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Introduction

One of the problematic obstacles to Afghan sovereignty and the drawdown of coalition forces is Afghanistan's security infrastructure. At the heart of this challenge are the readiness, training, manning, and overall effectiveness of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ability of the local police to maintain order and security throughout the country will facilitate the transition of the country to democracy.

In order to develop the ANP, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) uses Police Mentor Teams to help develop them. A shortage of PMTs across the country, however, has led to the formation of *in-lieu of* advisor teams comprised of Soldiers from land owning units or attached Military Police units. The purpose of this document is to help provide those additional advisory teams with information they need to develop the skills required to effectively augment the CSTC-A program. This handbook will provide an overview of the entire police program including current goals, relationships to other organizations, the Focused District Development Program, key challenges that may be encountered and the duties of key members of the police advising teams including how to work with the team's enablers.

Due to conflict, many organs of the Afghan government have lost their "institutional memory," and no longer can be mentored and taught by the previous generation, but the ANP *do* have veteran police. Some ANP officers have served as police under the communist regime of the 1980's. Police, especially officers, will often claim over ten years of service. The ANP is perhaps the only arm of the government which has such memory. This may or may not be a positive factor.

Chiefs of Police (CoP) at the provincial and district level are often not from the local area, and are appointed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI.) Chiefs and senior officers who have been removed from one district or province due to disciplinary or other issues are often shuffled to other provinces where they do not bear a reputation. The CoP may not share the ethnicity of the majority of the district or province where he is assigned. A Dari-speaking CoP may be assigned to a Pashto-speaking district, for instance. In keeping with the ANP being a national police force, these situations must be worked with; but tensions may exist due to ethnicity. Many ANP leaders have had scant leadership training. Often, they were trained under the Soviet model; some are graduates of Russian Universities or service schools. Many ANP officers carry their side arms in the Russian "cross carry" fashion, an indication of their early training. Uniforms show Russian influence, and ANP goose step when marching formally.

Public perception of the ANP is often poor. The ANP have been known to establish Vehicle Control Points (VCP's) or Traffic Control Points (TCP's) for the purpose of

exacting tolls; stealing from the population. They will often ask to see the vehicle's registration papers and then require "*baksheesh*" (literally a gift) to return the registration to the owner. Prisoners are often bribed out of custody by their families before they ever see a jail cell. Local leaders will sometimes utilize the ANP to oppress their rivals in inter-family squabbles. While local citizens may hold the Afghan National Army (ANA) in high esteem, they may harbor ill-will towards the ANP. This is a key area frequently exploited by insurgents. ANP die from insurgent activity at a rate in excess of three times the rate of ANA soldiers.

Many of Afghanistan's 364 ANP districts have never had any mentoring. Each team's experience will vary, but each team will be affected in some way by similar problems. Being aware of the challenges that a team may face will better prepare the team for maintaining mentoring ability under challenging circumstances.

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Section 1: Afghanistan; History, Demographics, and Government

Respect is a key driver of Afghan relationships. It is considered very respectful to have some knowledge of the history and culture of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is an ethnic patchwork, with ethnic, tribal, clan, local and family loyalties contributing to the web of relationships that exist in each area. Terrain compartmentalizes and shapes these networks. Understanding the history of Afghanistan will help to make sense of local social networks, a key to understanding local security challenges.

Overview

This section gives a brief history of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Police, basic demographics and languages that may be encountered, a breakdown of various functions, the authority and limitations of police powers, the rights of Afghan citizens, and other agencies, such as the Judiciary, that the police will interface with.

Description of Afghanistan

Afghanistan may possibly be one of the most austere places on earth. The southern, western, and northern areas of the country begin as arid plains or deserts that eventually rise as one moves north and east into the Hindu Kush mountain range which dominates the central and western portions of the nation. Desert areas in the south and southwest are bleached white from the sun with human settlements few and far between, while the northern plain is

a uniform brown. Agriculture is limited to areas with drainage, rivers flowing south and west down from the mountains. Many of these streams only flow periodically, making farming difficult at best. Much effort is spent in irrigation and water management at the local level. Disputes over available water can quickly escalate to violence. In many areas, wells are the only source of water as the desert-like conditions and high summer temperatures prevent the collection of surface water. The mountainous areas are extremely rugged and desolate with few settlements




and even fewer passable areas. In most areas, the border areas between Afghanistan and its neighbors are unsettled and unguarded making transit between those countries and Afghanistan easy for criminals and terrorists.



Ethnic Breakdown

Although Afghanistan is a multicultural and multiethnic society, historically the word *Afghan* has been used to denote only Pashtuns, most likely due to the dominant status this ethnic group has had in the Afghan population. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group. They live primarily in the southern and eastern provinces, but Pashtun groups are scattered throughout the country. Pashtun tribes also populate most of northwestern Pakistan. The Pashtuns largely ignored the border during the British domination of India that ended in 1947 and they have never accepted the border demarcation known as the Durand Line. Since 1947, there have been periodic Afghan efforts, to create a greater “Pashtunistan” that would unite the Pashtun tribes – a source of continuing friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other principal ethnicities in Afghanistan include:



Tajiks (25%) live mainly in the northeast, the northwest, and the urban centers. Although they are mostly Sunni, they are believed to be the original Persians who settled in Afghanistan. They are known for their hardworking nature and strong

hospitality. They generally live close to the border with Iran, with Herat a major city, and in the northeast and south of Tajikistan where Mazar-i-Sharif has a large concentration of Tajiks although most other ethnic groups – especially Uzbeks – are also well represented. Tajiks are generally better educated than the other ethnicities and often have leadership positions in the armed forces.

Hazaras (10%) mostly reside in the very mountainous and isolated center of Afghanistan known as the Hazarajat. Small concentrations of Hazaras live in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. They are possible descendants of Ghengis Khan's hordes and therefore are a Mongolian tribe. Most Hazaras are Shi'a and thus have been considered an underclass by the Pashtuns. Hazaras are among the least educated and have often been relegated to performing manual labor or being servants. Hazaras are the largest Shi'a community in the country.

Uzbeks (6-8%) are predominantly found in the north. They are the largest Altaic language-speaking group and follow Sunni teachings. Most Uzbeks are sedentary farmers. They also are the most important ethnic group in the city of Kunduz.

Aimaks (4%) live in the northwest part of the country. They are a Persian-speaking group with Sunni affiliations.

Persian Turkmens (3%), a semi-nomadic people, are mostly seen along the border with Turkmenistan.

Balochs (2%) are found in southwest Afghanistan, and speak an Iranian language.

Other (4%). There are several other small communities, including the Nuristanis (a group of people who resisted Islamization for a long time), the Kizilbash (an urban people with Shi'a affiliations), and the Pashays in the northeast of Kabul.

Language

The geographic isolation of the communities settled in different parts of Afghanistan has prevented the development of a common language throughout the country. A wide variety of languages and dialects are spoken. More than the multicultural nature of Afghanistan, the many languages in use are a significant obstacle to cooperation and understanding and therefore have a great impact on police operations. Local languages also provide clues as to ethnic and political affiliations of various groups and their customs and values. **Dari** and **Pashto** are mutually unintelligible, although each has borrowed some words from the other. They are the two official languages, with Dari the traditional language of government and business.

Other common languages include:

Baluchi: Another language close to Persian of Iran spoken primarily in the border regions adjacent to the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

Nuristani: Language that is a mix of Iranian Persian and Urdu. Nuristani and several Nuristani dialects are confined largely to the very isolated region of Nuristan in Afghanistan's northeast.

Uzbek and Turkmen: Spoken widely in the north by Uzbek and Turkmen minorities. Both are Altaic languages and are closely associated with Turkish and Turkic dialects spoken in the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union.

National Identity

Although when traveling abroad Afghans proudly proclaim their Afghan nationality, inside Afghanistan they will first identify with their tribe, their region, or their city. Afghanistan has failed to promote a strong internal sense of identity and bond among its distinct groups to glue them together in a firm national unification process. Although a snapshot perspective cannot capture the complexity of the very diverse Afghan social environment, Afghan inter-ethnic relations can be viewed through distinct historical periods that help to explain the previous and current shape of societal understanding in the country.



The Islamic religion continues to shape Afghan society as a significant organizing principle. Ethnic community bonds prevail over many other forms of identity, and they shape interests and attitudes. National polarization caused by years of internal strife have sharpened ethnic divisions and accentuated religious differences, leading to a heightened emphasis on ethnic discourses.

President Karzai's effort to form an all-inclusive government has been moderately successful, although many challenges must still be met before this will be a truly national government. Ethnic discourses replaced religious discourses in societal understanding and conflict resolution. Ethnic affiliations often determine status in Afghan society. Pashtuns are the privileged ethnicity, a status that is resented especially by Tajiks, Hazaras, and other groups perceived to have lower

status.

These ethnic tensions sometimes come into play in intergovernmental relations; as between the Pashtun-dominated MoD and the more heavily Tajik MoI. Cuchis, a nomadic Pashtun group, dominate the Afghan banking industry.


History of Afghanistan

The area that is known today as Afghanistan has served as a stage for several empires dating back to the third century B.C., including Greco-Buddhist kingdoms, Muslim Ghaznavid and Ghurid dynasties, and the Safavids. Also known as the crossroads for conquerors, Afghanistan has been a battleground for centuries.

More modern Afghan history is marked by three Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919) the last of which led to Afghanistan gaining full independence from the British. Following “official” independence from Britain on August 19, 1919, Afghanistan concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, beginning an era of close relations, although Afghans generally remained suspicious of the atheist communist philosophy. Amanullah Khan, who during his almost ten-year reign sought to introduce some democratic reforms, including granting extensive rights to women and improved education, was forced to abdicate in a revolt that challenged his liberal reform program. There was relative peace and stability during the reign of King Zahir Shah from 1933 until he was deposed by his cousin and brother-in-law, Mohammad Daoud, during a bloodless coup in July 1973. Daoud, who declared himself President, fell victim to a communist coup led by Mohammad Taraki in April 1978. Taraki was ordered killed by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin in 1979, who subsequently took over the government. In 1979, at the request of Amin, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in response to the Afghan military’s inability to quell regional insurgencies. The Soviets immediately had Amin executed and installed Babrak Karmal.

Modern History of Afghanistan

From 1978 to 1988, efforts to introduce communist economic policies *failed* as dissatisfaction with the government increased. Mujahideen fighters gained strength and the capability to mount an effective guerrilla campaign against the communist regime and its policies, with strong U.S. backing and sanctuary in Pakistan. Despite maintaining 80,000-104,000 personnel in Afghanistan from 1979-1988, the Soviets were unable to halt the insurgency due to the topographic challenges, the regional nature of the insurgency, and support the insurgents received from the west. During the eight year occupation, the Soviets lost almost 14,000 KIA as well as a large amount of military equipment. These Mujahideen successes and increased dissatisfaction with the war forced Soviet forces to withdraw in 1988.



In 1986, a new constitution was enacted and Mohammad Najibullah was elected president. Despite the Soviet withdrawal, the Najibulla’s communist regime

survived until the Mujahideen defeated it in 1992, when an Islamic Republic was founded. Later, former Mujahideen allies turned on each other as Pashtuns sought to reestablish their preeminence, and Tajiks and others resisted. The Taliban movement was born in Kandahar, in part as a response to the tribal violence, and corrupt warlordism, spreading eventually to Kabul while Tajiks led by Ahmed Shah Massoud formed the “Northern Alliance” to fight the Taliban. *Ahmed Shah Massoud*

Post 9/11 History of Afghanistan

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden; their failure to do so resulted in Operation Enduring Freedom. Unlike the later Operation *Iraqi* Freedom, local forces from the Northern Alliance and other tribes not loyal to the Taliban conducted most of the fighting during OEF with support from NATO troops.

In 2002 Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from Kandahar, led the Afghanistan transitional government. From 2002 to present marked the increasing involvement by NATO and the International Security Assistance Force. Afghanistan remains dependent on the international community for both its security and financial support.

The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assist the Afghan government in maintaining internal order and training Afghan security forces to defeat the Taliban insurgency and other anti-government groups. Sponsored by the United Nations (UN,) Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany, and chose a 30-member interim authority led by Hamid Karzai. After governing for 6 months, former King Zahir Shah convened a Loya Jirga, which elected Karzai president and gave him authority to govern for two more years. On October 9, 2004, Karzai was elected president of Afghanistan in the country's first presidential election. The international community continues to provide financial and technical support to help develop Afghanistan's infrastructure, economic, and security systems in an effort to help the government become self-sufficient.

History of the Afghan National Police and the Police Mentor Mission

There has never been a tradition of a strong, professional police force in Afghanistan when judged by Western standards. Police in Afghanistan existed during the rule of King Zahir Shah, remaining relatively intact during the transition to and during communist rule. Much of the current ANP Officer Corps was trained in the former Soviet Union. After the fall of Dr. Najibullah's communist government and during Taliban rule, the role of police in daily life becomes unclear. While individual police will describe having upwards of twenty

years of continuous service, in some cases they were ordered by the Taliban not to leave their homes.


After the fall of the Taliban, there was little in Afghanistan resembling a functional police force. Warlord militias and other private armed militias filled the vacuum left behind the retreating Taliban. Under the Bonn II Agreement, Germany became the lead nation for police development, concentrating its efforts on setting up the Kabul Police Academy and drafting the long range blueprint for restructuring the police services. Germany's program was largely limited to Kabul and had little reach into the provinces except where Germany ran the PRT, such as in Kunduz.



