



**Military Strategic Communication
in Coalition Operations**

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A Practitioners Handbook

(MilStratCom Handbook)

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Disclaimer

(1) This document is not an academic study and does not raise an academic claim. It attempts to provide concise information compiled from various sources. For this purpose, the authors waive the requirement of formally citing references; academic standards on quoting are not applied. However, it is recommended to consult relevant publications listed in the Bibliography for additional information in the context of the original source.

(2) Although this document refers to the context of coalition military operations at the operational level of command, its proposed solutions are applicable to both coalition and alliance operations and its principles should be considered at all levels, as appropriate. The term *Joint Task Force* is used in a generic way to address deployed military forces regardless of their organisational origin; 'Joint Task Force HQ' is the operational-level HQ of the Joint Task Force; the *Joint Task Force Commander* is referred to as a 4* flag / general officer.¹

(3) For the purpose of this handbook, specific terms and definitions are introduced and explained in context, which may diverge from current use in NATO policy and/or doctrine. Their operational relevance suggests consequent adaptation.

(4) This document is gender neutral. Depending on the context and if, when referring to members of both sexes, the third person singular cannot be avoided or a gender-neutral noun does not exist, we reserve the right to use the masculine form of the noun and pronoun. This is to ensure that the document remains comprehensible.

¹ Joint Task Force formations of smaller scope may be commanded by lower ranking officers. In this case, indications of rank, grade or status for StratCom personnel made in this handbook should be interpreted and adapted appropriately.

Audience – Who should read the Handbook?

This handbook is intended for use by commanders and their staff at the operational Joint Task Force (JTF) level, but could be used at any level as a reference. The purpose of the publication is to describe the fundamental operational aspects of Strategic Communication (StratCom) in the military, and propose guidance for the implementation of StratCom in support of a deployed JTF.

The primary audience of this handbook comprises the JTF Command Group and HQ Special Staff; the members of the StratCom staff element(s); the Intelligence staff; the Operations staff; the Plans staff; the Information Operations (Info Ops) staff and Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) at all levels.

Additional audiences include: personnel involved in the UN Integrated Missions Planning Process or similar processes at the inter-governmental or strategic-political level; decision-makers, planners and analysts at the military-strategic level; the operational-level Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff; staff members involved in liaison and Joint Military Commission (JMC) activities; and related staff and commanders at the Component Command (CC) level.

Chapter 7 – Military Strategic Communication in a Nutshell – is intended to provide a concise first overview of the subject for anyone not (yet) familiar with or not directly involved in the execution of StratCom tasks.² It should also be read by the StratCom staff to derive incentives for discussions with, and education and training of non-StratCom personnel, as required.

² Note that by nature human communication involves everybody – "One cannot not communicate!" – and, therefore, this chapter is claimed relevant for everybody! (cf. Introduction and Chapter 1)

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Introduction

"Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communication [is] essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived. We must also use a broad range of methods for communicating with foreign publics, including new media."

(President Barack Obama)

Commanders, Planners, Operators, Analysts, Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines – we all – need to understand and internalise that ...

☞ **Everything we say, do, or fail to do and say, and that is perceived by others, sends a message.** Even things that remain unsaid or things we don't do may carry messages based on expectations of others, which may be met or not by our behaviour. The fact that *one cannot not communicate* bears risks and opportunities as others' perceptions and interpretations are not necessarily always in line with our intentions. Instead of just letting things happen we should proactively attempt to shape our image and design our public appearance in words and deeds so that it supports our objectives.

☞ **Our actions speak louder than words.** Talk is cheap – it is easier to say you will do something than to actually do it. However, it is the result of what we do rather than announcements or promises that counts most. People want to see an outcome, an effect that satisfies their needs or at least meets their expectations. There are manifold implications of this for military operations, the first and foremost being the challenge of designing operations in a way that they serve the military purpose while at the same time inducing a spirit of acceptance towards an enduring political end-state.

☞ **There must not be a discrepancy between what we say and what we do.** Any *say-do gap* negatively affects our credibility and thus the effectiveness of our operations. Our actions should be self-explanatory without justification required. Awareness of our mission, the strategic vision, and the commander's intent for its implementation is key for aligning words and deeds and avoiding a say-do gap. Common awareness and understanding promotes cohesion and a corporate identity of the forces; coherent activity enhances military power and the implementation of political will. Effective operations require that the military operational environment is reconciled with the Information Environment and a say-do gap is minimised.

34 ☞ **In today's information age, through the rapid modernisation of information and**
35 **communication processes, military operations are under constant observation of the media**
36 **with virtually real-time reporting.** As the primary source of information for the global community,
37 the media influence politics, (governmental) decision-making, and ultimately, public support for
38 operations. Any uniformed member of the forces, regardless of rank or position, who responds to
39 media or speaks publicly about an issue, will be perceived as *a military spokesperson*, regardless of
40 whether that is technically the case or not.

41 **Strategic Communication is a commander's tool for policy-making and guidance to improve the**
42 **forces' communication by promoting the appropriate consideration of the above.**

43



watzlawick.jpg (Source: Internet)

“One cannot not communicate. Because every behavior is a kind of communication, people who are aware of each other are constantly communicating. Any perceivable behavior, including the absence of action, has the potential to be interpreted by other people as having some meaning.”

—PAUL WATZLAWICK

week-01-introduction-to-interface-design-3-638.jpg (Source: Internet)

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Chapter 1 – Integrated Communication

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A. The Communication Challenge

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
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Cell phones, smart phones, the Internet, and GPS are increasingly available and are changing the nature of conflict, even in remote areas. Information can now reach out in new ways to global audiences because of the revolution in Information Technology (IT), particularly using cell phones and smart phones. The revival of hybrid warfare manifested in recent developments in the international security environment – such as the Arab Spring, the Ukrainian crisis, the rise of Jihadist-Salafist terrorism, and the European migrant crisis – demonstrates the power of communication, broadly based on IT advantages: messages and perceptions become predominant of physical engagements and strongly impact the behaviour of people. Orchestrated activities carry messages and have a crucial effect on public opinions, decision-making processes, and domestic support.



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Figure 1: Military Communication Challenge

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From a communication perspective, military operations are part of a *vicious circle* (see Figure 1)³: they result from political decisions, are part of state-funded activity, and are under constant observation of the media who strongly affect public opinion, which in turn influences political discussion and decision-making.

³ "War is [] a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." (Carl von Clausewitz)

63 Military success can be either directly aided or challenged by activities in the Information Environment.
64 Military communicators need to convey the message that operations are in line with political decisions
65 and serve the interest of the involved nations and their populace. In this respect, they may act as
66 **guardians of the political Narrative**, ensuring that political will is reflected in words and deeds
67 throughout operations planning and execution.

68 Today's military operations are also challenged with a fragmentation of communication capabilities
69 and insufficient integration of communication with operations planning, resulting in fragmented
70 Information Activities by multinational partners, insufficiently harmonised for achieving objectives in
71 the Information Environment that support common strategic objectives. In the last decades the
72 multinational community of communication practitioners struggled to overcome this challenge by
73 introducing coordination mechanisms. For instance, the military Info Ops function and later StratCom
74 were designed to provide an analysis, advice, coordination and oversight capacity for communication
75 capabilities at various levels.

76 However, relying solely on the coordination of capabilities and actions treats the symptom more than
77 it constitutes a solution to the underlying problem. In addition, there is still a lack of consideration of
78 the comprehensive scope of non-media activities that may help to create desired effects from a
79 communication perspective.

80 Coalition partners need to be able to gain enhanced situation awareness in the Information
81 Environment; develop and issue timely, relevant and feasible communication guidance; implement
82 communication plans in a consistent, transparent and flexible manner; and take emerging
83 communication practices and technology into account.

84 All this finally led to the concept of integrated communication and communication management – an
85 approach to adequately respond to and shape developments in the Information Environment from a
86 multinational coalition and comprehensive approach perspective.

87 **B. Dimensions of Integrated Communication**


88 Integrated communication addresses a range of dimensions in order to support the achievement of
89 consistency throughout the levels of involvement, and respond to the expectations of various
90 stakeholders involved.

91 Integrated communication requires the alignment of all communication **within the JTF** and
92 communication **between the JTF and other actors** for the sake of consistency, credibility, and
93 ultimately effectiveness in support of mission accomplishment.

94 Integrated communication also relates to the JTF HQ internal communication processes such as
 95 Command and Control (C2), staff routine, troop information, and education and training.⁴

96 Integrated communication vertically involves communication of the JTF HQ personnel – the
 97 Commander and his staff – with Higher Headquarters (HHQ) and subordinate commands to issue,
 98 receive and clarify direction and guidance, including plans and orders. In the horizontal dimension,
 99 communication processes involve JTF mission partners as well as local and regional stakeholders to
 100 promote JTF objectives and enhance awareness, understanding, and support of JTF operations.
 101 External audiences also include – directly or indirectly – the media and the local, regional and domestic
 102 public.

103 All the internal and external relationships and processes shown in Figure 2 exist at any given time:
 104 communication occurs – deliberately or unintentionally, with desired or undesired results. It is
 105 therefore advisable to pro-actively exploit this 'communication reality' to benefit own objectives.



106

107

Figure 2: Dimensions of Integrated Communication

108 The second set of dimensions to be integrated refers to legal obligations for public information, the
 109 deliberate exert of influence through communication, and the safeguard of own information:

⁴ NATO's policy for Military Public Affairs defines *internal communication* as communication with and among NATO military and civilian personnel and their families. *External communication* is defined as the function that comprises media relations and outreach activities to address key stakeholders and the public through mass media or other means.

- 110 • The presentational dimension takes into account a global expectation that some or all elements
111 of JTF activities must be in the public domain, because of (national) freedom of information rights,
112 public information activities, and the need to inform the public about the JTF's mission, objectives
113 and activities.
- 114 • The targeted dimension includes agreed elements in the Information Environment towards which
115 Information Activities should be directed in order to affect capabilities and influence perceptions,
116 attitudes, and behaviour favourable to the achievement of own objectives.
- 117 • The protective dimension refers to existing disclosure policies and Operations Security (OPSEC)
118 requirements. It aims at safeguarding own freedom of manoeuvre in the Information
119 Environment, minimising the opportunity for adversaries to exploit JTF vulnerabilities, and
120 protecting individual partners' national interests.

121 C. Principles of Integrated Communication

122 Communication must be understood as a **process of creating and conveying meaning** through
123 interaction – verbally or non-verbally, intentionally or unintentionally – with perception and
124 interpretation of actions playing a fundamental role.

125 Communicators need to understand the **strategy or vision** of their organisation in order to be able to
126 craft adequate messages and advise effective activity to get these messages across in support of
127 mission objectives.

128 A systemic and comprehensive **understanding of the Information Environment** is a condition that
129 enables communication practitioners to tailor communication efforts to audiences and design
130 culturally attuned Information Activities, based on a better comprehension of complex communication
131 situations.

132 Communication must be integrated throughout all processes **from analysis and planning to execution**
133 **and assessment** of activity. Planners and operators; leaders and servicemen – they all need to consider
134 the Information Environment and understand the possible (informational) effects of their actions.

135 **Commanders must accept their key role in their organisation's communication**, assisted by
136 consulting, education and training efforts. When senior leaders ignore the importance of
137 communication – and the necessity of their own active, personal role in it – they seriously undermine
138 the value of major initiatives of their organisation. Ineffective communication can sow dissention,
139 heighten anxiety and confusion, alienate key individuals or groups, and damage the leadership's
140 credibility with critical audiences both inside and outside the organisation.

141 Harmonisation of internal and external communication efforts is paramount for the development of
142 both **a common identity and a desired image** of the organisation, and is thus a major prerequisite for
143 effectiveness and ultimately for the achievement of objectives and mission accomplishment.

144 **D. Current Doctrine and Best Practices**

145 This handbook supports the deduction of practical recommendations for the application of proposed
146 solutions from multinational Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) and identifies
147 implications for military Public Affairs (PA), Info Ops and StratCom doctrine. These implications are
148 primarily relevant for NATO, but also for multinational JTF HQs in a coalition context and national
149 contributions thereto.

150 Key current doctrinal elements reviewed include:

- 151 • the PA role in ensuring the public's right to obtain information from military agencies (*Freedom of*
152 *Information*);
- 153 • the requirement of the PA staff / spokesperson to have direct access to the Commander for
154 fulfilling their function;
- 155 • separate functional reporting hierarchies of PA and the chain of command;
- 156 • functional barriers or restrictions that impair collaboration of the PA and Info Ops staffs;
- 157 • the positioning of PA as part of a military HQ's Special Staff;
- 158 • the positioning of the Info Ops staff within the J3 Operations division of a military HQ;
- 159 • the scope of functional responsibilities of the Info Ops staff related to PA with respect to
160 operationalizing communication guidance (i.e., Information Objectives, themes and master
161 messages);
- 162 • the scope of functional responsibilities of the Info Ops staff related to J2 Intelligence (INTEL) with
163 respect to the analysis of the Information Environment and targeting;
- 164 • the scope of functional responsibilities of the Info Ops staff related to J5 Plans respective the
165 integration of communication planning and operations planning (including respective planning
166 products);
- 167 • the relationship of communication planning, effects development and activity planning;
- 168 • the introduction of a project management approach to the staff organisation of a military HQ
169 (e.g., administrative and functional reporting relationships).

170 For all these considerations it is important to acknowledge the operational focus on deployed
171 multinational joint forces in a coalition context: the proposals for the adjustment or modification of

172 processes and organisational structures made in this handbook neither refer to the NATO Command
173 Structure (NCS) nor the NATO Force Structure (NFS) and their related peacetime establishments.⁵

174 However, national and organisational military structures may adapt and evolve based on operational
175 best practices, international developments and events, and the constant interaction between political
176 and military authorities. Additionally, the permanent exchange of information and specialized
177 knowledge and experience between military experts and political actors is a constant and continual
178 means of mutual education. That said, given the probability nations will work in a NATO C2 structure,
179 NATO documents could be reviewed.

180 **E. Innovation – A New Mind-Set**

181 Integrated communication requires a new mind-set on the part of all actors involved in StratCom. It
182 cannot be achieved by just superimposing new procedures and organisational structures on extant
183 settings. Consequently, in order to facilitate the practical implementation of this approach, existing
184 doctrine and best practices from contemporary military operations have been considered and
185 appropriate plug-ins identified for accepting and developing a mutually beneficial attitude.

186 The authors suggest that multinational joint exercises be used as platforms for training and education
187 of practitioners, testing the proposed solutions, and deducing modifications, as appropriate. The new
188 StratCom mind-set should develop through the practitioners in action!

189 This handbook is designed as a living document, taking into account lessons learned from exercises
190 and operations as they occur. Proposed changes can be submitted to the authors at any time.

⁵ For the purpose of this handbook a traditional J-staff organisation is taken as an example, acknowledging that there are multiple options for organising a JTF HQ.

Chapter 2 – Military Strategic Communication

A. Key Terms and Definitions in Context

1. Communication

Communication is the process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by people through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages.

The use of the plural – communications – appears often, confusingly, in tandem with the singular – communication. In the military, the plural is predominantly used in the Signals / C2 Support area, where "strategic communications" for instance means satellite links or HF radio broadcast. The singular reflects a broader concept to describe the exchange of thoughts, messages, or information, as by speech, signals, writing, or behaviour. Furthermore, communication in its singular form makes the expression 'Strategic Communication' into an abstract noun, whereas its plural makes it into a verb. The focus needs to be on the idea of establishing StratCom as a principle of thought, and therefore a noun. Hence, placing the emphasis on strategy first and foremost and only then on the action of communicating, leads to the singular use of the term in this handbook.

2. Communication Management

The term communication management is used here in the broadest sense to include planning, approval and implementation of communication guidance. It corresponds with the terms operational design and operational management introduced in NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine to embrace analysis, planning, execution and assessment.

Chapters 3 and 4 detail the tasks and organisation involved in communication management.

3. Information Environment

The Information Environment is the virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems.⁶

The Information Environment is the domain that facilitates the exchange of information between people, and where C2 of military forces is exercised.

Principal characteristics of the Information Environment are:

⁶ According to NATO's Military Policy for Info Ops, the Information Environment comprises the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.

- 217 • The nature of the Information Environment is global, overarching and multi-faceted, and does
218 not belong to anyone.
- 219 • There are no physical boundaries that limit the worldwide flow of information.
- 220 • Digital media involve data sets that are so large and complex that traditional data processing
221 applications become more and more inadequate (*big data*).
- 222 • As a consequence of the digital communication revolution – including high-speed information
223 transmission capability and the role of media users as *prosumers* –, traditional news reporting lost
224 importance and reliability.
- 225 • Modern information systems comprise an emerging and diverse infrastructure posing increased
226 challenge to standardisation and interoperability, and are also subject to high dynamics of
227 technical development.
- 228 • Means to create effects on information and/or information systems are available to everybody,
229 independent of budget resources.
- 230 • It is increasingly difficult to differentiate between intended and unintended effects in the
231 Information Environment.
- 232 • Actors in the Information Environment are able to act anonymously, making it difficult to identify
233 the originators and determine their intent.
- 234 • In the Information Environment compliance with legal norms – if such exist at all – is difficult to
235 enforce.


236 The security environment is a complex political-military web of regional, cultural, and political
237 competitions and conflicts, involving threats to vital interests posed by a variety of actors. Once a crisis
238 has been identified through conflict analysis and/or political decision-making, specific attention will be
239 focused on a defined operational environment by relevant actors. An operational environment
240 constitutes a composite of the elements, conditions and influences that affect the employment of
241 resources and capabilities, and that bear on operational decisions.

242 In modern societies the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, and manipulation of information is a
243 significant economic, political, and cultural activity. The information factor evolved to become a
244 substantial element of security-related capabilities and is critical to all areas of activities. Information
245 is pervasive across the areas of activity. It spans the scope of civil and military, national and
246 multinational, as well as governmental and non-governmental activities, and involves the
247 consideration of both the deliberate and inherent informational impact of actions. The nature of
248 information is global, overarching and multi-faceted in a sense that it cannot be owned by anyone

249 once open in the public domain. Despite state-controlled technical and procedural systems to deny
250 access and limit consumption of information to audiences, it is extremely difficult to restrict the
251 worldwide flow of information for an extended period of time.

252 The Information Environment must by nature be recognised in global dimensions and cannot be
253 limited to a specific security or operational environment.

254 Planning for crisis management within a comprehensive approach needs to consider the operational
255 environment as a system of systems, focused within the context of an overarching security
256 environment and embedded in the Information Environment (see Figure 3).



257

258 **Figure 3: Information Environment, Security Environment, Operational Environment**

259 Assessment of the Information Environment is a crucial task in support of national and multinational
260 strategic assessments; it complements other assessments provided from areas of activities or
261 functional views with considerations concerning the information factor.

262 The assessment of the Information Environment contributes to the development of mission objectives
263 in general and of Information Objectives in particular.


264 **4. Information Activities**

265 Information Activities are actions designed to generate an effect in the Information Environment,
266 performed by any actor.

267 Information Activities include direct and indirect communication, and comprise the whole scope of
 268 actions and operations conducted to impact the Information Environment. They may involve kinetic
 269 and non-kinetic actions, and include protective measures.

270 The delineation between what constitutes Information Activities and what constitutes *mainstream*
 271 military activity is becoming increasingly blurred as effects-based thinking is pursued. In today's
 272 information age commanders need to consider all means for creating effects from the outset, and they
 273 must be as familiar with information as with the traditional operational factors: force, space and time.
 274 Ideally, the *4th operational factor* information (i.e., options in the Information Environment) will be
 275 fully integrated with traditional warfighting.

276 It is the aim of the conceptual approach to integrated communication that military commanders
 277 consider operations in the Information Environment to be as important as those traditional operations
 278 conducted on the land and sea as well as in the air, space, and cyberspace.



279
 280 **Figure 4: Information Activities and Effects in the Information Environment**

281 Information Activities will most often be employed in conjunction with other activities to ideally form
 282 a synergetic whole across all activity (see Figure 4). These efforts must be closely coordinated in order

283 to portray a consistent image of the actors in multinational crisis management and enhance their
284 effectiveness.

285 Resources to conduct Information Activities can be as varied and extensive as the complexity of the
286 Information Environment. The scope and scale of possible Information Activities also relates to the
287 basic features of information – development of knowledge, communication, and automation – and
288 covers a multitude of kinetic and non-kinetic actions to create lethal and non-lethal effects on
289 understanding, will and capabilities, including human as well as technical system elements.

290 While Information Activities focusing on preserving and protecting JTF freedom of manoeuvre in the
291 Information Environment should take place at all times, Information Activities focused on influence
292 and counter command may only take place as part of an Operation Plan (OPLAN) and thus with
293 strategic approval, including definition of adversaries and potential adversaries.

294 Depending on the organisational construct, Information Activities are generally planned under the
295 authority of the J5 Plans section and executed under the authority of J3 Operations section. However,
296 they must be aligned with the wider StratCom effort to ensure coherence of all information and
297 communication activities and capabilities, both civilian and military.

298 **5. Communication Capabilities and Functions**

299 The term *communication capabilities and functions* stands for the force capabilities and staff functions
300 the *primary role* of which is to execute communication management tasks, to conduct communication
301 planning and/or to create effects in the Information Environment.

302 It is a collective term and placeholder used whenever the precise naming of a capability or function is
303 impractical or inappropriately limiting, for instance if the scope of involved parties in generating an
304 effect is indefinite.

305 Communication capabilities execute Information Activities to generate desired effects in the
306 Information Environment. Examples include Public Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and
307 Computer Network Operations (CNO), but also commanders involved in Key Leader Engagement (KLE)
308 or C2. The term communication capability not only applies to force capabilities that are able to or
309 actually conduct Information Activities on a case-by-case basis, e.g., combat units involved in physical
310 destruction of critical infrastructure causing psychological effect on adversaries.

311 Communication functions do not perform Information Activities themselves but *inter alia* assist,
312 coordinate, guide, plan, liaise, network and moderate communication processes (including staff
313 development and education programs). Examples are StratCom and Info Ops. A future (standing)

314 decision-making or working body for communication planning or Information Strategy development
315 may also qualify as a communication function.

