ATTACK THE NETWORK FIELD GUIDE

AFGHANISTAN

Version 1
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The Attack the Network (AtN) and tactical actions listed in this field guide are from interviews with battalion, company, and platoon warfighters successful in reducing the employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan during 2007-2010. The primary intent of this field guide is to provide a collection of field-tested actions that enabled mission success in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment with an IED threat.

"IEDs should not be found with a metal detector. By the time the IED is in the ground, you have done something wrong: You aren't partnered with ANA the right way, aren't doing correct night patrols, and so on. You should learn about IEDs before the metal detector finds them." – Company Commander, USMC

Background: Recent tactical operations have US forces conducting counterinsurgency against adversaries with improvised explosive device capabilities. The best units quickly realized commonality between COIN and Counter-IED (C-IED) best practices in Afghanistan. Operating effectively along the C-IED Attack the Network line of operations led to COIN success as well as a reduction in the effectiveness of IED attacks.

Intent: This field guide provides small unit leaders and individual Soldiers and Marines a proven collection of actions to focus their efforts while attacking networks. Primarily, these actions consist of mission analysis, briefing, and execution and are adapted for use by these small unit leaders in a population-centric operating environment.

Scope: The operating environment noted here is COIN. The actions noted in this document should be coordinated with doctrine, theater guidance, and unit standard operating procedures (SOP). Attack the Network is an operational approach that consists of building and enabling friendly networks as well as countering threat networks. The development and coordination of these friendly networks might actually become the focus of main effort.

Note: Building the capability of these friendly networks is also a basic tenet of COIN doctrine. The Afghans understand best how to address their needs and the threat. Enduring success will be achieved when the Afghan Government (GIRoA) has the capacity to provide for their own basic needs, especially security. To the greatest extent possible, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should be integrated and eventually lead operations. Initially, this Coalition force effort may be termed Partnering; longer-term implementation of this effort may be termed Advising. Again, AtN serves as a key component in developing these capacities.

Updates: This field guide is intended to be a living document, updated frequently to reflect and incorporate current conditions on the battlefield. We invite you to propose changes to guide at

any time so that others can benefit from your best practices. Please send proposed changes to atn_fieldguide@jieddo.dod.mil. When this field guide is updated you will automatically be notified of the update and the field guide will be posted and available to download and print from https://jknife.jieddo.dod.mil, under the C-IED References tab. All proposed changes will be processed within 72 hours and the submitter will be notified of the disposition.

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Attack the Network Purposes

Interviews with warfighters revealed the need for a common and consistent, operational framework that captures Attack the Network actions. This graphic organizes these warfighters' effective actions into an operational framework for AtN in Afghanistan.

AtN activities require a balanced set of lethal actions against adversary networks and non-lethal actions directed at the threat. It also requires friendly and neutral networks to undermine adversary networks or to reduce or eliminate the factors that allow threat networks to operate. These three purposes require building relationships with the local populace while simultaneously gaining valuable intelligence in order to neutralize the adversary through lethal and non-lethal operations.



Build effective relationships with the right people in order to gain the cooperation of the local power base.

Gather intelligence on the location, tactical characterization and technical categorization of IEDs, the identities of people participating in the adversary network, the location and sources of their supplies and funding, and ways to influence people from participating in adversary network. Then share and transfer this knowledge between deployment cycles.

Eliminate through lethal and non-lethal means the adversary network's ability to operate effectively by co-opting the adversary network, removing the local populace's active & passive support for the adversary network, and disrupting the adversary activities and supplies.

Attack the Network Activities

Below the three AtN purposes are subdivided into supporting activities.



Build effective relationships with the right people in order to gain the cooperation of the local power base.

Minimize Negative Actions
Reduce collateral damage, understand and mitigate the negative effects of your actions

Develop Understanding of Local Culture
Deepen your understanding of the local culture

Build Relationships with Local Influencers
Understand the power base in the specific village to focus relationship building

Build Trust Through Actions
Conduct activities to address the needs of the local power base

Build Trust & Support Through Information Operations (IO)
Use IO to build trust and support by advertising successes and positive actions

Interact Frequently with the Local Populace and Influencers
Maintain frequent communications with the local power base and local community

Minimize Negative Actions

Reduce collateral damage, understand and mitigate the negative effects of your actions

- When conducting kinetic actions, use the most precise weapons available to avoid civilian deaths, injuries and other collateral damage.

- No matter what, we will always act with honor, and we will always do what is right.
    - Minimize collateral damage. Be prepared to make immediate reparations for collateral damage and do so as necessary.
    - Treat the Afghans' houses well – respect their property.
    - Make your troops aware of cultural and religious taboos, and how violating such taboos feeds the adversary's IO campaign. Provide your troops with a simple list of taboos that to avoid and regularly train them on these taboos.
    - Be careful and use discretion when interacting with women. Afghan culture considers women as "people who belong to the home." Men's dominant attitude will make it hard for you to ensure female contribution.

- Ask Afghans about the operations conducted by previously deployed units, and their opinions of those operations. Do not repeat mistakes. Ensure that you record all of your operations for the next turnover.

- Remember that interacting with one person or group may offend another. Gain knowledge of and consider the human terrain before making alliances.

