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Mentor Guide



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Foreword

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance is pleased to introduce The Afghan National Army (ANA) Mentor Guide. The ANA Mentor Guide and its companion, The Afghan National Police (ANP) Mentor Guide, provide essential information on the force structure, organizational culture, operations, and challenges of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Primarily geared for tactical advisors and partnering units, this guide is useful to anyone deploying to Afghanistan. The reader will gather invaluable insights from lessons learned from our ongoing Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. This publication is a must read for advisors, trainers, and leaders preparing to conduct Stability Operations in Afghanistan.



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Lieutenant General, US Army
Director, JCISFA

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Preface

This guide is a JCISFA publication on mentoring the Afghan National Army and is applicable to advisors, mentors and partner forces executing Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations. The guide is a companion to the May 2009 JCISFA Afghan National Police Mentor Guide and addresses identified gaps in mentoring Afghan National Security Forces. The guide offers cultural background information, partner security force challenges, advisor/mentor best practices, and challenges. As the United States assists other nations, our forces must adopt a "by, with, and through" strategy to enable a supported nation and its security forces to generate and sustain capabilities institutionally and operationally. We can achieve this **by** advising and mentoring them, partnering **with** the supported nation and **through** development of the supported nation and its security forces so that they can do it themselves.

While not an inclusive guide, the information contained herein provides a starting point for advisors/mentors to develop a working relationship with the Partner Nation security forces and provide U.S. advisors a basic understanding of Afghan culture, history, and Afghan Army development challenges in order for them to become successful.

The Secretary of Defense established the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to institutionalize lessons and best practices from SFA operations. This information provides US forces a knowledge base to assist in the rebuilding of Partner Nation nation's security forces during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. JCISFA's purpose is to:

- Serve as a DOD center of Excellence and US Armed Forces focal point to provide advice and assistance for international security force assistance missions that includes the tasks to organize, train, equip, and rebuild Partner Nation security forces
- Capture, analyze, and document security force assistance observations, insights, and lessons from contemporary operations
- Advise combatant command on practices and proven tactics, techniques and procedures for rapid response to emerging security force assistance efforts, specific to the organizing, training and equipping of military, police, and border security forces and to the rebuilding of their security infrastructure
- Advise combatant commands and military departments by recommending practices and proven TTPs to prepare for and conduct security force assistance missions
- When directed, assist other nations that are conducting security force assistance missions as part of a larger regional engagement strategy

This guide is for use by all military, civilian or contractors in the planning and execution of Security Force Assistance operations.

Please send written comments and recommendations to the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 425 McPherson Avenue (Building 74), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 via our website <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil>.

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Section 1: Afghanistan; History, Demographics, and Government

Overview

This section gives a brief history of Afghanistan, basic demographics and languages that someone may encounter, such as a breakdown of various government functions, the rights of Afghan citizens, and other agencies, such as the police that the soldier will interface with.



Figure 1 Afghan National Army soldiers search the Salang Pass for human remains at a passenger airline crash site, while an Afghan National Army Air Corps Mi-17 brings in more soldiers.

Description of Afghanistan

Afghanistan may possibly be one of the most austere places on earth. The southern, western, and northern areas of the country begin as arid plains or deserts that eventually rise as one moves north and east into the Hindu Kush mountain range which dominates the central and western portions of the nation. Desert areas in the south and southwest are bleached white from the sun with human settlements few and far between, while the northern plain is a uniform brown. Agriculture is limited to areas with drainage, rivers flowing south and west down from the mountains. Many of these streams only flow periodically, making farming difficult at best. As such, district and local officials spend much effort on irrigation and water management. Disputes over available water can quickly escalate to violence. In many areas, wells

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are the only source of water as the desert-like conditions and high summer temperatures prevent the collection of surface water.

The mountainous areas are extremely rugged and desolate with few settlements and even fewer passable areas. In most areas, the border areas between Afghanistan and its neighbors are unsettled and unguarded making transit between those countries and Afghanistan easy for criminals and terrorists.

Ethnic Breakdown

Although Afghanistan is a multicultural and multiethnic society, historically the word *Afghan* represented only Pashtuns, most likely due to the dominant status this ethnic group has had in the Afghan population. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group. They live primarily in the southern and eastern provinces, but Pashtun groups are scattered throughout the country. Pashtun tribes also populate most of northwestern Pakistan. The Pashtuns largely ignored the border during the British domination of India that ended in 1947 and they have never accepted the border demarcation known as the Durand Line. Since 1947, there have been periodic Afghan efforts, to create a greater “Pashtunistan” that would unite the Pashtun tribes – a source of continuing friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other principal ethnicities in Afghanistan include:

- **Tajiks** (25%) live mainly in the northeast, the northwest, and the urban centers. Believed to be original Persians who settled in Afghanistan, Tajiks are mostly Sunni - known for their hardworking nature and strong hospitality. They generally live close to the border with Iran, with Herat a major city, and in the northeast and south of Tajikistan where Mazar-e-Sharif has a large concentration of Tajiks. Tajiks are generally better educated than the other ethnicities and often have leadership positions in the armed forces.
- **Hazaras** (10%) mostly reside in the very mountainous and isolated center of Afghanistan known as the Hazarajat. Small concentrations of Hazaras live in Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. They are possible descendants of Ghengis Khan’s hordes and therefore are a Mongolian tribe. Due to the Hazaras being mostly Shi’a, the Pashtuns consider them an underclass. Considered the least educated, Hazaras inherently perform manual labor or serve as servants. Hazaras are the largest Shi’a community in the country.
- **Uzbeks** (6-8%) Predominantly located in the north, they are the largest Altaic language–speaking group and follow Sunni teachings. Most Uzbeks are sedentary farmers. They also are the most important ethnic group in the city of Kunduz and well represented in Mazar-e-Sharif.
- **Aimaks** (4%) live in the northwest part of the country. They are a Persian-speaking group with Sunni affiliations.
- **Persian Turkmens** (3%) This group seen along the border of Turkmenistan is a mostly semi-nomadic people.
- **Balochs** (2%) are found in southwest Afghanistan, and speak an Iranian language.

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- **Other** (4%). There are several other small communities, including the Nuristanis (a group of people who resisted Islamization for a long time), the Kizilbash (an urban people with Shi'a affiliations), and the Pashays in the northeast of Kabul.




Figure 2 Afghanistan Ethnic Distribution

Language

The geographic isolation of the communities settled in different parts of Afghanistan has prevented the development of a common language throughout the country where a wide variety of languages and dialects exist. More than the multicultural nature of Afghanistan, the many languages in use are a significant obstacle to cooperation and understanding and therefore have a great impact on police operations. Local languages also provide clues as to ethnic and political affiliations of various groups and their customs and values. **Dari** and **Pashto** are mutually unintelligible, although each has borrowed some

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words from the other. They are the two official languages, with Dari the traditional language of government and business.

Other common languages include:

- **Baluchi:** Another language close to Persian of Iran spoken primarily in the border regions adjacent to the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.
- **Nuristani:** This language is a mix of Iranian Persian and Urdu that is confined largely, to the very isolated region of Nuristan in Afghanistan's northeast
- **Uzbek and Turkmen:** Spoken widely in the north by Uzbek and Turkmen minorities. Both are Altaic languages and are closely associated with Turkish and Turkic dialects spoken in the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union.

National Identity

Although when traveling abroad Afghans proudly proclaim their Afghan nationality, inside Afghanistan they will first identify with their tribe, their region, or their city. Afghanistan has failed to promote a strong internal sense of identity and bond among its distinct groups to glue them together in a firm national unification process. Although a snapshot perspective cannot capture the complexity of the very diverse Afghan social environment, one can view Afghan inter-ethnic relations through distinct historical periods that help to explain the previous and current shape of societal understanding in the country.

The Islamic religion continues to shape Afghan society as a significant organizing principle. Ethnic community bonds prevail over many other forms of identity, and they shape interests and attitudes. National polarization caused by years of internal strife have sharpened ethnic divisions and accentuated religious differences, leading to a heightened emphasis on ethnic discourses. Moderately successful, President Karzai's effort to form an all-inclusive government has many challenges that must be met in order to have a truly national government. Ethnic discourses replaced religious discourses in societal understanding and conflict resolution. Ethnic affiliations often determine status in Afghan society. For example, lower status groups like the Tajiks, Hazaras, and others resent the privileged status of the Pashtuns. These ethnic tensions sometimes come into play in intergovernmental relations; as between the Pashtun-dominated Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the more heavily Tajik Ministry of Interior (MoI). Cuchis, a nomadic Pashtun group, dominate the Afghan banking industry.



Figure 3 Afghan soldiers on parade in Kandahar Province.

The Calendar

Afghanistan has three separate and distinct calendars; however, there is only one official calendar: the Persian calendar. Based on perceived seasonal changes and synchronization with the apparent motion of the sun, Afghans historically use and accept this calendar as the official calendar. Of note, the basis of the Islamic calendar is lunar phases. With the presence of western forces in the country since 2001, the Western or Gregorian calendar has become widely used and accepted.

