



ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide

“SFA is a mindset requiring a fundamental change in how we operate and is the method ISAF will utilize to transition into, and maintain ANSF’s lead for the security of Afghanistan.”


*—General Dunford, USMC
Commander ISAF*



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Introduction

This guide is designed to provide NATO partners and troop contributing nations (TCNs) participating as part of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) a common understanding of Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. It provides a summary of the ISAF SFA concept as well as guidance and information concerning SFA activities, countering the insider threat, mission critical tasks, and training requirements in support of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

The current strategic environment is seen as one of persistent conflict in which Coalition strategic objectives require unified action to achieve unity of effort. These synchronization, coordination, and integration activities of both governmental and non-governmental organizations with military operations also require close relationships with Coalition partners, key friends and allies. Keys to achieving unity of effort are strengthening interagency coordination, working with international allies and partners, and synchronizing strategic communications by NATO and its partners.



In concept, military forces conduct SFA to facilitate a host nation's (HN) ability to deter and defend against transnational and internal threats to stability. Respective Ministries of Defense also conduct SFA to: assist in a HN's ability to defend against external threats; contribute to Coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions.¹

As it relates to Afghanistan successful SFA requires that TCN commanders thoroughly understand the operational environment. Conditions of the operational environment affect what SFA commanders provide. Commanders must understand the conditions that make up the current situation, including the Afghan population, other regional actors, and Coalition forces. From this understanding, commanders visualize desired conditions that represent a desired end state. Commanders must understand the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) helps to determine desired conditions associated with the ANSF. After envisioning a desired end state, commanders then conceptualize how to change the current situation to the desired end state.

Acknowledging the gap in SFA doctrine,² and cognizant of the fact that Supreme Allied Command Transformation has been tasked to lead the development of a NATO SFA Concept,³ this guide provides SFA direction and information, specific to the ISAF mission as it relates to the ANSF.

1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) AJP 3.4.4.

2. 500 FEF 0080/TT 7242/SER: NUO132, HQ ACT, Security Force Assistance (SFA) Conceptual Study The GOTEAM Framework, dated 13 Mar 12.

3. IMSM-0470-2012, Tasking to SCs for development of a NATO Security Force Concept.

CHAPTER 1

Security Force Assistance Overview

1.1 This chapter provides a general overview of the concept of SFA by illustrating broad SFA imperatives, SFA developmental tasks (Organizing, Training, Equipping, Rebuilding, and Advising – OTERA), and Advisor knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs). The second part of this chapter highlights COMISAF's 15 SFA principals and provides a conceptual framework to mitigate Insider Threat (IT) during the conduct of SFA.

1.2 Security Force Assistance (SFA) encompasses all activities conducted to organize, train, equip, build, rebuild, advise, and assist a host nation (HN) in support of their efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, national, or regional security forces and their supporting institutions. This includes activities from the national security sector and the ministry level to the tactical units.

1.3 Conducting SFA requires a specific mindset that Coalition forces (CF) work by, with, and through the HN security forces to support their internal defense and development (which includes local security requirements) and work within other regional organization's charters that are supporting HN security forces development. Personnel conducting SFA must also understand that HN government legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive HN forces as legitimate supporters of the HN for long-term success. Those conducting SFA must understand that the military instrument of national power is only one part of a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. Described below are a set of SFA imperatives which provide a foundation for a proper mindset



1.4 The imperatives of SFA come from the historical record and recent experience. They provide focus on how to successfully conduct SFA. The six imperatives apply to SFA at every level of war (tactical, operational and strategic), for any echelon, and for any CF individual. They are:

a) **Understand the Operational Environment.** An in-depth understanding of the operational environment is critical to the success of CF planning and conducting of SFA operations with the HN security forces. Advisor teams must clearly understand the various opposing threats and civil considerations across the theater framed with a deep understanding of the population dynamics, CF capabilities, diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, sociological, psychological, and geographical considerations. Tactically, successful SFA requires identifying the friendly and hostile decision makers, their objectives and strategies, and the ways they interact. Further, the conditions of the operational environment can rapidly change, and those conducting SFA must anticipate these changes and exploit potential and possibly fleeting opportunities.

b) **Provide Effective Leadership.** Leadership, a critical aspect of any application of combat power, proves indispensable in the dynamic and complex environments associated with SFA. The operational environment in which SFA occurs places a premium on effective leadership at all levels, from the most junior to the most senior general officer and agency director. Leading HN forces or a combined group of NATO and HN forces is inherently more challenging due to differences in culture, language, training, motivations and other aspects. Leaders focus on transitions and decisions that move the HN forces toward independent operations.



c) **Build Legitimacy.** Ultimately, SFA aims to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the local populace. Significant policy and legal considerations may apply to SFA activities. Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining domestic and international support. The force conducting SFA cannot sustain long-term SFA without legitimacy. Legitimacy is a concept that goes beyond a strict legal definition; it includes the moral and political legitimacy of a host-nation

government or partner organization. Local civilians and the international community determine the government's legitimacy based on collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods.

d) **Manage Information.** Successful SFA disseminates timely and protected relevant information, integrates it during planning, and leverages it appropriately during execution. Effective and efficient information management supports decision-making throughout capacity building. Managing information encompasses the collection, analysis, management, application, and preparation of information. Maintaining continuity between rotating SFA elements is critical. For long-term SFA efforts, HN forces expect more professional training from their advisors. To meet expectations and success in general, units conducting SFA establish and integrate lessons learned. Capturing and incorporating evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures and aspects of the operational environment is vital; with each successive SFA-AT rotation, planners strive to maintain continuity and momentum. Finally, planners synchronize effective information engagement with the entire mission.

e) **Ensure Unity of Effort.** SFA often includes many actors, making unity of effort essential for success. SFA will often include international and HN forces, including conventional forces, Special Forces, or a combination of the two. Other civilian and military organizations are often involved in SFA. Planners integrate them into one cohesive effort.

f) **Sustain the Effort.** Sustainability consists of two major components: the ability to sustain the SFA effort throughout the operation and the ability of the HN forces to sustain their operations independently. While each situation will vary, personnel conducting SFA must avoid assisting HN forces in techniques and procedures beyond the HN forces' capability to sustain. Tactics, techniques, and procedures must be modified to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the HN forces. Those involved in SFA must recognize the need for programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by both the SFA force and HN forces. They must not begin programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the host nation to maintain without outside assistance. Such efforts are counterproductive.

1.5 SFA spans the range of military operations from military engagement to crisis response and contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns. It can include combat advisory and support activities not falling under SFA. SFA does not include direct combat by SFA forces, as direct combat does not build the capability or capacity of the HN. Direct combat may assist the HN forces in the same sense as a Coalition partner assists another Coalition partner in dire need.

1.6 CF conducting SFA will find that initial and continuous assessment of the HN forces is essential for successful advisory efforts. Particular attention should be paid to the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the HN forces involved. Continuous assessment is essential throughout advisory operations. An initial comprehensive assessment will establish a baseline and help advisors develop program objectives and milestones to measure the progress of the HN forces.