- Do not increase corruption by forming alliances or otherwise empowering corrupt persons.
    - Use relationships with local contacts to vet local or national security force commanders for corruption before allying with them.
    - Understand that Afghans have a higher tolerance for (and a different definition of) official corruption.
    - Watch for corruption by host nation military, police, or civilians and report it to trustworthy local/regional authorities.

Develop Understanding of Local Culture

Develop deep cultural understanding at the local level

- Live in the village when possible, not outside the village. If you live there, then you will provide force protection for the entire village, and that builds trust.
    - Observe and analyze daily routines and local customs in order to understand local perspectives.
    - Avoid generalities (i.e. if all the villagers leave the village, do not assume there is going to be a firefight—it may be that there is a wedding or harvest taking place).

- Talk to individual Afghans to understand their local history, culture and religion. Generalizations about national traits are dangerous.
    - Upon meeting your assigned Afghan partners, get to know them. Get to know their background. Where are they from? What do they know about the area? They may be a gold mine of human terrain information or terrific human terrain collectors.
    - Learn about the history of armed conflict in your village (particularly with the Soviets and the British). Many Afghans know this history well. Engage them in discussions on this topic. Ask them how they defeated these adversaries.
    - Understand the Afghans' perspectives, and the perspectives of the threat in your area. Resist the urge to judge Afghans against American/Western values and norms. You can achieve this through understanding their culture and asking their opinions.

- Quiz your troops on one point of Afghan etiquette each day. Solicit input from them on their observations.

- Coordinate through headquarters to contact the Special Operation Forces (SOF) Village Stability Platform (VSP) and/or the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) upon arrival to get district contacts and to learn about local civil society organizations.
    - Contact the local Human Terrain Team, USAID District Support Team, non-governmental organizations (NGO), etc.

Build Relationships with Local Influencers

Understand the power base in your village to focus relationship building

- Build a trusted network involving personal relationships between Coalition leaders at the tactical level and the civilian and host nation leaders of the population they secure.

- Choose which warfighters interact with the locals based on aptitude and abilities.
    - Remember which of your troops interacted best with Afghan role players during pre-deployment training. Put them out front and put those that interacted poorly in physical security roles.
    - Identify the former farmers, craftsmen, and tradesmen among your troops and leverage their knowledge when dealing with Afghan farmers, craftsmen, and tradesmen.
    - Have someone in your unit create a relationship with every key member of the local Shura.

- Determine who has influence in the area, and understand the traditional and current roles they now play in Afghan societies. Determine why the person has influence and how he uses it. If that person is friendly to the Coalition mission, determine how we can promote that person's influence. If that person is not friendly (neutral or adversary), then determine if he can be persuaded to have a more positive government position. People who have influence may include:

  - A local mullah, malik, or khan.
  - A village elder who has lived within the same 15 kilometers of his house for 60 years.
  - An insurgent leader whom the people know will send his subordinates into the village at night to kill them if they do not cooperate.
  - A local police chief who is respected for the performance of his duties.
  - A local doctor who is constantly treating people.
  - A respected Mujahedin warrior who fought the Soviets.
  - The local who controls the water distribution.

- Conduct Key Leader Engagements (KLE) to build relationships with people and entities of influence in your village. The KLE fosters and expands effective communications and cooperation between Coalition forces and local Afghans. Night KLEs are an effective way to talk privately and anonymously with a key leader, and should be arranged in advance so the person knows you are coming. If you live in the village, it is easy to conduct a night KLE unnoticed. The KLE is a cyclic process with 7 steps:
  - Step 1, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE): Confirm/deny key leader's capability in relation to desired effects. Leverage their tribal background, tribal code, religious background, political affiliation, alliances, and/or resources.
  - Step 2, Identify Key Leaders: Identify persons or entities of influence, and determine their potential for long term influence.
  - Step 3, Identify desired effects: Determine what you want to achieve, identify supporting objectives.
  - Step 4, Prepare: Determine who will take the lead, and discuss social nuances.
  - Step 5, Execute: Demonstrate mutual respect and Afghan meeting etiquette. Be patient, be an active listener, focus on objective, instill local ownership in solutions.
  - Step 6, Debrief/Report: Conduct after action review (AAR), establish continuity of all KLEs at all levels of command.
  - Step 7, Re-Engage: Sustain/maintain relationship, maximize civil-military cooperation, and monitor key leader development and protection.

- Create your own KLE 'diary' or continuity folder from the beginning so that the unit to follow you can continue with a coherent focus and effort--benefiting from your actions.

- Let locals lead during your discussions with other locals.
  - Try to have at least one ANSF leader present to take an active lead or have the appearance of taking the lead during each engagement. This consideration will put an Afghan face on the meeting, and can lead to a question and answer session with a government representative. The relationship displayed between the Coalition and Afghan leaders is as important as the relationships within a platoon. Let the locals talk about their concerns and aspirations.

- Determine what leads to power in the local society. Is it age, wealth, land, religion, consensus, elected office, blood or marital relations to another, higher-level official, the barrel of a gun, or something else?
    - Observe carefully and study the interactions within the local population. Talk to locals, regional experts, and anthropologists about this. Realize that those in formal positions of power and authority may not be the ones actually wielding the power.
    - Learn this through KLEs and by creating an Executive Shura of key elders that facilitates positive interaction between the local elders and the district Governor.

- Identify the groups that would benefit from stability and those that do not.