316 Expert representatives of communication capabilities and functions are called 'communication
317 specialists'.

318 **6. The Military Levels of Involvement and Command & Control**

319 The strategic level is defined as the level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or
320 multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
321 From a national perspective, the strategic level concerns applying the full range of national resources,
322 across all instruments of power⁷, to achieve policy objectives. It is the responsibility of the head of
323 government and ministers. Within NATO, the strategic level concerns applying Alliance resources to
324 achieve strategic objectives set out by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Operations by allied joint
325 forces are directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and
326 tactical levels. The geographic space associated with the strategic level is called Theatre of Operations
327 (TOO) or theatre. It includes areas deemed to be of political, diplomatic and/or military importance,
328 designated by political and/or military authorities, where an operation may take place.

329 The operational level is the level at which campaigns (sets of operations) are planned, conducted and
330 sustained to achieve strategic objectives. The operational level links strategic objectives to tactical
331 military activity. At the operational level and within a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA), armed
332 forces are deployed and employed in accordance with a strategy to achieve military-strategic
333 objectives. A JOA is defined as a temporary area defined by the strategic authorities, in which a
334 designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission. A JOA and its defining parameters,
335 such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and
336 normally associated with JTF operations.

337 The tactical level is defined as the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and
338 executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. Successfully achieving
339 these objectives will contribute to success at the operational and strategic levels. The geographic space
340 associated with the tactical level is called Area of Operations (AOO); it is defined by the operational
341 commander.

342 The distinction between the military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint operations is not
343 always clearly defined. This is because even if a force is only of small tactical value, its employment


⁷ All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives (political, military, economic, and civil; diplomacy, development and defence).

344 may have a political context in relation to the providing nation. Conversely, the pursuit of strategic
 345 objectives will not always require deploying large and heavily equipped forces. Furthermore, the
 346 Commander of the JTF (COM JTF) may not have C2 of all military assets engaged within the JOA. Some
 347 assets, such as forces held in reserve for strategic engagement and special operations forces, may be
 348 controlled at the military-strategic level.

349 In stability operations the levels of operations are often compressed or blurred. This happens because
 350 stabilization is inherently political at all levels and nations' instruments of power are employed not just
 351 at the strategic and operational level, but also at the tactical level. This enables the security effort to
 352 be synchronized with economic development and governance. Although the characteristics of the
 353 operational level may now manifest themselves at the tactical level, the nature of operational-level
 354 command has not changed; it is still defined by complexity not scale.

355 **7. Operations Planning and Communication Planning**

356 Operations planning is the planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.
 357 Operational-level planning is the military planning at the operational level to design, conduct and
 358 sustain operations in order to accomplish strategic objectives within a given JOA.



359
 360 **Figure 5: Operations Planning and the Information Environment**

361 Communication planning involves the development of direction and guidance to communication
362 capabilities and functions, and the provision of advice to the decision-making process on how to
363 consider the Information Environment in plans and operations.

364 Operations planning without consideration of the Information Environment is pointless, and in turn,
365 communication planning separated from operations planning will rather provoke an opening of the
366 say-do gap than prevent it. Therefore, in order to fully integrate communication planning and
367 operations planning at the operational level, there must not be any parallel, segregated planning
368 process for communication (see Figure 5). Instead it is required that communication capabilities and
369 functions play an integral part in the operational-level planning process.

370 An integrated and corporate approach to communication suggests that an Information Strategy⁸ –
371 developed at the earliest stage of crisis response planning as strategic-political guidance for activities
372 to affect the Information Environment – be considered as additional planning guidance at the
373 operational level. The Information Strategy initially serves to complement the Strategic Planning
374 Directive (SPD) and the strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and would be further developed
375 and updated during the subsequent planning process and the conduct of operations, as required by
376 changes in the mandate, mission or situation.

377 Chapter 4 details the communication planning process and its integration with operations planning at
378 the operational level.

379 **8. Strategic Communication**

380 NATO's Policy of 2009 defines Strategic Communications (StratCom) as the coordinated and
381 appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs,
382 military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations, as appropriate – in
383 support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.

384 Military Committee advice on the 2009 Policy states that it is important to underline that StratCom is
385 first and foremost a process that supports and underpins all efforts to achieve the Alliance's objectives;
386 an enabler that guides and informs our decisions, and not an organization in itself. It is for this reason
387 that StratCom considerations should be integrated into the earliest planning phases – communication
388 activities being a consequence of that planning.

389 NATO's Military Concept on StratCom of 2010 proposes that StratCom is not an adjunct activity, but
390 should be inherent in the planning and conduct of all military operations and activities. NATO StratCom

⁸ In NATO the term 'StratCom Framework' is used. In the absence of strategic-political, NAC approved communication guidance, SHAPE will develop and issue the highest-level StratCom Framework.

391 is a leadership-driven process focussed on enhancing the Alliance's ability to coherently articulate its
392 Narratives, themes, and messages to external and internal audiences. NATO StratCom provides
393 strategic-political and military guidance and direction based on a NAC-approved Information Strategy.
394 NATO' Allied Command Operations (ACO) in 2012 further developed the definition of StratCom: In
395 cooperation with NATO HQ, StratCom is the coordinated and appropriate use of military PA, Info Ops,
396 and PSYOPS which, in concert with other military actions, and following NATO political guidance,
397 advances NATO's aims and operations.

398 The current draft Military Policy of 2016 defines StratCom, in the context of the NATO military, as the
399 integration of communication capabilities and information staff function[s] with other military
400 activities, in order to understand and shape the Information Environment, in support of NATO aims
401 and objectives.

402 Based on the evolving NATO definition of StratCom, we are using the term to describe **a process and**
403 **command function**, defined as:
404 **the integration of military communication capabilities and functions with other military capabilities**
405 **in order to understand and shape the Information Environment, inform, persuade or influence**
406 **audiences in support of mission objectives, and to implement political will.**

407 In order to provide a clear distinction between own communication plans and Information Activities
408 and opposing actors' efforts in the Information Environment, it is suggested to use terms such as
409 "information warfare" or "propaganda" for these rather than applying own terms.

410 **B. Strategic-political Communication Guidance**

411 **1. The Mandating and Coalition Building Process**

412 It is assumed that coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized
413 under international law originating with such an authority as the United Nations Security Council
414 (UNSC) or based on other multinational agreements. This recognized civil authority will most likely act
415 to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching
416 objectives and the desired end-state. It is further assumed that this same entity would designate, or
417 accept the offered services of a Lead Nation. The mandating and coalition building processes will
418 virtually occur in parallel, as a political mandate without physical resources is unlikely to be issued.

419 The Lead Nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the
420 essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning,
421 mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational

422 framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated
423 as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the
424 operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic,
425 operational, and/or tactical levels.

426 The Lead Nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to organize
427 consultation on and the development of the coalition's political objectives, act as sponsor and
428 spokesman for the coalition's operations in the world community, lead coordination and building of
429 consensus during the coalition's planning and execution phases, and be competent to carry out the
430 anticipated operation. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition
431 partners. The latter is likely to include consideration of the Lead Nation's ties to and interests in the
432 specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. International political
433 consultation and control of the operation needs to be carried out through an appropriate council of
434 national leaders duly empowered by their respective governments. A preponderance or operationally
435 significant share of the overall force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a Lead Nation;
436 however, that nation must also possess the strategic and political attributes required to sustain a
437 coalition, or the coalition effort is likely to fail. Strategic-political communication guidance should come
438 from the Lead Nation developed in close cooperation with coalition partners.

439 **2. Purpose**

440 Coalitions in multinational crisis management operations require versatile, agile capabilities to project
441 combined forces into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish their mission.
442 Relevant scenarios and operation/mission types range from low-intensity operations that assist
443 populations, groups or individuals – such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or
444 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) – to high-intensity combat operations against a
445 broad spectrum of adversaries – from global competitors to belligerent regional powers to networked
446 violent extremist organizations. These operations may also involve situations in which there are no
447 specific adversaries, but where operations take place in highly unstable areas where little or no
448 governmental or societal authority exists, aside from armed civil populations and criminal groups. It is
449 important that coalition partners coordinate all activities across all instruments of power from the
450 earliest stages of the coalition building and strategic planning process⁹.

⁹ In multinational coalition operations, it is unlikely that permanent working bodies could be established at the strategic-political level (as they exist in standing organisations like NATO or the EU) to develop relevant and feasible communication guidance, and ensure multinational coordination and strategic-political endorsement. This issue is, however, not subject of this handbook. For StratCom we demand that strategic-political communication guidance is provided; we assume that coalition partners would sign up to respective

451 The Information Strategy outlines the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict
452 prevention and resolution in the Information Environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and
453 political communication guidance for multi-agency activity of coalition partners across all levers of
454 power in support of mission objectives.

455 An Information Strategy prompts leadership at all levels to understand how activities will be / should
456 be perceived by key audiences, ensuring alignment with overarching strategic objectives. It shall be
457 used as guidance to fully integrate communication in operations planning.

458 Operational-level commanders define tasks for subordinates that are designed to set desired
459 conditions, thus ensuring that tactical actions achieve operational objectives that nest within strategic
460 objectives. Focusing on the relationship between the operational environment and the Information
461 Environment and recognizing the risk to the mission that a *say-do gap* entails is an important part of
462 the operational StratCom process.

463 3. Scope

464 The development of an Information Strategy informs strategic planning and, vice versa, is integrated
465 with and guided by the development of strategic plans and objectives. The first version of an
466 Information Strategy should be ready and approved by the political authorities prior to mission
467 planning is concluded to ensure that strategic planners appropriately consider effects in the
468 Information Environment. On the other hand, development of an Information Strategy needs to await
469 the approval of strategic objectives for integration with Information Objectives.

470 Figure 6 shows a generic example of the analysis and planning process that leads to a multinational
471 Information Strategy. The process of developing an Information Strategy may start even before a
472 mandate is agreed on. On the other hand, the strategic Narrative needs to refer to the mandate and,
473 therefore, an Information Strategy cannot be formally issued prior to the mandate. Thus, the
474 mandating process may inform the development of the strategic Narrative.

475 It takes into account available national and multinational assessments of the crisis situation, and builds
476 on relevant political agreements and strategic directives. In order to meet situation requirements in
477 theatre as well as consider possible adjustments to the mandate and mission, an Information Strategy
478 must be periodically reviewed – in line with strategic plan review.

guidance of the coalition lead nation or organisation; and we propose that this guidance would require a minimum content in the format of an Information Strategy as outlined in this handbook.




Figure 6: Development of an Information Strategy

479

480

481 The scope of required guidance from the strategic-political level demands that an Information Strategy
 482 be produced as an internal document in the first place, with no pro-active external distribution.
 483 However, in order to meet the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, it should only
 484 contain unclassified information and should be written in a way that it could be shared with partners
 485 and public disclosure would not jeopardise mission accomplishment. An unclassified, sharable
 486 Information Strategy is the ideal situation. However, there may be instances that require classified
 487 content in order to conform to operational security and/or maintain diplomatic options.

488 **4. Content**

489 The coalition Information Strategy sets out the Narrative, Information Objectives, key themes, master
 490 messages and audiences, which shape the general approach and the conduct of specific activities, both
 491 physical and psychological. It must be based on a sound understanding of the Information
 492 Environment. Individual nations will have full responsibility for then implementing these activities
 493 affecting their domestic audiences. Nations may also undertake additional Information Activities
 494 independently, provided they are consistent with the agreed strategic-political guidance.

495 For a complete overview of suggested content, see Supplement V.1.

496 *a. The Narrative*¹⁰

497 To achieve sustained outcome, the short-term communication focus of targeted messaging has to be
498 coherent with the long-term goals of an organisation. Sustainable support for any campaign is founded
499 on both logic and instinct. The coalition therefore needs to ensure that, firstly, it has a core Narrative
500 that resonates with its audiences, and, secondly, its operations and actions are consistent with that
501 Narrative.

502 The core element of an Information Strategy is the Narrative. It is the structured expression of a
503 thematic story about the rationale, intent and aims – the *why* – of the coalition. It reflects the vision
504 and strategy of the coalition, and, like a script or score, guides its mission conduct – the *how* of its
505 general activity. It provides the overall concept (*Leitbild*) and guiding theme (*Leitmotiv*) for the
506 coalition and its mission, and supports the development of a corporate identity and corporate image.
507 The pursuit of a corporate idea is a prerequisite for integrating words and deeds, and thus creating
508 desired effects.

509 In order to achieve this corporate idea, the Narrative should – in simple language: easy to remember,
510 easy to understand, and easy to communicate – provide answers to three fundamental questions:
511 (1) Who are we / where are we coming from? (2) What benefits are we bringing to whom? and
512 (3) Where are we going to / what is next?

513 The strategic Narrative of an Information Strategy directly refers to the mission mandate, for instance
514 a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). The coalition's Narrative should be the compelling
515 foundation of all its communication efforts. It is the common reference point that should guide the
516 development of all of the coalition's kinetic and non-kinetic plans. It ultimately portrays the coalition
517 identity and provides an important foundation for achieving a desired image.


518 The strategic Narrative comprises the whole scope of the political and military nature of a coalition.
519 For the purpose of implementing it through military StratCom at the operational level, it needs to be
520 focused and operationalised for military activity during operational-level planning. In order to promote
521 awareness of the political will and consistency throughout all levels, the resulting JTF Narrative should
522 always refer to the strategic Narrative in any related operational planning product.

¹⁰ The Narrative Development Tool described in the MNIOE White Paper (see Bibliography) helps to understand the elements a Narrative is made of; guides analysis of the Narrative Landscape (Narratives of other actors, etc.); and focuses operational-level input to the revision of the Information Strategy.

523 **b. Information Objectives**

524 Information Objectives are desired conditions to be created in the Information Environment. They
 525 should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/
 526 evaluation of related actions and effects. Information Objectives only exist at the strategic level and
 527 support strategic objectives by providing the focused view on the Information Environment. With
 528 Information Objectives, an Information Strategy should offer a clear description of the desired
 529 conditions to be created in the Information Environment linked to the Narrative and strategic
 530 objectives.

531 As the information factor is relevant for all activity and because the operational environment is an
 532 integral part of the Information Environment, Information Objectives cannot be isolated from strategic
 533 objectives nor be considered strategic objectives themselves. Information Objectives propose a
 534 different layer for looking at desired system states and must be fully integrated and supportive to
 535 strategic objectives (see Figure 7).



536
 537 **Figure 7: Information Objectives In Support of Strategic Objectives**

538 Information Objectives will guide subsequent planning at all levels (e.g., decisive conditions,
 539 operational effects). Operational effects support the achievement of operational objectives. Thereby
 540 communication planning will concentrate on desired changes in the Information Environment and
 541 clearly indicate the operating direction of the effect.

542 **c. Themes and Master Messages**

543 Themes represent the subject or topic of communication in terms of a unifying or dominant idea of a
 544 message or set of messages. They guide message development at all levels and express the context to

545 be conveyed to audiences by Information Activities. Themes are *headlines* that indicate the issue of
546 concern for associated master messages.

547 Messages represent the substance of an act of communication transmitted by words, signals, or other
548 means from one person, station, or group to another; the point or points conveyed (intentionally or
549 unintentionally). Messages in communication plans or guidance express the intended content of
550 information exchange. They directly relate to audiences and targets of Information Activities and
551 inform the development of operational effects from a communication perspective, as they articulate
552 desired perceptions (as states of systems or system elements in the Information Environment).

553 Master messages are the most important, enduring, and high-level messages for framing Information
554 Activities. Master messages listed in the Information Strategy present initial, immediate guidance for
555 national initiatives and Information Activities at higher multinational levels.

556 All personnel involved in planning and execution of operations should be aware of the master
557 messages (and other Information Strategy content) in order to support the alignment of messaging by
558 JTF activity.

559 *d. Audiences and Targets*

560 The Information Strategy should also provide a list of audiences and targets, considering political
561 sensitivities of mission partners and the public.

562 Information Activities may be aimed at individuals, groups, populations (audiences) as well as technical
563 components of information systems (targets):

- 564 • **Audiences** could be (potential) adversary decision-makers, supporting opinion leaders and
565 opinion formers, and their followers.
- 566 • **Targets** could be the information infrastructure, IT and information-based processes of (potential)
567 adversaries; ultimately also humans may become targets, if non-kinetic action is ineffective.

568 Internal and domestic audiences, as well as multinational organisations (such as NATO, the EU, UN,
569 etc.) with a leading representation of partner nations, may be addressed by multinational Information
570 Activities. Identification of these audiences will require political consent amongst partners or allies.

571 International community audiences include other countries and individual actors abroad, in particular
572 from neighbouring countries to the host country, local influential countries, International
573 Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) involved in the region, to whom the
574 messages sent by the coalition need to be coordinated. Another category of audiences covers the

575 wider population of the host country, local media, formal and informal authorities, including the local
576 government(s) and affiliated opinion leaders and opinion formers.

577 Information Activities against targets, i.e., (kinetic) actions to create a deliberate effect on adversary
578 key leaders, physical components of information systems, or the Internet, may have strategic impact
579 as well and must, therefore, be subject to strategic-political guidance.

Chapter 3 – Communication Management at the Military Operational Level

A. The Commander's Responsibility

"The art of communication is the language of leadership." (James Humes)

Senior leaders have a pivotal role in communication efforts at all levels. Common guidance for coalition Information Activities issued by strategic-political authorities intends to minimise the risk of contradictory messaging by coalition partners, as it would result in a loss of credibility and, subsequently, ineffectiveness of operations. It is a leadership responsibility to implement superior communication guidance so that it becomes effective throughout all levels of involvement.

Integrated communication must build on helping the JTF senior leadership achieve their objectives by identifying important audiences, developing strategic and consistent messages and delivering those messages with maximum effectiveness. In this respect, it is of utmost importance to understand that, although personnel with assigned StratCom tasks may act on behalf of the Commander, the ultimate responsibility for JTF communication rests with the senior leadership.

Any separation or stove-piping of communicators and operators must be avoided in order to promote a common JTF identity and achieve coherent activity that contributes to a desired image of the JTF as a unified and capable organisation. Communication capabilities and functions must get actively involved in all analysis, planning, execution/management, and assessment/evaluation activity. Communication specialists should be key actors in the senior leadership's decision-making process.

The development of a corporate identity and image needs to be driven by the senior leadership who not only own, but naturally represent their organisation to external actors. If corporate identity constitutes the *persona* of the JTF, leaders are the *face*. Integrated communication incorporates several processes that need to be taken care of by the senior leadership and appropriate assisting functions in order to be implemented consistently and become effective. These processes materialise in so-called 'communication management tasks'.

B. Communication Management Tasks

The following tasks describe the scope of communication management involving a multitude of actors, including and beyond StratCom staff (see Chapter 4).

1. Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) constitutes an Information Activity in itself: designated superiors wield power and exercise authority and direction over subordinates through communication (e.g., issue

610 orders, instruct and motivate, explain the tactical situation, present a role model). Communication is
611 a leadership function to support unity of effort of the JTF. Commanders are the supreme
612 communicators and drivers of integrated communication. Those involved in communication
613 management should be authorised to issue direction and guidance to communication capabilities and
614 functions to ensure their integration with operations analysis, planning, execution and assessment.

615 **2. Analysis of the Information Environment** ¹¹

616 Situation awareness and understanding the Information Environment are inextricably entwined.
617 Analysis of the Information Environment enables the identification of action requirements,
618 opportunities and risks, and provides the baseline for the assessment of effects. It is a cross-
619 dimensional, transdisciplinary and continuous task, which needs to be performed by a highly qualified
620 staff. Analysis results must be translated and operationalized in order to benefit communication
621 capabilities and functions as well as operations planners, operators, and – finally – the Commander.

622 Applying the traditional PMESII systematic (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and
623 Information) can be useful to structure thought processes and the involvement of functional experts.
624 Compared to the other PMESII analysis areas there is no single academic field of knowledge to
625 comprehensively cover *Information*. Analysis of the Information Environment includes a variety of
626 different subjects such as the media, IT, leadership and social networks, and it also significantly
627 overlaps the other areas, e.g., political propaganda, military C2 structures, media industries, social
628 communication relations, and information infrastructure. Therefore, Information Analysts should
629 involve various Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and establish flexible expert networks that are linked
630 with the other analysis areas and fully integrated in the overall systemic analysis effort. They should
631 also ensure that results from digital media analysis, other Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and
632 classified information are fused, as required.

633 Analysis of the Information Environment always requires considering two dimensions in order to
634 appropriately advise operations planning, execution and assessment: (1) Most obviously, JTF actors
635 need to understand the potential *perception* of relevant audiences regarding JTF messages conveyed
636 by any means, kinetic or non-kinetic; (2) in addition, JTF actors need to understand the *expectations*
637 towards JTF activity, i.e., the potential consequences of inactivity or silence. Both dimensions and
638 related analysis results are equally important for designing Information Activities and choosing
639 between alternative options for action.

¹¹ Details on how to analyse the Information Environment can be found in the MNIOE Applied Concept and the MCDC 2013-14 Concept of Employment (see Bibliography).

640 3. Effects Development

641 An effect is the physical and/or behavioural state of a system that results from a military or non-military
642 action or set of actions. An effect can be thought of as an intermediate state, created by actions,
643 between the current state and the military objectives that support the end-state.

644 Effects provide a bridge of reason between end state and actions; the context for interagency
645 collaboration; and the basis for continuous assessment of the success of an operation. In order to
646 assure this functionality, it is paramount to accurately and succinctly convey the meaning of desired
647 effects to all involved in planning, execution and assessment. Effects statements should therefore
648 describe the conditions resulting from desired changes in the operational environment (or
649 intermediate system states – between current and end-state) in a comprehensive and comprehensible
650 way, following standard rules for verbalisation.

651 The text must consist of a concise statement identifying the *who* or *what* (system element(s)) is to be
652 affected and the *desired state* as a consequence of actions being undertaken. Importantly, the
653 requirement to focus on outcomes rather than activity necessitates that effects should be enunciated
654 as a past participle; they should not be referred to as transitive verbs which are more suited to describe
655 actions. Effect statements should also not infer how the effect is to be realised. Effects must be
656 measurable and allow to quantify observable system and attribute changes. Finally, effects must be
657 feasible, i.e. achievable in terms of timing and resources, and assignable to a functional lead for their
658 creation.

