-1 (SY-1) (Chinese copy of Russian SS-N-2a STYX)
Hai Ying 1 (HY-1) (derived from SY-1) (SILKWORM)
Hai Ying 2 (HY-2) (improved HY-1)
C801
C802

**Air-to-Surface**
C801K
C601 antiship
C611 antiship

**Surface-to-Air**
HQ-61 (CSA-N-1)
LY-60N (Aspide derivative)
HQ-2/-2J
KS-1
SA-N-20
HHQ-9
HN-5 (Russian SA-7)
SA-N-7
HHQ-7 (derivative of Naval Crotale)
86(+) R440 Crotale (missiles) (France)

**Air-to-Air**
Pen Lung 2
Pen Lung 5
Pen Lung 7
Pen Lung 9

**PLA(N) Air Force**

The PLA(NAF) is a land-based force used primarily for coastal defense and shipping interdiction. It comprises three antiship (bomber) divisions, five fighter divisions, and several support squadrons (maritime, helicopter, transport, training).
Equipment

Bombers
B-6 (BADGER) maritime strike

Fighters
A-5 (FANTAN) attack
F-7B/F-7E (FISHBED) (MiG 21 derivative)
FB-7/FB-7A (FLOUNDER) fighter-bomber
F-8A-E (FINBACK) fighter
Su-30 MK2 (FLANKER) fighter-bomber

Antisubmarine/Maritime Patrol
SH-5 amphibian ASW
Y-8X (CUB) maritime patrol
Y-8 AEW airborne early warning
Y-7 (Russian An-24 COKE)
Yak-42D
Y-5
F-5/F-5A (FRESCO)
F-7 (FISHBED)
F-6 FARMER
Y-7 (Russian An-24 COKE) avionics trainer

Helicopters
Ka-28A (HELIX) ASW
Z-9 Haitun (French AS565N Dauphin)
Z-8 ASW/ASUW (French SA321 Super Frelon)

Air-to-Surface Missiles
C801K
C601
C611
Air-to-Air Missiles
PL- 5
PL- 9

Deployment

The following is a list of major naval facilities and fleet headquarters:

- North Sea Fleet (HQ – Qingdao) Bases in Qingdao, Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Lushun, Jianggezhuang, Xiaoping Dao
- East Sea Fleet (HQ – Ningbo) Bases in Shanghai, Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan, Daxie Dao
- South Sea Fleet (HQ – Zhanjiang) (Guangdong province) Bases in Zhanjiang, Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Hong Kong, Yulin, Beihai, Guangpu, Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands

Nuclear submarines are assigned to the North Sea Fleet. MING-Class submarines are operational in the North and South Sea Fleets. SONG-Class submarines are assigned to the North and East Sea fleets and four KILO SS are assigned to the East Sea Fleet.

Paracel Islands. In early 1994, China deployed additional aircraft to its newly constructed 2,600-meter (8,230-foot) airstrip on Woody Island. These aircraft join patrol boats, helicopters, and marines already stationed there. From Woody Island, China can extend limited air coverage to the Spratly Islands to the south.

Spratly Islands. The Chinese military improved facilities on their claimed islands in 1995-96.
**Issues**

Since the late 1990s, the PLA(N) has made progress toward developing into a regional naval power with some blue-water capability. Modernization efforts encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and force structure in favor of more blue-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the expansion of China’s blue-water naval capability include extended naval operations in the South China Sea, and goodwill tours to the U.S., Australia and other Asia-Pacific countries.

The PLA(N) has reportedly faced significant obstacles with onboard weaponry, radar-computer missile guidance interface, antiquated electrical equipment, and power plants on new platforms. Efforts to handle overall fleet deficiencies including AAW, ASUW, ASW, electronic warfare, and C4ISR are complicated by foreign purchases that pose force integration problems. The PLA(N) has made efforts to address these problems through indigenous production programs.

**Plans and Programs**

**Submarines.** China purchased eight additional KILO-Class SS in 2002, which were delivered to China by the end of 2006. The KILOs are equipped with the SS-N-27B, an advanced supersonic antiship cruise missile that has significantly enhanced China’s ability to conduct submarine antisubmarine warfare (ASUW). As of late 2007, 13 SONG-Class SS, capable of firing a C801-derived submerged-launched cruise missile, had been commissioned. Series production most likely ceased in 2005 and it was expected to have transitioned to the YUAN-Class SS. There
are two YUANs in the PLA(N); a third is expected to be launched in 2008. The YUAN appears to be of indigenous design and incorporate features of the SONG and KILO classes, including a teardrop-shaped hull, which suggests a pressurized double hull construction. In addition, it is speculated that the YUAN is fitted with an air-independent propulsion system. The MING-Class SS has gradually replaced the ROMEO-Class SS, which are nearing the end of their operational lives.