- Learn how to negotiate the power dynamics to get what you need.
    - Compare what you need to what the local Afghans want and need. Determine a solution where you both might get what you want.
    - Practice the Afghan custom of "friends first – business second."
    - Remember that political borders drawn on a map (national, provincial, and district) may not align with political, ethnic, and/or religious influence networks.
    - Remember that lines on a map describing your village align even less with these influence networks. Identify the boundaries of these influence networks.
    - Sit down with local leaders to discuss their priorities.
    - Remember that the Afghan's agenda may not match your agenda.

- Rehearse your engagements with Afghan power brokers.
    - Develop a plan before every meeting; create talking points to guide the conversation.
    - Include a rehearsal with interpreter, ensure your interpreter knows all terms you are going to use, DO NOT use slang.
    - Read the documentation from previous meetings before going to any meeting.
    - Think through and rehearse for potential problems.
    - Document the results of the meeting. All documentation of such events should be included in the unit turnover during Reliefs In Place (RIP).

- Know the difference between an interpreter and a translator. A translator provides verbatim word for word exchange, but an interpreter also provides context, background info, local knowledge, etc. Interpreters interpret the meaning of words.
    - Hire locals as interpreters since they understand local culture, dialect, norms, etc., but use caution as locals may have their own agendas.
    - Treat a good interpreter like gold. Good interpreters are difficult to come by.
    - Vet interpreters and periodically verify the accuracy of their translations by any means available to you.

- Prepare your troops before interactions with locals.

  - Set the right tone before important meetings so that each troop understands what sort of behavior is expected.

- Facilitate regular interactions between National and Provincial government officials with Afghans in your village, when feasible.

Build Trust Through Actions

Conduct activities to address the needs of the local power base

- Consider the possible unintended consequences of your actions before engaging the local leaders. Does support for one person or group, marginalize another and drive them to the adversary? Be seen as impartial until you are certain of the situation.

- Establish combat outposts near local power brokers and initiate patrols with the locals under legitimate GIRoA authority/influence.

- Give the Afghan people a reason to support their government, the ANSF and us.

- Protect the Afghan people. Do whatever you can to prevent Afghan civilian casualties of any type, from any source.
  - Take ownership over knowing and protecting the local populace, as the police would do in the US.
  - Not all locals are guilty! You must protect the people and leverage them in finding the guilty ones.

- Provide medical aid to locals through tailgate or pre-planned Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) or Veterinary Civil Action Programs (VETCAPs). Some locals will only approach US warfighters during a medical emergency. While treating them or their family member, ask them about their home and other aspects of their daily life to begin building a relationship. To the maximum extent possible, local medical aid should be delivered through the local medical providers in order to manage long-term expectations of GIRoA medical care.

- Live and train with your ANSF counterparts, incorporating them directly into your formations. Only linking up for operations is not good enough.

- Demonstrate personal bravery, commitment, and hardship when providing physical security to Afghans.
  - Act in accordance with US military professionalism.
  - Learn when to remove body armor.
  - Do not automatically jump to using direct fire that may kill innocent civilians; instead close on the adversary with the weapons, tactics and leadership possessed by your unit or by the ANSF unit you are partnered with.

  - Provide security at day and night. The populace will appreciate the security you provide. In some cases, attacks may lessen because the elders will not allow them in that area.

- Reward Afghan bravery.
  - Reward bravery through GIRoA when opportunities allow.
  - Create an award and award ceremony to reward ANA/ANSF bravery, such as a "Certificate of Accommodation" to Afghan individuals/units assigned to work with Coalition units. One local Afghan Commander has a 1-inch binder, of which he is quite proud: It is full of paper certificates of recognition signed by previous US Commanders.

- Find out if any units previously deployed in your village had made any commitments to the Afghans. Honor those commitments. Tie up loose ends before you leave. Ensure that this is part of your turnover/RIP.

- Address needs that the adversary cannot provide or sustain. (Ex: The adversary cannot provide electricity or irrigation, GIRoA and ISAF can.)
  - Never make a promise that you do not control the ability to keep or that you will not keep.
  - Get the Afghans intimately involved in the design and construction of infrastructure projects. If they own it, they will protect it.
  - Use aid and infrastructure investments to enhance the stature of your allies among the Afghans.

- Include Afghan locals in the approval, design and construction for every infrastructure project built.
  - Determine up front what they will get out of the project and what you will get out of the project.
  - Help the Afghans learn the process of how to decide what they want done, marshal resources, find the place to fit it in, and do it on their own.
  - Help local government officials to take the lead in development projects.
  - Do not get pressured into providing something that you do not want to provide. Reconstruction efforts receive pushback from Afghans themselves who may only tell you what you want to hear, or tell you that your predecessors made promises they did not deliver on.
  - Help the Afghans develop infrastructure projects that can be operated and maintained within the constraints of local resources and knowledge.
  - Hire Afghans to do the work, even if this is slower or less efficient.

- Be sure the Afghans see your troops out there every day with ANSF, protecting them.
  - Reduce vehicle use: Travel on foot whenever possible.

- Create opportunities for young Afghans to organize sporting events and receive social services.

- Provide mobile medical clinics, including local medical providers, when available and qualified.
    - Partner with Provincial Governors and local elders to access GIRoA assets.

Build Trust & Support Through Information Operations (IO)

Use IO to build trust by advertising successes and positive actions

- Make a list of the good things the local government and your unit did by, with, and through your Afghan partners for the Afghan people at the end of each day. Then, identify each day what the IO messages are for the next day.

