Ministerial-Level Advisor
Training Effectiveness Study
Phase I Initial Impressions October 2010

Analytical Support for the Warfighter

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**Background**

In order to better support Security Force Assistance (SFA) operational requirements across the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), JCISFA will publish a Ministerial Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study in May 2011. Specifically, the framework of the study will highlight lessons, best practices, capability requirements related to US civilian and US military Ministerial Level Advisors supporting partner nation ministries of defense (MoD), ministries of interior (MoI) and others as required. The purpose of the study is to shape and influence US joint doctrine and future concepts related to Ministerial Level Advising.

During the course of the study’s research and analysis, JCISFA will routinely publish Initial Impressions and rapidly disseminate observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) related to key focus areas and specific operating environments. Although not conclusive, releasing initial impressions and OIL throughout the study’s process sustains knowledge development and decision support requirements for joint operating and generating forces.

This document serves as Phase I Initial Impressions in support of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSCT-A). In June 2010, at the request of Commander NTM-A/CSTC-A, the JCISFA deployed a collection and analysis team to the Afghanistan Theater of Operation (ATO) to capture observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) and best practices from currently serving senior military Ministerial-Level Advisors within the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior (MoD and MoI). The intent of these efforts is to improve capabilities and future training efforts. The framework of the JCISFA support to NTM-A/CSTC-A consisted of interviews, data collection and operational assistance in lessons learned program development within NTM-A/CSTC-A.

**Training Effectiveness Study Key tasks:**

- Conduct interviews with NTM-A/CSTC-A outgoing senior military Ministerial advisors.
- Assist the NTM-A/CSTC-A in developing an enduring lessons learned program and process for incoming and outgoing Ministerial-level advisors and key organizational functions.
- Support the COMISAF COIN Training Guidance (dated Nov 2009) as it relates to Ministerial-level advisors operating in the ATO.
- Identify capability requirements to support Ministerial Advisors reach-back support and analysis.
- Draft and publish Ministerial Training Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial Impressions: Late August 2010.
- Publish final Ministerial Training Effectiveness Study (May 2011).
• Integrate study findings across joint DOTMLPF-P domains to include ongoing Advisor pre-deployment training programs as well as joint and service issue resolution processes (IRP)

Figure 1 illustrates the methodology of the Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study

The JCISFA will continue to provide regular updates during the development and production of the Ministerial Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study. Those seeking to provide additional observations and recommendations (O&R) concerning Ministerial Level advising are encouraged to submit them in the Ministerial Advisor Community of Interest (CoI) on the JCISFA website: https://jcisfa.jcs.mil.
Executive Summary

The intent of Phase I initial impressions is to provide rapid support to the Warfighter. In parallel, these insights serve as part of a broader Ministerial-Level Advisor Training Effectiveness Study, which JCISFA will publish in the spring of 2011. These observations and insights may support planning and decision-making within the NTM-A/CSTC-A as well as joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) organizations responsible for force generation supporting the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission. Specifically, this report addresses contemporary issues and senior leader perspectives within the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial-Level Advisor program to include prospective gaps across joint DOTMLPF-P domains. The following illustrates the NTM-A/CSTC-A mission.

“NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with key stakeholders, generates and sustains the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity in order to enable accountable Afghan-led security.”

Senior level Advisors supporting the development of Afghan ministries provide critical roles in helping the United States and the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) achieve national objectives within Afghanistan. As a core function within the NTM-A/CSTC-A, senior Advisors support and influence capability development across two primary Afghan ministries: the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

Primarily, Afghan MoD and MoI provide an executive role and function in order to administer the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) policy, recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and building ANA and ANP capabilities. These capabilities provide the nation of Afghanistan with capacity to meet local and regional security requirements. In parallel, the Afghan MoD and MoI must influence and shape local and regional political decisions, plan and execute strategically, assess readiness levels, conduct reviews and analysis, as well as forecast and budget ANA/ANP fiscal requirements.

These complex roles and functions within the Afghan ministries require skilled Senior Advisors capable of adapting culturally as well as operating functionally as subject matter experts (SME) within their respective ministry counterpart’s role and function. Within this framework, the JCISFA conducted Senior Advisor interviews and analysis across the NTM-A/CSTC-A in order to gauge senior Advisor capability requirements to support pre-deployment training and selection methodologies. Two sections provide organization for these initial impressions. The first deals with findings within Ministerial-Level Advisor Training. The second focuses on potential issues within Ministerial-Level Advisor Training.

Ministerial-Level Advisor Findings

- Interviews and surveys revealed that no formal pre-deployment training exists that prepares senior military officers to be Ministerial-Level Advisors.
- Interviews and surveys revealed that there is no standardized transition process between incoming and outgoing Ministerial-Level Advisors.
• There is no enduring capability to collect, analyze and integrate Ministerial advisor lessons learned in NTM-A/CSTC-A.
• A majority of the advisors interviewed/surveyed felt that the recent integration of support staff functions into the DCOMs has been a valuable first step towards improving Ministerial development capability.
• Personnel coming into theater and performing primary or additional duties as advisors are not receiving requisite advisor skills training.
• Senior Advisors interviews focused on how Ministerial developmental goals are established and evaluated/assessed. Almost all advisors interviewed/surveyed stated that the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial Development Plan (MDP) process has been an effective tool in establishing goals and coordinating efforts across multiple functional areas.
• Senior Advisors interviewed/surveyed expressed that coordinating, conducting and reconciling travel with their counterparts is an extremely difficult and frustrating process.

Ministerial-Level Advisor Potential Issues

• Overall, the majority of Ministerial-Level Advisors interviewed/surveyed expressed support for the AFPAK Hands program.
• Many of those interviewed/surveyed had comments and recommendations on the types of skill sets required for Ministerial advisors and on how joint force providers should identify, assign, and track future advisors.
• A great deal of observations and insights were collected regarding the Afghans’ abilities to govern/sustain themselves and effectively deal with corruption.

Core DOTMLPF-P Implications

**Doctrine:** Revise SFA doctrine across the services and joint domains to provide enduring concepts to support Ministry level (i.e. Ministry of Interior MOI, Ministry of Defense MOD, etc) development of roles and functions. See also, **Policy Implications**

**Training:** The NTM-A/CSTC-A/CSTCA serves as an operational level Joint Task Force (JTF): as such, CONUS-based joint force generation (JFORGEN) collective training programs and centers (i.e. JWFC, BCTP, JCOA, JCISFA, etc) should institute and resource ministry level specific staff assistance visits (SAV) to support Senior Advisor and staff specific training and integration.

**Leader Development and Education:** JFORGEN training developers (e.g. JCISFA, JKDDC, etc) develop and resource online and distributive learning (DL) courseware to support Senior Advisor and leader development (e.g. Senior Military Advisor Training Course - Advisor 501), Understanding Roles of Ministerial-Level Advisors (e.g. Advisor Strategic Considerations), or Senior Advisor Functional area development (e.g. departmental roles and functions, recruiting, acquisition, etc.).

**Personnel:** Deployment orders for Ministerial-Level Advisors must clearly state and describe pre-deployment training requirements (i.e. Senior Military Advisor Training Course - Advisor 501).
Manning Documents (JMD) should clearly reflect skills and attribute requirements for each senior level Advisor position within operational level SFA equivalent joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

**Policy:** Operationalize CJCSM 3150-25 Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) in order to better support the joint operating force (Warfighter). In concept, direct the integration of the JLLP within joint command and control (C2) doctrine.
Section 1:

Advisor Training Effectiveness

This section provides the framework and develops the issue(s)/finding(s) that are the primary focus of the study, specifically, Ministerial-Level Advisor requirements, capabilities and training effectiveness. Additionally, these issues represent the key issues that NTM-A/CSTC-A, in concert with JCISFA, can have the most immediate and near-term impact on resolving.

Topic 1.1: No formal strategic/Ministerial-Level Advisor pre-deployment training.

Discussion: Interviews and surveys revealed that no formal pre-deployment training exists that prepares senior military officers to function as Ministerial-Level Advisors. After selection, most advisors attended a weeklong combat readiness center (CRC) program, but this only focused on basic “survival skills” and administrative requirements for deployment. Generally, those interviewed/surveyed felt that a senior level educational foundation (such as SSC/War College, Civilian Graduate-level degrees) and work experiences (such as higher-level Joint/DoD assignments) were helpful, but that more focused training is required. Most conducted their own preparations by seeking reference materials through online searches or through personal recommendations, (some commonly stated examples included Steve Coll's: “Ghost Wars,” Greg Mortenson’s: “Three Cups of Tea” and the Center for Army Lessons Learned – CALL Handbook: “The First One-Hundred Days”).

The following is a list of topics that advisors felt should be included in pre-deployment training (or at a minimum, provided as a type of “read-ahead” prior to arrival in theater):

- Incorporate current National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and appropriate service doctrine into pre-deployment training.
- Incorporate current Department of State (DoS) and NATO policy, guidance and goals into pre-deployment training.
- Incorporate latest COIN doctrine and policy (specifically, the recommendation was made that all senior advisors should go through the CTC-A COIN Academy. The NTM-A/CSTC-A should dedicate/allocate time for this to happen.
- Require Senior Advisors to review the NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Brief, Campaign Plan and the Program Budget Process.
- Include Afghan Ministerial situation updates – includes overview of Afghan systems, doctrine, key personalities/stakeholders, national goals and internal structure and roles of the Afghan MoD and MoI.
• Include cultural considerations – history, customs, courtesies, standards, communication/basic language, ethnic issues, etc.

**Recommendations:** Establish a standardized pre-deployment preparation process for Ministerial-level advisors (both military and civilian). The process should properly sequence and balance pre-deployment training and post arrival, “in-theater” training. Specific recommendations include:

• Develop and provide a standardized list of specific Ministerial-Level reference materials and suggested reading for advisors upon formal selection. Direct selected Advisors to the JCISFA website as part of their assignment orders.

• Develop additional online resources to assist Ministerial-level advisors; includes orientations to Security Force Assistance/basic advisor skills and senior-level Ministerial advising.

• Influence the development of an actual on-site training course for Ministerial-level advisors. OSD recently completed a seven-week training session (May/June 2010) for civilian Ministerial-Level Advisors. This seven-week training course could potentially serve as a model for a standardized course for both civilian and military Ministerial advisors.

• Encourage branch-specific training that could augment/compliment a standardized Ministerial-level advisor course. Specifically, some advisors whose positions require certain functional skills (Finance, IG, etc) in order to effectively interact with their counterparts, could benefit from more focused training provided from their branch.

