Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors
Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising

February 2012
Building Partner Capacity Through Lessons and Operating Experiences

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Abstract: This handbook provides perspectives into the roles and functions of senior advisors to include cultural and environmental considerations for advisors operating at the highest levels in support of partner nation ministries and institutional development. Although not prescriptive, the reference brings together lessons and analysis to offer current and future senior advisors a lens from which to expand and improve upon their professional knowledge base, their skill levels, and their abilities.

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Foreword

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) is pleased to introduce the “Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors: Perspectives on Institutional Level Advising” guide for senior advisors. This guide seeks to bridge gaps in current joint and service concepts and doctrine to carry out building partner capacity. Specifically, leaders, planners, and advisors can leverage this document during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment to shape and influence partner nation security force development.

Insights and analytical perspectives herein characterize senior advisor lessons and experiences from across the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and include examples from Security Force Assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior advisors in support of partner nation executive and institutional development can draw upon these perspectives to build their individual knowledge base and support decision-making at strategic levels within partner nation ministries or institutions.

We at JCISFA encourage key leaders, trainers, and educators responsible for training and developing our senior officers and civilians to integrate these perspectives into seminars, curriculum, and programs of instruction to improve the core knowledge, skills, and abilities of our future and currently serving senior advisors.

David G. Perkins
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Director, JCISFA
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Note: This document provides topic areas with supporting insights characterizing the cultural, environmental, and functional aspects of senior level advising. Although not prescriptive or inclusive, each topic area provides logic to what must occur, which offer senior level advisors a lens from which to expand their knowledge base, skills, and abilities.

Active links within the document facilitate linkage to sources and reference documents

Visit the JCISFA Knowledge Portal to find additional information related to Senior Level Advising

https://jcisfa.jcs.mil

https://jcisfa.js.smil.mil
Chapter 1
Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors

“Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important...Whenever, possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”


1-1. Introduction

a. When advising and assisting partner nation security ministries and their institutions, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) leverages the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) from a combination of senior uniformed and civilian personnel, to include contractors to carryout development in a broad range of partner nation ministries and institutional requirements. Once selected, these individuals must bring forward executive level talent and capacity to meet the developmental needs of partner nation [executive] counterparts.

b. The aim of this chapter is to go beyond anecdotal and academic suggestions of describing what a senior advisor is or is not. Its goal is to provide a direct correlation to what senior level advisors “must do” or the required capabilities, that senior advisors must have, in context to Security Force Assistance (SFA).1 Through lessons and analysis of current and projected operating environments, the concepts proposed herein offers a framework to support broader force-wide initiatives in the training and leader development of senior advisors. This chapter does the following:

- Describes Strategic Context and Implications for Senior Advisors
- Depicts the Senior Advisor Operating Environment (OE)
- Provides Emphasis on Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors

c. Senior advisor requirements for specific partner nations are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, as senior advisors carry out their specific roles and functions, their actions will occur within the context of a broader strategic and organizational context as it relates to the ministries they are advising and assisting.

1-2. Strategic Context and Implications

a. DoD Policy and Joint Force Training Emphasis

(1) Recent U.S. strategic guidance coupled with current policy requires DoD to develop and maintain capabilities within general purpose forces (GPF), special operations forces (SOF), and the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) to carryout SFA activities in support of U.S. policy and in coordination with U.S. government departments or agencies.2 In parallel, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) emphasized that SFA is a key component of U.S. defense strategy against both traditional and

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1 DoD defines SFA as: “activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”
2 DOD Instruction 5000.68, dated Oct 2010
increasingly irregular threats. In doing so, he added SFA to the joint force high interest training issues (HITI) list, stressing that joint force providers should identify individuals and organizations likely to conduct SFA and address training certifications, language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness for those personnel and organizations.³

b. DoD Concepts and Strategic Planning Implications

(a) In addition, policy and training emphasis captures DoD’s transition from a contingency-centric to a strategy-centric approach, provided through its Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). This strategic document seeks an end-state, through security cooperation (SC) activities to enable partner nations to provide for their own security, contribute effectively to broader regional or global security challenges, and maintain professional, civilian-led militaries that respect human rights.⁴

(b) In practice, SFA activities support concepts such as building partner capacity and extend U.S. capabilities and capacity within Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) programs and activities. DoD policy mandates that SFA serve as a subset of overall DoD level SC initiatives. In support of this requirement, the U.S. Army, for example, recently approved its conceptual framework for building partner capacity and identified SFA as a required capability or operational action that it must perform to carry out this framework.⁵ As such, there are four core strategic planning focus areas, contained within the GEF, that drive DoD security cooperation – and in effect, SFA strategic planning, they include:

✓ Focus on providing the necessary training and equipment required to improve the performance of partner military forces (Operational Capacity and Capability Building)

✓ Focus on developing partner country military and civilian security officials and the human capacity they require to sustain their defense sector over time (Human Capacity and Human Capital Development)

✓ Focus on security institutions of partner countries and the development of the necessary systems and processes to sustain operational and tactical capacities and human capital over time. (Institutional Capacity and Security Sector Reform)

✓ Focus on a partner’s ability to operate effectively alongside or in lieu of U.S. forces in a coalition or formal alliance (Combined Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization)

(c) Regardless of the adequacy or sufficiency of current joint or service SFA doctrine, the focus areas contained within the GEF provide a top-level view of where we can expect Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to focus their strategic planning and in effect, drive Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operational requirements for SFA. The ability of joint force generating capabilities to support the above

⁵ “Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-4,” page 4-5, November 2011

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1-2
focus areas provides supporting context to expected capability requirements for current and future senior advisor operating environments (OE).

c. Force Generation and Employment of Senior Level Advisors

(1) As GCCs formulate and carry out Theater Campaign Planning (TCP) in concert with Department of State (DoS) Country Teams - refined security cooperation objectives (requirements) for critical partner countries will start to emerge. The implications of these emerging requirements on what senior level advisors “must be able to do” to include their human capital or intellectual capacity to meet these demands will affect U.S. training and leader development domains. In parallel, DoD and service department, institutional constructs will adapt as they execute specific capability development and force generation processes to meet these emerging operational SFA requirements.

(2) DoD’s capacity to provide qualified and experienced senior advisors to meet SFA and other OE demands calls for adaptable training solutions and flexible joint force generation processes. Similarly, our ability to rapidly-share senior advisor lessons and operating experiences from those that “know” to those that “need” to know - is of critical importance.6

(3) In practical terms, the pool of prospective candidates, of U.S. senior advisors comes from the ranks of senior uniformed individuals and senior DoD civilian employees. At times, these individuals will have support from dedicated contractors or other entities to provide expanded capacity or team support to carry out specific roles and functions related to advising and assisting counterparts. Regardless, specific requirements within a partner nation drive all selection, force generation, organization, and employment aspects of senior level advisors and their teams. As caution, historical issues that affect uniformed senior advisor training and leader development include (not inclusive):7

- Lack of standardized training requirements and designated organizations to support the development of formal programs of instruction (PoI), lessons, and courseware within senior uniform leader professional military education (PME)8

- Lack of theater specific training requirements and designated organizations to support the development of senior uniform leader seminar sessions, pre-deployment training support packages (TSP) , and staff assistance visits (SAV)

(4) Refinement of SFA requirements (i.e. partner specific) typically occurs through GCCs in concert with DoS Country Team; service component commands (SCC), supporting agencies, or temporarily established organizations that have specific charters and purposes related to the development of a partner nation. Senior advisors can and should expect to participate in J5/J8 style planning processes that support

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6 Concept from U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Rapid Adaptation Initiative (RAI)
7 Note: The MoDA program provides standardized and Afghan theater specific training for civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) employees. Likewise, contractors in support of senior advising functions have requirements within respective statements of work or performance work statements (SOW/PWS).
8 Note, the U.S. Army’s War College has taken the industry lead in senior leader development through its elective course: “Fundamentals of Building Partner Capacity” that begins Spring 2012

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requirements determination for partner countries. This includes providing input to J7 like requirements determination that helps prepare the force – such as, theater or country specific training standards for prospective or actual serving senior advisors. Requirements determination is the first step in capability development and integration for all stakeholders.

(5) Depending on the security approach that a GCC takes and authorities enacted, the CCDR may plan for and direct that critical partner countries have dedicated enabling capabilities such as offices of security cooperation (OSC) that provide in-country strategic planning, execution, assessment, and oversight of SC objectives. Also known as security cooperation offices (SCO), the scale and scope of these organizations may vary from small to larger complex organizations. During contingencies these organizations may emerge as a fully qualified joint or coalition task force (CJTF) that carry out all aspects of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising partner security forces.

(6) For example, the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I) has an expanded focus to balance the effects of recent large scale SFA transition coupled with continued focus on refining and improving the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Strategic level SC planning within U.S. CENTCOM, via its TCP, specifically addresses what, OSC-I the successor to the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I), must accomplish as it relates to the continued development of the ISF and its supporting institutions.

(7) In comparison, the capacity of NTM-A or, its U.S. CSTC-A arm, enables it to provide an SCO/OSC role and function to meet U.S. security requirements related to development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and their supporting institutions. As ANSF development succeeds, the large scale CSTC-A role and function, prospectively, will transition to a scaled-down effort, with diminished DoD authority, that enables it to achieve future U.S. security objectives within Afghanistan.

(8) Regardless, typical functions resident within a SCO/OSC like organizations during contingency or strategy-centric planning and execution environments, include:

- Manage Equipment and Services Provided Partner Nation
- Manage Training
- Monitor and Assess Programs
- Evaluate and plan for partner nation security capabilities and requirements
- Administer Support
- Promote, rationalize, standardize, interoperability and other security cooperation measures
- Liaison exclusive of advisory and training assistance
- Organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise (OTERA)

(9) The nature of these functions, the number of DoD personnel supporting the organization, to include funding, may expand or contract depending on special authorities or directives enacted to support U.S. national security objectives in the partner country. For example, a CCDR may have expanded

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9 Note, during normalized operations DoD’s role in police development may be limited
authority to organize, train, equip, and advise both military and police forces in a partner country. However, during normalized operations, the CCDR must seek approval from the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission to that country for changes in size, composition, or mandates of a particular SCO/OSC or other DoD staff activities.

(10) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to operate within a joint, interagency, multinational environment
- An ability to understand and apply strategic and regional political and cultural context
- An ability to determine, coordinate, manage, and resource requirements in support of counterpart
- An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of project management (PM)
- An ability to serve as a functional staff officers coupled with an ability to advise and assist respective counterparts in their functional domain
- An ability to assist and provide recommendations to Security Cooperation (SC) programs and processes
- An ability to communicate U.S. strategic level key messages and themes
- An ability to develop and manage U.S. contract requirements as a contracting officer technical representative (CoTR) in support of counterpart requirements development
- An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of Enterprise-Level Force Management concepts (Capability Development and Integration)

Note: From this point forward, to provide supporting context related to core capability requirements for senior advisors, each section will have supporting crosswalks with respective Joint Capability Areas (JCA) and Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The joint force JCA construct provides required capability areas the U.S. joint force must have whereas; the UJTL construct provides force-wide tasks, conditions, and standards to drive joint force planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Each construct provides strategic, operational, and tactical level context to “what” the joint force must be able to do. The cross-walks align JCAs and UJTLs in context to SFA and senior advisor requirements.

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(a) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:  

✓ 8.2.2: Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions  
✓ 8.2.3: Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions  
✓ 8.2.4: Leverage Capacities and Capabilities of Security Establishments

(b) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:  

✓ SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups  
✓ ST 5.1.14 URGENT PROPOSED TASK Establish Knowledge Management  
✓ ST 5.3.4 Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders  
✓ ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)  
✓ OP 5.4.5 Coordinate/Integrate Component, Theater, and Other Support  
✓ OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support  
✓ OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)  
✓ OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)
### 1-3. Senior Advisor Operating Environment (OE)

“NATO must...[develop the]...capacity within both the Afghan security ministries to execute the strategic-level functions necessary to sustain the fielded force and transition the lead for security...[and]...further enhance their ability to conduct strategic planning, budgeting, and resourcing, and improve the operation of the national-level systems necessary to sustain the forces.”

LTG William B. Caldwell, COMNTM-A, 2011

a. Current perspectives, such as COMNTM-A’s emphasis above, related to what must occur at the Afghanistan MoD and MoI levels nests seamlessly with strategic planning guidance highlighted earlier and contained specifically within the GEF. To be effective, NTM-A aligned its senior advisors at the highest levels of Afghan ministries where senior advisor efforts in the development of their counterparts occurred within context to the whole of Afghan government (GIRoA) goals, objectives, and interests.¹⁵

b. Supporting the development of executive counterpart human and functional capacity within partner nation [security] institutions is the central role and function of the senior advisor. Partner nation security institutions normally reside at the ministry of defense (MoD), ministry of interior (MoI), and may include other executive departments or proponents within these or other institutions. Likewise, senior advisors can expect to operate at the highest levels of military and police departments and staffs to include major functional and operational commands within these departments.