1.7 The following tasks are common to SFA mission sets. These tasks facilitate SFA planners to assess and allocate resources based on conditions.

a) **Organizing:** SFA includes organizing institutions and units that can range from standing up a ministry to improving the organization of the smallest maneuver unit. Building capability and capacity in this area includes personnel, logistics, intelligence, and infrastructure support. Developing HN tactical capabilities alone is inadequate; strategic and operational capabilities must be developed as well. HN organization and units should reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and capabilities – they should not simply mirror existing external institutions.

b) **Training:** Training occurs in training centers, academies, and units. Training includes a broad range of subject matter, including security forces responding to civilian oversight and control.

c) **Equipping:** Equipping is accomplished through traditional security assistance, foreign support, and donations. The equipment must be appropriate for the physical environment of the region and the HN's ability to operate and sustain it.

d) **Rebuilding and Building:** In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild existing or build new infrastructure to support HN forces. This includes facilities and materiel but may also include other infrastructure such as command and control systems and transportation networks.

e) **Advising and Assisting:** Advising HN forces and institutions is essential to the ultimate success of SFA. This benefits both the state and the supporting external organizations. To successfully accomplish the SFA mission, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel who fit the profile of one who can advise in a foreign country, is culturally adaptable, and performs in an ambiguous and chaotic environment. In reference to SFA, the SFA organization provides “assistance” to support the execution of the tasks to develop HN forces. “Assistance” should not create a dependency on the CF AT.

The Advisor

1.8 Advisors are the most prominent group of personnel that serve with HN forces. They live, work, and if necessary, fight with their HN forces. The relationship between advisors and HN forces is vital. Advisors are not liaison officers nor do they command HN forces units.



1.9 Advisors may operate at the national, operational, and tactical levels. The national level is considered the largest national subdivision. This may be a nation's combined military headquarters, service components, national-level government officials, or a combination. Operational-level advisors work at a level below the national-level advisor. This may be with military corps or division officers, with regional government officials, or a combination. Depending upon the size of the nation and its military, operational-level advisors may be assigned as low as the brigade levels. Tactical-level advisors normally advise military units at or below the brigade level and provide counsel and assistance across the spectrum of conflict. They advise and assist counterparts in developing unit combat effectiveness and serve as liaisons between HN forces and Coalition combat, support, sustainment and protection forces.

Considerations for Advisor Selection

1.10 Depending on the nature of the SFA mission, senior level planners must clearly identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes that the advisors must possess in order to successfully accomplish the designated SFA tasks. Rigorous vetting and selection of advisor personnel by the TCN is critical to ensuring that those personnel directly engaged in SFA possess not only the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with foreign military personnel, often for extended periods without respite.

1.11 Identification of personnel for SFA missions who possess the required technical or functional skills is the critical first step in forming advisor teams,

or selecting individual augments for SFA missions. For example, if the mission requires a physician to advise HN forces doctors on trauma medicine, the supporting TCN cannot fulfill the requirement by sending a physician's assistant (PA) or a nurse. If the mission is to advise a civilian police unit, then TCNs must use civilian police for advisors. Likewise, if the requirement is to form, train, and equip a team to advise a HN forces artillery battalion, the team as a whole must have the collective capabilities required to develop the HN forces along all lines of doctrine, training, organization, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) appropriate for that type of unit and echelon of command. Additionally, the senior members of the team must meet the rank and grade requirements identified by the Combatant Commander in order to build rapport and a healthy dynamic between the advisors and the HN forces artillery battalion commander and his staff.

1.12 Personnel or teams designated to advise the HN forces must have the requisite expertise to advise their counterparts within required categories. The supporting TCN must ensure the training and education of all personnel on all requisite functions required for the SFA mission to advise those HN forces' functions.

1.13 Often, selection of the right personnel for the SFA mission implies a de-selection of the wrong personnel. A significant percentage of personnel demonstrate exceptional professional merit; they are competent, courageous, and dedicated to their professions. However, not all of these personnel have many of the personal traits that make an effective advisor: empathy; the ability to work through HN forces counterparts; patience; the ability to generate influence without formal authority; and the ability to work "within shades of gray." No matter how competent they are in their professions, avoid selecting personnel who cannot adopt these principles, as well as personnel who do not show a genuine interest in other people irrespective of cultural differences. Keep in mind, selecting the wrong people can have a more negative impact than having no advisor at all.

Roles of the Advisor

1.14 The advisor has three roles involving different responsibilities. First and foremost, advisors are typically members of a military organization with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Second, advisors embed themselves with their counterparts. Third, advisors are interpreters and communicators



between their respective forces and their foreign counterparts.

1.15 As members of formal organizations (military, police, governmental, etc.), advisors receive and execute the orders of superiors. These orders may conflict with the orders their counterparts (HN forces) receive. Among other duties, advisors must act unobtrusively, but nonetheless positively, often observing, evaluating, and reporting on the performance of counterparts and their assigned unit.

1.16 Secondly, advisors live, eat, and work with the officers and men of their host units. Often, advisors soon regard themselves as one of them. Sharing common hardships and dangers forges potent emotional ties. The success and good name of their units become matters of personal importance to the advisor.

1.17 Finally, advisors are interpreters and communicators between their superiors and foreign counterparts. Advisors must introduce and explain one to the other; they help resolve the myriad of problems, misunderstandings, and suspicions which arise in any human organization, particularly when people of starkly different cultures approach difficult tasks together. Advisors with quick and easy access to influential counterparts can sometimes be the best possible means of communicating.

1.18 To be effective, advisors obviously must gain their counterparts' trust and confidence. This relationship, however, is only a prelude to the advisor's major objective: inspiring and influencing a counterpart to effective action. In pursuing this goal—constantly, relentlessly, and forcefully, yet patiently, persuasively, and diplomatically—advisors must recognize conditions which can benefit or handicap their cause.

Advisor Considerations

1.19 The following considerations are presented for the conduct of advising.

a) **By, With, and Through.** All planned operations of an advisory mission must be conducted by, with, and through the HN forces. Not counting immediate action responses, the mark of an effective advisory effort is the amount of personal involvement the HN forces take in their own operations. To promote the legitimacy of the host nation and their capacity to build trust and confidence, civilians must see that their own security forces protect them. In a word, combat advisors are shadows whose presence is felt at all times and as HN forces' capacity is grown are seen less often.

b) **Empathy leads to competency.** Empathy can be defined as identification with, and understanding of, another's situation, feelings, and motives. This is tough for experienced military leaders and often harder to explain, but it is the



key to the success of an advisory mission. Truly understanding other human beings and where they come from allows for honest relationships to develop. In most cultures, the place to begin understanding another person's feelings and experiences is by understanding the other person's narrative. The narrative is a collective group's identity as an interpretation of both ancient history and recent collective experiences. Delving into the narrative, understanding it and how it affects people, is the beginning of empathy.

c) **Success is built on personal relationships.** Developing a sense of empathy allows advisors to begin nurturing relationships with those they are tasked to advise. No amount of resources and firepower can compensate for the lack of a relationship between advisors and their counterparts. It must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual respect, trust, and understanding create success. Both parties rely on each other for mission accomplishment and often for survival. This relationship is likely to be challenged on numerous occasions; only one built on mutual trust can survive and ensure mission success. Furthermore, advisors learn to pick their battles. Camaraderie and rapport with HN forces can vanish in an instant if one does not prioritize and define critical lines in the relationship.

