Cordon and Search Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

A summary of collected lessons, observations, interviews, after action reports, and relevant documents from OIF-II, OIF-III and OEF

3 June 2005

MCCLL v. 7.0

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Prologue

The observations, analyses and assessments summarized in this document are based on the candid comments and reports of the men and women who fought the battles, supported the forces, and led our Marines. The high level of professionalism and military aptitude demonstrated by individual and unit performances during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were a hallmark of these conflicts. The Marine Corps has an enviable reputation for innovation and adaptation, and maintains the highest standards of excellence in the art of warfare. It is with a conscious intent to maintain this reputation that the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) offers the observations and commentary within this report.

Comments and feedback are welcomed and encouraged. It is recognized that what works in one Area of Operations (AO) may not be effective in another AO or conflict. Just as the enemy changes their Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), we too must quickly change and adapt to the fight at hand. Please take the information provided, build on it, and report back on its applicability. It is of the utmost importance that individuals and units continue to provide their lessons and observations so we can ensure the next unit to deploy has your documented hard earned experience prior to crossing the line of departure. Getting your observations and lessons into the Lesson Management System (LMS) early enough to impact pre-deployment training is crucial to increasing the effectiveness of follow on units and saving the lives of our Marines.

This is one of many documents and briefings covering a wide variety of topics that have been put together by the MCCLL. These collations of lessons and observations are not sole source or authoritative, but are intended as a means of informing the decision making process and effecting needed changes in our institution.

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Reference Information

In addition to the MCCLL search-enabled website, users of this document are encouraged to read the following reference material to gain additional doctrinal and non-doctrinal background and insight on this topic. This list is not all-inclusive, and users are invited to forward additional points of reference to: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 1776 Elliot Road, Quantico, Virginia, 22134, or use the ‘feedback’ button on the MCCLL website.

Cordon and Search References

Publications and Documents

- Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-6, Counterintelligence
- MCWP 3-11.3, Scouting and Patrolling
- Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-11.1A, Commanders Tactical Handbook
- FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Site Links

- Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA): ALSA - CORDON & SEARCH DOCUMENTS https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/CordonSearch.htm (manually enter and accept the security certificate)
Tasking

The Air Land Sea Application Center (ALS A) will host a conference to begin development of a multi-service TTP publication on Cordon and Search operations. MCCLL was asked to provide a summary of lessons regarding Cordon and Search and Cordon and Knock Operations resident in the LMS of the MCCLL in preparation for USMC participation in the ALSA conference.

Overview

There are numerous lessons, observations, interviews and other material contained in MCCLL’s LMS and search-enabled database. This document summarizes that material. Often, where multiple references to the same issue are reported, this document summarizes those by including a representative LMS record. The information is based upon vetted input from Operating Forces submitted to the MCCLL LMS and observations and information gathered by trained collectors forward deployed from the MCCLL. While information contained within the LMS provides insight into the area of interest, it may not represent a comprehensive overview of the issues. In some cases, there may be perspectives not available within the MCCLL database. Circumstances and the operating environment that existed for any particular observation may not apply in other regions or even other locations within an AO. Sound military judgment has been applied in vetting these lessons for inclusion in the LMS and in this report.

Information presented below provides a summary of the data currently contained within the LMS on the topic. Source material for this document is contained in an LMS binder located at [www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil). After registration/login, click on the “My Binders,” then “Cordon and Search.” Information on other topics is available in the MCCLL LMS at:

**SIPRNET:** [www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil)  
**NIPRNET:** [www.mccll.usmc.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.mil)

A search was performed on MCCLL databases. Search criteria included “cordon and search,” “cordon and knock,” “cordon and urban terrain,” “cordon and mount,” and “cordon and SASO.” The search returned over 70 documents including Lessons, Observations, Interviews, and After Action Reports (AARs). In addition to the useful outside references provided from such places as the U.S. Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), numerous relevant references were appended to the individual documents.
Executive Summary

Information resident in the MMCLL LMS reflects frequent employment of Marine forces in cordon and search and cordon and knock operations, with the preponderance of observations stemming from OIF II and OIF 04-06. This document includes numerous functional area and tactical recommendations discussed in the LMS, but reaches no conclusions concerning the validity of current doctrine as it was applied in OIF.