Figure 1-1 illustrates typical executive level security functions of partner nation institutions where senior advisors can expect to advise and assist.¹⁶

#### Figure 1-1 Security Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Functions</th>
<th>Public Order and Safety Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Defense</td>
<td>Police, Fire, and Protection Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td>Law and Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td>Prisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Aid or Assistance</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*MoD</th>
<th>*Military General Staff</th>
<th>*MoI</th>
<th>*Police Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and Education Finance</td>
<td>Training (Institutional)</td>
<td>Training and Education</td>
<td>Anti-Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General (IG) General Council (Legal) Research and Development (R&amp;D) Disaster Response/Support</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Finance and Budget</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>Academy</td>
<td>Recruiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology (ICT)</td>
<td>Procurement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not inclusive of all functions or naming conventions


¹⁶ Figure 1-1 derived from multiple sources
c. Executive Authority

(1) Executive power and authority, or its means, normally resides within partner nation constitutional authorities or law and within higher-level strategic level policy, planning, and execution documents. At times, senior advisors will play important roles in assisting various counterparts in the staffing and development of these higher-level documents. In practice, these instruments must provide the security institution and its executive with the authority and resources required to recruit, organize, train, equip, employ, build, and fund capabilities within their respective departments.

d. Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to advise, assist, and serve as sounding boards for executive counterparts
- An ability to identify, develop, integrate, and assess capabilities within counterpart functional domains
- An ability to develop human capital and the intellectual capacity of counterparts and their staff
- An ability to carry out key leader engagements and sustain key leader relationships (KLE/KLR)
- An ability to frame, communicate, and integrate key messages and themes (STRATCOM)
- An ability to conduct staff training and provide analytical support to counterpart and stakeholder executive level issues
- An ability to research, write, and provide executive level oral perspectives on policy issues
- An ability to assist in the formulation and implementation of policy, programs, and initiatives
- An ability to advise and assist in coordinating, developing, staffing, and implementing national level security strategies and documents
- An ability to assist counterpart in requirements determination and resourcing solutions
- An ability to promote and rationalize U.S. strategic and regional security goals and objectives
- An ability to support security cooperation (SC) planning and resourcing requirements to meet partner nation capability requirements

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17 JCISFA O&R 955 “SC Reform Phase I Report” Recommendations 1.1.1 & 1.2.1, page 8, July 2011
(1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
- 8.2.2.2: Supply Partner Aid
- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

(2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
- OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

**e. Executive Direction and Management**

(1) By design, executive level counterpart functions must provide direction, management, and oversight across department functional domains to include the human capital domain. At the executive level, capabilities such as programs, budgeting, and execution systems must provide capacity for the counterpart to fulfill his department’s role and function. In practice, programs require higher-level management, oversight, and broad coordination where projects or activities exist or function within a particular program(s) and may require narrower or targeted coordination and assessment.

(2) Program definitions may vary in size and scope; however, the strategic planning and implementation of executive level programs typically follow a means, ways, and ends construct (formally stated as ENDS = WAYS+MEANS). In effect, executive level programs, policies, and systems must provide the counterpart with capacity to operate across the breadth and depth of his functional and human capital domain(s).

(3) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to understand and apply theories in organizational design
- An ability to understand and apply principles of program and project management
- An ability to recruit, organize, and integrate partner nation interagency, private industry, and non-government capabilities to include coalition partners as required
- An ability to guard against and manage short term gains for long term problems

(a) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
- 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
- 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

(b) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
- OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

f. Security and Non-Security Functional Integration

(1) To achieve recognized whole of government approaches, senior level advisors may find themselves supporting non-security institutions (national and local levels) of partner nations to strengthen these institutions capacity to contribute or participate in essential services for its people. Institutionally, senior advisors work in partnership with DoS senior level advisors in cross level development of these functional domains.

(2) For emphasis, strategic planning guidance requires GCCs to plan for support of non-security sector institutions within context to security cooperation (SC) focus areas. An enduring example of such development efforts could be the integration and collaboration of partner nation security and non-security functions in response and support to natural disasters where requirements for the partner nation’s military command and control and logistics capacity must provide support to essential or other services during an emergency. In practice, security and non-security cooperation requires interagency coordination, liaison, and integration.

(3) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to understand, interface with, and apply the functions of government and their strategic planning processes
- An ability to analyze, communicate, and integrate security and non-security sector issues, goals, and objectives
- An ability to unify or synchronize competing agendas and programs

(a) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

(b) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- OP 5.4.5 Coordinate/Integrate Component, Theater, and Other Support
- OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support

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18 "Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-8-4", page 4-5, November 2011
1-4. The Fundamentals...Senior Advisor Business

Do No Harm – “A maxim that acknowledges that any intervention carries with it the risk of doing more harm than good. Practitioners should proceed with programs only after careful consideration and widespread consultation...”

Ministry of Defense Advisor (MODA) Program 2012

a. Senior advisors operate in direct support of their counterpart or contribute collectively across counterpart stakeholder environments. This is not to suggest that the majority of the senior advisor’s time is in direct contact with his counterpart – for contrast, Afghan MoD/MoI senior advisors typically spent, on average, two to three days a week with their counterparts. During normalized operations, senior advisors and their supporting teams may reside on counterpart site or provide support remotely via reach-back means or through on-site, staff-assistance visits (SAV) programmed and resourced to support specific counterpart requirements.

b. Regardless, senior advisors seek to add value and above all else, must guard against doing harm within the eyes of their counterpart or in the eyes of a counterpart’s stakeholder base. Establishing rapport, credibility, and sustaining a value-added concept in the mind’s eye of a counterpart(s) requires a deliberate effort on behalf of the senior advisor – to be effective, the senior advisor must undeniably want to be in the job and must unequivocally accept the norms and traditions of the culture for which his counterpart lives and operates within.

c. Historical insight suggests that senior level advisors achieve credibility with their counterparts based on their level of real-world experience and subject matter expertise (SME) in their respective disciplines. Coupled closely, is an ability for the senior advisor to transfer their knowledge, skills, and ability (KSA) to their counterpart. A logical question is, does the advisor have the experience that the counterpart reasonably expects the advisor to have – requirements determination will push these types questions to the forefront and mitigate risks when assigning senior advisors.

d. The senior advisor’s ability to learn and grow with his counterpart is crucial. Ideally, the advisor and his counterpart should have similar or equivalent disciplines though, at times, advisors may find themselves providing advice or working problem solutions outside their own or the counterpart’s immediate area expertise. Likewise, managing risks related to transition is utmost importance – the period at which the counterpart no longer needs advice and assistance.

e. Strategic Planning and Approach Considerations

(1) As executive level advisors, senior advisors can expect to operate at the enterprise planning levels when working executive level functions. A general approach to strategic planning could include industry-recognized methods such as analytical perspectives related to strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) including complex strategic planning systems and or theories in operational design.19 In all methods or tools employed, strategic planning must consider among other things an organizing framework; priorities; performance standards, risks, fiscal bounds, to include influencing factors within stakeholder environments. As mentioned earlier, constructs of strategic level planning typically follow a

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19 Analytical perspectives of counterpart functional or human capital domains

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means, ways, and ends model. In practice, [the means] of strategic planning and execution provide authority or resourcing for strategic approaches [the ways] designed and executed to solve strategic level problems or set strategic level conditions [the ends].

(2) A major function of the executive is design and implementation of processes that enable requirements determination, solutions development, and integration. As requirements unfold, an executive requires an ability to see strengths (capabilities) and weaknesses (gaps) in context to the strategic approach or direction he intends to or is currently carrying out. In concept, an executive’s capability and prospective gaps exist in each of the three strategic planning realms - means, ways, and ends. Influencing, shaping, and changing requirements is of critical importance to the executive counterpart.

(3) Effective management and resourcing of strategic level requirements is an institutional problem. As such, institutional or force wide development and integration principally resides within one or more domains of doctrine, organization, training, leader, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Programming and budgeting systems normally operate within or across these domains in support of specific executive level functions or activities.

f. Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

✓ An ability to think strategically – socially (e.g. persuasion, negotiation, and conflict management)²⁰

✓ An ability to analyze and develop executive direction or activities that enables strategic employment, strategic management, and strategic development of a security force

✓ An ability to analyze, forecast, and action issues across one or more of the domains of DOTMLPF-P²¹

✓ An ability to analyze and adapt to counterpart established programs, systems, and initiatives to improve capability development and integration.

(1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

✓ 8.2.2: Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions
✓ 8.2.3: Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions
✓ 8.2.4: Leverage Capacities and Capabilities of Security Establishments

(2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

✓ ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
✓ OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)

²⁰ The Curtain: Developing Strategic Thinkers of ICAF, by Mark McGuire, NDU Press 4th Quarter 2011
²¹ An issue is a capability requirement or gap that affects the counterpart’s ability to carry out executive level functions
OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

1-5. Enterprise-Level Force Management Considerations

a. Strategically, enterprise-level force management within partner nation security forces principally deals with organization-wide prioritized requirements, operations, and improvement – via three interdependent functional concepts, which include executive, generating, and operating functions. Its cornerstone is an ability for an organization to carry out capability development and integration. In practice, organizational development provides the means to operate and adapt to changing conditions or requirements.

b. Senior level advising supports the partner nation’s ability to develop and integrate capabilities – functions that enable the security organization to fulfill its intended purpose – for example, an ability to provide for its nation’s national defense or public order and safety, which is a core requirement within U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance (SFA) activities.

Figure 1-2 illustrates the enterprise-level force management concept

![Figure 1-2 Enterprise-Level Force Management Concept](image)

b. Organization or force management seeks to inform senior leader decision-making requirements regarding sourcing of organization and or force policy and or strategic direction.  

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22 DoD Manual 8260.03 "Global FM Data Initiative Implementation – Organizational and Force Structure Construct, 14 June 2011"
function, principally entails requirements determination across the domains of DOTMLPF-P and budgeting. An iterative process that translates requirements into plans and programs, bound fiscally, to accomplish organizational requirements. Whereas, the integration function, includes organizational structuring, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding initiatives to meet operating or change requirements – this includes risk mitigation. Additionally, this concept must synchronize roles and functions to produce capable organizations.\textsuperscript{23}

c. Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

✓ An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of program and project management in support of counterpart capability development and integration

✓ An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of requirements determination in support counterpart strategic and operational context

✓ An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of capability development in support of counterpart functional domains

✓ An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of capability integration across counterpart functional and human capital domains

✓ An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of capability assessment across all counterpart capability areas

(1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

✓ 8.2.2: Provide Aid to Foreign Partners and Institutions
✓ 8.2.3: Build the Capabilities and Capacities of Partners and Institutions
✓ 8.2.4: Leverage Capacities and Capabilities of Security Establishments

(2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

✓ ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
✓ OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
✓ OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

d. Practical Approaches

(1) The practice of advising and assisting an executive level counterpart in organizational development is an iterative process that can occur at any level and across all functional areas. As eluded earlier, organizational development is at the heart of SFA and is of the utmost importance to the senior advisor. In concept, the senior advisor can start out by framing or putting together a counterpart estimate.

\textsuperscript{23} JCISFA “SFA Force Management Seminar – Course and Lesson Material” August 2011
Initially, the senior advisor may have limited information, where he will have to rely solely on tasking authorities such as SFA higher-level headquarters or outgoing advisors to provide counterpart assessments, and needs statements.

(2) To assist in developing a counterpart estimate, the senior advisor should seek out information that helps in evaluating and framing the executive counterpart’s state of affairs to gauge the strategic context and organizational framework. From this, the senior advisor can go about making an estimate of the counterpart’s problem(s). Follow this by projecting and aligning implications of these problems across specific counterpart functional and stakeholder domains. Make a practical estimate of the counterpart’s requirements – what must occur in context to his problems. After completing these steps, the senior advisor is in a position to understand and identify potential solutions. The concept of formulating a counterpart estimate can be informal to assist the senior advisor prior to deployment and initially in establishing rapport and credibility early on. Once in the job, counterpart estimates can be running estimates or works in process (WIP) and requires the senior advisor to work closely with his counterpart and other stakeholders to carry out the process.

e. Capability Development and Integration Concepts

(1) Capability development and integration, is a functional capability requirement an executive counterpart must develop and sustain. Carrying out the concept requires a formal framework for the senior advisor and counterpart to plan, prepare, execute, and assess within, a framework that assists in managing benefits and risks associated with a security organization’s development.

Figure 1-3 illustrates core components in capability development and integration.

**Figure 1-3 Capability Development and Integration Breakdown**

Note: The intent of the conceptual framework is not to serve as process or a sequential logic – in its practical state, the framework provides domains for which organizational development and integration occurs.

(2) Strategic Context Formulation

(a) An ability to frame the strategic environment is an enduring capability requirement in enterprise-level force management and is a core function for the counterpart executive to carry out. As an initial step in force development concept, strategic context is a primary source for determining requirements. Analyzing and capturing influencing factors within the environment provides an executive with an organizing framework from which to plan and execute. The tenets of strategic planning discussed earlier apply whereas; documenting the process is of the utmost importance.
(b) Principally, at the strategic level, requirements determination comes from broad array of partner nation authorities, directives, and planning documents. Typical these documents come from four inter-related sources: (1) national level authorities or law, (2) strategic planning and implementation documents, (3) approved activities/operating concepts, to include (4) national level contingency-based directives. As mentioned earlier, in the absence of these strategic level instruments, the senior advisor may participate in their development to include supporting concepts as well as other strategic level processes. Within the context of SFA, partner nation strategic instruments must align with and support U.S. strategic level security objectives for the partner nation.

(c) Strategic instruments provide the executive with the performance standards within context to the “what” that he is to achieve. Identifying and establishing these performance standards [requirements] can be a work in process or explicitly spelled-out. Regardless, refinement of these standards occurs within formal capability development processes as executives identify and forecast requirements. In parallel, the executive may face bureaucratic resistance or pressure when the scope of his performance standards conflict or influence other stakeholder domains. At times, development of counterpart functions may out-pace other functional areas due to the sheer depth and breadth of requirements contain in strategic instruments – in effect, creating inefficiencies or redundancy across the counterpart’s organization.

(d) Strategic level planning requires an analytical approach to discern counterpart priorities. Priorities establish the broader “what” a higher-level authority expects, the planning guidance that an executive is to carry out, and bounding considerations that he must follow. When these requirements exceed the capacity of counterpart’s functional domain(s) – capability development must occur.

(e) As depicted earlier, a means-ways-end model provides a framework for which strategic planning occurs. Likewise, strategic context includes an understanding of the counterpart’s institutional, functional, and operational domains – such capacity enables the counterpart to operate in a particular way for a particular purpose or end.