d) **Advisors are between their national forces and the HN forces.** Living, working and sometimes fighting with HN forces allows for the development of true bonds, empathy, and trust. These desired results require a price. When addressing their own military, advisors soon realize that they are also not one of them, increasing their level of frustration. Advisors are often alone, navigating between two military systems and two cultures, never quite fitting in with either one.

e) **Advisors will never win, nor should they.** Often advisors find it difficult to understand what victory looks like in their operating environment. Progress tends to occur at a glacial pace and cannot usually be tracked on a day-to-day basis. The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not achieve success; success is achieved by the HN forces achieving the objective. Advisors find it difficult to satisfy their own units, and they never fully satisfy the demands of their HN forces. They are figuratively and literally caught in the middle. Advising is the art of striving to make a win-win situation for all parties. The advisor and HN forces relationship is one in which the advisor removes the obstacles in the way. Only a plan by HN forces will succeed—and it will only succeed if it is, in fact, their plan.

f) **Advisors are not commanders.** Advisors do not command HN personnel or units. Advisors provide advice, training, and access to Coalition resources as needed. They are not intended to lead HN forces in combat; they are responsible for the command and control of their own team of advisors. However, they can and should influence the commander of the foreign unit.

g) **Advisors are honest brokers.** Advisors are advocates for HN forces with conventional forces. They transparently access capabilities and reveal limitations of foreign units to the HN forces' and advisors' higher command. They also provide access to Coalition enablers—from close air support to medical evacuation—to HN forces they advise.

h) **Advisors live with shades of gray.** Black and white is not available to the advisor. Caught between two cultures, systems, and narratives, the advisor



works within a gray area. Unlike operations in a conventional unit, many of the checks and balances are not present. Advisors often find themselves isolated with great autonomy and no supervision. These conditions present moral and ethical dilemmas daily. Advisors need to be comfortable in this environment. Often they lose sleep at night and question their actions and those of their HN force. Thus, this mission calls for personnel of enormous character, moral courage, and intellect.

i) **Talent is everything, but advisors must understand rank.** Military forces around the world approach rank and prestige in completely different ways. In some cultures, rank equals experience; in others, it is nobility or education. Often many militaries have rewarded loyalty with promotions, which results in rank-heavy armies. Some HN forces recognize talent, while others recognize rank. Advisors likely advise counterparts much more senior in rank. They must understand that rank on the uniform is important to many armies.

j) **Make Do.** Advisors will never have everything they believe they need to succeed. However, their creativity often distinguishes between success and failure. Austerity and economy of force can fail to meet the prevalent expectations that HN forces have of a Coalition military unit in regards to resources. It is up to the advisor team to close the expectation gap by its creativity and imagination. Scrounging, bartering, and negotiating are daily activities of advisors. An enormous amount of energy must be devoted to these activities to achieve mission success and endear them to their counterparts.

Culture and Communication

1.20 As an advisor, understanding the host-nation population is a crucial element of pre-mission planning and the development of HN forces. Prior knowledge of socio-cultural differences aids in building effective relationships and prevents embarrassment, loss of rapport, and compromise of the mission. This section discusses three aspects of the socio-cultural environment to provide a framework for analysis and comparison of foreign cultures for operational purposes. These aspects are society, culture, and communications.



a) Society

1) People who have a common culture, share a group identity, occupy a common territory, and are subject to the same political authority can be identified as a society. A society is not easily created or destroyed. Though they share the above factors, societies are neither homogeneous nor static. A society usually has a dominant culture but can also have a vast number of secondary cultures, each influencing the other.

2) Advisors derive much of their effectiveness from their ability to understand and work with counterparts from a foreign society. Advisors must also consider societies outside their immediate operational environment whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission

b) Culture

1) Social structure comprises the relationships among groups, institutions, and individuals in a society; in contrast, culture provides meaning to individuals within the society. Social structure can be thought of as a skeleton, with culture being the muscle on the bones. The two are mutually dependent and reinforcing. A change in one results in a change in the other.

2) Culture influences an individual's range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. It influences judgments about what is right and wrong and what is important and unimportant. Cultural rules are flexible in practice; the customs and actions that an individual practices are based largely on that particular environment.

c) **Communications.** Communication is determined by culture; as a result it can be either high context or low context. High context communication places an emphasis on clearly stating issues and problems and working towards resolving them in a straightforward manner. Low context communication places a premium on building relationships; as such, problem sets tend to be worked in a less formal matter in societies that utilize this type of communication. Quickly and effectively identifying whether a society uses high or low context communication is a key to effectively conveying material between the advisor and the host-nation population.

d) **Levels of communication.** The cross-cultural communication capabilities required by an effective advisor to HN forces can be described in three levels. At the lowest level is awareness, followed by knowledge. The highest level is reached when these two are combined with well-trained and refined skills.

1) **Awareness.** Awareness is the basic level of cross-cultural capability. Awareness of cultural differences and their impact is the first prerequisite for successful work with a counterpart. Simply being sensitive to the fact that differences exist and carefully observing actions and reactions can assist the advisor in adjusting behavior and modifying actions to achieve greater influence with the counterpart. Awareness is not region specific and can be instilled in the advisor with relatively little training.

2) **Knowledge.** Knowledge of the details and nuances of a specific culture is the next level of cross-cultural capability. Advisors attain this level through academic study and immersion. Such knowledge is inherently area-specific and rarely transfers from one target area (or culture) to another. Developing in-depth regional knowledge necessary for effective cross-cultural communications requires extensive, time-consuming training. Appropriate personnel assignment policies must support this training.

3) **Skills.** Skills fundamental to effective cross-cultural communication, when combined with awareness and knowledge, form the highest level of cross-cultural capability. These skills include professional competence, language, nonverbal communication, negotiation, interpersonal skills, observation, problem solving, leadership, instruction, and fitness. Although some individuals show greater natural talent for these skills than others, all advisors require continual training in each to achieve and retain their full potential as advisors to foreign counterparts.

Establishing Rapport with Counterparts

1.21 Once rapport is established, it is a mark of a relationship comprised of cooperation, conformity, harmony, and affinity. When people discuss good rapport, they describe a relationship founded on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Relationships characterized by personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of



friction often lack rapport and are doomed to failure. For the advisor, rapport is a major key to effective advising.

1.22 Since advisors are in a unique position, they establish rapport with their foreign counterparts. That position is one in which the advisor has no positional authority over the actions of their HN forces counterparts. Advisors instead use their people skills to build rapport. They influence the actions and decisions of their counterparts through the application and exercise of those people skills. They have a genuine interest in other people, smile, remember and use people's names, encourage others to talk about themselves, listen to others, discuss what the other person is interested in, and make the other person feel important. Advisors incorporate information specific to the culture and society of their potential counterparts. This information may take the form of thorough area studies, operational area studies, and other research materials. Knowledge includes the components and techniques of rapport.

