



## **Civil Affairs Detachment Operations in Support of Marine Expeditionary Brigade – Afghanistan**

**Lessons Learned from 4th CAG, Detachment L, Afghanistan Deployment,  
May – December 2009**

28 June 2010

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(U) **Purpose:** To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Programs, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L) Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, operating forces, and others on results of a 22-23 February 2010 collection effort to document lessons and observations from 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG), Detachment Lima (Det L) operations in support of Marine Expeditionary Brigade - Afghanistan (MEB-A).

**Bottom Line Up Front:**

(U//FOUO) MEB-A civil affairs (CA) was organized as a primary MEB staff section under the MEB-A Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations (G-9), vice a stand-alone CAG with a commanding officer. Its subordinate elements, including 4th CAG, Det L, conducted field operations. Det L Marines were assigned in general support (GS) of MEB-A and direct support (DS) of Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 3 and subsequently RCT 7 following the RCT relief in place (RIP) in November 2009. The Det L headquarters element GS team supported units that did not fall under the RCT but who were still responsible for battlespace, such as the MEB-A Brigade Headquarters Group (BHG), 3d Battalion 11th Marines (3/11) (an artillery unit), and 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion.

(U//FOUO) As part of the pre-deployment training (PTP), 4th CAG, Det L participated in a portion of Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) with their supported battalions. This was important in terms of preparing for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and establishing and maturing working relationships. Such training and relationship development should continue to be replicated. However, due to the compressed timeline between activation of the reserves and deployment, Det L was divided into two groups, with each group alternating between participating in two weeks of EMV and completing other mandatory pre-deployment training. Future CAG deployment cycles should be structured to enable all CA Marines to participate in the entirety of EMV with their supported battalions.

(U//FOUO) Insufficient communications resources and connectivity hindered Det L's ability to conduct command and control, share information, and submit reports. This included a lack of radios with sufficient range, land-line connections, and computer networks and was particularly limiting given that Det L CA teams supported units dispersed throughout the MEB-A area of operations (AO), making regularly scheduled, in-person coordination infeasible.

(U//FOUO) MEB-A and 4th CAG attempted to determine sources of local instability and develop effective response plans employing the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) methodology developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and which was adopted by the U.S. Army and the MEB. TCAPF focuses on assessing local measures of stability and sources of instability by directly surveying the population. The MEB derived metrics from TCAPF in an attempt to target identified sources of instability and assess the conditions for transition of responsibilities to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

(U//FOUO) Fourth CAG deployed 37 Marines and sailors for Det L, many of them E-4 and below with varying degrees of CA training and experience, to cover the MEB-A AO, which included three provinces and seven districts consisting of 58,000 square miles of territory. This required restructuring the CA Det into teams as small as one or two Marines serving at remote outposts. The small size of the teams, often composed of junior personnel,

**combined with mobility challenges experienced by all MEB-A units was a significant limiting factor in the overall impact of the MEB CA mission.**

**(U//FOUO) Det L's ability to engage with local Afghan populations, assess and prioritize needs, conduct civil-military operations (CMO) planning, advise unit commanders, and respond with funds necessary to complete projects requested by local leaders supported MEB-A operations and facilitated the MEB's ability to leverage "money as a weapons system". These were the primary means by which MEB-A CA contributed to stability and COIN operations.**

**(U//FOUO) Det L had limited RIP or face-to-face turn-over upon their May 2009 arrival in-country. Approximately half of the Det L CA teams only had a few hours to conduct turn-over with the units replacing them during their RIP in December 2009. As a result, these teams were unable to directly introduce individual replacements to Afghan key leaders or provide a definitive transition of the relationships they had established during the course of their seven month deployment. These personal relationships are critical to successful COIN operations and time must be allocated to ensure they are managed effectively during RIP or other personnel transitions.**

**Key Points:**

- (U//FOUO) The two month period between mobilization and deployment was insufficient time to optimize pre-deployment training. The general consensus among 4th CAG, Det L personnel was that another 15 days would have enabled Det L to conduct more advanced infantry skills training and more in-depth civil affairs and cultural training, particularly with the junior Marines.
- (U//FOUO) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) was the primary Civil Information Management (CIM) tool and it was intended that all CA project and key leader engagement (KLE) reports and critical infrastructure data be loaded into CIDNE. Det L also used SharePoint as a platform to disseminate and share information. However, the effectiveness of both of these tools was degraded by communications connectivity limitations, including limited communications equipment and network architecture at the COPs and other remote positions and a lack of computers or access to computers.
- (U//FOUO) Det L used Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds as the primary mechanism for using money as a "weapons system" to help achieve MEB-A's desired effects. CA Marines were designated as paying agents (PA) and project purchasing officers (PPO). CERP funds were the most readily available and provided flexibility and responsiveness. CA Marines also used Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF), an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO fund available for named operations. The benefits of POERF included the ability to use this money to fill some of the funding gaps when CERP was unavailable or could not be used due to statutory restrictions.
- (U//FOUO) Battalion commanders were limited to \$25,000 of bulk CERP funds available on the battlefield at any given time. The process established for accounting and replenishing these funds was onerous and, to a great extent, seemingly arbitrary in its execution. This process was regarded as time consuming and logistically demanding and it occasionally deterred units from initiating larger scale CA projects.

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- (U//FOUO) MEB-A and Det L operational CA was focused principally on the governance and development lines of operation (LOO). This was largely dependent on CA's ability to cultivate effective key leader relationships, respond expeditiously to local needs, and help establish the conditions for GIRoA success. CA and CMO efforts that facilitated this included:
  - CA operations were integrated with information operations (IO) and the employment of "radio in a box" (RIAB) broadcasting systems. The targeted distribution of personal radios was considered to be among the most successful and effective means of disseminating information to the local population.
  - To help facilitate improved governance by the GIRoA, Det L also worked to construct or refurbish government offices in towns and district centers.
  - The majority of CA development projects requested by local Afghans centered on water and included digging wells, the reconstruction of canals to improve irrigation, and constructing bridges across canals to improve mobility. Other important projects included refurbishment of bazaars and building roads to stimulate economic activity and improve freedom of movement for the local population.
  - Det L worked with female engagement teams (FET) established by MEB-A in an effort to initiate contact and build relationships with the Afghan female population in their AO.
- (U//FOUO) Social and cultural dynamics unique to the region of Afghanistan that constituted the MEB-A AO were significant planning factors for MEB shape, clear, hold, and build operations and the CA activities that supported them. Det L personnel were nearly unanimous in expressing the idea that pre-deployment cultural training would have been more effective had it been more in-depth and tailored to the specific provinces in which CA Marines were intended to operate.
- (U//FOUO) The infantry battalions and other supported units provided all of the primary life support and logistics support to their assigned CA Marines. Det L Marines were entirely dependent upon their supported units for communications equipment and mobility, as their only vehicles and communications assets assigned were M-1114 up-armored HMMWVs (that were not authorized for use off base due to the IED threat) and hand-held Motorola radios that were only effective out to 4-5 miles line-of-sight. While this meant that 4th CAG would not have to deploy a large amount of equipment, this also hindered the ability of CAG Marines to conduct operations and respond to emergent opportunities.
- (U//FOUO) In addition to low manning levels, the pace of CA operations was constrained by limited existing infrastructure and availability of skilled local contractors and building materials and the effect this had on the ability of Afghan communities to support and sustain CA projects. Because of these factors, Det L did not attempt to cover the entirety of the districts and instead, focused their operations on where the population was, not necessarily on where the enemy was.
- (U//FOUO) Fourth CAG was tasked on occasion with coordinating medical civil action program (MEDCAP) and dental civil action program (DENCAP) events. In anticipation of this, the Det L commander had requested (but did not receive) a preventative medicine or environmental health specialist be assigned to Det L, in addition to, or in place of, the corpsman they received.

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(U) Recommendations suggested by content of interviews include the following topics and associated doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) pillars.