659 To impart the explicit meaning, the effects statement should conform to the following criteria:

- 660 • Express one idea, in passive voice, in simple language, and without adverbs.
- 661 • Address one or more systems at the operational level to identify what elements and/or
662 relationships need to change.
- 663 • Describe how the desired system state differs from the system state that precedes it.
- 664 • Do not suggest how the effect is to be realised.
- 665 • Include a time duration factor that indicates when the effect needs to exist.

666 Within the framework of StratCom, the same principles must be observed to describe effects to be
667 created in the Information Environment. The most important requirement in this respect is that effects
668 contributed through integrated communication must refer to information and/or information systems,
669 in particular Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and Command and Control Systems (C2S),
670 in order to fully integrate relevant communication aspects in the planning process.

671 Effects are developed to describe the physical or behavioural states that the JTF must cause to create
672 the desired military (operational) objectives. The purpose of this activity is to keep the staff focused
673 on the objectives, rather than actions and resources, drafting Courses of Action (COAs) via effects, i.e.,
674 multiple effects paths to reach a single end-state through decisive conditions and military objectives.

675 Operational effects shouldn't be developed into sub-effects since this process would complicate the
676 planning process while providing no additional value.

677 The development of effects in the Information Environment¹² in support of operational objectives and,
678 in particular, Information Objectives is a key task that collectively involves analysis, plans and
679 operations personnel. It must be based on a profound understanding of the Information Environment,
680 the mandate and mission objectives, as well as the available capabilities able to create respective
681 effects. The development of effects in the Information Environment needs to be guided from a
682 commander's perspective and fully integrated with and phrased as operational effects.

683 Effects development requires meetings of the Communication Coordination Working Group (CCWG)
684 and the Information Activities Working Group (IAWG) prior to respective JTF HQ planners' meetings to
685 include all relevant functional and capability expertise and viewpoints.

686 **4. Contribution to Targeting**

687 All actions, kinetic and non-kinetic, have an effect on the Information Environment (lethal or non-
688 lethal), either in a positive manner – in closing the say-do gap – or negatively by contradicting the JTF's
689 message to audiences within and outside the JOA. Negative effects from such things as collateral
690 damage and especially civilian casualties have the potential to significantly damage support for the
691 JTF's mission. For this reason, the potential effect of actions should be taken into consideration from
692 the outset of the joint targeting cycle. Information analysts and planners, as well as Info Ops and PA
693 staffs, should be included at every level of the targeting process.

694 **5. Activity Planning**

695 Activity planning constitutes the lower end of operations planning. Its aim is to examine the range of
696 possible (and probable) cause-and-effect relationships between potential actions and desired effects

¹² NATO defines "information effects" as desired conditions created in the Information Environment as a result of Information Activities. This terminology does not conform with effects-based language (an *effect* is a change in the state of a system) and confuses the definition and understanding of Information Objectives, which are considered necessary elements of strategic-political communication guidance. Furthermore, integration of communication in operations planning forbids the introduction of separate terms in addition to *operational effects*. This handbook, therefore, does not use the term "information effect". Instead, the phrase *effects in the Information Environment* is applied to specify operational effects resulting from activities in this engagement space.

697 in order to identify the actions needed to cause the desired effects.

698 Subsequently – but still within the activity planning process – the staff must identify and continuously
699 review the resources to be used in the conduct of each military action (match resources to actions).
700 Further, the staff must determine whether any military resources might be necessary to support other
701 coalition/government organization (non-military¹³) actions. It is likely that while the planning staff will
702 provide guidance on the actions, it will be the decision of the subordinate commands to develop
703 actions in more detail and allocate the resources. As a result, the level of effort during this step at the
704 CC level will likely be greater than that at the JTF HQ.

705 Planning of Information Activities is an original task and competence of capabilities that are able to
706 create effects in the Information Environment themselves. Planning may be guided by StratCom and
707 advised by communication functions (such as Info Ops); the ultimate responsibility, however, to decide
708 on the concrete employment of means and assets rests with the force capabilities that are cognizant,
709 trained and equipped for their specific scope of activities.

710 Activity planning requires meetings of the CCWG and the IAWG prior to respective JTF HQ planners
711 meetings to develop and de-conflict possible actions that can be conducted by the relevant capabilities
712 to create identified effects in the Information Environment; support the creation of other effects by
713 conducting Information Activities; and to identify support requirements of military capabilities and
714 non-military actors to create effects in the Information Environment (supported/supporting roles).

715 **6. Coordination**

716 Coordination is a key task and main responsibility of StratCom to promote the integration of
717 communication in all aspects of operations planning, execution and assessment. Therefore, StratCom
718 needs to manage the appropriate involvement of all communication capabilities and functions in the
719 JTF HQ staff routine. Effective and efficient communication requires harmonisation and
720 synchronization of Information Activities. Furthermore, activities designed to create effects in the
721 Information Environment need to be coordinated with other force activities and manoeuvre
722 operations that – through human perception – affect the Information Environment as well.

723 **7. Direct Communication**

724 Direct communication promotes the principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity. Therefore,

¹³ Non-military = not belonging to, characteristic of, or involving the armed forces. A civilian is a person who is not a member of the military or of a police or firefighting force. As the latter two categories should not be excluded from planning considerations – in particular in peace support or stability operations –, the term *non-military* is chosen here in preference to *civilian*.

725 opportunities to directly address internal and external audiences should be sought and planned for
726 whenever and wherever possible. In principle, the personal commitment of the senior leadership is
727 the preferred option. Because communication managers are communicators at the same time, the
728 HQ's communication capabilities and functions need to act carefully synchronized to convey the right
729 messages to their colleagues and counterparts.

730 **8. Media Communication**

731 Larger audiences can be best reached by using media channels with wider reach. The JTF disposes of
732 own media capabilities (such as PA and PSYOPS) and may also employ public or commercial media –
733 e.g., by contracting, buying news time and newspaper inserts; by giving selected information at
734 compulsory media opportunities; or through embedded journalists. Once released into the public
735 domain, the original information is no longer under JTF control. Therefore, in order to sustain the
736 principles of transparency, credibility and authenticity, media outlets need to be coordinated and
737 documented.

738 **9. Assessment of Effects**

739 Driving and shaping JTF communication requires dynamic and prompt measurement of effectiveness
740 in order to design and appropriately adjust effects and activities. This task needs to be closely linked
741 to the continuous analysis of the Information Environment, which provides the baseline for change
742 assessment, and to effects development and activity planning.

743 Assessment of effects is part of the wider operations assessment process led by J5. Depending on the
744 envisioned participation of JTF HQ staff in assessment team meetings, prior meetings of the CCWG
745 and/or the IAWG are required to coordinate communication input. Communication capabilities and
746 functions contribute to the development and evaluation of Measures of Performance (MOP) and
747 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).

748 **10. Education and Training**

749 Integration of communication in all plans and activities, and advancing the new mind-set towards
750 awareness and perception of the Information Environment, requires the assistance of communication
751 Specialists during staff processes and working routines as well as general communication training for
752 all (which constitutes a communication management function itself). Internal leadership and staff
753 development programs should enhance the accountability of all members of the JTF as
754 communicators, promote the mission Narrative, evolve the corporate identity and image of the JTF,
755 and in turn contribute to overall mission success. It is the Commander's responsibility to ensure that

756 properly trained personnel are empowered through training and education opportunities in order to
757 facilitate these requirements.

758 Led by StratCom and based on the Commander's guidance, the JTF HQ staff as well as subordinate
759 commanders need to involve in education and training programs that support the development of the
760 mind-set of integrated communication. Each and every member of the JTF must acknowledge the fact
761 of not being able to not communicate, and implement this in their plans and actions – shaping the
762 *body language*¹⁴ of the JTF's operations.

763 Staff education programs also serve the purpose of promoting situation awareness, information
764 exchange, transparency, and a common understanding of the Commander's intent related to the
765 Information Environment. Cross-functional individualised training should be considered extremely
766 important as it will help communication and coordination amongst all staff elements. Leadership
767 development efforts should include the commanders and key leaders of the JTF. It is a primary
768 responsibility of the Dir StratCom as the senior communication specialist to plan and conduct these
769 activities. In addition, the permanent advice of the Dir StratCom to the Commander will contribute to
770 the achievement of a better understanding of his role in the Information Environment.

771 **C. StratCom's Role in Communication Management**

772 Personnel with assigned StratCom duties (e.g., the StratCom Directorate, Information Analysts, and
773 Information Planners) working in a deployed military HQ at the operational level should assume the
774 following tasks. Most of these are continuous tasks throughout the operation.

- 775 • Translate political-strategic policy and guidance into the Commander's decision-making process
776 from a communication perspective.
 - 777 ○ Review the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD) in order to understand the strategic-
778 political will to achieve by the operation.
 - 779 ○ Analyse the Information Environment focused on the situation and developments in
780 the assigned JOA.
 - 781 ○ Interpret the SPD and the Information Strategy in the light of mission requirements.

¹⁴ The term 'body language' usually depicts nonverbal, unconscious communication through postures, gestures, facial expressions, and the like. In the context of military operations, it refers to the perception of observers (such as the media or the local populace) and their interpretations of the military intent and effects. An example is the force's Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), which ideally should be purposefully designed to send the right message to audiences concerned.

- 782 ○ Develop guidance for the operational-level planning process from a communication
783 perspective.
- 784 • Contribute to developing and maintaining a common understanding of the Information Strategy
785 within the JTF in the context of other actors' communication efforts.
- 786 ○ Share the Information Strategy with all key JTF personnel.
- 787 ○ Explain the relevance of the Information Strategy to JTF operations.
- 788 ○ Develop an understanding of relevant other actors' communication efforts (e.g., those
789 of coalition partners, the Host Nation, opposing forces, etc.).
- 790 ○ Advise / inform the JTF on other actors' communication efforts.
- 791 • Coordinate recommendations for revision of higher level communication guidance.
- 792 ○ Collect and fuse insights on the situation development from various JTF, mission
793 partner, and Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) sources related to the Information
794 Environment.
- 795 ○ Relate situation assessments with existing communication guidance in order to
796 identify challenges, risks and opportunities for implementation of this guidance.
- 797 ○ Collaboratively develop recommendations for adjustment of higher level
798 communication guidance with JTF communication capabilities and functions.
- 799 • Provide bottom-up feedback on higher level activity affecting the Information Environment.
- 800 ○ Identify higher level activities that could be relevant for JTF communication efforts.
- 801 ○ Evaluate the impact (positive or negative) of higher level activities on the
802 implementation of the Information Strategy / achievement of JTF objectives with
803 respect to the Information Environment.
- 804 ○ Collaboratively develop reports to higher levels on the assessment of their activities
805 with JTF communication capabilities and functions.
- 806 • Coordinate operational-level communication guidance with strategic authorities.
- 807 ○ Share draft operational-level communication guidance with the custodian of the
808 Information Strategy (informal).
- 809 ○ Advise operations planning based on feedback from the strategic authorities on draft
810 operational-level communication guidance.

- 811 • Direct all internal and external communication processes of the JTF at the operational level on
812 behalf of the Commander.
- 813 ○ Exercise the Commander’s authority to ensure consistency and effectiveness of all JTF
814 internal and external communication efforts.
- 815 ○ Assist in operations planning and assessment, and provide advice from a
816 communication perspective.
- 817 ○ Lead operational-level communication planning.
- 818 ○ Advise on the integration of kinetic and non-kinetic activities affecting the Information
819 Environment.
- 820 ○ Design education and training programs for JTF personnel on communication issues
821 and manage corporate identity campaigns.
- 822 ○ Advise on the development of directives and orders from JTF HQ to subordinates.
- 823 ○ Guide communication efforts of subordinate commands.
- 824 ○ Ensure the alignment of JTF spokesperson’s statements addressing external audiences
825 with JTF communication guidance.
- 826 ○ Develop directives that guide the overall approach to, and use of digital media, and
827 interaction through Social Media platforms.
- 828 ○ As appropriate, engage in approval processes for products (e.g., Internet postings,
829 news releases, leaflets) to be used for Information Activities.
- 830 ○ Develop and update the communication parts of the JTF HQ SOP.
- 831 • Liaise and coordinate communication efforts with neighbouring commands and other
832 organisations and stakeholders in theatre.
- 833 ○ Identify appropriate communication counterparts.
- 834 ○ Establish working relationships and/or information sharing mechanisms with
835 communication counterparts.
- 836 ○ Share communication guidance or releasable excerpts from planning products with
837 communication counterparts, as appropriate.
- 838 ○ Advise civil-military interaction from a communication perspective.

- 839 • Contribute to facilitating the group effort of JTF HQ staff functions and capabilities involved in
840 communication management.
- 841 ○ Prepare and conduct the Information Strategy Board (ISB).
- 842 ○ Establish the CCWG as the venue and process for implementing communication
843 guidance in JTF HQ staff activities and beyond.
- 844 ○ Participate in operations planning, campaign synchronization and joint coordination
845 processes and provide communication input.
- 846 ○ As appropriate, manage the involvement of communication specialists from strategic
847 and tactical levels, mission partners, and the Host Nation in the CCWG.
- 848 ○ Integrate, coordinate and harmonise communication specialists' contributions to JTF
849 HQ staff activities.
- 850 • Contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the situation and dynamics in the Information
851 Environment, and its relevance for the JTF mission and operations.
- 852 ○ Guide and conduct systemic analysis of the Information Environment.
- 853 ○ Integrate results from Information Environment analysis in the development of the
854 Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE).
- 855 • Guide and assist KLE planning and execution.
- 856 ○ Develop and coordinate intended outcomes for KLE meetings.
- 857 ○ Coordinate JTF key leaders' involvement in KLE meetings.
- 858 ○ Direct the development of tactical background information on external stakeholders.
- 859 ○ Provide oversight to the Info Ops integration of KLE in the JTF targeting process.
- 860 • Ensure JTF communication efforts are documented.
- 861 ○ Collect, distribute and archive materials on own activities affecting the Information
862 Environment in support of creating an institutional memory that provides the context
863 for future communication efforts (e.g., to avoid undesired duplication of effort, avoid
864 contradictory messaging, and to enable building on previous achievements).
- 865 ○ Guide and coordinate the contributions of other JTF HQ staff and subordinates to
866 communication documentation

Chapter 4 – Organisation of Military Strategic Communication

A. Headquarters Staff Involved in Communication Management

1. The Strategic Communication Directorate

In current crisis response operations there are several options for organising a military operational-level HQ. For the purpose of this concept, a generic HQ organisation is applied as a baseline for further elaborations on the appropriate integration of communication (see Figure 8).¹⁵




Figure 8: Positioning of StratCom in a Generic HQ Organisation

Communication management involves a number of traditional staff elements, which should be complemented by a dedicated StratCom staff, Information Analysts and Information Planners.

It is suggested that the Director StratCom (Dir StratCom) with assistants forms a staff element within the Command Group of a JTF HQ – the **StratCom Directorate** – in order to provide direct support to the Commander, emphasise the importance of communication as a leadership responsibility, and promote the Dir StratCom's authority to provide direction and guidance on behalf of the Commander.

¹⁵ This generic example is derived from NATO doctrine on Joint Force Headquarters Management Processes, and organisational designs of NATO JFC HQs, ISAF HQ and IJC 2014.

881 *a. Director Strategic Communication*

882 **Role:** The Dir StratCom assists the senior leadership in all aspects of integrated communication. He
883 coordinates communication guidance with strategic authorities and directs all internal and external
884 communication processes of the JTF at the operational level on behalf of the Commander. The Dir
885 StratCom coordinates communication efforts with neighbouring commands and other organisations
886 and stakeholders in theatre, and guides respective communication efforts of subordinate commands.

887 **Status:** The Dir StratCom must not outrank the COM (4*) or DCOM (3*), but should have sufficient
888 seniority to act on par with the COS, DCOS and ACOS. This may be a military post in the rank of a 2*
889 flag / general officer or a civilian post in the rank of Director or Counsellor (Senior Executive Service,
890 SES). Both options may have a deputy, either a civilian in the rank of Secretary or Attaché (General
891 Schedule, GS) or a military (field-grade or senior officer) in the Army rank of Brigadier (1*) or Colonel
892 (or equivalent).

893 **Authority:** The Dir StratCom should be granted the authority to require consultation between JTF
894 agencies (organisations or commands and their representatives) for all issues related to JTF
895 communication. Within his responsibility for integrating internal and external communication
896 processes the Dir StratCom should also be authorised to directly address all members of the JTF HQ as
897 well as communication specialists of subordinate commands.

898 Using relevant working groups, boards, centres and cells, and their meetings in the HQ's staff routine
899 / battle rhythm for coordination with communication capabilities and functions, the Dir StratCom
900 should be equipped with coordinating authority¹⁶. Within the scope of the Dir StratCom's coordinating
901 authority it is important to understand who the appropriate problem-solving authorities are once an
902 issue needs to be referred to someone else for decision. This may not necessarily always be the direct
903 superior at the operational level, but could, e.g., involve the strategic authorities as well as a
904 Component Commander in case of tactical urgency or functional responsibility (principle of
905 subsidiarity).

906 Direct liaison should be authorised for the Dir StratCom to coordinate and cooperate with strategic
907 and mission partner authorities regarding JTF communication issues.

908 **Qualification:** The Dir StratCom has to be a manager, a smart consumer of consulting services, and a

¹⁶ The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or activities involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). The person with assigned coordinating authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

909 problem-solver. There must be a comfort level with a range of subject matters, from marketing and
910 media relations issues to human resources or legal matters. The best person to drive that integration
911 process is someone with the largest possible view of how the processes should work. The Dir StratCom
912 should be a generalist, but rooted in at least one specialty (e.g., PA or Info Ops) and with enough
913 experience in several disciplines to manage them effectively. He should have a clear understanding of
914 intended messaging and how the JTF responds to incoming information and inquiries. He must be able
915 to facilitate open dialogue to build strong relationships with important stakeholders and should fully
916 understand the value and role that third-party endorsements play in managing perceptions or
917 perpetuating misperceptions. The Dir StratCom needs to be a counsellor to senior leadership. He must
918 be proficient at playing the primary advisory role to the Commander, and in certain situations as being
919 the organisation's spokesperson¹⁷. He should be a skilled public speaker, have established relationships
920 with leaders, and be deeply knowledgeable with every facet of the JTF organisation, in particular with
921 the operations planning and campaign synchronization processes.

922 *b. Staff Officers Strategic Communication*

923 **Role:** The SOs StratCom assist the Dir StratCom for all intents and purposes. In this respect, the Dir
924 StratCom's role is mirrored in the roles of the SOs at a lower level of competency and higher
925 granularity. Their focus is on coordination, support, and dissemination of direction and guidance on
926 behalf of the Dir StratCom. They coordinate communication guidance with other authorities and
927 support all JTF HQ internal and external communication processes with special emphasis on
928 communication planning. They coordinate communication efforts with neighbouring commands and
929 other organisations and stakeholders in theatre, and impart respective guidance to subordinate
930 commands.

931 **Status:** The SOs StratCom should have sufficient seniority (in rank and/or expertise) to act on par with
932 Branch heads or Section chiefs, as well as with representatives of the JTF HQ Special Staff. This may
933 require military posts in the rank of field-grade or senior officers (Army ranks of Major, Lieutenant
934 Colonel or Colonel, or equivalent) and/or equivalent civilian posts (GS).

935 **Authority:** The SOs StratCom should be granted the authority to require consultation between JTF HQ
936 staff elements and communication specialists of subordinate commands, on behalf of the Dir
937 StratCom, for all issues related to JTF communication.

¹⁷ Acting as the JTF spokesperson is not a role of the Dir StratCom but a responsibility of the PA staff. However, the Dir StratCom should be trained in speaking to the media and thoroughly understand the professional attitudes and intentions of journalists.

938 Direct liaison should be authorised for the SOs StratCom to coordinate and cooperate with HHQ and
939 mission partner authorities regarding JTF communication issues.

940 In case there isn't a Deputy to the Dir StratCom technically established in the StratCom Directorate,
941 the SO StratCom performing this function may have comparable authority in the absence of the Dir
942 StratCom.

943 **Qualification:** The SOs StratCom should be communication experts, trained in at least one
944 communication discipline (communication capability or function, e.g., PA or Info Ops). They should be
945 generalists able to manage several communication disciplines effectively. The SOs StratCom should
946 have a clear understanding of the JTF intended messaging and how the JTF responds to incoming
947 information and media inquiries. They should have established relationships with leaders, and be
948 generally knowledgeable with every facet of the JTF organisation, in particular with the operations
949 planning process.

950 Depending on the scope of mission, the JTF design, the JTF HQ set-up, and the number of available
951 posts, the tasks and responsibilities – and consequently the required qualification – may vary between
952 the incumbents.

953 *c. StratCom Directorate Supporting Staff*

954 The StratCom Directorate needs adequate administrative support. This support should be provided by
955 personnel affiliated to the StratCom Directorate. As a minimum, a Military Assistant (MA) to the Dir
956 StratCom, one or more interpreters, and a Staff Assistant (SA) should be established.

957 Their roles *inter alia* comprise: calendar management, taking minutes, IT support, making meeting
958 arrangements, (local) language support, drafting presentations, preparing staff summary sheets,
959 clerical work, etc.

960 **2. Information Analysts**

961 **Role:** The Information Analysts assist all analysis and assessment processes from a communication
962 perspective. This includes fusion of data and information related to the Information Environment from
963 various sources, and guidance to Intelligence development. Information Analysts provide expertise to
964 all relevant staff elements and activities, thus promoting awareness and understanding of the
965 Information Environment.

966 **Status:** Information Analysts are integral members of the J2 INTEL division (or equivalent) and work as
967 desk officers in the Plans and Production sections. Information Analysts should fill military posts in the
968 rank of field-grade or senior officers (Army ranks of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent) and/or
969 equivalent civilian posts (Senior Specialist). It is worth pursuing a mix of civil and military incumbents

970 to cover a broader scope of views from different personal backgrounds. Information Analysts should
971 be recognised as affiliates of the StratCom Directorate with functional reporting relationships to the
972 Dir StratCom.