- Create an IO billboard with photos of good work the local government, your troops and your Afghan partners have done (i.e. pictures of military doctors helping children, pictures of US Forces fixing roads destroyed by IEDs, pictures of the ANA providing security in a market, etc.)
    - Create short talking points that warfighters can use to explain each image. You and your ANA partners should explain these pictures to the locals.
    - Deliver IO messages through trusted local police and local government officials whenever possible.

- Communicate your mission. For example: "We're [XXX Company] partnered with our Afghan brothers [in YYY location]. Our mission is simple: we're here to serve as 'No Better Friend' to the vast majority of the Afghan people that have every right to live in peace with the hope for a better life. We and our ANSF brothers are 'No Worse Adversary' to the small segment of the population who do not want peace or for the Afghan people to have a better life, those who are a threat to us, the people of [YYY location] and to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan."
    - Ensure that your unit's personnel communicate a consistent message.

- Portray every success as a success of the applicable level of the Afghan government.
    - Enable the local tribal elders to take credit for the development projects that benefit their constituents.

- Create messaging that supports tactical and operational objectives.
    - Identify what segments of the local population you need to get in contact with so that you can engage (influence, persuade, or convince) them with your IO messages regarding your actions, policies, and conduct.
    - Determine what media (e.g. radio, print, word-of-mouth from clerics, etc.) will most effectively reach the target audiences.

- Create messages that will resonate in the cultural context of the target audiences to achieve the intended effect.
- See the section on IO on page 29 for more information.

Interact Frequently with the Local Populace & Influencers

Maintain frequent communications with the local power base and local community

- Maintain a continual presence (on foot if possible) in the villages identified as key terrain for the network. Continual presence builds relationships and trust and helps identify the village's influential people, patterns and dynamics. A presence causes locals to return to their normal state of operations. Once US forces know the local populace, they can identify indicators of insurgent activity. In this environment, bottom up intelligence is key to understanding the populace as well as the adversary networks.
  - Do not get nervous talking and working with Afghans through an interpreter. Pre-deployment training on language, culture, and working with an interpreter may seem overwhelming, but putting these concepts into practice will probably prove to be much easier than expected.
  - Take advantage of forward deployed analysts to determine which people or groups in a particular village are part of the adversary network.

- Identify the forums where the Afghans make community decisions, and ask for an invitation.
  - Find opportunities to introduce your senior leaders to their senior leaders.

- Drink every cup of tea and eat every meal you are offered. Reciprocate by offering your guests something to drink and eat.

- Teach your troops as many phrases as possible in the languages/dialects prevalent in your village. Learn the basics (the first 100 words), but do not expect true language proficiency—you cannot get good enough fast enough. Incentivize your troops to use local phrases as often as possible.

- Observe non-verbal communication signals.
  - Identify non-verbal communication signals (including body language, posture, facial expression, etc.) when interacting with locals in order to recognize certain cues when you see them.
  - Be aware of the body language and non-verbal cues that you are exhibiting.
  - Watch the subject while translations are occurring. Does the interpretation match the body language of the subject?
  - Remember that non-verbal communication cues differ between cultures.

- Ask your troops who they talked to when they were out on patrol. Make relationship building a key metric of patrol debriefs.

- Remember that Afghans can grow weary and irksome by repeatedly answering the same questions.

- Locals will not confuse acceptable Afghan female behavior with western female behavior. You should not either. Female troops should not try to mimic Afghan female behaviors.

Your Notes

Gather intelligence on the location, tactical characterization and technical categorization of IEDs, the identities of people participating in the adversary network, the location and sources of their supplies and funding, and ways to influence people from participating in adversary network. Then share and transfer this knowledge between deployment cycles.

Collect on the Human Terrain
Gather and record data on individuals' relationships to each other and to the adversary networks

Collect on Patterns of Life
Collect on peoples' patterns of life and environment

Analyze the Network in Real-Time
Understand the human networks and critical nodes of friendly, neutral and adversary power bases

Collect & Exploit Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
Use WTI to target and prosecute adversaries and to identify their supply sources

Identify Adversaries' Measures of Influence and Their Sources
Understand adversary TTPs used to influence local power base

Retain, Share, & Transfer Intelligence
Retain knowledge while sharing and transferring lessons across the AO and deployment cycles

Identify Drivers of Instability
Identify how the adversary network creates and uses instability to its advantage

Collect on the Human Terrain

Gather and record data on individuals' relationships to each other and to the adversary networks

- Refine intelligence collection from the bottom-up by soliciting input from subordinate units to validate, invalidate, or refine the intelligence picture created.

- When questioning Afghans, never use the term "Taliban" in reference to the adversary. The term holds admirable connotations to the Afghan people as its true meaning, "Student of Religion."

- Take a camera everywhere you go. With their permission, take pictures of everyone and build this information into a local 'phonebook.' Play into their bias of you being a dumb American who knows nothing: ask everything about people. Have a process for downloading the photos every day, and capturing names and other information associated with the person. Create relevant intelligence questions for your troops to ask tomorrow about specific people. Share important information on who's who (elders, suspected adversary, criminals, friends, etc.).
    - Always ask village elders for permission to take pictures and record information in the village. Explain why (so that they can be identified by name and to help build better relationship between the village and the unit). Most village elders will allow this to prove they have nothing to hide.
    - Collect a photo, name, friends' names, brother's name, etc. for every house in your village. For every person who lives there, take biometrics. Eventually you will have 4,000 pictures of locals that you can use to stimulate dialogues. ("Please tell me about him.")