Figure 1-4 illustrates the concept of formulating strategic context to support capability development and integration.
(f) As a core function of the executive, strategic planning, cannot occur in isolation and is better suited for a unified approach where subject matter expertise and stakeholders participate in the process. The senior advisor can expect to facilitate this concept by recruiting and integrating stakeholders and developing processes that more effectively support the counterpart. Getting the executive counterpart to institutionalize this concept is a role and function of the senior advisor. Of note, it is far easier to get buy-in and support for strategic initiatives when all stakeholders contribute to the process—a situation that may require a give and take or alternatives approaches. Refining requirements is a work-in-process (WIP) for both the senior advisor and the executive counterpart.

(g) Further, the executive must leverage and communicate strategic level context when dispenses authoritative directives, planning, and execution guidance [or policy] to subordinate executives—a concept further discussed in the capability integration and assessment section later in this section.

(h) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to analyze and develop a strategic management framework in support of the counterpart’s strategic planning function

- An ability to analyze and define requirements, priorities, and performance standards in support of counterpart capability development

- An ability to recruit and integrate stakeholder concerns and interests to support counterpart goals and objectives

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An ability to participate in and contribute to working groups, matrix staffing, and stakeholder issue resolution processes that support counterpart requirements

An ability to analyze and contribute to the formulation of national and strategic level planning and execution documents that affect the counterpart role and function

An ability to provide input and recommendations to U.S security cooperation (SC) planning and execution that enables the counterpart to meet strategic level requirements

1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
- 8.2.2.2: Supply Partner Aid
- 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
- 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
- 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
- OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

(3) Requirements Determination

(a) As an extension of strategic context development, requirements determination enables the executive counterpart to go about identifying and refining requirements in perspective to his organization’s intended role and function. Organizing and framing requirements is crucial to an organization’s development efforts.

(b) Organizing requirements normally fall within three interdependent domains – operational requirements, functional requirements, and institutional requirements. Combined, these domains define what the organization must do, how it will do it, and its sourcing means. For example, operational requirements provide the organization with what it must do, its end purpose – directed or otherwise. Whereas, functional requirements, describe operating concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, or bounds in how the organization will operate, specifically or generally. In contrast, institutional requirements describe what the organization’s means construct (e.g. political will, industry, DOTMLPF-P, and fiscal) must produce. In practice, institutional requirements provide an organization with refined resources and capabilities.
Figure 1-5 provides a simple perspective of these interdependent domains

(c) Of note, the integrity of a task to purpose relationship must remain – where a capability, generally, in military terms is an ability to achieve a military objective. Senior advisors can expect to advise and assist their counterpart in designing strategy or approaches, establishing or formulating business rules, and framing institutional constructs. Often, framing such requirements will exceed the skill level and capacity of both the senior advisor and his counterpart – this will require the formation of working groups, partnerships, or integrated process teams (IPT) to provide subject matter expertise, stakeholder interest, and an ability to learn and adapt as conditions change across these requirement domains.

(d) Requirements Context and Qualification

3) Executive counterparts must be able to make decisions and provide executive direction regarding which requirements to action, delay, phase-in or request additional authority or funding to support. Qualifying requirements provides the greatest risk to the counterpart, given that identified requirements will not have equal footing, of which is essentially a strategy discussion provided later in the capability development section. However, the practical dilemma the executive counterpart faces is - what can he afford, what is he willing to pay for and, when required, what actions should he take to obtain additional resources. Identifying the right requirements and stating them correctly to support strategy and resourcing is a cornerstone of requirements determination.

4) Requirements determination is an iterative process where, the framing of a requirement directly affects all aspects of follow-on initiatives to develop, integrate, and assess a particular capability(s) to meet the requirement. A properly stated requirement must maintain the integrity of a requirement to purpose relationship. The nature of requirements has two features – an organization must consider. These features include “definitive” or “needs” (e.g. gaps) characteristics. A definitive requirement is explicit. Whereas a needs requirements describe a desired state or necessary condition the organization must obtain – or a capability requirement that must exist. Both of which, drive all aspects of capability development, integration, and assessment.

5) In concept, definitive or needs requirements have implications to the executive as he structures capabilities across the institutional, functional, and operational domains to meet such requirements. Structured organizations will facilitate this process – a concept discussed in the capability integration
section where organizations have specific roles and functions in context to higher executive requirements – in essence, an operating arm of the executive.

6) Creating a value chain is an important construct. At times, a value chain can occur locally within an organization such as, when a commander and his staff have the ability to define, resource, and action requirements at a local level. In comparison, the executive may have concern for force-wide abilities that requires an institutional approach. Regardless, the relationship of requirements and implications exist without regard to the “whom” or “when” aspects until organization and force structuring occur.

Figure 1-6 provide an example of requirements within each domain:

**Figure 1-6 Requirements and Domain Relationships**

**Operational Requirements:**
- *(Definitive)* - Breach the inner concrete wall in order to clear enemy combatants from the building
- *(Needs / Gaps)* - An ability to breach reinforced 25-inch concrete walls in order to support tactical operations in urban environments

**Functional Requirements:**
- *(Definitive)* – Develop, refine, and employ operating concepts and methods to support tactical wall breaching operations in urban operating environments
- *(Needs / Gaps)* - An ability to learn from the current urban operating environment in order to support organizational adaptation and improvement

**Institutional Requirements:**
- *(Definitive)* – Design, source, or employ material solutions that can breach reinforced 25-inch concrete walls
- *(Needs / Gaps)* - An ability to document and train wall breaching operations in support of urban operating requirements

7) Each of the scenarios above has its own unique requirements, which may necessitate further study, qualification, and integration. Study and qualification requires deliberate research, analysis, and documentation. How the senior advisor carries out this process, when assisting his counterpart, is beyond the scope of this document. However, the capability to carry out the process must reside within the counterpart’s functional domain. Research efforts develop requirement context whereas, analysis attempts to frame the requirement’s relevancy and suitability. Relevancy and suitability deal with a requirement’s validity, implication, and scope. The concept of “analysis” must lead to a recommended framework that defines the counterpart’s problem. Of central importance is the ability of the counterpart to document and archive the entire process to support all aspects of capability development and historical perspective.

*(e) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:*
An ability to analyze and define requirement priorities, and performance standards in support of counterpart requirements determination.

An ability to employ working groups, partnerships, and configure teaming arrangements to support counterpart requirements determination.

An ability to design and implement framework approaches to support a counterpart’s ability to determine operational, process, and institutional requirements.

An ability to provide input and recommendations to U.S security cooperation (SC) planning and execution that supports the fulfilling of counterpart requirements.

1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
- 8.2.2.2: Supply Partner Aid
- 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
- 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
- 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
- OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

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26 JCISFA O&R 955, “SC Reform Phase I Report,” Recommendations 1.1.1 & 1.2.1, page 8, July 2011
(4) Capability Development

(a) This capability area is an organizational management function. As an extension of force development, this iterative process must have an ability to translate requirements into plans and programs, bound fiscally, to accomplish or solve organizational problems. Capabilities and capacity provide an organization with the following abilities:

- Operational abilities to achieve specified objectives, goals, purposes, intents, or ends
- Functional abilities to carry out specified and implied tasks, activities, or ways
- Institutional abilities in the design and application of resources and or means

(b) Often, the routine use of the terms capability and capacity become synonymous and lose their practical meaning and application. For this discussion, a capability is an in ability to act, to exist in form, or to influence and or shape something for a particular purpose. At its foundation, capability relevancy and suitability is a direct measure of its [capacity] or the extent of its ability related to such factors as breadth, depth, reach, volume, speed, endurance, or timing of an effort. Obviously, these are not inclusive, only problem framing through requirements determination can identify such variables. In practice, when the scope of a requirement exceeds the capacity of a capability – the capability becomes irrelevant and adaptation or improvement must occur.

(c) Operational Capabilities (What an organization can do…in context to what it must do)

1) Operational capability provides an organization depth and breadth to what it can achieve in its strategic environment. These capabilities provide the organization with solutions and approaches to problem(s) it faces based on priority, acceptable risks, reach, and respective bounds in place. In practice, operational capabilities provide abilities for an organization to achieve specified objectives, goals, purposes, intents, or ends.

2) Planning and execution or application of executive level operating capabilities typically takes a near to long-term (e.g. 12 months to three years) approach. However, this does not suggest that executive direction and action occurs only at the highest levels of an organization. In contrast, executive authority exists anywhere there is a supervisory role and function present; and, where budgeting and resourcing authority resides within such a role and function.

3) Operating concepts provide an organization capacity to reach and affect or shape its problems. The development and implementation of operating concepts can be both art and science – structured to meet the demands of the environment. In practice, strategic approaches serve as executive direction, to enable among other things, planning and execution guidance, unify terms of references, and to provide authority for an organization to operate.

4) Senior advisors can expect to advise and assist their counterparts in the development of operating capabilities to include, when necessary, shaping and influencing higher executive operating concepts, authority, and bounding restrictions. Operating capabilities and concepts take on the following characteristics:

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27 JCISFA “SFA Force Management Seminar - Course Material” August 2011
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Executive Vision, Strategy and Policy  
Key Leader Alignment and Progression  
Strategic Approach (Operating and Functional Concepts)  
Explicit Course(s) of Action  
Authorities and Bounds (Fiscal or Otherwise)  
Roles (job, task, or function)

5) Often executives express desired capability requirements (what the force must be capable of doing), to provide flexibility in meeting emerging requirements. Typically, these requirements become operational needs statements (ONS) or projected requirements. When the executive expresses and describes desired capabilities that must exist within the force, the organization must develop such capabilities within the constraints expressed in higher-level guidance or request additional resources to support the requirement. At times, adaptation or development will occur under time-constrained conditions where the executive counterpart will need flexible and adaptable solutions to support emergent requirements across the organization.

(d) Functional Capabilities *(How an organization carries out what it must do)*

1) Functional capability development is typically a structuring or organizing and execution function that provides an organization with an ability to carry out specific tasks for specific purposes within the realm of broader stated requirements or ends.

2) The “functions of an executive” reside within this domain. Nonetheless, functional capabilities provide the organization with abilities to carry out specified and implied tasks, activities, and or ways. For example, an organization that designs and implements a *lesson learned program* (i.e. capability)… has an ability to learn from and adapt to changing conditions. Likewise, the development and integration of a *partnering concept* enables an organization to team with external organizations or agencies to unify actions toward a common purpose(s).

3) As mentioned earlier, Enterprise-Level Force Management principally deals with organizational development, a framework that provides an organization with priorities, the means to operate and adapt to emerging requirements. Essential functions that must exist within an organization are three interdependent functions the *executive, generating, and operating* functions. These functions enable a security organization to fulfill its intended purpose for example, an ability to provide for its nation’s national defense or public order and safety.

4) At the partner nation national level, these functions can be costly and complex undertakings. Likewise, designated organizations charged with carrying out enterprise level functions, at the national level, must maintain the same functions (to whatever degree) within their own organizations. Regardless, the *executive function* develops priorities for the organization whereas; the *generating function* primarily supports the *operating function*. 

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Figure 1-7 illustrates the concept of core enterprise-level organizational functions.

Figure 1-7 Enterprise-Level Organizational Functions

5) Functional capabilities must enable an organization to operate and cooperate. Further they must provide interdependence and interoperability across a means, ways, end construct. For example, a work breakdown structure (WBS) is a method that decomposes a project (end objective) and provides relationships of its components, subcomponents (ways) and its supporting activities, and tasks (means). During functional capability development, the maintenance and integrity of a task to purpose relationship is of the utmost importance – business rules development can provide structure to this process. *28* Senior advisors can expect to support counterparts in all areas of analyzing, designing, and implementing functional concepts and capabilities. Examples of functional capabilities include:

- Programs and Projects - Design and Execution
- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
- Work Breakdown Structures (WBS)
- Functional Concepts (e.g. Force Development and Force Integration)
- Planning and Execution Frameworks
- Systems Design and Employment (e.g. Medical, Human Resource, IT Infrastructure)
- Warfighting Functions *29*
- Focal Points (e.g. centers of excellence charters, working groups, etc)

(e) Institutional Capabilities *(The source that enables an organization to do what it does)*

1) Institutional development is primarily a generating function and is one of the more complex undertakings an organization will take. In effect, institutional capabilities provide an organization with abilities to generate its means or core structure. The capacity of an organization’s institutional construct enables an organization to set priorities, operate, and improve itself. Of caution, not only is institutional development a complex endeavor but bureaucracies exist or emerge and managing costs becomes a major concern for the executive. Equally important, are the “human will” and “leadership” aspects of an organization, which reside within its institutional domain.

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28 Business rules provide detailed structure to a project or activity.
29 Command and Control, Intelligence, Maneuver, Fires, Protection, Sustainment
Figure 1-8 illustrates the purposeful aspect of institutional capacity to support the scope and degree of functional and operational requirements.

Figure 1-8 Institutional Perspective of Capability Development

2) As a reminder, capability development determines requirements across the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) – an iterative process that translates requirements into plans and programs, within bounding considerations, to accomplish organizational roles and functions.30

3) Institutional Domain Capability Concepts:

**Doctrine:** As a core component, of a counterpart’s institutional capacity, doctrine describes what the organization will do and generally how it will do it – from an enduring standpoint. Its development requires a direct correlation to valid requirements placed on the organization and when written, is prescriptive in nature. Organizations design, test, and employ operating concepts that lead to capability assessments and development. In concept, once the design and implementation of doctrine occurs, the organization can proceed with developing capabilities across the full depth and breadth of itself to support concept requirements contained within its doctrine.

**Organization:** As a capability, the ability of an organization to effectively organize and structure itself with supporting or subordinate organizations is a cornerstone within institutional development. In practice, carrying out an organizing function includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate operating concepts, design and authorizations for physical organizations, structuring of processes (e.g. command and staff actions), or the arrangement of institutional business rules to include universal joint tasks. Advisory functions will assist in the design and implementation of organization requirements.