• Time should be allocated for incoming Ministerial-level advisors to attend the one-week CTC-A COIN Academy: COIN Leader’s Course as part of their in processing and transition.

• As part of the expansion of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Advisor Course from two to five days and assuming mandatory attendance from Senior Advisors, NTM-A/CSTC-A should:
  
  o Integrate more of the topics recommended by experienced advisors into the curriculum.

  o Continue to work with JCISFA to ensure proper sequencing of course curriculum with any pre-deployment training and/or orientations conducted.

  o Continue to update the course curriculum with current and relevant information based on; an ongoing lessons learned collection and analysis process.

**DOTMLPF-P Implications:**

**Training:** The NTM-A/CSTC-A/CSTCA serves as an operational level Joint Task Force (JTF): as such, CONUS-based joint force generation (JFORGEN) collective training programs (i.e. JWFC, BCTP, JCISFA, etc) should institute and resource ministry level specific staff assistance visits (SAV) to support Senior Advisor and staff specific training and integration.
**Leader Development and Education:** JFORGEN training developers (e.g. JKDDC, JCISFA, etc) develop and resource online and distributive learning (DL) courseware to support leader development related to Senior Advisor Basics (e.g. Senior Advisor 101), Understanding Roles of Ministerial-Level Advisors (e.g. Advisor Strategic Considerations), or Senior Advisor Functional area development (e.g. departmental roles and functions, recruiting, acquisition, etc.).

**Personnel:** Deployment orders for Ministerial-Level Advisors must clearly state and describe pre-deployment training requirements. Joint Manning Documents (JMD) should clearly reflect skills and attribute requirements for each senior level Advisor position within operational level SFA equivalent joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

**Discussion:** Interviews and surveys revealed that there is no standardized transition process between incoming and outgoing Ministerial-level advisors. The nature of existing transition periods range from, no transition, (based on some advisors filling vacant positions) to transitions occurring over multiple weeks (based on BOG and assignment dates). The quality of the transition period often depends on the personal motivations of the outbound advisor. Specifically, select outgoing advisors contacted their replacement (incoming advisor) and provided extensive continuity packages once in country. However, this was not due to any type of command-directed, specified transition standards. The lack of established transition standards prevents the effective documentation and transfer of critical information from one advisor to the next.

**Recommendations:** NTM-A/CSTC-A should work to standardize outgoing/incoming advisor transition periods in order to more effectively ensure the transfer of knowledge and to minimize disruptions in advising efforts (specifically concerning counterpart relations). Specifically:

- **Establish a set transition time.** In general, most advisors interviewed stated that seven -10 days is preferred or optimal.
  - NTM-A/CSTC-A should protect this transition time period such that, any deviation from it should be by exception/command approved. This will ensure that the appropriate amount of time is available for advisors to conduct a quality transition.
  - This transition time requirement should drive arrival and departure dates of incoming/outgoing advisors. Should also take into account any other desired pre-deployment or in-theater training requirements.

- **Establish standards or guidelines for the transition period.** Should include:
  - A standardized pre-deployment package sent via email prior to arrival, introducing the incoming senior advisor to the outgoing senior advisor and the command. This could include the latest NTM-A/CSTC-A command brief and any areas of special emphasis/consideration that the command would like the incoming senior advisor to focus on prior to arrival. Additionally, it should allow the outgoing advisor to communicate any recommendations (for example, cultural readings or human terrain concerns).
  - Such guidelines should include checklists of key events/actions that must take place during the established transition period (such as introductions to key stakeholders and systems, review of command priorities, assessments, etc).
  - Standard continuity packages. This may include administrative type background information, but specifically, should provide information that articulates the goals and tasks associated with developing Ministerial systems and capabilities for a given functional area.
A formal out-brief between incoming/outgoing senior advisors and the command, ensuring that senior Advisors have completed all required tasks.

- Establish a formal end-of-tour AAR requirement (standardized format). The outgoing senior advisor should be required to complete and submit an AAR prior to an approved release from the command.
  - Implement an enduring, formal collection process that promotes the collection, analysis and documentation of Ministerial advisor observations, insights and lessons.
  - Requires the formal passing of information between the incoming and outgoing senior advisor. Also, provides NTM-A/CSTC-A with valuable oversight of the Ministerial advisor program.
  - Could be included as a part of the transition checklist and out-brief.
  - In the event that an under-lap occurs between senior Advisors, ensures that the incoming senior Advisor receives some type of continuity, as opposed to just “filling a vacant position.”
  - JCISFA will work with NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ-7 to develop the standardized AAR format. AAR’s will be submitted and archived online. Standardized format will allow for enhanced search capability, as well as support the Joint development of Ministerial advising capabilities.

DOTMLPF-P Implications:

**Doctrine:** Establish joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support functional transition between incoming and outgoing Ministerial-Level Advisors. Functional transition supports relief-in-place (RIP) and transition of authority (TOA) concepts within each Ministry functional area (e.g. finance, analysis, technology, logistics, etc). The framework and employment of these TTP can occur across an array of partner nations where development is occurring.

**Leader Development and Education:** Incorporate virtual transition meetings between incoming and outgoing Ministerial-Level Advisors during pre-deployment training or programs of instruction.
Topic 1.3: No Ministerial Advisor Lessons Learned Process.

Discussion: There is no enduring capability to collect, analyze and integrate Ministerial-Level Advisor lessons learned in NTM-A/CSTC-A. Although many individual advisors have taken actions to pass lessons and information on to their replacements, there is no formalized system sponsored by the command.

Recommendations: JCISFA, in coordination with NTM-A/CSTC-A, develops and implements a Ministerial-level advisor lessons learned process. The purpose of this process is to assist NTM-A/CSTC-A with a formalized and enduring system that provides enhanced visibility on lessons learned requirements and better facilitates more rapid and effective “in-house” solutions. Additionally, the process will provide valuable and sustained lessons learned data that allows JCISFA to influence required changes across the DOTMLPF-P domains in support of the institutionalization of SFA.

- Advantages:
  - JCISFA develops and provides the lesson learned process/system. Little effort required from NTM-A/CSTC-A, other than command emphasis and administrative oversight.
  - Implementation provides the NTM-A/CSTC-A with a formalized and standardized collection and analysis process within its senior Advisor program.
  - Standardized model provides increased potential for expansion and use of the lessons learned process in other areas (example, use for operational/tactical level advisors, not just Ministerial-Level Advisors).
  - JCISFA liaison officer (LNO) available to support and facilitate the lessons learned process.

- Lessons Learned Process Overview:
  - Year/tour-based cycle - follows advisors from arrival to departure, regardless of tour length.
  - Automated and knowledge based process – conducted via the JCISFA Ministerial-Level Advisor Community of Interest (COI) within the JCISFA website.
  - Senior Advisor observations and recommendations (O&R) inputs/results archived within the Ministry Advisor COI; enhances search capability.

- Lessons Learned Process Description:
  1. Upon notification of assignment or arrival within theater, senior Advisors register within the JCISFA website as part of pre-deployment preparation, in processing or as part of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Advisor Course.
2. Senior Advisors take an initial perceptions questionnaire soon after registration. Require Senior Advisors to take the questionnaire online. Primary purpose of this questionnaire is to capture senior Advisor perspectives on how well they have been prepared to assume their assigned duties.

3. The JCISFA conducts quarterly senior Advisor questionnaires/surveys during their tour (mid-term approach and more extensive).

4. At the end of tour, 30-60 days prior to departure, senior Advisors complete an end-of-tour after action review (AAR) in order to receive a theater release memorandum. The AAR will be in a standardized format where each senior Advisor will complete the AAR via the JCISFA web-based Ministerial-Level Advisor COI.

- Additional Capabilities:
  - The JCISFA web-base Ministerial-Level Advisor COI provides advisors with ability to submit observations and recommendations (O&R) at any time, and provides access to greater (and continually growing) geographically and functionally aligned COIs (e.g. CENTCOM COI, AFRICOM COI, US Authorities COI).
  - As part of advisor COI, outgoing advisors encouraged to be mentors.

- Recommended Way Ahead - Implement an enduring lessons learned program and process within the NTM-A/CSTC-A:
  - Achieved an initial operating capability (IOC) in conjunction with NTM-A/CSTC-A’s 16-17 August 2010 Advisor Course.
  - Achieve full operating capability (FOC) in September/October 2010.

Figure 2 illustrates a methodology for carrying out a lessons learned process.
Figure 2 Lesson Learned Process

**DOTMLPF-P Implications:**

**Doctrine:** Revise SFA doctrine across the services and joint domains to provide enduring concepts to support roles and functions development within Ministries (i.e. Ministry of Interior MOI, Ministry of Defense MOD, etc). See also, **Policy Implications.** Provide expanded doctrinal concepts within Joint Publication, (JP) 3-33 Joint Task Force (JTF) to support functional type JTF headquarters (e.g. MNSTC-I, CSTC-A, etc.).

**Training:** The NTM-A/CSTC-A/CSTCA serves as an operational level Joint Task Force (JTF); as such, CONUS-based joint force generation (JFORGEN) collective training programs (i.e. JWFC, BCTP, JCISFA, etc) should institute and resource ministry level specific staff assistance visits (SAV) to support mission specific training and integration.

**Policy:** Operationalize CJCSM 3150-25 Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) in order to better support the joint operating force (Warfighter). Direct the integration of the JLLP concepts and principles within joint command and control (C2) doctrine.
**Topic 1.4: NTM-A/CSTC-A Staff Organization.**

**Discussion:** A majority of the senior Advisors interviewed/surveyed felt that the recent integration of support staff functions into various Deputy Commanders (DCOM) has been a valuable first step towards improving Afghan Ministerial development capability, although there is still more to be done (as one advisor stated, “NTM-A/CSTC-A has yet to reach a steady state”).

Figure 3 illustrates the current organization construct within NTM-A/CSTC-A

**Figure 3, Organization of NTM-A/CSTC-A**

The following are specific examples of problems and issues requiring resolution or mitigation.

- The observation was made that the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff organization, despite recent changes, is still organized primarily to support institutional development (force generation focused) rather than Afghan Ministerial development. This organizational mindset tends to focus a majority of staff efforts on building/expanding ANSF capacities, and thus, fails to realize the importance of developing concurrent Afghan Ministerial capabilities, which are critical in order to assist in developing an Afghan process. Additionally, this often fosters an environment where the command does not want to hear certain information and recommendations from Afghan Ministerial-Level Advisors because it may not coincide with or support the US/Coalition-supported institutional development effort.
Recent growth and additions to the NTM-A/CSTC-A staff have created new issues, requirements and distracters that have negatively impacted Afghan Ministerial development and the ability of senior Advisors to effectively accomplish their mission. NTM-A/CSTC-A’s expansion, including more Joint/NATO participation and additional general officer billets, has raised the requirement for more internal support staff. This has diverted more attention away from Afghan Ministerial development.