China is also constructing the SHANG-Class SSN. This submarine is expected to replace the older HAN-Class SSNs. In addition to the SONG SS, it will be capable of firing a C801-derived submerged-launched cruise missile. There are two SHANG-Class units in the PLA(N); three more are expected to be constructed. Work continues on China’s new SSBN program, the JIN-Class. The first of the class is likely undergoing sea trials before being deployed in 2008. Four more JINs are likely to be constructed. It is estimated that the JIN SSBN will be able to carry 12 MIRVed JL-2-type (CSS-NX-4) submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and have a range of 8,000 kilometers (4,900 miles).

**Surface Ships.** An aircraft carrier, whether purchased or constructed, continues to have a place in China’s long-term strategic planning. In 2002, China acquired the ex-VARYAG-Class aircraft carrier from Ukraine. Since 2002, some repair work has been done on the platform, but it is still unclear whether it will become an operational platform or be used for research and development. China is also modernizing its coastal defense forces with production of the HOUEBI-Class PTG, a new, high-speed catamaran intended to replace the aging OSA-Class PTG. China has also expanded its naval strike capabilities with the acquisition of four SOVREMENNYY-Class DDG from Russia.
The SOVREMENNYYS are armed with eight launchers for the sea-skimming SS-N-22 (SUNBURN) surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of 120 to 160 kilometers (75 to 100 miles), two SA-N-7B (GRIZZLY) surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers with (GADFLY) missiles, and two twin 130-millimeter AK-130 guns. China has also bought Russia’s long-range naval SAM, the SA-N-20, for deployment onboard the two LUZHOU-Class DDGs, and has completed development of its own long-range naval SAM, the HHQ-9. The HHQ-9 is equipped onboard the LUYANG II-Class.

**Air.** The PLANAF also strengthened its maritime strike capability with the acquisition of the Russian Su-30MK2 (FLANKER) in 2004, a platform with more capable weapons.

**Coastal Defense Forces**

Coastal Defense Forces are organized into 25 coastal defense regions containing 35 to 40 independent artillery and surface-to-surface missile regiments. Coastal defense units are deployed in and around naval bases, offshore islands, and other vulnerable military sites. Equipment includes semimobile 85-, 100-, and 130- mm coastal guns (most located in hardened sites) and HY-1 and HY-2 STYX-derived antiship missiles. Most SSMs are semimobile. Coastal defense divisions are at Fuzhou, Jinan, Shenyang, Guangzhou, and Nanjing.

**PLA(N) Marines**

**Mission**

The PLA(N) Marines conduct amphibious operations and provide a land operations force for a fleet; coordinate with a fleet in seizing/defending the PLA(N)’s forward bases; take part in the land combat of a naval campaign; coordinate with other services to develop
tactics, techniques, and equipment for amphibious operations; and carry out coastal defense.

As the advance amphibious operations force, the PLA(N) Marines missions include seizing and consolidating beachheads, destroying the enemy at beachheads and adjacent areas, organizing landing duties, and supporting the Army’s main force landing, continuing on to launch its offense. Other missions include conducting surprise attacks and occupying enemy’s naval bases, seaports, and islands; build beachhead protective zones; and cover the landing force as it spreads from the enemy coast.

**Organization**

The PLA(N) Marines are subordinate to the Navy. There are two PLA(N) Marine Brigades deployed to the South Sea Fleet. The 1st and 164th Marine Brigades are located in Zhanjiang along with a unit of amphibious landing ships. In peacetime this marine force
is brigade sized and is equipped with amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers for amphibious landings. In war, the reserve cadres would increase fighting strength to eight divisions of 24 infantry, eight armored, eight artillery and two independent tank regiments.

**Personnel**

The combined strength of both brigades is estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 Marines.

**Capabilities**

China is continuing to improve its capabilities to conduct amphibious and airborne operations within the region. Its fleet of more than 100 ships (plus more than 230 in reserve) and 500 minor landing craft conducts modest-sized training exercises in coastal regions. Although China has never conducted exercises with fully coordinated with air support and airborne operations, its amphibious force is believed capable of landing at least one division on a beach.