**Training:** The training function provides capacity for an organization to shape, influence, and improve personnel and organizational attributes and standards of performance. Training exposes individuals to new or emerging requirements or attempts to sustain core job related skills. Likewise, training enables an entire organization to practice its collective skills (abilities). The ability for an organization to train must be an enduring capability within its institutional construct – senior advisors can expect to participate in framing and resourcing training requirements to support partner nations.

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30 JCISFA Senior Advisor Seminar Courseware, October 2011
**Materiel**: This institutional domain consists of all activities to create, improve, and integrate material and equipment, procurement and fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life-cycle management. This capability area provides an organization the ability to field equipment, assess equipment readiness, repair, and recapitalize as required. Senior advisor can expect to participate in requirements determination and integrating U.S. provided material solutions to fill gaps in partner-nation equipment requirements.31

**Leader Development and Education**: This domain deals with defining leadership expectations and preparing personnel across an organization in improving leader qualities. The term leader is inclusive to the term manager. Resident within this capability are formal development and execution programs of instruction (Pol), lessons, coupled with core career progression concepts for junior leaders through executive level leaders. In concept, this capability provides an organization with capacity to influence and shape all aspects within the counterpart’s human capital domain.

**Personnel**: As a institutional capability, the personnel domain is essentially a human resource (HR) function which seeks, primarily, to provide solutions through manpower availability, and human capital concepts. Personnel refers to the ability of an organization to provide qualified people in terms of specific aptitudes, experiences, and other human characteristics needed to operate, maintain, and support organizational systems.

**Facilities**: This capability provides an organization with capacity to design, develop, improve, and integrate physical infrastructures such as buildings, bases, and stations. Facilities include functional infrastructure capabilities like information communications technology (ICT), logistics structure, ranges, and training complexes.

**Policy**: As a governing and steering mechanism, policy provides an organization its strategic direction and a framework for it to achieve broader outcomes. This is a core requirement for the executive to guide his organization toward a particular end. A practical example of policy is a senior commander’s direction on the escalation of the “use of force” - a tool to constrain or bound his organization’s use of force. As a capability, policy must provide direction and priorities for the organization – in effect, policy is authoritative and provides an organization with an ability to act or exist that otherwise it would not be able to do.

**Budgeting and Financing**: Essentially, a comptroller function, are abilities for an organization, to program, allocate, or reprogram funds as required to meet forecasted or emerging requirements. Budget authority allows an organization to expend or commit funds for its operational requirements and maintenance. As a function of SFA, with specific authority within legal restrictions, the U.S. may authorize funds for the executive counterpart to bring about capability and capacity development, the Afghan National Security Force Fund (ANSFF) is an example of such a funding authority.32

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31 JCISFA O&R # 1006, “Country Materiel Assessments in Support of Security Cooperation Activities”
32 JCISFA O&R 227, “ANSFF Justification (DoD 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations)”
4) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

✓ An ability to analyze and define requirement priorities, and performance standards in support of counterpart requirements determination

✓ An ability to conceptually frame DOTMLPF-P requirements in context to counterpart functional and operational requirements

✓ An ability to provide input and recommendations to U.S security cooperation (SC) planning and execution that enables the fulfilling of counterpart requirements

a) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

✓ 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
✓ 8.2.2.2: Supply Partner Aid
✓ 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
✓ 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
✓ 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
✓ 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
✓ 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

b) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

✓ ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
✓ OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
✓ OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

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33 JCISFA O&R #955, “SC Reform Phase I Report,” Recommendations 1.1.1 & 1.2.1, page 8, July 2011
(5) Capability Integration

(a) Capability integration is a difficult and costly process; a concept of structuring an organization to fulfill specific roles and functions. The design and employment of organizations, as capabilities, must support the full realm of operational requirements, functional requirements, and institutional requirements. Integration is an extension of an organization’s institutional capabilities residing within the domains of DOTMLPF-P and provides abilities to surge to meet and sustain specific organizational requirements.

(b) Also referred to as force integration, a supporting function to the organization’s generating function, this capability concerns the structuring, manning/staffing, training, equipping, employment, stationing, and funding of organizational requirements. The process must synchronize organizational roles and functions as well as mitigate risks in the structuring and employment of capable organizations.\(^\text{34}\)

(c) Additionally, integration deals with concepts like force generation (e.g. JFORGEN), which enables an organization to manage surge requirements as well as manage “readiness” concepts.\(^\text{35}\) As a note, organizational readiness is typically a measure of abilities or availability for operational employment. Measuring readiness (abilities), are functions of capability assessment – discussed in the next section where, gauging “availability” is a sequencing concept in the employment/integration of an organization.

Figure 1-9 illustrates organizational structuring concepts that must exist during capability integration.

\(^{34}\) JCISFA “SFA Force Management Seminar - Course Material” August 2011
\(^{35}\) DoD’s force generation process is Joint Force Generation (JFORGEN)
1) **Organizing Capabilities**: Enable an organization to carry out deliberate and responsive organizational design, planning, and analysis to form new organizations, align leader/management requirements, and or adapt to or change roles and functions in context to policy, strategy, and authorizations. Organizational design includes relationships and inter-relationships of people, processes, and organizations. For example, military organizations that primarily have a “warfighting role” or supporting role typically operate across warfighting functions – functions that provide strength and capacity to carry out their primary warfighting role and function. Organizations operating primarily in the generating or executive domain may have their own functions to provide strength and capacity to carry out primary objectives.

2) **Manning/Staffing Capabilities**: Is a concern of managing authorized end-strength levels and specific requirements within organizations – core drivers within this concept are authorized billets or workload equivalents for the employment of a person (i.e. military, civilian, or contractor). For example, as a partner nation’s minister designs their own staffing structure for assistant ministries, deputy ministries, and supporting staff – its design must consider the nature of the billet (e.g. appointment, permanent, temporary, or contracted billets). Synchronization of individual duty descriptions or job skills with an organization’s design aspect, discussed earlier, is an important consideration.

3) **Equipping Capabilities**: Equipping capabilities within an organization seek to integrate materiel solutions within an organization. Such capabilities also seek to repair and recapitalize legacy equipment to meet emerging requirements.

4) **Training Capabilities**: This capability area is primarily concerned with all aspects of developing and managing human capital requirements as well as training and learning management concepts across an organization. Components of these abilities include leader development and education initiatives, initial training, skills certification, and training management concepts supporting individual and collective training requirements.

5) **Sustainment Capabilities**: The sustainment of an organization is a broad application. It includes functional concepts and their supporting systems such as logistics, personnel services, and health service support. Logistics typically include supply, maintenance, transportation, distribution, contracting support, and general engineering functions. Personnel services entail human resource support, religious support, finance and resource management to include among other things legal support. Health services deals primarily with the physical health and mental wellbeing of organizational personnel.

6) **Employment Capabilities**: Includes all activities in the employment of organizations, resources, infrastructure, technologies, industry, etc to achieve objectives and goals. An ability of the partner nation to deploy security forces geographically, separately, or in concert to meet requirements either internally or externally. Employing is strategy and function based.

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36 WFF: Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment

37 JCISFA O&R #950, NTM-A SFA Model; *Gaps in Afghan MoD manning structures resulted in heavy military manning without consideration for hiring longer term specialty skills found in the Afghan civilian labor pool*
7) **Stationing Capabilities**: Stationing activities represent an ability to manage and operate facilities and infrastructure requirements to support organizational goals and objectives.

8) **Funding Capabilities**: Deals with all aspects of in-flows and out-flows of funds. This includes funding made available through internal operations where an organization produces income from providing a product or service; and, where funding is made available to an organization through authorizations or budgeting. Primary funding for partner-nation security forces come from funding authorizations or annual budget estimates. Estimates to support approved organizations in the way the organization expects to operate within a given period – typically referred to as operations and maintenance budget (O&MB). Unfunded requirements normally require special authorization from a higher executive authority.

(d) A core requirement of capability integration is to ensure the right capability is available at the right time and right place to support operational requirements. A supporting component to capability integration is capability assessments.

(e) **Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors**:

- An ability to analyze and define requirement priorities, and performance standards in support of counterpart requirements determination
- An ability to provide input and recommendations to U.S security cooperation (SC) planning and execution that enables the fulfilling of counterpart requirements

1) **Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk**:

- 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
- 8.2.2.2: Supply Partner Aid
- 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
- 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
- 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

2) **Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk**:

- ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)
- OP 7.3 Conduct Security Cooperation and Partner Activities Operations in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

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38 [JCISFA O&R #955, “SC Reform Phase I Report,” Recommendations 1.1.1 & 1.2.1, page 8, July 2011](#)
(6) Capability Assessment

(a) Assessing capabilities enable partner capability development and integration. Iterative in nature, assessments must occur across the entire organizational construct. As a recap, requirements determination is a deliberate process and directly affects all aspects of follow-on initiatives to develop capabilities, integrate capabilities, and assess capabilities. The nature of requirements, have two features, the “definitive” and or the “need or gap” relative to an organization’s capability and capacity.

(b) At this stage, refined constructs of people, functions, systems, organizations must be operating and exist within context to an organization’s operating environment – in effect; ownership and action must exist as it relates to performance of assigned tasks to meet requirements in an organization’s primary operating domain. As assessments occur, the same means, ways, end construct proposed earlier has application for assessing any organization’s operational capabilities, functional capabilities, and institutional capabilities. Having a strategic view provides a perspective of the total capacity of an organization’s ability to achieve its objectives and goals.

Figure 1-10 illustrates an a strategic level assessment perspective for any organization

![Figure 1-10 Strategic Level Assessment Perspective](image)

(c) Numerous methods and systems, legacy or otherwise, exist to measure an organization’s performance and effectiveness across all domains. Some requiring advanced analytics and complex integration. However, a core requirement when conducting capability assessments is an ability to research, analyze, organize, and document capability requirements. Knowing what is going well; and what is not, is of central concern. In practice, there are two solutions to measuring an organization’s performance and effectiveness. The employment of these methods can support the measurement of any task and its expected outcome – regardless of individual, systems, or organizational tasks. Accurate requirements determination is a cornerstone to applying these concepts. Methods:

1) Measure of Effectiveness (MoE): A MoE is a measure of the degree of a capability’s [ability] to meet what a requirement is calling for – in effect, a MoE provides perspective to the effectiveness of a task or action. It informs an organization of how well the organization is meeting its object(s). If the requirement is not accurate, a MoE will typically reflect an under performance or over performance for the organization. Developing requirement context is of utmost importance during capability assessments.
As such, a task-to-purpose relationship must provide a result, outcome or consequence — the “what” that must be done. A MoE typically measures variation in an objective or end requirement whereas; measuring task performance is a structuring related to capabilities. MoE may also support a task-to-purpose relationship between operating concepts, functions and processes. Accurate MoE establish context — is the organization doing the right things in relation to its objective(s). For context, a MoE gauges the degree of achieving a military objective.

2) Measure of performance (MoP): These indicators provide perspective in how well an organization is performing a task(s). Tasks provide the “what” that must occur within context how an organization carries out a concept, function, or process. For example, an ability to carry out a specific task provides capacity to meet process, functional, or end requirements. Task performance requires established criteria (matched to requirements) to assess task completion or level of completion. Correlating a MoP to a requirement provides context for evaluation of task relevancy and supporting context. Often these measures require intuition based on experience and may be qualitative or quantitative in their structure. In effect, MoP informs an organization if it is performing a task correctly whereas a MoE determines task effectiveness.

Figure 1-11 illustrates MoP and MoE relationships in context to a requirement(s) and or objective(s)

![Figure 1-11 MoP and MoE Relationship](image)

Note: the above illustration is not inclusive to all tasks, activities, or objectives as it relates to the operational ends

(d) Maintaining the integrity of a means, ways, ends construct is fundamental to capability assessments and provides the framework for assessments at any level. To illustrate, the above example provides context to a particular warfighting requirement and the capabilities required to provide solutions to the problem across the spectrum of an organization’s functional capabilities. However, the same approach can apply to the most basic operational requirement in any organizational operating environment.

(e) Earlier we discussed during capability integration, that organizations having a primary warfighting role and function build capacity (also known as combat power) through warfighting functions. Assessing these warfighting functions (WFF) is a way to gauge the capability and capacity of U.S. UNCLASSIFIED REL NATO, ISAF, GCTF, ABCA FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
these organizations. For example, the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), through its Coordination, Liaison, and Assessment Team (CLAT) employs a WFF assessment matrix when making initial assessments of partner tactical forces.  

(f) As a note, senior advisors must embrace the conceptual difference in counterpart MoP to that of senior advisor’s ability to gauge his own MoP. For example, a counterpart’s MoP normally serves as a senior advisor’s MoE – the degree to which a senior advisor develops the performance or actions of their counterpart. This is not to suggest, that a counterpart’s MoE is immaterial to the senior advisor – given that a counterpart’s action(s) must serve an intended purpose.