Building on the previous point, all those interviewed felt strongly that senior Advisors must be fully dedicated to Afghan Ministerial development, as opposed to having dual advisor and staff roles/responsibilities. Coupled with a requirement to develop their counterparts is a need to develop Afghan Ministerial systems and processes, further highlighting the necessity to focus solely on advising. Additionally, these senior Advisors expressed that “part-time advisors” are also more of a detriment than a benefit. These types of advisors normally tend to focus more of their attention on the staff side and do minimal advising. Furthermore, when they do attempt to advise counterparts, they tend to cause confusion, and even distrust, because of a failure to build and sustain an ongoing rapport with the Afghans.

The NTM-A/CSTC-A command should recognize the roles and value of dedicated Ministerial-Level Advisors. Not only do Ministerial-Level Advisors act as liaisons between the US/Coalition command and their counterparts, but they also provide a capability to achieve situational awareness that many advisors felt/expressed was not being fully utilized. One senior Advisor termed it as “Reverse Atmospherics,” or, an effective ability to evaluate/use partner perceptions and desires to frame a US/Coalition approach, as opposed to “forcing our will on the Afghans.”

Recommendations: NTM-A/CSTC-A should continue its efforts to align staff functions with Afghan Ministerial developmental goals and requirements. This may include:

- An overall understanding and agreement of what the command expects from its Ministerial-Level Advisors. Specifically, further development of the Afghan Ministerial campaign plan and a clear understanding of the desired end state will make it easier to identify the need for dedicated advisors and the appropriate level of staff support.

- Periodic troop-to-task analysis/reviews: Building on the previous point, NTM-A/CSTC-A may want to consider conducting periodic troop-to-task reviews in order to determine if the advisor/staff organization correctly supports the desired development of Afghan Ministerial leaders, systems and processes.

- Implement a lessons learned program within NTM-A/CSTC-A to support development and integration of lessons learned and best practices. From this effort, prospective capability issues will surface, which the organization can institute an issues resolution process (IPR) to bring about resolution or mitigation. For those NTM-A/CSTC-A issues having institutional DOTMLPF-P implications across the joint force – the JCISFA will facilitate integration within the joint and issue resolution processes.
Organizational Inspection Program (OIP): NTM-A/CSTC-A may consider developing and implementing an OIP in order to improve advisor/staff issues and other procedures. Specifically, an OIP may assist with framing or identifying potential issues:

- What functions are lacking and/or suffering in effectiveness due to dual roles in advising and staffing responsibilities?
- What additional advisor/staff capabilities may be required?

**DOTMLPF-P Implications:**

**Doctrine:** Revise SFA doctrine across the services and joint domains to provide enduring concepts to support roles and functions development within Ministries (i.e. Ministry of Interior MOI, Ministry of Defense MOD, etc). See also, Policy Implications. Provide expanded doctrinal concepts within Joint Publication, (JP) 3-33 Joint Task Force (JTF) to support functional type JTF headquarters (e.g. MNSTC-I, CSTC-A, etc.).

**Training:** The NTM-A/CSTC-A/CSTCA serves as an operational level Joint Task Force (JTF): as such, CONUS-based joint force generation (JFORGEN) collective training programs (i.e. JWFC, BCTP, JCISFA, etc) should institute and resource ministry level specific staff assistance visits (SAV) to support mission specific training and integration.

**Policy:** Operationalize CJCSM 3150-25 Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) in order to better support the joint operating force (Warfighter). Direct the integration of the JLLP concepts and principles within joint command and control (C2) doctrine.
Topic 1.5: Advisor Training Course

Discussion: Personnel coming into theater and performing primary or additional duties as advisors are not receiving requisite advisor skills training. Of the 26 newly arrived advisors that attended the NTM-A/CSTC-A one ½-day advisor course, conducted 22-23 June 2010, only five had received previous advisor training at one of the service provided advisor training centers. The JCISFA-administered interviews and surveys with outgoing Afghan Ministerial advisors revealed that they had not received any formal advisor training prior to arrival in theater, with the exception of self-study. All of those interviewed, however, indicated that they felt advisor training prior to arrival or prior to the beginning of their assignment would have greatly improved their effectiveness as a Ministerial-Level Advisor.

Recommendations: The NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-7, Education Division create an expanded five-day advisor training course to be presented to all advisors, to include the senior civilian Ministerial-Level Advisors that have attended the MoDA training course, and all personnel that will be performing additional duties as an advisor (this could also include those personnel designated to work with a partner unit). Recommendations also include that all advisors currently assigned to NTM-A/CSTC-A that have not previously attended advisor training should also attend the CJ-7 advisor course.

• Advisor Training Course Advantages:
  o All personnel receive a known advisor curriculum.
  o Advisors gain a better understanding of the command structure and the resources available to them as advisors.
  o All advisors should register and participate in the JCISFA Advisor COI, which will provide them with an ability to collect and share advisor best practices and lessons learned.
  o JCISFA LNO is available to support the Advisor Training Course.

• Advisor Training Process Overview:
  o JCISFA drafts five-day curriculum.
  o JCISFA provides materials and resources.
  o JCISFA supports development and initial course delivery.

• Completed Tasks:
  o JCISFA drafted a five-day curriculum and presented to CSTC-A, CJ-7, Education Division and to Dr. Kem.
  o JCISFA provided material references, research, and subject matter expert contacts to NTM-A/CSTC-A, CJ-7, Education Division, in order to support the course.
• Additional Capabilities:
  
  o JCISFA web presence provides access to advisor materials, research and formal request for information (RFI) capability, and subject matter experts. The JCISFA web-base Ministerial-Level Advisor COI provides advisors with ability to submit observations and recommendations (O&R) at any time, and provides access to greater (and continually growing) geographically and functionally aligned COIs (e.g. CENTCOM COI, AFRICOM COI, US Authorities COI).

• Recommended Way Ahead – NTM-A/CSTC-A develops and executes a five-day advisor course based on a JCISFA recommended POI (See Annex A of this report).

**DOTMLPF-P Implications:**

None
**Topic 1.6: Ministerial Development Goals and Assessments**

**Discussion:** Senior Advisors interviews focused on how Ministerial developmental goals are established and evaluated/assessed. Almost all advisors interviewed/surveyed stated that the NTM-A/CSTC-A Ministerial Development Plan (MDP) process has been an effective tool in establishing goals and coordinating efforts across multiple functional areas. In order to support this, many advisors expressed the importance of establishing specific lines of operation (LOO) or effort (LOE) within their assigned Afghan Ministerial functional section. However, despite these positive steps, interviews suggest the following issues require resolution/mitigation:

- Many Afghan Ministerial Advisors felt the primary focus of the MDP process is on quantitative results, which do not always match qualitative development of capabilities required in a Ministerial environment.

- It is essential to have Afghan participation in the development of long-term goals.

- Assessments must be honest and realistic. Some senior Advisors are hesitant to show progression in Capability Milestone (CM) assessments, often due to an over-application of US standards. Specifically, arriving advisors tend to adjust targets based on their own experiences, as opposed to the guidelines of the overall Ministerial Development Plan. Also, at times, advisors become hesitant to change ratings due to the need to “overly defend” an upgrade. According to one advisor, a CM3 rating means that they cannot function at all on their own; however, this is not always the case. They can function, just not to US standards/expectations.

**Recommendations:** NTM-A/CSTC-A should:

- Continue to work towards a realistic balance between US/Coalition expectations and “Afghan good enough.” Advisors must tie realistic metrics to desired end states. Honest assessments must take into account Afghan standards and must allow for realistic progression.

- Continue to integrate Afghan counterparts into the development of Ministerial goals; overall, it needs to be an Afghan process. Additionally, there must be effective efforts to wean counterparts from the mindset that “NTM-A/CSTC-A will fix their problems.”

- NTM-A/CSTC-A may want to consider including a block of instruction in its advisor course that focuses on Ministerial development goals and proper assessments of progress.

**DOTMLPF-P Implications:**

**Doctrine:** Revise joint doctrine to reflect how the US joint operating force can go about determining, evaluating, and assessing foreign security force (FSF) force operating capabilities (FOC). FOCs define what the FSF must do (not “how” to do it) relative to their own operating environment – FSF-FOCs do not reflect US standards or an equivalent operational requirements. Revise joint doctrine to reflect and
illustrate concepts for establishing LOOs/LOEs within Ministerial-Level functional domains to support campaign like approaches to meet specific Ministerial developmental end states.

**Leader Development and Education:** Educate senior and mid-level officers to include civilians during senior service colleges (SSC), staff colleges, and civilian courses in “how to think” about building partnership [security] capacity (BPC) through security force assistance (SFA). Development of a partner nation’s security capacity will normally require resident US operating and generating force like capabilities within theater.
Topic 1.7: Advisor Travel Process.

Discussion: Afghan Ministerial-Level Advisors interviewed/surveyed expressed that coordinating, conducting and reconciling travel with their counterparts is an extremely difficult and frustrating process. The issues can primarily be broken down into two categories:

- External Travel: Many Ministerial advisors have the requirement to travel outside of Afghanistan with their counterparts. Unfortunately, there is no centralized or standardized process or procedures for doing so. Instead, a very confusing process of trying to navigate through local travel agents also makes it difficult to file claims through the US travel and finance system. Additionally, the purchase of airline tickets often requires obtaining large sums of cash in order to make transactions in unsecure off-post locations. The bureaucracy of diverging two very different systems (the US automated process and the Afghan manual process) often causes undue stress on the advisor and detracts from the mission.

- Internal Travel: Advisors also expressed that conducting travel within Afghanistan with their counterparts was difficult due to conflicting policies and procedures. Specifically, US/Coalition scheduling requirements and force protection guidelines tend to hinder movement. One advisor expressed the belief that there is clearly a “disconnect” between ISAF guidance on COIN and force protection rules. An example of this is a requirement to wear protective gear, even if it communicates the wrong message while traveling with counterparts. Overall, there is a belief that contradictory policies and guidelines prevent advisors from getting the job done and makes being credible and effective with their counterparts difficult to achieve.

Recommendations: NTM-A/CSTC-A should take steps to formalize the advisor/counterpart travel process. This is also a good example of the ability to identify shortfalls in support and properly align the staff or other resources to address requirements. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A should:

- Consider establishing or coordinating for a US endorsed, “SATO-like” travel office located on Camp Eggers to support Ministerial-Level Advisors travel requirements.