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>F</b>
1. (U//FOUO) Determine adequate CA manning levels and provide designated manpower to units prior to commencement of pre-deployment training.		X	X			X	
2. (U//FOUO) Further develop and institutionalize force-wide standard operating procedures (SOP) and regulations governing the expeditious disbursement and accountability of all available in-theater funding streams in accordance with USFOR-A Pub 1-06, "Money As A Weapons System – Afghanistan," in order to achieve greater efficiency and establish a more streamlined process.	X		X		X		
3. (U//FOUO) Ensure any funding levels for commanding officers are sufficient in amount and discretionary enough in application to be effective in COIN.	X				X		
4. (U//FOUO) Resource CAG detachments with all necessary communications, photographic, global positioning system (GPS), and information technology equipment prior to deployment.	X	X	X	X			
5. (U//FOUO) Structure pre-deployment training timelines to enable CA Marines to participate in the complete Enhanced Mojave Viper with the battalions they will support in-theater.		X	X			X	
6. (U//FOUO) Incorporate robust CA/CMO participation into COIN-oriented large scale exercises in order to increase exposure of the operating forces to these capabilities and efforts. Also, CA officers and staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO) must be trained in the staff planning process.			X	X		X	X
7. (U//FOUO) Structure pre-deployment training timelines to enable CA Marines to conduct advanced civil affairs training, including key leader engagement scenarios with role players, tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) methodology, and employment of CIDNE.			X		X	X	
8. (U//FOUO) Tailor Afghan cultural awareness training to the region CA Marines will be deploying. Language training should be conducted as close to actual deployment date as possible to prevent loss of perishable skills.			X		X	X	
9. (U//FOUO) Train CA Marines in the "money as a weapons system" concept and the rules and regulations for the utilization of CERP and other funds. Marines designated to be PAs and PPOs must receive additional mission-specific training and qualification designations during pre-deployment. Also, each deployed ground combat element company should have Marines trained and authorized to recommend projects for approval and disburse money in the absence of CA PAs.	X		X		X		

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<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>L</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>F</b>
10. (U//FOUO) Ensure deployment schedules allow for a comprehensive relief in place and the effective turn-over of local key leader relationships between CA teams.	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>			<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	
11. (U//FOUO) Provide CAG detachments with adequate ground mobility assets and provide these same theater-appropriate vehicle types for CAG pre-deployment training and driver qualifications. Units tasked with receiving or supporting CA teams should ensure sufficient ground mobility resources are available.	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		
12. (U//FOUO) Continue to resource equipment and develop doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the employment of RIAB systems.	<b>X</b>		<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>		
13. (U//FOUO) Continue development of female engagement teams (FET) and include this capability in CA operations.	<b>X</b>		<b>X</b>			<b>X</b>	
14. (U//FOUO) Provide a preventative medicine or environmental health specialist to augment CAG manning if CA units are tasked with coordinating MEDCAP and/or DENCAP operations.	<b>X</b>	<b>X</b>				<b>X</b>	

(U) The remainder of this report contains more detailed background and rationale on the above and other topics.

(U) **Table of Contents**


**Note: Click on below headings to go to the respective section of the report.**

<b>Prologue .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Background .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Command Relationships .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Command and Control (C2) .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Information Management/Knowledge Management (IM/KM) .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Force Flow .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Operations .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Key Leader Engagement (KLE) .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Money as a Weapons System .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Governance and Development Lines of Operation (LOO) .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Radio in a Box (RIAB) .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Female Engagement Teams (FET).....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Opium and Agribusiness .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Population.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Fires.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Intelligence.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Training .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Equipment .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Personnel and Personnel Organization.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Recommendations (DOTMLPF Pillar).....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Summary.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Endnotes.....</b>	<b>28</b>

## Prologue

(U) This report is one of many publications addressing a wide array of topics assembled and produced by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. The MCCLL library is not a sole or authoritative source, was not designed as such, and doesn't purport to be. MCCLL provides a vehicle to inform the operating forces in the queue for subsequent deployments, the DOTMLPF stakeholders, and the advocates of the unvarnished experiences of Marines engaged in operations. Reporting or relaying these experiences may provide the impetus to effect a change in any or all of the DOTMLPF pillars.

(U) MCCLL relies on the individual Marine and commands to provide their hard learned lessons in order to disseminate them throughout the Marine Corps. The goal is to get these knowledge jewels into the MCCLL Lesson Management System in order to disseminate them in such a timely manner as to make them invaluable to the next Marine in the deployment queue.



C. H. Sonntag

Director, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned



## Background

(U//FOUO) This report is a continuation of the focused collection effort on units supporting operations in Afghanistan as directed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The collection team examined the mission, scope, successes, shortfalls, equipment, manning, and emerging issues associated with 4th CAG Det L operations in support of MEB-A. Interviews of eleven 4th CAG, Det L personnel, including the detachment commander and executive officer (XO), were conducted at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, from 22 - 23 February 2010. Those interviews cited as endnotes in this report are available in the search enabled MCCLL database at [www.mccll.usmc.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.mil), and typically can be located by doing a MCCLL site search (Action Menu on left of screen) on the individual's last name.

(U//FOUO) In December 2009, 4th CAG, Det L returned from a seven month deployment to Afghanistan. Det L supported the ground combat elements of Task Force Leatherneck (MEB-A) to include RCT 3 (May – November 2009), RCT 7 (November – December 2009), 2d LAR Battalion, 3/11, and the MEB-A Brigade Headquarters Group (BHG). The detachment conducted civil-military and stability operations in three provinces (Helmand, Farah, and Nimruz) and covered seven districts, facing a diverse set of issues due to the large geographical area covered and the different stages of development encountered within each district. Det L participated in numerous operations including Operation Khanjar, Eastern Resolve II, Gator Crawl, and support of the national elections. Det L also worked closely with the MEB-A G-9, Helmand and Farah Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), District Support Teams (DST), USAID, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

## Command Relationships

(U//FOUO) MEB-A civil affairs (CA) was organized as a primary MEB staff section under the G-9 (vice a stand-alone CAG with a commanding officer (CO)), and its subordinate elements conducted field operations. 4th CAG, Det L Marines were in General Support (GS) of the MEB-A and Direct Support (DS) to units of the ground combat element.

- The 14 officers, NCOs, and Marines that formed the Det L headquarters element were based at the RCT headquarters and also served as the MEB GS team. Operating in this capacity, they would task organize as necessary to support units that did not fall under the RCT but who were still responsible for battlespace within the MEB AO. This included providing CA teams to support the BHG, 3/11, and 2d LAR. The GS teams would also augment CA teams provided to support the RCT headquarters and battalions on an as-needed basis and be responsible for coordinating projects that crossed unit boundaries, such as major road projects. The GS team also helped plan future operations and interact with key leaders and the local population in areas not yet assigned to a maneuver battalion, such as in southern Marjah.<sup>1</sup>
- Once the GS team was reassigned to support a different unit or recalled to the regimental headquarters, the DS teams remaining behind were required to sustain any new projects initiated by the GS team and maintain new relationships established with local Afghans.<sup>2</sup>

(U//FOUO) MEB-A CA supported the four primary LOOs: governance, development, security, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development. The 4th CAG Det L commander functioned as the CA representative on the regimental commander's staff. He would also organize and assist with interagency support, which consisted primarily of USAID, PRTs (usually concerned with coordination across the province on a macro scale), and DSTs (usually

focused on project execution). There were two PRTs - Helmand PRT and Farah PRT; there was no separate PRT for Nimruz province.<sup>3</sup>

(U//FOUO) Although Det L functioned as an element of the MEB G9, it was also DS to the regiment. This created a circumstance where Det L seemingly answered to two commanders, the G9 and RCT commander, which occasionally required deconfliction regarding employment and placement of the limited number of CA teams.<sup>4</sup> There were times when the MEB would bypass the RCT and task the CA teams directly.<sup>5</sup>

## **Command and Control (C2)**

(U//FOUO) Insufficient communications resources and connectivity hindered Det L's ability to conduct command and control, share information, and submit reports, to include the daily and weekly situation reports (SITREP) and summaries which were required from all of the CA teams. This included a lack of radios with sufficient range, land-line connections, and computer networks and was particularly limiting given that Det L CA teams supported units dispersed throughout the MEB-A area of operations (AO), making regularly scheduled in-person coordination infeasible.

(U//FOUO) Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRnet) and/or Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet) email or Defense Switched Network (DSN) phone lines were the primary means of exercising command and control. The secondary means included Iridium satellite phones and, later in the deployment, voice over secure internet protocol (VOSIP). C2 challenges were particularly acute during the first third of the deployment, as the NIPRnet and SIPRnet weren't always reliable due to intermittent internet connections and Iridium phones were not yet available. Interim solutions included utilizing radio networks maintained by the supported units and employing the text functionality of Blue Force Tracker (BFT). These, however, were also intermittent at times and not always reliable.<sup>6</sup>

## **Information Management/Knowledge Management (IM/KM)**

(U//FOUO) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) was the primary Civil Information Management (CIM) tool and it was intended that all CA project, KLE summaries, and critical infrastructure data be loaded into CIDNE. SharePoint was also used by CA as a platform to disseminate and share information and was useful because when conducting a SIPR search, information resident in CIDNE was not available. However, the effectiveness of both of these tools was degraded by communications connectivity limitations.<sup>7</sup>

- CIDNE was a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)-wide system that allowed for long-term storage and wide access to information. Users from various agencies at remote locations could review and add information and analysis.
- Although most of the information entered into these CIM tools was unclassified, it was stored on classified networks. This limited access to the information, much of which could be useful to the MEB's civilian partners. Development of an unclassified means to share information would enable improved coordination between MEB-A and entities such as humanitarian relief agencies and non-governmental organizations providing services in the MEB AO.<sup>8</sup>