Cordon and search missions have been an almost daily activity in conjunction with other tactical operations within Stability and Support Operations (SASO) in both OEF and OIF. As in all tactical operations, units refined individual tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to meet the requirements of the situations they encountered. Cordon and search activities were not always conducted as discreet missions but as supporting operations within SASO, and can begin as less invasive “cordon and knock” efforts to gain information, and rapidly evolve into “cordon and raid” or “cordon and destroy” as the tactical situation dictates. While these terms may not be found in doctrinal references, units in their observations use them.

Units cited preparatory actions in planning SASO that presumed the need to rapidly transition between missions within the “three block war”. The requirement for tactical flexibility in task organizing for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as well as combat operations in a MOUT environment is reflected in observations and lessons included in the LMS. Hasty cordon and search was rehearsed and executed as a planned immediate action following Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonation by units in OIF II.

Specific doctrinal deficiencies regarding cordon and search were not noted in the document review. Cordon and search doctrine and tactics were applied in at least one “Millennium Dragon 2” experiment conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, without comment in the final report.

Marine Corps experiences in OIF II truly reflect the concept of the 3-Block War, and cordon and search/knock/raid/destroy missions have provided key examples, observations and lessons across the spectrum of conflict in both the urban and rural battlespace.

Doctrinal Overview

There are numerous publications that provide guidance on conducting cordon and search operations. The following is extracted from observations and represents the common recommendations submitted. This mission involves isolating a pre-designated area by cordonning it off and systematically searching for enemy personnel, weapons, supplies, explosives, or communication equipment. Here is the technique for a squad-sized urban patrol in what is called a point search: a search of one house or building identified by intelligence as a possible cache.

- To the maximum extent possible, to conduct it with limited inconvenience to the population.
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— The populace may be inconvenienced to the point where they will discourage urban guerrillas/insurgents from remaining in the area, but not to the point that they will assist the enemy as a result of the search.

- Assault & Security elements patrol elements establish an inner cordon around the target building to seal it off, with the primary intent of preventing movement out of the targeted building.
- Designated reaction force establishes an outer cordon perimeter.
  — Cover routes leading into the area in order to prevent outside interference or reinforcement.
- Reaction force maintains a reserve to reinforce either the inner or outer cordon, or react to problems such as civil disturbance in response to the operation.
- Once cordons are established, the commander, with assistance of local police and/or translators, does the following:
  — Informs the locals that a building is about to be searched.
  — Establishes a house curfew if permitted by higher HQ.
  — Requests that all occupants remain indoors.
  — Instructs occupants within the target house to gather at a central location to facilitate the search operation.
- HQ element, linked up with any required assistance, (local police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Interrogator Translator Team, dog team, etc.) conducts the search.
  — Include a female searcher if appropriate and available.
- Have the head of the household accompany the search party throughout the operation to prevent denial of incriminating evidence and possible accusations of theft and looting against Marines.
- Have a prominent member of the local community accompany the search party—if at all possible—to act as a witness.
- Search occupants first to screen for suspected enemy personnel.
- Evacuate any suspicious/apprehended persons as soon as possible.
- Search the building(s) from top to bottom.
- Ideally, conduct the search with the assistance of combat engineers using mine detectors to locate hidden arms and ammunition.
- If the targeted building is empty or the occupant refuses entry to friendly forces, it may be necessary to forcefully enter the premises to conduct a search.
- If an unoccupied house containing property is searched, make arrangements to secure it until its occupants return.
  — Either with local police or own forces.
- Avoid unnecessary force and damage to property.

Functional Area lessons and observations

Surveillance

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as the Predator, served as an outstanding surveillance asset for direct actions missions, raids, and cordon and knocks. UAVs were able to provide the ground element commander with real time intelligence of what was on the objective. This allowed a commander the opportunity to change the main effort before committing to a target, or

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abort a mission to avoid burning a target. More training is required in instances where Marines are being fed real time information, before they hit an objective. Additional ground surveillance assets should be utilized during night Cordon and Search Operations, as aircraft cannot determine if buildings are occupied.\textsuperscript{1} The focus of the recommended training is reducing the ‘sensor to shooter’ interval between collecting the information and providing it real-time to the forces involved in the Cordon and Search.