In Spring, 2005, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense decided to shift implementation of the police training and equipment program to the Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan (OSC-A.) In April, 2006, OSC-A became the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A.) The first provincial Police Mentor Teams (PMT's) were fielded in late 2006, drawn from existing Embedded Training Teams (ETT's.) These teams fell under newly-formed Regional Police Advisory Teams (RPAT's,) which later became Regional Police Advisory Commands (RPAC's.) Each RPAC fell under the existing Regional Commands, corresponding to the ANA

Corps areas. The Regional Commands fall under TF Phoenix, reporting to CSTC-A. In 2007, the CSTC-A Commander identified the Police Mentoring mission as the primary effort.

ISAF units made various efforts to assist in the police mission. Some Task Force Commanders instructed the Military Police (MP) units under their command to assist in training and evaluating the ANP. Each PRT also has a Police Advisory Team, often consisting of Security Forces personnel. These teams predate the RPAC's and often have overlapping responsibilities.

U.S. / Coalition Command Structure

The U.S. Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) contributes to the effort, as well as providing contracted DynCorp personnel. DynCorp's contract is through the State Department, not the DOD. DynCorp contractors are typically civilian police officers from the United States, either on leave from their departments or retired. DynCorp contractors add civilian police expertise including policing skills, budgetary management, training management, personnel management, and police intelligence management.

The overlapping responsibilities of these departments and commands provide additional capabilities and challenges to the PMT.

Organization and Security Roles of the Afghan Government

This information is intended to provide a brief overview of the Afghanistan National Government, its key players, and the operations of the two ministries responsible for establishing and maintaining state security—the Ministry of Defense (MoD)

which oversees the armed forces (army and air force) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) which oversees the various police forces, including the border police.

Overview of the Afghanistan Government

The 2004 Afghan constitution established the framework of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA.) The constitution established Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic. While Islam is the basis of Afghan law and no laws may counter Islamic dictates, the constitution guarantees religious freedoms. The Afghan system of government is similar to that of the United States with *three independent branches of government, (1) a strong, individually elected president, (2) two houses in the legislature, and (3) a separate and independent judiciary that has constitutional review powers over enacted laws.*

1. The President, the executive branch, consists of the various ministries that actually oversee the operations of the government.
2. The Legislature, or National Assembly, consists of two houses, the lower house and the upper house.
3. The Judiciary is an independent arm and is expected to handle cases much the same as US courts (under a different legal system, however).
 - Supreme Court Judges are appointed by the President and approved by the National Assembly to one 10-year term. Lower level judges terms and appointment conditions are set by law.
 - Due to the infancy of the court system, many parts of the country do not have courts in place, leaving the judicial process to tribal jirgas. (The term *Jirga* is a Pashtun term commonly used to refer to any meeting of leaders (usually tribal) to make key community decisions. *Shura* is the Dari equivalent).

The Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) is a national-level convention convened by the President to deal with issues of national importance including grave threats to the state, presidential impeachment, or constitutional amendments. (Hamid Kharzi was installed by a Loya Jirga as interim President in 2002. He then convened the last Loya Jirga in 2003 and 2004 to debate and ratify the Afghan Constitution).

Local Government


Provincial Governors are appointed by the President. Provincial Governors then appoint District Sub-governors, called *Wuliswahls*. There are Provincial and District Shuras to provide input to the governor and sub-governors, but they have no binding power. At the sub-district level, villages will have a *Malik* or *Malek*, who has a function similar to a mayor, as well as a council of village elders. Village

elders and Maliks will often be members of the District Shura. Provincial and District Governors and Sub-governors will often attempt to control ANP activity with varying degrees of success, but are not in the official chain of authority over the ANP.

Ministry of Interior

The MoI provides nationwide law enforcement services and manages local administration in provinces and districts throughout Afghanistan. The police chain of command was revised in 2006. Whereas previously the governors had greater authority over the police, the current chain of command is from the Minister of Interior to the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs to the regional commanders to the provincial chiefs of police (CoPs) to district CoPs. *Governors are not in the operational chain of command and can no longer direct police activities.* The Interior Minister is also responsible to appoint all Regional and Provincial police chiefs to their positions. The MoI is responsible for overseeing the police, implementing the government counter-narcotics policies and programs, and provincial and district administration in the 34 provinces and 364 districts. The Interior Minister has a Deputy Minister for Security/Police who is in charge of eight Departments that provide the various law enforcement personnel as well as support personnel.

ANP Organization



ANP task organization.

Ministry of Interior; Deputy Minister for Security Organizational Structures

For police advisors, the key department in the MoI is the Deputy Minister for Security, who oversees the various parts of the Afghan National Police including:

Criminal Investigations

Relatively new (2007), which oversees criminal investigations. Currently, only police departments in major cities have investigative capabilities.

Training and Education Department

Manages training academies.

National Police Command Center

Coordinates communication and response between the 5 regional HQs and the ANA.

Administrative Department

Handles vetting, pay, and administrative issues for all ANP.

Logistics Department

Handles ANP equipping and resupply.

Narcotics Police

Enforcement of narcotics law.

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)

The AUP is the largest force within the ANP with a proposed end strength of approximately 46,000. It is responsible for day-to-day police activities in the districts and provinces by maintaining public order and security, preventing and discovering crime, arresting suspects, protecting public and private property, and regulating road traffic.

Afghan Border Police

The Afghan Border Police are responsible for securing Afghanistan's borders and the international airports. They provide surveillance and control, and they attempt to prevent smuggling, drug trafficking, and the cross-border movement of insurgents. They monitor checkpoints and patrol the border. They are being reorganized from eight border brigades into a five-zone force to match the five regions being used by the ANA and ANP. The proposed manpower of the Border Police is 18,000.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

ANCOP was stood up in 2007 to maintain civil order in the seven largest cities to provide mobile response forces in an emergency and cities, emergency, to support other police forces. The ANCOP are intended to have better leadership and training than the AUP and, potentially, special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training.

Currently there are approximately 5000 ANCOP on the force. The ANCOP replace District AUP during the Focused District Development training cycle to ensure continuity.

Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)

This effort attempted to equip and train local militias to provide security in their areas failed as most of the groups maintained loyalty to warlords as opposed to the government. By October 2008 all ANAP were required to attend a police academy and join an AUP station or disband.

National Police Command Center

The National Police Command Center (NPCC) is located in Kabul adjacent to the Ministry of Interior. It is a 24-hour operations center that is staffed with liaison officers from the major security organizations in the country. The NPCC facilitates coordination and communication with the six Regional Commands in located in Kabul (2 commands;) Gardez; Kandahar; Heart; and Mazar-i-Sharif and with other security forces such as the ANA and coalition forces. Some of the Command Centers are challenged by lack of communication equipment, connectivity and established reporting procedures. MoI is in the infant stages of implementing the NPCC, but they are making good strides. They have a TOC-like setup with the capability to project maps and slides and are developing the ability to conduct video teleconferences from that location. The NPCC publishes a twice-daily update that lists all police significant activities and events by region; it comes out at noon and midnight. The quality of information in it is improving, and gives a look at the police situation throughout Afghanistan.

Joint Regional Coordination Center (JRCC)

The purpose of the JRCC is to coordinate security responses to threats that arise within the region but are outside the scope and capability of the PCC. The JRCC is also an information conduit between the PCC's and the NPCC. These are sometimes referred to as RCCs or JRCCs. There is one JRCC located in each of the five police regions collocated with the Regional Police HQ. The Regional Police Advisory Teams are co-located with the JRCC, as the RPATs are the primary mentors for the regional police commanders. The JRCC is a coordination center and not a command center. It is led by a senior Ministry of Defense representative and augmented by the regional police commander. It is authorized 25 personnel from numerous organizations, including the ANP, ANA, border and customs police. It sends

situational reports to the MoD and the NPCC for incorporation in their national situation reports.

Provincial Coordination Center (PCC)

This is sometimes referred to as a JPCC. There is one PCC located or planned for each of the provinces of Afghanistan. Many of the PCC's are still being stood up throughout Afghanistan and are at varying levels of effectiveness, even though a Presidential Decree mandated that each province establish a PCC in October, 2007. The Police Mentor Teams–Provincial (PMT-Ps) are primarily responsible for the training and mentorship of the PCC personnel. As with the JRCC, the PCC is a coordination center and not a command center. The PCC is a 24/7 operation center that permits close operational relationships to develop between participating security organizations in order to track and coordinate all security activities in the province. The Ministry of Defense has primacy for the operation of the PCC, and ideally it should be located at or near the ANP provincial headquarters. The Provincial ANP Chief or his appointed Chief of Operations is responsible for assisting in the overall operation of the PCC. It will be manned by duty officers from the ANP, who will receive regular updates of security activities from individual districts within the province. There will be liaison officers from other ANSF elements and coalition/International Security Assistance Force forces. An effective exchange of information between the duty officers and the liaison officers will permit an up-to-date picture of all security activities in the province. Every day, the PCC will forward a situation report to the JRCC. The PCC will also be able to direct security forces to respond to developing security situations based upon approved, pre-planned responses to situations and ANSF assets that are available at the time of the needed response.



Afghan National Security Force Capacity Development Plan

While not without its problems, the development of the Afghan National Army has proceeded well thus far. While still lacking in systems development such as logistics and suffering from an inability to perform such combat missions as artillery support, the ANA has still exhibited growth in basic competence and leader development since 2002.

The Afghan National Police, however, have not enjoyed the same levels of improvement. As a result, the police development mission has become the main effort of CSTC-A and ISAF. The key strategies for improving the police force:

- Ensuring all ANP receive a basic level of training including training in police ethics, rule of law, and democratic policing
- Reforming the pay and rank structure to increase professionalism and reduce corruption
- Removing incompetent or corrupt leaders
- Developing self-sustaining headquarters systems, especially administration and logistics
- Increasing the number of women ANP

Police Law—Duties

The duties of the police as enumerated in Afghan Law and are not dissimilar to what police forces in the western countries are expected to do. Most importantly, the police are expected to maintain order under the rule of law by protecting individual rights, attempting to deter crime, investigating crimes that do occur, ensuring safety on the public roads by enforcing traffic regulations, and assisting citizens in trouble who are either victims of crime or natural disaster. The Border police are also charged with customs and immigration functions at border crossing points and the airport. Finally the police are supposed to establish relations with the police of bordering countries and other nations in order to develop cross-border systems to deter, detect, and defeat crime.

Police Law—Powers

Notice and Warning: The police may instruct people to perform or not perform certain actions in order to protect public order. Failure to do so by people so notified or warned can result in their arrest

Stop people to determine identity: The police may stop and identify people in order to:

- Remove a danger or prevent a crime
- Control customs documents at ports of entry
- Detect a crime and arrest the suspect

The police may detain an individual who fails to produce necessary identification and transport him/her to the police station.

Order people to vacate a site: The police may order people to leave an area in order to remove a danger, prevent and detect criminal acts, or enforce provisions of law.

Calls and Summons: The police may require a person to come to the police station in order to investigate a crime, restore the rights of the people, or when directed by a court issued warrant. If an individual does not come on his/her own accord, the police may go and bring him/her to the station. The police are required to take work and other obligations into account when issuing calls.

Financial Sanctions: Road traffic police may impose a cash fine on violators of traffic law if the crime is minor, accused may refuse to pay the fine, in which case the crime is referred to court.

Police Law—Searches

Search rules are similar to the rules imposed on western police officers, however since many areas do not have functioning courts, illegal searches are rarely brought into question. In most cases, the ANP can search anyone they encounter whose identity are they unsure of as well as anyone they arrest or detain. Additionally, they may conduct searches at checkpoints set up for that purpose. The property of an individual subject to search may also be searched, i.e.—car, packages, etc. The police may enter and search a building if there is reason to believe an occupant is in danger or has committed or is committing a crime or the evidence of that crime is in the building. Otherwise, they are supposed to obtain a warrant to enter and search.



Police Law—Confiscation of Property

The police have the authority to confiscate any items that present an immediate threat to public security, if possession is prohibited by law, or that may have evidentiary value in the investigation of a crime. The owner or the holder of the item is entitled to know why the police are confiscating the item and to a receipt listing the property taken in order to reclaim the property once the police have completed the investigation or it no longer presents a threat. The police are required to protect confiscated property in order to return it to the owner in the same state it was taken.



Police Law—Use of Force

The police are authorized to use force, up to and including deadly force, in order to maintain order and public safety. When using force, the police are required to use the minimal amount of force to contain the situation. Afghan police are allowed to use a variety of items when employing force, including vehicles, water cannons, obstacles, hand cuffs, police dogs, and weapons. Not only may the ANP use their firearms, but they may also use beating weapons (nightsticks or clubs) lacerating weapons (knives), and explosives. The police may only resort to force by weapons to:

- Stop a crime when lesser means have failed
- Arrest a person who has or is suspected of having committed a crime or to prevent his escape when lesser means have failed
- To arrest a person under an arrest warrant when lesser means have failed
- To prevent escape of a prisoner who has a weapon
- To maintain public order when all lesser means have failed
- Legitimate defense of self or others

Police Law—Use of Deadly Force

The police are expected to use and exhaust any lesser means of force than can be reasonably employed before resorting to deadly force. Deadly force may not be employed against children nor may it be employed if innocent bystanders may potentially be injured. Although impractical in many cases, and inherently dangerous, the law requires that the police issue a verbal warning and fire three warning shots before using deadly force. ANP are authorized to use explosives as a means of deadly force whenever explosives or firearms are used against the police, whenever firearms are ineffective in defending the police, or to destroy any item or

structure that threatens public safety. Deadly force may only be employed against crowds or groups of people when the group has engaged in an attack or other violent act with weapons and all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed.