(U//FOUO) In utilizing CIDNE, the biographies of key leaders and others whose information was entered into the system needed to be substantive and sufficiently detailed. This information could then be used to help map the human terrain (based on the ASCOPE model: area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events) and identify linkages between individuals and groups

as well as people and places. The goal was to build detailed profiles of people and places so Marines could better analyze and understand the operating environment and conduct influence operations in COIN as well as support proposed Taliban reconciliation programs. Used properly, this tool could also solve the problem of information being lost after a unit rotated out of the AO, an issue often encountered by units in Iraq.<sup>9</sup>

(U//FOUO) Det L also had its own internal information tracking mechanism consisting of an Excel spreadsheet used to track planned projects that needed to be funded, ongoing projects that were currently funded, and completed projects. The information on the spreadsheet was also written and maintained on a dry erase board in the Det headquarters so that activities could be reviewed at a glance.<sup>10</sup> However, the utility of this tracking process was hampered by communications challenges, because some of the field CA teams were unable to download the common spreadsheet from their remote locations and were forced to produce local versions that may or may not have accurately reflected the information displayed at the headquarters, and vice versa.<sup>11</sup>

## **Force Flow**

(U//FOUO) Det L received limited RIP or face-to-face turn-over upon their May 2009 arrival in Afghanistan. During their RIP in December 2009 approximately half of the Det L CA teams only had a few hours to conduct turn-over with the units replacing them. These teams were unable to directly introduce individual replacements to Afghan key leaders or provide a definitive transition of the relationships they had established during the course of their seven month deployment. These personal relationships are critical to successful COIN operations and time must be allocated to ensure they are managed effectively during RIP or other personnel transitions.

(U//FOUO) Det L produced a comprehensive turn-over binder that included information regarding the key leaders they had engaged, CA projects that were completed or still ongoing, and procedures and processes for managing various funding streams and working with the Afghans. Det L also used SharePoint extensively to ensure the flow of current information to their replacements months prior to their RIP. However, at a minimum, deployment schedules must allow time for “left-seat/right-seat” turn-over, familiarization with the AO and supported unit SOPs, and personal introductions to local key leaders.<sup>12</sup>

## **Operations**

(U//FOUO) Fourth CAG, Det L conducted civil affairs, civil-military operations (CMO), and stability operations in support of MEB-A and several of its major subordinate commands (MSC). Principal components of this effort were stabilizing an area concurrently with combat operations, identifying and engaging local key leaders, evaluating local needs and shortfalls along the MEB’s primary LOOs, and facilitating and coordinating MEB efforts to address those needs in a COIN environment.

## **Key Leader Engagement (KLE)**

(U//FOUO) The CA KLE mission focused on facilitating engagements between local key leaders and their counterparts among the units responsible for that area. Each Afghan key leader should have an in-line, “right level,” relationship within the Marine chain of command not necessarily requiring it to be a CA Marine. For example, as applicable, the District Governor should have a relationship with the battalion commander, the village elders’ relationship should be with the

company commanders. CA's role should be to facilitate engagement opportunities and help target the talking points used during meetings.<sup>13</sup>

(U//FOUO) Important factors in conducting successful KLE included taking the necessary steps to corroborate the identity of the true local key leaders and then determining within the maneuver units who "owned" that relationship in order to build trust, maintain continuity, and establish a personal relationship.<sup>14</sup>



**Figure 1: U.S. Marines engage village elders in Northern Nawa during the secure phase of Operation Khanjar.**

### **Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF)**

(U//FOUO) MEB-A and 4th CAG, Det L attempted to determine sources of local instability and develop effective response plans employing the TCAPF methodology developed by USAID and subsequently adopted by the U.S. Army and the MEB. TCAPF focused on assessing local measures of stability and sources of instability by directly surveying the population through tactical questioning using a standard format. The MEB derived metrics from TCAPF in an attempt to target identified sources of instability and assess the conditions for transition to the GIROA.

(U//FOUO) The benefits of TCAPF included the ability to sample a cross-section of the population and identify grievances and their causes as perceived by the average Afghan citizen in that area. This provided CA with a tool to address local instability and guide and mentor key leaders to better ensure they addressed the concerns of their constituents. TCAPF also served as a means to mitigate any personal agendas that these leaders may have intended to promote while providing data for evaluating measures of effectiveness and the discussion of long term progress. All of these helped facilitate the governance LOO, increase the credibility and legitimacy of Afghan civilian leaders, and focus development programs.<sup>15</sup>

(U//FOUO) TCAPF is built around surveying the local population by asking them four questions and then analyzing the responses to identify root causes of instability. These questions are: (1) Have there been changes in the village population in the last year? (2) What is the most important problem facing the village? (3) Who do you believe can solve your problems? (4) What should be done first to help the village?

(U//FOUO) In theory, question one would provide useful assessment information as the local population "votes with their feet"; question two would determine key grievances to focus CA programs and projects; question three would gauge perceptions regarding the effectiveness of local governance; and question four would be a prioritization tool. However, the TCAPF process requires a considerable amount of training and experience to be executed correctly. For instance, it can actually be counterproductive to simply ask the four questions directly as if conducting an interview or interrogation. Instead, the questions should be embedded in a more conversational approach, often during engagements of 45 minutes or longer. Otherwise, Det L found that the people were prone to say, as they were interviewed time and again, "You asked me those questions for the past three months and things haven't changed."<sup>16</sup> Or, as Major Anikow, the Det L executive officer stated: "...to keep going into one area and asking the same question just

*starts [angering] people. ... “Yeah, we told you [the most important problem] was water and you haven’t done anything about it.””*<sup>17</sup>

(U//FOUO) Another criticism of TCAPF was that there are a large number of small villages to survey spread throughout the MEB AO, so this became a significant mobility and manpower intensive endeavor to be done effectively. Also, because of the rural and dispersed nature of the MEB AO and its population, it was often only possible to survey a handful of people at a time, which had the potential to skew the data accordingly. Given these constraints, Det L CA teams focused TCAPF efforts primarily on key population centers. They also introduced the TCAPF process to the units they were supporting, thereby providing Marines on patrol with a basic framework for engaging with the locals in a productive manner and gathering data points for future operations. The Det L commander also recommended including TCAPF training at EMV for both CA and the maneuver elements.<sup>18</sup>

(U//FOUO) Eventually, to further bolster TCAPF metrics and improve accuracy and effectiveness, the RCTs directed the battalions to engage in the TCAPF process and collect and record data.<sup>19</sup>



**Figure 2: U.S. Marine negotiates with an Afghan about compensation for damages done to his shop in Delaram, Afghanistan.**

### Money as a Weapons System

(U//FOUO) Det L’s ability to engage with local Afghan populations, assess and prioritize needs, and respond with funds necessary to complete projects requested by local leaders facilitated MEB-A’s ability to leverage “money as a weapons system”. This was a principle means by which CA contributed to stability and COIN operations.

(U//FOUO) The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds were the primary mechanism employed by Det L in using money as a weapons system. CERP funds were most readily

available and afforded CA flexibility and responsiveness. CA Marines also used Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF), an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) NATO fund available for named operations. With the MEB higher headquarters (Regional Command-South) able to authorize single expenditures of up to 17,500 Euros (approximately U.S. \$23,301) and as much as 70,000 Euros (approximately U.S. \$93,204) available at a given time, the benefits of POERF included the ability to fill gaps when CERP was not available or could not be used due to statutory restrictions. For example, governed by ISAF SOP 930 and described as having fewer bureaucratic hurdles to overcome than CERP, POERF was used to rapidly fund programs such as providing emergency financial assistance to internally displaced people who were forced to relocate due to MEB military operations.<sup>20</sup>

(U//FOUO) USFOR-A Publication 1-06, “Money As A Weapons System – Afghanistan (MAAWS-A)” was produced as a framework for U.S. funding program oversight and placed restrictions on the usage and amounts of funds available to commanders at any given time or regarding a specific expenditure. In accordance with MAAWS-A, the CERP program has the following primary components: Reconstruction, Humanitarian Relief, Battle Damage, and Condolence Payments. The overall program coordinator is USFOR-A J8; however, the USFOR-A Engineers, J9, and J3/5 nonlethal cell serve as project managers for their particular areas and



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functions. As applied to MEB-A, MAAWS-A, in conjunction with MEB and RCT CERP SOPs, dictated that:

- The MEB commanding general could approve projects up to \$500,000. However, the USFOR-A commander may delegate approval authority of projects less than or equal to \$2,000,000 to subordinate unit commanders.
- O-6 commanders could approve projects up to \$200,000 and O-5 commanders could approve projects up to \$25,000. This was for deliberate projects with an approved project plan, separate from bulk funds as described below.
- O-5 commanders could also maintain bulk funds or cash on-hand and approve quick impact projects up to \$5,000 on the spot or pay battle damage claims, each with a maximum of \$2,500, in order to expedite the use of money on the battlefield.<sup>21</sup> However, O-5 level commands were limited to a total of \$25,000 of bulk funds in the field at any given time, so the commander would have to distribute that money throughout the command. For example, if a battalion was supporting five combat outposts (COP), this would only provide \$5,000 for each COP.
  - LtCol DeFrancisci, Det L commander, considered these battalion-level amounts to be insufficient in order for CA to be as responsive as operations demanded. He recommended that:
    - O-5 commanders should have at least \$75,000 in bulk CERP available to use in their AO at any given time. For example, per month, this could facilitate approximately ten damage claims and ten to fifteen quick impact cash-for-work projects, such as canal clean-up and improvement, road and bridge repairs, and bazaar clean-up and improvement.<sup>22</sup>
    - Rather than require CA PAs to make their way out of the field and return to MEB headquarters in order to replenish funds (this process could take up to a week or more), MEB Disbursing should travel with funds to the supported units when necessary or on a scheduled basis.<sup>23</sup>