History of Afghanistan

Afghanistan as we know it today, has served as a stage for several empires dating back to the third century B.C., including Greco-Buddhist kingdoms, Muslim Ghaznavid and Ghurid dynasties, and the Safavids. Also known as the crossroads for conquerors, Afghanistan has been a battleground for centuries. Modern Afghan history saw three Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919)

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where the last war enabled Afghanistan to gain full independence from the British. Following “official” independence from Britain on August 19, 1919, Afghanistan concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, beginning an era of close relations, although Afghans generally remained suspicious of the atheist communist philosophy. Amanullah Khan, during his almost ten-year reign, sought to introduce some democratic reforms, including granting extensive rights to women and improved education; however, a revolt forced Khan to abdicate his liberal reform program. There was relative peace and stability during the reign of King Zahir Shah from 1933 until his cousin and brother-in-law deposed him in a bloodless coup in July 1973. Daoud, who declared himself President, fell victim to a communist coup led by Mohammad Taraki in April 1978. Later, Prime Minister Hafizullah ordered Taraki killed and subsequently took over the government. In 1979, at the request of Amin, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in response to the Afghan military’s inability to quell regional insurgencies. The Soviets immediately had Amin executed and installed Babrak Karmal.

Modern History of Afghanistan

From 1978 to 1988, efforts to introduce communist economic policies *failed* as dissatisfaction with the government increased. Mujahideen fighters gained strength and the capability to mount an effective guerrilla campaign against the communist regime and its policies, with strong U.S. backing and sanctuary in Pakistan. Despite maintaining 80,000-104,000 personnel in Afghanistan from 1979-1988, the Soviets were unable to halt the insurgency due to the topographic challenges, the regional nature of the insurgency, and support the insurgents received from the west. During the eight year occupation, the Soviets lost almost 14,000 KIA as well as a large amount of military equipment. These Mujahideen successes and increased dissatisfaction with the war forced Soviet forces to withdraw in 1988. In 1986, Afghanistan enacted a new constitution and elected Mohammad Najibullah as president. Despite the Soviet withdrawal, the Najibulla’s communist regime survived until the Mujahedeens defeated it in 1992 and founded an Islamic Republic. Later, former Mujahideen allies turned on each other as Pashtuns sought to reestablish their preeminence, and Tajiks and others resisted. The Taliban movement was born in Kandahar, in part as a response to the tribal violence, and corrupt warlordism, spreading eventually to Kabul while Tajiks led by Ahmed Shah Massoud formed the “Northern Alliance” to fight the Taliban.

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Figure 4 Afghan resident of the Tagab Valley applying for service with the army.

Post 9/11 History of Afghanistan

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden; their failure to do so resulted in Operation Enduring Freedom. Unlike the later Operation *Iraqi* Freedom, local forces from the Northern Alliance and other tribes not loyal to the Taliban conducted most of the fighting during OEF with support from NATO troops.

In 2002 Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from Kandahar, led the Afghanistan transitional government. The period from 2002 to present marked the increasing involvement by NATO and the International Security Assistance Force. Afghanistan remains dependent on the international community for both its security and financial support.

The US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assist the Afghan government in maintaining internal order and training Afghan security forces to

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degrade the Taliban insurgency and other anti-government groups. Sponsored by the United Nations (UN,) Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany, and chose a 30-member interim authority led by Hamid Karzai. After governing for 6 months, former King Zahir Shah convened a Loya Jirga, which elected Karzai president and gave him authority to govern for two more years. On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held its first presidential election where Afghans elected Karzai as president. The international community continues to provide financial and technical support to help develop Afghanistan's infrastructure, economic, and security systems in an effort to help the government become self-sufficient.

History of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANA Mentor Mission

An organized Afghan army has been in existence in a variety of forms since the late 19th century. During the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, the National Army of Afghanistan was involved in fighting against Mujahideen rebel groups. After the Soviets withdrew and the Afghan communist government fell, the remnants of the Afghan army splintered between the government in Kabul and the various warring tribal factions. During that time local militia forces were formed partly from the former Soviet era national army units which provided security for their own people living in the territories they controlled and the semblance of an organized army ceased to exist. Following this era, the Taliban regime removed the remaining organized militia forces and controlled the country by Sharia Law.



Figure 5 Afghan soldier awaiting the start of live-fire training at the Kabul Regional Training Center.

After US and coalition forces removed the Taliban in late 2001, the Afghan MoD created a number of new army formations as patronage opportunities.

Following the start of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the British Army trained the first new ANA battalion, the 1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard. Due to the UK forces' limited capacity at the time,

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recruiting and training of the subsequent new ANA battalions, the US Army Special Forces assumed training of these units. By January 2003, over 1,700 soldiers in five Kandaks (*Dari for battalion*) had completed a 10-week training course, and by June 2003, US forces had trained a total of 4,000 troops.

Oversight of ANA training efforts are now managed by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command CSTC-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a three-star level multi-national command headquartered in Kabul.

Two main ANA schools located in Kabul provide formal education and professional development. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) which is a four-year military university, producing second lieutenants in a variety of military professions. The second school is the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), located in southern Kabul, which prepares mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs.

U.S. / Coalition Command Structure




Figure 6, NTM-A/CSTC-A Organization Chart

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At the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO allies and partners, announced that they would establish NTM-A, drawing on NATO's successful experience training in Iraq, to oversee higher level training for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). NTM-A joined with CSTC-A on November 21, 2009 to create a comprehensive training program for ANSF. On November, 23 2009 NATO obtained commitments from allies for personnel and resources to train, mentor and equip the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP).

The current mission of NTM-A is to oversee higher level training for the ANA and training and mentoring for the ANP and in coordination with CSTC-A, plans and implements authorized and resourced operational capacity building for the ANSF, in order to enhance GIRoA's ability to achieve security and stability in Afghanistan.

Organization and Security Roles of the Afghan Government

This information is intended to provide a brief overview of GIRoA, its key players, and the operations of the two ministries responsible for establishing and maintaining state security—the Ministry of Defense (MoD) which oversees the armed forces (army and air force) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) which oversees the various police forces, including the border police.

Overview of the Afghanistan Government

The 2004 Afghan constitution established the framework of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The constitution established Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic. While Islam is the basis of Afghan law and no laws may counter Islamic dictates, the constitution guarantees religious freedoms. The Afghan system of government is similar to that of the United States with *three independent branches of government, (1) a strong, individually elected president, (2) two houses in the legislature, and (3) a separate and independent judiciary that has constitutional review powers over enacted laws.*

1. The President, the executive branch, consists of the various ministries that actually oversee the operations of the government.
2. The Legislature, or National Assembly, consists of two houses, the lower house and the upper house.
3. The Judiciary is an independent arm, which handles cases much the same as US courts (under a different legal system, however).
 - Supreme Court Judges are appointed by the President and approved by the National Assembly to one 10-year term. Law sets a lower level judge's term and appointment condition.
 - Due to the infancy of the court system, many parts of the country do not have courts in place, leaving the judicial process to tribal jirgas. (The term *Jirga* is a Pashtun term commonly used to refer to any meeting of leaders

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(usually tribal) to make key community decisions. *Shura* is the Dari equivalent).

The Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) is a national-level convention convened by the President to deal with issues of national importance including grave threats to the state, presidential impeachment, or constitutional amendments. For example, the Loya Jirga installed Karzai as interim president in 2002 where he (Karzai) convened the last Loya Jirga in 2003 and 2004 to debate and ratify the Afghan Constitution).

Local Government

The President appoints Provincial Governors. Provincial Governors then appoint District Sub-governors, called *Wuliswahls*. There are Provincial and District Shuras to provide input to the governor and sub-governors, but they have no binding power. At the sub-district level, villages will have a Malik or Malek, who has a function similar to a mayor, as well as a council of village elders. Village elders and Maliks will often be members of the District Shura. Provincial and District Governors and Sub-governors will often attempt to control ANP activity with varying degrees of success, but are not in the official chain of authority over the ANP.

Ministry of Interior (MoI)

The MoI provides nationwide law enforcement services and manages local administration in provinces and districts throughout Afghanistan. The MoI revised the police chain of command in 2006. Whereas previously the governors had greater authority over the police, the current chain of command is from the MoI to the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs to the regional commanders to the provincial chiefs of police (CoPs) to district CoPs. *Governors are not in the operational chain of command and can no longer direct police activities.* The Interior Minister is also responsible to appoint all Regional and Provincial police chiefs to their positions. The MoI is responsible for overseeing the police, implementing the government counter-narcotics policies and programs, and provincial and district administration in the 34 provinces and 364 districts. The Interior Minister has a Deputy Minister for Security/Police who is in charge of eight Departments that provide the various law enforcement personnel as well as support personnel.

Ministry of Defense (MoD)

The MoD is the Department of the GIRoA responsible for developing, fielding and ensuring the operational readiness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to fulfill its missions in peacetime and during war. The MoD, as part of the Government, sets military policy and strategy, maintains the long-term vision for the ANA; develops, integrates and refines strategic plans; and programs and budgets available resources to organize and field military units. Its role is to develop theater strategic defense plans for the defense of the nation. The Minister of Defense is an advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of defense policy and policy issues for the ministry. The General Staff implements the ministry's policies and guidance for the ANA.

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


Figure 7, Afghan MoD Organization Chart

Ministry of Finance (MoF)

The MoF is the Department within GIRoA responsible for the management and execution of the budget, collection of taxes, organization and control of public expenditures and payments to the government as well as the management of customs affairs. The MoF's importance as it relates to security forces is a role in funding both the MoD and MOI through internal tax collection as well as assistance from donor nations. The MoF also plays an important role in policy pertaining to anti-corruption, procurement, and guiding the provincial budgeting process.

Section 2: ANA Operations, Organization, Equipment and Training

The Role of the Army in a Counterinsurgency (COIN)

“COIN campaigns are often long and difficult. Progress can be hard to measure, and the enemy may appear to have many advantages. Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions. They often carry out barbaric acts and do not observe accepted norms of behavior. However, by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of the local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the Soldier can defeat their insurgent enemies.”

FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

Overview

This section outlines the fundamental counterinsurgency (COIN) principles found in FM 3-24 and the *role of the Army in a COIN environment*, the organization, equipment and training of the ANA. Success in COIN operations requires establishing a legitimate government, which is supported by the people. Achieving this goal requires the host nation (HN) to render the insurgent irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic level of essential services and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective HN security force.

The goal of developing and employing an Army in a COIN environment is to provide political legitimacy to the government through the population’s acceptance of authority.

The Army as a Counterinsurgency Force

The primary counterinsurgency objective is to provide security and rule of law to enable local institutions to grow and increase in effectiveness while decreasing the ability of the insurgency to execute operations. The police are often the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace. However, in the case of larger insurgent bands, or insurgencies that have had time to mature, the police often become ineffective in countering them based on mandate, mission, legal limitations, manpower, training and equipping issues resulting in the Army taking on the primary COIN mission.

In these types of counterinsurgency operations, specialized units, military or police, may need to move into the area to defeat the threat. The local police, if previously effective, can be extremely effective to the ANA in intelligence development efforts by their intimate knowledge of the area and ability to develop a detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent strength, organization, and support.

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Figure 8 Shinkey District Governor addresses elders at a district shura.

Regardless of how effective a police force may be in an area, the ANP's ability to neutralize a large or entrenched insurgency is limited at best. The police can, depending on their level of development, help provide intelligence and support to more heavily armed, equipped, and trained ANA that will eradicate the insurgency.

Civil Authority Triad

One of the challenges in developing transitional societies such as Afghanistan is the ability of the HN and coalition forces to establish a "civil authority triad," which consists of a fair and effective judiciary system, a professional police force, and a humane penal system. Through these three systems, the government can then provide reliable rule of law to its citizens.

Judiciary-Through an independent judiciary the Supreme Court manages the court system. As with the other parts of the triad, this system has developed slowly due in part to its cooption by the Taliban, a lack of trained and educated personnel, as well as the lack of courts throughout the country.

Law Enforcement-The enforcement arm of the triad is the police, managed by the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior. The lack of a viable police force in remote and ungoverned areas of the country often falls to the ANA and coalition forces until the environment is safe and legitimate governance is in place.

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Corrections-Until recently the corrections system in Afghanistan has been the most neglected system in the reform of the justice sector. The MoI transferred responsibility for prisons to the Ministry of Justice in 2003.

Stability and security depend on establishment of, and respect for, *the rule of law* by government institutions that represent the state and by the citizens whom the rule of law seeks to protect. The rule of law is founded on clear, understandable legislation that is applied equally to all; respect for and adherence to such laws by the public and governmental officials; governmental authority to enforce adherence to the law and to bring violators to justice; and the means to hold government officials accountable for the misuse of power. A safe and secure environment depends on an effective security force, court system, and penal system as depicted by the civil authority triad working hand in hand with a society's other governmental systems. A government and the people define acceptable actions and behaviors, which become law that serves as the foundation of a safe environment. In the triad, the security force enforces the laws and investigates potential crimes providing the evidence to the judiciary for adjudication. The judiciary system is responsible for interpreting and applying the laws to the population and the penal system effects the lawful punishments handed down by the courts.

These three systems converge as advisors train the competencies of apprehension, processing, investigation, pre-trial detention, and transfer of the case into the justice system for adjudication. The ANSF initiates and supports the rule of law through crime and threat reduction. Consequently, the ANSF provides the foundation for successful rule of law, and through legitimate and transparent law enforcement builds community confidence and trust.

All three systems depend on one another in order to combat criminal and insurgent activities. The area of focus for the ANSF is in enforcing the laws, without prejudice, throughout the local population.

Community Actors that Disrupt Order

The ANSF, in their effort to maintain order in the insurgency environment, face four principal adversaries:

- Terrorists
- Insurgents
- Militias
- Criminals

Of these four, the terrorists and insurgents represent the greatest threat to social order since their main goal is the destruction of that order. Al Qaeda and Taliban organizations make up the principal terrorist/insurgent groups and are the greatest threat to establishing and maintaining order as they thrive in areas of extreme disorder. These groups will employ any action that will instill fear and chaos to further their aims.

Militias and criminals, however, tend to operate within the existing social order or disorder and tend to support the status quo so long as it facilitates their operation. This does not make them any less

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dangerous to coalition or Afghanistan security forces, as they will fight to defend themselves or their operations, but it does force a different strategy in dealing with them.

Key to COIN: Creating a Secure Environment

Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. The first step to gaining trust and confidence in the government is to provide a safe and secure environment for the populace to work and conduct daily life. This initially involves securing the local populace and providing for essential services.



Figure 9 Partnered Afghan and Canadian soldiers man a joint observation post in the Panjwail district.

Countering an insurgency requires an army that is capable of rapidly deploying to address insurgent activities. The government will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents control the roads and country side far from the district or government center's immediate area of influence. Properly located and protected patrol bases that are defensible can establish a presence in communities as long as the soldiers use them as a base of operations and not hide in them.

An effective army can assist the police in creating a safe environment in the community. Being proactive and efficient in their actions displays a position of strength to the insurgents and a sense of safety to the

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local population. Showing a genuine interest in and concern for the safety and security of the local population through active patrolling and rapid response to the community are investments in building trust between the army, police and the local population. In order to foster trust and build confidence in GIRoA among the population, the army must work to protect and help them through active community engagement and acting as part of the community, not aloof from it.

The ANA must demonstrate that they are part of the solution for the average citizen and are working to put an end to the attacks from violent extremists. Violent opposition to the Afghan government and coalition forces comes from a variety of groups with political, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives. Some groups receive support from outside Afghanistan. Political power and relationships drive Afghan factions where factions are often violent and hostile to one another.

Another Key to COIN: Winning the Support of the People

Winning the support of the people is a fundamental COIN principle soldiers must understand. A soldier's ability to positively connect to the people determines the success of the ANA and perhaps the success of a democratic Afghanistan. The army in partnership with the police are the first line, face to face, connection to the larger government. There are many challenges to this concept such as individual actions of soldiers, the police and ever changing loyalties of the population to suit their needs and interests.



Figure 10 ANA officer addressing concerns of village elders in the Andar district.

Ever since the fall of the Taliban regime, there are documented cases of the ANA abusing their power for personal gain or for other issues such as tribe domination or helping the insurgent cause. In order to win support of the people, the ANA must accomplish the following:

- Convince the community that the army will contribute to the community's return to normal life by protecting them from criminal activity and insurgent violence. The soldiers must continue to show they are part of the solution for the average citizen.
- The ANA must strive to make life for the community better than life under the Taliban. Then the Taliban will have a hard time finding haven among the populace. People will turn on them and report their presence and activity to the ANA and ANP instead of tolerating their presence or criminal operations.
- Soldiers must separate themselves from negative factors such as sectarian and ethnic violence, corruption, and political influence. This effort will be very difficult because these "influencers" are embedded in everything about this society. The Minister of Defense and army leadership must help the soldiers work within these differences. The desired end state is for soldiers to learn how to treat the populace with equality.

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To improve relations with the Afghan people, the ANA will need to establish a bond of trust and cooperation upon their arrival to an area. The soldier must take steps to establish a relationship with the community they now serve. As the ANA gains the trust and confidence of the population they serve, a symbiotic relationship (you scratch my back, I scratch your back) evolves. This relationship built on trust increases the dialogue between the unit and the community, resulting in tips and information. Human source information from local nationals provides the most time-sensitive intelligence – intelligence delivered in a format the collector can describe with all five senses. While the police are often best suited to gather this information, they may not yet be established in the area or actively patrolling outside of the village proper due to the current security situation. In this scenario, the army may be the only government force in the area capable of providing security to the populace. Afghans may never realize one hundred percent trust for the ANSF by all people; however, they must achieve a level of trust that enables peace, security, and a sense of normalcy if GIRA wants to earn the acceptance of the population.

Effects of a Secure Environment

Establishing a safe environment will pay dividends to the ANA unit in their continuing efforts to reduce violence, establish order, and locate/eradicate other insurgent or criminal elements in the community. Beyond that, as security improves, the community will begin to live more normal lives with the return of work and commerce. As opportunities move into the area, the citizens will see that their government exists to serve, and helps them better improve themselves while making them more willing to support the government. This “winning of hearts and minds” will then translate into the community providing greater support to the government, and the army being able to hand over the security mission to the police and redeploy out of that area.

The Afghan Army Organization & Structure

This information will help the advisor understand what a typical ANA unit might look like to include their manning and equipping structures. Although the missions vary among the different corps, the equipment and capabilities are relatively similar. This portion provides information about the general design of the ANA, organizational structure, and authorized equipment.

The Tashkil

The Tashkil is a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) list in Excel spreadsheet format, by Unit type and is updated annually. The list provides required number of personnel by position and rank. It also provides the required quantity of equipment by unit and equipment type. The ANA unit commander requests fills in shortfalls based on authorizations in the Tashkil, budget permitting. As an Advisor this is an issue to observe. There may be differences between personnel present and personnel authorized, equipment present and equipment authorized. ANA Commanders often guard this document and resist letting others view it, which can point to corruption.

The Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA is a conventionally structured military force designated primarily for counterinsurgency operations. It comprises light infantry brigades operating under regionally aligned Corps capable of

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limited operational mobility. The Corps consists of brigades located in garrisons and Forward Operating Bases (FOB) with organic sustainment capability in Corps Service Support Kandaks. Each Corps also has a regionally focused commando Kandaks operating in its battle space.