973 **Qualification:** The primary qualification requirement for Information Analysts is to perform systemic
974 analysis. They should be competent to conduct an interdisciplinary analysis and assessment of the
975 Information Environment across the PMESII¹⁸ domains, considering the information factor throughout.
976 Information Analysts need to be familiar with general Knowledge Development (KD) and INTEL
977 procedures, processes and tools applied by the J2 division. A specific contribution from an integrated
978 communication perspective will be required to the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational
979 Environment (CPOE). This includes familiarity with and active involvement in the joint targeting
980 process. Information Analysts also need to be team players, able to fully integrate in various different
981 groups, and planning and coordination processes within the HQ staff routine. They must understand
982 military thinking and be able to *operationalize* academic insight in order to incorporate the information
983 factor in the CPOE, OLPP, targeting and assessment. Training in one or more communication
984 capabilities (such as PA or PSYOPS) would be an optional and complementary qualification
985 requirement for Information Analysts. Experience in Target Audience Analysis (TAA) or media analysis
986 may benefit their systemic analysis of the Information Environment. Information Analysts – provided
987 additional functional training – could also be employed as Information Planners.

988 3. Staff Officer StratCom Joint Effects

989 An additional SO StratCom position may be established in J3 Joint Effects.

990 **Role:** The main task of the SO StratCom Joint Effects is to promote the integration of kinetic and non-
991 kinetic activities, and, if required, bridge a potential gap between Fires and Info Ops in this respect.
992 There may be a misperception on both sides that, for instance, Info Ops would only take care of non-
993 kinetic actions or so-called 'soft communication channels', and Fires were not involved in affecting the
994 Information Environment at all. To mitigate this issue, direct advice and support from an internal
995 member of the J3 division – not belonging to either section – could be advantageous.

996 **Status:** The SO StratCom Joint Effects is an integral member of the J3 Operations division and works as
997 a desk officer in the Joint Effects staff element. He should fill a military post in the rank of field-grade
998 or senior officers (Army ranks of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent). The SO StratCom Joint
999 Effects should be recognised as an affiliate of the StratCom Directorate with functional reporting
1000 relationships to the Dir StratCom.

¹⁸ Cf. Section B-2 of Chapter 3 "Analysis of the Information Environment".

1001 **Qualification:** The SO StratCom Joint Effects should be trained and experienced in joint targeting and
1002 campaign synchronization at the military operational level. In addition, he should be trained in at least
1003 one communication capability or function, such as PA, PSYOPS or Info Ops, and have a sound
1004 understanding of the principles of integrated communication.

1005 **4. Information Planners**

1006 **Role:** The Information Planners assist in operations planning and assessment, and provide advice to all
1007 relevant staff elements and activities based on analysis and assessment of the Information
1008 Environment. They consolidate communication planning input from other JTF HQ staff and subordinate
1009 commands.

1010 **Status:** Information Planners are integral members of the J5 Plans division and work as desk officers in
1011 the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) branch. Information Planners should fill military posts in
1012 the rank of field-grade or senior officers (Army ranks of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent).
1013 Information Planners should be recognised as affiliates of the StratCom Directorate with a functional
1014 reporting relationship to the Dir StratCom.

1015 **Qualification:** Information Planners need to be proficient in all aspects of operations planning. They
1016 contribute their comprehensive understanding of the Information Environment as a core competence
1017 to planning and assessment of operations. The main function of Information Planners is the
1018 development of effects in the Information Environment and related indicators and metrics in
1019 conjunction with Info Ops and force capabilities, as appropriate. In order to do so, Information Planners
1020 should be trained in at least one communication capability or function, such as PA, PSYOPS or Info Ops.
1021 Information Planners – provided additional functional training – could also be employed as Information
1022 Analysts.

1023 **5. Staff Officer StratCom CIMIC**

1024 An additional SO StratCom position may be established in J9 CIMIC.

1025 **Role:** The main task of the SO StratCom CIMIC is to ensure that communication guidance is
1026 appropriately considered in civil-military engagements, and that the assessment of the civil situation
1027 is taken into account by StratCom.

1028 **Status:** The SO StratCom CIMIC is an integral member of the J9 CIMIC division and works as a desk
1029 officer either in the CIMIC Plans or Operations section. He should fill a military post in the rank of field-
1030 grade or senior officers (Army ranks of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent). The SO StratCom

1031 CIMIC should be recognised as an affiliate of the StratCom Directorate with a functional reporting
1032 relationship to the Dir StratCom.

1033 **Qualification:** The SO StratCom CIMIC should be trained and experienced in CIMIC / Civil-Military
1034 Interaction (CMI) at the military operational level. In addition, he should be trained in at least one
1035 communication capability or function, such as PA, PSYOPS or Info Ops, and have a sound understanding
1036 of the principles of integrated communication.

1037 **6. Military Public Affairs**

1038 In the military, Public Affairs (PA) is commonly understood as the function responsible to promote
1039 politically approved aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and
1040 understanding of military aspects of crisis management / crisis response involvements. This *inter alia*
1041 includes planning and conducting external (media relations and outreach activities) and internal
1042 communication, and community relations.

1043 The mission of military PA – within the scope of *Freedom of Information* – is to support commanders
1044 by communicating accurate information in a timely manner to audiences to improve public awareness
1045 and understanding of the military aspects of the coalition's role, aims, operations, missions, activities
1046 and issues, thereby enhancing its credibility.

1047 Military PA is a communication capability in its own right, possessing own assets for conducting
1048 Information Activities. It is part of the wider StratCom effort which aims to enhance coherence of all
1049 information and communication activities and capabilities, both civilian and military.

1050 Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) primarily communicate through the media. Audiences can be
1051 allied/coalition, international, regional, local or internal, depending on the issue or activity. PAOs also
1052 contribute to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

1053 The Chief Public Affairs Officer (CPAO) supports the Commander's StratCom process by ensuring that
1054 PA actions, plans and objectives are coordinated as part of the broader StratCom effort. The
1055 Commander's StratCom structure must not affect the direct link of the spokesperson or the CPAO to
1056 the Commander, nor modify the inter-relationships between the different information disciplines.

1057 Beyond coordination of efforts and messages, and being informed of these activities, PA will have no
1058 role in planning or executing PSYOPS or deception operations. However, since all coalition messaging
1059 needs to be fully integrated throughout the operation, PA shall align their activities in terms of timing,
1060 sequencing, and completeness of published content.

1061 The CPA at each level of command directly supports the Commander and may therefore not be further
1062 delegated or subordinated to other staff functions.¹⁹ The CPAO as the principal advisor on PA matters
1063 reports directly to the Commander. For general communication guidance issues, however, the CPAO
1064 has a functional reporting relationship to the Dir StratCom.

1065 **7. Information Operations**

1066 Info Ops is a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate Information Activities to create desired
1067 effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and approved
1068 audiences in support of mission objectives. Info Ops is not a capability in its own right, i.e., this staff
1069 function does not perform actions to affect the Information Environment itself.

1070 Info Ops is also an advisory and coordination function for military Information Activities. Commanders
1071 at operational and tactical level ensure through the Info Ops function that all military Information
1072 Activities are properly coordinated as well as integrated into the operational planning process and
1073 support the overall StratCom approach.

1074 While the StratCom focus is on policy-making and guidance, the focus of Info Ops clearly is on the
1075 practical execution of that guidance in close cooperation with force capabilities.

1076 The Info Ops staff conducts collaborative effects development and activity planning regarding the
1077 Information Environment. Guided by the Dir StratCom, the Info Ops staff is the instrument for
1078 coordinating contributions of communication capabilities – at the JTF HQ and from subordinate
1079 commands – to the operations planning process. Therefore, the Chief Info Ops has a functional
1080 reporting relationship to the Dir StratCom for general communication guidance issues.

1081 **8. Psychological Operations**

1082 Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are planned activities using methods of communication and other
1083 means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour,
1084 affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.

1085 PSYOPS constitute a force capability, which – along with other capabilities – will be coordinated
1086 through Info Ops processes guided by the Information Strategy and within the overall StratCom
1087 approach.

1088 PSYOPS forces will be task-organized for specific missions, and their composition will be based upon
1089 mission, size of the JOA, the psychological situation, the communications infrastructure/media

¹⁹ There are several options to organise a JTF HQ, e.g., as proposed by NATO StratCom. Placing PA as part of a larger communication directorate would not compromise the direct CPAO support to the commander.

1090 environment, composition and capability of adversary forces and indigenous populations and so on.
1091 Normally PSYOPS support will be provided by a Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
1092 (CJPOTF). Alternatively, a PSYOPS Support Element (PSE) may be integrated into the JTF HQ when there
1093 is no PSYOPS lead nation, or other limitations and considerations prevent the formation of a CJPOTF
1094 (Theatre PSYOPS Support Element, TPSE).

1095 The Commander CJPOTF (or Chief TPSE) acts as the primary PSYOPS advisor to the COM JTF. He has a
1096 functional reporting relationship to the Dir StratCom for general communication guidance issues.

1097 **9. Other Staff Involved in the Communication Management Process**

1098 ***a. Chief of Staff***

1099 The Chief of Staff (COS) is a principal advisor to the Commander. He coordinates the work of the staff
1100 divisions to ensure that the staff pulls together as a team. In this respect, he assists the building of a
1101 corporate identity and enables the appropriate involvement of key staff elements in the
1102 communication management process.

1103 ***b. Legal Advisor***

1104 The Legal Advisor (LEGAD) is the principal advisor to the Commander concerning national and
1105 international law and mandates, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and all legal matters arising from the
1106 presence of the JTF in the JOA. He advises on legal implications, including ROE, of proposed Information
1107 Activities. He also advises the targeting process in concert with Information Analysts and Planners, and
1108 the Info Ops and PA staffs.

1109 ***c. Political Advisor***

1110 The Political Advisor (POLAD) is the Commander's principal advisor on policy, and local, national,
1111 regional and international political issues, including the JTF's relationship with coalition partner
1112 nations, the Host Nation, and IOs and NGOs. In this respect, the POLAD may closely coordinate with
1113 relevant stakeholders on behalf of the Commander. The POLAD advises on policy implications of
1114 proposed Information Activities. He supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and
1115 assessment of the Information Environment.

1116 ***d. Cultural Advisor***

1117 The Cultural Advisor (CULAD) provides expertise on local languages, customs, religion, art, symbols,
1118 etc. relevant to the JTF operation. He offers a conduit to better understand foreign societies and
1119 communicate effectively. The CULAD supports the targeting process and contributes to analysis and
1120 assessment of the Information Environment. He advises on cultural implications of proposed

1121 Information Activities, including ethnological, religious and social aspects. He also contributes to cross-
1122 cultural awareness and, through cultural knowledge education and foreign language training,
1123 enhanced intercultural communicative competence of the JTF.

1124 *e. Gender Advisor*

1125 Military operations in today's world require a diversity of qualifications and resources to ensure that
1126 peace and security are achieved and maintained. The complementary skills of both male and female
1127 personnel are essential for the effectiveness of JTF operations. The Gender Advisor (GENAD) assists to
1128 integrate a gender perspective into all aspects of operations. In particular, the GENAD can provide
1129 advice regarding gender equity and women empowerment, and contributes to cross-cultural
1130 awareness and enhanced intercultural communicative competence of the JTF.

1131 *f. Chaplain*

1132 The Chaplain is responsible for the spiritual ministry and pastoral support to soldiers and their families
1133 in a range of challenging environments. He may contribute religious and cultural assessments to the
1134 StratCom process.

1135 *g. Director of Staff*

1136 The Director of Staff (DOS) *inter alia* is responsible for Information Management (IM) and, therefore,
1137 has a key role in ensuring an effective flow of information in support of all staff activities and
1138 communication management.

1139 *h. Liaison Officers*

1140 The Liaison Officers (LOs) assist cooperation and information exchange between the JTF HQ, higher
1141 command, adjacent units, the Host Nation, troops contributing nations, International Organisations
1142 (IOs) involved in the operation, and supporting forces / commands assigned to the JTF.

1143 *i. J1 Manpower Management*

1144 J1 identifies personnel requirements and advises on staff development programs.

1145 *j. J2 Intelligence*

1146 The J2 INTEL division is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevant Intelligence to
1147 meet the JTF's operational and security requirements, and maintain situation awareness. J2 supports
1148 the targeting process and contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information Environment as
1149 part of the CPOE.

1150 ***k. J3 Operations***

1151 The J3 Operations (Ops) division acts as the focal point through which the Commander directs the
1152 conduct of an operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources. J3 assesses
1153 the status and capabilities of assigned forces, specifies tasks for subordinate units based on the OPLAN,
1154 and leads campaign synchronization. J3 is responsible for the integration of effects and activities into
1155 the JTF HQ's deliberate short and mid-term planning process. J3 – in close cooperation with J2 and J5
1156 – manages the targeting process and contributes to analysis and assessment of the Information
1157 Environment.

1158 ***l. J5 Plans***

1159 The J5 Plans division leads the planning for future operations and coordinates these efforts within the
1160 JTF HQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil authorities. J5 supports activity
1161 planning and the assessment of the Information Environment.

1162 ***m. J6 Command & Control Support***

1163 J6 identifies Communications and Information Systems (CIS) vulnerabilities and develops procedures
1164 and capabilities to protect friendly battle management and Consultation, Command, Control,
1165 Communications and Information (C4I) systems. J6 develops INFOSEC plans and supports the
1166 development of OPSEC plans. J6 also assesses the impact of adversary Information Activities on own
1167 systems.

1168 ***n. J9 Civil-Military Cooperation***

1169 The J9 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) division is responsible for civil-military liaison activities and
1170 advising the Commander on the implications of all activities undertaken that concern the relations
1171 between the armed forces, local governments, civil population, IOs, NGOs, and other agencies of the
1172 countries where the JTF is deployed, employed and supported. When performing its liaison function,
1173 J9 becomes an important communication agent to directly convey JTF messages and contribute to the
1174 assessment of the Information Environment.

1175 ***o. J-ENG Engineers Support***

1176 The role of engineers is significant in relation to StratCom because of the particular visibility of
1177 engineers' achievements and their special capacity of contributing to Host Nation reconstruction. The
1178 Chief Engineer advises on capabilities and assessments that support Information Objectives.

1179 *p. J-MED Medical and Health Services Support*

1180 Medical support and assistance may have an enormous psychological impact on local/regional
1181 audiences. The Chief Medical advises on capabilities and assessments that support Information
1182 Objectives.

1183 **10. Command and Control Arrangements**

1184 Command and Control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
1185 individual over assigned resources in the accomplishment of a common goal. The implementation of
1186 StratCom to accomplish integrated communication at a JTF HQ requires the establishment of a
1187 designated staff element – the StratCom Directorate – and the definition of its working / reporting
1188 relationships with other related staff elements, in particular PA, J2, J3, J5 and J9 (in a traditional J-staff
1189 organisation), and PSYOPS.

1190 *a. Administrative Reporting Relationship*

1191 An administrative reporting relationship establishes a clear line of authority between positions or units
1192 in the organizational hierarchy. The actions of the subordinate are subject to the **direction and/or**
1193 **approval** of the next higher level of management, irrespective of the autonomy the latter may choose
1194 to grant to, or withhold from, subordinate levels. Subordinate positions never report administratively
1195 to more than one higher level supervisor.

1196 Administrative reporting relationships should be established between (superior – subordinate):

- 1197 • the Commander and the Dir StratCom;
- 1198 • the Commander and the COM CJPOTF (or Chief TPSE);
- 1199 • the Dir StratCom and the SOs StratCom;
- 1200 • the COS and the CPAO;
- 1201 • the ACOS J2 / Branch heads / Section chiefs and J2 Information Analysts;
- 1202 • the ACOS J3 / Branch heads / Section chiefs and the SO StratCom Joint Effects (if established);
- 1203 • the ACOS J3 / Branch heads / Section chiefs and Chief Info Ops;
- 1204 • the ACOS J5 / Branch heads / Section chiefs and J5 Information Planners;
- 1205 • the ACOS J9 / Branch heads / Section chiefs and the SO StratCom CIMIC (if established).

1206 *b. Functional Reporting Relationship*

1207 A functional reporting relationship establishes a connection between positions or organizational units
1208 at different management levels based on the specialized nature of the function for which a mutual
1209 responsibility is shared. In this type of situation – often referred to as an indirect reporting relationship

1210 – the higher-level position or unit provides functional **guidance and support** to positions or units lower
1211 in the organizational structure. There is no formal line of authority in a strictly functional relationship.

1212 Functional reporting relationships should be established between (higher – lower):

- 1213 • the Dir StratCom and the CPAO;
- 1214 • the Dir StratCom and the COM CJPOTF (or Chief TPSE);
- 1215 • the Dir StratCom and the J2 Information Analysts;
- 1216 • the Dir StratCom and the SO StratCom Joint Effects (if established);
- 1217 • the Dir StratCom and the J3 Chief Info Ops;
- 1218 • the Dir StratCom and the J5 Information Planners;
- 1219 • the Dir StratCom and the SO StratCom CIMIC (if established).

1220 **B. StratCom in the Headquarters Staff Routine / Battle Rhythm**

1221 **1. Meetings, Boards and Working Groups**

1222 The following constitutes a generic list of meetings currently conducted as part of the operational
1223 battle rhythm at various HQs. They may be taken as examples for organising the staff routine along
1224 the respective purpose of the meetings.

1225 Working Groups are preparatory and/or evaluation venues in a decision-making cycle. They are usually
1226 chaired by a representative of the responsible HQ staff element.

1227 Boards are decision-making venues, usually chaired by the Commander or an authorised flag officer.

1228 ***a. Commander's Meeting with the Chief of Staff:***

1229 At this meeting, the Commander discusses the daily routine with his COS and provides direction and
1230 guidance. The Dir StratCom shall attend in his capacity as the Commander's principal advisor on all
1231 communication issues.

1232 ***b. JTF HQ Morning Update / Situation Awareness Brief:***

1233 This briefing session, coordinated by the ACOS J3, involves all JTF HQ staff and the CCs (per LOs and/or
1234 VTC). Staff division representatives provide update information on the situation, current operations
1235 and plans, with concluding direction and guidance by the Commander. The Dir StratCom will use the
1236 briefing session as a platform to issue communication-related guidance to the whole staff and CCs. The
1237 Morning Update shall also be used as a venue for internal staff development by the Dir StratCom, who
1238 provides an assessment and outlook regarding the implementation of the Information Strategy.

1239 ***c. COS Coordination Meeting***

1240 This meeting, chaired by the COS, prepares meetings/VTCs of the Commander and the VTC of the COS
1241 JTF HQ with the CC COSs. The StratCom Directorate, CPAO and the Chief Info Ops shall attend the
1242 meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1243 ***d. Commander's Meeting with J5 Plans***

1244 This meeting, chaired by ACOS J5, informs the Commander on the status of J5 operations assessment
1245 and forecast, and addresses decision points and future coordination and synchronization
1246 requirements. It is also the forum for the Commander to issue direction and guidance to J5. The Dir
1247 StratCom and J5 Information Planners shall attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1248 ***e. JTF HQ COS Meeting with COS UN***

1249 The COS JTF HQ meets his counterpart at the UN Mission HQ²⁰ on a regular basis to address principal
1250 coordination issues at theatre level. A member of the StratCom Directorate and the CPAO shall attend
1251 these meetings to contribute communication aspects and advise on a coordinated implementation of
1252 the Information Strategy.

1253 ***f. Commander's VTC with Higher HQ***

1254 At this VTC, the JTF Commander provides his assessment of the situation and receives direction and
1255 guidance from HHQ. The Dir StratCom and CPAO shall attend the VTC to assist the Commander in any
1256 aspects related to communication guidance, as required.

1257 ***g. Commander's VTC with Subordinate HQ***

1258 At this VTC, CCs address assessments, concerns, and plans for the next 48-72 hours, and any requests
1259 at the commanders' level. The JTF Commander provides feedback from the HHQ and issues direction
1260 and guidance. The Dir StratCom and CPAO shall attend the VTC to assist the Commander in any aspects
1261 related to communication guidance, as required.

1262 ***h. Joint Military Commission***

1263 The Joint Military Commission (JMC), usually chaired by the Commander (depending on the level of
1264 participation in that meeting), coordinates joint activities, disseminates intent and instructions of the
1265 JTF, and resolves differences amongst the parties. A member of the StratCom Directorate and the
1266 CPAO shall attend these meetings to contribute communication aspects and advise on a coordinated
1267 implementation of the Information Strategy.

²⁰ The UN here is only one example for a mandating agency.

1268 ***i. Command Group Meeting***

1269 This meeting, chaired by the Commander, prepares VTCs with HHQ and CCs, the JMC, and the meeting
1270 of the COS JTF HQ with the COS UN, and addresses related synchronization requirements. The Dir
1271 StratCom and CPAO shall attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1272 ***j. Joint Coordination Board Working Group***

1273 The Joint Coordination Board Working Group (JCBWG) prepares the draft Joint Coordination Order
1274 (JCO), and addresses follow-up planning issues, targeting, and Commander's Critical Information
1275 Requirements (CCIRs). A member of the StratCom Directorate, the CPAO and the Chief Info Ops shall
1276 attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects and ensure common situation awareness.

1277 ***k. Joint Coordination Board – VTC***

1278 The Joint Coordination Board (JCB), often conducted as VTC, assists JTF activity and effects
1279 synchronization, specifically to prepare and issue Commander's priority guidance across the
1280 subordinate commands, and to resolve potential areas of conflict. The JCB assigns execution
1281 responsibilities, prioritises, de-conflicts and synchronizes all aspects of the employment of lethal and
1282 non-lethal means. The Commander provides, through the medium of the JCB, further amplification to
1283 his direction and guidance. The Dir StratCom shall attend the meeting to contribute communication
1284 aspects. Note: PA and J3 Info Ops shall be kept involved through the CCWG and informed through their
1285 attendance at the JCBWG.