- Conduct a review of existing internal travel policies and guidelines in order to determine if they contradict Ministerial development goals. The result could be special policies and guidelines established specifically for Ministerial level advisors.

DOTMLPF-P Implications:

Policy: The OSD should review and revise as necessary the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR) to support dynamic travel requirements of deployed joint operating forces.
Section 2:

Potential DOTMLPF-P Issues.

This section provides a framework of issues identified through interviews and surveys that require further collection and analysis. In most cases, they involve issues and factors that span beyond the immediate influence of NTM-A/CSTC-A or JCISFA and will require further development and/or incorporation into DOTMLPF-P development or issue resolution processes (i.e. Theater, Joint, and/or Service level resolution or mitigation).

Topic 2.1: Employment of AF/PAK Hands Personnel.

Discussion: Overall, the majority of Ministerial-Level Advisors interviewed/surveyed expressed support for the Afghanistan and Pakistan (AF/PAK) Hands or APH program and its trained personnel flowing in to support NTM-A/CSTC-A. Specifically, advisors liked the additional culture/language training and the overall emphasis on greater immersion with Afghan counterparts. However, there were some initial concerns regarding how NTM-A/CSTC-A employed APH trained personnel across NTM-A/CSTC-A:

• NTM-A/CSTC-A should assign APH trained personnel as advisors, not staff. Those interviewed felt that assigning these personnel to staff positions was a waste of their capabilities and potential.

• There may be gaps between APH training to what the Afghans want or need at the Ministerial-Level. Specifically, extensive language training is not as important in a Ministerial environment, where according to many of those interviewed; there is greater enthusiasm from Afghan counterparts to use English. Based on the Afghan’s desire to use English, it was felt that more time and specialized training could be spent on topics that have a greater influence or impact at the Ministerial-Level (e.g. functional staff processes/systems development, doctrine, etc).

• Building on the previous point, some felt that the APH immersion requirement sometimes directed the new Strategic Level Advisor away from their primary Ministerial-Level support requirements.

Recommendations: NTM-A/CSTC-A should consider these points when determining the placement and alignment of APH Hands trained personnel. As the APH program matures and more metrics are collected on the use and effectiveness of APH trained personnel, NTM-A/CSTC-A may consider submitting recommended changes/updates to the institutional training program that focus specifically on Ministerial-Level advising requirements.

DOTMLPF-P Implications:
**Leader Development and Education:** JFORGEN training developers (e.g. JKDDC, JCISFA, etc) develop and resource online and distributive learning (DL) courseware to support leader development related to Senior Advisor Basics (e.g. Senior Advisor 101), Understanding Roles of Ministerial-Level Advisors (e.g. Advisor Strategic Considerations), or Senior Advisor Functional area development (e.g. departmental roles and functions, recruiting, acquisition, etc.).

**Policy:** Align JMD requirements with Ministerial-Level Advisor and APH personnel flow to better support selection and pre-deployment training requirements.
Topic 2.2: Advisor Skills and Assignments.

Discussion: Many of those Ministerial-Level Advisors interviewed/surveyed had comments and recommendations on the types of skill sets required for Ministerial advisors and on how the US generating force (force providers) should identify, assign, and track future Advisors.

- Overall, the responses concerning the types of skills and attributes required to be an effective advisor tended to support previous studies and findings on this subject. Specifically, effective advisors tend to be those who display more flexibility, openness, better communication skills and a greater understanding of culture. For the most part, these traits apply to advisors at all levels. However, the differentiators in Ministerial-Level Advisors from other Advisors are general educational, professional skill levels, maturity, and the types of training conducted (as discussed earlier in this report).

- The selection process for Ministerial-Level Advisors does not fully take into account the desired traits and professional qualifications discussed above. The only exception to this is those selected as Advisors based on specific functional skills (for example, budget processes and Inspector General tasks). Otherwise, the services allocate most Ministerial-Level Advisor positions to different Branches for assignment through the Senior Leader Division of HRC (Note: all advisors interviewed as part of this study were US Army officers). Although officers had to meet certain prerequisite requirements, such as meeting general educational/professional steps, there was no indication from the interviews that US joint force providers used any desired advisor traits in evaluating the potential advisor’s qualifications.

- In addition, overwhelming interviews suggests that Ministerial advisors require more standardized pre-deployment training, many of those interviewed felt that the selection and assignment process should occur earlier in order to support enhanced training. Some specific recommendations included:
  - Identify Ministerial-Level Advisors no later than six months prior to deployment. Provide advisors an opportunity to permanently change of station (PCS) their families. Then conduct intensive training that includes such areas as COIN, culture and language.
  - Assigning advisors to a two-year deployment (with family PCS options and additional leave opportunities) in order to provide better continuity with counterparts.
  - Joint and Service force providers need to formalize advisor selection. Advisors should be skilled in tactical patience. Additionally, advisors should be identified far enough out to conduct standardized training (both pre-deployment and in theater).
  - Must give personnel time to invest in this training – these individuals should not have home-station distractions or be expected to “do it (prepare) all on their own time.”
• Some felt that an advisor-specific additional skill identifier (ASI) might be useful for tracking or managing those with Ministerial-Level Advisor skills. Additionally, advisors expressed that certain traits, not always realized on the surface, can have an influence on counterparts of a certain culture. Specifically in this case, advisors emphasized that Afghans respect those of greater physical stature/height, or would actually be more open about certain things with a female advisor. Although, not by any means would these be sole factors in advisor selection; but, they could be contributors in a more extensive and refined advisor selection and tracking process.

Recommendations: JCISFA continues to work with the services and SFA stakeholders to recommend and influence change in joint and Service processes for advisors are selection, training, assignment and tracking of advisors.

DOTMLPF-P Implications:

Leader Development and Education: JFORGEN training developers (e.g. JKDDC, JCISFA, etc) develop and resource online and distributive learning (DL) courseware to support Ministerial-Level Advisor and leader development (e.g. Senior Military Advisor Training Course - Advisor 501), Understanding Roles of Ministerial-Level Advisors (e.g. Advisor Strategic Considerations), or Senior Advisor Functional area development (e.g. departmental roles and functions, recruiting, acquisition, etc.).

Personnel: Deployment orders for Ministerial-Level Advisors must clearly state and describe pre-deployment training requirements. Joint Manning Documents (JMD) should clearly reflect skills and attribute requirements for each senior level Advisor position within operational level SFA equivalent joint task force (JTF) headquarters.

Policy: Align JMD requirements with Ministerial-Level Advisor and APH personnel flow to better support selection and pre-deployment training requirements.
Topic 2.3: Promoting Afghan Self Sufficiency and Dealing with Corruption.

Discussion: A great deal of observations and insights were collected regarding the Afghans’ abilities to govern/sustain themselves and abilities to effectively deal with corruption.

- In order to more rapidly achieve self-sufficiency, a true partnership must exist with the Afghans. The key to executing this partnership is effectively communicating to US/Coalition forces the need for respect, humility, and the necessity of not overly imposing our standards on the Afghans. A specific example was a case where US staff personnel did not treat Afghan MoD officials the same way they would officials at a similar level from our own DoD. An effective partnership also includes a thorough understanding of Afghan processes and capabilities. An example of this was a comment that the Afghans do not plan or execute well using PowerPoint slides; instead, they work better with written plans (e.g. US OPORD formats).

- There were differing beliefs/opinions from the advisors regarding how to best influence the achievement of self-sufficiency. On one end of the spectrum was the belief that the US/Coalition must first provide the Afghans with tangible goods in order for them to be responsive. This included the belief that the Afghans should be fully outfitted and resourced on the front end, and then shift the focus of development to sustainment and capability development. On the other end of the spectrum was the belief that the US/Coalition should never buy or provide the Afghans with anything if the intent is solely to gain favor, this will only lead to an ongoing state of Afghans taking advantage of the Advisor. Development must specifically tie resourcing considerations to stated and agreed upon goals or objectives (e.g. defined and measurable Afghan responsibilities and expectations).

- Observations suggest that the Afghans cannot fix corruption on their own. They are eager to support US/Coalition plans or methods to address it. Recommendations reflect that anything given to the Afghans that NTM-A/CSTC-A must audit or track because corruption is too prevalent. Auditing is the only effective method to prevent further corruption and misuse; by, 1) identifying where specific cases of corruption are occurring and 2) providing proof that can be used to punish those in violation.

Recommendations: NTM-A/CSTC-A should consider formalizing and documenting its standards, policies and guidelines concerning how to promote self-sufficiency and prevent corruption at the Ministerial-Level. These established standards should be part of advisor training, integrated into the Ministerial Advisor development process and communicated as part of the organization’s STRATCOM themes and messages.

DOTMLPF-P Implications:

None
Section 3

Senior Advisor Interviews

This section contains senior level perspectives from senior Advisors operating in support of the Afghan Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Afghan Army General Staff.

Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: BG MacDonald
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A
Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: Assistant Commanding General for Police Development – ACG-PD
Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010
Interviewer and Date of Interview: COL Mike Swanson, 22 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements
- Be genuine.
- Trust is key, must learn how to earn it.
  - Spending time, showing interest.
  - Outwardly displaying your trust.
- Duties /Roles
  - Three key functions:
    - Helping to organize thoughts, visions, strategy.
    - Logistics.
    - Finance.
- Previous Experience / Preparation
  - Prior work with Coalition is helpful.
  - Some language training, but more would have been helpful.
  - Three Cups of Tea.

Selection Process
- Selected because of training background and worked in the training field extensively.

Transition Process
- Transition to being effective with Afghan counterpart took 2-3 weeks.
Operating Environment
- Went from meetings with only US and not too many Coalition, to having EUPOL contractors and Afghans with headsets in their language. The Afghans are now driving those meetings.

Interaction with Other Agencies
- UNAMA
- UND
- DEA
- FBI
- DoJ

Support Required/Desired from Other Agencies
- Need better cross-talk so that everyone knows what the other is doing.

Capability Milestones and Assessments
- The assessment program stopped with Minister Atmar. He said the Afghans were going to take ownership of this process, but that only lasted about a month. Now the Minister is gone and there is no assessment process occurring.