**Equipment**

PLA(N) Marines has the new Type-63A amphibious tanks and the new Type-63C amphibious APCs. Marine units are also receiving a new version of the Type WZ 501, based on the Soviet BMP-1, equipped with a wave cutter and an outboard motor. The Type 63A tank, Type-63C was featured in the amphibious assault portion of “Peace Mission 2005.” It is possible that the Marines may eventually receive the new AIFV in advanced development that uses the 100 mm gun/missile launcher of the Russian BMP-3M. Once shore positions are secured, LSTs can then land Type-83 122 mm self-propelled howitzers. Marine infantry also use the new Type-95 “bullpup” 5.8 mm assault rifles.
China is improving its amphibious operation capabilities. In the past 2 years, its fleet of about 60 medium-sized LSTs and LSMs has been supplemented by two new classes of LST/LSMs. It is expected that 15 LST/LSMs will be built. Mid-2006, Russian reports indicated that the Almaz shipyard will produce up to six of the unique large ZUBR assault hovercraft for the PLA(N). The 60-knot-speed ZUBR can carry 3 medium tanks, or 10 tracked or wheeled APCs, or 140 troops and 130 tons of cargo. The PLA(N) may also be building its first large LDP capable of carrying a new LCAC-style hovercraft and Z-8 size assault helicopters.

**Paramilitary Forces**

Militia units facilitate the mobilization and deployment of active-duty units and provide rear-area security and civil defense. The mission of the militia force varies considerably by region and by the specialties of the individual militia members. The mission for the militia components is defined in the National Defense Law: Under the command of military organs, militia units shall perform combat-readiness duty, carry out defensive fighting tasks, and assist in maintaining the public order. In recent years, the reserves and militia have been more active in disaster relief efforts and in providing humanitarian aid.

**People’s Armed Police**

**Mission**

The mission of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) is to safeguard China’s national security by maintaining public order and internal security for the PRC. The PAP can be employed independently by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in times of internal crisis. It is task-organized to provide a mix of capabilities from special combat support augmenting more traditional police forces to bor-
der security, anti-smuggling operations and counterinsurgency. The secondary mission of the PAP is to augment the PLA in war time.

**Organization**

The PAP’s estimated 1,500,000 personnel are organized into three types of units: an internal security force of 45 divisions; a second force of 186,000 personnel that has a border and coastal control mission; and a third force of 69,000 personnel that protects key

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PAP Forces on Patrol
national infrastructure sites. The PAP is organized and run along military provisions. Its general headquarters has three departments responsible for operational, political and logistical matters.

Unlike the vertical leadership of the PLA units, the armed police force falls under the dual leadership of the State Council and the Central Military Commission. In a combat situation, the armed police corps is under the unified command of the CMC.

Capabilities

The PAP’s primary peacetime role is to maintain social stability and order, guarding critical buildings and infrastructure, and aiding disaster relief operation (for instance forest fires and floods).

The major task of the armed police during wartime is to work with local military units, the reserve force, and militia as well as with public and government security departments. During war, the PAP guards the borders, protects major government organizations and
important civil targets, safeguards social order, deals with major unexpected incidents, and disrupts enemy information flow.

**Equipment**

In 2000, armed police units that shouldered the task of participating in military operations were equipped with various advanced heavy field weaponry and light weaponry. In addition, they intensified their training in anti-guerrilla warfare in the cities.

All armed police units are being equipped with an array of sophisticated weaponry, including new purpose-developed armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, new-type lethal and non-lethal weapons, high-precision guns, and high-performance antimob shields for police use. The PAP has also begun acquiring helicopters.

**Public Security Police**

**Mission**

Mainland Chinese police functions cover a wider range of missions than any police in the world. All functions are performed by specific types of police officers trained and assigned to their respective fields. The following are responsibilities of the PSP:

- To prevent, stop, and investigate criminal offenses.
- To maintain social order and prevent activities that threaten civil order.
- To enforce traffic safety regulations and deal with traffic accidents.
- To organize, implement, and supervise fire prevention and fire fighting.
- To guard people, institutions, and other facilities designated by the state.
- To control and supervise rallies, parades, and demonstrations.
To execute penalties to the offenders sentenced to control, criminal detention, deprivation of political rights and offenders who serve their sentences outside prisons; supervise offenders serving suspended sentences and offenders on parole.

To monitor and administer security and protect national critical infrastructure relating to computer and information networks.

Organization

The PRC’s national police system consists of 5 components: the public security police, state security police, the correctional (prison) police, judicial police in people’s procurators (state prosecutors) and judicial police in the people’s courts. Each component force performs specifically designed functions with its own organizational structure.