**Aviation**

The LMS contains examples of the pros and cons of using aviation in Cordon and Search Operations (CSO). One unit recounted the use of a section of attack helicopters to conduct a reconnaissance pass of a cordon and search site prior to coalition force’s cordon of the objective. “Local personnel at/around the objective area claimed that the pass prematurely alerted a key target personality, who immediately left the cordon site prior to coalition arrival. Use of high flying Fixed Wing (FW) assets overhead of the target area is recommended for initial reconnaissance. FW holding altitudes should minimize engine noise (at least 15k AGL). For night operations, the AC-130H/U is an ideal Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform, is extremely responsive and provides [extremely] accurate fire support with minimal danger close ranges. Predator and Pioneer assets provide real-time video feed directly to the unit commander and represent another valuable source of target area intelligence. If Rotary Wing (RW) assets are the only reconnaissance platform available, weigh the cost versus benefit of prematurely alerting personnel in the objective area with an early RW reconnaissance pass.” \textsuperscript{2}

Aviation successfully supported Army cordon and search operations in several instances, as reported in a 1st Infantry Division (ID) After Action Report (AAR). “In deliberate cordon and search and raids, we always have [OH-]58s and in many cases FW aircraft, especially A-10s in support. The air can tell the ground commander where the enemy is, and where they are going. They also can help by identifying anyone fleeing a particular area, especially if they are traveling in a vehicle. We recently had an operation where an A-10 tracked a vehicle fleeing a CSO through our AO where we were able to get the Quick Reaction Force to set up a Tactical Command Post (TCP) and take them into custody. The Iraqis simply drove up to the TCP and tried to bluff their way through, but we knew, from the pilot, exactly the car we were looking for. When the patrol is conducting a reconnaissance and air is not available it is much more difficult to determine where the bad guys went and who they are.” \textsuperscript{3}

**Tactics**

Numerous tactical considerations are included among lessons learned and from AARs. The following are representative of tactics cited in CSO: “Numerous weapons and contraband were found not within the (village) compounds, but in the high ground, the corn and wheat fields, or buried under haystacks or rock piles surrounding the villages. Units need to focus on all areas surrounding the villages, including orchards, wells, haystacks and fields, up to and including 500m outside the village. Marines should remain very alert during these searches as on several occasions enemy fighters were found lying in the fields or hiding behind rocks 20 to 50 meters away from their stashed weapons.” \textsuperscript{4}
There is a common misconception that High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWVs) are quieter than tanks and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) when conducting movement to/from assembly areas in preparation for a cordon and search. “Dismounted maneuver is the only quiet means of approaching the target area without alerting potential targets. Outer cordon mobility must be assured in order to pursue High Value Targets (HVTs) leaving the area but must be emplaced with the security of the mission in mind. Once the inner and outer cordons are emplaced, there is value in the integration of armored assets that serve to discourage attackers.” It is also noted that “The firepower and protection of tanks and other ‘armored’ assets makes them formidable targets and their presence on the battlefield, whether in a static cordon or a moving convoy, makes would-be attackers look for an easier, softer target.”

Several lessons directly addressed the need for tactical surprise and enemy observation and warning:

“Many times when Marines enter on a Cordon and Knock mission when the objective is a HVT or a person of interest, the individual that is sought is not in the objective area. The establishment of both the Inner and Outer cordons when conducting a Cordon and Knock are often slow and occasionally are not tight enough to keep individuals from moving in and out of the objective area. Since traditionally the outer cordon is set first, followed by an inner cordon, there is usually a time lag between the setting of the cordons and the search team entering the objective. This time lag will occasionally allow a HVT or person of interest to escape the cordon and results in a 'Dry hole'. A Company, 1/8 has had success by hitting the objective with a sizeable force that contains both the inner cordon and the search team. The outer cordon is established once the Search Team knocks on the door of the objective. This cuts down on the time lag and gives the force a better chance of finding the person of interest or the HVT.”