Components of Rapport

1.23 Three components compose rapport: understanding, respect, and trust. All the components of rapport are two-way streets; to have counterparts share about their culture, language, and experiences, advisors also have to be willing and able to share. Building this rapport may require the advisor to establish a personal level of understanding with their counterparts.

a) **Understanding** is the first component of rapport. It begins before deployment and may include foreign cultural studies, language training, and equipment and doctrine familiarization. Once in country, advisors continue to broaden their understanding by observing and asking questions.

b) **Respect** is the next component of rapport. It is a reciprocal commodity. The foreign counterpart should grow to respect advisors, what they know, and how they perform. Advisors should look for those things that they respect in their counterparts. This may prove challenging. The counterpart may not fit the mold of Coalition officers. Lacking formal training or education, the foreign counterpart may even be illiterate. The uniform standards of the host nation often may differ from the advisors' standards. Start with the basics and expand over time. Additional factors may affect the counterpart's willingness and motivation. For example, by accepting the duties, the counterparts (and their family) may be in mortal danger. The counterpart may have proven to be a fearless warrior, even without formal training. In short, traits deserving respect will exist even before the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows through shared experiences and shared dangers. Advisors should live, eat, and if authorized, fight with their counterparts. By sharing their hardships and dangers, advisors build respect.



c) **Trust** is the final critical component for building rapport. Trust grows gradually from understanding and respect. Building trust needs to begin on day one, but it will not mature until later in the relationship. Advisors should begin by showing they are reliable and should do everything they say they will do. They should be in the right place at the right time. Two things can enhance this growth. First, the advisor should start out with confidence-building missions. Early success builds self-confidence and trust. Second, advisors should not promise any support they might not be able to deliver.

Techniques of Rapport

1.24 HN forces respect advisors who actually show them the right way to do a task rather than just talk. Experience has shown that HN forces units will not hesitate to go into danger if their advisors are right there with them. To further contribute to building rapport, advisors should maintain enthusiasm and a positive attitude; learn the language or how to use an interpreter; respect a counterpart's rank, age, status, and experience; develop negotiation skills; and improve interpersonal skills.

1.25 Other rapport-building techniques can include being confident, competent, and capable. Advisors never expect or demand their counterparts to do something that they are unable or unwilling to do. They demonstrate everything. Advisors learn their counterparts' names and spend time with them at meals and during holidays; they prepare mentally to interact with counterparts at all times. Advisors avoid giving the impression of favoring any one group. They frequently assess their

counterparts' perceptions. Advisors recognize threats to discipline and enforce the chain of command.

Accomplishment of Rapport

1.26 Advisors measure rapport by how well they can motivate their counterparts to act. The basic techniques of motivation (in the absence of authority) are advising, setting the example, seeking compromise, and coercing.

a) **Advising.** Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action is only effective if the counterpart trusts the advisor is professionally competent. If the counterpart does not perceive the proposed solution as realistic, the advisor's competence is questioned. Advisors carefully explain to their counterparts that recommended courses of action are realistic and will be effective.

b) **Setting the example.** Setting the example for the counterpart must be an ongoing effort for the advisor to avoid the appearance of a "do as I say, not as I do" attitude. In setting the example, advisors explain why what they are doing is the most effective action for the situation. This is particularly true when the counterpart really does not understand the behavior (or purpose).

c) **Seeking compromise.** When seeking compromise with the foreign counterpart, advisors may create a situation in which the counterpart has a personal interest in successful execution. In some cultures, seeking a compromise may allow the counterpart to save face. To reach an effective compromise, advisors may have to conduct negotiations.

d) **Coercing.** Coercion is the least desirable method of motivation because it can cause irreparable damage to the relationship. Advisors should use coercion only in extreme circumstances. Advisors must avoid unintentionally forcing their counterparts into action. Instead, they establish and maintain good rapport by conveying they are sincerely interested in their counterparts, their nation, and its cause. Advisors will not belittle their counterparts' efforts. Advisors must demonstrate that they have come to help because they believe the counterparts' goals are just, fair, and deserving of success.

ISAF Security Force Assistance

1.27 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan is at a critical stage in the campaign. Unified action by NATO to support the development of the Afghan National Security Forces' (ANSF's) capacity and capability is essential to the process of security transition. The effective conduct of SFA activities is, therefore, central to the campaign plan.



Figure 1-1. ISAF SFA principles

1.28 ISAF has developed 15 principles⁴ for SFA (see figure 1-1). These principles will assist ISAF leaders and personnel in understanding and framing the SFA mission in Afghanistan. Those principles are:

a) **Mission**

1) **SFA is the way to achieve mission success.** SFA is the way in which we will achieve the irreversible transition of lead security responsibility to the Afghans. The sovereign nation of Afghanistan will increasingly own the battle space and ISAF will support Afghan operations in accordance with their strategy and their plans.

2) **One Command and one mission.** SFA is conducted from the ministries down to the squad on patrol. Do not build alternative chains of command or ad hoc organizations. Use simple and unambiguous command and control systems that mirror the Afghan's chain of command and then support them at every level.

3) **SFA does not equal SFA Teams.** The Afghans' success is our success; therefore all elements of the force deliver SFA. SFA is the way by which we

4. The 15 SFA principles are visualized in 15 video clips, accessible on YouTube "CAAT SFA principle video," and recommended for training and education.

achieve the mission and SFA teams are one of the means; but they do not represent the only means.

b) Mindset

- 1) **Understand in order to advise.** Understand the entity that you are assigned to assist and where it resides on the continuum between dependency and self-sufficiency. Advise and assist from the perspective of unified action, do not become solely focused on any one entity at any one time. Examine and understand the connective tissue.
- 2) **There is no single approach.** ISAF will provide assistance to all ANSF entities. Do not solely focus on the Afghan National Army (ANA) because it is comfortable to do so. The Afghan National Police (ANP) are not the ANA, nor are they the National Directorate of Security (NDS). SFA requires a change of mindset, a different way of doing business; be comfortable with change and relish this unique opportunity.
- 3) **One Afghan, one advisor.** Define the sphere of influence for every Afghan unit, official and leader. Avoid multiple and overlapping advisory chains. Determine who owns the relationship and then allow that individual to develop it. The appropriate individual with the connections to the appropriate resources can deliver far more than a fully manned team without direction. Do not confuse quantity with quality.
- 4) **Their failure is not your failure.** Have the confidence and patience to allow your counterpart to lead and to learn through self-discovery and to determine their own shortcomings. The Afghans will get the occasional bloody nose and you must ensure that they learn from the experience. However, ISAF must not stand by and watch them being knocked down.
- 5) **Better that the Afghans do something adequately than we do it perfectly.** Ask and then listen to how the Afghans will conduct operations, and then assist them accordingly; increase their capability along the way. Your effect is measured by how well the ANSF develop, not the number of times you successfully complete a task, acquire resources, or the number of suggestions you make.

c) Approach

- 1) **This is Afghanistan.** Don't template assistance based on your own background or prejudice. Approach every problem from an Afghan perspective. Your counterpart will always take an Afghan approach or seek an Afghan solution. Observe and understand the cultural norms, their systems

and processes before offering advice. Sustainable solutions will be ones that Afghans can embrace as their own. Enable and then hold them to their choice.