Police Law—Detention and Arrest

The police may place a person in protective custody when their life is in danger and no other means of protecting them is available. The individual in protective custody can be taken against his or her will, but cannot be held longer than 72 hours. Individuals who cannot be identified can be detained and held until their identity is determined. The police may detain suicidal individuals, but the police must transfer them to a hospital within 72 hours of the detention. The police may also detain individuals who are suspected of committing a crime or on whom a court has issued an arrest warrant. In the case of suspicion of a crime, the ANP do not have to arrest the suspect unless one of a number of conditions exists:

- Hiding, inability to identify, or fear of escape
- Possibility of evidence tampering or repeating the crime
- Offense is punishable by more than 10 years in prison or the nature of the crime requires the police to protect the public

In all cases, the police must immediately inform the detainee of the reason for the detention. Once detained, the police may only hold people for up to 72 hours, after which a court must bind them over for trial or release them. Detainees bound over for trial should be held in a Ministry of Justice (MOJ) detention center. The use of handcuffs is authorized under all detention circumstances.

Curfews

While the police enforce curfews, they cannot impose them. Only the civilian government leadership may impose a curfew on an area or region. The Provincial Governor may impose a curfew in all or part of his Province for up to 48 hours with the approval of the Minister of the Interior. Curfews longer than that require the endorsement of the national Attorney General and the approval of the President.

Afghan Legal System

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the formal justice system has limited reach and legitimacy, and struggles to function in an environment with depleted human resources and infrastructure, a legal system in tatters, and where local power largely continues to supersede central authority. The justice system is relatively weak in the urban centers where the central government is strongest, and in the rural areas that

house approximately 75% of the population, functioning courts, police, and prisons are an exception. For the majority of Afghans, disputes are settled, if at all, at the local level by village elders, district governors, clerics, and police chiefs. These settlements – involving both criminal and civil matters – may follow tribal tradition, religious interpretation, or prerogatives of power.

The Clash of Two Goods: State and Non State Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, Thomas Barfield, Neamat Nojumi, and J Alexander Their published by USIP, 2006

Overview of the Afghan Legal System

This section will provide a foundation for ANP advisors in understanding the Afghanistan legal system and its key players; it focuses on the articles of police law, including duties, powers, rules on searches and confiscation of property, use of force statutes, detention and arrest, and curfew. The ANP must police using the rule of law if they expect to gain the support of the people. The information contained here will help police advisors understand Afghan Police Law so they can effectively mentor their ANP counterparts.

Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Office

These two organizations, along with the Ministry of Interior, serve as the Executive Branch agents of the civil authority triad. The (MoJ) serves as the government's "lawyer." As such, it reviews proposed laws, treaties, and agreements to legal ensure they are properly written and legal. The MoJ also represents the government before the courts in legal or criminal proceedings when the government is the plaintiff or defendant. Most importantly, the MoJ administers the nation's prisons and detention facilities.

The Attorney General's Office

The Attorney General's (AG) Office provides the government's prosecutors. While part of the Executive branch, it is supposed to be independent from government influence. The Attorney General's branch consists of a national level office that oversees the 34 Provincial offices that have investigations, juvenile, and general and judicial prosecution sections. The prosecutors are supposed to evaluate the evidence collected by the police, further investigate the crimes as needed, and then present the case before the courts for adjudication. In many cases, local AG offices are non-functioning, breaking the link between the police and courts and causing detainees to remain in limbo in detention facilities. In addition, the investigative departments often lack the experience and ability to effectively collect and evaluate evidence for presentation in the courts.



Court System

The judicial branch of the government is an independent branch that oversees the national court systems. The nation's Supreme Court sits at the top of the judicial system and has the responsibility for overseeing all lower courts including the Provincial Appeals Court and the Primary Courts. From a criminal justice perspective, crimes are initially heard at one of the courts. In theory each district should have its own court district primary courts. In theory, each district should have its own court with not less than three judges. In addition, each provincial capital is supposed to have its own Urban Primary Court. If verdicts at the Primary Courts are appealed, they go to the Provincial Appellate court for a ruling. After that, the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for final arbitration.

The Supreme Court can recommend and the President can establish travelling courts that can conduct business in districts or provinces without standing courts. These travelling courts still face great hurdles in transportation, logistics, and security when fulfilling their roles.

When deciding cases, judges are expected to use interpretations of Sharia (Islamic) and Afghanistan Civil law. All trials in Afghanistan are adjudicated by a 3 judge panel. Smaller panels are authorized if a court has less than three judges assigned. Appeals courts cases are always heard by three judges. Jury trials are not used. The Afghanistan Constitution states that all suspects are innocent until proven guilty and have the right to professional defense at trial. In reality, the lack of courts, prosecutors and qualified defense attorneys often result in suspects languishing in detention facilities for years before their case is heard.

Issues with the Court System

The largest issue with the court system to date is the lack of judges. It is estimated that the country is lacking about half of the Primary Court judges it needs to effectively hear cases consistently. In addition, over 40% of seated judges do not have formal legal training (either civil or Sharia) and around 37% do not even have a college level education. Finally, females are seriously unrepresented in the

judicial population, with only 3% of judges being women. This lack of female judges further exacerbates the judicial discrimination against women that sometimes prevents them from even bringing a case before the courts as a victim or plaintiff for adjudication.

The judicial system also has extreme issues with resources and infrastructure. In many cases, judges lack the reference materials (copies of laws, legal text books, and Supreme Court rulings) necessary to effectively decide matters of law. Furthermore, almost 60% of the designated courts have not been constructed yet while many of the existing courts require extensive repair to become functional. Most local courts lack the experience and legal expertise to effectively adjudicate complex cases, especially those involving forensic or circumstantial evidence. Often, those types of cases must be heard in Kabul which places extra strains on the justice system beyond the already potent issues the courts face.

Due to the inexperience of police, investigators, and prosecutors coupled with the inability of local courts to effectively weigh non-testimonial evidence, additional weight is placed on confessions and witness statements. As a result, abuse to obtain a confession or a statement is common and may result in false prosecutions. As detailed before, a severe shortage of prosecutors also hampers the system as cases are not presented to the courts, leaving the defendants remain incarcerated because the police cannot release them.

The Afghan people currently view the courts system as the most corrupt government institution. These feelings are not without basis as corruption or co-option of judges is common. There are several reasons for this:

- **Patronage:** Many judges are appointed to their positions by local tribal leaders or warlords and will not rule against those interests.
- **Poor pay:** Many judges earn less \$70 a month making them susceptible to bribes.
- **Security:** Judges who rule against powerful community figures, warlords, or terrorists are easily targeted by them for retribution. That many judges must travel distances from home to court over unsafe roads exacerbates this issue.

Jirgas and Shuras as local courts

A Jirga (Pashtun) or Shura (Dari) is a traditional meeting of community leaders to arrive at a decision on something that affects the entire village or tribe. In addition to rendering decisions on threats or disputes with outsiders, they also serve as an arbitrator and judicial system for local disagreements. The Afghan government recognizes the Jirga system of adjudication and arbitration, but is considering implementing some type of formal review process by the courts to help ensure

adherence to rule of law and human rights. Until that policy is implemented, however, rulings by Jirgas will carry the weight of law in many communities, especially rural areas.

Jirgas are typically comprised of tribal elders, religious and tribal leaders, and other members who may be specially selected to hear the case based on experience or knowledge of the disputants. Because Jirgas are local and comprised of men from the community, they are viewed very favorably by Afghans for dispute resolution with respect to trust and effectiveness. Often Jirgas will arrive at a resolution much faster than a court and the ruling will be more in line with the values of the disputants. Jirgas are also seen as less susceptible to corruption because the reputations of the Jirga members are on the line. Based on these factors, in all cases except murder, surveyed Afghans stated they would rather take a dispute to a Jirga as opposed to the court.

Operation of Jirgas

The convening of a Jirga is a ceremonial affair with many traditions that are followed during the process. The importance of the decision often drives the length and customs of the Jirga. A simple land dispute may be resolved under a tree in an afternoon while a murder case may involve a number of days' process with much ceremony. The principal goal of a Jirga is restorative justice. Under this system, both parties arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement.

In the case of wrong doing, the perpetrator admits the error and seeks forgiveness which the victim then grants thereby ending the dispute. This type of justice is critical in a culture comprised of small, potentially adversarial bands who cannot afford internal fighting that may weaken them to external threats. In order to be effective, however, all parties concerned (perpetrator, victim, and community) must see the Jirga's ruling as fair and impartial. Jirga members have a great deal at stake in arriving at fair decisions since their honor may be called into question restricting them from further Jirgas and causing a great deal of shame. The community's view of fairness is key in applying the moral and social pressure to enforce the verdict.

An appeals process exists for Jirgas. If either party feels the Jirga ruled improperly he/she may appeal to a second Jirga. If the second Jirga agrees that an error exists, the case goes to a third Jirga for re-hearing. If the second Jirga agrees with the first, the aggrieved party may appeal to a third and final Jirga. If that Jirga agrees with the first's ruling, the appeals process ends.

Jirgas are empowered by the community (not the government) to impose five types of punishments. Of these, reconciliation and peace (*sohl*) and compensation are the most common. Social boycott (*ratal*) is far less common while forced

marriage of a woman from the defendant's family to the victim's family (*baad*) and burning of the defendant's house, are very rare. However, different parts of the country may impose the punishments at different rates.

Issues with Jirgas

Jirgas are not without certain issues, however. The first is the concern that women cannot sit on Jirgas and often cannot bring complaints to them. In addition, the fact that the sentence of *baad* (forced marriage) of a woman from the perpetrator's family to a man in the victim's family is illegal under Afghan law cause many to argue that Jirgas may perpetuate the treatment of women as second class citizens. At this time, however, the courts are almost as inaccessible to women as the Jirga, although courts do not apply a sentence of *baad*.

Another issue with the Jirga is the perception that local warlords, militia, or the Taliban will install sympathizers on Jirga or be able to otherwise control their decisions. Since Jirga's decisions are not reviewed independently outside of the community, this fear is not baseless, although many Afghans surveyed believed that in most cases Jirgas remain insulated from this type of influence. Finally, some Jirga stand up a militia force (*arbakai*) to enforce its dictates. While this is not common, an area with an *arbakai* could potentially have two police forces, the militia and the ANP. In this case, conflict between the organizations could result. That the Jirga is recognized by the Afghan government as a valid form of legal recourse will further exacerbate the advisors' issues when dealing with the police.

Corrections System

The corrections system is operated by the MoJ and consists of pre-trial detention facilities and post trial prisons. Each province is supposed to have a functional prison while the MoJ operates 243 detention facilities across the country including the largest one in Kabul. The prisons house over 6000 inmates (approximately 200 females) while the detainee population is over 4400 (approximately 100 females).

Most prisons and detention facilities suffer from extremely poor conditions including overcrowding, lack of heat or cooling, and lack of basic facilities for food preparation and hygiene to include latrines. Inhumane treatment beyond the poor conditions is also prevalent including abuse and torture. Women and juvenile prisoners are especially vulnerable as most facilities lack adequate space to house them separately from the male population. In many cases, female prisoners have their dependant children held with them in the facility. The prison and detention facility population has increased markedly over the last few years, but it is unknown if this is due to an increase in criminal activity or the inability of the court systems to effectively adjudicate cases and release the innocent. Many occupants of

The detention facilities are held there for extended periods without seeing a judge because there is no prosecutor or judge to handle the case.

Detainee Rights

Once a detainee is transferred from the local ANP station to the area detention facility, a detention officer will review the case and determine if sufficient grounds exist to hold the suspect. If there is enough evidence, the detainee will be searched again and entered into the detainee log. The detention center will also retain any evidence on an evidence receipt. According to law, the suspect should receive his initial hearing within 72 hours of arrest to determine if he or she will be bound over for trial.

In reality, the rules listed above and the rights listed on the graph are more theory than practice. Many detention centers operators do not know the law. A further problem is these rules only apply to the MoJ detention centers, not detention cells that ANP may run. The ultimate result is that many detainees may remain in a limbo status for months or years awaiting their day in court.

Afghans have certain protections once they have been arrested:

- The detention officer will decide whether to detain that person
- A detention log must be opened
- Prisoners can be held only in accordance with the listed timelines
- The suspect will be searched again
- Grounds for searching must be made clear
- Officer of the opposite sex should never search a suspect
- Two witnesses of the same sex present
- Evidence should be entered on an evidence form
- Same sex share a cell
- 8 hours' uninterrupted rest in any 24-hour period
- 2 hours in the open air in any 24-hour period
- Supervised correspondence with outside persons
- Visits by close relatives
- Opportunity to buy food and books while in detention
- Visit by a physician



National Directorate of Security (NDS)

The NDS is the intelligence arm of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; a cross between U.S. CIA and FBI. NDS teams are found in every district, generally located nearby to the ANP headquarters. The NDS interface with the ANP with varying degrees of success and operate separate detention facilities. NDS officers occasionally wear uniforms but are most often seen in civilian clothes.

Section 2: ANP Operations and Effects

The Role of Police in a Counterinsurgency (COIN)

“Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their area of operation. Because of their frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace.” FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency pg 6-19

Overview

This section outlines the fundamental counterinsurgency (COIN) principles found in FM 3-24 and the *role of the police in a COIN environment*. Success in COIN operations requires establishing a legitimate government that is supported by the people. Achieving this goal requires the host nation (HN) to render the insurgent irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective HN security force.