(U//FOUO) In accordance with MAAWS-A, only ranks of E-7 and above could serve as the paying agent (PA) and E-6 and above as project purchasing officer (PPO). However, because of Det L's preponderance of more junior Marines, the MEB-A comptroller was able to initially obtain a waiver for E-5s and later an additional waiver for E-4s to serve as PAs.<sup>24</sup> As LtCol DeFrancisci noted, "*Civil Affairs is largely an E-5 and above job. We had a lot of E-4s and below.*"<sup>25</sup>

(U//FOUO) The PPO was authorized to provide oversight of execution and budgeting for projects up to \$500,000 (U.S. appropriated funded CERP projects exceeding the \$500,000 threshold required contracts to be administered by a warranted contracting officer) and the PA actually disbursed the funds for the project once the PPO validated that the work had been satisfactorily completed.<sup>26</sup>

(U//FOUO) In addition to the CA PAs and PPOs, each of the deployed ground combat element companies should also have Marines trained and authorized to recommend projects for approval and disburse money in the absence of CA PAs. This would help mitigate any CA manning shortfalls while enabling more of the quick impact projects (typically \$5,000 or less) that positively influence the local population by injecting capital into local economies, providing jobs, and improving quality of life.<sup>27</sup> There is a downside to decentralizing the authorization to

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expend funds; insuring training and standards are established for the company level PAs to ensure that local fund expenditures are compliant with the higher headquarters overall CA plan. [MCCLL Note: These issues are among those addressed in RCT 3 Commander's Emergency Response Program and Post Operational Emergency Relief Fund Standard Operating Procedures, 06 October 2009.]

(U//FOUO) Over the course of the Det L deployment, as overall security in the AO improved, USAID and the PRTs assumed a more significant role and took the lead in funding and managing several larger projects.<sup>28</sup> An example of MEB CA and outside agency collaboration was to separate a single project into different sections, with USAID funding one part and MEB-A funding another part. Also, USAID was able to pay money "up front" to help initiate projects, whereas MAAWS-A prohibits the MEB from doing the same.<sup>29</sup>

(U//FOUO) In complying with MAAWS-A, force-wide SOPs and regulations governing the expeditious disbursement and accountability of all available in-theater funding streams must be further developed and institutionalized to achieve greater efficiency and establish a more streamlined process. In the interim, the RCTs and Det L drafted their own SOP in accordance with MAAWS-A regarding utilizing, accounting for, and replenishing CERP funds in an effort to reduce the amount of time and logistics support it took to do these things.<sup>30</sup>

- LtCol DeFrancisci noted that, per MAAWS-A, CERP funds in Afghanistan did not have the cumulative spending caps that were placed on similar funds in Iraq and, if justifiable, MEB units could request additional funds as necessary. He also noted that "a little bit of money goes a long way in Afghanistan, so it was never an overall budgetary issue," and Det L ultimately reverted funds at the end of the fiscal year.<sup>31</sup> However, a contributing factor to this surplus was the process established by USFOR-A for accounting for and replenishing these funds, which was regarded as time consuming, inefficient, and logistically demanding during the Det L deployment and which occasionally deterred units from initiating larger scale CA projects.<sup>32</sup>
- Det L personnel completed all of the required PA and PPO training and documentation before they were able to draw CERP funds approximately two months after their arrival in Afghanistan. Then, every month PAs were required to return from forward deployed positions to Camp Leatherneck to draw money, reconcile their accounts, and return unused funds. The combination of travel days and administrative processing diverted PA Marines away from their units for an average of approximately one week per month.<sup>33</sup>

(U//FOUO) An unresolved point of contention during the Det L deployment pertained to the necessity of making payments to Afghans for Afghan property occupied by U.S. forces in the course of their operations. CERP funds were restricted from being used in this regard and an alternative procedure had not been established until several months into the MEB-A deployment. Other factors that were involved with making these payments included complying with the Foreign Claims Act (FCA) and the need to address this through the staff judge advocate (SJA). Also, it was difficult to establish who owned property due to a lack of records. These issues were discussed before Operation Khanjar in July. There was no combined real estate support team (CREST) compensation program, as was utilized in Iraq, and Major Anikow, the Det L XO, said that it was not until November that a restitution process was initiated by the Army Corps of Engineers, who were designated in MAAWS-A as the only organization permitted to rent or lease land/facilities. In the meantime, this had the potential to damage MEB credibility and become a wedge issue with IO benefit to the Taliban.<sup>34</sup>

## **Governance and Development Lines of Operation (LOO)**

(U//FOUO) MEB-A and Det L operational CA focused principally on the governance and development lines of operation (LOO). This was largely dependent on CA's ability to cultivate effective key leader relationships, respond expeditiously to local needs, and help establish the conditions for GIRoA success.

(U//FOUO) In supporting MEB-A campaign plans, CA aligned its activities with MEB shape, clear, hold, and build operational phases.<sup>35</sup>

- During the shape phase, Det L sought to establish a foundation for follow-on operations by integrating and synchronizing with the IO campaign, engaging the civilian population prior to the commencement of operations, mapping the human terrain and identifying key leaders, confirming funding streams in accordance with MAAWS-A guidelines, and helping provide the commander with analysis regarding how the civilian population may respond to different actions taken by the maneuver units.<sup>36</sup>
- During the clear phase, Det L provided CA capability in trace of the maneuver elements and leveraged their ability to spend money on the battlefield quickly, while combat operations were ongoing. This included assessing battle damage, processing claims, initiating and managing projects, employing TCAPF, and being prepared to establish civil-military operations centers (CMOC) if required. These efforts helped stabilize the area and initiate reconstruction and development.<sup>37</sup>
- During the hold phase, CA conducted a more deliberate and enduring CMO effort that supported LOOs and established linkages between the local population and the GIRoA. For instance, as Marine units continued to develop relationships with local leaders, those leaders would integrate into the damage claim approval process before final claim adjudication. Ultimately, claims processing will be co-located within GIRoA facilities. The end state for this process is that Afghans recognize that their government is the mechanism for filing and resolving grievances. This phase also focused on stimulating economic activity and enhancing GIRoA services.<sup>38</sup>
- In the estimation of the Det L commander, MEB-A CA did not get very involved in the build phase during their deployment and over time the build phase will become more prevalent.<sup>39</sup>

(U//FOUO) Det L developed a planning methodology at the RCT based on a 30/60/180-day model. This provided CA with an organized building block approach to its operations and established clear goals to be achieved during a seven month deployment. This was also a useful tool in integrating CA operations with the long-term campaign plan.<sup>40</sup>

- Each district in the MEB-A AO had its own 30/60/180-day CA plan, as each of these districts was at a different stage of development. For example, Garmsir district center was evaluated as being further developed than Nawa, particularly in governance, so its plan reflected this.<sup>41</sup>
- The CA plans also incorporated input from the DSTs, PRTs, and especially the GIRoA.<sup>42</sup>
  - Involving the GIRoA was vital to CA success. Instead of Marines dictating the district CA plans, it was a priority to directly involve the Afghans in the discussions and decisions.



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- According to LtCol DeFrancisci, initiating campaign plan development without acknowledging the need to incorporate Afghan input early on was an oversight that he observed and cautioned against during Det L's deployment. In order to ensure Afghan "buy-in" and ownership of the plan, it was key to involve them early in the process as decisions are being made. Without this, it would be extremely difficult to determine the effect of operations on the local population and whether or not the GIRoA could or would sustain any gains achieved.<sup>43</sup>
- Det L identified four basic services in governance that they worked to address and that shaped the 30/60/180-day plans: free basic medical care; public education; competent police and justice; and dispute resolution.<sup>44</sup> CA and IO worked closely in developing these plans and informing the local population about GIRoA capacity to provide these services.

(U//FOUO) Education and information dissemination were key components in developing effective governance in a region that had little if any experience with an effective central government. Even though elections had been conducted in Afghanistan before Det L arrived, there were still areas that remained relatively "untouched" by past elections. For example, in areas new to U.S. operations, such as in Khanishin, Det L worked with the ANSF to identify polling stations, educate local residents on the voting process, and establish the logistics of getting ballots to and from those polling stations. In an example that illustrates the state of awareness at that time, one village elder arrived to vote during the elections and declared, "...I've come to vote and we decided in a shura who to elect and I'm here to cast our vote for that person..." Not understanding that it's "one man/one vote," the village thought they could decide as a group who to vote for and send the village elder to cast that vote.<sup>45</sup>

(U//FOUO) The majority of CA development projects requested by local Afghans centered on water and included digging wells, the reconstruction of canals to improve irrigation, and constructing bridges across canals to improve mobility. There were also school and other infrastructure projects initiated.