2) **SFA is based on Afghan needs.** Afghan needs and requirements are just that. Their solutions must be durable, consistent and sustainable. The goal of effective SFA is self-sufficiency. Developing professionalism and leadership will have far greater and a more lasting effect than developing tactics. The emphasis should be on the “why and how” we do this, rather than on the “what to do”.

3) **Don’t allow cultural differences to divide us.** Operating according to Afghan priorities and timelines may involve periods of relative inactivity, be comfortable with this. Relationships are incredibly valuable. Chatting and drinking chai isn’t a distraction or an unproductive use of your time; view it as the time where you arrive at a mutual understanding of where you’re going and how you are collectively going to get there.



4) **Maintain the Sensory Network.** As force levels reduce, our traditional situational awareness will decline. Make up for any shortfalls by viewing the Afghans as the primary sensors. Develop and maintain the sensory network. Locals have an advantage, culturally and linguistically, over ISAF and can access information that you will never leverage.

5) **Afghans in the lead does not mean Afghans alone.** Live, eat, advise and if required fight with the Afghans. Assisting on the ground will deliver the greatest rewards, but there are associated risks. Remember you are part of a far larger force. Know your adjacent units and understand how this operational network provides support.

6) **It is ok to say “no.”** Just because you can, don’t always provide enablers

that the ANSF will not have access to, post transition. The routine provision of these assets will only stall the Afghans' ability to develop their own enablers. Keep the Afghans focused on the mission, force them to operate independently; build their confidence by offering a safety net to ensure their success.

7) Learning organization. Share best practices; explain to others what has worked in your sector. It is important to realize where the ANSF are along the continuum from dependency to self-sufficiency. Ensure continuity, chart progress and pass relevant information to your replacement, so that they can tailor their own pre-deployment training to accurately reflect the events on the ground.



Insider Threat Prevention Model

1.29 The insider threat prevention model (ITPM)⁵ is based on the combination of mastering force protection Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and the use of attribution, a concept in social psychology addressing the processes by which individuals explain the cause of behavior and events. This conceptual model consists of a set of five principles as depicted in Figure 1-2 and outlined in paragraphs below.

1.30 The Insider Threat Prevention Model consists of the following five principles:

5. ISAF CAAT Special Report, Insider Threat Prevention Model (IPTM) Effective Practices (5 November 2012).




Figure 1-2. ISAF Insider Threat Prevention Model

- a) **IT disrupts the Coalition/ ANSF bond; understand and prepare for it.** The first principle and foundation focuses on mastering the TTPs and the objective of understanding the Afghan culture necessary for countering the IT security problem.
- b) **Patience, Listening and Respect.** This principle is key to IT prevention and is squarely based on common principles of human interaction centered on kindness, understanding and empathy.
- c) **Reliability and Professionalism.** Reliability is a pre-cursor of trust and a leading indicator of professionalism.
- d) **Communication.** Surveillance detection and information gained from interacting with Afghan partners will ultimately enhance IT prevention.
- e) **Partnership.** The feeling of a partnership is the result of practicing the first four principles where partners see each other as fellow team members.

1.31 Insider Threat incidents can be caused by personal confrontations that involve cultural insensitivities. Instruction on conflict de-escalation and conflict resolution techniques should be a core part of pre-deployment training. Various cross-cultural conflict escalation scenarios should be utilized for role playing exercises. Effective integration of insider threat intelligence indicators into mission

planning and execution reinforces ISAF force protection, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success. Similarly, security and small arms TTPs should be developed and routinely practiced for confronting an insider threat incident. Finally, conducting an assessment of the events that led up to the attack, what transpired during the attack and post-incident actions will provide vital lessons learned that can be utilized to restore relations, continue development, and



regain combat effectiveness.

Countering the Insider Threat

1.32 Intent. The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to provide commanders with the context, conceptual framework, training guidance, and measures that will assist them in countering the IT.

1.33 Insider Threat. IT is the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, a person (or persons) who have a position of trust with Combined Team (CT) personnel⁶ by virtue of their employment, status, access, or affiliation.

1.34 Insider Attack. An Insider Attack occurs when a person, or persons, in a position of trust initiates an act of violence against the CT. Perpetrators of an Insider Attack possess motive, intent, and capability, and need opportunity in order to attack. Insider Attacks are characterized by surprise, speed, and shock.

1.35 Leadership. There is a need to institutionalize and professionalize the skill set required to defeat this threat; this will only be achieved through training, and demands command emphasis. Leaders at all levels must understand the strategic risk posed by IT. They must ensure that appropriate instruction in cultural adaptability, military TTPs, and the use of theater systems and procedures is planned, resourced, and integrated throughout the continuum of training. On operations they must implement these skills to mitigate the risk while maintaining

6. CT includes both ANSF and ISAF.

a posture that allows them to properly fulfill their mission.

1.36 **Context.** The concept of IT dates back many centuries. IT is not limited by location; it exists both “inside the wire” and “outside the wire.” The strategic consequences can be significant, influencing the CT’s Center of Gravity (its cohesion) by undermining the will of the nations. The inherent or perceived abuse of trust is an emotive issue. It is easily sensationalized and manipulated. The motivations for IT are various, often complex, and likely to evolve during the course of a campaign. Since 2007 the number of Insider Attacks against ISAF have risen significantly, and in 2012 they accounted for 22% of

our ISAF fatalities. While reporting is incomplete, the ANSF suffer more casualties from Insider Attacks than ISAF. (see Figure 1-3)




Figure 1-3. Insider Attacks per Year

our ISAF fatalities. While reporting is incomplete, the ANSF suffer more casualties from Insider Attacks than ISAF. (see Figure 1-3)

Insider Attacks can be categorized as:

- a) **Personally motivated:** Caused by ideology, stress, argument, volunteerism, or other personal or cultural grievances.⁷
- b) **Insurgent manipulated:** Result of co-option, coercion, or infiltration.⁸
- c) **Criminal:** Normally related to the protection of corruption.
- d) **Unknown:** When the perpetrator is killed or escapes, his motivation often remains unknown.

“ISAF will treat IT as an insurgent measure intended to attack ISAF and the ANSF along the seam of our relationship (partnering and advising) to sow mistrust at the tactical level, create operational disruption of the campaign and shake strategic confidence within the Coalition.”

COMISAF 21 Sept 2012

7. Cultural grievances can arise from local, regional, national, or global events of note (e.g., mishandling of the Quran or civilian casualties (CIVCAS) incidents).

8. The ISAF categorization of “insurgent-tied” is currently co-option (including coercion), infiltration, impersonation, and unknown. Impersonation should be regarded as an insurgent tactic in order to infiltrate; it is not an IT category.

1.37 Whatever factor, or combination of factors, caused an Insider Attack, the insurgents will seek to claim it and exploit its consequences. The response of the CT, both ANSF and ISAF, must be cohesive, synchronized and resolute.