1286 ***l. Joint Targeting Working Group***

1287 The Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG) prepares target nominations and conducts Battle Damage
1288 Assessment (BDA). J2 Information Analyst(s) and representative(s) of J3 Info Ops shall attend the
1289 meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1290 ***m. Joint Targeting Coordination Board***

1291 The Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), co-led by J2 and J3, is the primary agency for the
1292 synchronization and management of the joint targeting efforts. As such they will prepare target lists
1293 for JCB review and (if necessary) Commander's approval, maintain the targeting database and co-
1294 ordinate the production of target materials. Members of the StratCom Directorate, J2 Information
1295 Analysts and J3 Info Ops shall attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1296 ***n. Assessment Working Group***

1297 The Assessment Working Group (AWG), led by J5, prepares the operations assessment for the
1298 Commander's endorsement. J2 Information Analysts, a J3 Info Ops representative, J5 Information

1299 Planners, and the J9 SO StratCom CIMIC (if established) shall attend the meeting to contribute
1300 communication aspects.

1301 *o. Assessment Board*

1302 The Assessment Board (AB), chaired by ACOS J5, the operations assessment is presented to the
1303 Commander for his approval. A member of the StratCom Directorate and a J5 Information Planner shall
1304 attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1305 *p. Joint Operations Planning Group*

1306 Led by a dedicated J5 team leader, the JOPG conducts long-term operations planning, including the
1307 development of Branch plans and Sequels. A representative of J3 Info Ops and the J5 Information
1308 Planners shall attend the meeting to contribute communication aspects.

1309 *q. CIMIC Coordination Meeting*

1310 Chaired by the DACOS J9, this meeting prepares the CIMIC VTC by assessing ongoing CIMIC activities
1311 and focussing CIMIC efforts for the next 3-4 days. A representative J3 Info Ops shall attend the meeting
1312 to contribute communication aspects and coordination requirements.

1313 *r. CIMIC VTC*

1314 This VTC involves CIMIC representatives of all JTF CCs to exchange information and coordinate CIMIC
1315 activities. A member of the StratCom Directorate and the CPAO shall attend the VTC to contribute
1316 communication aspects, as required.

1317 *s. Information Activities Working Group*

1318 The Information Activities Working Group (IAWG) is the J3 Info Ops tool for synchronizing, integrating
1319 and harmonizing Information Activities and other military actions with (potential) effects in the
1320 Information Environment, and producing respective input to JTF current operations. A member of the
1321 StratCom Directorate, a PAO, as well as a J2 Information Analyst and a J5 Information Planner shall
1322 attend the IAWG to provide StratCom guidance and contribute functional expertise.

1323 *t. Engagement Working Group*

1324 The Engagement Working Group (EWG), chaired by the Chief Info Ops, coordinates key leader and
1325 media engagements of the JTF in theatre. It facilitates the implementation of engagement plans,
1326 bridging a potential gap between StratCom (guidance, JTF Command Group planning) and Info Ops
1327 (coordination of Information Activities). Attendance at the EWG comprises the IAWG plus
1328 representatives from J2/J3 Targeting and the Component Commands (via VTC).

1329 ***u. Commander's Decision Brief***

1330 At this meeting, the Commander decides on issues related to operations planning, targeting, PA,
1331 external correspondence, and high-level encounters. The Dir StratCom and CPAO shall attend and
1332 provide advice from a communication perspective, as required for clarification of the Commander's
1333 decisions.

1334 **2. The Information Strategy Board**

1335 The Information Strategy Board (ISB) is the Commander's decision-making venue for communication
1336 management. It is chaired by the Commander and prepared and led/conducted by the Dir StratCom.

1337 The purpose of the ISB is to issue the Commander's direction and guidance on implementing strategic
1338 communication guidance with a long-term perspective. It will usually be held at the beginning of each
1339 operational phase and in the event of significant change to the situation or mission.

1340 The ISB is attended by all JTF HQ staff at ACOS level, and – via VTC – by representatives of the strategic
1341 level and the CCs.

1342 **3. The Communication Coordination Working Group**

1343 ***a. Role and Functions***

1344 The Communication Coordination Working Group (CCWG) is the Dir StratCom's primary tool for
1345 communication management (i.e., coordinating and implementing integrated communication). The
1346 working group meets on a regular basis, but also provides the framework for bilateral and virtual
1347 coordination amongst its members. In this respect, the CCWG can be considered as a meeting venue
1348 and a process.


1349 The purpose of the CCWG is to:

- 1350 • Develop and maintain a common understanding of the Information Strategy and other
1351 communication-related guidance.
- 1352 • Interpret strategic guidance and the Commander's intent, and coordinate their proper
1353 implementation in all relevant planning and coordination processes.
- 1354 • Develop, review and adjust the mission Narrative, themes and master messages.
- 1355 • Coordinate communication input to JTF HQ working groups, boards, and other bodies, and the
1356 related processes.
- 1357 • Review and update the communication-related annexes to the JTF HQ Standing Operating
1358 Procedures (SOP).

1359 **b. Composition**

1360 The CCWG is chaired by the Dir StratCom and comprises the core of the JTF HQ communication
 1361 specialists: SOs StratCom from the StratCom Directorate and other staff divisions, the CPAO, a J2
 1362 Information Analyst, the Chief J3 Info Ops, a J5 Information Planner, and the COM CJPOTF (or Chief
 1363 TPSE) (see Figure 9).

1364 The Director of Staff (DOS) will attend the CCWG, as required, to ensure that the integration of
 1365 communication specialists / expertise is adequately reflected in the JTF HQ SOP, and to advise on
 1366 appropriate ways and means for HQ internal information exchange, including the staff routine / battle
 1367 rhythm. If needed, communication specialists from the strategic and tactical levels will be invited to
 1368 attend the CCWG in order to clarify and promote communication guidance.



1369

1370

Figure 9: Communication Coordination Working Group

1371 Furthermore, the CCWG may invite other external communication representatives, such as mission
 1372 partners (e.g., the Public Information staff of the UN and other organisations operating in theatre) or
 1373 Host Nation communication specialists, in order to support a comprehensive approach to integrated
 1374 communication.

1375 However, attendance at the regular CCWG meetings must be kept to a limited number in order to
 1376 avoid any duplication with other staff meetings, in particular the IAWG.

1377

Chapter 5 – Communication Planning Process

1378 "To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more
1379 about what our actions communicate. --- We need an Information Order with an Operations Annex!"

1380 (Admiral Michael G. Mullen)

1381 The main purpose of StratCom involvement in the operations planning process is to achieve a
1382 common understanding of the planning tasks amongst communication specialists and other
1383 functional and capability experts, to coordinate the respective input related to the Information
1384 Environment, and ultimately promote the implementation of the Information Strategy (and other
1385 superior communication guidance). It includes respective advice on the development of operational
1386 objectives, decisive conditions and operational effects throughout the operations planning process,
1387 wherever appropriate.

1388 This can be achieved by either employing the CCWG, the StratCom Directorate as a whole group or
1389 selected members of communication capabilities and functions. Depending on mission and situation
1390 requirements, possible options to prepare communication input to discrete planning steps include:

- 1391 • A standing StratCom or Info Ops staff participation in meetings of respective planning teams
1392 (JOPG, etc.);
- 1393 • The permanent availability of communication specialists for providing advice to JTF HQ planners;
- 1394 • The conduct of *ad hoc* or regularly scheduled meetings (CCWG, IAWG) to prepare required input
1395 to discussions of JTF HQ planning teams.

1396 A. Initiation of the Operational-Level Planning Process (OLPP Step 1)

1397 1. Process Description

1398 **Purpose:** Understand the strategic situation and the nature of the problem, as well as the proposed
1399 end-state and strategic objectives; and contribute operational advice to the Strategic Commander
1400 on his military response options and assess the operational-level viability of these options.

1401 **Input:** Strategic Planning Directive (SPD).

1402 **Activity:** Framing the problem – CPOE; examination of the SPD; end-state analysis.

1403 **Output:** Initial operational estimate; warning orders to subordinate commands; the document
1404 containing the JTF's operational advice; Commander's initial guidance.

1405 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1406 • Command and Control: The Commander provides operational advice to the strategic level,
1407 including input to the development of the Information Strategy (if it is not already available).
1408 He provides initial guidance to the JOPG and authorises the Dir StratCom to directly coordinate
1409 with communication managers and practitioners at the strategic level. The Dir StratCom assists
1410 and advises the Commander. He also directs HQ staff elements (communication capabilities
1411 and functions) to prepare communication input to operations planning, and provides guidance
1412 to subordinate commands, i.e., he initiates the communication planning process. For this
1413 purpose, the Information Strategy (once available) needs to be emphasised and conveyed to
1414 the HQ staff and subordinate commands.
- 1415 • Analysis of the Information Environment: The Information Analysts continue and focus their
1416 analysis on the identified crisis situation. They contribute to the strategic assessment and
1417 provide analysis results to the Dir StratCom and the JOPG, as required. Analysis results will
1418 feed into the JTF's operational advice to the Strategic Commander.
- 1419 • Coordination: On behalf of the Commander, the Dir StratCom contacts strategic-level
1420 communication managers and practitioners, as well as appropriate counterparts from
1421 multinational partners, including civilian organisations, in order to establish working
1422 relationships amongst relevant Points of Contact (POCs). The Dir StratCom coordinates with
1423 the CPAO what lines to take for communication to and via the media.
- 1424 • Direct Communication: The Dir StratCom advises and assists the Commander for addressing
1425 external audiences. The Commander uses lines to take when talking to his counterparts and
1426 representatives of other agencies and organisations.
- 1427 • Media Communication: Media attitudes may reflect or influence public opinion and ultimately
1428 will influence, positively or negatively, popular and political support of JTF activities, and
1429 eventual mission success. The CPAO, in accordance with guidance by the Dir StratCom,
1430 responds to media enquiries and develops programs to inform the public about the JTF's role
1431 in crisis management.
- 1432 • Education and Training: On behalf of the Commander, the Dir StratCom continues internal
1433 communication programs to enhance the accountability of all members of the JTF as
1434 communicators, promote the mission Narrative, and evolve the corporate identity and image
1435 of the JTF.

1436 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1437 • Initial estimate of the Information Environment (as part of the initial operational estimate)
- 1438 with conclusions to inform the JTF's operational advice to the Strategic Commander and his
- 1439 initial guidance to the JOPG.
- 1440 • Liaison and coordination template for interaction of the Dir StratCom with other actors
- 1441 ("Interaction" might involve: coordination, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, exchange
- 1442 of information, toleration).
- 1443 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1444 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.

1445 B. Mission Analysis (OLPP Step 2)

1446 1. Process Description

1447 **Purpose:** Analyse the crisis situation in depth; determine precisely the operational problem that

1448 must be solved and the specific operational conditions that must be achieved.

1449 **Input:** Commander's initial guidance.

1450 **Activity:** Identify and understand the situation and the problem; appreciate conditions to be

1451 established; analyse mission and objectives; identify constraints and restraints; conduct staff

1452 estimates and initial force estimates.

1453 **Output:** Initial operations design; restated mission (if required); Commander's intent;

1454 Commander's planning guidance, including guidance for COA development and selection.

1455 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1456 • Command and Control: The Commander considers the essence of the Information Strategy to
- 1457 become part of his initial statement of intent. Advised by the Dir StratCom, the Commander
- 1458 provides direction and guidance to his staff and subordinate commands to further detail and
- 1459 operationalise the strategic-political provisions contained in the Information Strategy and the
- 1460 SPD. As a key activity of this planning step, the Dir StratCom and communication capabilities
- 1461 and functions, as appropriate, will develop the operational-level Narrative, coordinate it with
- 1462 the JOPG, and submit it to the Strategic Commander for approval. The Dir StratCom will also
- 1463 advise the Commander and planning staff to consider potential effects in the Information
- 1464 Environment to become a COA selection criterion.
- 1465 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Led by the Dir StratCom, the POLAD, Information
- 1466 Analysts, PAO, J2 INTEL, the Info Ops staff, and J9 CIMIC will analyse the strategic-political

1467 assessments from a communication perspective and relate it to the operational level and the
1468 assigned JOA. They assist the development of a sound common understanding of the mission-
1469 specific elements of the Information Environment.

1470 • Coordination: The Dir StratCom contacts strategic-level communication managers and
1471 practitioners in order to confirm the appropriate operational-level interpretation of strategic-
1472 political guidance regarding the Information Environment and seek clarification and additional
1473 guidance, as appropriate.

1474 • Direct and Media Communication: Continued from previous step. Internal and external
1475 communication needs to be continued throughout the planning process (and conduct of
1476 operations) in order to support situation awareness, transparency, and freedom of
1477 information.

1478 • Education and Training: Continued from previous step. Throughout the planning process (and
1479 conduct of operations) the JTF needs to gain, maintain and further develop situation
1480 awareness, a common understanding of the importance of communication, and a corporate
1481 identity in order to promote the JTF's synergy and effectiveness.

1482 **3. Communication Planning Outputs**

1483 • Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of the
1484 operational design and a sound common understanding of the mission-specific elements of
1485 the Information Environment).

1486 • The approved operational-level, mission Narrative (as part of the Commander's planning
1487 guidance) to help inform the development of the Commander's intent statement.

1488 • A proposed phrasing that highlights communication (as a task) and/or the Information
1489 Environment (and the intended effects in it) in the Commander's intent statement.

1490 • Proposed themes, themes to avoid, and audiences to address (as part of the Commander's
1491 planning guidance).

1492 • Proposed initial COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.

1493 • Lines to take for external communication.

1494 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.

1495 C. Courses of Action Development (OLPP Step 3)

1496 1. Process Description

1497 **Purpose:** Develop a set of tentative COAs²¹, all of which will accomplish the mission effectively in
1498 accordance with the Commander's intent (this may be a collaborative planning effort between
1499 strategic and operational-level planners to produce coherent broad COAs for each level in order
1500 to preserve a common context during the further development steps)..

1501 **Input:** Initial operations design; restated mission (if required); Commander's intent; Commander's
1502 planning guidance.

1503 **Activity:** Develop and test COAs; implement Commander's guidance for COA development.

1504 **Output:** A set of own feasible COAs; refined COA selection criteria.

1505 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

1506 • Command and Control: Within the scope of the Information Strategy and the approved
1507 operational-level Narrative, the Dir StratCom and communication capabilities and functions,
1508 as appropriate, contribute to the development of tentative COAs in order to incorporate
1509 communication (as a task) and/or the Information Environment (and the intended effects in
1510 it), as required, to reflect the Commander's intent. Based on advice by the Dir StratCom, the
1511 Commander carries on his attitude towards communication (as stated in his intent) when
1512 providing guidance for COA refinement.

1513 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Lead by the Dir StratCom, the POLAD, Information
1514 Analysts, PAO, J2 INTEL, the Info Ops staff, and J9 CIMIC will continue to analyse the
1515 Information Environment and assist the further development of a common understanding of
1516 its mission-specific elements.

1517 • Coordination: The Dir StratCom, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level
1518 communication managers and practitioners in order to directly harmonise communication
1519 input to COA development.

1520 • Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.

1521 • Media Communication: Continued from previous step.

1522 • Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

²¹ COAs should answer the following questions: (1) When does the operation begin and/or when must it be completed for the required conditions be established? (2) Who will conduct the operation? (3) What military operations are considered? (4) Where will they be performed? (5) Why is the operation conducted? (6) How will the operation be conducted?

1523 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1524 • Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the development of tentative
- 1525 COAs).
- 1526 • COA refinement guidance that reflects the Commander's intent regarding communication and
- 1527 the Information Environment.
- 1528 • Proposed refined COA selection criteria related to the Information Environment.
- 1529 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1530 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs

1531 D. Courses of Action Analysis (OLPP Step 4)

1532 1. Process Description

1533 **Purpose:** Refine and analyse the COAs based on the Commander's guidance on tentative COAs
1534 (this will partly be a collaborative planning effort between the operational and tactical-level
1535 planners to produce coordinated COAs for each level).

1536 **Input:** Set of own COAs.

1537 **Activity:** Analyse and refine COAs; wargaming.

1538 **Output:** refined COAs; outline CONOPS for each COA.

1539 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1540 • Command and Control: The Dir StratCom, in close coordination with the COS and J3
1541 Operations, directs the involvement of representatives of subordinate commands and JTF HQ
1542 staff elements (communication capabilities and functions) in the wargaming process.
- 1543 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step. In addition, in this
1544 step the Information Analysts will contribute their expertise to the development of COA
1545 evaluation criteria (derived from the principles of joint and multinational operations; see
1546 Supplement I.1).
- 1547 • Coordination: The Dir StratCom will ensure appropriate participation of communication
1548 capabilities and functions in the wargaming process and coordinate their input to meet the
1549 requirements of a realistic representation of the Information Environment. The Info Ops staff
1550 actually conduct this coordination effort, as directed by the Dir StratCom. The LOs represent
1551 their sending organisations / agencies; they should, upon request of the Dir StratCom, place
1552 an additional focus on the Information Environment and the particular role of their
1553 organisations / agencies in it (The same applies to the JTF HQ's LOs to other organisations /

1554 agencies; in addition to their information gathering function, they also convey JTF
1555 Commander's messages). The Info Ops staff will also contribute their expertise to the
1556 development of the synchronization matrix.

- 1557 • Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1558 • Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1559 • Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

1560 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1561 • Communication input to the wargaming process (simulation of communication capabilities
1562 and functions, and their activities).
- 1563 • Proposed COA evaluation criteria focused on the Information Environment.
- 1564 • Communication input to the synchronization matrix (reference to the implementation
1565 paragraph of the Information Strategy).
- 1566 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1567 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs

1568 E. Courses of Action Validation and Comparison (OLPP Step 5)

1569 1. Process Description

1570 **Purpose:** Validate and compare the COAs that were analysed during the previous step.

1571 **Input:** Refined COAs.

1572 **Activity:** Compare advantages, disadvantages, and performance against adversarial COAs; apply
1573 Commander's selection criteria; conduct COA risk assessment.

1574 **Output:** Evaluated and prioritised COAs; recommended COA.

1575 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1576 • Command and Control: Based on the results from wargaming and following consultation with
1577 the JTF HQ communication capabilities and functions, the Dir StratCom recommends to the
1578 Commander how to evaluate COAs from a communication perspective. Once approved, he
1579 provides guidance to the JOPG.
- 1580 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.
- 1581 • Coordination: Internal coordination amongst the communication capabilities and functions, as
1582 mentioned above. The Info Ops staff will contribute the coordinated input from the
1583 communication capabilities and functions.

- 1584 • Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1585 • Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1586 • Education and Training: Continued from previous steps

1587 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1588 • Communication input to COA evaluation, including recommendations and guidance (*inter alia*
- 1589 advantages and disadvantages concerning desired effects in the Information Environment and
- 1590 the achievement of strategic / Information Objectives, and prioritisation of joint functions,
- 1591 sequencing and phasing).
- 1592 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1593 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs

1594 F. Commander's Courses of Action Decision (OLPP Step 6)

1595 1. Process Description

1596 **Purpose:** Gain the Commander's decision on a chosen COA and then refine this COA as the future
1597 core of the CONOPS.

1598 **Input:** Prioritised COAs; recommended COA.

1599 **Activity:** Conduct COA decision briefing; receive Commander's decision; further refine the selected
1600 COA; review Commander's intent.

1601 **Output:** Commander's decision and additional guidance on the selected COA to be developed,
1602 including Branches and Sequels; liaison, coordination and reconnaissance requirements; refined
1603 Commander's intent.

1604 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1605 • Command and Control: The Dir StratCom guides the Info Ops staff to coordinate contributions
1606 to the refinement of the selected COA to ensure consistent implementation of the Information
1607 Strategy. He will advise and consult with the Commander on potential adjustments of his
1608 statement of intent.
- 1609 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.
- 1610 • Coordination: The Dir StratCom, in close coordination with the POLAD, contacts strategic-level
1611 communication managers and practitioners – within the OLPP and C2 procedures – in order to
1612 confirm concurrence of the selected COA and the proposed refinement with strategic-political
1613 guidance. The Info Ops staff coordinate contributions to COA refinement with communication
1614 capabilities and functions, involving JTF HQ staff elements as well as subordinate commands.

- 1615 • Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1616 • Media Communication: Continued from previous step.
- 1617 • Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

1618 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1619 • Communication considerations incorporated in the strategic appreciation of the Commander's
- 1620 selected COA.
- 1621 • Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of the refinement of the selected
- 1622 COA).
- 1623 • Refined Commander's intent regarding communication / the Information Environment.
- 1624 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1625 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs.

1626 G. Concept of Operations and Plan Development (OLPP Step 7)

1627 1. Process Description

1628 **Purpose:** Produce a coherent operational-level CONOPS and OPLAN as collaborative planning
1629 effort between the strategic and the operational level.

1630 **Input:** Selected COA with outline CONOPS; Commander's additional guidance and refined intent.

1631 **Activity:** Develop and coordinate the CONOPS and OPLAN for the selected COA.

1632 **Output:** CONOPS; proposal for target categories and illustrative target sets; Rules of Engagement
1633 Request (ROEREQ); Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) and associated
1634 documents; approved OPLAN.

1635 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1636 • Command and Control: The Dir StratCom supervises the planning activities of communication
- 1637 capabilities and functions in order to promote the implementation / realisation of guidance
- 1638 provided with the Information Strategy and the Narrative(s). He also permanently cross-checks
- 1639 intermediate planning products and ideas with the Commander's intent and, if required,
- 1640 advises on required modifications.
- 1641 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous step.
- 1642 • Effects Development: Information Planners will be permanently involved in the development
- 1643 of operational objectives, decisive conditions and operational effects. Based on the estimate
- 1644 of the Information Environment and Information Strategy guidance (here in particular:

1645 Information Objectives), they will consider corresponding potential effects in the Information
1646 Environment and advise the JOPG on desired and undesired, intended and unintended effects,
1647 and related indicators and metrics. In order to incorporate the contributions from
1648 communication capabilities and functions, Information Planners will closely cooperate with
1649 the Info Ops staff.

1650 • Contribution to Targeting: The Info Ops staff will lead this activity, primarily assisted by
1651 Information Analysts, Information Planners and the PAO. The aim of the contributions to the
1652 targeting process from a communication perspective is a) to facilitate consideration of effects
1653 in the Information Environment from any action, and b) to integrate communication audiences
1654 and relevant targets in the process. Planning joint fires, including the use of lethal and non-
1655 lethal means against priority targets, requires significant support by the CULAD, LEGAD and
1656 POLAD, in particular to enable consideration of overarching, cross-dimensional aspects of the
1657 Information Environment. Therefore, these advisors should be available to assist the Info Ops
1658 staff, as appropriate. The Dir StratCom, in close coordination with the LEGAD (in the lead), will
1659 propose ROEs that are relevant to the Information Environment and the operational design.
1660 PA needs to continue their 'constitutional' task with respect to freedom of information and
1661 must therefore not exclusively be tied into the targeting process. However, in order to at least
1662 de-conflict activities and effects – in other words: messages and audiences – PA should
1663 participate in and contribute to target nomination, as appropriate.