“Cordon and search operations were more successful when tactical surprise was achieved. During one CSO, Recon was inserted the evening prior to the operation. The locals heard the helicopter insert and our tactical surprise was lost. The town was cleaned of weapons before the raid force was inserted the next morning. On other CSOs where tactical surprise was achieved, our success in confiscating weapons and ordnance was greatly improved.”

“[The] enemy will use mass pigeon releases as a means of signaling to others that Coalition Forces are in the area. Pigeon keepers generally have their pigeon coops on the roof. When U.S. forces enter the area the pigeon keeper will release all of his birds into the air at once. This has been seen on cordon & knocks, dismounted patrols and mounted patrols. “Pigeon Flinging” was also observed in Ar Rutbah at the beginning of a 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Cordon and Knock.”

Considerations for the need to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local population in a counter-insurgency are contained in cordon and search lessons from both OEF and OIF:

“Do not run unless the tactical situation dictates. The environment, specifically heat and heavy personal equipment load, can quickly cause heat casualties. Running Marines also make locals nervous. Especially during Cordon And Knock operations; the appearance of calm professional Marines may prevent unnecessary panic among locals.”
During operations in Somalia it was noted that discussions/negotiations with town elders can be an interesting and sometimes frustrating experience but will pay dividends in conducting CSOs. “Patience is required; they will take a long time to gather and meet with you. Having an interpreter is a must. Be direct, respectful, and talk through your interpreter. In one town, the elders organized the people waiting in line at the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) and kept them away from the extract Landing Zone (LZ). The elders quickly announce your force’s intentions, and their credibility and position in the community reduce tensions between the people and your force. During a cordon and search, they made sure that the people opened all locked doors.”

Small unit tactical considerations with specific application to OIF II include the following two lessons:

Information sharing within and between units conducting cordon and searches was addressed by Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/2. One company assigned an intelligence representative from within the company to track and update CSOs. By working closely with the Company Commander and Battalion S-2, he was able to update the patrol leaders on recent events that occurred in the AOs. He produced and maintained a catalog of every cordon and knock that the Company participated in along with a database of important information concerning the detonation and discovery of IEDs. This catalog greatly assisted in the selection of future cordon and search operations including re-visits to those already visited.

“During Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), it is important to understand that families own multiple houses in close proximity to each other. It is also important to understand that Iraqis sometimes sleep overnight in a relative’s house. During a recent raid, we did not allocate enough dismounted forces to have an inner cordon of all of the “family houses.” Thus, some targeted individuals were able to leave their house, forcing the outer cordon and reserve to capture them. Understanding that families own multiple houses and how they regularly sleep at different houses is important when assigning cordon elements. During IPB, units should consider that surrounding houses may belong to the same family and that adding an additional cordon element to those houses will increase the chance of mission success.”

**Cordon and Knock (House Search).** Unlike the aggressive method of cordon and search, Marines in OIF II were often instructed to conduct 'cordon and knock' to reduce the animosity of the local population and still achieve the intended goal of searching residences and businesses.

a. **Outer and Inner Cordon.** The first action is to establish the outer cordon to ensure the safety of the Marines conducting the search. The outer cordon shall have sufficient observation, stand-off firepower and mobility to counter unwanted surveillance, interference and escape of target subjects. Inner cordon is established to ensure all personnel and vehicles are contained inside the cordon area and to provide the security of the personnel conducting the search.

b. **Entry Methods.** In accordance with the 1st Marine Division's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Task, Condition and Standards, training, and instructions were provided to use the preferred methods of entering residences and businesses of the locals with their consent in order to reduce the potential anti-coalition sentiment. However, more forcible entry methods and clandestine means of entry had to be considered depending on the
situation. The training at the Matilda Village involved extensive use of "knocking" and requesting permissions to enter houses. There is no preponderance of MCCLL data that suggests this method is more or less effective in accomplishing the mission without compromising security. It is generally accepted that units must retain the ability to escalate from permissive entry to forcible entry and possess the proper tools and training.

c. Use of cultural training. Marines are introduced to rudimentary do's and don'ts in accordance with the regional tradition. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) of this training are required to assess and develop future, adaptive cultural training methods. This training helps Marines exploit opportunities and avoid negative public perceptions. Current training consists of power point presentations given once or twice prior to deployment. This training should be formalized and continuous, and incorporated with language training.