1.38 **Conceptual Framework.** The conceptual framework for countering IT has five functions:

- a) Prepare
- b) Deter
- c) Detect
- d) Respond
- e) Recover and Exploit




Figure 1-4. IT Conceptual Framework

1.39 At its most simple, the model at Figure 1-4 shows the PREPARE, DETER, and DETECT functions as components of a prevention strategy that comes before an attack and RESPOND, RECOVER, and EXPLOIT as reactions that come after an attack. In truth, the model is more complex. PREPARE, DETER, and DETECT are continuous and enduring; RECOVER is a transitional action that sets the conditions for EXPLOIT and so is grouped with it as a single function. EXPLOIT can either be linear, as in pursuit operations, or cyclical, in the case of lessons that enable development of the prevention strategy. The table in Figure 1-5 illustrates examples of IT tasks arranged by function and separated across the spectrum of operations.

1.40 **The Functions in Detail.** Our approach to defeating IT must be holistic. Each of the five functions in the conceptual framework are expanded below, concentrating on the tactical level. The principles apply equally to a mobile training team in Helmand, or a liaison officer in Kabul.

Prepare

1.41 Preparation is a continuous process that starts prior to deployment and continues throughout operations. At the tactical level, tasks within this function are:

a) Pre-deployment

1) **Select for Aptitude.** Not all ISAF personnel have the aptitude for working alongside partners of different cultures; such personnel are ineffective in advisory roles and can introduce risk to themselves and others. Commanders

Function► Level of ▼ Conflict	PREPARE	DETER	DETECT	RESPOND	RECOVER & EXPLOIT
Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Set Counter IT training requirements and standards - Set FP and arming policies - Conduct STRATCOM - Engage at senior levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct STRATCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct reactive STRATCOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Warn and report - Manage consequences - Engage CF partners - Conduct STRATCOM - Exploit lessons
Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Apply FP and arming policies - Set SOPs - Engage at senior level - Learn lessons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Conduct Info Ops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Conduct vetting and screening of CT personnel - Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Warn and report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Manage consequences - Engage CT partners - Conduct EYBO - Conduct Info Ops - Exploit lessons
Tactical	<p>Pre-deployment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Select for aptitude - Develop and practice Counter IT TTPs - Conduct cultural training - Conduct advanced weapon training (QRD) - Conduct threat awareness training <p>While Deployed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Plan each operation - Assess threat, vulnerability, and risk - Adopt risk mitigation measures - Develop messaging - Rehearse - Learn lessons 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Build and maintain rapport - Enforce access procedures - Challenge - Enforce arming policies - Enforce FP TTPs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognize behavioral and activity indicators - Report - Investigate - Disseminate threat warnings - Conduct biometric enrollment and screening of ANSF personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concentrate force rapidly - Gain and maintain control - Contain and neutralize the threat - Warn and report - Conduct a joint response 	<p>Recover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manage consequences - Engage CT partners - Reinforce morale - Resume mission <p>Exploit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investigate - Conduct follow-up operations - Exploit lessons

Figure 1-5. The Counter IT conceptual functions across the Levels of Conflict.

must ensure that personnel who are in key advisory and mentoring roles have the appropriate aptitude and motivation. Those personnel who are not suitable for such key roles may be employed in supporting roles.

2) **Conduct Cultural Training.**

Cultural misunderstandings can result in grievances that may, particularly if combined with other influences, lead to Insider Attacks.

To counter this, our personnel must be culturally adaptive.

The key characteristics of good cultural adaptability are cultural awareness, empathy, skillful rapport-building, respectfulness, self-reflection, and self-control.



3) **Conduct Threat Awareness Training.** Personnel typically dismiss the risk of an Insider Attack happening to them or their unit. This can lead to complacency. All personnel must understand the nature of the threat. Threat awareness training must be provided (normally by Counter Intelligence (CI) personnel).

4) **Develop and Practice Counter IT TTPs.** Posture, presence, profile, and TTPs are critical in countering Insider Attacks. If not deterred, Insider Attacks can develop very quickly, giving little chance to those involved to react and defeat them. Guardian Angel drills are essential for developing rapid response, recovery, and exploitation capabilities and should feature



prominently in training. 'Guardian Angels' are designated armed individuals, pairs, or small groups of ISAF personnel whose sole purpose is to protect other ISAF personnel who are in close proximity to ANSF or Afghans in a position of trust. It must be remembered that they are only one part of the physical defense and that physical defense is only one

part of defeating the Insider Threat.

5) **Conduct Advanced Weapon Training.** Normal weapons proficiency is insufficient to respond to Insider Attacks, which often occur in close quarters and crowded spaces and develop rapidly. Advanced weapons training is required to enhance speed of response, controlled weapons handling, and accurate shooting. This is particularly vital for Guardian Angels.

b) While Deployed

1) **Plan each Operation.** Plans, orders, and rehearsals for every interaction between Combined Team partners must take account of IT and Force Protection. The planning of operations must consider risks associated with specific dates or events – for example religious holidays, anniversaries, or following significant incidents such as the mishandling of Qurans in 2012. The uncertainties, opportunities, and distractions in transitional operations such as base transfers lead to an increase in risk. Insider Attacks have occurred on ISAF bases when personnel have been socially interacting, e.g., playing sports. ISAF base security operations must be planned and rehearsed.

2) **Assess Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk.** The attacker possesses motive, intent, and capability and needs opportunity in order to carry out an attack. Motive, intent, and capability are identified through threat assessments; opportunity is identified through vulnerability assessments. Risk assessment examines threat and vulnerability in order to gauge probability and impact. Commanders must carry out these assessments both in fixed locations and while on operations in order to mitigate the identified risk. In shared locations attention must be given to the division between ISAF and ANSF locations, which must be defensible. When visiting ANSF bases secure areas and rally points should be identified. Moving personnel to secure, defensible areas in the event of an Insider Attack allows for a cooling down period and supports recovery and exploitation.



3) **Implement Risk Mitigation Measures.** Once a risk assessment has been completed, commanders must mitigate the risks. Implementation of appropriate force posture and disposition as well as dress state and arming status is the foundation of tactical IT risk mitigation. This implementation process must cover day-to-day internal operations of ISAF bases. Bases within our control should be modified to enhance physical security. Some risks may be mitigated through engagements with partner chains of command.

4) **Develop Messaging.** The insurgent narrative seeks to portray the Combined Team as divided and unsuccessful; our narrative must counter that through proactive messaging. When an Insider Attack occurs, the insurgency will seek to capitalize on it to attack cohesion. The Combined Team's responsive messaging must be coherent, convey the facts of an incident, and reinforce our resolve.⁹ Talking points must be prepared in advance to allow a drip-feed of information to start quickly, with talking points increasing in scope as and when facts become clear.

5) **Rehearse.** Counter IT plans, TTPs, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) must be rehearsed to ensure successful implementation.

6) **Learn Lessons.** All aspects of preparation should be dynamically informed by lessons identified from operations, including after Insider Attacks. As part



9. ISAF FRAGO 193-2012.

of an agile and responsive lessons process, risk assessments, force posture, TTPs, and SOPs should all be reviewed and, where necessary, amended and rehearsed.