Figure 11 ANA General Staff

The ANA underpins internal security by providing support to legitimate civil authorities and to the ANP. End-state for the ANA is a well organized and professionally trained maneuver force, capable of self-sustainment that shares a national identity in support of the GIRoA. Overall the MOD & ANA General Staff continue to progress. Strengths include strong leadership from the MOD and the Chief of Staff and are steadily improving capability to formulate and distribute policies, plans, and guidance. ANA force generation remains on schedule in accordance with the accelerated program to increase the ANA end strength to 134,000 by December 2010. The ANA officer corps continues to improve in their professional capacity.




Figure 12, ANA Organization Chart

ANA Corps

The Corps is the largest formation or unit within the ANA. As such, ISAF's Regional Commands (North, South, East, West, Capital and Southwest) directly support each corps. A Corps will typically be composed of a headquarters battalion, two to three brigades, and a commando kandak. There are currently seven established corps deployed throughout the country; the 201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 209th, 211th, and 215th.




Figure 13, ANA Regional Corps Organization Chart

ANA Brigade

The Brigade is in the first subunit under the ANA Corps. A Brigade consists of six Kandaks at different locations within the brigade area of operations where each ANA Brigade can internally support independent operations. One Brigade is typically collocated at the Corps Headquarters and provides support for all of the Corps staff offices.




Figure 14, ANA Brigade Organization Chart

ANA Kandak

The basic unit in the Afghan National Army is the Kandak (Battalion), consisting of 600-750 troops. The Kandak is the equivalent to the U.S. Army Infantry Battalion in both size and mission. There are typically six Kandaks in an ANA Brigade. The number of Kandaks can vary between brigades based on military functions and unique mission requirements. Although the vast majority of ANA kandaks are conventional infantry, several mechanized infantry battalions, and at least one tank battalion exists in the ANA. Every ANA Corps has a Commando Battalion that has advanced Infantry training and US equipment. Kabul area units have specific missions, and their organizational structure reflects their unique missions.




Figure 15, ANA KANDAK Organization Chart

ANA Corps Support Battalion

The Corps Support Battalion (CSB) provides a key logistics link to above Brigade units in the Corps area and Brigade CSSKs. They comprise the following eight functions: transportation, supply, maintenance, medical, food service, personal administration, communications and security. The CSB has a Forward Support Team (FST) capable of deploying forward to provide automotive, engineering, and artillery maintenance as well as medical support identical to the CSSK medical company. Additionally, the CSB is structured to lift two Kandaks simultaneously, lift one infantry company inside armor protected vehicles (7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle), and provide organic maintenance capabilities for corps assigned vehicles, weapons and communications equipment.



CDOs are rapidly deployable, highly mobile, light infantry units that are organized and trained to conduct complex commando operations such as direct action, and air assault. These operations can be in conjunction with, or in support of other Afghan Security Forces. CDOs accomplish the strategic and operational goals of the General Chief of Staff of the ANA, and the Regional Corps Commanders. CDOs are a national asset, operating at echelons above corps level. CDO operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence. CDO operations by design, fill the security gap in remote high- threat locations where regular Afghan Security Forces are limited, or not available.

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


Figure 17, ANA Commando KANDAK Organization Chart

The commando kandaks provide the MoD a high-end force projection capability throughout Afghanistan. The Commando Kandak Commander serves as a member of the Corps Commander's Special Staff for the planning of CDO operations.

Criteria for CDO Employment: Because CDO Forces are limited (e.g. one Kandak assigned to each Corps' area), employment should only occur for approved battle tasks under the following mission conditions:

- Limited duration (less than 72 hour operations)
- Limited scope (i.e. high value targets (HVT))
- Disciplined adherence to an operational readiness cycle (utilization of units no larger than a reinforced CDO Rifle Company to allow the remainder of the Kandak to continue its mission, training, and recovery cycles).

The following are approved battle tasks for CDO forces:

- Cordon and Searches
- Reconnaissance Operations
- Raids
- Ambushes
- Close Quarters Combat
- Target Interdiction

Garrison Support Units

Garrison Support Units (GSU) provide installation and life support operations for designated Combat Brigades or Corps. GSUs are not combat oriented but do focus on supporting combat units. Units that fall under the GSUs are the Personnel, Plans and Operations, Supply, Communications, Medical, Engineering, and other staff offices.

ANA Air Corps

The Afghan Air Force is an important element of the national defense infrastructure that provides a third dimension maneuver capacity, freedom of action, battle-space situational awareness, intelligence, and air combat support for national military and police forces. Its mission is to provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the air in support of the ANA, and when directed by the MoD and General Staff, to support by air the civil authorities of Afghanistan at all levels.

A number of Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters and AN-24 cargo planes are operated by the Afghan Air Force, and the Afghan MoD is also seeking the return of 26 aircraft — nine helicopters, five bombers, eight fighters, two trainer jets and two transports. Officials say nineteen are in Pakistan and seven in Uzbekistan. The Afghan government is negotiating the purchase of Cessna A/T-37 Dragonfly jet aircraft as its main fighter/trainer. Once organized, trained and equipped, the Afghan Air Force will perform a wide range of mission types including Presidential Airlift, MEDEVAC, battlefield mobility, CASEVAC, airlift, reconnaissance, close air support, training, and light attack.

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Figure 18 ANA soldiers conducting air movement on an Air Corps Mi-17.

The Afghan Air Force:

- Plans, develops, trains, organizes and equips to fulfill its operational functions. Planning efforts require detailed planning in how the AAF will achieve effective interoperability with Afghan and NATO ISAF forces.
- Fields the Force in accordance with the Combined Air Power Transition Force/AAF Campaign Plans.
- Acts as the airpower advocate to the MoD, and in the interests of optimizing economic and security sector development, assists MoD in development of inter-ministerial, Coalition, ISAF and IC agreements and processes to facilitate effective and efficient use of resources, including agreements that facilitate combined security sector and commercial use of airfields to the greatest extent possible in accordance with international and national standards.

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


Figure 19, ANA Air Corps Organization Chart

ANA Leadership Structure

Control within the ANA is very centralized. As a result, subordinate officers rarely have the latitude to make decisions without first consulting with the unit commander. In some ways, this centralized control makes the advisor's job easier since once he convinces the commander of the need to do something, he has convinced the whole unit. On the down side, however, subordinate leaders will rarely take the initiative to solve problems without direction, and if the commander is not present they will often defer a decision, even a critical one, until his return.

Many ANA commanders owe their position not to their leadership ability or past performance, but to the patronage of a government official. As a result, advisors must often guide them very closely to help them do the right things. Afghan leaders are often not expected to "lead from the front", and this also hampers action as the commander may avoid danger while placing his ANA soldiers in precarious situations. Many leaders also feel that their position grants them the right to certain "benefits" including skimming pay or demanding additional compensation from the community in which they are operating.

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Many staff officers have little or no formal branch training, and rely on experience acquired while on the job to acquire the skill sets necessary to fulfill their staff functions. This lack of knowledge will force the advisors to not only help them develop systems, but to also teach them the basics of their staff roles. Finally, levels of commitment and enthusiasm among soldiers vary greatly. Most are illiterate, but are easily trained through “show, then do” type training. Repetitious reinforcement achieves the desired effect, but this method requires patience. However, a reluctance exists to conducting and carrying out reinforcement training that one should not attribute to laziness, but to a culture that assumes that if a soldier sat through a period of instruction, the soldier should know the material that was covered.

ANA Organizational Equipment, Facilities, and Individual Equipment

Uniforms

Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment items for the ANA include a combat or field uniform and the PT uniform. The combat/field uniform includes:

- Camouflage jacket
- Camouflage trousers
- Trouser belt
- Black boots
- Green beret
- Camouflage hat
- Equipment belt
- Pistol belt

ANA soldiers receive their uniforms and equipment during basic training. Many advisors will find that uniformity levels will vary from unit to unit. ANA soldiers also receive additional equipment to include helmets, load carrying equipment, field jackets and individual service weapons. Advisors should place an emphasis on correct and complete uniform wear when mentoring ANA soldiers.



























Figure 20 Newly commissioned female ANA second lieutenants.

ANA Insignia and Emblems

Soldiers affix a number of distinctive items to their uniforms for identification. For example, soldiers wear the Afghan flag patch on the upper right arm of the uniform where embroidered shoulder boards affixed to epaulets denote their rank. Many officers will intentionally wear one rank higher than their actual rank to correspond to the rank that officers held during the Soviet occupation. Officers wear the MoD insignia on their cap or beret. NCOs wear the NCO emblem on their cap or beret. Soldiers may affix other indicators, insignias and stripes which show special professions such as a sniper, military parachutist, meritorious service, drill instructors, NCO or Officer school graduates in the middle of the left pocket. There are also three optional brassards (shoulder arm bands) soldiers may wear to indicate military police, training instructors, and duty officers/NCOs. Refer to Figure 11 for current ANA rank insignia and the “OF” (NATO) equivalent pay grade.

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Rank	Lapel	Shoulder	Rank	Lapel	Shoulder
OF-9 Field Marshal			OF-4 Lieutenant Colonel		
OF-9 General			OF-3 Major		
OF-8 Lieutenant General			OF-2 Senior Captain		
OF-7 Major General			OF-2 Captain		
OF-6 Brigadier General			OF-1 1 st Lieutenant		
OF-5 Colonel			OF-1 2 nd Lieutenant		










Rank	Shoulder	Rank	Shoulder
OR-9 CSM/SGM		OR-4 SPC	
OR-8 1SG		OR-3 PFC	
OR-7 SFC		OR-2 PV2	
OR-6 SSG		OR-1 PVT	
OR-5 SPC			

Figure 21, ANA officer and enlisted rank insignia.