- When conducting tactical questioning, ask Afghans questions in indirect ways:
    - Example: To find the location of fuel stores that could be used for IEDs, ask about how the crops are doing, where they are getting supplies from, and do they have enough fuel for that, etc.; instead of asking the question directly.
    - Example: When lights are on in a house at night, check it out. One squad found a wedding celebration. They stayed and built relationships that later led to good intelligence.
    - Example: Do not ask, "Who are the adversaries?" They will not say, but they will see increased vehicle traffic, strangers, operations, and hear about injured people. If you gain their trust, ask about new people coming into the area, or ask how and where their child was hurt. Indirectly, they can tell you who is causing harm in the area.

- Create useful information requirements for collecting on the human terrain. Examples may include:
    - Defining (graphically) each tribal area (with specific attention to where they adjoin or overlap with neighboring tribes).

  - Location and contact information for each village or tribal elder and any other important people (government officials, security forces, etc.).
  - Location of mosques, schools, and areas of commerce/markets.
  - Identification of the population's battle rhythm or pattern of life (when do they wake up/sleep/shop/etc.).
  - Nearest ANSF locations/checkpoints.
  - Economic driving force / Employment (how do they earn a living?).
  - Employment/unemployment levels.
  - Are people moving out of the village or moving in?
  - Anti-Coalition presence and/or activities.
  - Access to essential services (fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc.).
  - Local population concerns/issues.

- Provide your troops with questions for gathering intelligence, and hold them accountable for sharing intelligence gathered while on patrol.
  - Assign the same units to the same AO, giving them a set template of the information that they are required to collect. Explain that they have ownership of their AO. Create a competition among the squads and platoons on who can get the information first and who can do the most with it to neutralize the adversary and help the local populace.
  - Properly brief patrols with task and purpose and ensure that you conduct rehearsals.
  - Ensure that the CoIST/CLIC conduct post patrol after action reviews (AARs) and disseminate that information.

- Employ trusted police to assist in gathering information on adversary and other networks.
  - As often as possible, have your Afghan partners run meetings with locals (ie. KLEs). They understand the language, culture, and how to build relationships. Afghans can get more information from the locals than we can as foreigners. It also sets them up as the security force in the area.

- Seek out communities and individuals who are unhappy with the adversary actors and their attacks.
  - Use night KLE, medical clinic, and census operations as opportunities to identify and interact with these groups.

- Collect census data to identify and fill intelligence gaps.
  - Include Human Terrain Mapping (HTM) in patrol activities as often as possible to:
    - Make initial and develop contacts.
    - Gain inside knowledge of local citizens.
    - Provide a framework for determining the reliability or motivations of contacts.
    - Put an Afghan face on a contact within the population being secured.
  - Conduct a typical HTM patrol in the following manner:
    - Move tactically and establish a cordon around the area to be mapped.

        - Afghan partners go to the village leader(s) to request permission to enter the men of the village into our biometric-data system (HIIDES/BATS). When no Afghan partners are available, the unit leader will take this role. Most local leaders have no problem with the request and view the biometric census as evidence of their innocence and willingness to cooperate with Coalition Forces.
            - If the leader agrees, the platoon establishes a centralized location to begin this process.
            - If the leader was uncomfortable with this request, the commander should try immediately to ascertain why and the unit would earmark the village for a return visit when they can continue to press this issue.
        - Meanwhile the unit leader (and any augments or designated personnel) may begin talking with as many of the military-age males as possible to answer the intelligence requirement (IR).
        - Talk to as many people as possible to pass on the specific IO themes/handouts. On average, these patrols take about two to four hours to complete.
    - Increase the number of people and expertise, engaging in the village by including special teams in patrols, including Civil Affairs Teams, Human Intelligence Collection Teams (US Army HCTs), Military Information Support to Operations (MISO), and/or additional medical personnel.
        - For example: Having a unit medic treat a civilian, especially a child, with an acute problem provides direct evidence of the goodwill of our units, and provides a tangible benefit to cooperation with the Coalition.
    - Approach every HTM patrol as if the adversary was watching and assessing your team. Human terrain mapping can bring you closer to the locals and deter adversary contact.

- Learn about the tribal and ethnic structure in your village. What tribes are present now, or were there previously? How do they get along with each other? What are their occupations?
    - Interact with the local community, immersing yourself with the local population to eventually answer these questions.

- Do not ask Afghans yes or no questions. Ask open-ended questions to avoid the cultural habit of telling strangers what they think you want to hear in order to appear hospitable.

Collect on Patterns of Life

Collect on peoples' patterns of life (i.e. behaviors and actions) and environment

- Understand the daily pattern of life in the village through frequent interactions. This allows you to notice when something is out of the ordinary due to the presence of an IED or

impending adversary action. These patterns of life will be different in each village, and may include observations of:

- Types of people who go to the market (men/women, old/young) and when they go to the market.
- Times of day that children are outdoors.
- Where and when groups of males meet.
- Prayer times and locations.

- Understand the seasonal patterns of life, particularly in agricultural communities.

- Be prepared to observe for several weeks before seeing patterns emerge.