1664 • Activity Planning: Information Activities will be planned and conducted by the force
1665 capabilities. The Info Ops staff – through the IAWG – advise activity planning with a view on
1666 creating desired effects in the Information Environment and assist the force generation
1667 process, i.e., the identification of required means and assets.

1668 • Coordination: The Dir StratCom contacts strategic-level communication managers and
1669 practitioners in order to directly harmonise communication input to CONOPS development.
1670 The Info Ops staff – through the IAWG – will involve the JTF HQ's as well as subordinate
1671 commands' communication capabilities and functions to contribute to the development of
1672 effects in the Information Environment, and for planning Information Activities.

1673 • Direct Communication: Continued from previous step.

1674 • Media Communication: Continued from previous step.

1675 • Education and Training: Continued from previous step.

1676 3. Communication Planning Outputs

1677 • Modified Commander's intent regarding communication, if required.

- 1678 • Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of CONOPS development).
- 1679 • Proposed desired effects in the Information Environment.
- 1680 • Proposed target nomination for creating effects in the Information Environment and achieve
- 1681 decisive conditions.
- 1682 • Proposed set of ROEs relevant to the Information Environment.
- 1683 • Proposed Information Activities to create desired effects in the Information Environment.
- 1684 • Proposed force capabilities for conducting Information Activities (as part of the CJSOR).
- 1685 • Lines to take for external communication.
- 1686 • Updated training/education plan for internal communication programs

1687 H. Operations Assessment and Plan Review / Revision (OLPP Step 8)

1688 1. Process Description

1689 **Purpose:** Monitor and assess campaign progress; adapt the OPLAN, as required; and plan for
1690 conflict termination and transition.

1691 **Input:** OPLAN; approved ROE; crisis establishment (manpower and capabilities).

1692 **Activity:** Conduct operational management, operations assessment, plan adaptation and planning
1693 for transition.

1694 **Output:** Operational-level assessment reports for the strategic level; revised OPLAN.

1695 2. Communication Management Activities and Participation

- 1696 • Analysis of the Information Environment: Continued from previous steps.
- 1697 • Assessment of Effects: This activity is considered the most difficult one in the age of "swarm
1698 communication" and Social Media, where simple cause-effect relationships don't exist. Co-led
1699 by the Info Ops staff (involving those force capabilities that execute Information Activities to
1700 create desired effects) and J2 INTEL (involving Information Analysts), communication
1701 specialists develop recommendations to the Dir StratCom for advising the Commander and
1702 further coordination with the HQ's joint assessment staff (usually consisting of the J5 Plans in
1703 cooperation with J2 INTEL and J3 Operations).

1704 3. Communication Planning Outputs

- 1705 • Refined estimate of the Information Environment (in support of operations assessment).
- 1706 • Communication part of the assessment report(s) (draws from the continued analysis of the
1707 Information Environment).

1708

I. Summary: Integration of Operations Planning and Communication Planning




Figure 10: Operations Planning and Communication Planning

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1710

1711 J. Capturing Communication Planning Outputs

1712 Communication planning outputs – i.e., inputs to operations planning – should become an integral part
1713 of the OPLAN Main Body and annexes.

1714 NATO doctrine is taken as a baseline for the design of an operational-level OPLAN. Based on results
1715 from experimentation, producing of a stand-alone document *with information not contained in the*
1716 *OPLAN* is not an option as this could create the potential perception of communication planning not
1717 fully integrated with or even separated from operations planning. As an UNCLASSIFIED *excerpt* from
1718 that, a Communication Plan should highlight the most important parts from a communication
1719 perspective, able to be shared with external actors for coordination of communication efforts.

1720 For the purpose of integration of communication guidance with the military OPLAN as well as for the
1721 coordination of efforts with other external and civilian counterparts (such as IOs and NGOs or local
1722 actors), a combination of existing military planning products with an additional format for external use
1723 is suggested. Situation and mission requirements may demand the consideration of keeping
1724 operational-level communication guidance internal without intentional public disclosure.

1725 Ideally, the mission-specific Narrative materialises in the Commander's intent statement. This
1726 prominently demonstrates the full integration of communication and highlights the importance of
1727 communication guidance for the conduct of military operations.

1728 In detail:

1729 Produce an operational-level Communication Plan to summarise the major contributions to the OLPP
1730 from a communication perspective in a format similar to the Information Strategy (see Supplement
1731 V.1 – Information Strategy Format), and incorporate communication guidance in the OPLAN, Main
1732 Body, Para 3.d "Concept of Operations" and Para 4.b.(7) "Coordinating Instructions / StratCom and
1733 Information Strategy", in the Annex A "Concept of Operations", and the Annex SS "Strategic
1734 Communication"²². Note that the functional annexes TT (PA), UU (Info Ops), VV (PSYOPS), and others,
1735 such as D (INTEL), Q (CIS) or W (CIMIC), need to be adjusted, as appropriate.

1736

²² In NATO, the use of Annex SS (StratCom) is currently not mandated for the operational level. A proposed format is at supplement V.2.

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
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1739 **Chapter 6 – Delineation of Roles, Tasks and Activities**

1740 Planning, approval and implementation of communication guidance through communication
 1741 management requires close cooperation of the StratCom and Info Ops functions and the capabilities
 1742 to perform Information Activities.

1743 Roles, tasks and activities of integrated communication are sustained by communication capabilities
 1744 and functions with different emphasis at the various levels of command. At the strategic level,
 1745 integrated communication is promoted by StratCom and (military) PA. At the operational level this
 1746 responsibility is shared by StratCom, military PA and Info Ops, while at the tactical level integrated
 1747 communication is driven by Info Ops and military PA.

1748 Figure 11 shows key roles, tasks and activities involved in integrated communication at the operational
 1749 level, grouped by functions and capabilities. Roles, tasks and activities depicted in overlapping areas
 1750 of the graph are shared responsibilities that entail collective action.



1751
 1752

Figure 11: StratCom, Info Ops and Communication Capabilities Delineation

1753 **A. Strategic Communication**

1754 **1. Information Strategy Implementation and Development**

1755 StratCom holds the primary responsibility for implementing strategic communication guidance
1756 manifested in the Information Strategy (or equivalent format). This includes the operationalization of
1757 the strategic Narrative, the provision of planning guidance by Information Objectives, themes and
1758 master messages, as well as the contribution of respective advice to HHQ from the operational-level
1759 communication perspective.

1760 StratCom provides communication-specific analyses and assessments, and related input to strategic
1761 planning.

1762 **2. Command & Control**

1763 The Dir StratCom is the primary advisor to the Commander on all communication issues affecting the
1764 JTF, its mission and its operations. This responsibility includes advice on the design of reporting
1765 relationships, the involvement of subordinate commands in JTF activities with high external effect, and
1766 on corporate leadership.

1767 The Dir StratCom is also authorised to provide direction and guidance on behalf of the Commander.

1768 **3. Education and Training**

1769 The Dir StratCom is responsible for the planning and conduct of staff and leadership development
1770 programs to improve communication patterns and communication skills, promote the JTF corporate
1771 identity, and enhance situation awareness regarding the Information Environment.

1772 **B. Strategic Communication and Information Operations**

1773 **1. Analysis of the Information Environment**

1774 The StratCom Directorate, Information Analysts and Info Ops share the responsibility to provide
1775 coordinated results from analysis of the Information Environment and respective input to all relevant
1776 JTF HQ staff processes.

1777 Advice to decision-making involving the Command Group is a responsibility of the Dir StratCom.
1778 Analysis input to lower-level boards, cells, centres and working groups is a shared responsibility of the
1779 StratCom Directorate, the Information Analysts and Info Ops, the actual practice of which depends on
1780 arrangements laid down in the JTF HQ SOP (attendance requirements at meetings). The CCWG and the
1781 IAWG should be used as venues for coordination.

1782 **2. Operations Planning**

1783 The StratCom Directorate, Information Planners and Info Ops – assisted by Information Analysts –
1784 share the responsibility to provide coordinated input to operations planning.

1785 Members of the StratCom Directorate are primarily responsible for providing direction and guidance
1786 for the implementation of superior communication guidance and the Commander's intent related to
1787 the Information Environment. StratCom also drafts and coordinates the operational-level Narrative.
1788 Information Planners support the planning process from a general communication perspective. Info
1789 Ops relays coordinated input from communication capabilities.

1790 **3. Effects Development**

1791 Members of the StratCom Directorate are primarily responsible for providing direction and guidance
1792 for the implementation of superior communication guidance and the Commander's intent related to
1793 the Information Environment. J3 Info Ops is responsible for the coordination of effects in the
1794 Information Environment with (communication) capabilities. The operational phasing of respective
1795 effects will be developed by Info Ops, Information Planners and PA within their scope of responsibility.

1796 **4. Key Leader Engagement**

1797 Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is defined as the meeting of JTF military leaders with decision-makers of
1798 approved audiences that have defined goals. These engagements can be used to shape and influence
1799 local leaders within the operations area or may also be directed toward specific groups (religious,
1800 academic, tribal, etc.).

1801 KLE planning is a shared responsibility of the StratCom Directorate and Info Ops. The StratCom
1802 Directorate has the better insight concerning the Commander's intent and the availability of the
1803 Command Group and Special Staff to attend KLE meetings, and is responsible for implementing
1804 strategic communication guidance. J3 Info Ops has the closer link to communication capabilities and
1805 the CCs, and thus is in a better position to provide (tactical) background information on stakeholders
1806 to be engaged by JTF leaders. J3 Info Ops is also responsible for integrating KLE into the joint targeting
1807 process.

1808 **5. Coordination**

1809 StratCom and Info Ops share the responsibility to coordinate communication input to JTF HQ staff
1810 processes. The focus of StratCom is on decision-making and direction and guidance. StratCom
1811 coordinates vertically with HHQ and horizontally with JTF external (military and non-military) mission

1812 partners. Info Ops focuses on Information Activities and communication capabilities, and coordinates
1813 with JTF subordinate commands.

1814 **C. Information Operations and (Communication) Capabilities**

1815 **1. Targeting**

1816 J3 Info Ops is responsible to provide coordinated input to the joint targeting process regarding effects
1817 in the Information Environment. In particular, Info Ops supports the integration of lethal and non-
1818 lethal effects and kinetic and non-kinetic actions, and contributes to target nomination. Info Ops,
1819 assisted by Information Analysts and Information Planners, advises on potential effects in the
1820 Information Environment caused by actions directed at specific targets. In close cooperation with
1821 communication capabilities, Info Ops develops and maintains target folders for KLE.

1822 **2. Activity Planning**

1823 J3 Info Ops identifies capabilities which are best suited to convey messages to specific audiences and
1824 thus create desired effects in the Information Environment. Info Ops coordinates activity planning with
1825 communication capabilities and JTF subordinate commands.

1826 **3. Operations Assessment**

1827 In close cooperation with capability representatives, Info Ops contributes to operations assessment by
1828 use of MOP and MOE. The primary role of Info Ops is the coordination, integration and synthesis of
1829 individual assessments into an overall view on the Information Environment.

1830 **D. (Communication) Capabilities**

1831 **1. Information Activities**

1832 Information Activities can be performed by all force capabilities executing tasks on order of
1833 commanders and leaders in order to create desired effects in the Information Environment. They
1834 constitute the lower end of OPLAN execution.

1835 **2. The Role of Military Public Affairs**

1836 Military PA in all democratic societies constitutes a specific communication capability (Freedom of
1837 Information) and has a particular role in implementing an Information Strategy.

1838 PA releases or publishes information with the primary purpose of keeping the public informed, in order
1839 to gain their understanding and support for military operations. PA endeavours to ensure accurate and
1840 timely information about the coalition forces, their commanders, staffs (temporary or permanent),
1841 activities and operations for reporting by external and internal news media.

1842 In a democracy, military forces are responsible and accountable to the public for the performance of
1843 their mission. PA is the primary means to reach the general public, and is a command responsibility of
1844 highest priority.

1845 PA addresses the media and general public – national and international, own and other audiences,
1846 using means and methods such as media outlets, press conferences, media opportunities, press
1847 statements and other media products. Once PA has released a message to the public, the further
1848 transmission of that message is under the control of the media. It is the media who will then decide
1849 what portion of the original message is communicated and to which audience.

1850 PA activities are Information Activities. Therefore, other communication capabilities must be closely
1851 coordinated with PA in order to ensure consistency in the message released by the military to outside
1852 audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the JTF campaign.

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
Chapter 7 – Military Strategic Communication in a Nutshell

1856 **One cannot not communicate!**


1857 What that means is even when you're not actively sending
 1858 a message, even when words are not coming out of your
 1859 mouth, coming across the keyboard from your typing, or
 1860 being texted you're still communicating. So, is it the
 1861 message you want to be sending? It's important to be
 1862 cognizant of that because "one cannot not communicate"
 1863 means that what you're doing, active communication or
 1864 not, you're still sending a message and that's important for
 1865 you to know.

1866 Communication is a basic function of human life. Every day,
 1867 we communicate with a lot of people including our families,
 1868 our friends, our colleagues, or even strangers. Without
 1869 having the possibility to communicate and talk to other
 1870 people, no individual, community, group or any other
 1871 institution would be able to exist, or prosper. Strictly
 1872 speaking the ability to communicate or the general right of
 1873 communication make it possible to exchange opinions,
 1874 thoughts and meanings. Many people believe that the
 1875 significance of communication is like the importance of breathing. Indeed, communication facilitates
 1876 the spread of knowledge and forms relationships between people.

1877 People interact by exchanging messages. Quite a lot of communication is carried on below the level of
 1878 consciousness; it just happens automatically. Even when you think you are not sending any messages,
 1879 that absence of messages is quite evident to any observer, and can itself constitute quite a significant
 1880 message.



you-cannot-not-communicate-L-ehzeFA.jpeg
 (Source: Internet)



you-cannot-not-communicate-L-ehzeFA.jpeg (Source: Internet)

1881 Everything we do, and the way
 we do everything, sends a
 message. Everything that can be
 observed or otherwise
 perceived with all of our senses
 will be interpreted based on
 individual knowledge,
 experience, needs, etc. We
 usually transmit quite a few non-
 verbal messages unconsciously,
 even when we think we are not
 sending any messages at all. This
 means that, unless you are a

1894 hermit, you cannot really avoid communicating. You can, of course, very easily get your communication
 1895 scrambled – often in both directions – but that is not much consolation. In other words, you cannot
 1896 not communicate: communication happens all the time – intentional or unintentional, with desired or
 1897 undesired effect.

1898

1899 **Actions speak louder than words!**



"Jesus Christ said 'by their fruits ye shall know them,' not by their disclaimers."

— William S. Burroughs

"Faith without works is dead."

— James the Apostle

Behaviour is the most important carrier of messages, as words are symbols and actions are undeniable real. Communication is usually considered to be restricted to language and words, but in reality body language and action play an important role in perception of the message in communication. Communication is more than just speaking, and much more than just media. What you do is more important and shows your

1913

1914 intentions and feelings more clearly than what you say.

1915 At the end of the day, whatever your
1916 actions may be will show what you are
1917 trying to prove. If you are simply talking,
1918 nothing is happening, but when actions
1919 take place, you are actually engaging in
1920 this behaviour. Actions prove who
1921 someone really is while words only show
1922 what someone wants to be.

1923 "The belief that one's own view of reality
1924 is the only reality is the most dangerous of
1925 all delusions."

1926 — Paul Watzlawick



Strongbaby.jpg (Source: Internet)

1927 It is not only depended on the sender to depict the meaning of any communication, the receiver plays
1928 a major role in the outcome of the communication. The message send by the sender may not be
1929 interpreted the same way it was intended. It is impossible to speak in such a way that you cannot be
1930 misunderstood.

1931 All military actions – such as key leader engagements, military-to-military engagements, movements
1932 on the ground, visits by leaders, overflights of aircraft, and transits of ships – send messages. Observers
1933 of our actions reason (interpret and conclude) what they think is our intent. Therefore, our actions
1934 need to be consciously designed and executed in order to convey our intended messages.

1935

1936 "Words have less substance than air. Don't tell me about your zealous dreams, your firm convictions,
1937 your profound love – show me."

1938 — Richelle E. Goodrich

1939

1940

1941 **Avoid the say-do gap!**

1942 The way people conduct themselves in different situations is a greater
 1943 determinant of behaviour and character than the words through which
 1944 they choose to express themselves. What you do holds much more
 1945 significance than what you say.



shutterstock_business_gap_eelnosiva.jpg (Source: Internet)

1946 Credibility, reliability and consistency are paramount for the
 1947 effectiveness of any communication. Promises mean nothing without
 1948 proof. Actions should meet verbal commitments, not conflict them.

1949 A say-do gap arises in the minds of targeted audiences when an organization’s statements conflict with
 1950 the actions it takes. In the military, the term describes the mismatch between strategic policy
 1951 objectives and military tactical actions. Any gap between publicised information and actual
 1952 performance has the potential to damage trust and confidence, which can negatively affect the
 1953 achievement of our objectives. If you promise something, people might not believe you until they see
 1954 you actually do it.

1955 It is all about trust, which is the bedrock of effective leadership and influencing others. Your behaviour
 1956 is your single greatest mode of communication, and it must be congruent with what you say. If we give



Lies.jpg (Source: Internet)

off two contradictory messages, verbal and nonverbal, people will have the tendency to believe the nonverbal over the verbal. If your actions don’t align with your words, there’s trouble.

Recent examples of a say-do gap came from operations in Afghanistan, where NATO forces proclaimed respect for the Afghan people and Islam, a verbal message that appeared contradicted by images and incidents of civilian casualties and military operations in and around mosques. Such apparent inconsistencies were successfully exploited by the Taliban via globally distributed images on the Internet.

1968

1969 We must ensure actions match words. We must ensure we do what we say we do. Our actions will
 1970 invariably have a greater impact than what we communicate verbally or in writing.

1971 **Consider real-time media reporting!**

1972 Today's technological achievements
 1973 enable world-wide, real-time
 1974 communication by individuals and the
 1975 media. Permanent media surveillance
 1976 makes military operations limpid to global
 1977 audiences.



AluxoWorldBackground2.jpg (Source: Internet)

1978 Reports of actions taken and the results of
 1979 those actions are quickly spread across the
 1980 globe; they affect the perceptions of the
 1981 audiences we are trying to engage, not
 1982 limited by any geographical boundaries.



In modern newsrooms, Social Media and the prevalence of smartphones means news posted in real-time is now more accessible to media outlets than ever before. This influx of information – together with audiences now conditioned to expect to read about breaking news as it happens – raises challenges as well as opportunities. There's more and more information



1991 out there, and so finding the signal in the noise is harder for our
 1992 audiences. Real-time data access and real-time reporting are
 1993 determined by the speed at which information changes and when
 1994 it becomes available for the user to manipulate.

1995 The media provide a major source of information and the basis
 1996 for public opinion-forming. Political discussions follow public
 1997 opinion, and thus lead to, and impact on, military operations in
 1998 terms of principle approval and resourcing.

1999 Own public information activities compete with others' reporting and people select what information
 2000 to take as credible. Therefore, it is important to envision how our actions will be perceived by the
 2001 different audiences and what messages they will deliver.

2002 **Military Strategic Communication**

2003 In today's Information Environment, characterized by a 24/7 news cycle, the rise of social networking
 2004 sites, and the global interconnectedness of audiences, it is increasingly important that a coalition
 2005 involved in crisis management communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive
 2006 manner on its roles, objectives and missions. Coalition partners must use various channels, including
 2007 the traditional media, internet-based digital media and public engagement, to build awareness,
 2008 understanding, and support for their activities. Effective communication must build and maintain
 2009 credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis consistency, veracity and
 2010 transparency both in words and deeds. This requires a coherent institutional approach, coordination
 2011 of effort with partner nations and between all relevant actors, and consistency with agreed policies,
 2012 procedures and principles.

2013 At the military operational level, the political will of coalition partners and their common strategic
 2014 objectives are translated into military action. StratCom is a commander's function to implement
 2015 political-strategic guidance for the Information Environment, i.e., how operations and engagements
 2016 are to be perceived by local, regional, global and domestic audiences. Ideally, all members of a joint
 2017 force deployed to a theatre of operations act in line with communication guidance, fully aware of the
 2018 perceptions that their actions may create; ideally, military operations speak for themselves without
 2019 any accompanying media support required. StratCom aims at guiding and coordinating all joint force
 2020 elements to act as one.

2021 As long as the ideal world of all coalition actors accepting their roles as *strategic communicators* has
 2022 not been achieved, StratCom requires the establishment of organisational structures and processes to
 2023 support the development of this mind-set, and assist military commanders to implement political goals
 2024 in the Information Environment. StratCom personnel will be employed as part of an operational-level
 2025 military HQ to advise, coordinate, guide and direct analysis, planning, execution and assessment of
 2026 operations, including decision-making, operations planning, and campaign synchronization.