- For planning purposes, Det L delineated between what it determined to be reconstruction and development. Reconstruction involved fixing something that was already in place and was damaged during MEB-A operations. Conversely, development was defined as capacity building – constructing something that was not there before.<sup>46</sup>
- Det L was able to do reconstruction and battle damage repair relatively quickly. Generally speaking, if the MEB broke something, CA was able to initiate on-the-spot fixes without conducting a lot of prior staff work, coordination, or authorizations from higher headquarters. However, in the development process, such as constructing a school or clinic, CA sought coordination with the PRTs and other agencies to ensure they did not have a similar project already planned or in place.<sup>47</sup>

(U//FOUO) Development priorities were determined via interaction with village elders and other key leaders and focused on evaluating what was needed, not simply what was wanted. This was also validated by TCAPF. Once it was decided to expend funds for a given project, the next phase was finding local businesses and workers that could perform the work, get the necessary materials, and agree to an acceptable price. The goal was to secure at least three bids for a particular project, however, on several occasions there weren't enough suitable contractors available to do multiple bids and the accepted practice was to submit single source bid documentation for approval.<sup>48</sup>

(U//FOUO) The development process was further complicated by the security environment and the reluctance of some local residents to place themselves and their families at risk of Taliban retaliation. This was exacerbated by Afghan uncertainty, particularly early in the Det L deployment, regarding whether or not the Marines were determined to remain in the region and follow through with the hold and build stages of their operations. A turning point was the period following the national elections where there was a general Afghan population belief that once the election was completed, the Marines would pull-out. When it became clear that the Marines were staying, the Afghans began cooperating to a much greater extent. In some areas, this cooperation included pointing out IED sites and identifying Taliban operatives.<sup>49</sup>

(U//FOUO) From a project management perspective, Det L ensured that the individuals who were awarded contracts were present and involved throughout the contracting process, took before, during, and after pictures to document and track actual physical progress, and entered ongoing project management information on the Det L spreadsheet and/or into CIDNE as able.<sup>50</sup>

(U//FOUO) Early in their deployment, Det L executed a number of quick impact projects, such as constructing small bridges, clearing canals and culverts, and doing minor road maintenance and repair. The bigger projects began in earnest in August, when Det L started working on government buildings, large bridges, wells and irrigation, and major roadway projects. In conducting these larger scale projects, Det L would coordinate with the G-9 if there was a need to resource capable Afghan contractors from outside the immediate area.<sup>51</sup>

(U//FOUO) Development efforts were integrated into the IO campaign and supported other LOOs by serving to help legitimize the GIRoA and the ANSF. These efforts also increased credibility of local government leaders by demonstrating their ability to deliver on improved quality of services, ability to construct or refurbish government offices in towns and district centers, and, whenever possible, ensured the ANSF was the lead element and public face regarding any humanitarian assistance and relief projects.<sup>52</sup>

(U//FOUO) One of the best practices CA used in Afghanistan that was different than the Iraq model was, before funding would be allocated to larger and more complex projects (e.g., a school or clinic), RC-South required a memorandum of understanding (MOU) confirming that GIRoA would support and sustain the project once it was completed. The MOU was usually with GIRoA at the provincial level and outlined what was expected from all parties. For example, the Marines would agree to repair a medical clinic and GIRoA would agree to provide sustained medical supplies and Afghan doctors.<sup>53</sup>



**Figure 3: U.S. Marine gives a radio to a local Afghan near Marjah, Afghanistan.**

### **Radio in a Box (RIAB)**

(U//FOUO) CA operations were integrated with MEB-A IO, and the CMO and IO working groups were used to synchronize efforts and develop themes and messages. The employment of “radio in a box” (RIAB) broadcasting systems and the targeted distribution of personal radios were considered to be among the most successful and effective means of disseminating information to the local population. Major Robinson, MEB-A deputy fires and effects coordinator, noted, however, that prior to deploying into the AO, it would have been beneficial for the effects board to produce a more

developed coverage plan to prevent overlapping broadcast areas and more efficiently employ these assets at the outset of operations.<sup>54</sup>

(U//FOUO) RIAB is a portable radio station capable of transmitting at up to 250 watts and the broadcast area was operationally tested by Det L out to at least 25 kilometers. Programming could be uploaded and transmitted via a laptop computer, MP-3 player, and broadcast a live or pre-recorded feed using its microphone connection.<sup>55</sup>

(U//FOUO) Det L distributed hand-cranked portable radios that could also be powered by battery, solar, or USB charger, and included a flashlight attachment, all of which made them attractive to local residents.<sup>56</sup>

(U//FOUO) With an adult literacy rate of less than 30 percent across the MEB-A AO, transmitting messages and information over RIAB proved to be highly effective and better enabled MEB-A to be proactive, not just reactive, regarding local news events and Taliban propaganda.<sup>57</sup>

(U//FOUO) Additionally, because the personal radios were in such high demand, Det L could leverage issuing radios in developing relationships and influencing key leaders. It also enabled CA to pass information in a format that increased the personal security of key leaders, as opposed to in-person, public interactions. The MEB was also aware that oftentimes Marines' presence in a relatively stable area had the potential to make it unstable by drawing the attention of the Taliban; using RIAB helped mitigate this risk.<sup>58</sup>

(U//FOUO) RIAB programming centered predominantly on music borrowed from interpreters and others, because Det L found that much of the musical programming included with the RIAB package wasn't listened to locally.<sup>59</sup>

- Information passed included topics such as general hygiene, farming techniques, current and upcoming events, and coalition news.<sup>60</sup>
- CA recorded messages regarding local governance and security from key leaders and would broadcast these messages in cooperation with MEB IO. This was particularly useful in countering and mitigating propaganda being disseminated by the Taliban.<sup>61</sup>



**Figure 4: U.S. Marine offers a piece of candy to a young Afghan villager during a Female Engagement Team mission in Helmand province.**

### Female Engagement Teams (FET)

(U//FOUO) Det L integrated with MEB-A female engagement teams (FET) in an effort to initiate contact and build relationships with the Afghan female population. The requirements and concept of operations for these teams was formalized in Task Force Leatherneck FragO 045-09, "Requirements for TFL Female Engagement Team (FET)," 11 July 2009.<sup>62</sup> The primary duties of the FET included conducting searches of Afghan women and their living quarters and gathering information. Established in Afghanistan and comprised of female Marines sourced from a variety of MEB units, most members of these initial teams lacked formal CA training and had limited experience in combat patrolling.<sup>63</sup>

(U//FOUO) Until the development of the FET, Afghan women were not accessible by MEB personnel and any attempts at direct interaction with these women would be perceived as highly offensive. Indirect information regarding Afghan women and their observations was also shielded by the local males, even to the point that if a man was asked how many children he had, he might only answer with the number of sons. <sup>64</sup>

### **Opium and Agribusiness**

(U//FOUO) Opium poppies were the primary cash crop in the MEB AO and a significant source of revenue for the local residents, as well as the Taliban. Because an aggressive poppy eradication program would have a major impact on the local economy and be counterproductive to COIN objectives, CA worked with the GIRoA to promote wheat production and other crops as an alternative to poppies. However, this was achieving moderate success since ultimately the farmers were making financial decisions about whether or not to grow poppies or wheat and, even with government subsidies, poppies were a more lucrative crop for the farmers. <sup>65</sup>

### **Population**

(U//FOUO) Pashtunwali is the moral and social code that the majority of Afghans in the MEB AO live by and can be useful in providing context for many of their actions and opinions. <sup>66</sup> The Pashtunwali code is based on the following primary belief systems: 1. Hospitality; 2. Honor; 3. Forgiveness; 4. Revenge; 5. Shame. <sup>67</sup>

(U//FOUO) These social and cultural dynamics plus relevant idiosyncrasies unique to the region of Afghanistan that constituted the MEB-A AO were significant planning factors for MEB shape, clear, hold, and build operations and the CA activities that supported them. One Det L CA specialist described the environment as, “...*you could literally be at one village and 200 yards away go to another village and their dialect will be completely different....*” <sup>68</sup> Similar statements were made regarding local variations in cultural norms that were apparent throughout the MEB AO. <sup>69</sup>

(U//FOUO) The Afghan population was generally described as a pragmatic people, who would shift their support to coalition COIN efforts only if they were convinced that the coalition was going to remain long enough for those efforts to be successful in ending the insurgency. <sup>70</sup> Mr. John Weston, MEB-A Political Advisor, observed, “...*The Afghan people do not care about the troop increase...they care about the commitment....*” <sup>71</sup>

(U//FOUO) In contrasting their experience in Iraq with operations in Afghanistan from a cultural or societal perspective, Det L observed some general characteristics:

- Afghans didn't do projects unless they wanted them done. They resisted being told to do something and instead would approach the Marines if they wanted something done. This was perceived as being different than Iraqis, who would say they would do a project and then not do it, adopting an attitude of “Oh well, Insha'Allah (God's will), I couldn't do it.” Afghans, on the other hand, would either do something or they wouldn't and they would make that known upfront. <sup>72</sup>
- Iraq was a more mature theater of operations with an established infrastructure of businesses, contractors, and building codes. Afghanistan, however, was characterized by a distinct lack of infrastructure, construction standards, building supplies, and experienced contractors and tradesmen. <sup>73</sup>



- In contrast to Iraq where the tribal leaders had the power and influence, the village elders were the key leaders who wielded power and influence in the villages within the MEB-A AO, which may or may not have had anything to do with tribal affiliation. <sup>74</sup>
- Relative to the point stated above, GySgt Manasterli, Det L staff non-commissioned officer in charge (SNCOIC), noted that Iraqis seemed more willing to step-up and assume leadership of a project. However, Afghans who may have been capable leaders were often reluctant to stand-out or risk offending the local elders. <sup>75</sup>
- In Iraq, a country that has historically experienced recent stability, it was possible to talk with the local people about aspects of their lives when the country was relatively stable. They understood stability and could use it as a frame of reference. In Afghanistan, there were very little in the way of similar points of reference for the locals, many of whom couldn't recall having ever experienced peace and stability. <sup>76</sup>

(U//FOUO) Another social dynamic encountered was that many Afghans felt they had no ability to change their circumstances. LtCol DeFrancisci remarked that time and again they would receive responses such as, "Hey, I'm just a farmer, what can I do or what do I know? How does what I say have any influence on anything?" Where present, this mindset hindered local initiative to take action, because of a general belief that whatever they did was not going to make a difference. <sup>77</sup>



**Figure 5: Afghan men listen as a member of the Afghan National Police speaks during a shura.**

(U//FOUO) GIRoA weakness and corruption also made it difficult for MEB-A and Det L to effectively accomplish its CA mission. The Taliban operated a "shadow government" within the AO and MEB-A and GIRoA were in competition with them to establish influence and legitimacy with the Afghan people. Det L emphasized the importance of managing the expectations of the locals. The GIRoA was susceptible to appearing incompetent if the people had unrealistic expectations regarding the level of services the government was able to offer them. However, an area in which

the government could little afford to fail if called upon was dispute resolution pertaining to land ownership and particularly issues involving water rights. Det L understood that the GIRoA, not the Marines, had to be able to help the people resolve these issues, because if not, the Taliban would. <sup>78</sup>

(U//FOUO) Reconciliation and reintegration were also issues that confronted MEB CA and generated a significant amount of discussion. Reconciliation pertained to Taliban party members being reconciled with the GIRoA and reintegration pertained to Taliban fighters being brought back into Afghan society. Det L, however, identified a third activity in which CA had a major role – dissuasion. This concept was described as an issue that is much discussed within the CA community and is focused on what CA can do to prevent local youth from joining the insurgency in the first place. This includes effectively addressing a variety of issues such as education,

economic opportunity, and social stability. It also includes mobilizing village elders to talk with young males about not taking up arms.<sup>79</sup>

## Fires

(U//FOUO) MEB-A and RCT effects boards produced non-lethal targeting orders that employed non-kinetic effects aimed at influencing specific people. Information loaded by CA into CIDNE was a key component in developing these types of influence-based target packages. However, its value was dependent upon the quantity, quality, and relevance of the information that had originally been entered in CIDNE. Communications challenges across the AO continually impeded the ability of CA Marines to consistently input data into CIDNE.<sup>80</sup> Also, the G-2 used MarineLink as the repository for its information, and database interoperability issues between MarineLink and CIDNE prevented retrieving information from CIDNE and transferring it to MarineLink. This required double entry of reports, potentially resulting in inconsistent, erroneous, or less reliable information.<sup>81</sup>



**Figure 6: Maj George Anikow, 4th Civil Affairs Group, Det L executive officer, shakes hands with village elders during a patrol in Helmand province, Afghanistan.**

## Intelligence

(U//FOUO) MEB-A intelligence efforts were described as primarily threat-based and lacking depth regarding “the human terrain”. LtCol DeFrancisci observed that civilians are the center of gravity in the MEB-A AO and civilian-centric operations were vital to success. At a minimum, this concept should be of equal importance in analysis of the threat and in driving operations. In that regard, he believed that the MEB and RCT commanders were not getting a clear enough picture of the civilian population and infrastructure.<sup>82</sup>

(U//FOUO) Also, because MEB-A and Det L were initiating operations in several areas where

U.S. and coalition forces had not previously been, in many ways the intelligence process worked in reverse, with CA providing a significant amount of information required by the G-2 to develop analysis, particularly pertaining to the social, economic, and political environment. CA Marines weren’t necessarily providing large amounts of operational intelligence data. However, they often worked directly with the human exploitation teams (HET) and human terrain teams (HTT) and provided information to the economic political intelligence cell (EPIC).<sup>83</sup> Cpl Weckesser, an assistant CA team chief noted, “*Most of our intel we got straight from the locals on patrols.*”<sup>84</sup>

## Training

(U//FOUO) Fourth CAG, Det L participated in a portion of Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) with their supported battalions. This was important in terms of preparing for COIN operations in Afghanistan and such training should continue to be replicated in the future. However, due to the compressed deployment timeline, 4th CAG Marines were divided into two groups, with each group alternating between participating in two weeks of EMV and completing other mandatory pre-deployment training. Future CAG deployment cycles should be structured to enable all CA Marines to participate in the entirety of EMV with their assigned battalions.

(U//FOUO) The two month period between mobilization and deployment was insufficient to optimize pre-deployment training. An additional 15 days of PTP is recommended. This would have enabled 4th CAG to conduct more basic and advanced infantry skills training and more in-depth civil affairs and cultural training, particularly for the junior Marines and those with negligible or no combat deployment experience. CA pre-deployment training must include key leader engagement scenarios with role players, TCAFP methodology, and employment of CIDNE. CA Marines and designated personnel within maneuver units must also be trained in the “money as a weapons system” concept and the rules and regulations for the utilization of CERP and other funds.<sup>85</sup>

(U//FOUO) CA Marines must understand CA doctrine, the Marine Corps planning process (MCP), and have a strong foundation in infantry skills. According to GySgt Manasterli, properly trained CA Marines deploying to Afghanistan will be able to recognize that governance and development need to be accomplished and sustained through the GIRA and that, *“those institutions need to be developed or they’ll fall on their faces and you have no real success.”*<sup>86</sup>

(U//FOUO) Marines designated to be PAs and PPOs must receive additional mission-specific training and any required qualification designations during pre-deployment. In executing these programs, CA Marines must understand the basics of contracting and project management. Each team needs to know how to put together a project package, including developing scopes of work, drafting letters of justification for deliberate development projects, and managing project accountability processes.<sup>87</sup>

(U//FOUO) To the greatest extent possible, CA Marines should receive Afghan cultural awareness training tailored to the specific regions they will deploy to so they understand the significant regional or local idiosyncrasies. For example, in one of the training classes, Det L Marines were instructed to take your shoes off when entering an Afghan home; however, when one of the Marines did this on a mission, the Afghans were surprised and asked why they wanted to do that. CA Marines are expected to be subject matter experts in operational culture and the impact of combat operations on the local population and they require more than a cursory understanding of local culture.<sup>88</sup>

(U//FOUO) Det L received largely Iraq-based training; the experiences of Marines returning from deployments to Afghanistan must be fully integrated into training. Det L CA Marines were informed throughout training that “Afghanistan is not Iraq”, but they weren’t told exactly what those differences were.<sup>89</sup>

(U//FOUO) LtCol DeFrancisci recommended that the training ratio should be 20 percent classroom work and 80 percent practical application in the field mastering necessary skills. CA officers and SNCOs must also thoroughly understand how to work as part of the operational planning team (OPT), how to present and integrate the CA plan into the battalion plan, and how to integrate with a variety of enablers, including IO, FET, public affairs, combat camera, psychological operations, and intelligence.<sup>90</sup>

(U//FOUO) Language training should be conducted as close to actual deployment date as possible in order to better maintain proficiency and prevent loss of the skill. Training should also include familiarity with less formal expressions and idioms. When used in Afghanistan, the local residents did not understand many of the phrases the Marines had been taught. Even though these were Pashtun phrases, they were no longer in use in parts of the MEB AO. The Marines also received feedback from the locals that the language they were taught was overly formal and elitist.<sup>91</sup>

(U//FOUO) Every Marine should be trained on key leader and local populace engagement TTPs.<sup>92</sup> CA/CMO were designed to function as “force multipliers;” however, it is the Marines on daily patrol throughout the AO who most often engage with the Afghans and it is critical that these Marines be able to interact in a positive and effective manner.<sup>93</sup>

## Equipment

(U//FOUO) Det L was not adequately resourced with the necessary communications and information technology equipment prior to deployment. This included a lack of radios with sufficient range, computers suitable for use in the field, and printers and copiers.