1.42 **Deter.** Deterrence is conducted simultaneously and continually at every level. It ranges from strategic communications to continuous rapport-building between CT partners to the rigorous application of visible Force Protection measures. Based on the assumption that ISAF personnel are being observed at all times, following these steps demonstrates our preparedness to defeat Insider Attacks. At the tactical level, tasks within this function are:

a) **Build and Maintain Rapport.** Establishing rapport provides protection at multiple levels. Afghan culture provides for the protection of friends. Politeness is an important part of the Afghan culture; they are much more likely to discuss difficult matters—such as suspicious individuals—with those they trust. ISAF personnel must place strong emphasis on building close and trusted relationships with their Afghan partners.

b) **Enforce Access Procedures.** Rigorous enforcement of security measures is essential to denying access to those not authorized to enter ISAF bases, such as those who seek to impersonate CT personnel. Non-Coalition personnel—locally employed civilians, contractors, and interpreters—must wear recognized identification at all times.¹⁰

c) **Challenge.** Although good security measures should ensure that only authorized personnel enter an ISAF or GIROA location, no one should solely rely on access procedures to provide security. All personnel must remain alert to the possibility that an unauthorized person may gain access to a location where ISAF personnel work. It is vital to have the moral courage to challenge anyone who appears out of place. When challenging, personnel should be prepared to respond.

d) **Enforce Arming Policy.** Arming policy directives mitigate a risk based on an identified vulnerability. These directives are an essential element of Force Protection and must be adhered to without exception.¹¹

e) **Enforce Force Protection TTPs.** Force Protection TTPs present a visible posture, presence, and profile to deter both opportunist and planned attacks. They provide a mix of direct protection (e.g. wearing of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE)), indirect protection (e.g. alertness and weapons readiness) and actions to follow should an attack occur. Commanders must ensure that

10. ISAF SOP 231 establishes Theater policies for installation access and badging requirements.

11. ISAF FRAGO 139-2012 directs the arming policy for ISAF. The latest COMISAF IT TACTICAL DIRECTIVE provides guidance on the ANSF arming status within ISAF locations.

these TTPs are trained, rehearsed, and followed.

1.43 **Detect.** Detection is a continuous process during operations. Detection of a threat is everyone's responsibility and takes place at all levels. A systematic approach to detection is fundamental. Above the tactical level, vetting of CT personnel aims to detect and reject those who present danger or vulnerability to hostile influence. Recognition and timely reporting of threat indicators enable pre-emptive action and de-escalation as well as feeding the intelligence effort at every level; this allows development of IT warnings. The rapid passage of threat warnings across the force is critical to Force Protection. At the tactical level, tasks within this function are:

a) **Recognize Behavioral and Activity Indicators.** At a basic level, detection is about spotting the presence of the abnormal or the absence of the normal. Troops must be trained before, and throughout, their deployment to notice things that are out of place. Every soldier is a sensor and individual vigilance is key. Afghans are likely to have the most success in spotting adverse indicators in other Afghans. This reinforces the importance of building and maintaining good rapport between CT partners. Guardian Angels have a specific responsibility for detection, and should consider themselves sensors first.

b) **Conduct Biometric Enrollment and Screening of ANSF Personnel.** All members of the ANSF should be biometrically enrolled as part of their recruitment, vetting, and screening process. This allows ISAF personnel to proactively confirm the identity of those with whom they partner. This will help to detect impersonators. ANSF personnel returning from leave, or a prolonged period of absence, should go through a routine reassessment to look for signs of potential insurgent co-option. Changes in behavior, attitude, or performance may be linked to threats against the ANSF member or his family. Another potential indicator is an unexplained increase in wealth.

c) **Report.** Trust your instincts and act rapidly. It is vital that those who recognize indicators act upon them; even minor suspicions must be reported



to the chain of command. Units must inform higher headquarters of any IT indicators.¹² This is essential to building situational awareness and generating IT warnings that ensure everyone has current threat and risk awareness.

d) **Investigate.** CI personnel investigate incoming IT indicators to generate situational awareness and issue-specific threat warnings. This is a key part of the detection effort and a lynch-pin in the holistic effort to defeat IT. Teams on the ground make a vital contribution to this effort by providing timely and accurate reporting. This is everyone's responsibility and it needs to be rehearsed in training.

e) **Disseminate Threat Warnings.** Rapid dissemination of threat warnings ensures all personnel are informed of specific credible threats that have been identified through intelligence fusion. On receipt of threat warnings, commanders must reassess vulnerabilities and resultant risks and, where necessary, take actions in accordance with TTPs and SOPs. ANSF and ISAF commanders must ensure that warnings, and actions to be taken, are disseminated rapidly within their units.

1.44 **Respond.** Regardless of the effectiveness of ISAF deterrence and detection efforts, determined Insider Attacks will still occur; therefore, ISAF must be prepared to respond. The Respond function lasts from the time an Insider Attack is identified or an imminent attack is perceived, until that threat has been neutralized and a safe and secure local environment has been re-established. The basis of the Respond function is the implementation of established and rehearsed TTPs and SOPs; these ensure the fastest possible response when under the surprise and shock of an attack. At the tactical level, tasks within this function are:

a) **Concentrate Force Rapidly.** Immediate and decisive concentration of force will protect personnel and deter expansion of an attack. Guardian Angel(s) are the first planned response and much may depend on their alertness and the quality of their training. Everyone who can, must react to the attack immediately and decisively to neutralize the threat acting within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Commanders should consider use of all available assets including the Quick Reaction Force (QRF); Intelligence, Surveillance, Target, Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR); neighboring Combined Team fires; and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).

b) **Gain and Maintain Control.** The surprise, speed, and shock of an attack are likely to lead to a temporary reduction in Coalition Force control in that immediate vicinity. The initiative must be rapidly regained with strict adherence to ROE, effective identification, and fire control measures. The many assets called to assist must be coordinated and controlled in order to maximize their

12. The report format that must be used is in Annex E to ISAF SOP 331 (5 Jan 13).

combined effectiveness. An increase in local Force Protection measures and access control must be implemented.

c) **Warn and Report.** Information must be passed rapidly to all personnel in the area. Higher HQs, subordinate units, and neighboring units must be informed as the situation develops. It is far better to provide incomplete information, in short frequent update reports, than to wait until “perfect” information is available.

d) **Contain and Neutralize the Threat.** The incident must be contained to limit the attacker’s freedom of maneuver. Containment is not enough to neutralize the threat because within the containment, attackers are likely to continue to engage ISAF personnel. Therefore, responders must enter and clear within the containment area until the threat has been fully neutralized.

e) **Conduct a Joint Response.** Wherever possible, all available CT personnel should be involved in the response. The ANSF provide better local knowledge, language skills, and cultural understanding than ISAF alone and therefore can be more effective in responding to, recovering from, and exploiting an Insider Attack. This requires careful coordination or, at least, deconfliction.

1.45 **Recover and Exploit.** The Recover and Exploit function must commence as soon as the on-scene commander is content that the threat has been neutralized and a safe and secure local environment has been re-established. Recover aims



to stabilize the situation so that operations may continue. Exploit involves military pursuit operations, technical pursuit operations to gather evidence, and the lessons process. Recover and Exploit are inextricably linked and conducted in

tandem—and so are treated as one function. The foundation of the Recover and Exploit function is implementation of established and rehearsed SOPs. At the tactical level, tasks within this function are:

a) **Recover:**

1) **Manage Consequences.** In any incident where there has been violence between CT partners, or there is a perception that such violence has occurred, the consequences can be severe; negative public opinion creates a strategic risk. The establishment of facts and communication of those facts is essential to dispel misinformation and rumors and de-escalate heightened emotions. Messaging at all levels must be well-informed and coherent. CT personnel and their families must be reassured that everything possible is being done to determine the cause, to bring those responsible to justice, to restore good CT relationships, and to continue the mission.