2027

Lexicon

2028

Part 1 – Abbreviations

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AB	Assessment Board
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AOO	Area of Operations
Asmt	Assessment
AWG	Assessment Working Group
Bi-SC	Bi-Strategic Commands
BUDFIN	Budgets and Finance
C2	Command and Control
C2S	Command and Control Systems
C4	Command, Control, Communications and Computers
CC	Component Command
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CCWG	Communication Coordination Working Group
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
cf.	compare (lat.: confer)
CICOM	CIMIC Coordination Meeting
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CJPOTF	Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

CJSE	(SWE) Combined Joint Staff Exercise
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CMI	(NATO) Civil-Military Interaction
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COA	Course of Action
COG	Centre of Gravity
COM	Commander
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
CPAO	Chief Public Affairs Officer
CPOE	Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment
CSEL	Command Senior Enlisted Leader
CULAD	Cultural Advisor
DARB	Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (also: JCMB)
DC	Decisive Condition
DCOM	Deputy Commander
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
Dir	Director
DOS	Director of Staff
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
Eng	Engineer(s)
EU	European Union
EWG	Engagement Working Group
FINCON	Financial Controller
FP	Force Protection
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GENAD	Gender Advisor

Geo	Geographic
GPS	Global Positioning System
GS	General Schedule (Civil Service)
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
HHQ	Higher Headquarters
HQ	Headquarters
IAWG	Information Activities Working Group
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ICDemo	Integrated Communication Demonstration
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IM	Information Management
IMPP	Integrated Missions Planning Process
IMSWM	International Military Staff Working Memorandum
Info Ops	Information Operations
Infra	Infrastructure
INTEL	Intelligence
IO	International Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISB	Information Strategy Board
IT	Information Technology
JCB	Joint Coordination Board
JCBWG	Joint Coordination Board Working Group
JCMB	Joint Collection and Management Board (also: DARB)
JCO	Joint Coordination Order
JDAWG	Joint Defended Assets Working Group
JEC	Joint Effects Cell
JFC	Joint Force Command

JIOS	Joint Intelligence Operations Section
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JMC	Joint Military Commission
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JOPG	Joint Operations Planning Group
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF HQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTWG	Joint Targeting Working Group
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
KLEP	Key Leader Engagement Plan
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LO	Liaison Officer
LOG	Logistics
LoO	Line of Operations
MA	Military Assistant
Mar	Maritime
MC	Military Committee
MCDC	Multinational Capability Development Campaign
MCM	Military Committee Memorandum
Med	Medical
MEDAD	Medical Advisor
MNE	Multinational Experiment
MNIOE	Multinational Information Operations Experiment
MOE	Measure(s) of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure(s) of Performance

NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
NFS	NATO Force Structure
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NR	NATO Restricted
NU	NATO Unclassified
OE	Operational Effect
OLPP	Operational-Level Planning Process
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPP	Operations Planning Process
Ops	Operations
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PA	Public Affairs
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PERS	Personnel (Management)
PM	Provost Marshall
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information
PO	Private Office (of the NATO Secretary-General)
POC	Point of Contact
POLAD	Political Advisor
PSE	PSYOPS Support Element
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROREQ	Rules of Engagement Request

SA	Staff Assistant
SAB	Situation Awareness Brief
SACT	Supreme Allied Command Transformation
SES	Senior Executive Service (Civil Service)
SG	Secretary-General (of the United Nations)
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SO	Staff Officer
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOFAD	Special Operations Forces Advisor
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SPD	Strategic Planning Directive
Spt	Support
SRSR	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (of the United Nations)
StratCom	Strategic Communication
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TOO	Theatre of Operations
TPSE	Theatre PSYOPS Support Element
TRG	Training (and Exercises)
TSC	Target Support Cell
U	Unclassified
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VTC	Video Teleconference

2031

2032

Part 2 – Glossary of Terms and Definitions

Action	The process of doing something to achieve an aim.
Actor	A person or organisation, including state and non-state entities, with the capability to pursue its interests and objectives.
Area of Operations	An area within a joint operations area defined by the joint force commander for the conduct of specific military operations at the tactical level.
Area of Responsibility	For a given level of command, an area assigned to a commander to plan and conduct operations.
Battle Damage Assessment	The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-lethal, against a military objective.
Big Data	The reality of huge volumes and streams of different forms of data from diverse sources (external and internal) and their constant processing, qualified by volume, variety, veracity and velocity.
Campaign	A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.
Centre of Gravity	The primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action, or will to fight.
Communication	The process by which information, meanings and feelings are shared by people through an exchange of verbal and non-verbal messages.
Communications and Information System	An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish information processing and transfer functions. CIS include C4 systems and use IT to provide communication between its users and may embrace transmission systems, switching systems and user systems. Related sub- systems are based upon the continuous need for information to support operations.
Command and Control System	An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures – including planning and decision-making tools –, and personnel that enable commanders and their staffs to exercise command and control.

Note: One of the major functions of a C2S is to ensure that data and information get to the right place on time and in a form that is quickly usable by its intended recipients and generates appropriate actions. In this regard, C2S play a critical role in the processing, flow, and quality of data supporting information requirements throughout the joint force.

Communication Specialist

An expert representative of a communication capability or function.

Communication capabilities and functions are those force capabilities and staff functions the primary role of which is to execute communication management tasks, to conduct communication planning and/or to create effects in the Information Environment.

Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment

A process (and product) to synthesise staff analyses and estimations in order to describe the main characteristics, and allow the planning staff to further assess the potential impact, of the operational environment on the accomplishment of the mission. The scope of the analysis and description comprises the conduct of operations, force capability requirements, logistics, medical and engineering support, communication, arrangements for C2 and CIS, cooperation with civil authorities and other civil actors, and force protection.

Note: CPOE is supported by (and results from) Knowledge Development. The part conducted by J2 INTEL is called Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

2033

Coordinating Authority

The assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or activities involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). The individual with assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement, he/she should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he/she is unable to obtain essential agreement he/she shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

Coordination

Consultation in order to forge common action or harmonisation in a concerted manner. Co-ordination activities can involve both subordinates as well as those organisations over which the commander has no authority. Co-ordination results in carefully planned and executed activity in which the various elements involved in an operation – military and civil – are harmonised in such a manner as to provide the greatest advantage to the overall

	mission. Co-ordination does not require command relationships (subordination) but active participation of all involved. The co-ordination process usually is organised by the assignment of Coordinating Authority.
Cross-Cultural Awareness	The understanding of the differences between oneself and people from other countries or other backgrounds, especially differences in attitudes and values, based on conscious attention and knowledge of culture.
Cultural Awareness	The recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background, that people have different values, different behaviours and different approaches to life.
Decisive Condition	A combination of circumstances and effects, or a specific key event, critical factor or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contributes materially to achieving an objective.
Effect	<p>A change in the state of a system (or system element) that results from one or more actions or other causes.</p> <p>Desired effects are those that have a positive impact on the achievement of objectives.</p> <p>Undesired effects are those that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives.</p> <p>Intended effects are predetermined effects, anticipated to result from the actions taken.</p> <p>Unintended effects are those that are not anticipated or envisioned to be associated with the objectives and actions taken. These effects may be desired or undesired.</p>
End-State	The (statement of) conditions that define(s) an acceptable concluding situation for the coalition's military involvement.
Engagement	Action taken against a hostile force with intent to deter, damage or neutralize it. (Synonym: Battle)
Engagement Space	That part of the strategic environment to a particular crisis in which the coalition may decide, or has decided, to engage.
Information	<p>An assembly of data in any medium or form capable of communication and use by assigned meaning through known conventions used in symbolic representation.</p> <p>Basic features of information are:</p> <p>(1) Development of Knowledge: Information is data interpreted in a context, and in turn, enables the linkage of data as a basis for the development of knowledge – this function is a prerequisite for developing situational awareness and understanding;</p>

	<p>(2) Communication: Information enables humans to communicate and act in a social environment – this function inter alia is a prerequisite for effective leadership;</p> <p>(3) Automation: Information enables automated systems to function without direct involvement of human reasoning – this function constitutes a decisive factor for new technological advances, including the whole range of sensors and effectors.</p>
Information Activity	An action designed to have an effect in the Information Environment, performed by any actor.
Information Environment	The virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems.
Information Factor	The actuality of information pervading societies, such as actors and audiences have become increasingly indistinguishable, and every action sends a message, intended or not. (In the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor per se that will increasingly affect the operational factors force, space and time.)
Information Objective	A desired condition to be created in the Information Environment. It should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and effects.
Information Strategy	The interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the Information Environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political communication guidance for multi-agency activity of coalition partners across all levers of power in support of mission objectives.
Information System	<p>A socio-technical system for the collection, processing and dissemination of information. It comprises personnel , technical components, organisational structures, and processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share, transmit and disseminate information.</p> <p>Note: The personnel component of information systems comprises those key individuals or groups that use and/or act on information.</p>
Intercultural Communicative Competence	The ability of a person to behave adequately in a flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations of representatives of foreign cultures.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment	A J2 process that provides an understanding of the operational environment as a basis for planning and assists in the implementation of the plan by identifying opportunities to promote decisive action. (The JIPOE process has replaced the former IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace – process at the operational level.)
2034	
Joint Military Commission	Formally established meetings of the Joint Task Force attended by two or more military representatives (usually commanders) of the parties in conflict / former warring factions. At such meetings, the parties meet under Joint Task Force supervision to coordinate joint activities, disseminate intent and instructions, and to resolve difference
Joint Operations Area	A temporary area defined by the strategic commander, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations.
Key Leader Engagement	The meeting of JTF military leaders with decision-makers of approved audiences that have defined goals. These engagements can be used to shape and influence local leaders within the operations area or may also be directed toward specific groups (religious, academic, tribal, etc.).
Knowledge Development	A staff-wide process across all command levels that collects and analyses information, integrates isolated data into a usable body of information based on an understanding of systems, and makes it available so that it can be shared in order to develop comprehensive situation awareness and understanding of the operational environment, and support decision-making.
Line of Operations	A path linking decisive conditions to achieve an objective.
Master Message	The most important, enduring, and high-level message for framing Information Activities.
Measure of Effectiveness	The criteria, derived from indicators of system state, used to evaluate how system behaviour has been affected. The MOE will help answer the question “Was the intended new system state—the desired effect—created?” This may require multiple MOEs per effect to fully capture the changes in system states.
Measure of Performance	The criteria used to evaluate the accomplishment of own actions.

Message	The substance of a communication transmitted by words, signals, or other means from one person, station, or group to another; the point or points conveyed (intentionally or unintentionally).
Narrative	The statement of identity, cause and intent around which people can unite.
Objective	A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved.
Operation	A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose. (NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions.)
Operational Environment	<p>A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. (Synonym: Operating Environment)</p> <p>Permissive Environment: host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a military force intends to conduct.</p> <p>Uncertain Environment: host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a military force intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.</p> <p>Hostile Environment: hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a military force intends to conduct.</p>
Operations Assessment	The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.
Reachback	Process allowing, through the use of communication and information systems, to timely provide deployed forces with services and capabilities from expert organisations that are external to the theatre.
Security Environment	The totality of the factors, conditions and relations existing in the fundamental domains of human society and the international community (political, diplomatic, economic, military, social, ecological, juridical, informational, etc.), at a certain moment in time, over a certain reference geographical area.
Situation Awareness	The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.

Note: The term is often used incorrectly with the adjective form 'situational': situational awareness is awareness that just happens sometimes, and situation awareness is awareness of the situation.

Strategic Communication	The integration of military communication capabilities and functions with other military capabilities in order to understand and shape the Information Environment, inform, persuade or influence audiences in support of mission objectives, and to implement political will.
Synchronization	The process of precisely coordinating or matching two or more activities, devices, or processes in time.
System	A functionally, physically, and/or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole.
Theatre of Operations	A geographic space including areas deemed to be of political, diplomatic and/or military importance and designated by political and/or military authorities, where an operation may take place.
Theme	The subject or topic of communication in terms of a unifying or dominant idea of a message or set of messages.

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Supplement

2041

I. Communication Planning Principles

2042

I.1. Principles of Joint and Multinational Operations

2043

2044 The fundamental principles of joint and multinational operations guide operations planning and hence
2045 the respective contributions from a communication perspective.

2046 • **Unity of Effort.** Multinational operations depend on cooperation and coordination to realize
2047 maximum combined effect. Alignment of words and deeds to achieve a common end-state is
2048 the overall goal of all operations. Communication advice must, therefore, be provided to
2049 operations planning from the early beginning of the process. The Information Environment
2050 must be considered throughout effects development, activity planning and conduct of
2051 operations.

2052 • **Concentration of Force.** Combat power should be concentrated at a pre-selected time and
2053 place designed to achieve decisive results. Capabilities for creating effects in the Information
2054 Environment are manifold and complex, and their activities may have unexpected and/or
2055 unintended side effects. A sound analysis of the Information Environment and the
2056 coordination, harmonization and synchronization of Information Activities is prerequisite for
2057 an effective integration of communication and combat power.

2058 • **Economy of Effort.** In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take risks in
2059 some areas. This implies the balance of available resources, given acceptable risk, against a
2060 commander's priorities. The application of the principles of subsidiarity and empowerment
2061 will support the employment of communication means where they are available and best fit.
2062 Furthermore, pooling and sharing of capabilities (e.g., media assets) at higher levels may
2063 facilitate a shift of emphasis, as required.

2064 • **Freedom of Action.** JTF commanders should be empowered to pursue their designated
2065 missions with a minimum of restrictions placed upon them. The application of the principles
2066 of subsidiarity and empowerment to communication efforts will enable commanders to
2067 effectively tailor their forces and employ their capabilities where they are needed.

2068 • **Definition of Objectives.** Joint multinational operations must be focused towards clearly
2069 defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the
2070 desired end-state. Information Objectives must be phrased to support strategic objectives and

2071 provide a focus on the Information Environment. The Narrative supports the building of a
2072 corporate identity of the JTF and enables a widespread understanding of its mandate and
2073 mission.

2074 • **Flexibility.** Plans and procedures should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the unexpected
2075 and to empower commanders with maximum freedom of action. Analysis and assessment of
2076 the Information Environment is a continuous and essential task to detect changes and trends
2077 that require the attention of communication practitioners. An appropriate variety of
2078 communication means and techniques should be held available for expeditious reaction on
2079 situation requirements.

2080 • **Initiative.** Initiative is about recognizing and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an
2081 original manner. It usually requires command authorities to be delegated to the lowest level
2082 possible. Generally, communication must be proactive rather than reactive. Activities of the
2083 JTF should be self-explanatory and not require parallel or later comment. The application of
2084 the principles of subsidiarity and empowerment will support active communication.

2085 • **Offensive Spirit.** At the core of offensive spirit is the notion of a pro-active mind-set to foster
2086 confidence and encourage enterprise. This pro-active attitude of mind is the essence of
2087 integrated communication: StratCom needs to drive operations by implementing the
2088 Information Strategy and anticipate developments in the Information Environment in order to
2089 effectively shape and respond.

2090 • **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception, and if successful, achieves results
2091 disproportionate to the effort expended. It is not necessarily required that the JTF
2092 communicates everything on a subject issue. The selective messaging of truthful information
2093 (or even temporary silence) may serve deceptive purpose while not compromising the JTF's
2094 credibility.

2095 • **Security.** Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and
2096 threats. Truthful information promotes authenticity and credibility, and reduces the risk of
2097 wrongful accusation. Situation awareness and an appropriate level of operational knowledge
2098 limit the JTF's vulnerability to adversarial misinformation.

2099 • **Simplicity.** Simple plans and clear orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Effective
2100 communication depends on the perception of the audience, which can never be fully
2101 controlled (as it is composed of numerous factors such as personal attitudes, knowledge,
2102 experience, expectations, etc.). However, a first step in entering the sphere of another one's

2103 perception is sending a clear message: "If language is not correct, then what is said is not what
2104 is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, then what ought to be done remains undone."
2105 (Confucius)

2106 • **Maintenance of Morale.** High morale is essential for operational success. It depends on good
2107 leadership, which instils courage, energy, determination, respect and care both for and
2108 amongst the personnel under command. Command of multinational forces demands an
2109 attitude of mind that is not only international, but also able to understand differing national
2110 perspectives and how they relate to the common purpose. Cross-cultural awareness and
2111 intercultural communicative competence both have an internal and external dimension.

2112 • **Sustainment.** Planning for sustainment encompasses strategy, tactics and administration.
2113 Ensuring a sound administrative baseline should be part of operations planning from the
2114 outset. Communication must be coherent and consistent. This requires foresighted strategic-
2115 political guidance (Information Strategy) and appropriate documentation mechanisms that
2116 enable comprehension of past activity and anticipation of future trends.

2117 **I.2. Principles of Operations Planning**

2118 The principles for operations planning reflect the challenges for both civilian and military actors
2119 involved in planning for operations in a complex and uncertain security environment. They need to be
2120 considered for planning contributions from a communication perspective.

2121 • **Coherence.** Every plan must positively contribute towards the accomplishment of the
2122 strategic objectives for addressing the crisis. Information Objectives must be clearly related to
2123 strategic objectives. Effects developed at the operational level must support the achievement
2124 of Information Objectives.

2125 • **Comprehensive Understanding of the Environment.** Achieving the desired strategic
2126 outcomes must be understood at all echelons during planning and conduct of operations.
2127 Understanding the Information Environment is a prerequisite for purposeful effects
2128 development, activity planning and assessment of effects.


2129 • **Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding.** Operations planning in support of
2130 the JTF's contribution to a comprehensive approach should allow collaboration and
2131 cooperation across multinational and national bodies, among civil and military actors, and with
2132 other relevant actors and local authorities. Communication planning should always consider
2133 the 'end-user perspective', i.e., how own messages be understood by intended and

- 2134 unintended audiences in a specific operational context. The Narrative and its
2135 operationalization will be key for promoting transparency, credibility and authenticity.
- 2136 • **Consultation and Compatible Planning.** Mutually supportive, compatible, and wherever
2137 possible, concerted and harmonised planning is fundamental for success of a comprehensive
2138 approach. Civilian mission partners need to be involved in communication planning as much
2139 as possible, and communication planning products need to be prepared in a way that enables
2140 appropriate information exchange.
 - 2141 • **Efficient Use of Resources.** Decision-makers should be made aware of the risk of not
2142 adequately resourcing an operation. Planners must allow both military and non-military
2143 contributions to focus on and leverage their core competencies within the international
2144 response to a crisis. Communication planning needs to provide constant feedback to the higher
2145 command and identify potential resources at all levels for creating Information Effects. The
2146 application of the principles of subsidiarity and empowerment will support the employment
2147 of communication means where they best fit.
 - 2148 • **Flexibility and Adaptability.** Planning should accommodate an expanding set of
2149 circumstances, allowing due consideration for likely costs evaluated against benefits gained.
2150 Planning should be flexible enough to adjust to evolving political guidance, civil and military
2151 advice needed to facilitate collaborative planning and adapt to political requirements during a
2152 crisis. Analysis and assessment of the Information Environment is a continuous and essential
2153 task to detect changes and trends that require the attention of communication practitioners.
2154 Modified communication guidance must be forwarded to subordinate levels without filtering
2155 and as quickly as possible.

2156 **II. Campaign Synchronization**

2157 **II.1. Mid-term Planning and Joint Functions**

2158 Campaign synchronization is the coordination and prioritisation of all efforts of the JTF in order to
 2159 maximise the efficiency and synergism of all activities in time and space in accordance with the OPLAN.
 2160 At an operational-level JTF HQ, the JCB is the Commander's principal tool for campaign
 2161 synchronization. It establishes the procedures and responsibilities for mid-term planning, integrating,
 2162 synchronizing, de-conflicting, and executing joint fires, usually within the timeframe of Day 3 to Day
 2163 10²⁴, bridging the gap between the short-term conduct of current operations and long-term operations
 2164 planning (see Figure 12).



2165
 2166 **Figure 12: Campaign Synchronization**

2167 Campaign synchronization is a command function managed by the J3 Operations staff in close
 2168 cooperation with J5 Plans and – for contributing to the joint targeting process – J2 INTEL. In this
 2169 respect, one key purpose of campaign synchronization is to coordinate the employment of lethal and
 2170 non-lethal actions to create specific physical and psychological effects in order to achieve military
 2171 objectives and reach the desired end-state. Guided by the Dir StratCom, all staff elements involved in
 2172 communication management will have to contribute to campaign synchronization through
 2173 appropriate processes in support of the JCB.

2174 The primary objective of the JCB is to attain the most efficient use of the JTF's resources and assets by
 2175 capitalising on their synergistic effects. It is a decision-making body, usually chaired by the Deputy
 2176 Commander or the ACOS J3, which involves all joint functions²⁵ (see Figure 13): C2, INTEL, Manoeuvre

²⁴ Default for high-intensity combat operations; time frame may expand in low-intensity stability operations.

²⁵ Joint functions provide a sound framework of related capabilities and activities grouped together to assist JTF commanders to integrate, synchronize and direct various capabilities and activities in joint operations.

2177 and Fires, Sustainability, Force Protection (FP), and CIMIC. This handbook suggests adding
 2178 Communication as another joint function, replacing Info Ops in the current understanding of NATO
 2179 doctrine. Communication as a joint function should comprise a broader scope of capabilities and
 2180 functions than Info Ops currently does, including PA and internal communication. Hence it will be
 2181 represented by the Dir StratCom in all JTF HQ decision-making processes.




Figure 13: Communication as a Joint Function

2182
 2183
 2184 The JCB conducts regular meetings, prepared by the JCB Working Group (JCBWG, J3-led) and supported
 2185 by the Joint Defended Assets Working Group (JDAWG, led by the designated Air Defence Commander
 2186 of the JTF), the Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board²⁶ (DARB, led by the Theatre Collection Manager /
 2187 J2), the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB, J2 / J3 co-led), and the Assessment Working Group
 2188 / Assessment Board (AWG/AB, J5-led). Current NATO doctrine also involves the IAWG (J3-led) as a
 2189 principal body in support of the JCB.

2190 Additional bodies involved in the Joint Coordination process are: the Joint Operations Centre (JOC, J3),
 2191 the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG, usually operated at the Air Force Component level), the
 2192 Target Support Cell (TSC, J2), and the Information Activities Working Group (IAWG, J3).


2193 During conduct of operations, the JTCB integrates joint targeting into the campaign, crossing functional
 2194 and component layers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The JTCB is typically responsible

²⁶ Alternative: Joint Collection and Management Board (JCMB).

2195 for: reviewing target information; developing targeting guidance and priorities; refining target lists;
 2196 maintaining a list of restricted targets and areas where Special Operations Forces (SOF) are operating;
 2197 ensuring target nominations are consistent with the Commander's intent and concept of operations;
 2198 and ensuring that Information Activities are adequately addressed.