Personnel

The PSP consists of approximately 625,000 police officers.

PSP Officer (left) and PAP Soldier on Patrol
Capabilities

At the local level, PSP forces are quite competent in fulfilling their community policing role and addressing minor criminal and traffic violations. However, China’s national police has been more focused on internal security and control of the population than on crime and law enforcement.

With increased emphasis on quality recruitment and professional training, the PSP is gradually improving its capabilities to investigate and prosecute more sophisticated types of crime. As Chinese economic reforms progress, police and law enforcement agencies, with the help of legislation, are transitioning toward more traditional duties and capabilities. Through research and studies in social sciences, PSP forces are identifying requirements and modernizing their roles, functions and capabilities to meet the needs of the emerging market economy. This has shifted emphasis away from the more administrative duties and toward expanding the scope of criminal investigation to include organized crime, corruption, fraud, narcotics.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

In 1955, Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party decided to proceed with a nuclear weapons program; it was developed with Soviet assistance until 1960. After its first nuclear test in October 1964, Beijing deployed a modest but potent ballistic missile force, including land- and sea-based, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

China became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s. Beijing joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July 1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers, but announced in September 1992 that it would no
longer participate because of the U.S. decision to sell F-16A/B aircraft to Taiwan.

China was the first state to pledge “no first use” of nuclear weapons. It joined the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) in 1984 and pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1986. China acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. In 1996, it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and agreed to seek an international ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material. China has not ratified the CTBT.

In 1996, China committed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member in October 1997. The Zangger Committee is a group that meets to list items that should be subject to IAEA inspections if exported by countries that have, as China has, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September 1997, China issued detailed nuclear export control regulations. China began implementing regulations establishing controls over nuclear-related dual-use items in 1998. China also decided not to engage in a renewed nuclear cooperation with Iran (even under safeguards), and will complete existing cooperation, which is not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short period. In May 2004, with the support of the United States, China became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Based on significant, tangible progress with China on nuclear nonproliferation, President Clinton in 1998 took steps to bring into force the 1985 U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
**Chemical Weapons**

China is not a member of the Australia Group, an informal and voluntary arrangement made in 1985 to monitor developments in the proliferation of dual-use chemicals and to coordinate export controls on key dual-use chemicals and equipment with weapons applications. In April 1997, however, China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and, in September 1997, promulgated a new chemical weapons export control directive. In October 2002, China promulgated updated regulations on dual-use chemical agents, and now controls all the major items on the Australia Group control list.

**Missiles**

Although it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the multinational effort to restrict the proliferation of missiles, in March 1992 China undertook to abide by MTCR guidelines and parameters. China reaffirmed this commitment in 1994, and pledged not to transfer MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles. In November 2000, China committed not to assist in any way the development by other countries of MTCR-class missiles. However, in August 29, 2003, the U.S. government imposed missile proliferation sanctions lasting two years on the Chinese company China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) after determining that it was knowingly involved in the transfer of equipment and technology controlled under Category II of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex that contributed to MTCR-class missiles in a non-MTCR country.

In December 2003, the PRC promulgated comprehensive new export control regulations governing exports of all categories of sensitive technologies
KEY FACTS

Official Name. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR)
Short Form. Hong Kong

National Flag. Red with a white Bauhinia flower in the center.

Time Zone. UTC (formerly GMT) +8 hours

Head of Government. Chief Executive Donald Tsang

Telephone Country Code. 0852

Population. 7 million (July 2008)

Languages. Chinese (Cantonese), English; both are official

Currency. Hong Kong Dollar (HK$)

Exchange Rate. HK$7.80 = US$1 (2007)
U.S. MISSION

U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong

Location 26 Garden Road, Hong Kong

Mailing Address PSC 461, Box 5, FPO AP 96521-0006

Telephone (852) 2523-9011

Fax (852)2845-1598

E-mail uscghk@pacific.net.hk

Hours Monday – Friday

0830 to 1230 and 1330 to 1730

Entry Requirements

Passport/Visa Requirements

A visa is not required for tourist visits of up to 90 days by U.S. citizens. An extension may be granted upon application to the Hong Kong SAR Immigration Department. Visas are required to work or study in Hong Kong. U.S. Citizens should obtain all required visas before departing the United States. Specifically, U.S. citizens wishing to travel to the PRC from Hong Kong require a PRC visa and should apply at the PRC Embassy or consulates in the United States.