(U//FOUO) CA teams lacked adequate ground mobility assets and the units tasked with receiving and supporting them did not have sufficient resources to dedicate Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) specifically in support of CA. Once forward deployed, Det L Marines moved predominantly by foot and air or convoy, as available. These mobility challenges limited the ability of CA teams to consistently access population centers beyond walking distance from their positions.

(U//FOUO) The infantry battalions and other supported units provided all of the primary life support and logistics support to their assigned CA Marines. Det L Marines were entirely dependent upon their supported units for the communications equipment and mobility resources noted above. Their only assigned vehicles were M-1114 up-armored HMMWVs that were not authorized for use off base due to the IED threat. Their assigned communication equipment were hand-held Motorola radios with an effective range of 4-5 miles line-of-sight, which were not particularly useful given that distances between some CA positions ranged from 30 to 60 miles.<sup>94</sup>

(U//FOUO) While 4th CAG did not have to deploy from CONUS with a large amount of equipment, thereby enabling the unit to activate and deploy on a short timeline, this also hindered the ability of CAG Marines to conduct operations and respond to emergent opportunities. This situation began to improve approximately two to three months into the deployment with the issuing of iridium satellite phones; however, this wasn't a decisive improvement. Only one Iridium phone was allocated per team and the team leader was based at the battalion headquarters, which already had sufficient communications. The primary issue continued to be the multiple, dispersed CA teams at COPs and other sites that were unable to maintain consistent and reliable communications and information sharing required by the CA mission.<sup>95</sup>

(U//FOUO) The initial pre-deployment personal equipment issue was accomplished incrementally through multiple trips to Consolidated Issue Points. This was further augmented by ongoing equipment issue in Afghanistan. A more efficient and dependable means of ensuring that Det L personnel had all necessary equipment would have been to coordinate a single, complete issue of equipment to each Marine in CONUS prior to PTP and deployment, including tactical items such as modular tactical vests (MTV – which were not issued until Det L arrived in Afghanistan) and environmental protection items.<sup>96</sup>

(U//FOUO) Det L Marines were expected to take photographs of ongoing projects and damage claims; however, due to a lack of cameras, most used their personal digital cameras and when these broke, there were no replacements. They also lacked hand-held GPS receivers to mark locations.<sup>97</sup> Each CA team must be equipped with a digital camera and GPS.



(U//FOUO) The M-4 was the preferred personal weapon for CA Marines. The smaller profile made it easier to conduct KLE. Also, Polaroid cameras worked well as an engagement tool (Det L observed the Afghans enjoyed receiving pictures of themselves) and each team should be equipped with one of these cameras.<sup>98</sup>

## **Personnel and Personnel Organization**

(U//FOUO) Det L deployed 37 Marines and sailors, many of them E-4 and below with varying degrees of CA training and experience, to cover all of the MEB-A AO, which included three provinces and seven districts consisting of 58,000 square miles of territory. This required restructuring the CA teams into units as small as one or two Marines and deploying them to remote outposts. The small size of the teams, often composed of junior personnel, combined with mobility challenges significantly limited the impact of the MEB CA mission.

(U//FOUO) In addition to low manning levels, the pace of CA operations was hindered by limited infrastructure and availability of skilled local contractors and this affected the ability of Afghan communities to support and sustain CA projects.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, Det L focused their operations on where the population was, not necessarily where the enemy was, and did not attempt to cover the entirety of the districts.<sup>100</sup>

(U//FOUO) To the greatest extent possible, CA teams deploying to Afghanistan should task organize with the ability to conduct split operations. Each team should have two officers serving as team leader and assistant team leader, preferably two SNCOs as team chief and assistant team chief, and four to five sergeants and below assisting them. The team could then provide CA support to the battalion at the COPs and other forward deployed positions. This organization would also make qualified PAs and PPOs available to each of these smaller teams.<sup>101</sup>

(U//FOUO) The CA detachment headquarters element should deploy with a dedicated CA planner. This was a shortfall for Det L. Also, the CA detachment should continue to deploy with a GS team. This provides flexibility for the RCT commander.<sup>102</sup>

(U//FOUO) The preponderance of MEB-A CA personnel were reservists and their collective experience as professionals in the private sector was a significant factor in enabling mission success. For example, a Det L team in Garmsir had a structural engineer assigned and he conducted many of the bridge assessments for the team. This facilitated that team's ability to rapidly gain funding in order to refurbish those bridges and ensure these projects were satisfactorily managed and completed. GySgt Manasterli stated the MEB would have benefited from having more CA personnel with experience as engineers, construction contractors, and other similar professionals who understood project planning, contracts, project management, and construction on the battlefield. The same recommendation was also expressed regarding business professionals to advise a commander on economic development or teachers advising on public education, etc.<sup>103</sup>

(U//FOUO) According to GySgt Manasterli, deploying Marines that aren't qualified in CA to fill CA billets or who don't have sufficient rank or expertise have the potential to undermine CA credibility. Inexperienced or too junior CA Marines will short the supported battalion of a capability that is expected from that individual.<sup>104</sup>

(U//FOUO) Establishing civil affairs as a secondary USMC military occupational specialty (MOS) should continue to be examined and evaluated.<sup>105</sup> [MCCLL Note: Currently, 0530 and 0531 are non-primary free MOSs. Utilizing a free MOS system causes several issues, such as the experience base is lost from the active duty component when the CA Marine transfers and

serving in a non-primary free MOS billet can have an unintended consequence for the Marine's promotion potential. A short-term solution being examined by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) Capabilities Development Division/Fires and Maneuver Integration Division (CDD/FMID) Civil Affairs DOTMLPF Working Group is to convert 0531 from a free MOS to a necessary MOS and map the 0531 MOS to specific primary MOSs, such as 06XX, 08XX, 11XX, 13XX, etc.<sup>106]</sup>

(U//FOUO) Fourth CAG was tasked on occasion with coordinating medical civil action program (MEDCAP) and dental civil action program (DENCAP) events. In anticipation of this, the Det L commander had requested (but did not receive) a preventative medicine or environmental health specialist be assigned to 4th CAG, in addition to, or in place of, the corpsman they received.<sup>107</sup> Each CA detachment should have a preventative medicine or environmental health specialist assigned to support MEDCAP/DENCAP operations during deployment.

### **Recommendations (DOTMLPF Pillar)**

1. (U//FOUO) Determine adequate CA manning levels and provide designated manpower to units prior to commencement of pre-deployment training. (**Organization, Training, Personnel**)
2. (U//FOUO) Further develop and institutionalize force-wide standard operating procedures (SOP) and regulations governing the expeditious disbursement and accountability of all available in-theater funding streams in accordance with USFOR-A Pub 1-06, "Money As A Weapons System – Afghanistan," in order to achieve greater efficiency and establish a more streamlined process. (**Doctrine, Training, Leadership and Education**)
3. (U//FOUO) Ensure any funding levels for commanding officers are sufficient in amount and discretionary enough in application to be effective in COIN. (**Doctrine, Leadership and Education**)
4. (U//FOUO) Resource CAG detachments with all necessary communications, photographic, GPS, and information technology equipment prior to deployment. (**Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material**)
5. (U//FOUO) Structure pre-deployment training timelines to enable CA Marines to participate in the complete Enhanced Mojave Viper with the battalions they will support in-theater. (**Organization, Training, Personnel**)
6. (U//FOUO) Incorporate robust CA/CMO participation into COIN-oriented large scale exercises in order to increase exposure of the operating forces to these capabilities and efforts. Also, CA officers and SNCOs must be trained in the staff planning process. (**Training, Material, Personnel, Facilities**)
7. (U//FOUO) Structure pre-deployment training timelines to enable CA Marines to conduct advanced civil affairs training, including key leader engagement scenarios with role players, TCAFP methodology, and employment of CIDNE. (**Training, Leadership and Education, Personnel**)
8. (U//FOUO) Tailor Afghan cultural awareness training to the region CA Marines will be deploying. Language training should be conducted as close to actual deployment date as possible to prevent loss of perishable skills. (**Training, Leadership and Education, Personnel**)

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9. (U//FOUO) Train CA Marines in the “money as a weapons system” concept and the rules and regulations for the utilization of CERP and other funds. Marines designated to be PAs and PPOs must receive additional mission-specific training and qualification designations during pre-deployment. Also, each deployed ground combat element company should have Marines trained and authorized to recommend projects for approval and disburse money in the absence of CA PAs. (**Doctrine, Leadership and Education, Training**)
10. (U//FOUO) Ensure deployment schedules allow for a comprehensive relief in place and the effective turn-over of local key leader relationships between CA teams. (**Doctrine, Organization, Leadership and Education, Personnel**)
11. (U//FOUO) Provide CAG detachments with adequate ground mobility assets and provide these same theater-appropriate vehicle types for CAG pre-deployment training and driver qualifications. Units tasked with receiving or supporting CA teams should ensure sufficient ground mobility resources are available. (**Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education**)
12. (U//FOUO) Continue to resource equipment and develop doctrine and TTPs for the employment of RIAB systems. (**Doctrine, Training, Material, Leadership and Education**)
13. (U//FOUO) Continue development of female engagement teams (FET) and include this capability in CA operations. (**Doctrine, Training, Personnel**)
14. (U//FOUO) Provide a preventative medicine or environmental health specialist to augment CAG manning if CA units are to be tasked with coordinating MEDCAP and/or DENCAP operations. (**Doctrine, Organization, Personnel**)

## Summary

(U) Units deploying to Afghanistan must be trained, organized, and equipped to conduct conventional combined arms operations and transition to COIN and stability operations on a widely dispersed battlefield through varying terrain with little to no existing infrastructure to support mobility and enable reconstruction, governance, and development activities.