(g) Core Capability Requirements for Senior Advisors:

- An ability to analyze and apply strategic context of organizational capability assessments
- An ability to analyze and apply Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) context as it relates to organizational effectiveness
- An ability to analyze and apply Measures of Performance (MoP) context as it relates to organizational performance
- An ability to assess senior advisor performance and effectiveness as these capabilities relate to developing partner capabilities and capacity
- An ability to analyze and provide input to U.S security cooperation (SC) planning and execution in support of counterpart requirements

1) Joint Capability Area (JCA) Crosswalk:

- 8.2.2.1: Identify Aid Requirements
- 8.2.3.1: Determine Partner Requirements
- 8.2.3.2: Enhance Partner Capabilities and Capacities
- 8.2.4.1: Identify Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.2: Determine Utility of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities
- 8.2.4.3: Stimulate the Use of Foreign Security-Related Capabilities

2) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Crosswalk:

- ST 5.1.14 URGENT PROPOSED TASK Establish Knowledge Management
- ST 5.3.4 Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders
- ST 5.4.4 Conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)
- OP 5.7.11 Execute Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP)

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39 JCISFA O&R #752: “Partner Nation Assessment Matrix – Tactical (PAM-T), 28 July 2011
40 JCISFA O&R 955, “SC Reform Phase I Report,” Recommendations 1.1.1 & 1.2.1, page 8, July 2011
1-6. Summary

This chapter described U.S. strategic context and implications for senior advisors as well as illustrated the typical operating environment (OE), which senior advisors can reasonably expect to operate within as it relates to partner-nation security ministries. Likewise, the chapter provided emphasis on roles and functions of senior advisors with supporting capability requirements. Nowhere does this chapter suggest that every senior advisor must possess all capability requirements. However, the requirements do provide context to “what” must occur during the course of carrying out security force assistance (SFA) at the senior advisor level.
Chapter 2

Working within a Strategic Environment

2-1. What is the strategic picture?

a. While a tactical advisor may succeed in his mission without a thorough understanding of the overarching strategic picture, the senior advisor cannot afford to ignore it. Since the senior advisor operates at the host nation (HN) strategic level, his actions and observations require strategic level context and understanding to enable him or her to advise effectively at the higher levels.

b. The Department of Defense (DoD) does not conduct military operations overseas in a vacuum. Such operations occur within and sometimes across (e.g. Afghanistan-Pakistan) sovereign nation’s borders as a result of US government, foreign government, and/or multi-national organization policy decisions. In addition, various agreements (treaties, ceasefires, sanctions, resolutions, etc.) which exist among the organizations and nations involved in an operation may shape and influence strategic policies. These agreements can also shape the HN government’s attitude toward foreign intervention. Because the institutional advisor will be working directly with HN government officials, he should have a thorough understanding of the political-strategic policies, agreements, and attitudes associated with the mission.

c. At the same time, because his actions involve SFA at the strategic level, he needs to have a more thorough understanding of the overarching guidance associated with the SFA mission than his counterparts at the tactical level. He should know the background, purpose, and objective behind the SFA mission. He should also be familiar with the limitations of the SFA mission such as the time constraints, budget constraints, and resource allocations (transportation, force protection, personnel, sustainment, information, etc.) that will affect his mission. A solid understanding in these areas will ensure the advisor sets realistic expectations with his counterpart and coordinates actions which complement the US mission.

d. While these requirements may seem standard for most military commanders, they are far more critical for the institutional advisors; their actions and communications can have rippling effects all the way from the HN national or federal government down to the HN FSF tactical level. Inappropriate actions and/or communications by someone advising a HN minister of defense, for example, can lead to an unsuitable HN national military strategy, incorrect security cooperation expectations, and an improperly developed FSF. Thus, the institutional advisor must carefully ensure his actions are in-line with the overarching US and coalition political and military strategic objectives.

2-2. Getting into the SFA mindset when coming from a different mission

a. An operational commander who has trained for and conducted combat operations will need to change his mindset when assigned to an institutional advisory position as part of an SFA mission. The quick, aggressive, and disciplined behavior required for combat may actually be counterproductive to FSF institutional development which requires patience, HN consensus, open-mindedness, and a long-term approach.

b. The eager Warfighter who’s trained and/or seasoned in combat operations will need to learn how to approach their role differently when placed in an SFA-centric role. Furthermore, the officers and enlisted
who work directly for them may require special training and their advisory team’s culture may require modification.

c. SFA operations normally require an advisor to focus initially on building relationships with the HN. The aggressive Warfighter must holster his weapon and take the time to learn about and learn from his host nation counterpart. The seasoned policy-maker or technically skilled civil servant will need to avoid immediately suggesting sophisticated policy procedures or highly technical systems be used to improve organizational effectiveness. They must take the time to gain an understanding of the counterpart’s perspective and treat him with respect. This can take time and may require close interactions, including eating, living, and working with the counterpart. This can be a difficult process, as the counterpart may not even welcome the US force presence.

d. SFA operations take a long time and require an open mind. The fast-paced Warfighter trained to accomplish everything a specific way, as rapidly as possible, will have to change his rhythm. His HN counterpart will probably not be able to accomplish tasks as quickly as a US equivalent could accomplish them. A contractor responsible for providing advising contract “deliverables” will need to be prepared to not push solutions when HN conditions aren’t established – necessitating the need for constant revalidations with contract oversight representatives. Advising efforts focused on delivering capacity-building end products will probably not look like a US end product. However, the advisor needs to remember he is operating in someone else’s country. The HN must be involved in the planning, development, and operation of their own forces, even if that means a slow process, a different way of doing things, and a marginal product by US standards. In some cases, the HN’s resistance to US influences and control will complicate this process. The advisor’s disciplined, ‘take charge’ behavior may have to give way to patient, subtle interactions based on an understanding of the HN culture and the HN perception of US forces.

e. The advisor needs to operate with long-term objectives in mind. She must replace his “make it happen now” behavior with a focus on enduring development and sustainability by the HN. She may be inclined to conduct immediate impact projects, which show an immediate affect and provide immediate satisfaction, but effective SFA requires a focus on the long-term, not-so exciting, yet enduring projects. After all, providing the FSF a capability without the ability to sustain it will not provide an enduring change. For example, providing a FSF with high-tech equipment and the applicable training may be very satisfying. However, if the HN has an inadequate budget, a broken education system, an absent sustainment system (logistics, parts, maintenance, etc.), a low-tech environment, and/or a non-existent training system, these changes will not remain long after US withdrawal. Similarly, using contractor support to provide a service to the FSF may only provide a band-aid fix.

f. The Warfighter who is comfortable taking charge, always getting it done right, and ‘doing it all’ must also realize that in an SFA environment this behavior may be counterproductive. The FSFs must not develop a continual dependence on US forces. Likewise, the advisor’s counterpart must understand US forces will eventually leave. The advisor must let the counterpart do certain things himself, accepting certain failures, while preventing others. At the same time, the US does not have a bottomless bank account and thus cannot build the FSF’s entire infrastructure. The HN must pay for things as well. The advisor needs to effectively, yet appropriately, convey these constraints to his counterpart.
Thus the Warfighter or bureaucrat-turned-advisor must undergo a transformation from a fast moving, aggressive, zero-defect, hard-charger to a patient counterpart who accepts a satisfactory product from the HN and aims for enduring change. Such a makeover will not be easy, but can be crucial to accomplishing an SFA mission.
Chapter 3
Influencing and Shaping Requirements

3-1. What does the HN need?

a. At the outset of an SFA mission – or ideally, in the planning phases of an SFA mission – it is critical to establish an assessment of HN FSF capabilities and capacities, as well as the abilities of the HN institutions that oversee, direct or sustain those HN FSFs. The OE in question may range from a country with a sizeable FSF structure and history, as well as security institutions and bureaucrats that oversee, manage and sustain these forces, to an OE where the country has been devastated by years of conflict, with little memory or tradition of formalized security forces being overseen by any type of government officials.

b. The advisor or advisor team must understand the OE context at this level, or risk identifying the baseline capabilities, problems or strengths of the security institutions and associated FSFs. Before planning, what a HN “needs” to build a well-functioning security institution and FSF, the current and historical context needs framing and clarification.

c. Once this assessment is complete, pre-SFA mission planning can commence. This planning, where possible, should include HN representatives, expatriates or “surrogates” (U.S. experts or government officials that can role-play HN priorities/preferences) to appropriately frame planning assumptions, constraints, restraints and challenges. This planning should start with a comprehensive HN security review, where possible.

d. As such, before expending large amounts of money, time, and labor building a Foreign Security Force (FSF), a Host Nation (HN) National Security Strategy (NSS) or its equivalent should be developed (if one does not already exist). While the absence of a written document should not preclude Security Force Assistance (SFA), the lack of a clearly defined HN NSS can result in wasted effort, lost time, and unnecessary expenditures. The development of a HN NSS should include U.S. whole-of-government representatives from the State Department and USAID at a minimum, so that governance and development objectives of a national strategy can shape, inform and restrain the development of subordinate security force plans and priorities.

e. Using the existing or “developed” HN NSS, advisors should next work with HN FSF leaders or ministerial counterparts to revamp or build a National Defense Strategy (NDS) that reflects the current and projected realities of the OE. This NDS will be the “playbook” for determining defense and military priorities, a clear articulation of the specific threats facing the FSF and their ability to support the HN NSS, and focused set of HN-owned or influenced objectives for improving institutional capabilities and sizing, shaping and generating the FSF.

f. US institutional advisors may be inclined to develop FSFs using US security forces as a model. However, the HN’s legitimate threats, needs, and resources must drive FSF development. This is why a HN NSS/NDS must be developed as early as possible in order to determine the HN’s security force capability requirements. This is necessary for 1) clearly defining an FSF End State, 2) determining existing gaps, and 3) formulating an SFA plan. Any efforts made to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and
advise (OTERA) a FSF without an overarching HN NSS/NDS may occur in vain if they lead to unnecessary, overly robust, redundant, or counterproductive capabilities.

g. A HN NSS and NDS is also necessary to appropriately designate roles for existing or developing FSFs. Once the NDS is updated – U.S. institutional advisors will better understand the primary jobs of each security force (law enforcement, police, military, gendarme, border guards, etc.). As a result, they will have a better understanding of how, to appropriately focus, their development efforts. In many cases, this will help US operating and generating forces more appropriately organize, train, and equip the advisory teams units tasked with the SFA mission. It will also aid in the formulation and management of foreign military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) plans, which are more appropriate to the HN needs. For example, selling air defense equipment to a nation with no air- or missile-capable adversaries would not benefit the HN.

h. At the same time, the HN NSS and NDS are necessary for appropriately shaping the public’s image of the HN security forces and getting public buy-in for the U.S. SFA mission in their country. HN leaders need to be able to justify the existence of specific security forces to the public and these strategic (and public) documents allow these leaders to articulate this justification, at least indirectly, to the public. After all, unpopular security capabilities are unlikely to become enduring capabilities.

i. Furthermore, the HN NSS and NDS can serve as a bridge between U.S. national objectives and HN requirements. When feasible, the HN’s leadership should play the lead role in developing the strategy for protecting their nation. U.S. leaders and advisors should focus their efforts on advising HN counterparts on the advantages of reflecting U.S. national security objectives in their strategies, but avoid “forcing” the adoption of U.S. objectives that will not be sustained by the HN.

j. After all, the U.S. government’s long-term security cooperation and political intentions in the region may affect the HN’s future security requirements and, thus, the FSF capability requirements. At the same time, gaps, which exist between the HN’s future security requirements and the FSF capabilities, may necessitate a security cooperation agreement with and political action by the U.S.

k. That said, there may be cases where HN security interests and perceived threats differ from U.S. policy objectives or preferences. Senior advisors should be cautious of these differences and clearly identify their implications in terms of its impact on the SFA mission. For example, in a HN with an OE that contains both regional security threats and an active insurgency, the U.S. may not want to promote capabilities development that addresses the former, but promote the later.

a. Experience has shown that most HNs will continue to focus on the threats they perceive or fear the most – which can complicate SFA implementation if coalition and U.S. forces do not comprehend where potential divergences are. In many cases, basic capability development and fielding of FSFs can serve a variety of threats.

b. Using the example above, U.S. advisors should focus on those areas of development that are common to counterinsurgency and territorial/border defense, initially. This will help in preventing the possibility that HN leadership will simply disregard advanced counterinsurgency capacity building, and also, reduce the potential waste associated with building FSF units or capabilities that are not perceived as “needed” by the HN.
1. A poorly defined or non-existent strategy will lead to wasted effort by institutional advisors. Those conducting SFA at the strategic level need to recognize the HN threats, needs, and resources, the resultant FSF capability requirements, and U.S. national objectives. They need to ensure their actions, as well as the actions of those at the tactical level, are in line with these high-level requirements.

3-2. Rapport as a Primer

One of the most important abilities for senior advisors is the advisor’s ability to develop and maintain a strong and positive rapport directly with their counterparts. For context, rapport equates to the relationship between the senior advisor, his counterpart, and respective stakeholders based on mutual understanding, respect, and trust. The goal is to achieve positive rapport outcomes as opposed to negative conditions within relationships that cause unintended results. Shared or contributing purposes run parallel and provide context to rapport amongst varying stakeholders. The concepts behind understanding, respect, and trust is as follows:

a. Understanding: This component of rapport begins prior to the senior advisor deploying and requires study and preparation related to culture, language, and other environmental considerations previously mentioned in this document. Having perspective of a counterpart’s organizational structure and potential needs help prepare an advisor in context to understand. As mentioned in Chapter 1, senior advisors should seek out information and observe once on station to make estimates of the counterpart’s situation, problems, implications, and needs – that can become running estimates or works in process (WIP), which will require the senior advisor to work closely with his counterpart and other stakeholders to carry out the process. Rapport is a double sided coin where willingness to share cultural, language, professional experience, and personal background become critical aspects and strengthen the relationship.

b. Respect: Transferable experience is a key aspect of this rapport component. Transferable experience equates to an advisor’s near-peer or practical experience to advise and assist his counterpart. Adding value and guarding against doing harm within the eyes of their counterpart or in the eyes of a counterpart’s stakeholder base is of central importance. Establishing rapport, credibility, and sustaining a value-added concept in the mind’s eye of a counterpart(s) requires a deliberate effort on behalf of the senior advisor – to be effective, the senior advisor must undeniably want to be in the job and must unequivocally accept the norms and traditions of the culture for which his counterpart lives and operates within. The concept of respect matures as individuals share experiences, risks, and benefits.

c. Trust: As an outcome of understanding and respect, trust builds and matures over time. Patience and commitment are truly virtues within this rapport component. Reliability plays an important role in gaining trust – where follow through occurs on promises and agreements. Senior advisors should never promise or commit to something that they cannot provide.