GEOGRAPHY

Geography

Boundaries

The South China Sea borders Hong Kong to the South, East, and West. China borders Hong Kong to the north.
Land Statistics

Area, Total 1,092 square kilometers (422 square miles)
Comparative

- About six times the size of Washington, DC
- Land: 1,042 square kilometers (402 square miles)
- Water: 50 square kilometers (19 square miles)

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

Transportation

Roads

Hong Kong’s roads have one of the highest vehicle densities in the world. At the end of 2004, there were more than 600,000 licensed vehicles using about 1,831 kilometers of road. This high vehicle density, combined with difficult terrain and high density building development, causes traffic congestion and poses a
constant challenge to transport planning, road construction, and maintenance. To alleviate this problem, numerous road projects are underway and more are planned.

Because taxis, buses, and the subway are readily available, relatively inexpensive, and generally safe, they are recommended over driving. Those who drive should be aware that traffic moves on the left. Most roads in Hong Kong are narrow and poorly marked. Those involved in traffic accidents are automatically tested for alcohol influence.

**Rail**

Hong Kong is serviced by several public passenger rail ways. The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is an underground railway
network with six lines and 50 stations. It is operated by the MTR Corporation Limited. The six lines were built in stages beginning in 1979 with the most recent being completed in August 2002. The railway totals 87.7 kilometers. The East Rail is 35.5 kilometers long and connects East Tsim Sha Tsui in Kowloon with Lo Wu. There are 14 stations that carry about 800,000 passengers daily. Ma On Shan Rail is operated by the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation. It came into service in December 2004. It runs over a length of 11.4 kilometers and comprises nine stations.

The West Rail is operated by the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corp. It came into operation December 2003 and also has 9 stations. It is a 30.5 kilometers twin passenger railway linking up Nam Cheong in West Kowloon with Yuen Long and Tuen Mun in the north-
west territories. The light rail opened in 1988 and is operated by the Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation. The light rail network extends to 36.2 kilometers of double track, with 68 stops and a fleet of 119 single-deck light rail vehicles. The system is supported by feeder bus services. In 2004, about 360,000 passengers traveled daily in the system.

**Air**

The Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) opened for commercial operations in 1998. It is a vital component of Hong Kong’s economy serving both tourism and commerce as an important regional trans-shipment center, passenger hub and gateway to other Chinese cities. The airport operates around-the-clock and is capable of handling 45 million passengers and three million tons of cargo a year.

There are some 78 international airlines providing about 5,300 scheduled passenger and all-cargo flights each week between Hong Kong and some 140 destinations worldwide. The Civil Aviation Department is responsible for the provision of air traffic control services, certification of Hong Kong registered aircraft, monitoring of airlines on their compliance with bilateral Air Services Agreements, and the regulation of general civil aviation activities.

**Maritime**

Hong Kong owns 1,649 ships (1,000 GRT or larger) Many passenger boats between Hong Kong and other cities have been phased out due to the competition with rail and air transportation. The remaining coastal boats depart from the China Hong Kong City ferry terminal in Kowloon. Jet powered catamarans and hovercrafts, however, travel between Hong Kong and destinations on the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) Delta, as well as to Zhuhai and
Macau. There are 11 ferry operators providing 26 regular licensed passenger ferry services to outlying island and across the Harbour. In 2004, ferry passengers amounted to 56.7 million.

**Communication**

Hong Kong’s communication system is one of the most technically advanced and competitive in the Asia-Pacific region. Its fully digitized communications infrastructure is a result of and continues to bolster Hong Kong’s position as the leading business, financial, and communications center in the region.

In 2003, the telephone density was 56 exchange lines per 100 population—one of the highest in the world. Also serving Hong
Kong’s needs in data communications were more than 491,195 dedicated facsimile lines. The communications infrastructure provides excellent domestic and international services. The infrastructure includes microwave radio relay links and extensive fiber-optic networks; three satellite earth stations, three Intel Sat (one Pacific Ocean and two Indian Ocean); coaxial cable to Guangzhou, China; access to five international submarine cables providing connections to ASEAN member nations, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Middle East, and Western Europe. There are 3,801,300 telephone main lines in use and 7,241,400 mobile cellular telephones in use in Hong Kong.

Nearly every household and commercial building is covered by the broadband network. The number of broadband accounts increased significantly during 2005 totaling 1,648,409 or 23.6 broadband accounts per 100 inhabitants, representing an annual increase of 11 percent. In addition, 65.6 percent of households had broadband Internet access. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) numbered 286 at year-end. There are 800,834 (2006 est.) internet hosts and 4.879 million (2005 est.) internet users.