d. Use of language training. During the preparatory phase, selective members of units were taught various useful phrases to facilitate training of their peers and subordinates in their units. This rudimentary training method was effective in establishing a basic level of understanding throughout elements of the force. Civilian interpreters employed by civilian contractors were also used with mixed success, and there were never enough interpreters to meet all the requirements. The good interpreters were extremely valuable, and in some cases were able to increase overall situation awareness within units, as well as teach Marines some basic Arabic commands. Battalions should consider development of foreign language study programs to increase Arabic language proficiency as a near-term measure. Additional discussion on language training follows below.

**HET and PSYOPS**

“The PSYOP team utilized their dismounted translators and mounted broadcast system to speak with the local Sheik, alert the local Iraqis of the presence of coalition forces, and warn them to remain indoors. The PSYOP team also engaged the local civilians face to face. The locals the PSYOP team interacted with appeared to receive their messages positively and promptly cooperated with every request. The PSYOP team’s participation allowed both the cordon and raid elements to effectively execute their assigned roles without significant interference from the local population. The ability of a PSYOP team to provide a means of crowd control increases the chance of mission success. The inclusion of a PSYOP element into specific future operations will allow leadership to focus all organic manpower on the task at hand and not be concerned with interference by local civilians.”

“During any type of patrol where contact was likely with the insurgents or the civilian populace, a HET team was employed to interview/interrogate civilians/enemy to gather intelligence on who was involved in IED making, placement, or funding for such activities. This employment netted numerous leads that resulted in additional counter-insurgency patrols, search and destroy missions, cordon and search missions and helped to develop and shape the battlefield.”
Training

The following interview excerpts highlight unit experiences in both OEF and OIF and reflects on the training value in preparing for OIF II operations.

“Prior to arriving in country, the (Battalion) Task Force published a playbook that focused on raids and cordon & searches. Standard actions during these types of operations were summarized in a standard Operations Schedule (OPSSKED). The unit conducted Task Force and Company-level rehearsals using the playbook. During targeted raids and CSO, the playbook assisted the abbreviated Military Decision Making Process and sped up execution time as well as made reporting procedures more efficient due to the standard OPSSKED.”

“One month prior to deployment, all battalion Marines should attend a mandatory, structured, Arabic language course. This course should mirror the US Army’s Special Forces language program, which consists of small-group, 30-minute, daily periods of instruction. Each lesson should focus on learning and applying Arabic nouns, verbs, and adjectives that have immediate application to common tasks performed by Marines during deployed combat operations. E. A. Hawk’s book, “Down and Dirty Guide to Learning Languages Fast,” published by Paladin Press, is another excellent and readily available Arabic language source, and would be a substantial improvement over language materials currently being distributed to deploying OIF Marines.”

“Looking back now, I think that …well, it’s hard to say, because I mean it was truly the three-block war out here, where … at one point, we had folks kicking in doors, engaging the enemy in close combat, while we’re running [Heavy Armor (HA)] sites, while we’re doing just basic patrolling and things of that nature. So what I would say is, certainly at that squad, platoon, up to company level… we probably need to make sure we have a good solid package on cordon and searches and the like and be at least familiar with the TTP on how to engage the enemy in a built up area. We encountered just a variety of enemy over here and used different techniques to breach palaces, for instance, and the like… the enemy was extremely crafty. Those who wanted to die in place were able to pull back, use the doors as kill zones, things of that nature.”

“I think the highlight of Iraq and the best training that we got there would have been, you know, room clearing. I think we pretty much rewrote the book on that with what we had to do…everything we had been taught we saw different concepts of doing it and some of the equipment that we were given, like the breacher kits that… each squad was carrying was a great benefit. Coming here, there are some buildings that you have to clear and some of the operations that you have to do, if you do a cordon and search, there are buildings that you have to search, the difference is…is in Iraq you had just homes… here you have homes with tunnels and they are all interconnected, so… … that would bring a person to think, well if I was going to pass up [into that area] to make sure you’ve got multiple flashlights. You need things like that. You need more flashlights than anything else. And I would also suggest concussion grenades. Those are the things that would give you an advantage in the tunnels. You don’t really want to use a frag in the tunnel, you don’t know if it’s going to cave in or what the structures’ built like, but the concussion grenade will give you that few seconds to get into that tunnel.”
Equipment