Recommendations
1. Advisors need to know the campaign plan prior to arrival.
2. Everyone needs blackberries. There is a lot of info on computers, and when you’ve got advisors with limited access because they’re sitting in meetings, this is critical.
Advisor: COL Dreyer
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ8
Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: US Senior Advisor to both Afghan MoD Finance Chief and General Staff Budget and Finance Chief
Dates of Deployment: 22 July 2009 through 11 July 2010
Interviewer and Date of Interview: LTC Samuel Lex, 22 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements
- Evolved over time. Position is actually an Army Financial Management Branch LTC position. COL Dreyer was promoted while in the position. As part of his position with the CJ8, COL Dreyer advises both the General Staff (GS) Budget and Finance Chief as well as the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Finance Chief.
- WIAS System Tasker. Job description articulates specific qualifications required.
- Two primary requirements / functions: 1) Develop Afghan National Army Budget System, 2) Ensure soldiers are paid.
- Advisors must exhibit enhanced flexibility – the ability to read people of different cultures.
- Previous Experience / Preparation
  - Had a background as a comptroller prior to the Army merging this skill with Finance.
  - DISAM is trying to influence pre-deployment training – advisor training that focuses on Finance and Budget.

Selection Process
- Received an email from HRC/Branch that dwell time made him eligible for deployment. It was a general skill set match.

Transition Process
- Positive transition; good predecessor that put together a great continuity package. Consisted of a document that included key stakeholders, systems, assessments, which he will update for replacement.
  - Continuity package is a great tool for articulating progress of systems and effectively documenting progress.
- Lines of Effort:
  - Supported: Budget Development and Execution – capability to match resources to requirements and execute budgets.
  - Supported: Pay Modernization – enhancement of pay system to improve pay delivery to soldiers in terms of timeliness and accuracy.
Supporting: Skills/Institutional Development – capability to develop systems/school.
Supporting: Technical Development – automated payroll system.
10 day overlap with replacement is desired.
COL Dreyer has established contact via email with his replacement. He has made recommendations regarding cultural readings and human terrain concerns.

**KM Processes**
- Dynamic change has occurred in last 7 months, mainly based on a thirst for information.
- The establishment of a SharePoint site in the CJ8 has been structured along the stated LOEs.

**Operating Environment / Interaction with Other Agencies**
- Good relations at the senior advisor/counterpart level. COL Dreyer has worked during his time to foster relations between NATO advisor and Afghan staffs. However, the ability to do this is often based on the style of the Afghan principal. Specifically, the principal who follows a more Soviet style will not permit subordinates to interact with NATO subordinates. The other principal, however, encourages subordinate interaction, as long as it stays within prescribed guidance/standards.
- COL Dreyer is also the Deputy CJ8; in this capacity, he has worked on the Police Development side and on internal CJ8 matters.
- Works weekly with CENTCOM – systems implementation focus.

**ACG-AD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors**
- Changes to C2 structure – DCOMs with own subordinate staffs. CJ8 interacts with all staffs.
- CJ8 has a dual-hatted role: CJ8 works for CoS, but has both a staff and advising role (which mainly equates to little time with the CoS, a lot of time with the AD).

**Support Required/Desired from Other Agencies**
- Staff Role: OSD Policy and comptrollers – concerning authorities.
- USAID: grants processes to other like agencies.
- Private Bank Interests: support services for soldiers (EFT participants = 95%).
- There is a partnership between MoD, MoF and Banks.

**Capability Milestones and Assessments**
- Ministerial Development Plan – long term focus.
- Quarterly Board.
- Process at first did not involve Afghans as participants; mainly started as an assessment of their capabilities. Increased Afghan participation likely in the future – could be developed as a partnered assessment.
- Approach has been to be transparent and share.

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<th>Recommendations</th>
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<td>1. Must give folks time to invest in this training – shouldn’t be distracted by home station things or be expected to “do it all on their own time.”</td>
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<td>2. Cultural foundation and organization of Afghans (and their goals) should be included in pre-deployment training.</td>
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<td>3. Must be dedicated time to effectively train/prepare the advisor (in both pre-deployment and in theater).</td>
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<td>4. The following qualifications and experiences would help extremely with this position:</td>
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<td>• Educational foundation (Civ and Mil) – Grad business, comptroller training.</td>
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<td>• ILE – Strategic thinking and instituting systems.</td>
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<td>• Security Assistance (SA) experience – familiarity with other forces, FMS, DISAM SA course.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Resource Management at Army HQ and Joint Staff – Broad exposure, PPBE experience.</td>
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Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: COL Kleponis
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A
Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: US Senior Advisor to the Afghan Deputy MoI for Security
Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010
Interviewer and Date of Interview: , MSG Michael Beemer, June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements
- Previous Experience / Preparation
  - Had previous deployment experience (Iraq).
  - IW background.
  - CIVMIL.
  - Joint Staff working in STABOPS.
  - Worked with the previous advisor over emails and with other peers working as advisors in the MoI.
  - Background in Anthropology was helpful.

Selection Process
- Stated that selection for this position seemed to be done prior to his coming into theater.

Transition Process
- Filled a vacant position.
- Transition to being effective with Afghan counterpart took about 30 days.

KM Processes
- Not aware of any way to locate Ministerial advisor best practices, lessons learned, or previous advisor AARs.
- No requirement to submit best practices or end-of-tour AAR.

ACG-PD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors
- ACG-PD staff supports the MoI and counterpart on all levels through the other advisors, CJ-Staffs, and other support which runs up and down through the organization.

Interaction with Other Agencies
- Most interaction runs through CJ-Staff.
- Some aspects of interaction with outside organizations like UNAMA.
Capability Milestones and Assessments
- No real role in the CM of units or functional sections.

**Recommendations**

1. Need to get better at selecting the “right person,” for advisor assignments through:
   - Psychological testing.
   - Volunteering.
   - Identifying necessary skills / attributes:
     - Knowing how to listen.
     - Having a balanced perspective.
     - Desire to learn culture / history / religion.
   - Leveraging applicable training already ongoing (SOF).
Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: COL Palgutt
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A

Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: US Senior Advisor to the Afghan MoI
Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010
Interviewer and Date of Interview: LTC Samuel Lex, 27 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements:
- Three essential elements to an effective advisor/counterpart relationship:
  • Right experience – time with OSD-P very helpful, provided useful experience with high-level government and strategy.
  • Advisor must learn to develop a personal, interconnected relationship with counterpart, regardless of personality differences.
  • Must outwardly display trust of counterpart to gain trust from counterpart.
- Noted that Afghans often respect advisors of greater physical stature. May not always be possible, but could be a consideration in certain special situations.
  - Previous Experience / Preparation
    • CRC pre-deployment training.
    • Knew his predecessor and started an email dialogue early.
    • Most beneficial thing he received was a list of personal characteristics of the Minister he would be advising. This allowed him to work a personal strategy prior to arrival.
    • More information on the MoI would have been helpful.
    • Wished he could have had more cultural training.

Selection Process
- Nominated by Branch/SLD. Approved by CSTC-A Commander (MG Formica).

Transition
- Had a five-day transition with his predecessor.
  o Consisted of an introduction to key players and a review of the battle rhythm.
- No continuity book received, although there were electronic files passed.
- Plans to give his replacement a DVD with important documents/files.
- Took about three months to become truly effective with his counterpart.

KM Processes
- ISAF Cdr depended on COL Palgutt for MoI atmospherics.
- Instituted a daily reports process (on CENTRIX) and consolidated files on SharePoint.
CIDNE is used for KLEs.
- Transitioned at one point from weekly to daily reports, however daily reports often tend to force people to write a diary as opposed to just providing important SIGACTS.
- MoI Senior Advisor Huddle provides a good forum for passing information.
- Has a requirement from LTG Caldwell to produce a paper. Thinks he will do it on Reverse Atmospherics.

**Operating Environment**
- “Adopted” the Afghan MoI CoS due to the fact that he did not have a dedicated US Military advisor.
  - CoS did have two contractor advisors, but as retired US police officers, they did not have the required executive-level experience to mentor the CoS on staff processes/systems.
  - COL Palgutt helped the CoS to develop a developmental action plan.
- The announced July 1, 2011 withdrawal has given the Afghans a more sense of urgency.

**ACG-PD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors**
- Staff reorganization has been detrimental in some ways. Used to be more closely aligned to the Ministry due to fewer US/NATO general officers. The growth of the command (NTM-A/CSTC-A), along with additional GOs, has added new added an additional layer of supervision and coordination that added to the overall increase bureaucracy, often taking the primary focus off of Ministerial development.

**Interaction with Other Agencies**
- Worked with FBI major crime TF, some UN, Embassy (RoL) and ISAF.

**Support Required/Desired from Other Agencies**
- Has talked with predecessor throughout his tour. Other mentor reach-back capability would have been helpful.

**Capability Milestones and Assessments**
- Briefs Ministerial standpoint/moving parts at the MDP process.
- MDP focused more on quantitative results, as opposed to qualitative.

**Recommendations**
1. Assessment process needs to be an Afghan process. Need to wean counterparts – Minister often tried to default to “NTM-A/CSTC-A will fix.”
2. Need to put the right people with the right skill sets with the Afghans. For example, CoS had two contractor advisors, but as retired US police officers, they did not have the required executive-level experience to mentor the CoS on staff processes/systems.
3. There must be an agreement/understanding of what is expected of an advisor.
   - Need guidance and expectations from the command.
• Need to build a trusting relationship.
• There must be an agreement of what information can be passed – releasing certain reports can ruin the trust between advisor and counterpart.
• Need open and honest communications between advisor and staff.
• Command sometimes doesn’t want to hear what advisors have to tell them. Information / recommendations from advisors need to inform the decision making process.

4. Advisors can pay dividends by providing “Reverse Atmospherics.”

5. Need to treat Afghan Ministers the same as we would our own (used example of being told to “have the Minister sign this today.” Something that wouldn’t happen within our own staffing processes).

6. Need a written plan (US OPORD format works well; Afghans don’t identify well with PowerPoint slides).

7. Would be beneficial to identify other assignments where the advisor experience could be used.

8. Need to tie development and growth to the campaign plan / end-state.
   • Need to ensure that training is synchronized with desired growth and capability. Look at leadership training curriculum; solely needed. Must be properly analyzed. People often get hung up on time requirements, and not the required curriculum to effectively produce a leader.
Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: LTC Tracy  
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A  
**Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment:** US Senior Advisor to MoD Personnel Education and General Staff (G1) for Personnel  
**Dates of Deployment:** 2009-2010  
**Interviewer and Date of Interview:** LTC Samuel Lex, 24 June 2010

**Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:**

**Ministerial Advisor Requirements**
- Personnel who rigidly apply doctrine have a difficult time as advisors.
- LTC Tracy established four lines of efforts for his section:
  - Leadership Development.
  - Personnel management.
  - Recruiting.
  - Retention.
- Proved that he could produce results, be trusted and that he understood Afghan systems/processes.
  Examples:
  - Facilitated the implementation of a personnel management system.
  - Executed a true conference.
  - Integrated the “Cadet Lottery” system, effectively getting Afghan lieutenants out into the field.