The goal of policing in a COIN environment is to provide political legitimacy to the government through the population’s acceptance of authority. Since the police are best positioned to affect the population’s perception of the government on a daily basis, they become the frontline COIN force.

Because of their forward position in the counterinsurgency, the fact that the ANP are more lightly armed than the ANA, their tendency to operate in much smaller groups, use repetitive routes, and the fact that they are often in static positions, the ANP are often times more likely to be killed by insurgents than are ANA.

Police as a Counterinsurgency Force

The primary counterinsurgency objective is to provide security and rule of law to enable local institutions to grow and increase in effectiveness while decreasing the ability of the insurgency to execute operations.

Because of their frequent contact with the populace, police are often the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace. It is equally important to note, however, that in the case of larger insurgent bands, or insurgencies that have had time to mature, the local police often become ineffective in countering them based on mandate, mission, legal limitations, and training and equipping issues.



In these types of counterinsurgency operations, special strike units, military or police, may need to move into the area to defeat the threat. The local police, if previously effective, will play a key role in intelligence development through their intimate knowledge of the area and ability to develop a detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent strength, organization, and support. Except when faced by a large, aggressive insurgency, the police should be able to accomplish their goals by implementing the tenets of Community Policing. These actions become the basis of the policeman's daily duties.

Police effectiveness on the Spectrum of Conflict

Regardless of how effective a police force may be, law enforcement's ability to neutralize a large or entrenched insurgency is limited at best. The police can, depending on their level of development, help provide intelligence and support to more heavily armed, equipped, and trained elements (such as the ANA) that will eradicate the insurgency.

Even if the insurgency renders the local police unable to provide security, the police advisors can still work to help develop the station in such areas as:

- Anti-corruption efforts
- Processing of detainees turned over by paramilitary or military units or Coalition Forces
- Personnel and equipment accountability
- Post conflict security assumption plans

Civil Authority Triad

One of the challenges in developing transitional societies such as Afghanistan is the ability of the HN and coalition forces to establish a "civil authority triad," which consists of a fair and effective judiciary system, a professional police force, and a humane penal system. Through these three systems, the government can then provide reliable rule of law to its citizens.

- **Judiciary**-The court system is managed through an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court. As with the other parts of the triad, this system has developed slowly due in part to its cooption by the Taliban as well as the lack of courts throughout the country.
- **Law Enforcement**-The enforcement arm of the triad is the police, managed by the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior. The lack of a viable police force during the Taliban era has handicapped efforts by U.S. and ISAF to develop the police into a competent professional organization.

- **Corrections**-Until recently the corrections system in Afghanistan has been the most neglected system in the reform of the justice sector. Responsibility for prisons was transferred to the Ministry of Justice in 2003 from the Ministry of Interior.

Stability and security depend on establishment of, and respect for, *the rule of law* by government institutions that represent the state and by the citizens whom the rule of law seeks to protect. The rule of law is founded on clear, understandable legislation that is applied equally to all; respect for and adherence to such laws by the public and governmental officials; governmental authority to enforce adherence to the law and to bring violators to justice; and the means to hold government officials accountable for the misuse of power. A safe and secure environment depends on an effective police force, court system, and penal system as depicted by the civil authority triad working hand in hand with a society's other governmental systems. The base of a safe environment is provided by the laws set forth by a government and the people, defining acceptable actions and behaviors. In the triad, the police enforce the laws and investigate potential crimes providing the evidence to the judiciary for adjudication. The judiciary system is responsible for interpreting and applying the laws to the population and the penal system effects the lawful punishments handed down by the courts.

These three systems converge as police advisors train the competencies of apprehension, processing, investigation, pre-trial detention, and transfer of the case into the justice system for adjudication. The ANP initiates and supports the rule of law through crime and threat reduction. Consequently, the ANP provide the foundation for successful rule of law, and through legitimate and transparent law enforcement build community confidence and trust.

All three systems depend on one another in order to combat crime and insurgent activities. The area of focus for the police service is in enforcing the laws, without prejudice, throughout the local population. To do this, the police must understand the laws and legal system so as to actively apply the law day to day.

Community Actors that Disrupt Order

The police, in their effort to maintain order in the insurgency environment, face four principal adversaries:

- Terrorists
- Insurgents
- Militias
- Criminals

Of these four, the terrorists and insurgents represent the greatest threat to social order since their main goal is the destruction of that order. Al Qaeda and Taliban organizations make up the principal terrorist/insurgent groups and are the greatest threat to establishing and maintaining order as they thrive in areas of extreme disorder. These groups will employ any action that will instill fear and chaos to further their aims.

Militias and criminals, however, tend to operate within the existing social order or disorder and tend to support the status quo so long as it facilitates their operation. This statement does not make them any less dangerous to coalition or Afghanistan security forces, as they will fight to defend themselves or their operations, but it does force a different strategy in dealing with them. In most cases the police, when properly trained and prepared, are better suited than military units to deal with these types of organizations.

Key to COIN: Creating a Secure Environment

Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. The first step to gaining trust and confidence in the government is to provide a safe and secure environment for the populace to work and conduct daily life. This initially involves securing the local populace and providing for essential services.



Countering an insurgency requires a police force that is visible day and night. The government will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets some or all of the time.

Properly located and protected police stations that are defensible can establish a presence in communities as long as the police do not hide in those stations.

An effective police force can assist in creating a safe environment in the community. Being proactive and efficient in their actions, police display a position of strength to the insurgents and a sense of safety to the local population. Showing a genuine interest in and concern for the safety and security of the local population through active patrolling and rapid response to the community are investments in building trust between the police and the local population. The community must believe that the police work to protect and help them while remaining accountable to the local government. It is the police that must foster these beliefs through active community engagement and acting as part of the community, not aloof from it.

The Police must demonstrate that they are part of the solution for the average citizen and are working to put an end to the attacks from violent extremists. Violent

opposition to the Afghan government and coalition forces comes from a variety of groups with political, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives. Some groups receive support from outside Afghanistan. Each of the violent Afghan factions is driven by its own political power relationships, and the factions are often hostile to one another

Another Key to COIN: Winning the Support of the People

Winning the support of the people is a fundamental COIN principle police must understand. There is no doubt that the success of the Afghan Police and perhaps the success of a democratic Afghanistan is tied to the police's ability to positively connect to the community they serve. The police are the first line, face to face, connection to the larger government. This concept is not easily accomplished due to many factors including the actions of the police during and after the Taliban era.



Ever since the fall of the Taliban regime, there are documented cases of the police abusing their power for personal gain or for other issues such as tribe domination or helping the insurgent cause. In order to win support of the people, the police must accomplish the following:

- Convince the community that the police will contribute to the community's return to normal life by protecting them from criminal violence. The police must continue to show they are part of the solution for the average citizen.
- The ANP must strive to make life for the community better than life under the Taliban. Then the Taliban will have a hard time finding haven among the populace. People will turn on them and contact the police instead of tolerating their presence or criminal operations.
- Police must separate themselves from negative factors such as sectarian and ethnic violence, corruption, and political influence. This effort will be very difficult because these "influencers" are embedded in everything about this society. The Minister of Interior and police leadership must help the police work within these differences. The desired end state is for police to learn how to treat the people in the community they serve with equality.

To improve relations with the Afghan people, the police will need to establish a bond of trust and cooperation. The police must take steps to establish a relationship with the community they serve. As the ANP gain the trust and confidence of the population being served, a symbiotic relationship (you scratch my back, I scratch

your back) evolves. This relationship built on trust increases the dialogue between the police and the community, resulting in tips and information. Information collection is a critical piece of a policeman's daily job. Information from local sources provides the most time-sensitive information in a format that the collector can describe with all five senses since police duties require daily interaction with the local populace, the police are best suited to gather this information. One hundred percent trust for the police by all people will never be realized. However, a level of trust enabling peace, security, and a sense of normality must be achieved. The police need the cooperation of the community to do their job.

Effects of a Secure Environment

Establishing a safe environment will pay dividends to the police in their continuing effort to reduce violence, establish order, and locate and eradicate other insurgent or criminal elements in the community. Beyond that, as security improves, the community will begin to live more "normal" lives with the return of work and commerce. As opportunities move into the area, the citizens will see that their government exists to serve and help them better themselves and make them more willing to support the government. This "winning hearts and minds" will then translate into the community providing greater support to the government and the police making it harder for the enemy factions to operate in that area.

Leveraging Police Intelligence Operations

Police Intelligence Operations (PIO) are conducted by collecting raw information and observations and then categorizing, organizing, and evaluating the material. That process converts the information into intelligence. The data comes from the information gathered by the police from the local populace, criminal reports and investigations, reports from other stations, other local or governmental organizations, and open sources (news, internet, etc.). The information gathered from the people in the community is invaluable and can often guard those people from harm and advance security and stability. The talk on the street in Afghanistan is extremely powerful; passing information by word of mouth is the most important part of communicating in this society.

The police must understand how to get this information while protecting from harm the person who is giving it to them. The criminals or insurgents will punish anyone giving up information that would stop one of their acts of violence. Protecting the people and families of those who choose to trust the police is very important. This is not a new idea, but it cannot be



overemphasized, especially as this new relationship begins. As the ANP systems develop, the advisors must ensure they collect the intelligence developed by the ANP and pass it on to the land-owning S-2 section to ensure that all information is incorporated into Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield products. The advisors should also provide commentary on the perceived reliability of the information.

The Afghan Police Organization & Structure

This information will help the police advisors understand what a typical ANP station might look like and how the station is manned and equipped. Although the missions vary among the types of police, the station and capabilities are relatively similar. This portion provides information about the general design of an ANP station, organizational structure, authorized equipment, and identification cards.

<p><i>“First time I ever saw an Afghan Police Station I thought it was something straight out of the dark ages, complete with zero electricity, mud structure, and no sewage drainage. Immediately I knew this mission would be challenging and wondered what the heck I got myself into?”</i></p> <p>U.S. Army MP CPT</p>
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The Tashkil

The Tashkil is similar to an Army Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE,) and is organized as follows: Each police organization is described in a document, followed by an organization chart, followed by a rollup of the organization; it includes generic documents of the structure and substructures in a table of distribution and allowances. These generic tables of distribution and allowances form the baseline for developing a fully documented force structure.

District Station Organization

The Tashkil breaks down district ANP stations into three broad categories, small, medium, and large. These basic types are then further sub-divided into different size organizations based on the Tashkil.

The numbers listed underneath the type of unit are the recommended personnel strength for the HQ element companies, platoons and squads. In addition to what is shown here, each District is supposed to have 3 traffic police assigned to the HQ element. Provincial HQ are authorized 60 ANP and Regional HQ are authorized 296 personnel.

Tashkils have been through many changes. No numbers in this guide can be taken as a representation of what every province or district may be allotted. It is a key issue to ensure that advisors are operating off of the most recent Tashkil published by MoI for their area of responsibility.

District Station Headquarters Breakdown

In order for a district station to function properly, the ANP need to fill key staff and leadership roles. Unfortunately, in many stations, some of the positions are unfilled, while in other stations the chief is the only key position filled. This lack of staff officer support makes the advisor's job of developing the support systems for the station much more difficult. Districts usually have a Chief, a Deputy Chief, a Personnel Officer, a Logistics Officer, and a Training Officer. They will likely have designated someone as a "Checkpoints Officer." Due to rank reform, some of these positions may be filled with non-officer ranks.

ANP Leadership Structure

Control in the ANP is very centralized. As a result, subordinate officers rarely have the latitude to make decisions without first consulting with the chief. In some ways, this centralized control makes the advisor's job easier since once he convinces the chief of the need to do something, he has convinced the whole station. On the down side, however, subordinate leaders will rarely take the initiative to solve problems without direction, and if the chief is not present they will often defer a decision, even a critical one, until his return.

Many ANP chiefs owe their position not to leadership ability or police experience, but to the patronage of a local leader. As a result, advisors must often guide them very closely to help them do the right things. That Afghan leaders are not expected to "lead from the front" also hampers action as the chief may avoid danger while placing his ANP in precarious situations. Many chiefs also feel that their position grants them the right to certain "benefits" including skimming pay or demanding additional compensation from the community.

Most staff officers that do exist have no formal training or experience in their role. This lack of knowledge will force the advisors to not only help them develop systems, but to teach them the basics of their staff roles. Finally, while the ANP will normally have some type of duty officer, these men will have little leeway to make independent decisions. Additionally, many of them do not realize that part of supervision is actually going out to where the ANP are operating and watching them do their jobs.

Rank structure in the ANP is more like a military organization, and the ANP patrolman is referred to casually as a “sarboz.” ANA soldiers are “askar”, but both sarboz and askar mean soldier. The ANP sarboz is most likely a local male of military age, sometimes selected by his elders to serve as an ANP. Levels of commitment and enthusiasm vary greatly. Most are illiterate but are easily trained through “show, then do” type training. Repetitious reinforcement brings the maximum effect. This requires patience.

ANP Rank Reform

The pre-reform ANP was a top-heavy organization with too many officers for the population of ANP patrolmen. Rank reform is the process of scaling the leadership positions in accordance with the Tashkil authorizations of the organization. Rank reform is an ongoing phased process. Pay reform is connected to rank reform in that, until officers are vetted through rank reform and assigned an authorized position, they continue to be paid under the pre-reform pay scale if an officer is not slotted into the scale. If in an authorized position, he is either reduced to a rank that is in accordance with an authorized position or moved out and receives a severance-type payment equal to one year’s salary under the old pay scale. Police chiefs often use their previous higher rank (their rank prior to rank reform) when dealing with advisors. For example, a chief previously held the rank of Colonel before the rank reform, and after the reform his rank was lowered to major. That chief will still want to be called “Colonel” even though his new rank is Major. He may even wear the higher rank on his uniform, or he may refuse to wear rank. This may cause some confusion with the advisors who are trying to verify pay. They need to verify their chief’s rank against the by-name list based on position published by the MoI.