41 Rapport Primer, JCISFA, 2008
3-3. Influence Techniques

Measuring the effectiveness of rapport relates to a senior advisor’s ability to influence his counterpart and respective stakeholders in his operating environment. Affecting a counterpart’s decision making process and perceptions related to problems that he faces is of central importance to the advisor. Influence and persuasion serve as capability requirements or tasks in support of building partner capacity. According to the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), establishing credibility and gaining the respect of the counterpart were critical in managing perceptions and receptiveness of a counterpart to take advice – from the advisor. The stakeholder environment provides supporting context to gauge influencing factors, which will require a senior advisor to understand types of influence and the steps to take in carrying out influence.

a. Compliance or commitment focused influence: This type of influence is a measure and outcome of authority and is typically short lived and not sustainable. Of note, advisors normally have little to no authority to force behavior change. Use of compliance normally occurs when requirement has immediate importance and tolerance for risk is at a minimum. Whereas commitment focused influence is enduring and provides deep context to values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior. Commitment is a measure of loyalty, professionalism, selfless service, respect, and duty.

b. Logical steps to influencing: As advisors make estimates of how to influence the following revised steps can assist the advisor in process:

- Determine your goal
- Determine who or what needs to be influenced
- Determine motives and purposes served
- Determine an individual’s or group’s beliefs, values, and attitudes
- Compare and contrast individual and group beliefs, values, and attitudes to the predominant culture’s beliefs, values, and attitudes
- Determine susceptibility
- Determine tactics and techniques
- Apply tactics and techniques
- Assess measures of effectiveness and gauge unintended consequences

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42 The Human Dimension of Advising: Descriptive Statistics for the Cross-Cultural Activities of Transition Team Members, ARI, June 2009.
43 Advising, MTTP Sep 2009
44 Ibid,
Chapter 4
Adapting to the Culture and Environment

4-1. Understand the Cultural Environment

a. FSF development requires interaction with foreign nationals of different ethnic groups, religions, and backgrounds. In many cases, foreign nationals having suffered through great hardships, have great needs, and are very passionate about specific issues. Such circumstances can greatly complicate SFA operations. Thus, the institutional advisor will be far more effective if he understands the cultural environment (i.e. how his counterparts think, how they behave, and why they behave the way that they do).

b. At the very basic level, the advisor should be conversant in his counterpart’s language and recognize how to use an interpreter. He should also understand the accepted behavioral norms, including non-verbal communication, necessary for positively influencing his counterpart and other HN personnel. He should be familiar with the type of behavior considered unacceptable or offensive in the HN. However, this expertise only scratches the surface of what an advisor needs to know about the HN and his counterpart.

c. In addition, the advisor should have a thorough understanding of the relevant HN history, to include the following:
   - The causes, triggers, and characteristics of the pre-existing conflict/instability and the actions taken to address them
   - The history of the HN’s security sector
   - The major past events which have a large influence on modern society
   - Any preexisting relationships (e.g. colonization, conflict, trade, sanctions, business, etc.) between the HN and any of the coalition nations or joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partners involved in the operation

d. Such information will give an advisor a basic understanding of the background history, which has not only shaped, but is also still affecting the HN society.

e. An advisor should also have a solid comprehension of the various groups (e.g. clans, tribes, ethnicities) that exist within the HN. For example, he should know or have a working understanding of the following:
   - The values, ideologies, and perceptions that affect the behavior of these groups
   - The geographic division of these groups
   - Group demographics, literacy rates, and perspectives of patronage networks
   - The nature and intensity of the differences among the groups
   - Whether any groups claim past grievances against the other groups
• Whether some groups control other groups and/or a disproportionate share of the HN resources
• Whether and how these groups are represented (or not) in HN governance, especially in the institutions and operating forces of the FSFs
• Whether any groups are outside of government control
• Whether any groups are opposed to foreign intervention
• Whether any groups have large numbers of internally or externally displaced people

f. Such knowledge will ensure an advisor has a handle on the breakdown of society. This is critical for an appreciation of the sources of any internal competition, differences, and/or disputes.

g. The advisor should also understand how these building blocks of society come together to affect the operation of society. He should recognize, for example, the following:

• The most important things to the average citizen on a daily basis and their priority of loyalties
• The key influencers/leaders and nature of their influence (e.g. religious, financial, political, etc.)
• Informal networks (religious, financial, political, militia, etc.) which exist within society and whether they support or undermine the security sector
• The roles government, religion, family, race, and gender play in society
• The standard rules and methods of discipline
• The means and methods people use to cope with disputes, insecurity, or injustice

h. This information will help the advisor understand the society’s operating mechanisms and processes: he may have to use, bypass, or defeat them in order to effect change.

i. The advisor should also understand the cultural challenges affecting an SFA mission. He must know the following, for example:

• Whether the culture supports relationship development with coalition forces.
• Whether the culture supports the development of a security sector which protects human rights and gender equality
• Whether the culture supports change and reform
• Whether the culture supports corruption or anti-corruption efforts
• Whether the culture supports non-religious / secular standards for establishing rule of law

j. An understanding of the cultural challenges will paint a more realistic picture of the road ahead and facilitate better planning. If a culture strongly resists the needed changes, the advisor may have to dig deeper into the culture, uncover the deeply ingrained beliefs contributing to such resistant behavior, and challenge those beliefs in the appropriate fashion. Such a process requires a certain level of finesse and can be both time consuming and painstaking, but crucial to enduring change.

k. Inadequate cultural understanding can lead to the planning and execution of unproductive or even counterproductive advisory activities. Therefore, most advisors need to have a deep understanding of the
HN’s history, societal breakdown, modus operandi, and cultural challenges in order to bring about enduring change to security sector institutions. Such a process can be very complicated; however, institutional level SFA has rarely been simple.

4-2. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) partners are not optional

a. Activities evolving SFA are inherently multinational and/or combined efforts. Enduring success requires the work of multiple services, organizations, and nations in order to maximize capabilities, work within budgets, and provide a politically acceptable solution.

b. Institutional advisors with a ‘can-do’ attitude or a lack of familiarity with JIIM strategic issues and operations will be inclined to stick to what they know when tasked with an SFA mission. This typically means they’ll rely on their own service’s capabilities to build institutional capabilities; however, in an era of fiscal constraints and limited assets, multiple players need to work together in order to appropriately leverage the tools and resources which multiple groups can bring to an operation.

c. Most institutional advisors would agree a FSF would be more capable of providing security if its military services, civilian organizations, and government agencies work together; however, this FSF coordination will be much harder to achieve if our own advisors are not coordinating with our own JIIM partners during the SFA operation. JIIM coordination within the coalition and the U.S. government will 1) reinforce the importance we really place on this coordination and 2) demonstrate how this coordination should occur. Our own JIIM coordination will also make FSF coordinate with their own JIIM partners easier by providing an interconnected network of US counterparts, which reaches their military services, civilian organizations, and government agencies.

d. At the same time, institutional advisors will be far more capable of success when complemented by civilian and international partners. A suit or polo shirt may be able to open a door that a uniform will not open. Civilian partners can also reduce the operation’s military overtone, which sometimes arouses tension and harmful political perceptions. International partners can improve the operation’s perceived legitimacy by demonstrating the operation is the result of an international consensus, not US unilateral action. Both types of partners can reduce both the financial and manpower burden the SFA operation places on US military forces. These civilian and international partners also bring a wealth of experience in OEs and expertise in developing institutions that will likely not be resident in military-led SFA operations. In general, they may provide much deeper and time-tested experience with human rights, rule of law, education, literacy training, building sustainable plans and institutions, and monitoring and evaluation than most military personnel.

e. However, institutional advisors need to recognize both our partners’ strengths and limitations. On the one hand, they can bring niche capabilities, which exceed our own forces’ capabilities. NATO, for example, has nation-building subject matter experts and specialized military schools, which exceed US capabilities. On the other hand, many of these partners will be less capable, have far fewer personnel, and have much less money than our military forces. Some countries, for example, will send into theater service members who are untrained, unarmed, unable to sustain themselves, unpaid, and/or unprotected. Thus, institutional advisors must recognize what their partners bring to the table but form realistic expectations of their abilities.
f. Institutional advisors also need to remember that military operations do not occur in a political or non-cooperative vacuum. As mentioned earlier, senior advisors act within the borders of another sovereign nation in order to achieve their own nation’s political objectives. This requires coordination between senior advisors working in military organizations (uniformed, civilian, or contractor) and U.S. government entities in theater, especially the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Before the operation begins, for example, DoS and USAID should be involved in planning processes given that DoS is primarily responsible for establishing policy and conducting foreign assistance. Likewise, USAID is primarily responsible for long-term development, implementing foreign assistance (developmental concepts), and near-term humanitarian assistance. Of note, stakeholders within this framework of cooperation normally include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multination (JIIM); non-government organizations (NGO), and inter-governmental organizations (IGO).

g. In parallel, At the same time, once the operation is complete, DoS and USAID will likely be the only players left in the HN, coordinating the long-term FSF change after the military leaves. Institutional advisors need to recognize their actions are part of a much larger political and cooperative plan formulated by civilian and other leaders; therefore, senior advisors must consider and coordinated with stakeholder leaders as required.

h. Along these same lines, in order to prevent redundant or counterproductive behavior, institutional advisors forces must ensure their actions take into consideration their JIIM partners’ actions. The advisor that executes a transition should consider the progress of partner organizations. Actions by an advisor (e.g. providing funds to a ministry) should not undermine the actions of another organization (e.g. granting a loan to the same ministry). Actions by advisors in theater should not contradict the messages or actions of other partners in the same AOR. This may require an advisor to balance or coordinate the US military objectives, as dictated by their military chain-of-command, and the objectives of other players in theater.

i. This coordination can incredibly complicate the actions of advisor in theater, but it can also serve as a force multiplier by bringing many tools and resources to bear in developing the FSF. This coordination will likely produce a much more enduring and sustainable solution or approach with HN counterparts. In an ideal world, all players involved would be in constant communication in order to coordinate every single task, but this is unrealistic. Actions can, however, be more efficiently coordinated by balancing communication with decision making which is based on a clearly defined and agreed upon 1) end state, 2) purpose, and 3) roles. If all JIIM partners are on the same page with regard to the desired end state FSF (DOTMLPF) and the roles they each play in getting there, coordination is easier with less communication.

j. Of course, trying to obtain consensus from such a diverse group of partners can be overly time consuming. For this reason, the advisor will have to find the right balance between getting consensus and getting things done. The more limited the time, the more a senior advisor may have to lead the development process, letting the other JIIM partners follow his or her lead. Rarely will coordination with JIIM partners be an easy task or involve a standard solution.
4.3. The minister and his organization do not operate in a vacuum

a. The institutional advisor should coordinate his actions with the actions of his own JIIM partners; at the same time, he should ensure his HN counterpart coordinates his actions with the actions of the HN JIIM partners. This will make the HN security sector’s institutional developments more effective and more efficient for a number of reasons.

b. First, most likely no single HN security institution has the manpower, funding, or capabilities for optimally achieving all its objectives. Thus, a HN security institution will be far more capable if it leverages the existing capabilities of other HN partners. First, the advisor needs to assess whether their counterpart understands or values the roles that other HN institutions play in providing governance, security and development in country. If not, significant education and relationship building may fall on the advisor or other coalition. This may also require coordination with U.S. / coalition JIIM advisors.

c. Next, the advisor needs to ensure his counterpart is taking advantage of the other force multipliers, which exist outside his institution. For example, the advisor should ensure his counterpart understands the capabilities offered by HN intelligence entities, private corporations, and academic institutions. These are just a few of the groups that can vastly enhance the capabilities of any HN security institution. Thus, the advisor should ensure his counterpart is establishing lines of communication and resource partnerships with such entities.

d. Second, HN security sector developments will be far more effective if they are properly coordinated with the developments of closely related HN government organizations, departments, and agencies. The Ministry of Interior’s ability to make numerous arrests, for example, will be far more effective at dealing with crime if the Ministry of Justice is capable of processing, trying, convicting, and imprisoning criminals. The Ministry of Defense, as another example, will be far more effective at executing a robust budgeting process if the Ministry of Finance is capable of providing sustained funding. Overzealous developments in any security sector institution without complementing capabilities in the adjoining institutions can run into frustrating roadblocks. In many cases, such developments can be coordinated via a HN interagency national security council or body; however, if such an entity does not exist, regular communication via other means will need to be established. Thus, the advisor needs to ensure his counterpart is coordinating his developments with other government institutional developments before charging ahead.

e. Finally, because the media provides a bridge between the security sector and the public, it has the power to either disturb or enhance the perceived legitimacy of the various security sector developments and thus affect the endurance of progress. For this reason, the advisor should also ensure his counterpart and the institution writ large is effectively working with the media. A security sector institution, which ignores, stonewalls, or aggressively deals with the media will not only undermine its own developments, it will also fail to take advantage of a potentially robust, yet free force multiplier. Therefore, the advisor needs to help his counterpart develop a solid relationship with the media and ensures his counterpart understands the means and value of solid strategic communications.

f. However, the advisor should be cautious about helping his counterpart establish strong relationships with too many HN JIIM partners. The advisor needs to recognize, and help his counterpart recognize, the long-term roles and relationships of many of these HN JIIM partners. Some partners, by
design, will support the security sector on a temporary basis while others will support it long after the SFA mission is complete. Therefore, the advisor must be careful about making a HN security institution too dependent upon a partner, which will not be able to provide enduring support. For example, the HN counterpart should not become overly reliant upon local organizations, institutions, corporations, or media sources, which will not operate within the HN after mission completion.

g. Thus, the advisor needs to ensure his counterpart appreciates the HN JIIM capabilities that can complement his security institution developments. Then he needs to ensure proper communication and coordination take place with the appropriate JIIM partners in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of various security institution developments.
Chapter 5
Awareness and Stakeholder Interests

5-1. Watch out for FSF Politicization

a. The primary goal of US forces tasked with SFA is FSF development; however, monitoring should occur of the HN government’s use of those FSF’s. Improper application of the HN’s security forces can affect not only the HN government’s perceived legitimacy but also the success of the US mission. If HN security forces recruit the wrong people and used for the wrong purposes, they may provide the HN government leaders with a powerful political tool instead of a legitimate security apparatus. Thus, the advisor needs to recognize some of the symptoms and root causes of a politicized HN security force and be able to recommend viable solutions to both his counterpart and his own chain-of-command.

b. Symptoms of Politicization:

(1) HN political leaders might use the FSF for narrow personal or political objectives. For examples, the FSFs might be employed to do the following:

- Target political opponents
- Negative Influencers such as corruption
- Launch investigations of political opponents
- Suppress dissenters (journalists, activists, protestors, etc.)
- Target specific groups (ethnic, religious, racial, etc.)
- Ensure regime survival (i.e. ‘coup-proofing’)

Such actions would be contrary to U.S. values and interests.