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Equipment

Each ANA unit is authorized equipment based on its mission and number of personnel authorized on the Tashkil (i.e. the personnel authorized within a unit). Advisors should routinely spot-check equipment on hand to ensure accountability and serviceability as well as document and report unserviceable items to the higher headquarters in order to get replacement items for the ANA. A related equipping challenge is to obtain sufficient funding to operate and maintain authorized equipment. Vehicles are of little use when the soldiers do not understand how to perform basic preventive maintenance or know how to acquire fuel for them. Another related equipping challenge is the problem of nonstandard or substandard equipment. Contractors provide a large portion of equipment maintenance support for the ANA. Mentors should familiarize themselves with these maintenance contracts when developing plans to address unit maintenance problems.

Communications

ANA organic communications have been slowly evolving with the force. Prior to 2004, the ANA possessed no organic communications equipment and relied almost exclusively on cell phones. In the spring of 2004, the ANA began initial fielding of unsecured HF and VHF man packs, base stations, and hand-helds. In the fall of 2006, fielding initiatives provided automatic link establishment and voice encryption capabilities. In 2007, MoD began monitoring of long-haul HF systems. Current communications systems in use at the brigade and below include:

- PRC 1099 HF Man-Pack and Base Stations
- RT 7000 HF long-haul
- PRC 1077 VHF Man-Pack
- PRC 1070 VHF Squad Radio
- HH 7700 VHF Handheld
- TA 312 Fieldphones
- RF 5800 Multiband Man-Pack

Weapons

The basic soldier rifle for all ANA is now the M-16. Afghan soldiers acquire their first M-16 in basic training. Afghan soldiers have been equipped with additional NATO weapons including:

- 9mm Smith and Wesson Service Pistol
- M24 Sniper Rifle

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- M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) (5.56mm)
- M240B/M240G Medium Machine Gun (7.62mm)
- M2 Heavy Machine Gun (.50 caliber)
- MK-19 Automatic Grenade Launcher

ANA units have also maintained some of their former Russian-bloc weapons such as the:

- RPK Light Machine Gun (7.62X39)
- PKM Medium Machine Gun (7.62X54R)
- DShK Heavy Machine Gun (12.5mm)
- RPG – most commonly the RPG-7, although RPG-2's can be found

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Figure 22 ANA soldier taking a break from basic tactics training.

Afghans refer to any AK-47/74 variant as a “Kalashnikov.” Afghan soldiers may not recognize the term AK-47, but will immediately recognize the term “Kalashnikov.” Currently, the ANA has phased out all AK-47s in its inventory – however, other soviet bloc variants are still available.

Muzzle awareness is a major problem with many ANA, especially those who have never had an advisor team before. Developing muzzle awareness takes patience and constant spot corrections. Over time, these efforts will have an impact. ANA will also have a tendency to carry loaded weapons with the safety disengaged. A Kalashnikov-type weapon with a selector switch in a position other than “safe” is easy to spot. Advisors need to maintain vigilance regarding the condition and position of ANA weapons.

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ANA Vehicles

The ANA operate several different vehicles. The majority patrol in four-door, four-cylinder, and five-speed diesel variant Ford Ranger pickup trucks. The 1114, 1151, and 1152 series HMMWVs are replacing these trucks. Afghan soldiers also operate International 7-Ton trucks. Mechanized infantry units are normally equipped with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers of U.S. manufacture. ANA tank units operate M60 tanks, T-72 tanks, and other American and Russian main battle tanks. Advisors must encourage their counterparts to perform maintenance, including preventive maintenance.

Contractors provide maintenance support to the ANA through five regional maintenance sites and six satellite sites. They also have mobile maintenance teams to support remote sites, if needed. Stations should route requests for maintenance support through their higher HQ while the advisor teams should provide parallel copies of the request through their chain of command.



Figure 23 ANA mounted patrol utilizing up-armored HMMWVs and Ford Ranger pick-up trucks.

Accountability

Accountability of weapons and ammunition remains problematic due to poor record keeping, theft, maintenance issues, and, in the case of ammunition, operational use. A constant challenge for the Advisor is to keep units stocked with sufficient ammunition – given ANA soldiers are ill-disciplined in fire control.

The amount of equipment on hand at a unit will vary for several reasons (priority level of the unit, accountability, availability, theft, corruption etc.). Equipment on hand will not always be fully mission

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capable. Some units will have more of a “push” based logistics system where the ANA Corps Commander receives equipment and then pushes the equipment down to the kandak after they have taken the amount they need. In some cases, the logistics flow stops at the MoD or corps level due their refusal or inability to issue equipment to subordinates. These decisions and gaps in ability create bottlenecks that result in units not receiving required equipment.



Figure 24 ANA staff officer reviewing unit supply inventory reports.

Systems Development

Overview

Systems development is one of the key goals of the overall advising mission. While the initial focus on developing the ANA included growing and equipping the force and providing the basics in survivability and professionalism training, as the army matures, the inherent weaknesses in their personnel, logistics, and operations system will retard their overall improvement. This section provides the advisors with an overview of how ANA systems are supposed to function. In many cases, however, the team will find the reality on the ground is far from the ideal. In some cases, the system may not even exist. The five key systems are:

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- Personnel
- Finance
- Logistics
- Operations
- Training



Figure 25 ANA officers conducting background checks to vet potential applicants.

Systems development requires a top down approach for completely successful implementation. Lower level advisory teams will have to work with the corps advisors to ensure a top down synchronization of systems development. Mentors should spend their time focusing on tangible aspects of systems such as reports, meetings, and SOPs and stay away from theory.

ANA Recruiting and Vetting Process

The recruiting and vetting process is the same for both ANA and ANP and follows the three-step process described below. All vetting of candidates to serve in the ANSF meet the requirements of the law

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prohibiting military assistance to units or individuals known to have committed human rights abuses. The ANA director at the National Army Volunteer Center (NAVC) is the approval authority for both the ANA and ANP.

- Step 1: The applicant provides 12 passport photos and secures a national identification card from the district, which the governor or another designated individual verifies. Recruits must be between 18 and 28 years old. Age waivers are considered based on the applicant's qualifications.
- Step 2: The applicant sees a recruiter at a provincial headquarters and completes a contract. An escort guides the applicant through the screening process which examines health and criminal records, as well as other relevant background information. The applicant must get two village elders to sign the form vouching for his character. Likewise, an official at the district center must sign the form. All documents are then taken by the escort to the ANA Commissar headquarters for verification and signature.
- Step 3: The Commissar's office conducts medical pre-screening. All documents go back to the sub-governor for signature. Ultimately, the MoD reviews all the documentation and then notifies the provincial authorities of acceptance by issuing the directive to commence training.

The ANA has also implemented an additional level of review for potential ANA recruits. An Afghan who requests to join the ANA must complete a form while at the recruiting center. The recruiting process adds the recruit's name to a list that is circulated among various MoD offices, including the ANA General Staff G2, for a rudimentary background check.

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Figure 26 District level ANSF recruiting event draws local elders and leaders.

During periods of high recruitment, an Afghan recruiting strategy is to appeal to the elders to support the ANA by bringing candidates forward. This strategy has a secondary effect of binding the local population to the ANA. Elders may resist this process based on the image of the ANA in the local community and the perception of danger to the ANA from insurgents or criminals.

Current initiatives to improve recruiting and vetting for both the ANA and ANP include:

- State-of-the-art biometric collection and database program that will provide both the MoD and MoI a capability to positively identify all Afghan soldiers and police; and
- Monetary incentives for enlistment and re-enlistment, particularly for Commandos and Afghan Border Police (ABP).

Positive identification will allow for more reliable tracking of personnel and ensure that soldiers and police officers receive their full pay. In order to encourage enlistment and re-enlistment, soldiers may receive monetary incentives. For example, commandos that have graduated and are filling active roles in a commando unit receive \$50 per month in incentive pay in addition to their regular Army salaries. Additional proposed initiatives are under financial review, including signing bonuses, retention bonuses, and hostile fire or imminent danger pay.

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ANA Basic Training

New ANA recruits attend an eight-week basic training course held at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTTC). This training serves as a starting point for soldiers and not as an ultimate training solution. The course covers basic military subjects and combat skills to include drill, marksmanship, physical fitness, and first aid. Based on the high illiteracy rate within the country, a literacy training program is included in basic and all advanced military training courses. Coalition military members provide oversight and Afghan instructors teach the courses.



Figure 27 ANA soldiers examining shot groupings during basic marksmanship training.

Advanced Training Courses

Within the ANA, the Afghan National Training Command (ANATC) contributes significantly to force development through ANA institutions such as the ANA Bridmal (NCO) Academy, which teaches the 1U NCO course that fast tracks recently graduated recruits with special skills and higher education into the NCO ranks as well as Squad Leader Course (SLC), Platoon Sergeant Course (PSC), Senior Sergeant Course (SSC), First Sergeant Course (FSC), and Sergeant Major Course (SMC). For reference, Kabul, Bridmal Academy, and Regional Training Teams (RTT) – when in the Corps area, teach the SLC and

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PSC. The SSC, FSC, and SMC receive instruction only in Kabul at the Bridmal Academy. Whereas, Corps/Brigades carryout the Team Leader Course (TLC) with oversight from the Bridmal Academy.