**Skills and Knowledge**
- Ministerial-Level advisor should possess the following skills/experiences:
  - Military experience.
  - Problem solving skills.
  - Creativity – ability to express options effectively to the Afghans.
  - Must be human and open.

**Selection Process**
- Originally on a WIAS tasking to be an XO for the ACG-AD.
- Upon arrival, transferred to Recruiting Assistance Team Chief. Within month, transferred to Chief of Personnel, ANA.

**Transition Process**
- Replaced someone that had only been in the job two months.

**KM Processes**
- Weekly synchronization meeting and reports used.
- Internal accomplishments:
• Section goal chart – provides to ACG-AD.
• Use of SharePoint.
• No requirement for an end-of-tour AAR.

Operating Environment
- Dealt with CJ7 on a daily basis.
- ANNEX K – GSG1 approval process, ethnic mix pre-planning.
- Worked closely with CJ Med and Senior Advisors.
- A big challenge is working with Joint and NATO personnel. Many basic military standards are not being enforced on Camp Eggers.
  • Feels that many of the Air Force and Marine junior officers assigned to the command do not possess the appropriate skills or experience to effectively contribute in NTM-A/CSTC-A.
  • Lack of training in advising and conducting security force assistance (SFA).
- Stated that advising his counterpart(s) was the best part of the day.
- Ethnicity and Provincial Balance – Afghans are tracking, but US/NATO is not doing it effectively.
  • Too overly focused on percentages.
  • Should focus on power of key leaders and the provinces that they influence and/or represent.

Interaction with Other Agencies
- Accurate Afghan demographics from UN, DoS or other appropriate agency would have been helpful.
  o Ethnicity breakdown – UN targets.
  o True per capita – influences ANA pay raises.
- Had difficulty with the stove-piped processes of other countries participating in the NATO mission. Some additional education/orientation to these processes would have been helpful.
- Command is often too overly focused on numbers; debate over the proper balance between quantity and quality is on-going.

Capability Milestones and Assessments
- Never had an approved campaign plan.
- Quarterly updates that LTC Tracy provided to NTM-A/CSTC-A included:
  o Current Afghan Assessment.
  o Quantitative CM Ratings.
  o Recent accomplishments.
  o Goals for next quarter.
- Standards sometimes set too high based on US or NATO processes/culture. Need to understand what is “good enough” for the Afghans.
- Implemented a personnel management strategy.
## Recommendations

1. Some type of pre-deployment training session that focuses specifically on Ministerial-level advising would have been helpful.
   - In the past, attended the SATMO course at the JFK Center, which could be a good model for a Ministerial advisor course.

2. NTM-A/CSTC-A needs to do a serious troop-to-task analysis.
   - Advisors and staff need to be organized properly to influence the development and implementation of effective ANA processes and systems, not just senior Ministers (counterparts).

3. Liked/supports the NTM-A/CSTC-A implementation of an advisor course. Need to know your business.

4. Need to provide Afghans with tangible goods in order for them to be responsive. Advocates fully outfitting the Afghans on the front end, then focus on sustainment and capability development.
Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: COL Barbee  
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A  
Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: US Senior Advisor to the Afghan MoD  
Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010  
Interviewer and Date of Interview: LTC Samuel Lex, 24 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements

- Duties / Roles
  - The advisor’s primary roles are to 1) provide strategic advice, and 2) work with counterparts to support the goals and objectives stated in the ISAF campaign plan.
  - Some specific duties/requirements of his position included:
    - LNO between the Ministry and IJC, ISAF, and NTM-A/CSTC-A.
    - Military assistant to support Ministerial-level engagements and MoD visits.
    - Building trust with counterpart; confidant.
    - Assisting counterpart with training of Afghan Aide-de-camps.
  - Liaison tended to be the simpler job; the more challenging aspects at his level were:
    - Mitigating friction created when operational requirements of ISAF/IJC were not consistent with requirement to develop ministerial capacity at MoD.
    - Dealing with the conflicts created between ISAF/IJC and the MoD due to variance in operational perspective.
    - Coordinating and executing Ministerial-level travel with counterpart (caused many bureaucratic headaches).

- Previous Experience / Preparation
  - Had previous deployment experience.
  - Senior Staff College (SSC) helped to prepare him considerably for the assignment.
  - Read some books/articles (“Ghost Wars”, “Three Cups of Tea”, Afghan military history).
  - As BCTP COG, went to/conducted multiple MRXs.

Selection Process

- Was a prior COG at BCTP at Ft. Leavenworth. Volunteered for assignment with Senior Leader’s Division (SLD).
- Was originally supposed to be an ARSIC Commander, but was diverted to current position by then CSTC-A Cdr MG Formica.

Transition Process
Only had a two-day overlap with his predecessor due to the fact that the required report date sent to SLD was not coordinated with his predecessor’s departure date.

Transferred computer files and was given a very small continuity book which lost relevance quickly.

Transition to being effective with Afghan counterpart took about 30 days.

**KM Processes**
- Effective knowledge management (KM) is a weakness in the Command.
- It is difficult to find useful and relevant information; very time-consuming effort. There are multiple websites that are not standardized.
- Available information is often not up-to-date.
- ANA Synch Meeting is primarily focused on the staff, but it provides good information for advisors to synchronize efforts.

**Operating Environment**
- NTM-A has not reached a “steady-state.”
- Recent growth and integration of many NATO officers adds to turmoil.
- Based on constant change, the staff gets pulled in multiple directions.

**Interaction with Other Agencies**
- Interfaced with RCs, US Embassy, UNAMA.
- Cross-talk with other agencies is required. Daily huddle and reports have enhanced information flow.

**Capability Milestones and Assessments**
- Must have metrics, but with some allowance for subjectivity. The CM rating system is good if applied correctly.
- Arriving advisors often tend to adjust targets based on their own experiences.
- Advisors hesitant to change ratings due to the need to defend an upgrade.
- Advisors often don’t take into account what is “Afghan good enough.”
- It is good to reflect improvement if it is warranted. (Afghan Army existed before. A CM3 rating means that they cannot function at all, which is not often the case).
- Honest assessments should:
  - Take Afghan standards into account.
  - Allow for progression.
  - Not be influenced by a default assessment that relies more on US/NATO standards.

### Recommendations
1. Portals should be purged of old information, and standardized to enable quick and easy access to current, relevant information.
2. Short of a required pre-deployment course, a standardized list of reference materials/suggested reading/study would have been helpful. (However, scope should be concise and narrowed to the most important.)

3. An update on current Afghanistan situation; specifically, ethnic rivalries and an overview of key Afghan leaders in the Ministries or other key organizations.

4. Advisors need to have a current orientation on key personalities and groups that they will be dealing with. NTM-A could integrate this into in-processing/advisor course.

5. NTM-A should work to better integrate the Afghans into the Quarterly Development Boards.
   • Need to pull MoD and Chief of the General Staff into the Ministerial development process – the desire is for them to direct and train their personnel, and hold Ministerial and General Staff leaders accountable for progression.

6. An advisor must be trained on how to listen effectively.

7. Advisor-specific ASI might be useful for tracking/managing those with Ministerial advisor skills.
Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: COL Jordan
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A

Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: Senior Advisor to the Deputy MoI for Counternarcotics in Afghanistan

Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010

Interviewer and Date of Interview: LTC Samuel Lex, 21 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements
– Duties / Roles
  • COL Jordan’s position is an Aviation Branch coded position. Some functional Ministerial requirements have been divided up between branch assignment offices, as opposed to seeking personnel with special skills that are directly tied to the particular Ministry.
  • Distinction between an “advisor” and a “mentor”: Counterparts in centralized systems, such as the Soviet-influenced Afghans, often prefer advisor, because mentor tends to denote a subordinate relationship.
– Skills and Knowledge
  • Must be able to put personal feelings on the shelf.
  • Don’t be afraid to branch out – “do what they do” in order to learn their culture and ways – allows you to be a more effective advisor. However, always maintain your personal security.
  • Develop cultural knowledge through personal relationships.
– Previous Experience / Preparation
  • Had a National Guard background, which included many counter-narcotics type courses and assignments, so he had a lot of experience working with civilian law enforcement and counterdrug type organizations.
  • For information prior to deployment, COL Jordan used his connections at the War College to speak with folks experienced with topics such as COIN, advising and the current situation in Afghanistan. He then built his own library based on recommendations from these subject matter experts.

Selection Process
– Was not interviewed for the position. Selected and nominated for approval by Aviation Branch (potentially due to counterdrug experience). COLs must all be nominated and the approval process normally takes 3-4 weeks before notification.
– Approval comes from the 4-star level.
– Once officially selected, COL Jordan was informed and given a report date.
NTM-A/CSTC-A had the opportunity to endorse COL Jordan for the position. Otherwise, internal adjustments of advisors by NTM-A/CSTC-A is rare, due to the nomination process.

**Transition Process**
- Position had been vacant prior to COL Jordan’s arrival. Lead counter-narcotics advisor position had been filled by the LTC deputy position.
- Transition to being effective with Afghan counterpart is about 30-60 days; often depends on the personalities of the advisor and counterpart. ( Mentioned few known cases of a US advisor not being able to adjust at all.)

**KM Processes**
- MoD advisors tended to have a better developed KM system than MoI.
- There has been much effort recently to develop common reports, schedules and to use SharePoint to organize important files/documents.

**Operating Environment**
- Afghans often have a Soviet oriented management style - centralized. COL Jordan’s counterpart had a drug background; he was often referred to as being a “drug dealer” when he was with the Northern Alliance. His skills participating in the drug trade gave him a great amount of knowledge on how to combat it. The Counter-Narcotics Ministerial position was created in 2004. Although often seen as a “lesser minister,” it is a presidentially appointed position.

**ACG-PD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors**
- The staff was originally configured to support Institutional Development (force generation focus), not for Ministerial development. This is beginning to evolve. ACG-AD and PD now both have their own internal staffs.

**Interaction with Other Agencies**
- Interaction occurs with agencies such as the UN, Multinational partners and NGO.

**Support Required/Desired from Other Agencies**
- Intelligence reach-back support: information is necessary to help effectively shape the environment. COL Jordan gave an example of attending a meeting where there were representatives from countries like Iran, China and North Korea and he had no intelligence on them. This would have been extremely helpful.