**Mass Media**

Hong Kong’s mass media at the end of 2005 included 49 daily newspapers, numerous electronic newspapers, 722 periodicals, two free television program service licensees, three domestic pay television licensees, 13 non-domestic television program licensees, one government funded public broadcaster and two sound broadcasting licensees.

The availability of the latest telecommunications technology and keen interest in Hong Kong’s affairs have attracted many international news agencies, newspapers with international
readership and overseas broadcasting corporations to establish regional headquarters or representative offices in Hong Kong. The successful regional publications produced in Hong Kong underscore its important position as a financial, industrial, trading and communications center.

Hong Kong has five AM radio broadcast stations, nine FM radio broadcast stations, and four television broadcast stations. Hong Kong’s television viewers have access to more than 159 domestic and non-domestic television program service channels in various languages. These include four free-to-air terrestrial TV channels, 130 pay TV channels and a variety of free-to-air satellite channels.

**Newspapers and Magazines**

At the end of 2005, the Hong Kong press included 23 Chinese-language dailies, 13 English-language dailies (one of them in Braille and one Internet edition), eight bilingual dailies and five in other languages. Of the Chinese-language dailies, 17 cover mainly local and overseas general news, five specialize in finance, and the rest cover horse racing.

The larger papers include overseas Chinese communities in their distribution networks, and some have editions printed outside Hong Kong, in particular in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.

**CULTURE**

**Society**

**People**

Hong Kong’s population has increased steadily over the past decade, reaching about 6.9 million in 2004. Hong Kong is one
of the most densely populated areas in the world, with an overall density of approximately 6,380 people per square kilometer. Cantonese, the official Chinese language in Hong Kong, is spoken by most of the population. English, also an official language, is widely understood and spoken by more than one-third of the population. Religion is practiced freely in Hong Kong.

All children are required by law to be in school full time between the ages of 6 and 15. Preschool education for most children begins at age 3. Primary school normally begins at the age of 6 and lasts for 6 years. By age 12, children progress to a 3-year course of junior secondary education. Following 3 years of secondary education, most stay on for a 2-year senior secondary course, while others join full-time vocational training. More than 90 percent of children complete upper secondary education or equivalent vocational education.

**Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>6,980,412 (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth rate</strong></td>
<td>0.561% (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–14 years</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–64 years</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and older</td>
<td>13% (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Ratio</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At birth</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 15 years</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–64 years</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and older</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ethnic Groups**

Chinese 95 percent, other 5 percent

**Cultural Considerations**

Over the years, Hong Kong has developed as a unique society based on Chinese tradition and Western technology. It is a society that practices religious and racial tolerance. It is also a society that emphasizes hard work and success.

**Etiquette**

Americans encounter few cultural problems when traveling or working in Hong Kong due to Hong Kong’s history of British influence. Americans should be aware that Hong Kong people tend to be more formal than many Americans. Business acquaintances are addressed as Mr. or Ms., unless they state that their first name should be used. Business cards are exchanged frequently and the exchange should be fairly formal; card should be accepted with both hands and a moment taken to read it carefully. Areas of disagreement should be handled tactfully and indirectly to avoid embarrassing people; in Hong Kong, the people are very proud.

Though a study of local customs and practices may be helpful, most people in Hong Kong are sufficiently familiar with Western customs that they are tolerant of cultural differences. Business contacts should be treated the same as a formal business relationship in the United States. Western business attire is appropriate. Most Hong Kong business executives speak excellent English, and are accustomed to dealing with Westerners.
HistorY

In the late 19th century and early 20th centuries, Hong Kong developed as a warehousing and distribution center for UK trade with southern China. After the end of World War II and the communist takeover of Mainland China in 1949, hundreds of thousands of people fled from China to Hong Kong. Hong Kong became an economic success and a manufacturing, commercial, finance, and tourism center. High life expectancy, literacy, per capita income, and other socioeconomic measures attest to Hong Kong’s achievements over the past five decades.

On 1 July 1997, China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, ending more than 150 years of British colonial rule. Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China with a degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign and defense affairs. According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) and the Basic Law, Hong Kong will retain its political, economic, and judicial systems and unique way of life for 50 years after reversion and will continue to participate in international agreements and organizations under the name, “Hong Kong, China.”