Besides pay and rank reform, a merit-based system for officer selection has been implemented. Officers now have to compete for their position by submitting a written application, taking a written test, and after being vetted for suitability, appearing before a board for an interview.

ANP Organizational Equipment, Facilities, and Individual Equipment

SHOOT			
Weapon	Weapon Issuance	Ammunition	Ammunition Issuance
9MM S&W Pistol (Individual)	1 each AUP, ABP, All Others	9MM Ball	64 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads
AMD-65 Rifle (Individual)	1 per AUP/ABP	7.62MM X 39MM Ball/Tracer	420 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads (340/80)
12GA Mossberg Shotgun (Squad)	1 per 7 AUP	12GA Buckshot/Slug	50 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads
PKM Light Machine Gun (Squad)	1 per 7 ABP, AUP	7.62MM X 54MM Ball/Tracer	1,200 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads (960/240)
RPK Machine Gun (Squad)	1 per 7 ABP, AUP	7.62MM X 39MM Ball/Tracer	1,200 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads (960/240)
GP25/30 Grenade Launcher (Squad)	1 per 7 ABP, AUP	GP25/30 Grenades	36 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads
RPG-7 Grenade Launcher (Platoon)	1 per 30 ABP, AUP	RPG-7 HE/FRAG Grenades	14 Rounds per Weapon/2 OP Loads

MOVE	
Vehicle Type	Vehicle Issuance
LTV: Ford Ranger Pick-Up Truck	1 Per 7 Personnel
Donor Vehicles	As Required; Working On Hand Qty

COMMUNICATE	
Radio Type	Issuance
HF LTV (Long Range)	1 Per 4 Vehicles ABP
VHF LTV (Short Range)	1 Per Each Vehicle For AUP
VHF Hand Held (HH) (Short Range)	1 Per 3 AUP, 1 Per 2 ABP
HF Man Pack (Long Range)	10 Per CTC/RTC
HF Base Station (Long Range)	2 Per RCC/PCC HQ, 1 Per District HQ
VHF Base Station (Short Range)	1 Per District HQ

Equipment

Each Afghan Police station is authorized equipment based on the CSTC-A fielding plans as depicted in the table. The equipment fielding plan is based on the personnel authorized at a station. The equipment on hand should be routinely inventoried by the advisors for accountability and serviceability. Unserviceable items need to be reported on the *MoI Form 14* in order to be reissued to the ANP.

A related equipping challenge is to obtain sufficient funding to operate and maintain authorized equipment. Donated police vehicles are of little use when the police cannot afford to maintain or get fuel for them. A related equipping challenge is the problem of nonstandard or substandard equipment.

Communications

ANP communications equipment is intended for two purposes: to keep district headquarters in touch with their assigned forces and to keep headquarters at all levels linked to the Ministry of the Interior command and control system. While advisors may find a wide variety of communications equipment in any district, some of which has been “gifted” by donor nations or retained from the Soviet occupation, the Ministry of the Interior is now issuing a standard suite of communications equipment to all districts. HF radios (base stations man-portable units Codan stations, man units, and vehicle radios) are manufactured by Codan. The VHF radios (base stations, repeaters, man-portable units, vehicle radios and hand-held radios) are manufactured by Motorola.



The Afghans do have a system for requesting maintenance support for communications equipment through ANP channels. Maintenance support may be delivered by mobile maintenance teams or by a depot repair system, depending on the severity of the maintenance problem. Almost all HF systems can be powered by city power, local generator power, automotive alternators, batteries, solar cells (provided with all base station units), or hand-cranked generators (also provided with base station units). Because much of the ANP radio equipment is mobile, expensive, and highly pilferable, advisor teams should emphasize personal accountability for assigned equipment and advise their counterparts to accomplish frequent, regularly scheduled accountability checks.

Insurgents often use ICOM radios for communications. Advisors may find ANP using ICOM radios as well. While effective communications equipment, their communications can be monitored by insurgents and vice versa. ANP and

insurgents have been known to exchange taunts via these radios. This may be an area of Communications Security (COMSEC) weakness.

Weapons

The ANP are not armed like a Western police force. They carry automatic weapons including belt-fed machine guns and RPG's. Weapons include:

- AKM, AKMS (Caliber 7.62 x 39)
- AMD-65 – an AKMS variant with a metal stock that folds forward underneath the weapon, forward vertical grip, slightly shorter barrel, and muzzle brake/flash suppressor (Caliber 7.62 x 39)
- RPK Automatic Rifle (Caliber 7.62 x 39)
- PKM Machine Gun – belt fed, non-disintegrating link machine gun of Russian design – commonly called “Pika” by Afghans (Caliber 7.62 x 54R)
- RPG – most commonly the RPG-7, although RPG-2's can be found
- Smith and Wesson 9mm pistol – provided by coalition

Afghans refer to any AK-47 variant as a “Kalashnikov.” If an advisor asks about an AK-47 or AKM, he will sometimes not be understood, but “Kalashnikov” will immediately bring recognition.

All sight adjustments on AK-47 type weapons are made at the front sight post and require a special tool. Sight adjustment tools are very difficult to find. The ANP rarely have them and generally their weapons are not zeroed.

Muzzle awareness is a major problem with many ANP, especially those who have never had an advisor team before. Developing muzzle awareness takes patience and constant spot corrections. Over time, these efforts will have an impact. ANP will also have a tendency to carry loaded weapons with the safety disengaged. A Kalashnikov-type weapon with a selector switch in a position other than “safe” is easy to spot. Advisors need to maintain vigilance regarding the condition and position of ANP weapons.



ANP Vehicles

The ANP drive several types of vehicles. The majority patrol in Ford Ranger pickups provided by the coalition, but other vehicles may include late-model pickups



donated by other nations and Soviet-era jeeps. Motorcycles may also be in the inventory. These vehicles will be in various states of repair at the different stations. Advisors must encourage their counterparts to perform maintenance, including preventive maintenance. Contractors provide

maintenance support to the ANP through five regional maintenance sites and six satellite sites. They also have mobile maintenance teams to support remote sites, if needed. Stations should route requests for maintenance support through their higher HQ while the advisor teams should provide parallel copies of the request through the PMT channels to the ARSIC.

Accountability

Accountability of weapons and ammunition remains problematic due to poor record keeping, theft, maintenance issues, and, in the case of ammunition, operational use. Since the ANP are not known for their fire discipline, keeping stations stocked with sufficient ammunition in areas with a lot of enemy activity will become a constant challenge for the advisor teams.



The amount of equipment on hand at a station will vary for several reasons (priority level of the station accountability, availability, theft, corruption etc.). Equipment on hand will not always be fully mission

capable. Some regions have more of a “push”-based logistics system where the ANP Regional Commander receives equipment and then pushes the equipment down to the next level after he has taken the amount he needs. In some cases, the logistics flow stops at the provincial level due to provincial chiefs’ refusal to issue equipment to subordinates. This results in equipment being hoarded at the provincial level

with stockpiles of equipment sitting in storage. Advisors must work with the District CoP and the higher HQ PMT to ensure that they request supplies and that the supplies are issued by the provincial CoP.

Facilities



District Police Station in Zormat.

Afghan National Police Station Design

Station Layouts

Police stations in Afghanistan run the gamut from a single small building in a town center to large compounds that incorporate the police along with other government buildings. Since the ANP live at the station while on shift, the buildings often include sleeping areas and cooking areas as well as working areas. The building should have a detention cell that can hold an average of 30 persons. There should be numerous offices to accommodate the leadership, administration, supply, storage, and arms room. Some stations have lockers and shower facilities. Standard arms rooms typically do not exist.



The Nurguram, Nuristan District Center has been under construction for over two years. The contractors were paid up front.

Instead, weapons storage may range from a room within the police station to under the ANP's beds. The police will usually have some form of force protection plan implemented by coalition forces to protect the station from attack. Advisors need to talk with their coalition partners to confirm or deny the existence of such a plan and develop one if there is none in effect. The force protection plan should include some form of an ECP manned by the ANP. Recent trends are away from direct attacks on coalition and Afghan National Army (ANA)

forces. The Taliban has shifted their attacks to the police, aid workers, the media, and civilians. In light of this, CSTC-A is assisting the ANP in upgrading the infrastructure and force protection of individual police districts in the outlying regions. Advisors should expect to see various levels of force protection at different stations from nothing, to only local construction, to a mix of coalition supplied equipment and local construction, to complete augmentation by ISAF.

The most common type of coalition provided barrier materials are HESCO baskets, although some stations close to ISAF facilities will have concrete barriers. Locally contracted concrete and rock walls are less expensive than HESCO barriers and provide good ballistic protection. Walls do not provide as effective protection against heavy Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED's.) PMT's often find themselves seeking contracts to improve facilities for force protection and other reasons such as sanitation or habitability.

Advisors should not expect the typical ANP station to resemble anything close to what an American police station would look like. ANP stations range from mud and straw buildings to newly constructed buildings using Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) funds. CSTC A is also funding numerous station rebuilds and renovations throughout the country. Most of these pre-existing buildings are poorly constructed, and the advisor teams should expect to encounter these conditions:

- *Electricity (1 to 2 kerosene lanterns for light) in rural areas up to 2 to 4 hours of power each day.*
- *Lack of heat and air conditioning.*
- *Generators that work poorly (if at all).*
- *Latrines that are almost all "Eastern style" and have plumbing problems.*
- *Limited water and an unworkable sewage system.*

Remote stations may have solar panels with what appear to be car batteries to store power during the day.


Winterization

Each PMT will be required to complete a winterization plan for the ANP facilities beginning in the late summer months. This is to ensure that proper supplies of firewood and stoves are available as the weather becomes cold.



Afghan roof construction technique

Layout of a District Station Complex



This diagram depicts a sample layout of a District Station. The ANP station is co-located with the district's government building and sits on the edge of town. Adjacent to the compound are a hotel, a market, and a cell phone tower.

Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE)

ANP Officer and Enlisted Uniforms

Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) items for the ANP include: Uniforms (including boots and cold weather gear,) baton w/holder, service belt, 9mm magazine case, handcuffs, flexi-cuffs w/cutter, whistle, flashlight, binoculars, ear and eye protection, and tactical gloves. ANP that have attended an academy since 2007 (either individually or as part of FDD) should have received this basic issue. Many advisors will find, however, that their stations are woefully short of this equipment with the logistics officer (if he exists) not having records of what was or was not issued.

This figure depicts examples of officer and enlisted uniforms. Stations that have gone through the focused district development program and ANP that have attended an academy should have uniforms. In some cases, especially in rural

areas, many ANP assigned to a station may have no or only partial uniforms.



ANP summer and winter uniforms appear identical, but are made of different materials




Traffic Police Uniform

ANP Patch and Uniform Variants

The ANP patch is worn on the upper left arm, with the Afghan flag patch on the upper right arm. Many ANP, especially in the outlying provinces and districts, have yet to receive their uniform issues. As a result, it may be difficult to distinguish the ANP from anyone else in the community.



Summer and winter uniforms look similar, with the winter uniform being made of wool. Most PMT's may never see a ceremonial uniform. Officer and NCO rank is worn on epaulets.



Systems Development

Overview

Systems development is one of the key goals of the police advising mission. While the initial focus on developing the ANP included growing and equipping the force and providing the basics in survivability and ethics training, as the police mature, the inherent weaknesses in their personnel, logistics, and operations system will retard their overall improvement. This section is designed to provide the advisors of an overview of how the ANP systems are supposed to function. In many cases, however, the team will find the reality on the ground is far from the ideal. In some cases, the system may not even exist. The five key systems are:

- Personnel
- Finance
- Logistics
- Operations
- Training



*ANP Systems challenge ANP and
Advisors alike*

As will be covered later, systems development requires a top down approach for completely successful implementation. Lower level advisory teams will have to work with the provincial and regional PMTs to ensure a top down synchronization of systems development.

Work Station Schedule

ANP normally work a “fire house” schedule where they will live and work at the station for a number of days followed by some time off. Unfortunately, the work schedule of the ANP is rarely formalized. Therefore neither the chief nor the advisors can accurately predict how many ANP will be at the station from day to day. This lack of predictability is exacerbated when the ANP conduct a major operation. It is not unusual on the day after an operation for the ANP to have almost no one on duty due to poor schedule management. Typically, advisors can expect to find 50-70% of a station’s assigned strength on duty at any given time. While some of the absences are authorized (time off, sick, injured, leave) some of the absences may be “ghost” police who either do not exist or exist only to collect a pay check.

Pre-shift guard mounts or inspections of ANP on duty are alien concepts to most ANP leaders. Many ANP will receive their duty assignment to a check point and then will remain there all day without relief. With the exception of the station's guard force, most ANP do not work at night and will be found asleep in the station. If the area has a high threat of attack, most of the ANP may stay up at night to protect themselves then sleep during the day, leaving the community uncovered. Those ANP assigned to staff work normally live at the station also and will be "on duty" from mid morning until mid afternoon. The chief also normally lives at the station, but his work hours may vary depending on his assessment of the threat in the area.

ANP Recruiting and Vetting Process

While the Ministry of the Interior has established national standards for eligibility into the ANP, the decentralized nature of the recruiting and vetting process makes these standards more of a suggestion than an enforceable edict. In many cases, nominees for the ANP are brought forth by local and tribal leaders as a form of patronage. The amount of influence that these leaders can bring to bear on the ANP leadership often guarantees that their nominees will get accepted onto the force.