(2) Host nation political leaders might develop over-centralized control over military units. For example, the HN president might be capable of providing specific direction to tactical units without any review or advice being given by uniformed leaders of the FSF. Such meddling may not only be counterproductive to the FSF’s operations; without adequate transparency, it could also provide the leader with the opportunity to use these units for narrow purposes.

(3) The HN government might keep the FSF merely focused on politically important problems. For example, the government might limit FSF tasking to security threats found in areas inhabited by groups favored by the government. Alternatively, FSF employment against various security threats might be prioritized based on their impact on a political leader’s reputation rather than the real dangers they pose to the public. The HN government should be objectively using FSF’s for the physical protection of the public and the nation, not solely using them for political purposes.
Furthermore, the FSF members might have strong political ties. Loyalty to individuals, political parties, or primordial identities may overshadow their loyalty to the institutions they serve. This will make them more susceptible to political, sectarian, and other types of manipulation.

c. Potential Root Causes:

(1) Roles and functional areas that require development in the host nation’s political system/process to include capability gaps in the national security sector (personnel systems) may attribute to such problems.

(2) For example, the HN leader, or at least the executive branch of government, might have lots of power that goes unchecked by the other branches of government. Such a political system may allow inappropriate manipulation of the security sector such as:

- The political appointment of senior security force (military, civilian, or law enforcement) officials by the president without obtaining additional approval, advice, or consent
- The creation of extra-constitutional security bodies which report directly to the president but are not monitored by the other branches of government
- The direct and unchecked control of specific security force units, entities, and niche presidential organizations (e.g. Presidential Brigades, Special Forces Units, Intelligence Services, Operations Centers, etc.)

(3) Such unchecked power by one individual, or at least the executive branch, can provide a leader more opportunity to use the FSF for narrow political and personal objectives.

(4) Politicization problems can also stem from the politicization of operational commands. In some cases, individuals with absolutely no experience may serve in high-level commands because of their political or sectarian connections. In other cases, competent leaders may be removed because of their unfavorable political or sectarian associations. Both actions can fuel resentment, distort the perceived role of the associated security forces, and influence the FSF’s loyalties.

(5) Too much power in the hands of one group can cause many problems. For example, one group may fill most of the senior leadership positions in the HN government or the FSF. Or, one group may make up an exaggerated portion of the entire FSF. Such a situation can be the result of discrimination, harassment, recruiting procedures, or conflict and can contribute to inappropriate employment of the FSF.

(6) The unresolved presence of prior regime members who remain within or now reside outside of the national security sector can also contribute to these problems. The strong emotions ignited by their public presence or mere existence may aggravate political instability and exacerbate the politicization of the FSF’s. Those in power may unnecessarily use the FSFs to either protect themselves and/or harm their enemies.
d. Potential Solutions:

(1) Security force politicization is a very complicated problem. Each situation will require different actions based on the operating environment, US objectives, and resource constraints. There are no standard solutions to the FSF politicization problem; however, positive change will likely be the result of actions, which correct the political system and delicately alter the personnel composition of the national security sector. Many of these actions will be beyond the capabilities of any single advisor and will require the coordinated effort of the chain-of-command and/or multiple advisors at the ministerial level acting together as a team. The importance of working strategically with JIIM partners cannot be underscored enough here as well.

(2) No action should be taken until the advisory team has developed an adequate understanding of the problem. The team must have a detailed understanding of the HN national security bureaucracy, to include the complex relations among the various security entities, the key influencers, and the human terrain. The team also needs to have a comprehension of the behavior of the national security sector over a period of time. In other words, the team first needs to figure out how and why the FSF is being manipulated for narrow political and personal objectives. Only then can the advisor and others develop a path forward.

(3) Change must begin at the HN political level because attempts to change the FSFs first will likely be discouraged by a biased political system. For example, previously marginalized groups must be allowed to participate in the political process in order to reduce the monopolization of power over the FSF by a single group. This requires a safe environment for participation, a system that allows participation, and a desire to participate based on confidence in the system. These conditions may require security from US forces, engagement by US government agencies at the strategic level, and communication with key influencers at all levels.

(4) The HN political structures, or at least the composition of the individuals filling those structures, may require changes in order to prevent the monopolization of power by a single group. Filling the senior level positions with members of multiple groups will reduce the opportunities available for one group to use FSF’s solely for their own benefit.

(5) The HN political system must include oversight, accountability, and consent measures, which limit the executive branch’s power over the FSFs. The HN government should have processes in place for reporting, investigating, and punishing leaders who abuse their power over the FSFs.

(6) In addition, the HN government must improve opportunities in the FSF for previously marginalized groups. This is a delicate matter, which requires a balance between the need to improve the ethnic breakdown of the FSFs and the need to develop merit-based FSFs which recruit, retain, and promote the most competent individuals. The following are some previously tested solutions:

- Political action to balance the FSF senior officer ranks horizontally and vertically. Unfortunately, the rapid promotion of individuals for ethnic reasons could fuel resentment among other groups and undermine the normal chain-of-command.
• Recruiting based on ethnic quotas. Such as: 1) an equal share for each group or 2) shares, which match the ethnic makeup of the population. Unfortunately, such quotas can undermine the principle of merit and also fuel resentment

• Recruiting based on regional quotas. This can both improve the ethnic balance of the FSF’s and maintain a merit based system, but may be more difficult to employ

(7) Such efforts to balance the FSF can be complemented by 1) ‘integrated security mechanisms,’ in which nonintegrated security units of different ethnic groups are forced to work together, and 2) ‘cross-cultural deployments,’ in which nonintegrated security units are sent to live and work in geographic regions of other ethnic groups, under US force supervision in both cases. If different groups become accustomed to working together for an extended period of time, they may begin building relationships which reduce sectarian strife and foster long-term reconciliation.

(8) Processes that provide for reporting, investigating, and punishing members of the FSF which intimidate, harass, or discriminate against certain groups can be complimentary. At a higher level, similar processes should exist for dealing with entire FSF units, which commit human rights violations. Every service member and every unit must know they will be held accountable for their actions.

(9) With regard to supporters of the previous regime, a vetting process needs to be balanced with a reconciliation process. On the one hand, these old supporters may have blood on their hands and the public may resent their presence in the new national security sector. On the other hand, removing those with the most FSF experience and know-how will likely result in a brain drain of the security sector and the creation of angry groups of unemployed weapons experts. Such a complicated issue requires the SFA commander to balance moral concerns and practical concerns. The best approach may require 1) reintegration and/or retention of some of the past regime’s members, 2) replacement of some of those in highly visible positions (‘cosmetic changes’), 3) trials for some key leaders known for the most egregious offenses, and 4) partial vetting of new recruits. The ultimate decision will depend on the target society and its capacity for reconciliation.

(10) Many of the above discussed problems can also be solved through professionalization. A FSF full of educated, disciplined, and skilled personnel who are more dedicated to the HN and the institution in which they serve will be harder to politicize. Soldiers, airmen, marines, sailors, and law enforcers who are filled with a sense of purpose and a sense of duty to their nation will be far less likely to tolerate sectarianism, cronyism, and political manipulation in their ranks. Such an environment will make it harder for leaders to use the FSF for narrow personal and political purposes.

(11) Many of these solutions go well beyond most advisors’ scope of influence, but if the advisor has a clear understanding of the problem, the root causes, and the potential solutions, he can provide advice to his chain-of-command and to the other advisors. He can also provide the same advice to his HN counterpart, but the imparting of such advice requires a certain amount of finesse; he must consider his counterpart’s political associations, role in the problem, and emotional response to such advice. The advisor will have to find the right balance between achieving the desired outcome and accepting a practical outcome; he may not be able to comprehensively alter decades of behavior in a single deployment, but any progress made will be crucial to mission success.
5-2. What do the locals think of the new FSF’s?

a. In a country with poor security, few public services, and scarce infrastructure, the HN security forces will serve as the face of the HN government to the local population. The role played by these security forces can affect the inhabitants’ 1) perception of the HN government, 2) priority of loyalties, and 3) behavior, all of which can affect the long-term success of the SFA Mission. Thus, the ministerial advisor must understand more than just the roles which his counterpart’s security forces are supposed to fill; he must also understand the roles these forces are actually filling.

b. First, the ministerial advisor must recognize which role each security element is supposed to fill. The advisor needs to have a clear understanding of 1) the specific types of threats (criminal, terrorist, foreign invader, etc.) each of his counterpart’s security elements are designed to handle, 2) the acceptable use of force for each of those elements, and 3) the specific entities (citizens, property, government, etc.) they are designed to protect. He should also understand the special circumstances (security threat, natural disaster, etc.) or expected future conditions (improved security conditions, transition to HN, etc.) which will require a change in these roles.

c. For example, the HN counterpart’s security elements may be expected to fill the following roles:

- National defenders
- Border enforcers
- Law enforcers
- Property protectors
- Public protectors
- Government protectors
- Criminal investigators
- Drug enforcement agents
- Counterterrorism experts
- Security experts
- Disaster responders

d. Then the ministerial advisor needs to obtain a realistic, unbiased assessment of the role actually being filled by his counterpart’s security elements. This may require the use of outside resources (JIIM partners, intelligence sources, tactical units, etc.) to conduct interviews, surveys, or observations at the lower level. This is important for determining 1) what the public really thinks of the security forces and the HN government, 2) what the security forces are really doing when not under the direct observation of US forces, and 3) how these elements impact the average citizen’s behavior.

e. For example, in the eyes of the HN public, the HN counterpart’s security elements may actually be filling the following roles:

- Jihadist terrorists
- Sectarians defenders
- Infidels
- Organized crime leaders
• Political arms of the government
• Pawns of the foreign occupiers
• Minor players who remain in the background
• Incompetent amateurs who do more harm than good
• Mysterious forces who operate behind the scenes
• Scary authoritarians
• Just another militia

f. Local inhabitants who see security force elements taking up these roles will find it more worthwhile to conduct illegal or adversarial actions, which undermine the HN government and the SFA mission.

g. Such role-playing can be the result of either FSF behavior (actions, personalities, competence, etc.), distorted perceptions (rumors, old disputes, etc.), or a combination of the two. This can stem from issues in the security elements themselves or deeper issues in the security sector institutions, the legal institutions, or society in general. In any case, the ministerial advisor and his counterpart will need to determine the roots causes of this role error and formulate a plan of action to 1) make the required changes to the security forces, 2) change the behavior of the security forces, and/or 3) change the public perception. Such action will be key to recapturing the support of the local inhabitants and getting them to change their behavior.

h. When top-notch service members and government civilians from a first-rate defense institutions and military services spend years of hard work and numerous resources building a FSF, the ministerial advisor and his counterpart may have trouble believing the U.S. government could have helped create security elements filling such unfavorable roles. However, they should not delude themselves; this very problem has emerged many times in recent history. For this reason, they need to conduct regular assessments of the roles being filled by various security elements and recognize when a new course of action may be required.
Chapter 6
Achieving Institutionalization

6-1. Think DOTMLPF-P for enduring change

a. When coalition forces develop FSFs, the new capabilities must be institutionalized to ensure FSF survival and sustainment following SFA mission completion. The host nation needs to be able to produce, maintain, and employ its own forces without foreign support. A failure to develop solid support structures for the FSFs will result in a rollback in progress and/or an accompanying degradation in the security situation when the coalition departs.

b. Institutional advisors engaged in an SFA mission need to ensure FSF developments realistically consider the capabilities of the expected end state HN institutions. The advisor needs to ensure security unit developments are linked to developments in the security sector’s DOTMLPF as well as developments in other HN sectors.

c. The following list includes items the institutional advisor needs to consider when supporting specific FSF developments. Some of the items mentioned are outside the realm of the security sector, but can still have a huge impact on the security sector. The items mentioned below are neither all-inclusive nor relevant to every SFA mission.

6-2. Doctrine

During an SFA operation, FSF operational successes will often stem from coalition training and/or combined operations conducted using coalition doctrine. However, the FSF will need their own documented doctrine once coalition forces depart and the coalition’s methods and doctrine fade from memory and/or become obsolete. They need doctrine tailored to their needs and a process for doctrine development based on evolving threats.

- What type of doctrine exists for the appropriate portions of the security sector and is it adequate for the capability requirements?
- Are there informal, unwritten procedures followed by the security sector, which overshadow the formal doctrine?
- How doctrine creation, formalization, and modification occurs?
- What is the concept of employment that will guide security operations at the regional and local levels? What are the roles and missions of various FSF units in this concept?