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Government

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) is headed by Chief Executive Donald Tsang, who officially took office on 21 June 2005 after China’s State Council announced its approval. Former Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa is vice-chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Foreign Relations

Hong Kong’s foreign relations are the responsibility of China. Hong Kong is an independent customs territory and economic entity separate from the rest of China and is able to enter into international agreements on its own behalf in commercial and economic matters. Hong Kong, independently of China, participates as a full member of numerous international economic organizations including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

ECONOMY

Economic Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>US$293.4 billion (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per Capita</td>
<td>US$42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>US$549.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>US$371.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>US$353.3 billion f.o.b., including reexports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force</td>
<td>3.65 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hong Kong is one of the world’s most open and dynamic economies. Hong Kong has numerous economic strengths, including accumulated public and private wealth from decades of unprecedented growth, a sound banking system, a strong legal system, and an able and rigorously enforced anti-corruption regime. The need for economic restructuring poses difficult challenges and
choices for the government. Hong Kong is endeavoring to improve its attractiveness as a commercial and trading center, especially after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and continues to refine its financial architecture.

On the International front, Hong Kong is a separate and active member of the WTO and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, where it is an articulate and effective champion of free markets and the reduction of trade barriers. Hong Kong residents across the political spectrum supported China’s accession to the WTO, believing this would open new opportunities on the Mainland for local firms and stabilize relationships between Hong Kong’s two most important trade and investment partners, the United States and China.
MACAU

KEY FACTS

Official Name. Macau Special Administrative Region

    Short Form. Macau

National Flag. Light green background with a white lotus above a stylized bridge and water, beneath an arch of five stars; one large star and four smaller ones as on the flag of the PRC

Time Zone. UTC (formerly GMT) +8 hours

Telephone Country Code. 0853

Population. 456,989 (2007 est.)

Languages. Cantonese 87.9%, Hokkien 4.4%, Mandarin 1.6%, other Chinese dialects 3.1%, other 3% (2001 census)

Currency. Pataca (M$)

Exchange Rate. M$7.99 = US$1
ENTRY REQUIREMENTS

Passport/Visa Requirements
Valid passports are required. Passports should be valid for 30 days beyond the intended period of stay in Macau. Because many neighboring areas require 6 months validity remaining on the passport, U.S. citizens planning travel beyond Macau should ensure that their passports are valid for at least 6 months from the date of their proposed entry into such areas. A visa is not required for tourist visits of up to 30 days.

GEOGRAPHY

Boundaries
Macau is bordered by China to the North, and the South China Sea.

Land Statistics

| Area, Total | 25.4 square kilometers (9.5 square miles) |
| Comparative | Less than one-sixth the size of Washington, DC |
| Land        | 25.4 square kilometers (9.5 square miles) |
| Water       | None |

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

Transportation

Roads
There are 345 kilometers (214 miles) of paved roads in Macau. Traffic moves on the left, and roads are narrow and winding. On
the Macau peninsula, roads are congested throughout the day, and driving is not recommended. Taxis are plentiful and inexpensive, as are public buses. Visitors may travel by bus when transiting between Guangzhou, China, and Macau.

**Air**

The Macau International Airport serves Macau. It has more than 3,047 meters (9,997 feet) of paved runway. It provides a convenient connection to the China border allowing easy access to numerous provinces in Southern China.

**Maritime**

Most visitors travel to and from Macau by boat. There are a variety of craft such as jetfoils, turbocats (jet-powered catamarans), and high-speed ferries. A one-way trip to Hong Kong takes 1 hour.
Communication

The telephone system has fairly modern communication facilities maintained for domestic and international services. There were approximately 174,600 main telephone lines in use in 2003 and 364,000 mobile cellular telephones in use.

CULTURE

Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>456,989 (2007 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>0.841%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–14 years</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–64 years</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>8% (2007 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender ratio</td>
<td>male(s)/female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At birth</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 15 years</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–64 years</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and older</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Society

People

Macau’s population is 95.7 percent Chinese, primarily Cantonese and some Hakka, both from nearby Guangdong Province. The remainder is of Portuguese or mixed Chinese Portuguese ancestry. Official languages are Portuguese and Chinese (Cantonese). English
is spoken in tourist areas. Macau has 10 higher education institutions, including the University of Macau; 85.5 percent of the university’s 4,700 students are local and 14.5 percent are from overseas.