The KMTC also conducts several courses which develop the force, including the Company Commander Course (CCC), Kandak Commander Course (KCC), Staff Officer Course (SOC), Military Skills Instructor Course (MSIC), Battle Staff NCO Course (BSNCO), the Training Management Course (TM), Computer Courses, Up-Armored HMMWV Training (UAH), Literacy Training and English language training. The Sergeant Major Academy at KMTC has oversight of the Command Sergeant Major, First Sergeant, and NCO Battle Staff Courses. The ANA Logistics School in Kabul provides additional logistics training such as the Driver Instructor Course, the Mechanics Course, the Mobile Kitchen Trailer Course, and other logistics training courses. Whereas, the EOD school in Mazar-e-Sharif (MeS) provides EOD and CIED training. ANA Officers and NCOs receive counterinsurgency (COIN) training at the COIN Training Officer Course – Afghanistan in Darulaman.



Figure 28 Kandak staff officers conducting tactical planning.

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NTM-A is currently establishing 22 branch schools around the country. These branch schools will then house the company commander, squad leader, platoon sergeant, and senior sergeant courses formerly held at KMTC and Bridmal. ANA soldiers receive Professional Military Education (PME) from the Command & Staff College (CSC) in Kabul via the following four courses: the Junior Officer Staff Course (JOSC); the Command & General Staff Course (CGSC); the Higher Command & Staff Course (HCSC); and the Strategic Command & Staff Course (SCSC). Finally, force development also occurs via International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs sponsored by a variety of countries, some of which are administered by CSTC-A.




Figure 29 ANA Force Generation Process



Figure 30 Basic marksmanship qualification at the KMTC.

ANA Pay Rates

The Following is the monthly pay rate by grade effective as of October 2009.

ANSF Rank	<1 to 3	>3	>6	>9	>12	>15	>18	>21	>24
GEN	\$ 945	\$ 990	\$ 1,005	\$ 1,020	\$ 1,035	\$ 1,050	\$ 1,065	\$ 1,080	\$ 1,095
LTG	\$ 845	\$ 890	\$ 905	\$ 920	\$ 965	\$ 950	\$ 965	\$ 980	\$ 995
MG	\$ 745	\$ 800	\$ 815	\$ 830	\$ 845	\$ 860	\$ 875	\$ 890	\$ 905
BG	\$ 645	\$ 700	\$ 715	\$ 730	\$ 745	\$ 760	\$ 775	\$ 790	\$ 805
COL	\$ 495	\$ 530	\$ 545	\$ 560	\$ 575	\$ 590	\$ 605	\$ 620	\$ 635
LTC	\$ 445	\$ 480	\$ 495	\$ 510	\$ 525	\$ 540	\$ 555	\$ 570	\$ 585
MAJ	\$ 395	\$ 430	\$ 445	\$ 460	\$ 475	\$ 490	\$ 505	\$ 520	\$ 535
CPT	\$ 345	\$ 350	\$ 365	\$ 380	\$ 395	\$ 410	\$ 425		
1LT	\$ 295	\$ 310	\$ 325	\$ 340	\$ 355	\$ 370			
2LT	\$ 275	\$ 290	\$ 305	\$ 320	\$ 335				
Chf NCO/SGM	\$ 275	\$ 310	\$ 325	\$ 340	\$ 355	\$ 370	\$ 385	\$ 400	\$ 415
SNCO/1st Sgt	\$ 255	\$ 270	\$ 285	\$ 300	\$ 315	\$ 330	\$ 345	\$ 360	\$ 375
SSgt/SFC	\$ 235	\$ 245	\$ 260	\$ 275	\$ 290	\$ 305	\$ 320	\$ 335	\$ 350
Sgt/SSgt	\$ 210	\$ 230	\$ 245	\$ 260	\$ 275	\$ 290	\$ 305		
1st Ptrmn/Sgt	\$ 180	\$ 215	\$ 230	\$ 245	\$ 260	\$ 278			
2nd Ptrmn/Sld	\$ 165	\$ 200	\$ 215	\$ 230	\$ 245				

Figure 31, ANSF Pay Chart

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ANA pay has been a constant issue that has contributed to the corruption level within the government. The low pay, coupled with ANA leaders' penchant for skimming pay as it passed through each level of leadership has led to the ANA's habitual use of extortion and bribery to augment their income. To overcome this challenge, MoD instituted electronic funds transfers (EFT) as a means to ensure the individual ANA soldier receives his entitled pay. However, opportunities for leaders to skim or extort pay still exist – the Advisor must report such activities when observed.

Personnel Administration

One of the key factors in helping the ANA with their administration section is realizing that Afghanistan is still a third world country with third world problems. While not necessarily efficient or effective, the stubby pencil method of record keeping may be the best. The key question is, can the administration section answer higher HQ and the commanders' questions regarding his personnel? In some cases, the advisors will have to help the ANA develop their administrative record keeping from scratch. Since most HQs do not require Personnel Status (PERSTAT) reports, many units have ignored the requirements of maintaining any types of records. In addition, the low literacy level of the soldier makes record keeping difficult at best. Mentors should periodically check personnel reporting since the unit will receive food and other supplies based on personnel strength reports of the reporting unit.

Logistics

One of the most significant shortcomings in the ANA is their inability to plan and execute large-scale logistics and sustainment requirements. Factors underlying this deficiency include inadequate levels of sustainment stocks and limited capacity of the MoD to execute the planning, acquisition, and sustainment cycle. Senior advisors and civilian contractors are assisting senior MoD officials in developing their capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and upgrade their forces.

To help the ANA take a giant step toward becoming a self-sustaining military force, advisors need to reinforce the importance of relying on the Afghan supply system for logistical support instead of turning to coalition forces for support. There have been modest improvements in the MoD's ability to perform key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting.

The MoD is responsible for all facets of ANA supply and manpower. Due to the impoverished nature of the country, however, almost all of the equipment distributed by MoD to the ANA comes from donor nations that purchase or provide the equipment. Since the Afghan economy is still in a developmental status, this fact is not likely to change in the near term. The Tashkil manning document determines the amount of equipment the MoD will provide through each command level. Once fielded units receive their equipment, they maintain accountability of their equipment through unit property books. Unfortunately support from coalition and donor nations in some way hampers the development of the ANA logistics system since it engenders a feeling of, "If we wait long enough, NATO will just give us what we need".

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Figure 32 Distribution point for ANSF supplies to a subordinate unit.

Advisors must make obtaining coalition logistical support as painful as possible for the ANA leadership in order for the ANA leadership to develop a reliance and confidence on the ANA logistics system over their dependence on NATO's logistics system. Although there is an Afghan Supply System in place that should push equipment and supplies down from MoD warehouses to the corps and individual kandaks, the ANA does not fully understand or execute this supply system. The main problem is getting the Afghan government to take ownership of the supply system and push the equipment down to ANA units. Warehouse managers often hoard the equipment they receive and will not push it out down to designated units. As with administration, if they exist at all, the vast majority of supply records are handwritten memos or logbooks, which make the entire supply process cumbersome. This poor record keeping also makes theft or sale of ANA equipment easier to accomplish and harder to detect. The country's limited road network, its varying degree of trafficability hampers supply distribution to and from central supply warehouses.

Another issue that often affects maintenance is the wide variety of types of equipment the ANA uses. Multiple donor nations have provided different types of equipment that may or may not be compatible with other gear. Further, the ANA will also have Taliban and Soviet era equipment that they continue to use. Finally, the ANA supply system is normally not proactive in nature and does not track usage rates or

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conduct periodic inventories. As a result, it is not until a unit is critically short on some type of equipment that they will announce there is a problem.

Afghan Supply Request Process




Figure 33, ANA Supply Request/Distribution Process.

Advisors should be aware that the ANA has established logistics decrees (logistic policies) as well as standardized forms and procedures to use and follow. However, it is not an uncommon occurrence for requests from units to go unfilled or receive untimely support, leaving the unit in dire need of supplies. The Advisor team may have to escort the logistics officer or commander to the next higher headquarters to ensure the proper issue of requested supplies. If this fails, the team must contact the next higher advisor team or their chain of command to work the issue. Subordinate organizations have responsibility for proper equipment accountability, with most elements maintaining equipment accountability through the use of hand receipts and manual ledgers.

The two primary forms utilized by the ANA for requesting, receiving, and turning in equipment and supplies are the Supply Request (MoD Form 14) (refer to Appendix A) and the Issue and Turn-In Order (MoD Form 9) (refer to Appendix B). The requesting unit submits or forwards the MoD Form 14 up the chain of command for approval and fill by the supporting CSS Kandak or higher level supply agency. When the supporting unit or agency fills the logistics request, the supporting unit or agency completes a MoD Form 9. A copy of the MoD Form 9 will then accompany the requested items down to the gaining unit. ANA units will also complete a MoD Form 9 when they have unserviceable gear that must be turned-in.

Currently, NTM-A/CSTC-A policy places emphasis on the Afghan MoD 14 Logistics Process as an integral and core aspect in the effective development of the ANA. Likewise, NTM-A/CSTC-A has primary responsibility to validate and resource International Joint Command (IJC) and Regional Command (RC) requirements through the Afghan National Security Force Fund (ANSFF). Commanders within the IJC and respective RCs identify and validate requirements that exist within the fielded ANA. As such, US advisors and logisticians, to include purchasing and contracting officers supporting the development of ANA, should have a base understanding in how to request, coordinate, and fill emerging requirements (not within the base fielding plan), starting with the Afghan MoD 14 Logistics Process.