Analyze the Network in Real-Time

Understand the human networks and critical nodes of friendly, neutral and adversary power bases

- Identify the personnel for Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) for Army units or Company-Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC) for Marine Corps units based on aptitude for tactical military intelligence tasks and company level operations. These personnel would not always be from an intelligence background but should be designated for these duties full-time.
  - Identify personnel based on ability and aptitude. Commanders who handpick warfighters based on abilities to perform tactical analysis in the CoIST/CLIC versus defaulting to warfighters assigned to the company headquarters get better analytical results and actionable targeting intelligence.
  - Request C-IED Operations Intelligence/Integration Center (COIC) analytic support to train CoIST/CLIC on COIC tools.

- Analyze the structure of Afghan friendly and neutral networks because the adversary network draws from it.
  - Use link diagrams to understand the adversary and civilian networks and which individuals are working together. As information becomes available, update these diagrams to see how the threat is organized.
    - Update to show individuals who have been killed, captured, or recently released from jail.
    - Show the relationships between the hostile individuals. The diagram should show both professional relationships and blood relationships.
    - Keep them up to date in order to be useful.
    - Include information about individuals, such as the types of cars they drive and the locations of their houses.
  - Determine if the adversary's network structure is hierarchical, distributed, diffuse, hub and spoke, or something else.
  - Determine if critical nodes exist in the network.
    - Identify important people and roles in the network.

        - For example: Financiers may support many operations, and IED makers build many IEDs. Both will likely have contacts linking them to multiple IED incidents. Both of these individuals are important to the organization, whereas an individual who emplaces the IED is more easily replaced and less important.
      - Remember that when an individual is removed from the network, someone else must replace him.
    - Identify missing links or unknown persons whose existence is likely but not certain. The diagrams may have a name of an individual but no picture or a picture with no name.
    - There are software programs such as Analyst Notebook to build the diagrams, but Microsoft PowerPoint also works well if the unit has no access to these programs.

- Test your assumptions about the networks constantly through questions in KLEs. The structure may change daily, seasonally, or over time.

- Units need to ensure they document their knowledge and pass it up and down the chain, and share laterally.

Collect & Exploit Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)

Use WTI to target and prosecute adversaries and to identify their supply sources

- Incorporate Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) into your intelligence cycle. Be knowledgeable and have access to theater exploitation capabilities (such as EOD, CEXC, and JEFF).
  - Recognize which items possess potential forensic value. You may have only minutes to assess the scene, photograph it, and scoop up what we want before the tactical commander says you must go. In order to make the best of whatever limited time we have, our collectors must go into each situation with a good set of priority information requirements (PIRs) or Forensic Collection Requirements.
  - Preserve and protect materials and data from the point of collection and for as long as they potentially hold intelligence or evidentiary value. Establish and maintain a chain of custody for every piece of material taken from a site.
  - See the WTI Handbook for additional detail (https://jknife.jieddo.dod.mil).

Identify Adversaries' Measures of Influence & Their Sources

Understand adversary TTPs used to influence local power base

- Identify what motivates the adversary forces (religion, money, fear, pride).
  - Live with the local population; get off large FOBs and push out to patrol bases, immersed in cities to be available to the local population.
  - Coordinate with the Human Terrain Team in the village.

- Determine what goods and services the adversary provides the Afghans to leverage them. Identify superior alternatives that only GIRoA or ISAF can provide.

- Determine what coercion or threats the adversary uses to gain leverage over the Afghans. Interdict the communication of the threat or protect them from it.

- Talk to the Afghans to identify the hierarchy of needs at the local level. Their priorities are rarely the same as ours or of each other.

Retain, Share, & Transfer Intelligence

Retain knowledge while sharing and transferring lessons across the AO and deployment cycles

- Seek out information gathered by units that preceded yours into the AO. Share accumulated intelligence and lessons learned with your relief.
    - Conduct proper Relief in Place (RIP)/Transition of Authority (TOA) and proper pre-deployment preparation. Coordinate with unit S2 far in advance of RIP/TOA to insure proper data transfer and IPB update.

- Coordinate and share intelligence with forces in neighboring villages to help understand any regional links in the adversary network.
    - Constantly solicit intelligence from the unit intelligence section, and be a proactive part of the collections and intelligence/operations cycles. Reach out to and use intelligence from the COIC (accessible on unclassified systems at https://jknife.jieddo.dod.mil/Pages/JKnIFE.aspx or on SIPRnet at http://www.coic.smil.mil).
    - Establish a good working rapport with adjacent units upon arriving in Afghanistan.
    - Request unit S2 establish Liaison Officers or secure video conferences with key stakeholder commands and fusion centers to anticipate the effects of your actions, and coordinate with neighboring commands. (i.e. Will clear, hold, build in your district push a flood of insurgents into a neighboring district?)
    - Share pictures and information of suspected/accused Taliban members with neighboring AOs to gather additional intelligence about this person. If other villages independently identify the person as Taliban, tell them how many people/villages have said so. The response will build trust because you know so much information. In one case, a Taliban member turned himself in and begged to get reconciled with the government because he knew that we knew about him. He quit the Taliban immediately.
    - Continually update your IPB. This is done by your CoIST/CLIC. Be resourceful.
        - For example: A radio connected to a laptop can create a low bandwidth internet for sharing data and photos across the AO.

- Reach out to civilian teams (PRTs, NGOs, logistics support contractors) immediately and often.