HISTORY

Initially, the Portuguese developed Macau’s port as a trading post for China-Japan trade and as a staging port on the long voyage from Lisbon, Portugal to Nagasaki, Japan. When Chinese officials banned direct trade with Japan in 1547, Macau’s Portuguese traders carried goods between Portugal and Japan. When the first Portuguese governor was appointed to Macau in 1680, Chinese authorities continued to assert their control by collecting land and customs taxes from the local Portuguese population. Portuguese citizens continued to pay rent to Chinese authorities until 1849, when Portuguese abolished the Chinese customs house and declared Macau’s “independence.” Chinese authorities retaliated and subsequently assassinated the Portuguese Governor Ferreira do Amaral.

On 26 March 1887, the Manchu government acknowledged the Portuguese right of “perpetual occupation.” The Manchu-Portuguese agreement, known as the Protocol of Lisbon, was signed on the condition that Portugal would never surrender Macau to a third party without China’s permission.

Macau enjoyed a brief period of economic prosperity during World War II as the only neutral port in South China, after Japanese occupation of Guangzhou (Canton) and Hong Kong. However in 1943, Japan created a virtual protectorate over Macau. Japanese domination ended in August 1945.

When the Chinese communists came to power in 1949, they declared the Protocol of Lisbon invalid declaring it an “unequal treaty” imposed by foreigners on China. Due to wartime destruction
and postwar repairs, Beijing requested maintenance of “the status quo” of the Protocol of Lisbon until the China government could settle the treaty question at a more appropriate time. Beijing took a similar position on treaties relating to Hong Kong.

Riots broke out in 1966 when pro-communist Chinese elements and the Macau police clashed. The Portugal government reached an agreement with China to end the flow of refugees from China and to prohibit all communist demonstrations. This move ended the conflict, and relations between the government and the leftist organizations became peaceful.

Portugal, under its own stress and having difficulty running its territories, tried once in 1966 after the riots in Macau, and again in 1974, the year of a military revolution in Portugal, to return Macau to Chinese sovereignty. China refused to reclaim Macau however, hoping to settle the question of Hong Kong first.

Portugal and China established diplomatic relation in 1979. A year later, Melo Egidio became the first Governor of Macau to visit mainland China. The visit underscored both parties’ interest in finding a mutually agreeable solution to Macau’s status. Negotiations between Portugal and China began in 1985, a year after the signing of the Sino-U.K. agreement returning Hong Kong to China in 1997. The result was a 1987 agreement returning Macau to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China on December 20, 1999.

**GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS**

**Government**

The chief executive is appointed by China’s central government after selection by an election committee, whose members are
nominated by corporate bodies. The chief executive appears before a cabinet, the Executive Council (Exco), comprised 7 to 11 members. The latest Exco, appointed on 15 December 2004 has 10 members. The term of office of the chief executive is 5 years, and no individual may serve for more than two consecutive terms. The powers are limited from above by the central government in Beijing, to whom the chief executive reports directly, and from below (to a more limited extent) by the legislature.

The legislative organ of the territory is the Legislative Assembly, a 29-member body of 12 directly elected members, 10 appointed members representing functional constituencies, and seven members appointed by the chief executive. The Legislative Assembly is responsible for general lawmaking, including taxation, the passing of the budget, and socioeconomic legislation.

The legal system is based largely on Portuguese law. The territory has its own independent judicial system, with a high court. Judges are selected by a committee and appointed by the chief executive. Foreign judges may serve on the courts. Macau has three courts: the Court of the First Instance, the Court of the Second Instance, and the Court of Final Appeal, Macau’s highest court.

**Foreign Relations**

Macau’s foreign relations and defense are the responsibility of China. China has, however, granted Macau autonomy in economic and commercial relations.
**ECONOMY**

**Economic Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td>US$10 billion (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth Rate</strong></td>
<td>2.8% (3rd Quarter 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per Capita</strong></td>
<td>US$22,000 (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflation Rate</strong></td>
<td>3.8% (2nd quarter, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Debt</strong></td>
<td>US$3.1 billion (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>4.1% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imports</strong></td>
<td>US$3.478 billion c.i.f. (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Force</strong></td>
<td>251,200 (3rd Quarter, 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Macau’s economy is based largely on tourism, including gambling, and textile and garment manufacturing. Efforts to diversify have produced other small industries, such as footwear and machinery and mechanical appliances. The clothing industry has provided about three-fourths of export earnings, and it is estimated that the gambling industry contributed to more than half of China’s GDP in 2004. More than 16.7 million tourists visited Macau in 2004. The recent growth in gambling and tourism has been driven primarily by mainland Chinese and Hong Kong tourists.

Macau relies on China for most of its food, fresh water, and energy imports. The European Union and Hong Kong are the main suppliers of raw materials and capital goods.