Fuel Distribution

Vehicle fuel distribution is a shared responsibility of the MoD and coalition forces. The MoD provides a set amount of fuel to the kandak based on the assigned number of vehicles. Each kandak has a specific monthly allotment for fuel. Units must submit mileage reports on each vehicle to the Corps Logistics Officer, who will consolidate the reports and forward them to the MoD. All ANA requests for fuel must use the MoD procurement process. All fuel requests must originate from the kandak in need of the fuel. Such requests must pass through the corps headquarters prior to arrival at the MoD for approval. The MoD then approves or disapproves the request. Obviously, this process is very time consuming making it impractical when the unit has no fuel on hand.



Figure 34 Joint ISAF/ANA fuel distribution convoy.

In some cases, a unit's allocation is insufficient to meet its operational requirements. Since the process of getting additional fuel is so time consuming, vehicles may sit for weeks without gas. Also, the inherent danger on the roads makes moving fuel to outlying units difficult, often resulting in their not receiving their fuel allocation.

Advisor teams may have to provide fuel to the ANA in order to allow them to conduct operations. Each battle space owner will provide operating conditions and fuel amounts provided to the ANA. Again, the decision for the advisors to provide the ANA fuel makes the ANA more dependent on us and undermines their logistics systems. Leaders must balance the need to develop sustainable systems against operational requirements and decide if one outweighs the other.

The key reason behind the mileage reports on each vehicle is to prevent or recognize fuel theft. Fuel theft at all levels is a huge problem, exacerbating the existing distribution problems. Be aware that an ANA unit may approach you for fuel to replace the fuel that they have sold in the bazaar. Be especially careful of placing fuel in cans - given the ease of selling fuel cans.

Vehicle and Equipment Maintenance

CSTC-A has purchased a maintenance contract to ensure the ANA vehicles receive routine services (every six weeks or 5,000 miles) as well as receive major repairs when needed. The contract has established five regional maintenance facilities (in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif) and four satellite facilities (in Kunduz, Bamyian, Fayzabad, and Jalalabad). The contract calls for the maintenance company to provide towing services to move broken vehicles to the maintenance facility as well as provide a mobile maintenance team that can travel to various stations and conduct routine maintenance on site. The ANA should submit requests for maintenance through their higher HQ while the advisor team also forwards the request up through their chain of command.

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Figure 35 ANA mechanic conducting a serviceability inspection.

Despite this contract, preventive maintenance within the kandaks remains an issue. Not only do many ANA have little idea how to properly maintain their vehicles, they often lack the basic supplies (such as motor oil) necessary to actively maintain their trucks. Likewise, the rugged or dangerous areas of the country isolate outlying units preventing them from accessing maintenance facilities as they cannot safely get their vehicles to the facilities or get the mobile team to them.

Section 3: Mentoring Challenges, Strategies and Tools

Overview

Helping Afghan Army counterparts develop as a functional, stand-alone, and credible military force in the middle of an insurgency, exacerbated by uncontrolled criminal activity and terrorism, will be one of the toughest challenges an advisor will face. The cultural and ethnic differences discussed previously make the task even more complex. At times, these differences may appear to be too difficult to overcome, but they can be minimized with patience, understanding, and determination.



Figure 36 Basic warrior training graduation formation at the Kandahar Regional Military Training Center.

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The ANA do not now, nor will they probably ever look similar to the western armies that the advisor may be familiar with. This section will explain some of the key challenges the ANA face in their day-to-day operations as they grow and develop into a professional fighting force while simultaneously fighting an insurgency.

To provide the advisor a baseline from which to begin effecting change, the advisor should know that the ANA have very little history since the expulsion of Soviet forces. As mentioned in previous sections, the formal Afghan Army ceased to exist during the Taliban rule. Seasoned officers and NCOs within the ANA up until recent times, gained their combat experience as either Mujahedeen fighters or members of warlord militias.

ANA Development Mission

The development of an effective Afghan National Army is critical to the overall strategic goals of NATO in Afghanistan. The ANA is necessary to provide security to the country, degrade the insurgency to a negligible level, ensure the legitimacy and popular support for the Afghan government and the eventual withdrawal of NATO combat troops from the nation. Unfortunately the resurgence of the Taliban in traditional strongholds such as Kandahar Province and the skepticism of the population of whether to support the Taliban or the coalition, has set these goals back.

ANA Development Goals

Each of these development goals represents a key area in the development of the ANA's ability to function effectively. Depending on the size and mission of the mentored ANA unit as well as time available to the advisor teams, they may have to choose one or two areas to focus on since they may not have the ability to focus on each area.

Principles for development of the ANA include:

- Loyal to the Government of Afghanistan
- Disciplined and professional
- Ethnically diverse
- Multi-year process
- Affordable
- Sustainable

The advisor/mentor team must conduct an accurate assessment of their partner/supported ANA unit when beginning their relationship in order to establish an accurate baseline for planning the development and support they will provide to that unit. The primary tool currently in use for establishing this baseline is the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) (Refer to Appendix C). The CUAT provides a snapshot of the unit's personnel and equipment fills as it relates to the Tashkil. The CUAT also provides an assessment of the unit's individual critical mission functions, member training and leader development

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levels (e.g. NCO Academy, Platoon Leader Course, etc), along with previous assessments conducted on the unit, and their participation in named operations.

Comparison of Western vs. Afghan Soldiers

It is important to note that it is not the purpose of advisors to make the ANA look like a Western Army. The fact is that many facets of the western army model will not work in the tribal and economically lagging culture of Afghanistan. The country does not possess the financial resources to outfit and sustain the army with the technological weaponry present in most modern armies. Further, the literacy level of the population hinders the rapid introduction and employment of new military equipment and technology. Advisors should focus on basic soldiering, tactics and leadership skills. Ultimately it is up to the Afghan people to decide how their army will function and the models they will use to develop their force and responsibilities.

The key role for the advisor is to encourage the ANA to ensure that however they structure themselves and perform their mission that they develop into a professional and competent military organization. The importance of the Afghan people's perception of the ANA cannot be overstated.

Advisor Principles

The most important principle for improving the ANA is the development of their competence and professionalism. Soldiers must act as trusted agents of the government that both leaders and citizens see as a fair and impartial arbitrator of justice. The soldier must have the respect of the people and represent them from a demographic and cultural values standpoint. They must have the training, expertise, and equipment to successfully conduct security operations. Finally, they must demonstrate that they are dedicated to the welfare of the citizens and the nation; combating insurgents and criminals while protecting the rights of the people and creating security that allows growth in opportunity.

Six Advisor Imperatives

The six imperatives for effective advising are:

- Understanding the operating environment
- Leadership and Influence
- Promoting legitimacy
- Ensuring unity of effort and purpose
- Managing information
- Developing self-sustaining systems

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Working with interpreters

Interpreters are among the advisor's greatest assets. Advisors will find it next to impossible to get anything of value done in the absence of an interpreter. Advising through an interpreter is a skill. Interpreters are valued members of an advisor team. Advisors will be responsible for the safety, billeting, nutrition and pay of the team's interpreter. Sharing the time of the interpreter will be a mission critical task. To ensure the timely pay of interpreters, Advisors will need to be aware of the time sheet process. Advisors often find that their interpreter becomes as much a part of the team as any individual advisor, and that they can help solve many problems at the local level.

Interpreters often possess intuition regarding the behaviors of other Afghans that many advisors lack or gain slowly at best. Advisors are sometimes surprised at the level of feedback that the interpreter can provide following an engagement.

Remember to speak to the person you are addressing, not directly to the interpreter. Keep sentences short so as not to overload the interpreter. Include the interpreter in rehearsals. Limit private conversations between the interpreter and the local national.

Operating in a Divided Society

One of the most difficult things for advisors to understand when dealing with their Afghan counterparts is the importance that Afghans place on local and tribal affiliations as opposed to a national identification. While many ANA will claim to be working for a greater Afghanistan, they will almost always place family, tribal, or ethnic priorities ahead of national priorities. ANA leaders see no conflict in values when, for instance, the local tribal leader asks them to do something that may run counter to national priorities.



Figure 37 Village elder in the Nangahar Province.

In most western cultures, the expectation of values of certain organizations should trump local values. For instance, when a person joins the military, these expectations suggest he or she should subordinate the needs of a particular state or local government to the needs of the country as a whole. This is known as “cross-cutting” a value system. As a result, the society expects the army to enforce rules and regulations equally across the ranks and not give friends, family, and tribal affiliates a better deal. While this type of “soft” corruption occurs in western armies; the leadership, upon discovery will punish the perpetrator. However, Afghans expect and may encourage family and tribal preference.

Tribal or ethnic domination of the arms of national government is the norm in Afghanistan. Advisors must address issues of obvious favoritism, especially at the expense of other groups within the unit, but realize that the soldier’s loyalty will for the time being, remain linked to that particular group or tribe. Leaders are frequently not from the same tribal or ethnic affiliation as their soldiers. In these cases, the individual soldiers who are under the sway of a different tribe or village affiliation may attempt to manipulate or subvert the unit leader. Since Afghanistan has yet to develop a strong national identity, it is often difficult to convince ANA soldiers that they must put concepts such as national values, or the rule of law above the tangible responsibilities they have to their tribes and families.

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Coercive Interrogation

Afghan law places a primacy on confessions to obtain a conviction. The Taliban corrupted this process through the use of torture to maintain a veneer of justice. Those practices, combined with nonexistent evidence collection and analysis systems, have led many Afghan soldiers to think the only way they can get a conviction is through a confession.

Corruption

The hardest part of dealing with corruption in the ANA is that in many cases they do not see it as corruption; merely as a way of doing business. *Advisors cannot allow any instance of corruption to go unchallenged.* While the challenge may not stop the practice completely, it will often stop it at that moment and will reinforce to the leaders that their activities are under scrutiny. While directly addressing corruption is not mandatory, current COMISAF guidance is to report all identified instances of corruption up the chain of command. At a minimum, mentors should advise commanders to conduct investigations where they suspect corruption. ANA leaders do not like others labeling them as corrupt, even if they are.