Identify Drivers of Instability

Identify how the adversary network creates and uses instability to its advantage

- Seek out and engage minority groups/factions who have been marginalized by their neighbors. If you do not, the adversary will use their disaffection to recruit them.

- Identify and try to relieve sources of frustration within the local populace.
    - Ensure frustration is directed towards the adversary to alienate the locals from them.
    - Communicate the actions your troops are doing to minimize any frustration caused by our actions.
        - For example: Mobility problems caused by IEDs or battle damage caused by us affects locals, and quick settlements of claims helps alleviates these frustrations.

- Check proposed aid projects against local politics to avoid creating instability. Be open-minded; well-intentioned projects that benefit one group more than another may cause problems.
    - Consider if a proposed infrastructure project will inadvertently aid the adversary before building it. (Ex: Will subcontracting to an Afghan create a source of protection money for the adversary?)

- Account for every dollar spent or they will end up in the hands of the adversary.

Your Notes

Eliminate through lethal and non-lethal means the adversary network's ability to operate effectively by co-opting the adversary network, removing the local populace's active & passive support for the adversary network, and disrupting the adversary activities and supplies.

Provide Physical Security
Protect the local populace

Minimize Drivers of Instability
Use non-lethal actions as catalysts for stability and to isolate threat networks from the population

Disrupt the Adversary Network with Information Operations (IO)
Craft meaningful messages and deliver them through the right channels in timely manner

Disrupt Adversary Network Activities & Supplies
Destabilize the easy supply of effective IED components and people to the network

Conduct Targeted Lethal Actions
Use lethal actions, where necessary, to eliminate key influential nodes in the adversary network

Provide Physical Security

Protect the local populace

- Provide venues for Afghans to speak to you anonymously.
    - Ensure that any information that an Afghan provides to you that results in action against the adversary cannot be attributable to that Afghan, their clan, their tribe, etc.

- Learn the local human terrain, adversary actions, and local motivations before taking action.

Minimize Drivers of Instability

Use non-lethal actions as catalysts for stability and to isolate threat networks from the population

- Consider the local culture and the human terrain when recruiting local security forces.
    - Do not bring in security forces from other parts of the country. Their lack of local accountability encourages corruption.

- Include the local security forces in every operation with an eye towards developing their skills so they can sustain operations after you leave.
    - Help them provide their own force protection.
    - Ensure they are reliably trained.
    - Encourage them to live and spend locally.
    - Give them opportunities to put their training into practice.

- Ensure host nation and/or local government can provide physical security and justice, depriving the enemy's shadow government the opportunity to provide these services.

- Identify corrupt officials and either confront them to try to convince them to change or report them to competent/trustworthy authorities. The current Chief Justice is doing well in fighting corruption.

- Provide food security.
    - Secure resources and coordinate protection and distribution with GIRoA and ANSF.

- Build sustainable infrastructure to enable agriculture such as canals, water management, etc.
    - Help farmers build a viable economic livelihood through crop substitutions.
    - Build and support schools with GIRoA and ANSF after coordination with local leaders, NGOs, USAID, and Civil Affairs assets.

- Improve water infrastructure where water is a priority. Running canals make farms work. Execute with GIRoA and ANSF after coordination with local leaders, NGOs, USAID, and Civil Affairs assets.

- Identify opportunities to help Afghan women network with each other. The more Afghan women network with each other, the stronger they feel standing up for their children's rights, including rights to not cultivate opium or live in poverty.

- Use CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program) to help local Afghans, in order to tip the scales with respect to how helpful they are.

- Help Afghans solve Afghan problems.

Disrupt the Adversary Network with Information Operations (IO)

Craft meaningful messages and deliver them through the right channels in timely manner

- Never honor the adversary by referring to them as the Taliban (which means "student of religion.") In Pashtun areas, refer to them as the Munaafiqeen (which means "those who make false Jihad").

- Create messages that complement the local culture while supporting tactical and operational objectives.
    - Identify which segments of the local population you need to influence.
    - Determine what media (ie., radio, print, clerics, etc.) will most effectively reach those audiences.
    - Create messages that resonate with their values, goals, and culture.
    - See the section on IO on page 15 for more information.

- Take pictures of suspected members of the adversary network, take those photos to your KLEs and ask, "What do you know about this guy?" In one example, elders wrote witness statements that were as evidence in court. The Marines took those statements to the suspect's father and convinced the father to stop his son's behavior or his son would go to jail.

- Seek out any opportunity to gather intelligence on or disrupt the adversary.
    - For example: When one unit killed a member of the Taliban, they used the opportunity to collect intelligence. First, they collected biometrics off the dead body. Then, they coordinated ISR to track the body after a van picked it up. Following the van allowed those Marines to identify new people to interview who were associated with the Taliban. It created IO mistrust (ie., How did we know a body had been there earlier in the day?).

- Portray enemies using IEDs as common criminals for hire using IO flyers with photos.

- Portray enemies who use IEDs (that kill and maim innocent Afghan women, children, etc.), as men without honor.
    - Collect stories of adversary atrocities from Afghans that support the criminal, dishonor, cowardice, and False Jihad narratives. Provide them to your troops and have them repeated to other Afghans while on patrol.

- Portray enemies using IEDs as cowards who are afraid to fight you in open battle. Consider limiting the use of drones or airstrikes, which the adversary can use to imply that friendly forces are cowardly.