### Recommendations

1. Ministerial advisors would benefit considerably by having the following as part of pre-deployment training:
• NATO Policy session
• Cultural training – including some language
• COIN training – specifically focused on recent updates/changes. Used the example of shedding body armor in order to build more effective rapport.

2. Advisors would benefit greatly from some level of cultural immersion. This can give an advisor a better comfort zone. (COL Jordan mentioned how his experience living in Turkey made him more open to other cultures).

3. Ministerial advisors should be identified 6 months prior to deployment. They should be given the opportunity to PCS their families, then conduct 6 months of intensive training that includes things mentioned above such as COIN, culture and language).

4. Being in uniform was often a detriment to his efforts, and he believed this to be the case with some other Ministerial positions, specifically those that do not directly advise a military counterpart. Based on the situation he recommends taking these advisors out of uniform.
Advisor: COL Manzo  
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A  
**Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment:** Senior Advisor to the Deputy MoD  
**Dates of Deployment:** 2009-2010  
**Interviewer and Date of Interview:** LTC Samuel Lex, 23 June 2010

**Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:**

**Ministerial Advisor Requirements**
- Must be dedicated, full-time advisors. “Part-time advisors” are more of a detriment than a benefit. These types of advisors normally tend to focus more of their attention on the staff side and do minimal advising. (ACG-AD is currently working to fix this.)
- **Skills and Knowledge**
  - Knowing what you are doing is often more important than language proficiency.
    - At the strategic level, the Afghans want to learn English.
    - Need to understand Afghan systems and doctrine.
  - Advisors should be skilled in tactical patience.
  - Dealing with his counterpart required some working knowledge of personnel, logistics and budgeting processes/systems.
- **Previous Experience / Preparation**
  - Read “First 100 Days” and an advisor guide.
  - Had worked with the previous CG, however, did not know if that was a factor in his selection/approval.
  - Should be current on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Army doctrine.
  - A War College equivalent provides a good general base of knowledge/skills for Ministerial-level advising.

**Selection Process**
- Was not interviewed. Is an AV Branch officer that was selected for the assignment through the Senior Leader Division (SLD).
- Was informed of assignment in MAR 09, reported in JUN 10.

**Transition Process**
- Replaced an IN officer. Had a long overlap (stated that it was too long).
- Seven days for overlap period is preferred / required.
- Communicated with his predecessor via email prior to arrival. Was not given any suggestions for pre-deployment preparation.
- Predecessor provided a continuity book, but it was not very effective (mainly focused on admin issues and was quickly out-of-date).
- COL Manzo has built a continuity book (for admin issues) and a smart book (more operationally focused) for his replacement.
- Transition to being effective with Afghan counterpart took about 90 days; is required to build relationships and develop trust.
- COL Manzo’s replacement is an AFAK Hands officer. Believes that is a good concept, however:
  - It is not effectively linked to what the Afghans want.
  - Afghans sometimes need personnel that are better in doctrine.

KM Processes
- For first six months, did not have an effective file sharing system. SharePoint site was then established, which greatly improved information sharing. SharePoint on Centrix was very useful for organizing information.
- Six-month tours of some DoD and NATO forces present challenges to continuity and the effective passing off of information.

Operating Environment
- The July 2011 announced withdrawal has placed a sense of urgency on Afghan Ministerial development efforts.
- One of the biggest challenges was conducting travel with his counterpart. A very confusing process trying to navigate through local travel agents also makes it difficult to file claims through the US system.

ACG-PD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors
- Staff was not effectively reorganized to both force generation and Ministerial development.
- When the “fighting” function went to IJC, the staff reorganization did not adequately reflect this change.
- Advisors that wear “two hats” (advisor and staff) present a conflict of interest.
- Competing efforts often pull officers away from advisor duties.
- COL Manzo described a time when he was effectively able to address a situation by forming a special tiger team, as opposed to relying upon the existing staff structure.

Capability Milestones and Assessments
- Not aware of any Afghan-facilitated assessment other than quarterly assessments done at the tactical level.
- Ministerial Development Plan (MDP) should be tied to LOO’s:
  - MDP is first tied to the campaign plan.
  - Efforts are often not synchronized across AD, however, BG Naesmith is working to fix this.
• COL Manzo working to update plan – individual validation and approval by functional advisors with their counterparts.
• In the future, plan is to better integrate the Afghans into the MDP and assessment process.

**Recommendations**

1. A US endorsed, “SATO-like” travel office to coordinate travel would be extremely beneficial.
2. Some useful pre-deployment preparation would have been a review of the NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Brief, Campaign Plan and the Program Budget Process. These could be integrated into an NTM-A/CSTC-A specific pre-deployment requirement and possibly posted to the NTM-A/CSTC-A website.
3. Nine-month tours should be the minimum as six-month tours of some DoD and NATO forces present challenges to continuity and the effective passing of information.
4. All advisors should go through COIN Academy (time should be dedicated/allocated to this).
5. Army needs to get better at advisor selection. The challenge is that in a true joint and multinational organization like NTM-A/CSTC-A, you must be able to take into account different skill sets with regard to assigning Ministerial-level advisors.
   • Need to synchronize standards for advising.
   • Identify advisors far enough out.
   • Implement standardized training (both pre-deployment and in theater).
   • Have a standardized reference list that advisors can use to prep for deployment.
Ministerial Advisor Interview Summary

Advisor: LTC Killebrew
Unit: NTM-A/CSTC-A
Duty Position(s) Held During Deployment: Senior Advisor to General Staff, Inspector General (IG)
Dates of Deployment: 2009-2010
Interviewer and Date of Interview: LTC Samuel Lex, 26 June 2010

Major Points, Key Observations, and Recommendations:

Ministerial Advisor Requirements
- Must be a qualified IG to fill this position.
- Experience is important for the Afghans, many of whom have been influenced by the Soviet model.
- There must be a true partnership with the Afghans – trust them when they tell you there is a problem.

Skills and Knowledge
- Listening skills are very important; respect goes a long way with the Afghans. An effective advisor should be able to relax and understand that in their position, they are a “guest,” something that should not be abused.
- Must learn the boundaries between assertiveness and being too forceful.
- Be able to adapt: relationship with counterpart is dynamic and never stops changing.

Previous Experience / Preparation
- Had no pre-deployment advisor training.

Selection Process
- Volunteered for a WIAS tasking.
- There is a high demand among IGs for these types of advising positions.

Transition Process
- Prior to arrival, position was actually vacant for two months.
- Did not receive any type of continuity book, but is putting one together for her replacement.
  Planning to make a second copy that she will leave with her counterpart.
- Ideal transition time with replacement is 1-2 weeks, any longer would confuse counterparts.

KM Processes
- No requirement to do an end-of-tour AAR.
- During her tenure, reporting requirements increased, which made it difficult to operate with the section’s limited amount of personnel.
- IG section does not have the same systems as other sections (ISAF Secret/Centrix), making information sharing difficult.
Operating Environment
- Few female advisors. Soviet influenced counterparts don’t seem to have much problem working with women. Those that do have an issue often require a level of firmness to communicate the message that disrespect will not be tolerated.
- The “rules” that apply to male advisors don’t always apply to female advisors, which can sometimes be advantageous.
- Organization of the IG section makes advising difficult, due to a heavy staff requirement.
- There is a clear disconnect between ISAF COIN guidance and force protection rules. An example is the wearing of protective gear and the ability to travel with counterparts. These rules often prevent advisors from getting the job done and makes being effective / credible with counterparts difficult.
- There are differing views in the Afghan government and the MoD / MoI with respect to anti-corruption.
- Travel with counterparts is extremely difficult to coordinate due to scheduling procedures and force protection rules.

ACG-PD Staff Support to Functional Ministerial Advisors
- Staff functions / requirements place a heavy burden on the section.
- COL IG advisor is “triple-hatted.” The LTC advisor focuses solely on advising.
- Section is built / organized just for an advising function, but must fulfill staff IG support and provide an auditing function to the command.

Interaction with Other Agencies
- US Embassy is “inefficient and rude.” LTC Killebrew often found herself in a position where she felt she had to apologize for the actions of the Embassy.
- Stated that DoS personnel demonstrate that they know very little about the Afghan culture and are very hesitant to engage.

Recommendations
1. Need language training requirement, similar to that of AFPAK Hands.
2. AFPAK Hands personnel should be assigned as advisors, not staff.
3. Command needs to gain a better awareness / appreciation of the roles / capabilities of IG advisors.
   5. Provide informal links into MoD/GS.
   6. IG function is more powerful and respected in the Afghan, Soviet-influenced system.
   7. Can basically be an intelligence capability.
4. Anything given to the Afghans needs to be audited and tracked because corruption is too prevalent and it would be the only effective method to stop it along with punishing those who are found in violation.
   8. Afghans can’t fix corruption on their own. They are eager to support any plans / methods recommended by the US / NATO.
9. Corruption is a bigger problem than ethnicity.

5. US / NATO needs to develop a better understanding of the true role of religion in the Afghan society in order to be more effective in achieving goals.

6. Should not buy / provide things to the Afghans as a means of gaining favor; will often be taken advantage of.
   • Things provided must be tied to an operational need. Must then be tracked (put on property book or audited).

7. Two-year deployments (with family PCS options and additional leave opportunities) in order to provide better continuity with counterparts.

8. Staff processes are what hold the Afghans back. This is where we need to focus a great deal of our efforts.

9. A separate Command IG section is required to manage administrative functions in NTM-A/CSTC-A. NTM-A/CSTC-A could also use this section to perform an inspection function.

10. NTM-A/CSTC-A needs an Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). Could help to improve Advisor/staff issues and other procedures.

11. DoS needs to “step up to the plate.” There is a real need for effective advisors in the Presidential Palace.
Annex A (Advisor Course Program of Instruction - POI)

Five-Day Advisor Course - Task Overview

The following is a recommended POI to support expanding the current 2-day NTM-A/CSTC-A Advisor Course to 5 days (see Topic 1.5 Advisor Training Course).

*All advisors currently in country as well as incoming advisors should attend the six-day CTC-A COIN and Stability Framework Training and the 5-day Advisor Course. This should also include advisors who have attended a service-specific advisor course and/or the Civilian MoDA Course prior to entering theater.

*Pre-course requirements: All US Military students should be required to log in and complete the Security Force Assistance (SFA) 101 Course on JKO (J7S N-US333, 001).

*Instructor’s Note: Recommend that course instructors read “Cross-Cultural Strategies for Teaching Advisors” TR 1255 (2009, Army Research Institute) prior to conducting training.