2199 **II.2. The Joint Coordination Board and Communication Management**

2200 In order to promote a common understanding of communication guidance throughout the joint
 2201 coordination process, the Dir StratCom will have to take on his responsibility and play a visible role. A
 2202 clear division of labour needs to be established amongst the staff elements involved in communication
 2203 management, distinguishing between preparatory working groups and decision-making bodies.
 2204 Attendance requirements for communication capabilities and functions at the JTCB, JCBWG and JCB
 2205 need to be considered in order to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure representation of
 2206 communication expertise at the appropriate levels.



2207
 2208 **Figure 14: The CCWG in the Joint Coordination Process**

2209 The Dir StratCom should be supported by the StratCom Directorate and the CCWG as his tool for
 2210 communication management (see Chapter 4, Section B.3). Figure 14 shows the position and working
 2211 relationships of a CCWG in the Joint Coordination process.

2212 The Commander's direction and guidance on implementing strategic communication guidance with a
2213 long-term perspective is provided through the ISB.

2214 The CCWG should link up with the IAWG (to provide communication guidance and coordination to the
2215 targeting process), the EWG (to support JTF engagement activities from an overarching perspective),
2216 the AWG/AB (to assist operations assessment), the JOPG (to support operations planning), the JCBWG
2217 (to guide the preparation of Joint Coordination Orders, JCOs), and the JCB (to participate in the
2218 decision-making process from a communication perspective).

2219 Prepared by the CCWG, Info Ops should be in the lead for adequately contributing to the targeting
2220 process – based on guidance by the Dir StratCom and coordinated with PA (considering that PA usually
2221 does not nominate 'targets' as such, but advises on potential public and media issues).

2222 The JCBWG should involve a CCWG representative in addition to PA and Info Ops. This is to ensure that
2223 the Dir StratCom (or a deputy or assistant of his choice) has a formal seat in JCBWG meetings to deliver
2224 his opinion. Although PA and Info Ops themselves are part of the CCWG, their attendance is necessary
2225 to assure situation awareness and avoid misinterpretations.

2226 The JCB assists the JTF's activity and effects synchronization, specifically to prepare and issue the
2227 Commander's priority guidance across the subordinate commands, and to resolve potential areas of
2228 conflict. The JCB assigns execution responsibilities, prioritises, de-conflicts and synchronizes all aspects
2229 of the employment of lethal and non-lethal means. The Commander provides, through the medium of
2230 the JCB, further amplification to his direction and guidance. JCB representatives must have the
2231 experience, knowledge and authority to take decisions (on behalf of their commanders). With respect
2232 to the decision-making function of the JCB, its high-level tasking authority, and its role in support of
2233 requests and recommendations to the strategic level, the Dir StratCom himself, the CPAO, and the
2234 Spokesperson should attend JCB meetings. Info Ops will be kept involved through the CCWG and
2235 informed through their attendance at the JCBWG.

2236 III. Cultural Awareness and Communicative Competence

2237 III.1. Cultural Awareness and Cross-Cultural Awareness

2238 Understanding of the Information Environment begins with the coalition partners' understanding of
2239 themselves and the acceptance of the JTF as their organisation. It requires awareness of their own
2240 national identity and understanding the rationale for becoming a member of the multinational
2241 coalition forming the JTF, as well as the conditions of this multinational environment.

2242 **Cultural awareness** is the recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background; that
2243 people have different values, different behaviours and different approaches to life.

2244 Cultural awareness is a first step in developing the required intercultural competences for effective
2245 cross-cultural communication. This requirement is as relevant for internal communication – between
2246 multinational coalition partners within and across the JTF and their staffs – as it is for external
2247 communication with foreign and domestic audiences.

2248 Cultural awareness training would remain inadequate if its focus would primarily be intended to avoid
2249 embarrassing social offences in situations where members of foreign cultures meet. Awareness must
2250 not be mistaken simply as to know that it exists without understanding.

2251 Cross-cultural awareness complements cultural awareness by adding the actionable, applied
2252 dimension of cultural literacy. The resulting intercultural competences can then be focused for
2253 communication efforts and developed into intercultural communicative competence.

2254 **Cross-cultural awareness** is the understanding of the differences between oneself and people from
2255 other countries or other backgrounds, especially differences in attitudes and values, based on
2256 conscious attention and knowledge of culture.

2257 Cultural awareness training must also stress language skills which constitute a decisive factor for
2258 interaction in a multinational environment – and for cross-cultural communication.


2259 III.2. Intercultural Communicative Competence

2260 **Intercultural communicative competence** is the ability of a person to behave adequately and in a
2261 flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations of representatives of foreign
2262 cultures.

2263 With joint markets and global communication, mass tourism and mass migration, the need to mediate
2264 between languages and cultures increases. Consequently, new notions of transnational and
2265 intercultural literacy develop, which recognise that communication with others who do not share our

2266 background, and exposure to and contact with other modes of thinking is becoming essential to our
 2267 daily lives.

2268 Training in the context of integrated communication should therefore aim at an integrated approach
 2269 to developing intercultural communicative competence (see Figure 15).



2270

2271 **Figure 15: Development of Intercultural Communicative Competence**

2272 All JTF actors should engage in developing intercultural communicative competence. This will be
 2273 achieved mainly in two areas: cultural knowledge education and foreign language training.

2274 **III.3. Cultural Knowledge Education and Foreign Language Training**

2275 Cross-cultural awareness involves the ability of standing back from ourselves and becoming aware of
 2276 others' values, beliefs, perceptions, and modes or types of communication. It becomes central for
 2277 communication in a multinational context.

2278 In order to develop intercultural communicative competence throughout the coalition and its
 2279 individual members, cultural knowledge education should be introduced as a standard training subject.
 2280 Cultural knowledge education aims at becoming competent within a foreign culture. A thorough
 2281 cultural educational background will prevent significant mistakes in cross-cultural interaction and
 2282 promote the effectiveness of JTF communication efforts. Cross-cultural awareness will support both
 2283 internal and external communication in a multinational coalition environment.

2284 The knowledge of languages is the gateway to cultural understanding and international
 2285 communication. There is a significant relationship between foreign language proficiency and the ability
 2286 to develop a common (or corporate) identity in multinational environments such as a coalition JTF. In
 2287 particular internal communication and leadership depend on the ability to understand and use the
 2288 language of the Lead Nation, which for many is a second language rather than their mother tongue.

2289 Experience has shown that there are some observable behaviour patterns in multinational
 2290 organisations that directly result from the status of being a native or non-native speaker²⁷, and which
 2291 have an effect on intra-organisational co-operation (Figure 16). Generally speaking, group behaviour
 2292 may range between supportive and destructive concerning the cohesion of an organisation, depending
 2293 on language proficiency and group interests.

Language	Group Behaviour			
Native Speakers	ARROGANCE - neglect multinational integration - consider the organisation as national means with multinational augmentation		INCLUSIVENESS - accept cross-organisational responsibility to facilitate multinational integration	
Non-Native Speakers	PRESERVATION - insist on national discreteness while claiming authority	ISOLATION - back out and establish own niche	SUBSERVIENCE - unconditional fealty for native speakers / lead nation	MULTINATIONALISATION - suppress national identity to serve the organisation

2294

2295 **Figure 16: Language Skills and Group Behaviour**

2296 Although interacting linguistic, psychological and sociocultural factors determine individual language
 2297 proficiency to an extent that makes it almost impossible to predict related group behaviour, it can be
 2298 considered a valid assumption that good language skills can foster cohesion and facilitate the
 2299 development of a common identity amongst the members of complex organisations such as a coalition
 2300 JTF.

2301 Language shapes the way we behave and think: when we learn our mother tongue, we do after all
 2302 acquire certain habits of thought that determine our experience in significant ways. In other words,
 2303 the availability of symbols for objects influences our perception of these. Recent studies indicate that

²⁷ In this context the labels 'native' and 'non-native' are used in a generic sense and do not refer to a specific language or nationality. Also, the respective behaviour patterns shown in the Figure are illustrative and very much depend on individual attitudes.

2304 different languages influence our minds in different ways and that this it is not because of what our
2305 language allows us to think but rather because of what it habitually obliges us to think about. This
2306 distinctive quality of learning languages needs to be considered in cultural knowledge education and
2307 the development of intercultural communicative competence.

2308 Intercultural communicative competence in support of communication within an organisation requires
2309 remarkably different standards than that in external communication. Whereas for internal
2310 communication the skills of 'reading' and 'writing' may often become as important as the oral skills,
2311 'listening' and 'speaking' may become predominant for external communication in international crisis
2312 management interventions.

2313 All personnel deploying to a foreign country should acquire minimum standards in speaking and
2314 understanding the local language, relative to their prospective tasks. Local populations will not expect
2315 accentless command of their language from coalition actors but appreciate their honest endeavours
2316 of authentic communication.

2317 The employment of interpreters is another option for cross-cultural communication. However, co-
2318 operation with interpreters needs to be trained, *inter alia* with respect to interpersonal and security
2319 aspects. This indirect approach to communication may jeopardise authenticity and negatively affect
2320 the credibility of the messenger if there isn't a very close and trusting working relationship.

2321 IV. Templates

2322 IV.1. Information Strategy, Format

2323

2324 **REFERENCES:** (to mandating, strategic assessments and planning)

2325 **1. INTRODUCTION**

2326 **A. SLOGAN**

2327 (Name of the operation/mission with reference background or explanation, as required)

2328 **B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

2329 (Strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global
2330 perspective)

2331 **C. CUSTODIAN AND CUSTOMERS**

2332 (Strategic commander; partners/allies, contributing nations, operational/force commander)

2333 **D. REVIEW AND APPROVAL**

2334 (Periodical and event-driven; political approval)

2335 **2. STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

2336 **A. ASSESSMENT OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

2337 (Synopsis; reference to separate document(s), as appropriate)

2338 **B. MANDATE AND MISSION**

2339 (Summary of relevant UNSCRs; strategic commander's mission)

2340 **C. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

2341 (From strategic planning; non-military and military)

2342 **3. NARRATIVE AND INFORMATION OBJECTIVES**

2343 **A. NARRATIVE STATEMENT**

2344 (Strategic-political dimension: partner nations and populations, all instruments of power, global
2345 perspective, derived from mandate)

2346 **B. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES**

2347 (Linked to strategic objectives; phrasing: subject focus – quality of change - conclusion)

2348 **C. APPROVED AUDIENCES AND TARGETS**

2349 (Bullet list; amended with caveats, as required)

2350 **D. THEMES AND MASTER MESSAGES**

2351 (Not linked to specific audiences/targets; general overview; include Contingency Master Messages and
2352 Themes to be avoided)

2353 **4. POTENTIAL ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES**

2354 (Strategic-political level, all instruments of power; national responsibilities)

2355 **5. IMPLEMENTATION**

2356 **A. MILESTONES AND KEY EVENTS**

2357 (Milestones = decisive points; key events = important occurrences that happen anyway / periodically,
2358 story events that may lead to milestones or result from them)

2359 **B. COMMUNICATION APPROACH**

2360 (Broad description: mapping of audiences/targets, themes and master messages for each Information
2361 Objective; continuous text)

2362 **6. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS**

2363 (Procedures ref. to partners/allies, information sharing arrangements, dialogue and interaction
2364 between civilian and military actors; coordination between military and civil mission components in
2365 theatre)

2366 **IV.2. OPLAN Annex SS (Strategic Communication), Format**

2367

2368 **REFERENCES:** (to mandating, Information Strategy, operational assessments and planning)

2369 **1. INTRODUCTION**

2370 **A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

2371 (Relevance to the operational and tactical levels)

2372 **B. CUSTODIAN AND CUSTOMERS**

2373 (Communication capabilities and functions, HQ activities)

2374 **C. RELATED OPLAN ANNEXES**

2375 (List of annexes for specific consideration of StratCom guidance)

2376 **2. CONTEXT**

2377 **A. ASSESSMENT OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

2378 (Synopsis; reference to separate document(s), as appropriate)

2379 **B. MANDATE AND MISSION**

2380 (Summary of relevant UNSCRs; strategic and operational commander's mission)

2381 **3. NARRATIVE AND INFORMATION OBJECTIVES**

2382 **A. INFORMATION STRATEGY**

2383 (Strategic reference)

2384 **B. OPERATIONAL MISSION NARRATIVE**

2385 (Focused on the military aspects of the mission)

2386 **C. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

2387 (List of Information Objectives from the Information Strategy, each with explanation/
2388 operationalization for military implementation)

2389 **D. INFORMATION OBJECTIVES, DECISIVE CONDITIONS AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

2390 (Linking of Information Objectives and Decisive Conditions as starting-point for the development of
2391 effects in the Information Environment)

2392 **4. THEMES AND MASTER MESSAGES**

2393 (List of themes and master messages from the Information Strategy; additional operational-level
2394 themes and master messages, as required)

2395 **5. AUDIENCES AND TARGETS**

2396 (Approved audiences and targets; strategic, operational and tactical)

2397 **6. ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES**

2398 (Operational and tactical communication capabilities and functions)

2399 **5. IMPLEMENTATION**

2400 (Milestones and key events to be exploited for creating effects in the Information Environment;
2401 communication principles, e.g., transparency, comprehensive approach)

2402 **6. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS**

2403 (General working relationships; Communication Coordination Board introduction; approval of PA and
2404 PSYOPS Information Activities)

2405

2406 **APPENDIX SS-1 KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT**

2407 (Definition; principles; responsibilities of StratCom and Info Ops)

2408

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IV.3. Key Leader Engagement Plan, Format

2410

2411

2412

XYZ HQ Key Leader Engagement Plan (as of: DD/MMM/YYYY)							
(1) Information Objective							
(2) Operational Effect / Message(s)	(3) Information Requirements	(4) Preparation Lead	(5) Date	(6) Location	(7) Milestone Event	(8) Key Leader(s)	(9) Stakeholders / Conversational Partners
(1) Information Objective							
(2) Operational Effect / Message(s)	(3) Information Requirements	(4) Preparation Lead	(5) Date	(6) Location	(7) Milestone Event	(8) Key Leader(s)	(9) Stakeholders / Conversational Partners

2413

[Repeat table for additional Information Objectives, as required]

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2414

2415

2416 **KEY:**

2417

2418 (1) Respective Information Objective(s) (from Annex SS).

2419 (2) Supported Operational Effect and (Master) Messages (from Annex SS and Info Ops Activity Coordination Matrix).

2420 (3) Information to be gained from a KLE meeting in support of Information Activities.

2421 (4) Responsible POC for preparing the meeting and providing the Influence Briefing Package and Talking Points.

2422 (5) Date of the KLE meeting.

2423 (6) Location of the KLE meeting.

2424 (7) Related Milestone Event (e.g., conference, JMC meeting), if applicable.

2425 (8) Joint Task Force military leaders to meet with external conversational partners (9).

2426 (9) (External) Decision-makers of approved audiences to be engaged in a planned meeting.

2427

2428

2429

2430

2431 **Enclosures:**

2432 Influence Briefing Package

2433 Talking Points

2434

2435

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2436	IV.4. HQ SOP – Annex Strategic Communication, Format
2437	
2438	1. MISSION OVERVIEW
2439	(Brief description of the StratCom function)
2440	2. INFORMATION STRATEGY BOARD (ISB)
2441	(Purpose; incorporation into the Joint Coordination process; composition)
2442	3. COMMUNICATION COORDINATION WORKING GROUP (CCWG)
2443	(Purpose; incorporation into the Joint Coordination process; composition)
2444	4. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2445	(Key tasks and responsibilities of HQ communication capabilities and functions / communication
2446	specialists)
2447	A. STRATCOM DIRECTORATE
2448	B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS
2449	C. J2 INFORMATION ANALYSTS
2450	D. J3 INFO OPS
2451	E. J5 INFORMATION PLANNERS
2452	5. COMMAND AND CONTROL
2453	(C2 arrangements for HQ communication capabilities and functions listed in Para 3; reporting,
2454	supervision, cooperation, and liaison)
2455	6. BATTLE RHYTHM
2456	A. STRATCOM KEY ACTIVITIES
2457	(List of all meetings with attendance of communication specialists; purpose)
2458	B. ATTENDANCE AT HQ MEETINGS
2459	(Table indicating attendance requirements of HQ communication specialists, reference to Paras 3 and
2460	5.a)
2461	7. COORDINATION
2462	A. DEFINITIONS
2463	B. PRINCIPLES
2464	C. RESPONSIBILITIES
2465	
2466	APPENDIX – GENERIC STANDING AGENDA FOR ISB AND CCWG MEETINGS

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2467	IV.5. Generic Standing Agenda for ISB Meetings	
2468		
2469		
2470	ITEM	LEAD
2471	1. General Overview	Dir StratCom
2472	2. PA Update	CPAO
2473	3. INTEL Update	J2
2474	4. Operations Update	J3
2475	5. Plans Update	J5
2476	6. Information Strategy Update	Dir StratCom
2477	7. Commander's D&G	COM
2478		

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2479	IV.6. Generic Standing Agenda for CCWG Meetings	
2480		
2481		
2482	ITEM	LEAD
2483	1. General (Situation) Overview	Dir StratCom
2484	2. COMBFOR's Intent Update	Dir StratCom
2485	3. Information Strategy Update	SO StratCom
2486	4. Information Environment Update	J2 Information Analyst
2487	5. PA Update	CPAO
2488	6. Civilian Mission Partners Update	SO StratCom
2489	7. Civil Actors Update	SO StratCom
2490	8. Current Operations Update	SO StratCom
2491	9. Component Commands Update	SO StratCom
2492	10. Information Activities & Targeting Update	J3 Info Ops
2493	11. KLE Planning Update	SO StratCom
2494	12. Operations Planning Update	J5 Information Planner
2495	13. StratCom Guidance:	Dir StratCom
2496	a. JCB / JCBWG	
2497	b. Operations Planning	
2498	c. Info Ops & Targeting	
2499	d. Operations Assessment	
2500	e. PA	

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2502 **V. Examples**

2503 **V.1. Illustrative Examples for Information Objectives**

2504

	Part 1: <i>SUBJECT FOCUS</i>	Part 2: <i>QUALITY OF CHANGE</i>	Part 3: <i>CONCLUSION</i>
	SYSTEM ELEMENT, SUB-SYSTEM	DIRECTION AND MODALITY	RATIONALE
InfoObj XX	<i>"All national and domestic actors..."</i>	<i>...understand coalition aims, objectives, and intent...</i>	<i>...in order to ensure the continued willingness for member partners to continue their participation and maintain coalition cohesion."</i> Supports all strategic objectives.
InfoObj XX	<i>"Communications and information infrastructure in XYZ and the region..."</i>	<i>...is functioning and reliable...</i>	<i>...to enable wide-ranging and reliable communication between all actors and the populations in the region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Conditions that improve the economy, social welfare and humanitarian affairs of country XYZ."</i>
InfoObj XX	<i>"Relevant actors in the region..."</i>	<i>...are convinced to promote a positive vision of the future through dialogue, cooperation and education...</i>	<i>...in order to gain active participation and support for the stabilization and sustainable development of the region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Political process agreed among XYZ institutions and civil society, to allow for free and fair elections that will result in the full and equal participation of all stakeholders in the political future of XYZ, initiated within the constitutional framework."</i>
InfoObj XX	<i>"Telecommunication and C2 lines of communication of the L.M. Gang..."</i>	<i>...are disrupted...</i>	<i>...in order to reduce their insurgent capability and contribute to local security in the ABC region."</i> Supports strategic objective: <i>"Establishment of a safe and secure environment in which the government of XYZ exercises effective control of its entire territory and the security forces refrain from human rights violations."</i>

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V.2. Illustrative Examples for Themes and Master Messages

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<i>THEME:</i>	<i>"Acceptance of the Coalition" (Understanding of coalition aims is a prerequisite for achieving enhanced security and building an environment that is favourable for coalition activity.)</i>
<i>MASTER MESSAGES:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We support the XYZ government and people and will leave XYZ as soon as our mandate is complete. - We are actively generating support within the International Community for the benefit of the XYZ people. - The XYZ government has requested us to support the development of the infrastructure, economy and social services. - The coalition will respond in an even handed manner to situations regardless of the affiliation of individuals or groups involved. (...)
<i>THEME:</i>	<i>"Favourable Conditions for Development" (There are certain conditions that have to be met as a prerequisite for effective coalition activity. Most of these require collective effort.)</i>
<i>MASTER MESSAGES:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The military component is in XYZ to provide security and logistics for the coalition and humanitarian organisations to allow them to make their job. - Violence is the wrong way to solve your problems and might lead to reduced international support. - We will support the development of an open and accessible information environment which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides. - We are encouraging the local communities to accept refugees/IDPs on a temporary basis. We will support their return as soon as the situation allows. (...)
<i>THEME:</i>	<i>"Local Initiative, Involvement, Commitment & Self-confidence" (The people of XYZ and the ABC region should perceive their future being as achievable and within reach of own initiatives. Coalition assistance must not be mistaken as dependence.)</i>
<i>MASTER MESSAGES:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Substantial improvements in life conditions can only be achieved if the XYZ people mobilise and utilise their resources, capabilities, and abilities. - The XYZ government and people are capable to substantially contribute to overcoming present problems and creating better conditions. (...)
<i>THEME:</i>	<i>"Local and Regional Dialogue and Cooperation" (The coalition should empower self-help. An important factor to enable this ambition is a sense of commonality and interdependence.)</i>
<i>MASTER MESSAGES:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All actors are called upon to cooperate with relevant institutions that comply with the XYZ constitution. - We will support the development of an open and accessible information environment which will allow a constructive dialogue between all sides. - We encourage all sides of the conflict to start and continue a dialogue concerning the reconciliation process. (...)

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2511 **V.3. Information Strategy**

2512 ENCLOSURE 1 (separate document)

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2514 **V.4. OPLAN Annex SS**

2515 ENCLOSURE 2 (separate document)

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2517 **V.5. OPLAN Annex TT**

2518 ENCLOSURE 3 (separate document)

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2520 **V.6. OPLAN Annex UU**

2521 ENCLOSURE 4 (separate document)

2522

2523 **V.7. OPLAN Annex W**

2524 ENCLOSURE 5 (separate document)

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2526 **V.8. Key Leader Engagement Materials**

2527 ENCLOSURE 6 (separate document)

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2529 **V.9. Job Description: Director StratCom**

2530 ENCLOSURE 7 (separate document)

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