Arrange to be present during events where corruption is likely to occur. This is especially true when negotiating for services, when the event involves coalition money or resources. If the ANA is unable to have electronic fund transfers affected, make it a point to always attend pay operations.

Advisors may find the level and depth of corruption overwhelming. Make ethics a key point of discussion whenever possible, using analogies and casual conversation to illustrate these points rather than lecturing behavior. Combined with formal training, these efforts will slowly bear fruit. Target the corruption which has a disabling effect first. Once the ANA reach the concept of “functional” level of corruption, then more subtle methods may bring the most progress. When corrupt leadership is beyond any recoverable point, the advisor may have to press for the relief of the leadership. If relief occurs, the corrupt leaders most likely will work in similar positions elsewhere.

Corruption or criminal activity involving weapons and/or ammunition is the most serious of all and will require agencies outside of the advisor team to become involved to investigate and apprehend violators. Detection of this type of activity will often happen while making spot assessments of arms accountability or ammunition storage.

Corruption can be found at all levels, and may be justified by reasoning that the ANA risk much and are underpaid. One favorite tactic is to “shake down” travelers. Another is to steal various items while conducting searches. The advisor/mentor must be cautious when bringing reports of corruption to ANA leadership, if the ANA leader is unaware of the subordinate’s actions, he may demand a portion of the subordinate’s take, allowing the corrupt actions to continue.

Leaders must be encouraged to follow up on reported acts such as these and to resolve them. Unresolved issues such as these can and will lead to more violence against the ANA and more support for insurgents.

Infiltration

Infiltration of the ANA by insurgent or criminal group members is a reality and will take time to change. Insurgent or militia groups greatly influence some units, while others may have just a scattering of members. The key for the advisor is he must analyze how much the infiltration impacts the unit's effectiveness.

For instance, in some units, the bulk of the soldiers may belong to a tribe that is unfriendly to the government, or from a village sympathetic to the Taliban. On the other hand, some units use the cover of their deployed mission and ANA uniforms to perform illegal or criminal acts. In the first case, the infiltration is probably not a pressing issue, while in the second case, the advisor team will probably need assistance from the unit's higher headquarters in eradicating the infiltration.

Intimidation

The individual soldier is very susceptible to intimidation, either directly or through threats to their families. Advisors must remain aware that the ANA may want to do the right thing, but fear is often guiding their actions. Since the coalition cannot protect every ANA soldier and his family, this is a very real threat.

Inadequate system support

One of the most constant refrains the advisors will hear from the ANA is that they don't have enough... be it fuel, ammunition, weapons, uniforms, etc. Often viewed as dysfunctional, the ANA logistics system impacts equipment availability throughout the various headquarters levels. The team must work to improve the logistics system of the unit they advise, and not to circumvent it. Everything that the coalition does to augment the supply system with direct support only sets it back from self-sufficiency.

ANA Leadership Challenges

Leaders vary from good to bad

As with every organization, some leaders are better than others. The problem with the ANA, with its consolidated control structure, is that it is hard to find a subordinate leader to step up when the commander is ineffective. ANA leaders in many ways are still learning how to develop subordinates. Advisors will find themselves mentoring leadership skills in subordinate leaders and often pressing a reluctant leader to delegate authority. Afghans will hoard not only supplies but also authority, which disables the organization in their absence or under stress. ANA units are commander centric and the notion that large organizations need staffs to function efficiently may not be apparent. Mentors should work closely to develop collective staff systems and individual staff section proficiency. It takes a great deal of time and effort for ANA commanders to learn how to use their staffs and hold them accountable.



Figure 38 ANA Major General briefing a humanitarian assistance operation outside of Mazar e Sharif.

Many ANA leaders are in their position due to influence or patronage

The decentralized command appointment structure of the ANA has led to many leaders with little or no military or leadership experience to receive key leadership roles because they were able to convince an MoD leader to put them there through influence or intimidation. Senior officers have been known to “purchase” their position. Such a “purchase” is not for prestige, but to position the senior officer where he can maximize personal profit through coercion and corruption.

Few leaders have formal education/training

Although advanced training such as leadership and PME exists at the various training centers, many Officers and NCOs have not yet attended formal training programs. High operational tempo and perceived risk/danger precludes many leaders from attending formal training. Some may feel that the training is a waste of time because of their leadership experience in other areas (usually militia). This lack of training, coupled with a promotion system that favors influence and patronage, has slowed the development of leadership within the ANA.

This does not imply that all leaders are bad. Some are very brave, and truly want to make the ANA better. They just lack the talent, training, or experience to affect the changes needed. Advisors will need to become familiar with their officers and senior NCOs to ascertain the level of professional education possessed by the leadership, as well as the soldiers.

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NCO Corps

Under the Afghan leadership model, which we are trying to change, you will often find their system provides the NCO with absolutely no authority and expects no initiative from the NCO, a model built on the Russian military tradition. This is unlike the American Army where NCOs have wide decision making latitude. This notion about NCOs provides two challenges: first, ANA leaders are hesitant to empower their NCOs to function as leaders among the ANA, and second, the ANA leader may show less respect toward an NCO advisor than he would to an officer. Advisors will need to lead by example, demonstrating that NCOs are respected, professional, and empowered members of the advisor team.



Figure 39 *An ANA First Sergeant prepares his company for a predeployment parade review the KMTC.*

The ANA NCO Corps is developing an NCO tradition. Officers must empower and enable, while NCOs take the lead in assisting in the development of the infant NCO Corps. Officer advisors must also work the issue from the top down, as the NCO advisors work with ANA NCOs. The ANA officers need to learn how to make the best use of their unit's NCO Corps. Advisor officers set the example in this area. NCO advisors must lead by example with their ANA NCOs. This is a persistent problem for Afghans, again relating to their Russian military traditions. Advisors will notice a tendency for Afghans to fear developing other strong leaders within their organization.

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Some leaders do not understand the benefits of training

Most Afghans, even those who fought the Soviets, have never seen the total impact of effective training. Many ANA leaders do not understand the benefits or effects of good training. As a result, they sometimes pay “lip service” to the importance of training and will only minimally support it. The advisors will have to work hard to convince the Afghan leaders of the importance and effectiveness of good training and connect it with the individual leader’s ability to accomplish his mission.

The current system does not expect Afghan leaders to lead from the front or take responsibility for their subordinates

The Afghan leadership model does not require that leaders share the risks that face their subordinates. It also inexplicably allows leaders to be in charge until things go wrong, at which point the responsibility is not their own. This lack of willingness to assume responsibility makes it difficult for advisors to convey the value of recommended changes since the problems are not the leader’s fault; so why should he work to fix them?

Enterprises that support insurgent or warlord/militia activity

Some ANA are still choosing what side of the fight they are on and others have chosen the enemy’s side. The corruption and insurgent influence in some areas has led some soldiers to feel that the right side is the winning side. Advisors who identify ANA members who support or condone insurgent or criminal activity must immediately report their suspicions to their chain of command.

Working with Coalition Forces

Advisors will often find themselves working within a battlespace that has a Coalition Forces Commander. This may be a U.S. officer or one from a NATO partner. Based on requirements, the advisor should provide periodic reports through his chain of command, where the battlespace owner will want to know about activities that support the counterinsurgency plan within his battlespace. Advisors should quickly determine reporting formats and frequency. Much of the data reported will be the same.



Figure 40 Advisors congratulate ANA soldiers from the 215 Corps upon completion of a tactical small unit leader course in Helmond Province.

The local battlespace owner will also have coordination requirements for such things as movement within the battlespace. There may be local requirements for minimum convoy size based on the commander's threat assessment, coordination of air support, fire support, medical and casualty evacuation, as well as a quick reaction force. Advisors may find themselves challenged by these requirements and while some may be negotiable, the battlespace commander is the approval authority within that battlespace. The staff in the battlespace where the advisor is operating can be a valuable asset in providing local intelligence and coordination. Establishing a good working relationship will bring positive results.

Logistics and Support

Advisors will often find themselves seeking support from units that they are not organic to. Establishing good relations with local logistics and support providers, such as maintenance shops and contractors, is

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essential. Advisors will sometimes find themselves cast far from their higher headquarters' ability to materially support them and will have to be flexible in their relationships. Battlespace owners often provide support to advisors including housing. The landowner may or may not have been expecting to support the team when in the planning stages. The ability to form positive relationships will significantly impact the ease with which the team integrates into disparate support systems. These relationships most often work out very positively.

Conclusion

Current goals call for a fully constituted, professional, functional, and ethnically balanced Afghan National Army (ANA) with a combined force of 240,000 by October 2015, that will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and increasingly.

Achieving the above goal will require:

- Increasing the literacy rate among soldiers
- Training and equipping the ANA to full staffing establishment
- Reducing the desertion rate of soldiers
- Building the ANA's capacity to be self supporting and sustaining
- Continued coordination and partnership with the ANP

Advisor teams have the lead in this development. Mentoring leaders to improve systems and leadership, as well as training soldiers will be much of this effort. It is important to understand the climate in which the advisor will work, and how stakeholders perceive the effects of advising. . The goal of this document is to give the new advisor a head start in getting oriented with the environment in which he will operate.

Sources And Recommended Reading

Most Field Manuals are available online at: <http://www.apd.army.mil>

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Appendix A MoD Supply Request

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Appendix B MoD Issue & Turn-In Order

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Appendix C Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT)

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