Maps in support of cordon and search in Afghanistan: “1:100,000 maps were often outdated and lacked sufficient detail for foot mobile infantry. Digital copies of Russian 1:50,000 maps were used to locally produce detailed maps that were especially useful for patrols, and planning cordon and search operations.” 22

Individual lighting was an issue observed in both OEF and OIF when conducting interior searches. “Buildings and compounds had no interior lights. Entering a dark house, corner, cave, or well after being in the extremely bright sun caused the searcher to have little ability to see anything. Marines attempted using their own personal mag lights etc., to illuminate the inside of cordon and search compounds with little effect. SureFire lights were a necessity for every Marine, not just those in the search element. Marines on the outer and inner cordon had to clear caves and compounds at times in order to establish positions there. Pistol bearers especially should be equipped with SureFires because they are the Marines often tasked with clearing caves and tunnels.” 23

“The … another good thing we’ve been given was the knee pads…we get into a cordon search operation we actually we’re going into little tunnels and caves in side this town that’s on a hill side and those knee pads came in real handy…” 24

Summary

Among the lessons taken from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are many relating to cordon and search, and cordon and knock operations. Marines have continued to improvise and refine TTPs to successfully accomplish the missions given to them. No major doctrinal deficiencies were noted in the review of material contained within LMS, however, many area and mission-specific TTPs have been documented by Marine and Army forces participating in OIF II.

Material on the search-enabled MCCLL website and LMS database is available for review by deploying units’ staffs. Seeing “what worked” for units before them may aid in the development of their unit SOPs and TTPs. Deploying units can also benefit from studying those lessons where plans or actions did not provide a positive result or shortcomings might have contributed to failure, and incorporating applicable material into their pre-deployment planning and training.

1 BLT 1/2, 24 MEU Combat After Action Report for Dec 2004, Operation OIF II
2 LMS Lesson ID 15969
3 1 BCT, 1 ID, 82ndAbn AAR, 3 Sept 2004
4 LMS Lesson ID 15607, BLT 1/6, 1 April 2004
5 LMS Lesson ID 15431, 2BCT, 2ID, 1MARDIV, OIF II
6 LMS Lesson ID 15213, Capt Crow, 2BCT, 2ID, 1MARDIV, OIF II
7 LMS Lesson ID 15129, Capt Little, Michael A., MCCLL Det Iraq, 9 Dec 2004

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8 LMS Lesson ID 11119, BLT 1/2 S-3, Operation Restore Hope (ORH)
9 LMS Lesson ID 14628, 1MARDIV, OIF II, 17 Jul 2004
10 MCCLL Consolidated Document Repository (CDR), entry 475, 1MARDIV G-7 TTP Update, 17 Jul 2004
11 LMS Lesson 11117, BLT 1/2, 24 MEU S-3, ORH
12 BLT 1/2 Combat After Action Report, OIF II, December 2004
13 LMS Lesson 16620, 1MARDIV G-7, 30 Jul 2004
14 Preparatory SASO Training for Infantry Battalions and Attached Units (CDR 2042)
15 LMS Lesson 16125
16 LMS Lesson 16655, 1MARDIV G-7
17 LMS Lesson 15074, Maj Bourgeois, Marshall R., MCCLL Det Iraq, 3 Oct 04
18 LMS Lesson 16615
19 Task Force 2/2 After Action Report, OIF II, Sept 2004
20 Interview with LtCol Gentry, XO RCT-1, 3 April 2004, Camp Fallujah, Iraq
21 Interview with 1stSgt John Hawkins, G 2/8, Firebase Asad Abad, Afghanistan, 29 April 2004
22 LMS Lesson 15624, BLT 1/6, II MEF, OEF
23 LMS Lesson 15646, BLT 1/6, II MEF, OEF
24 Interview with LtCol John Caldwalter, Firebase Asad Abad, Afghanistan, 29 Apr 2004