That many ANP owe their jobs to the influence of these local leaders has led to the perception that many of them have ties to insurgents or the Taliban, work with illegal militias, or have questionable loyalty to the ANP over their tribal benefactors. Unfortunately, in many cases, these perceptions are reality. The lack of a comprehensive national criminal database also makes weeding out the bad very difficult. In a country where mid to upper level Taliban leaders

can freely travel the streets because no one is able or willing to identify them makes infiltration of the ANP by criminals and insurgents a foregone conclusion.

During periods of high recruitment, an Afghan recruiting strategy is to appeal to the elders to support the ANP by bringing candidates forward. This strategy has a secondary effect of binding the local population to the ANP. There may be resistance to providing candidates. Resistance to providing candidates will be based on the ANP image in the local community and the perception of danger to the ANP from insurgents or criminals.

Vetting and Recruiting Process



In order to begin the recruiting process, a recruit must have his National ID certificate, the Tazkera. Individuals can get the Tazkera at any official district center through the sub-governor. While at the district or provincial headquarters, the governor, sub-governor, or one of their designees then verifies identity with district records or confirms the authenticity of the two tribal elders who have verified the identity and background of the recruit. Each recruit must bring 12 passport photos: 6 for recruiting paperwork and 6 for additional copies of the paperwork.

It is important to note that the approval to hire an ANP recruit lies with the Provincial government. While this decentralized approach does streamline the process, it can potentially lead to abuses since the approving authorities may be more susceptible to influence from local leaders or forces. Also it makes it difficult to identify someone who committed crimes outside of the province. Finally, the provincial hiring authority is not bound to adhere to the MoI recruiting standards. As a result, it is not uncommon for illiterate men to get hired as ANP despite the requirement that they can read and write.

Potential police recruits should be entered into the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) system as soon as possible to establish biometrics. If the individual has been entered before, there may be information that serves to either confirm or deny reliability.

Basic Police Training

A new ANP hire is expected to attend basic police training at either the Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul or one of the seven Regional Training Centers (RTC) in Kandahar, Gardez, Herat, Kunduz, Jalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Bamian.

New hires are expected to attend training within 1-3 months of hire, since they are paid full ANP from the date of hire, often there is no impetus for them to go. Poor record keeping further exacerbates the problem resulting in a large number of untrained ANP. Districts and Provinces will typically have a Training Officer as well as a Personnel Officer. This is an opportunity to ensure progress with systems development for these officers.



The eight week Basic training is intended to serve as a starting point and not as the ultimate training solution. With the current security situation thrusting the ANP more into a COIN as opposed to a law enforcement role, most of the basic course focuses more on combat related skills as opposed to policing skills. The course does cover police ethics in depth, however. The courses at the training centers are taught by Afghan instructors who are overseen by American civilian police (CIVPOL) advisors or deployed police officers from other allied nations.

Kabul Police Academy (KPA)



The Kabul Police Academy (KPA) serves to develop ANP leaders. Its principal purpose is to provide a pre-commissioning course to potential ANP lieutenants. NCOs nominees also come here to attend a NCO leadership course. Additionally, the academy offers a number of short courses for professional skills development including senior leader training. The establishment of the KPA and its pre-commissioning courses for lieutenants and sergeants are an important

step to improving the professionalism of those ranks. Previously, ANP officers were often selected through family or tribal connections.

Advanced Training Courses

In addition to basic police training, the CTC and RTCs offer other, more advanced law enforcement training. The principal course among these is the 8-week ANP



advanced course that is designed to build on the basic course by providing more training on democratic policing skills including ethics, human rights, and gender equality. The course also works to instill national pride and identity with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and in the National Police organization while introducing advanced police tactics and night operations.

These centers also offer advanced leadership training for station officers and NCOs that did not attend the KPA. Unfortunately, provincial and district level leaders have not expressed much interest in this course and those designated to attend often fail to show up for the training. The CTC also has a number of advanced law enforcement courses designed by CSTC-A and MoI including Special Weapons and Tactics, Advanced Weapons Training, Women's Police Corps Training, Police K-9 Program (Bomb/Drug), Advanced Crime Scene Investigation, Homicide Investigation, Professional Standards Training, Customs Training, Driving Course, Domestic Violence Training, Instructor Training Class, Advanced Counterterrorism, and Counter Narcotics.

In addition to these courses, on-the-job training and mentoring programs are becoming more common. The CTC and RTCs have a five-week Field Training Officer Course that takes a train-the-trainer approach. The purpose of this course is to produce field training officers (FTO) that then return to their home stations with the skills and resources necessary to teach new hires and basic training graduates sustainment skills.





ANP Pay Rates

Following pay rates are effective from October 2007 until further notice.
Pay is per month.

RANK	Pre-"Pay Reform"	"Pay Reform"	ANP with ANA Pay Parity
LTG	\$107	\$750	\$780
MG	\$103	\$650	\$680
BG	\$95	\$550	\$580
COL	\$92	\$400	\$430
LTC	\$88	\$350	\$380
MAJ	\$83	\$300	\$330
CPT	\$78	\$250	\$280
1LT	\$69	\$200	\$230
2LT	\$66	\$180	\$210
1st SGT	\$62	\$160	\$190
2nd SGT	\$62	\$140	\$170
3rd SGT	\$62	\$115	\$145
1st PTRLMN	\$70	\$80	\$110
2nd PTRLMN	\$70	\$70	\$100

ANP pay has been a constant issue that contributed to the corruption level within the police force. During the Taliban reign and extending into the post Taliban period, police were some of the lowest paid workers in the nation. This low pay, coupled with ANP leaders' penchant for skimming pay as it passed through each level of leadership led to the ANP's habitual use of extortion and bribery to augment their income. As a result, CSTC-A is working with MoI and MoF to implement changes in the pay system that would both bring the ANP pay on line with the ANA thereby increasing recruiting and retention in the ANP as well as ensure that the individual ANP receives his entitled pay. The MOI will achieve this second goal through a three phase pay reform plan:

- Ministry of Finance representatives travel to provinces and verify payroll lists and pay police.
- The Ministry of Finance sends the payroll to the Afghan Bank. Tellers pay the police after checking ID.
- Electronic fund transfer to individual bank accounts. Note: Electronic fund transfer will not be possible in all provinces because of the lack of modern banks.

The goal for achieving the EFT phase is the end of 2008. Variances in infrastructure and the availability of banks and MoF representatives has resulted in an uneven progress in achieving these goals. As a result, depending on what part of the country the advisors are operating in will determine the pay system in use.

Station Personnel Administration

One of the key factors in helping the ANP with their administration section is realizing that Afghanistan is still a third world country with third world problems. While not necessarily efficient or effective, the stubby pencil method of record keeping may be the best. The key question is, can the administration section answer higher HQ and the Chief's questions regarding his personnel? In some cases, the advisors will have to help the ANP develop their administrative record keeping from scratch. Since most HQs do not require Personnel Status (PERSTAT) reports, many district stations have ignored the requirements of maintaining any types of records. In addition, the rampant illiteracy amongst the ANP makes record keeping difficult at best.

One of the key areas the records system must address is a by name tracking of who has attended formal training. In some cases, the ANP will track only numbers of attendees without linking names. As a result, even after the 10 trained ANP are killed, the station continues to report 10 trained ANP on the books.

PMT's need to create a tracking system of their own as a shadow of the Afghan records. While this takes some time, a simple system of tracking basic information, along with a photograph of each ANP will assist in recognizing issues and working towards resolution through systems development. This may be difficult at the Provincial level, but every opportunity must be taken to have a record of each individual that we are coming into contact with. This is also a tool to provide continuity with RIP/TOA, enabling relieving teams to pick up more quickly in the footsteps of the relieved team. When relieving another team, it should be determined if this has been done previously.

Logistics

One of the most significant shortcomings in the ANP is their inability to plan and execute logistics and sustainment requirements. Factors underlying this deficiency include inadequate levels of sustainment stocks and limited capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle. Senior military advisors and civilian contractors are assisting senior MoI officials in developing their capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and upgrade their forces.

To help the ANP take a giant step toward becoming a self-sustaining police force, advisors need to reinforce the importance of relying on the Afghan supply system for logistical support instead of turning to coalition forces for support.

There have been modest improvements in the MoI's ability to perform key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting.

The MoI is responsible for all facets of ANP supply and manpower. Due to the impoverished nature of the country, however, almost all of the equipment distributed by MoI to the ANP is provided by donor nations. Since the Afghan economy is still in a developmental status, this fact is not likely to change in the near term. The amount of equipment provided to MOI and then down to the lower commands is based on the Tashkil manning document. Unfortunately this foreign support in some way hampers the development of the ANP logistics system since it engenders a feeling of, "If we wait long enough, NATO will just give us what we need," in the ANP.



PMT's help prepare uniforms for issue

Police advisors must combat this feeling by making obtaining coalition logistical support as painful as possible for the ANP leadership. Although there is an Afghan Supply System in place that should push equipment and supplies down from MoI warehouses to the regional, provincial, and district ANP stations, this system is not well understood or effectively executed by the ANP. The main problem is getting the Afghan government to take ownership of the supply system and push the equipment down to the ANP stations. While the MOI pushes equipment quarterly to the regional commands, the regions and the provinces often hoard the equipment they receive and will not push it out to the district stations that need it.


As with administration, if they exist at all, the vast majority of supply records are handwritten memos or logbooks, which make the entire supply process cumbersome. This poor record keeping also makes theft or sale of ANP equipment easier to accomplish and harder to detect.

Another issue that often affects maintenance is the wide variety of types of equipment the ANP use. Multiple donor nations have provided different types of equipment that may or may not be compatible with other gear. Further, the ANP will also have Taliban and Soviet era equipment that they continue to use. Finally, the ANP supply system is normally not proactive in nature and does not track usage rates or conduct periodic inventories. As a result, it is not until a station is critically short on some type of equipment that they will announce there is a problem. Advisors will need to make copies of any requests forwarded by the ANP to their HQ and send these to the next level PMT to ensure that the request is being tracked at all levels. Sending the requests through this chain should ensure that the paperwork is making it to the right people.

Afghan Supply Request Process

Afghan Supply Request Process

- Advisors are attempting to develop a “push-pull” supply system where stations can identify and request what they need
- All supply requests submitted on [Form 14](#)
- Filled requisitions reported on [Form 9](#)



Advisor teams should be sensitive to the fact that requests for supplies from district commanders are generally not acted upon in a timely manner, leaving the stations in dire need of supplies. The team may have to escort the logistics officer or police chief to the next higher headquarters to ensure that the requested supplies are issued properly. If this fails, the team chief must contact the next higher PMT or their chain of command to work the issue.

Due to decentralized control and funding of elements that make up the MoI, there is no standardized unit equipment accountability procedure. The responsibility for proper equipment accountability is delegated to the subordinate organizations, with most elements maintaining equipment accountability through the use of hand receipts and manual ledgers.

Fuel Distribution

Vehicle fuel distribution is a shared responsibility of the MoI and coalition forces. The MoI provides a set amount of fuel to the regions based on the assigned number of vehicles. Each province has a specific monthly allotment for fuel. This is tied to mileage reports that must be submitted to the JRCC monthly. If a province fails to file mileage reports, their fuel allotment will be cut by 10% for that month. Districts must submit mileage reports on each vehicle to the Provincial Logistics Officer, who will consolidate the reports and forward them to the JRCC. All ANP requests for fuel must use the MoI procurement process by filling out a Form 14. All Form 14s must originate from the Afghan ANP station in need of the fuel. The request is then forwarded through the provincial headquarters before arriving at the MoI for approval. The MoI then approves or disapproves the request. Obviously, this process is very time consuming making it impractical when the station has no fuel on hand.



Fuel delivery to a Provincial HQ

In some cases, a station's allocation is insufficient to meet its operational requirements. Since the process of getting additional fuel is so time consuming, vehicles may sit for weeks without gas. Also, the inherent danger on the roads makes moving fuel to outlying stations difficult, often resulting in their not receiving their fuel allocation.

Advisor teams may have to provide fuel to the ANP in order to allow them to conduct operations. Specific guidance will be provided by the local battlespace owner regarding conditions and amounts you can provide. Again, the decision for the advisors to provide the ANP fuel makes them more dependent on us and undermines their logistics systems. Leaders must balance the need to develop sustainable systems against operational requirements and decide if one outweighs the other.

The key reason behind the mileage reports on each vehicle is to prevent or recognize fuel theft. Fuel theft at all levels is a huge problem, exacerbating the existing distribution problems. Be aware that an ANP unit may approach you for fuel to replace the fuel that they have sold in the bazaar. Be especially careful of placing fuel in cans, as it is more easily sold.

Vehicle/Equipment Maintenance

CSTC-A has purchased a maintenance contract to ensure the ANP vehicles receive routine services (every 6 weeks or 5000 miles) as well as receive major repairs when needed. The contract has established 5 regional maintenance facilities (in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif) and four satellite facilities (in Kunduz, Bamyian, Fayzabad, and Jalalabad). The contract calls for the maintenance company to provide towing services to move broken vehicles to the maintenance facility as well as provide a mobile maintenance team that can



This LTV was rolled down a mountain

travel to various stations and conduct routine maintenance on site. The ANP should submit requests for maintenance through their higher HQ while the advisor team also forwards the request up through PMT/ARSIC channels.