(U) The objective of this report is to collect and consolidate observations, lessons, best practices, and trends in order to assist units in preparing for and conducting civil affairs in Afghanistan. Lessons and observations from this report will also be distributed to appropriate advocates, proponents, and operating forces in the interests of improving how Marine forces are organized, trained, equipped, and provided to combatant commanders.

(U) This report will be posted to the MCCLL Lessons Management System (LMS) for future access.

(U//FOUO) The collection team leader for this effort was Mr. Mark Silvia, Col, USMCR, MCCLL Collection and Analysis Manager. Other team members included:

- Mr. Dan Bornarth, LCDR, USN (Ret), MCCLL Senior Analyst
- LtCol Dale Bain, USMCR, MCCLL Task Analyst
- LtCol Mark Bannach, USMCR, MCCLL Task Analyst
- Maj Carlos Ybarra, USMCR, MCCLL Assistant Operations Officer

(U//FOUO) Content of this report was developed by MCCLL Senior Analyst, Mr. Dan Bornarth, LCDR, USN (Ret).

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> DeFrancisci, LtCol Leonard, USMC, Commanding Officer, Det L, 4th CAG interview with Mr. Mark Silvia, MCCLL, 23 February 2010. Cited hereafter as DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. (MCCLL Note: GS CA Marines conducted operations in southern Marjah prior to Operation Moshtarak to identify key leaders and collect ASCOPE information. This was in the RCT engagement area and was not assigned to an infantry battalion.)

<sup>2</sup> Garcia, Sergeant David, USMC, NCOIC, Civil Affairs Team, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with LtCol Dale Bain, USMC, MCCLL, 22 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Garcia, Bain interview.

<sup>3</sup> Anikow, Maj George, USMC, Executive Officer, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with Mr. Mark Silvia, MCCLL, 22 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Anikow, Silvia interview. Also, DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>4</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>5</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>6</sup> Parvis, Sgt Alan, USMC, NCOIC, Headquarters Team and Light Armored Reconnaissance Team, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with LtCol Mark Bannach, MCCLL, 22 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Parvis, Bannach interview. Gagnon, Cpl Jasmin, USMC, Communications NCO, Det L 4th CAG, interview with LtCol Dale Bain, USMC, MCCLL, 23 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Gagnon, Bain interview.

<sup>7</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>8</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>9</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>10</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>11</sup> Weckesser, Cpl Jerry, USMC, Civil Affairs Assistant, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with LtCol Mark Bannach, USMC, MCCLL, 23 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Weckesser, Bannach interview.

<sup>12</sup> Parvis, Bannach interview.

<sup>13</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>14</sup> DeFrancisci, Anikow, Silvia interviews.

<sup>15</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>16</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>17</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>18</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Lee, Sgt Andrew, USMC, Assistant Team NCOIC, Det L 4th CAG, interview with Maj Carlos Ybarra, USMC, MCCLL, 22 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Lee, Ybarra interview.

<sup>19</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>20</sup> DeFrancisci, Anikow, Silvia interviews. Regimental Combat Team 3 “Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Post Operational Emergency Relief Fund Standard Operating Procedures,” 6 October 2009. (UNCLAS) ISAF Standard Operating Procedure 930, “Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund,” amended 2 August 2007. This SOP is available in the MCCLL classified consolidated document repository at [www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil).

<sup>21</sup> (UNCLAS) USFOR-A Publication 1-06, “Money As A Weapons System – Afghanistan (MAAWS-A),” 15 May 2009. Cited hereafter as MAAWS-A. This SOP is available in the MCCLL classified consolidated document repository at [www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil). Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>22</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>23</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Weckesser, Bannach interview.

<sup>24</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

<sup>25</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>26</sup> MAAWS-A.

<sup>27</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>28</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.

<sup>29</sup> Parvis, Bannach interview.

<sup>30</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.

- <sup>31</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>32</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>33</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>34</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview. Garcia, Bain interview. Weckesser, Bannach interview.
- <sup>35</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>36</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>37</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>38</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>39</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>40</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>41</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>42</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>43</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>44</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>45</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>46</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>47</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Garcia, Bain interview.
- <sup>48</sup> Parvis, Weckesser, Bannach interviews.
- <sup>49</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview. Parvis, Weckesser, Bannach interviews.
- <sup>50</sup> Weckesser, Bannach interview.
- <sup>51</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.
- <sup>52</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.
- <sup>53</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>54</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Robinson, Major George, USMC Deputy Fires and Effects Coordinator, MEB-A, interview by LtCol J.D. Harrill, MCCLL, 30 November 2009. Cited hereafter as Robinson, Harrill interview.
- <sup>55</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>56</sup> Manasterli, GySgt Nasser, USMC, NCOIC, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with Mr. Mark Silvia, MCCLL, 9 March 2010. Cited hereafter as Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>57</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>58</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview. Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>59</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>60</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>61</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>62</sup> (UNCLAS) Task Force Leatherneck Fragmentary Order 045-09, "Requirements for TFL Female Engagement Team (FET)", 112130D Jul 2009. This document is available in the MCCLL classified consolidated document repository at [www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil](http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil).
- <sup>63</sup> Gagnon, Bain interview.
- <sup>64</sup> Parvis, Bannach interview.
- <sup>65</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>66</sup> Parvis, Bannach interview.
- <sup>67</sup> Appendix 1 To Annex G to RCT-3 Operation Order, "Every Marine is a Civil Affairs Marine," 12 June 2009.
- <sup>68</sup> Darhele, LCpl Sukhvir, USMC, Civil Affairs Specialist, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with Mr. Dan Bornarth, MCCLL, 23 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Darhele, Bornarth interview.
- <sup>69</sup> Weckesser, Bannach interview.

- <sup>70</sup> Nicholson, BGen Larry, USMC, Commanding General, MEB-A, interview with Mr. Chris Wilk, MCCLL Liaison to II MEF, 4 December 2009. Cited hereafter as Nicholson, Wilk interview.
- <sup>71</sup> Weston, Mr. John, Political Advisor, MEB-A, interview with LtCol J.D. Harrill, USMC, MCCLL, 1 December 2009. Cited hereafter as Weston, Harrill interview.
- <sup>72</sup> Parvis, Bannach interview.
- <sup>73</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Weckesser, Bannach interview.
- <sup>74</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>75</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>76</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>77</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>78</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>79</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>80</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>81</sup> Derkach, LtCol Scott, USMC, G-2, MEB-A, interview with Mr. Chris Wilk, MCCLL Liaison to II MEF, 29 November 2009. Cited hereafter as Derkach, Wilk interview.
- <sup>82</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>83</sup> DeFrancisci, Anikow, Silvia interviews.
- <sup>84</sup> Weckesser, Bannach interview.
- <sup>85</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>86</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>87</sup> Weckesser, Bannach interview.
- <sup>88</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview. Gagnon, Bain interview.
- <sup>89</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>90</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>91</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview. Lara, LCpl Rovin, USMC, Civil Affairs Specialist, Det L, 4th CAG, interview with Maj Carlos Ybarra, USMC, MCCLL, 23 February 2010. Cited hereafter as Lara, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>92</sup> Lee, LtCol Curtis, USMC, Deputy G-9, MEB-A, interview with LtCol Steve Beck, USMC, MCCLL, 28 November 2009. Cited hereafter as Lee, Beck interview.
- <sup>93</sup> Parvis, Weckesser, Bannach interviews. Darhele, Bornarth interview.
- <sup>94</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview. Parvis, Bannach interview.
- <sup>95</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview. Parvis, Bannach interview.
- <sup>96</sup> Garcia, Bain interview. Lara, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>97</sup> Lee, Ybarra interview.
- <sup>98</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>99</sup> Lee, Beck interview.
- <sup>100</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>101</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>102</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.
- <sup>103</sup> DeFrancisci, Manasterli, Silvia interviews.
- <sup>104</sup> Manasterli, Silvia interview.
- <sup>105</sup> Anikow, Silvia interview.
- <sup>106</sup> Fears, LtCol Christopher, USMC, MCCDC CDD, phone conversation with Mr. Dan Bornarth, MCCLL, 10 May 2010.
- <sup>107</sup> DeFrancisci, Silvia interview.