- Operate among civilians. The adversary operates freely among civilians knowing we cannot engage and risk collateral damage. Do the same. The adversary has the same IO issue as we do concerning collateral damage.

- Use verbal means (spoken word, radio) to conduct IO among the largely illiterate population. Local voices are best.
    - Use trusted local Afghan leaders whenever possible to launch and conduct IO campaigns as they can use cultural references properly.

- Assemble well thought out and well-disseminated talking points. Include these talking points in the regiment/brigade, battalion or company operation order or fragmentary order and provide troops with a short list of key points. Examples of talking points could include the following:
    - We are here at the request of the GIRoA/the village elder.
    - We will stay here as long as it takes.
    - We want to help you build a strong economy.
    - We have a medical civic action program scheduled to help the children and women of this area.
    - We are committed to partnering with Afghan security forces to provide a safe and secure environment.

- Learn to speak spontaneously with the local populace, and not from rote memorization. You cannot sound scripted; Afghans will notice it right away and not believe anything said to them.

- Portray the adversary as a detriment to economic prosperity, while promoting economic prosperity.

- Differentiate ISAF behavior.
    - Differentiate US behavior from Soviet behavior (e.g. the Soviets indiscriminately used lethal force, little face-to-face interaction with Afghans, etc.).

        - Achieved through actions focused on building GIRoA popular support through local government and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development.
    - Remind Afghans of the US military's decades-long commitment in places like Korea and Europe, when asked.
    - Remind Afghans of the US long term support to Muslims around the world, such as to victims of tsunami (floods) in Indonesia.
    - Exploit the foreign nature (Arab influence) of the adversary in IO messaging.

- Exploit the success of military operations. Demonstrated military superiority over the adversary will build the confidence of the locals in partnered forces.

Disrupt Adversary Network Activities & Supplies

Destabilize the easy supply of effective IED components and people to the network

- Gain possession of, or access to, WTI capabilities so you can develop information about the network and the IED supply sources.
    - Collect and submit items for WTI analysis and demand access to adversary network intelligence derived from priority items.
    - Biometric collections are a critical component of the exploitation process.

- Determine if any IED supplies are used locally for legitimate uses. If so, support the substitution of a different item where possible.

- Teach your troops to recognize the IED Switches, Initiators, Main Charges, Power Sources and Containers all around them. IEDs in Afghanistan are generally simple in design and may appear to be made of "garbage."
    - Use the WTI IED Lexicon as a reference (https://jknife.jieddo.dod.mil).

- Teach your troops to recognize people engaged in Pre-operational Planning, OPSEC and RECON, Obtaining Primary and Operational Resources, and Tactical Planning. The Attack Phase is the last step in a sequence.
    - Use the WTI IED Task List Lexicon as a reference (https://jknife.jieddo.dod.mil).

Conduct Targeted Lethal Actions

Use lethal actions, where necessary, to eliminate key influential nodes in the adversary network

- Consider waiting to conduct lethal operations until you have a better understanding of the network and can strike with maximum precision for minimum collateral damage.
    - Think about the effects on your overall AtN campaign before using artillery and airstrikes.

  - Treat detainees with respect. Perhaps you have detained the wrong person. When you release that person, you want him to become your informant, not your adversary.
  - Ask yourself how many adversary recruits you may be creating when you engage in the actions needed to conduct a lethal strike to eliminate an adversary.
  - Get independent verification before taking offensive action. Local feuds may lead to false accusations of insurgent activity between rival factions. Do not get played.
  - Use targeting analysts to develop the adversary network, build targeting packages and identify the information requirements necessary to complete the packages. US forces embedded in key villages should be provided with these information requirements; HUMINT should participate or assist.
  - Focus targeting on the critical vulnerabilities that will have the most impact on the networks affecting your area of operation.

- Remember that a prosecution can remove an adversary from the battlefield without creating collateral damage.

- Remember that adversary network members are often creatures of habit, and will place IEDs in the same location repeatedly—develop a picture of these IED "hotspots."
  - Look at the map and imagine where the adversary will place the IEDs. Use these results to drive your reconnaissance and to kill or capture emplacers.

Your Notes

List of Acronyms

AAR	After Action Review
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AO	Area of Operations
AtN	Attack the network
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
C-IED	Counter-IED
CEXC	Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell
CLIC	Company-level intelligence Cell (US Marine Corps)
COIC	C-IED Operations Intelligence/Integration Center
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CoIST	Company Intelligence Support Seam (US Army)
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HCT	Human intelligence Collection Team (US Army)
HTM	Human Terrain Mapping
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IO	Information Operations
IPB	Intelligent Preparation of the Battlespace
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IR	Intelligence Requirement
JEFF	Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facilities
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Programs
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RIP	Relief in Place
TOA	Transition of Authority
TTP	Tactics, techniques and procedures
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USMC	US Marine Corps
VETCAP	Veterinary Civil Action Programs
VSP	Village Stability Platform
WTI	Weapons Technical Intelligence

Additional Reading

JP 3-15.1	CIED Operations
JP 3-24	Counterinsurgency Operations
MCIP 3-17.02	MAGTF Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations
MCIP 3-17.1	Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Operations
MCIP 3-11.01	COMBAT HUNTER
FM 3-24	Counterinsurgency
FMI 3-24.2	Tactics in Counterinsurgency
150-STD-0001	Staff Attack the Network Training Support Package
	WTI IED Lexicon, 3d Edition
	WTI Handbook