6-3. Organization

Information, resources, and orders may flow up, down, and across the HN security sector, efficiently and effectively, when coalition SFA is in progress. However, the HN security sector must be organized in a manner that facilitates a good flow, as well as successful security force operations, even when foreign assistance is no longer present.
What type of organizational structure does the FSF need based on its objectives, culture and current/projected capabilities and limitations

What is the current organizational structure of the FSF?
✓ How are security forces organized?
✓ What is the formal chain-of-command?
✓ What are the relationships among various security entities?
✓ How does the organization plan and execute employment of the FSF?
✓ How centralized is major decision making?
✓ What are the informal relationships that influence security sector management?
✓ Would external pressure for change negatively impact the organization’s power relationships?

Does the current organizational structure foster security sector success?
✓ Does the organization support each leader’s ability to do his job?
✓ Does the organization provide monitoring, assessment, and feedback for security element performance?
✓ Does the organization provide the ability to adapt the security sector (personnel, training, etc.) to changing requirements?
✓ Does the organization foster the needed coordination/cooperation among various security entities?
✓ Does organization design provide enduring support to the Warfighter?

6-4. Training

Coalition force training of the FSFs is a step in the right direction. However, those FSFs ultimately need to be able to train themselves long after coalition departure. Thus, the tools, programs, people, expertise, and facilities for such training need to be in place and operating before security force turnover occurs. The institutional advisor needs to recognize which training gaps are serious enough to require coalition intervention before this turnover occurs.

• Does a professional military training program exist and is it adequate?
• Does a regular training cycle exist and is it adequate?
• What is the actual level of training/experience of current personnel in the security sector?
• What type of training exists for new recruits?
• Are there serious training deficiencies that require immediate action from the security sector senior leadership?

• Does the training program instill a sense of duty and professionalism in members of the security sector?

• Does the training enforce values and behavior, which are in-line with US interests?

• Does training facilitate integration among warfighting functions and JIIM players?

• Does the training cover warfighting restraints (ROE, code of conduct, human rights, etc.) in addition to warfighting capabilities?

6-5. Materiel/Equipment

Coalition nations may find it easy to supply the FSF with their own equipment. However, such equipment may not be the most appropriate based on the HN needs, threats, resources, and related capabilities. The advisor must consider what will realistically happen to the equipment after foreign support is withdrawn.

• What equipment does the security sector currently have?

• What equipment does the security sector need?

• Will the security sector need equipment that is interoperable with JIIM partners?

• Will the security sector be able to support, maintain, and sustain the equipment?

• What is the technical ability of the population?

• Is the cost of the equipment reasonable for the HN’s economy?

• Does the HN have an effective force modernization process?

• Does the HN security sector have the means for equipment accountability?

6-6. Leadership Development

Under the tutelage and supervision of a coalition advisor, the HN security sector leaders may perform admirably. However, even more important will be the performance of these same leaders and their predecessors after coalition departure. Thus, the institutional advisor must recognize what his counterpart and other leaders both know and believe. Along a longer time scale, the advisor should also understand whether the current system properly selects, trains, regulates, and motivates those in leadership positions.

• Does the current leadership culture or do any individual leaders resist the necessary changes?

• Are any currently accepted HN leadership practices contrary to U.S. values?
• How does “corruption” or cultural patronage affect partner leaders?

• Does the current leadership possess an adequate knowledge and understanding of the NSS, NDS and desired end state for FSFs?

• Why do the security sector leaders behave the way they do?
  ✓ What are the security sector leaders’ priority and loyalties?
  ✓ What factors affect promotion into leadership positions?

• Is it more worthwhile for leaders to follow the formal rules?

• How will the behavior of the security sector leaders change after coalition departure?

• What type of leadership training exists at the various levels of leadership and is it adequate?

6-7. Personnel

Political pressure may force coalition forces to rapidly populate FSFs. However, security development should ensure that the right quality and composition of local inhabitants fill the security ranks. The advisor needs to ensure FSF capability expectations relate to a thorough understanding of the capabilities of the local population.

• How are the Human Resources function structured and is it effective?

• How educated is the HN population, what are the literacy rates across the populace?

• How skilled is the HN population?

• Determine demographics, how young and healthy is the population (e.g. “youth bulge” as a possible target audience for programmatic planning)?

• Is the composition of the security sector representative of society and what, if any, action one should take to change the composition?

• What vetting processes will be required to prevent the reentrance of perpetrators?
  ✓ What level of justice and what level of reconciliation is society expecting?
  ✓ Will the punishment and/or alienation of perpetrators cause greater security problems?
  ✓ How effective will disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) really be?

• What is the recruiting process?

• What factors affect promotion of personnel?

• What is the level of desertion and what are the primary causes?
• Are there serious personnel deficiencies that require immediate action from the security sector senior leadership?
• Does the HN security sector have the means for personnel accountability?
• Is there a system in place for retirements or removal?
• Is there a system in place for injured soldiers or those killed in action?

6-8. Facilities/Infrastructure

The institutional advisor needs to ensure lofty SFA goals passed down from those above are grounded in the realities of the HN capabilities. Otherwise, security sector developments may lapse of roll-back as a result of progress deficiencies in other HN sectors. The institutional advisor needs to recognize what will happen to the FSFs when foreign institutions cutoff resources to all HN sectors. Such implications may affect structures within the economy at the local and national levels and may extend to regional and international economic structures.

• What is the nation’s historical facility and infrastructure baseline? Are there local building styles, materials or plans that have proven the test of time, weather or conflict that should be leveraged in SFA activities?
• What infrastructure deficiencies affect the security sector’s ability to conduct operations (transportation, communication, utility, etc)?
• Are security operations throughout the country feasible?
• What security facilities need development, repaired, or upgraded, and can they be both maintained and sustained?
• Does a stable financial system exist for funding the security sector?
  ✓ Will the financial sector be able to provide adequate funding over the long run?
  ✓ Are the security sector personnel receiving an adequate paycheck?
• What resources gaps (material, technologies, etc.) will need resourcing from other nations over the short- and long-run?
• Will the HN’s infrastructure support the desired end state FSF (DOTMLPF) after allied forces depart?

6-9. Policy (Executive Direction)

Often the senior advisor and their supporting teams will directly or indirectly influence and shape the partner nation’s strategic policy and planning efforts. Such policy and planning may include national level defense strategies, force employment, and planning style documents or processes that support the partner nation’s security strategy and policy. Depending on the conditions within the partner nation’s security strategy and policy.
ministry(s), the senior advisor may be directly involved in policy formulation, staffing, implementation, and assessment.

Likewise, the senior advisor may serve as the lead communicator for ministry level key leader engagements (KLE) to establish cooperation and buy-in related to US policy objectives or coalition-level initiated SFA development goals and objectives. Core questions in policy development may include:

- What is the human capital capacity and education level in current and projected leaders (and their staff) for strategy, policy and planning? What gaps exist that need to be addressed over the long-run to adequately produce a NSS, NDS and other plans without coalition or U.S. SFA and advising? Such factors as demographics and literacy to include influencing target audiences are critical.

- If coalition or U.S. operations and planning need to be fused or integrated with HN strategic or operational planning, how will this be achieved in terms of skill-building, partnering and empowerment of the correct policy/planning leaders in the ministry or military staff organizations?

- Are the respective ministry’s strategy, policy, and planning efforts in support of the partner nation’s national level strategy and policy?

- Are there established processes that support the partner nation ministry’s ability to recruit, organize, train, equip, and build sufficient capability within its respective security force?

- Is enterprise-level force management (development and integration) a core and enduring capability within the ministry?

- Does the ministry or institution (e.g. General Staff) have the capability and capacity to plan and employ their respective operating force?

- Is there a clearly articulated and published command and control policy? How does it clarify senior leader ability to direct and employ deadly force? Does it clarify this connection and process from the HN leader / president, down through the ministry, and to subordinate commanders?

- Does the ministry have a published organizational manual that clearly articulates roles, functions and coordinating tasks to all aspects / offices of the institution? Does this organization and functions manual articulate the differences between the ministry, military staffs (e.g. a General Staff), military services or branches, subordinate organizations and institutions (personnel, training, logistics, etc.) and the operational commands and units?
Chapter 7
Advisor Development and Pre-Deployment Considerations

7-1. Prepare the advisor and advising team before they take the reins.

a. The conduct of Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations is an emerging topic/experience for many members of the General Purpose Force (GPF). Many institutional advisors are sent into theater without a solid definition or understanding of SFA, let alone how to develop an FSF at the institutional level. Pre-deployment training should include a clear definition of SFA as well as an immersion in the existing, though limited, doctrine and resources associated with SFA. This pre-deployment cycle should also include DOTMLPF/Force Management training in order to provide a solid foundation for FSF development at the institutional level.

b. Likewise, it is uncommon that advisors are prepared, trained and deployed in the team structures they will be operating within in the OE. Advisors should understand the implications of this. In the long-run, advising teams ought to train and deploy as units (in limited cases, this is happening in some SFA missions).

c. Most existing pre-deployment training already includes basic cultural training; however, more comprehensive, in-depth training is appropriate. We discuss specific areas in the next section of this guide.

d. Advisors would also benefit from some other forms of advisor-specific training. For example, many advisors arrived in theater without an operational understanding of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), or other developmental funding programs, which were available in theater. Many advisors also recommended deployment training on negotiation, diplomacy, and influence tactics. Of note, after action reports (AARs) from key leader engagements (KLEs) include a wealth of information in some of these areas. A broader knowledge base of micro and macroeconomic concepts related to stability operations adds value to a senior advisor’s ability to advise and assist respective counterparts.

e. In some cases, the pre-deployment cycle has missed some basic, yet crucial training. The advisors from one service, for example, who have orders to operate in another service’s environment (e.g. a US Navy or Air force officer expected to assist with HN army development in coordination with US army units) would benefit from basic training on the latter service’s structures, processes, terms, etc. Many advisors with no previous staff experience could benefit from a General Staff training course. Furthermore, some of the individual augmentees bypass the pre-deployment training and arrive in theater without even a basic understanding of their job and environment. Such minor training deficiencies can make a new arrival less effective for the first month in theater.

f. Where possible, advisors should also have the opportunity to visit the OE before their deployment, as part of their “work-ups” or training. Advisors from European countries, for example, have been sent to OEs like Afghanistan to receive updated briefings on the strategic picture, the role of advisors in current
command structures, and some of the major priorities/challenges in the OE. This would help make their skill-building and other training more relevant and focused.

g. Senior advisors should have standard tour lengths (~1 year) with up to 30 days for transition amongst advisors in order to keep progress moving. Standardization should occur in turnovers and transition with checklists and a database for passing the necessary information and lessons learned.

7-2. Recognize your weaknesses and get help

a. The U.S. military indoctrination and training programs typically teach service members to ‘improvise, adapt, and overcome’ when challenged with complex problems in austere environments. This flexible, adaptive, and hard-charging attitude moves service members to develop their own solutions when the situation demands one despite limited resources. This is necessary during kinetic military operations, especially when a unit’s survival or a critical mission is at stake. It may also be useful in an SFA operation severely limited by time, resources, and other constraints. However, service members need to recognize when a ‘can-do,’ hard-charging attitude will generate a solid solution and when the same attitude will result in a short-term solution, which is counterproductive to the mission. Ambitious behavior can produce both good and bad solutions depending upon the circumstances, the technical expertise of the service member, the mission objectives, and the mission constraints.

b. For example, institutional advisors’ tasks may include developing military institutions responsible for Force Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition, just like the institutions at the Pentagon, which perform these same functions for DoD. However, military personnel deployed as institutional level advisors usually do not have the type of experience or training needed to fully understand many of these functions. Most of these officers have experience commanding operational military units, with little experience in the operation of US DoD high-level institutions. Thus, expecting them to help the FSF build an institution that develops force modernization plans, budgeting plans, and acquisition processes is unrealistic when they are unfamiliar with the existing DoD structures and procedures themselves.

c. The lack of US joint doctrine on institutional level SFA further exacerbates such gaps. No written guidance, task lists, and standards for building FSF institutions exist. While the advisor’s motivation and ingenuity may eventually lead to a final product, the lack of such tools can make the process inefficient and affect the quality of the final product.

d. Therefore, the advisor must recognize when he and his team do not possess the knowledge and skills necessary to help their counterpart develop a capable and enduring institution. The end product does not have to be perfect and it does not have to look like a US institution; nevertheless, a failure to properly develop institutions at the senior levels can have far-reaching, long lasting consequences on the FSF and the HN. Plenty of experts and resources for this type of development exist within the USG and among the coalition nations.

e. For example, the Department of Defense has established the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program to provide U.S. civilian expertise and experience for ministerial and institutional advising. These are in many cases U.S. DoD civilians with experience in the types of institutions and functions (policy development, finance, acquisition, personnel management, etc.) that HN ministries and institutions require to be successful. This is a program, which has been tested in the Afghanistan OE, and
may be available in the future in other OEs. Additionally, the U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), is a program that provides strategic and operational advice to HNs as well as coalition and U.S. advisors, on how to build enduring security institutions. They have experience with this work in over 20 countries of the world, many of which will be similar to current and future OEs.

f. Thus, if an advisor (or a commander overseeing advisors) is not getting the experts or the resources he needs to produce a decent product, he should find a way to get them and/or communicate his needs to his chain-of-command. Higher headquarters may turn down his requests, but he should still make the effort.

g. The advisor needs to balance the need to ‘figure out solutions’ with the need to get the appropriate expertise and resources needed to produce a suitable product. The best balance will likely depend upon the political, physical, security, and technological limitations associated with the mission; however, ‘just figuring it out’ should not be the sole modus operandi for institutional advisors. Enduring change often demands complicated solutions; thus, the advisor should seek the best expertise and resources when feasible. The job of an institutional advisor is far too important to let a military ego get in the way of proper task completion.
Chapter 8
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