The following are recommended new classes.

**TASK 1:** Dari Language Training (Days 1-5)

**Day 1** (1 hour)
- Explain the importance of language (rapport vs. communication).
- Provide language resources (CDs, links to tactical Dari, Rosetta Stone, etc.).
  - Demonstrate 2 or 3 language sites.
- On a daily basis, pass out single page language worksheets with English phrases that the students must translate prior to the next class meeting (require/recommend they meet and acquire answers from Afghans on Eggers).

**Day 2-5** (15 minutes) Homework facilitates interaction with Afghans, language practice/learning, and cultural basics.
- Go over language worksheet from previous day.
- Provide language pocket book on morning of day 5 (UK Culture Center, Royal Navy).
- Conduct language assessment to determine language proficiency rating (Pre-DLPT, DLPT, OPI, in-house test, etc.).

**TASK 2a:** C2, NTM-A/CSTC-A, political structure, assess current threat (Day 1, morning)

**TASK 2b:** Area study/assessment (Day 1, afternoon)
- Provide current situational awareness brief.
- Provide area study/assessment worksheet (FM 3-07.10, Sep 09 “Advising”).
- Provide resources (CDs, books, links, etc.).
• Assign worksheet as homework (turn in on day 5).

**TASK 3:** Advisor Resources (Day 1, afternoon, 3 hours-1 hour per organization) - Block of instruction focusing on the major advisor resources currently available, to include:

- JCISFA Communities of Interest (COI) – Advisor support, lessons learned, best practices, resources, tools, and training materials. [https://jcisfa.jcs.mil](https://jcisfa.jcs.mil)
- Worksheet with information requirements that the individual advisors would have to look up or find on each of the specific sites and turn in on the morning of Day 5. These information requests would be in line with the position they are filling and would double as useful tools for the advisor as well as a training tool for using the advisor resources.

**TASK 4a:** Afghan History (Day 2, morning) Consider videotaping the class in order to provide any follow-on instructor with a comprehensive training package. Suggest assigning a one-hour history reading for the first night of the course that the instructor can go over on Day 2. Also recommend adding a more in-depth history covering 9/11 to present-day (major actions, events, development of ANSF, etc.).

- Consider providing a history manual. Provide the link to the Afghan History folder on SharePoint. Familiarize students with the Culture and Conflict Studies resources located at the Naval Postgraduate School. [http://www.nps.edu/programs/CCS/ExecSumm.html](http://www.nps.edu/programs/CCS/ExecSumm.html)

**TASK 4b:** Culture (Day 2, morning) Suggest showing a few short clips. Pass out current MCIA culture pocket guide to each individual. Have several copies of the current Afghan culture reference book available.

**TASK 4c:** Customs and Courtesies (Day 2, prior to and during lunch) Suggest a 30-minute brief on common customs and courtesies, do’s and don’ts. For lunch, coordinate an authentic Afghan meal. Students learn:

- Proper entrance.
- Appropriate seating arrangements.
- How to deal with weapons / gear.
- How to eat.
- What to say.
- How to handle gender issues.

**TASK 4d:** Religion (Day 2, afternoon) History, demographics, major events, calendar, prominent persons, rituals, etc.
**TASK 5:** Discuss MoI/MoD, ANP/ANA structure, resources, processes (Day 2, afternoon) Brief:
- MoI.
- MoD.
- ANP (Pass out ANP Logistics Guide).

**TASK 6:** Advisor METL (Day 3, morning) ALSA MTTP “Advising”. Appendix A, FM 3-07.10, MCRP 3-33.8A, NTTP 3-07.5, AFTTP 3-2.76, Sep 09) Review advisor METL (Issue “Advising” MTTP to each advisor).

**TASK 7:** Team Building and Adaptive/Agile Thinking (Day 3, morning)
- Advisor vignettes / classroom discussion (SLAP, Kinection).
- Conduct initiatives event or pass out scenario to solve.
- Pass out STAT Advisor Guide (Aptima).

**TASK 8:** Role of the Advisor (Day 3, morning) Pass out “Blind Leading the Blind, Soviet Advisors in Afghanistan” the evening prior to this section as mandatory reading (38 pages).
- Roles of the advisor (“Advising” MTTP).
- Advisor effectiveness (Advisor Equation, FSF long form Brief).
- SFA Planner’s Guide: FSF Force Generation (provide brief from TSP).
- Tasks from advisor METL:
  - 3.3.1 Develop Advisor Campaign Plan (C)
    - 3.3.1.1 Incorporate FSF Objectives into Campaign Plan
  - 3.3.2 Assess FSF Unit, Team or Individual current strengths and capabilities (C)
    - 3.3.2.1 Develop Measures of Effectiveness/Performance
  - 3.3.3 Employ Subject Matter Expertise MOS/Experience Base (Indiv)
    - 3.3.3.1 Teach individual and collective tasks.
    - 3.3.3.2 Coach-walk through/mission rehearsal/assist.
    - 3.3.3.3 Advise/mentor-FSF lead in execution of missions.
      - 3.3.3.3.1 Serve as a role model for FSF counterpart.
      - 3.3.3.3.2 Develop counterpart through NCOPD/OPD.
      - 3.3.3.3.3 Acknowledge and demonstrate the advisor as a subordinate.
      - 3.3.3.3.4 Advise only when requested or necessary to advance a phase.
      - 3.3.3.3.5 Elevate FSF counterpart and give him credit.
  - 3.3.4 Evaluate effectiveness of advisory effort.

**TASK 9:** Cross-Cultural Communications (Day 3, afternoon)
- Use Peace Corps, Univ of Pacific, or other curriculum.

**TASK 10:** How to Build Rapport (Day 3, afternoon)
- Rapport Primer, Female Rapport Primer.
- What is effective rapport?

**TASK 11:** Understanding Resistance (Day 4, morning)
- Provide basic instruction on resistance (15 min).
- Assign homework, complete Understanding Resistance Virtual CD (1.5 hours), CD created by Dr. Angela Karrasch from the Center for Army Leadership.

**TASK 12:** Influence (Day 4, morning)
- FM 6-22 (Dr. Karrasch) CCC Outline.
- Assign homework, complete Virtual Influence (3 hours) developed by Dr. Karrasch and SIMULEARN.

**TASK 13:** Working with Interpreters (Day 4, afternoon) *Show interpreters video clip.
- 3.1.2 Effectively communicate through an interpreter (Indiv).
  - 3.1.2.1 Understand the capabilities of your interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.2 Evaluate the trustworthiness of your interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.3 Understand the background and cultural biases of your interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.4 Prepare an interpreter for a communications event.
    - 3.1.2.4.1 Meeting.
    - 3.1.2.4.2 Training event.
    - 3.1.2.4.3 Social/political/media event.
  - 3.1.2.5 Conduct a meeting/event through your interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.6 Prepare to work with an unvetted/unfamiliar interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.7 Instruct a counterpart with the aid of an interpreter.
  - 3.1.2.8 Spend “unstructured time” with your interpreter.

**TASK 14a:** Negotiations (Day 4, afternoon)
- Same as current 2-Day advisor course.
- Pass out the MCIA Micro Mission Guide-Afghanistan “Conducting a Jirga, Meeting or Negotiation”.

**TASK 14b:** Key Leader Engagement (Day 4, afternoon)
- Set up key leader engagement practical exercises.
- Break class into 2-4 groups, depending on number of Afghan role players.
- Use key leader engagement worksheets.
**TASK 15:** Advisor COI and Submission of Advisor LL and EOT AAR (Day 5, morning)

- Register for JCISFA Website.
  - Demonstrate / review basic areas of JCISFA website (current advisor AARs, observations and recommendations, SMEs)
- Initiate Advisor AAR form. Require completion of form NLT 30 days from EOT.

**FINAL TASKS:**

- Administer cultural awareness assessment.
  - [http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/caa/(S(54bmi2iyqiw0mfz101z4ba45))/index.aspx](http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/caa/(S(54bmi2iyqiw0mfz101z4ba45))/index.aspx)
- Administer language proficiency test.
- Pass out Language Pocket Guide.
- Collect area study homework.
- Collect resources worksheet.
- Distribute all class materials on CD/DVD and provide students with location of all materials on SharePoint.
- Distribute student roster with contact information. Add advisors to database on SharePoint.
- Collect EOT critique for each block of instruction and for class overall.

*The below tasks are a sample layout if COIN must be conducted as part of the advisor course.

**TASK XX:** Pre-COIN 1 (homework to be given prior to start of COIN training)

- Require all personnel to complete TSP 3-24 or test out by completing COIN pre-test.

**TASK XX: COIN 1**

- Begin course with all personnel completing COIN test/same a pre-test noted above.
- Provide COIN instruction.
- Require all personnel to complete a COIN reading (i.e., COIN Case Study)

**TASK XX: COIN 2**

- Instructor-led discussion on COIN Case Study.
- Conduct COIN practical exercise.
# Use of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACG-AD</td>
<td>Assistance Commanding General – Afghan National Army Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACG-PD</td>
<td>Assistance Commanding General – Afghan National Police Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF/PAK</td>
<td>Afghanistan – Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>US Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Force</td>
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<td>APH</td>
<td>AF/PAK Hands Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Additional Skill Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Afghanistan Theater of Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTP</td>
<td>US Army Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partnership Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>US Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVMIL</td>
<td>Civilian Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Capability Milestones</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Community of Interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Combat Readiness Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCOM</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAS</td>
<td>Defense Finance and Accounting System</td>
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<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Distributive Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoJ</td>
<td>US Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>US Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader, Personnel, Facilities, Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operating Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCs</td>
<td>Force Operating Capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSF</td>
<td>Foreign Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>International Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>Irregular Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCISFA</td>
<td>Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>JCOA</td>
<td>Joint Center for Operational Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFORGEN</td>
<td>Joint Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIIM</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKDDC</td>
<td>Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMD</td>
<td>Joint Manning Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force (JTF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWFC</td>
<td>Joint Warfighting Center (JFCOM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Afghan Ministerial Development Plan</td>
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<td>Afghan Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense Advisors</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Afghan Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NTM-A/CSTC-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;R</td>
<td>Observations and Recommendation (JCISFA COI)</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operation Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Releasability</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Security Command</td>
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<td>Security Assistance</td>
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<td>SATO</td>
<td>Scheduled Air Transportation Office</td>
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<td>SAV</td>
<td>Staff Assistance Visit</td>
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<td>Senior Service College</td>
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<td>Stability Operations</td>
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<td>Strategic Communications</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UND</td>
<td>United Nations Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIAS</td>
<td>Worldwide Individual Augmentation System</td>
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