Despite this contract, preventive maintenance at the stations remains an issue. Not only do many ANP have little idea how to properly maintain their vehicles, they often lack the basic supplies (such as motor oil) necessary to actively maintain their trucks. Also outlying stations in rugged or dangerous areas of the country are often cut off from the maintenance facilities as they cannot safely get their vehicles to the facilities or get the mobile team to them.

In addition to the vehicle contract, CSTC-A has also established a communications repair contract at the regional HQs levels. District stations may send broken radios to these facilities for repair, but transportation issues often impair the outlying stations' ability to get the radios in for repair. Finally, the ANP, especially those who have not attended training, have very little preventive maintenance knowledge. The police will often neglect their equipment to the point of failure and then throw it into a room to rust.

Operations and Investigations

Most district stations have very weak operations sections that have yet to master the basics of operational planning and coordination. In many cases, the station will develop its patrol and check point plan (if it has one) based more on whim than on a solid analysis of the area including crime or activity patterns. Much of this problem is due to a lack of organization for intelligence operations within the ANP. Advisors will have to work with their counterparts to teach them how to develop intelligence requirements, how to collect the information that meets those requirements, and how to convert that information into actionable intelligence that the station leaders can use to drive mission planning decisions.

Districts often lack maps or may have hand-drawn maps. Maps in Dari can be requested, but land navigation training must be provided in order for the map to be read accurately. Dividing an area of responsibility into sectors based on recognizable terrain features and given simple code names based on colors or numbers, along with specific check points based on easily recognizable points will assist in intelligence gathering, operational planning, and communications.



*Alingar District divided into color-coded zones;
green, red, blue, purple and orange*

Using colored push pins for specific events will assist in trends analysis, giving the ANP the ability to recognize patterns of either criminal or anti-government behavior or events. This can also be used for patrol tracking.

One area in which an advisor team can have an immediate affect on ANP operations is enforcing pre-combat checks, inspections and rehearsals. The weakness of the ANP leadership often leads to their overlooking these critical steps that help guarantee mission success.

Post operations reports and patrol debriefs are another area requiring improvements. The ANP have yet to develop processes where logistics requests get linked to operational reports to justify supply usage, other than with the mileage reports for vehicle and fuel usage.

Investigator assets are not equally distributed across the ANP. The Criminal Investigations Division (CID) is a separate command on the same level as the regional commands. CID has assigned approximately 600-700 investigators to each

region with an additional 600 in Kabul. Unfortunately, in the case of the outlying regions, these investigators are often concentrated at the regional and provincial HQ or district stations located in larger towns. As a result, many smaller districts do not have any readily accessible assets to conduct investigations. That most rank and file ANP have no investigations training or experience places a critical strain on the criminal justice process. Often when the district ANP suspect a crime, they will arrest the suspect and transport him to the nearest detainee holding facility where CID will initiate the case. Since no crime scene analysis occurred or witness statements taken, the investigation is hamstrung from the beginning.

Section 3: Mentoring Challenges, Strategies and Tools

Overview

Helping their Afghan Police counterparts develop a safe community in the middle of an insurgency, exacerbated by uncontrolled criminal activity and terrorism, will be one of the toughest challenges police advisors will face. The cultural and ethnic differences discussed previously make the task even more complex. At times, these differences may appear to be too difficult to overcome, but they can be minimized with patience, understanding, and determination.



The ANP do not now, nor will they probably ever, look similar to a Western police force. This section will explain some of the key challenges the ANP face in their day-to-day operations in policing their communities and providing law and order under the precepts of the Rule of Law and Democratic policing.

To provide the advisor a baseline from which to begin effecting change, the advisor should know that the ANP have very little history since the Taliban really did not have a formalized police force in the manner that westerners think of one. In fact, most local ANP were nothing more than a local

warlord's "militia" that would extort the local population or passers-through in order to make money. They also served to keep the local population in line through intimidation and would serve as a protection force to handle conflicts with other tribes.

Leadership in the police during this time, and after the 2001 fall of the Taliban, was generally based on patronage or influence as opposed to competence. Additionally, since the pay differential between ranks was so small (a LTG only made \$30/month more than a CPT,) promoting officers to very high ranks regardless of position or ability was a low cost way for local government officials to curry favor.

Under the Taliban, law enforcement took a back seat to "morality" enforcement through the Ministry of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This organization, with its 30,000 enforcers, would pursue such critical crimes as men shaving their short beards too short, kite flying, listening to music, or failing to attend prayers. Punishments for violations of these and other "crimes" were swift and brutal.

In the traditional justice system, the focus on “morality” crimes as well as Shari’a law’s focus on testimonial evidence for conviction has led to the ANP having almost no investigative capability beyond obtaining confessions. The Taliban further perpetuated this focus on confessions by staging public trials where “criminals” (read enemies of the state) would “confess” (often after being tortured) to a crime, after which they were found guilty and executed. As a result of this history, most ANP have no ability to collect or process evidence and many judges do not know how to use it in determining guilt or innocence. Advisors should expect that, for the near future, obtaining confessions will remain the principal mechanism for prosecution in the justice system.

ANP Development Mission

The development of an effective Afghanistan Police Force is critical to the overall strategic goals of NATO in Afghanistan. The police force is necessary to provide security and establish the rule of law, which are critical for gaining and maintaining popular support for the Afghan government and the eventual withdraw of NATO combat troops from the nation. Unfortunately the resurgence of the Taliban over the last two years, coupled with dysfunction local government and courts and the public perception of ANP corruption, has set these goals back.

ANP Development Goals

Each of these development goals represents a key area in any unit’s functioning. Depending on the time available to advisor teams, they may have to choose one or two areas to focus on since they may not have the ability to focus on each area. Areas for development include:

- Fill key leadership positions with qualified and competent personnel.
- Full personnel accountability (ID cards and biometrics) on all district police.
- Fill the district with all key equipment; document the accountability chain.
- Fill the district to full *Tashkil* manning.
- Ensure that every policeman is trained to uphold the rule of law and takes pride in his work.
- Conduct individual training proficiency to support key collective tasks.
- Train key collective tasks to ensure police survival and district security.
- Train district staff to effectively manage key tasks in finance and budget, logistics, operational planning, personnel and training, and education.
- Train the staff to accurately track current operations.
- Train the staff to properly plan and execute key collective tasks

- Train the staff to conduct timely coordination with other supporting agencies and security forces.
- Continue to train districts through Focused District Development.

Focused District Development (FDD) Program

The FDD program is a CSTC-A initiative implemented in late 2007 to increase the effectiveness of the training and equipping process for district stations. Advisors found that ANP districts were unlikely to send their ANP to training under the older “slots available” system. Also, the piecemeal nature of equipment distribution across the ANP coupled with their ineffective supply tracking system made it impossible to ensure every station had the required equipment. In order to alleviate these problems as well as to help foster esprit de corps and professionalism in the ANP, CSTC-A implemented the FDD.

The principal operation of the FDD is the removal of an entire district station’s personnel to a regional training center for screening, equipping, and training. Upon completion, the ANP return to their district, which has then received all required station equipment as well as any building repair or replacement. A dedicated PMT is also assigned to further the training and development started at the academy. To date, the FDD program is a success. Communities that have their police go through the process all agree that the newly trained ANP demonstrate a higher level of professionalism and competence and add to the security of the area. Unfortunately, the process is very slow and will take six to seven years more to train all 400+ district stations. Due to the success of the FDD in training the ANP districts, CSTC-A plans to expand the program to begin training the 135 border police companies in the same manner.

Comparison of Western vs. Afghan Police

It is important to note that it is not the purpose of police advisors to make the ANP look like a Western police department. The fact is that many facets of the western police model will not work in a tribal culture of Afghanistan. Ultimately it is up to the Afghan people to decide how their police will function and the models they will use to develop their force and responsibilities. The key role for the advisors is to encourage the ANP to ensure that however they structure themselves and perform their mission, that they enforce the law equally to all.

The importance of the Afghan people’s perception of the ANP cannot be overstated. Coalition efforts, such as the *Focused District Development Program* (FDD) -- discussed later in this guidebook -- are helping change the view of the ANP. Generally, when the community is told that their local police are leaving for

training, they are very hesitant to allow ANCOP into their area since they are outsiders. This reluctance is in spite of the fact that the local police are corrupt. Often, however, once ANCOP begins working and the people see how an fair, values-based organization operates, they want them to stay as opposed to having the local police return.

Police Advisor Principles

The most important principal for improving the ANP is the development of their competence and professionalism. The police must act as trusted agents of the government that both leaders and citizens see as a fair and impartial arbitrator of justice. The police must have the respect of the people and represent them from a demographic and cultural values standpoint. They must have the training, expertise, and equipment to successfully conduct law enforcement operations. Finally, they must demonstrate that they are dedicated to the welfare of the citizens and the nation; combating insurgents and criminals while protecting the rights of the people and creating security that allow growth in opportunity.

Six Advisor Imperatives

The six imperatives for effective advising are:

- Understand the operating environment
- Leadership and Influence
- Promoting legitimacy
- Ensuring unity of effort and purpose
- Managing information
- Developing self-sustaining systems

Working with interpreters

Interpreters (terps) are among the advisor's greatest assets. Advisors will find it next to impossible to get anything of value done in the absence of an interpreter. Advising through an interpreter is a skill. Interpreters are valued members of an advisor team. Advisors will be responsible for the safety, billeting, nutrition and pay of the team's interpreter. Sharing the time of the interpreter will be a mission-critical task. Advisors will need to be aware of the time sheet process to ensure that the interpreter is paid in a timely manner. Advisors often find that their interpreter becomes as much a part of the team as any individual advisor, and that they can help solve many problems at the local level.

Interpreters often possess intuition regarding the behaviors of other Afghans that many advisors lack or gain slowly at best. Advisors are sometimes surprised at the level of feedback that the interpreter can provide following an engagement.

Remember to speak to the person you are addressing, not directly to the interpreter. Keep sentences short so as not to overload the interpreter. Include interpreter in rehearsals. Limit private conversations between the interpreter and the local national.

Advisor Reporting Requirements

Advisors will be required by the Regional Police Advisory Command (RPAC) to provide reports on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. Advisors will be required to perform district and provincial assessments periodically. The local battlespace commander will most likely wish to be copied on some or all of these reports. Formats for the reports have changed considerably over time. Advisors will want to acquire the reporting formats upon assignment to an RPAC.

Be careful not to give your ANP the impression that reporting is the top priority, but do convey that accurate reporting is important.

Policing in a Divided Society

One of the most difficult things for American advisors to understand when dealing with their Afghan counterparts is the importance that the ANP place on local affiliation as opposed to a national identification. While many ANP will claim to be working for a greater Afghanistan, they will almost always place family, tribal, or ethnic priorities ahead of national priorities. Police leaders see no conflict in values when, for instance, local tribal leaders asks them to do something that may run counter to national priorities.

In most western cultures, the values of certain organizations are expected to trump local values. For instance, when a person joins a city police force, he or she is expected to subordinate the needs of a particular neighborhood to the needs of the community as a whole. This is known as “cross-cutting” a value system. As a result, the society expects the police to enforce laws equally across the city and not give friends or family a better deal. While this type of soft corruption does happen in America, if the police hierarchy learns of it the officer will be punished. However, in Afghanistan, treating your family or tribe differently, is expected, if not encouraged.

Tribal domination of the arms of local government is the norm in Afghanistan. Advisors should expect the local police to draw men exclusively from the dominant

tribe in the region. While this may not be a problem in areas with only one tribe, in mixed areas it can cause strife as the un-represented groups will see the police as a functionary of their rivals. ANP leaders have to be responsive to their local tribal leaders, especially when the police leader answers to the tribal leader for tribal matters. While advisors may be invited to meetings between these leaders, most will occur at times when the team is not there.

Advisors must address issues of obvious favoritism, especially at the expense of other groups in the area, but realize that the chief's loyalty will, for the time being, remain linked to those local leaders. Chiefs are frequently not from the area where their command is located. In these cases, the ANP who are under the sway of the local tribal or village leaders may attempt to manipulate or subvert the chief. Since Afghanistan has yet to develop a strong national identity, it is impossible to convince the ANP why they must put concepts such as national values or rule of law above the tangible responsibilities they have to their tribes and families.



The ANP, in their mind, exist to protect their families and tribes, not to protect the rights of the accused. As a result of this mindset, activities such as torture or summary execution of threats are an acceptable way of protecting the community. This value system is reinforced by the dysfunction of the judicial system which may not provide justice to a victim. Almost any action, regardless of the extreme, is allowable if it protects the family or tribe.

Not only do the vast majority of ANP feel that police work is no place for women, many also believe that women have no right to bring complaints before the police. In Afghan culture, the family protects or punishes women. Therefore if a woman is a victim of a crime, it is up to the men of the family to avenge her. Also, the police may feel they have no right to interfere in the disciplining of a woman by her family, regardless of the end result.

Each province will have an officer dedicated to women's issues such as the reduction of domestic violence. This officer may be the only female ANP in the province, or it may be a male officer. It is a requirement to have such an officer, but whether or not the position is more than just a title varies from province to province.

Coercive Interrogation

Afghan law places a primacy on confessions to obtain a conviction. Under the Taliban, this belief was corrupted through the use of torture to maintain a veneer of justice. Those practices, combined with the nonexistent ANP evidence collection and analysis systems, have led them to think the only way they can get a conviction is through a confession.

Corruption

The hardest part of dealing with corruption in the ANP is that in many cases they do not see it as corruption; merely as a way of doing business. Even practices that, if committed on the ANP, would be seen as corruption, may be seen as acceptable when perpetrated by them on someone else. *Police advisors cannot allow any instance of corruption to go unchallenged.* While the challenge may not stop the practice completely, it will often stop it at that moment and will reinforce to the leaders that their activities are under scrutiny.

Arrange to be present during events where corruption is likely to occur. Any negotiation for services, especially if it involves coalition money or resources, should be attended. If the district is unable to have electronic funds transfer due to the banks or lack thereof, make it a point to always attend pay operations.

Advisors may find the level and depth of corruption to be overwhelming. Make ethics a key point of discussion whenever possible, using analogies and casual conversation to illustrate these points rather than lecturing behavior. Combined with formal training, these efforts will slowly bear fruit. Target the corruption which has a disabling effect first. Once the ANP reach what could be described as a more “functional” level of corruption, then more subtle methods may bring the most progress. If the leadership is corrupt beyond any recoverable point, the advisor may be forced to press for the relief of the leadership. If this occurs, they will most likely be reassigned to a similar position elsewhere. Advisors must do their best to work with the personnel who are found in place.

Corruption or criminal activity involving weapons and/or ammunition is the most serious of all and will require agencies outside of the advisor team to become involved to investigate and apprehend violators. Detection of this type of activity will often happen while making spot assessments of arms rooms or ammunition storage.

The judicial system is rife with corruption and inefficiency. Tribal loyalties may play a role in this, but most often it is money and influence that will allow apprehended criminals to go free. Civilians cannot approach a court with a civil

problem, such as a land dispute, with any reasonable expectation of satisfaction. Seeing this, the ANP may find themselves in a “corruption race” with prosecutors and judges to be the first or only ones to benefit from a situation. The advisor will likely have no impact on the other agencies, but needs to report observations of corruption to the appropriate agency/person.

Corruption can be found at all levels, and may be justified by reasoning that the ANP risk much and are underpaid. One favorite tactic is to “shake down” travelers at TCP’s. Another is to steal various items while conducting the search of a home. Leaders must be encouraged to follow up on reported acts such as these and to resolve them. Unresolved issues such as these can and will lead to more violence against the ANP and more support for insurgents.

Infiltration

Infiltration of the ANP by insurgent or criminal groups is a fact that will not be easily changed. Some stations are almost completely controlled by insurgent or militia groups while others may just have a scattering of members. The key for the advisors is analyzing how the station’s effectiveness is impacted by the infiltration.



For instance, in some villages, the entire police force may belong to a warlord militia, but they also do nothing but protect their village. On the other hand some stations’ militias use the cover of their district stations and ANP uniforms to perform illegal or terrorist acts. In the first case, the infiltration is probably not a pressing issue while in the second the advisor team will probably need assistance from the BCT in eradicating the infiltration.

Intimidation

The police are very susceptible to intimidation, either directly or through threats to their families. Advisors must remain aware that the ANP may want to do the right thing, but fear is guiding their actions. Since the coalition cannot protect every ANP and his family, this is a very real threat.

Inadequate system support

One of the most constant refrains the advisors will hear from the ANP is they don’t have enough... be it fuel, ammunition, weapons, uniforms, etc. This lack of equipment is a function of the dysfunctional MOI logistics system working its way down through the various HQ levels. The team must work to improve the system *his Captain was found to be*

but not to circumvent it. Everything the coalition does to augment the supply system with direct support only sets it back from self-sufficiency.

Police filling paramilitary role as opposed to law enforcement role

While police play a key role in effective COIN, currently most police are serving more as under equipped military units as opposed to police units. Local police are not expected to enforce laws, investigate crimes, or police their communities. Instead they are a front line combat force. While this role is driven by the current security situation, it will delay the development of a true police force in the country.

It is not inappropriate for the ANP to actively engage in COIN, even at the kinetic level, however, all COIN activities by the ANP should have as their end goal the provision or improvement of security for the population.

ANP Leadership Challenges

Leaders vary from great to worthless

As with every organization, some leaders are better than others. The problem with the ANP, with its consolidated control structure is that it is hard to find a subordinate leader to step up when the chief is ineffective. The advisor team may gain more effect working with higher PMT to try to get the chief replaced or transferred to a non-leadership position. ANP do a terrible job of developing subordinates. Advisors will find themselves mentoring leadership skills in subordinate leaders and pressing a reluctant leader to delegate authority. Afghans will hoard not only supplies but authority, disabling the organization in their absence or under stress.

Many ANP leaders are in their position due to influence or patronage

The decentralized command appointment structure of the ANP has led to many leaders with no police or leadership experience receiving key leadership roles because they were either able to convince a local leader to put them there through influence or intimidation. Senior officers have been known to “purchase” their position. Such a “purchase” is not for prestige, but to position the senior officer where he can maximize personal profit through coercion and corruption.

Few leaders have formal police training

Although leader training exists at the various training centers and the KPA, many station leaders have not attended any of the training. Many feel the trip is too dangerous, they cannot afford to leave their station, or that the training is a waste

of time because of their leadership experience in other areas (usually militia). This lack of training coupled with a promotion system that favors influence and patronage has led to a very ineffective leader corps.

None of this is meant to imply that all leaders are bad. Some are very brave and truly want to make the ANP better. They just lack the talent, training, or experience to effect the changes needed. Advisors will need to become familiar with their provincial or district officers to ascertain the level of professional education possessed by the leadership as well as the soldiers.

NCO Corps

Under the Afghan leadership model, which we are trying to change, NCOs are most often given absolutely no authority and are not expected to take initiative, as their view of NCOs is built upon the Russian military tradition. This is unlike the American Army where NCOs have wide decision making latitude. This notion about NCOs provides two challenges: first, ANP leaders are hesitant to empower their NCOs to function as leaders among the ANP and second, the ANP leader may show less respect toward an NCO police advisor than he would an officer. Advisors will need to lead by example, demonstrating that NCO's are respected, professional, empowered members of the PMT.



Similar problems developing an effective NCO Corps have been experienced in the ANA, who are now developing an NCO tradition. Officers must empower and enable while NCO's take the lead in assisting in the development of the infant NCO Corps. Officer advisors must also work the issue from the top down as the NCO advisors work with ANP NCO's. ANP officers need to learn how to make the best use of an NCO Corps. Advisor officers set the example in this area. NCO advisors lead by example with their ANP NCO's. This is a persistent problem for Afghans, again relating to their Russian military and police traditions.

Advisors will notice a tendency for Afghans to fear developing other strong leaders within their organization.

Some leaders do not understand the benefits of training

Most Afghans, even those who fought the Soviets, have never seen the total impact of effective training. Many ANP leaders do not understand the benefits or effects of

good training. As a result, they sometimes pay “lip service” to the importance of training and will only minimally support it. The advisors will have to work hard to convince the leaders of the importance and effectiveness of good training and connect it with the leader’s ability to accomplish his mission.

Afghan leaders are not expected to lead from the front or take responsibility for their subordinates

The Afghan leadership model does not require that leaders share the risks that face their subordinates. It also inexplicably allows leaders to be in charge until things go wrong, at which time the responsibility is not theirs. This lack of willingness to assume responsibility makes it difficult for advisors to convey the value of recommended changes since the problems are not the leader’s fault; so why should he work to fix them?

Enterprises that support insurgent or warlord/militia activity

Some ANP are still choosing what side of the fight they are on and others have chosen the enemy’s side. The corruption and insurgent influence in some communities has led some police to feel that the right side is the winning side. Advisors who identify chiefs who support or condone insurgent or criminal activity must immediately report their suspicions to land owners.

Police Capabilities and Limitations

The capability of a typical Afghan policeman is often misunderstood. Because the police operate in an insurgent environment, they are often used in combat operations. The ANP are not ideally trained or equipped as a combat force; however, they are often the only force available. The ANA was intended to clear out cities and rural areas of major resistance, and the police are supposed to enforce the rule of law and conduct community policing after the areas cleared by the ANA become relatively secure.



The police advisory program has brought along most of the stations it has partnered with to a point where they can perform the basic missions. More advanced law enforcement functioning along with continuous systems development from the MoI through the district stations remain problematic at best. Further, due to the shortage of PMTs, many stations have yet to undergo long term effective partnering. These stations may not be able to perform any tasks

effectively. It is important for the advisors to remember that just because a station *can* perform the mission does not mean it *will* perform it.



Captured opium

Some police do have advanced training. Investigators assigned to some stations are very helpful. They have enough knowledge to secure a crime scene, collect evidence, and conduct interviews and interrogations. Unfortunately many district stations do not have regular access to investigators, prohibiting them from effectively solving crimes or preparing case files. The typical police station can handle normal policing duties in their community: mounted and dismounted patrols, checkpoints, force protection, cordon and searches, and limited intelligence operations. Each station will be at different levels of proficiency depending on the leadership and the experience within the ranks. The advisor will assess each station's capabilities and adjust its training and mentorship accordingly.

Systems development will remain the biggest hurdle the advisors will face when trying to develop their stations. A station with the best leaders and competent and confident ANP will have no more effectiveness than the station conducting illegal activities if the former station cannot acquire basic supplies such as fuel or ammunition.

The Court System

As mentioned under **Corruption**, the court system is most often dysfunctional and does not have the trust of the populace. Riddled with corruption and unable to bring cases to trial quickly and resolve them, prisoners who were unable to bribe their way out of trouble often find themselves incarcerated for long periods of time awaiting resolution.

The main challenge here to an advisor is the public perception of a total lack of objective justice, and the painting of the ANP with the same brush. Although "outside the lane" of a PMT, report observations relating to judicial corruption or abuse.

The National Directorate of Security (NDS)

The National Directorate of Security has personnel collocated with the ANP at the district and provincial level. NDS officers do not answer to the ANP chain of command. They often wield considerable influence. They are capable of sharing

information, but may not choose to. NDS chiefs will sometimes work to “poison the well” for CoP’s and others who they disagree with or who resist their influence. NDS officers can be very helpful or they can be an operational detractor. A good relationship with the NDS can be very beneficial when it is possible.

Advisors will have to determine for themselves based on local conditions what type of relationship they and their ANP have with the NDS. If the NDS appear to be counterproductive to security, report the facts.

Working with Coalition Forces

PMT’s will find themselves working within a battlespace which has a Coalition Forces Commander. This may be an American officer, but may not be. Most PMT’s assigned to this mission will be assigned to TF Phoenix, but some may be ad hoc teams assembled by a battlespace owner as part of his local counterinsurgency plan. If a PMT is part of TF Phoenix, the advisor may find himself with separate reporting responsibilities. The advisor will be required to provide periodic reports as required by the RPAC; and the battlespace owner will also want to know what is being done in the battlespace to support the counterinsurgency plan within that commander’s battlespace. Advisors will need to become aware quickly of any reports, their schedules and formats. Much of the data reported will be the same.

The local battlespace owner will also have coordination requirements for such things as movement within the battlespace. There may be local requirements for minimum convoy size based on the commander’s threat assessment. PMT’s may find themselves challenged by these requirements and while some may be negotiable, the battlespace commander is the approval authority within that battlespace.

The staff in the battlespace where the PMT is operating can be a valuable asset in providing local intelligence and coordination. Establishing a good working relationship will bring positive results.

A PMT may arrive in an area to find that the local battlespace commander has fielded his MP assets as trainers/advisors to the ANP in the battlespace. The advisor will need to work with the battlespace owner to clarify the relationships and responsibilities of the PMT and MP assets. Chain of command issues can interfere with effective use of all available assets in these situations and must be avoided.

Logistics and Support

PMT's will often find themselves seeking support from units that they are not organic to. Establishing good relations with local logistics and support providers, such as maintenance shops and contractors, is essential. Advisors will sometimes find themselves cast far from TF Phoenix's ability to materially support them and will have to be flexible in their relationships. Advisors will often be supported by the battlespace owning unit, including housing. The landowner may or may not have been expecting to support the team when in the planning stages. The ability to form positive relationships will significantly impact the ease with which the team integrates into disparate support systems. These relationships most often work out very positively.

Civilian Police Advisors

PMT's will most often find themselves partnering with Civilian Police (CIVPOL) advisors. These contractors are capable of significantly adding to the mentoring capability of the team. They have civilian policing experience and are typically very knowledgeable in the areas of community based policing, administration, crime scene management, interviewing and fiscal management. They will generally have up-armored commercial vehicles and private security, often a Gurkha.



*DynCorp Advisor and his
Gurkha bodyguard*

Smoothly integrating them into the team is essential in order to gain the most impact from their skills, knowledge and abilities.

Contractors may have caveats on their employment due to contractual requirements and the laws of war. CIVPOL do not have law enforcement authority and are prohibited from engaging in combat except in self defense and the defense of others. CIVPOL advisors need to be integrated into the team's security plans and defensive battle drills, but must not engage in "offensive operations." Advisors will need to become aware of any areas operationally or geographically in which their partners cannot participate.

Conclusion

Current goals call for a fully constituted, professional, functional, and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police (ANP) force with a combined force of 82,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable by the end of year 2010.

Achieving the above goal will require:

1. Reforming the MoI command structure
2. Reforming MoI local government structures
3. Instituting legislative roles in the MoI
4. Training and equipping the ANP to full staffing establishment
- 5 Fully integrating all payments into normal government budget procedures
6. Policing national borders against crime with ANA support

Advisor teams have the point in this development. Provincial and district teams will not need to concern themselves with reforming major ministerial structures. Mentoring leaders to improve systems and leadership, as well as training soldiers will be much of the effort. It is important to understand the climate in which the advisor will work and the effects that may be seen from other actors. The goal of this document is to give the new advisor a head start in getting oriented to the ground upon which he will operate.