2) **Engage CT Partners.** Following an Insider Attack, relationships between CT partners will be strained. Commanders must consider timely liaison and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) to explain the incident, the response, and the future. Good rapport built before the event and a joint response to the event will significantly ease tension and speed a return to normal operations.

3) **Reinforce Morale.** Morale will be damaged as a result of an Insider Attack. Firm leadership is essential in restoring morale amongst CT partners. Determining facts through investigation and communication of those facts to all personnel, especially highlighting that the Insider Attack was the action of an individual and not a unit, will help rebuild confidence and cohesion.

4) **Resume Mission.** Commanders must resume their assigned mission as rapidly as possible. The effectiveness of the Insider Attack will be rendered operationally ineffective once full partnering returns to pre-incident levels; this not only signals trust to our Afghan partners, it also demonstrates commitment to the campaign. Statistically, another attack is likely to take place somewhere within theater inside of 48 hours. Commanders must remain aware of this and adjust force posture and profile appropriately.

b) **Exploit:**

1) **Conduct Follow-on Operations.** This can involve both pursuit and technical investigation. Investigative results can in turn lead to follow-up operations. The aim of Evidence Based Operations (EvBO) is to pursue escapees and accomplices and to bring them to justice. EvBO may result in wider successes against insurgent networks.

2) **Investigate.** Once the operational circumstances allow, incident evidence must be secured as a crime scene objective, not a military objective, in order to preserve it and allow exploitation. This includes the immediate area of the attack, bodies, witnesses, detained personnel, and equipment used to perpetrate the attack. The evidence must be exploited¹³ to establish who did what, to identify perpetrators and accomplices, and to determine cause. The successful preservation of evidence will support future judicial proceedings. Commanders need to be aware of the scale of this response. Units should be prepared to receive several investigative agencies within hours of an Insider Attack.

3) **Exploit Lessons.** The investigation may identify changes that CT should make to the Prepare, Detect, Deter, Respond, Recover, and Exploit functions in order to reduce risks and strengthen us against future Insider Attacks. Lessons are identified as a result of investigations, but lessons are only learned when deliberate action is taken to change or maintain something, e.g. policies, TTPs, and SOPs. Commanders must implement a review process so that learning can take place. Implicit within all this is the sharing of lessons across the CT.

13. Sensitive Site Exploitation [SSE] / Evidence Based Operations [EvBO].

1.46 **Summary.** IT is not a new phenomenon. Understanding the serious strategic risk IT poses to our mission emphasizes the imperative to defeat it. Understanding the context, in particular the miniscule percentage of ANSF involved in attacks against ISAF, will prevent it from having a corrosive effect on the Combined Team. This conceptual framework underpins our common approach and guides our counter-measures. While skills and drills are important, combating IT is first and foremost about mindset and therefore it needs to be command-led. If our preparation makes us culturally adaptive, develops effective systems and procedures, and hones our military skills and TTPs, we will succeed in our SFA mission.

1.47 **Insider Threat Conclusion** SFA occurs throughout the Coalition, from HQ ISAF engagement with the GIRoA security ministries, all the way down to the squad on patrol. SFA-centric operations require not only a fundamental way in how we operate, but also in how we think. The implementation of SFA across Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A) creates a new battle space geometry that is characterized by small tactical elements employed in conjunction with advising and providing combat enablers to the ANSF.

1.48 SFA requires a unique perspective that incorporates the SFA imperatives. Commanders must understand, through assessments, the ANSF, the operational environment and its effect on the ANSF, and its established objectives. Assisting the commander in these endeavors are the ISAF 15 principles of SFA. Additionally, all personnel performing SFA activities must be mindful of the insider threat and take the proper measures for mitigation and reduction of this threat.



CHAPTER 2

ISAF SFA Concept

“SFA is the single most important change that ISAF will implement in more than ten years of the campaign—it reflects a fundamental milestone in the campaign and change in relationship with the ANSF”

Gen John Allen, USMC
Commander ISAF
January 2012

Introduction

2.1 This chapter provides a descriptive summary of the ISAF SFA concept to inform TCNs on specific SFA terms of reference and operating concepts. Specifically, this chapter describes the SFA-AT construct that consists of Police Advisor Teams (PATs), Military Advisor Teams (MATs), Operations Coordination Centers Advisor Teams (OCC-ATs), and Ministry Advisors in context to ANSF, their supporting institutions, and the ISAF Headquarters. In addition, IT awareness and the evolving nature of the ISAF campaign drives the need to inform and assist nations as they prepare national commitments, train forces and deploy personnel in support of the mission. This guide emphasizes the police development due to the fact that the police are, in many cases, the face of the GIROA and their development is lagging behind the ANA is several fronts.

2.2 The SFA-AT is one of the most significant contributions that nations can make to support ANSF development and professionalization within the framework of the announced Transition. With Afghan leadership and our continued support, the ANSF will become an institution of national unity, the ultimate mechanism for defeating the insurgency and the long-term guardian of Afghan peace, stability, and prosperity well after 2014. This chapter addresses key points relevant to SFA-AT employment in Afghanistan to provide a better understanding of SFA-AT roles, responsibilities, and national requirements. Respective TCNs should use this information in consideration of contributions and preparation of SFA-AT employment in Afghanistan.

Background

2.3 In October 2011, ISAF issued a revised campaign plan that prescribed an evolution to the way in which ISAF conducted the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan. This evolution included an SFA model, provided later in this chapter,

and marked a fundamental adjustment to the Coalition's relationship with the ANSF. This SFA model underpins a deliberate and irreversible transition strategy which began in July 2011.

2.4 The ISAF mission will conclude by the end of 2014; however, NATO, alongside partners and other International Community actors, will play a crucial role in the continued training, advising, and assisting of the ANSF beyond 2014, a concept recognized and reaffirmed by GIROA. The 2012 Chicago Summit provided direction and guidance for the ISAF transition process, as well as describe the post-2014 engagement. To support ISAF Transition goals and objectives, core SFA activities (organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise) serve as the cornerstones for developing ANSF capacity. In parallel, SFA-ATs are instrumental in advising and assisting the fielded ANSF as they assume the lead for security through the Transition process.

SFA in a Retrograde Environment

2.5 As stated by COMISAF, "the goal of effective SFA is self-sufficiency of the Afghan National Security Forces." This is a lofty goal that is made more challenging by the rapid shift from steady-state SFA to conducting SFA in a retrograde environment. At the same time, an active counterinsurgency campaign is still being fought in major parts of Afghanistan, which adds another complicating factor.



2.6 To put the SFA process in perspective and organize the related observations and insights, it is helpful to establish a framework that models SFA as a circular cycle, as depicted in Figure 2-1.

2.7 This framework expands on the linear model, as used in the current SFA doctrine, by incorporating the feedback of lessons learned from one SFA mission into the next, and by emphasizing the need to constantly assess and adapt all elements of the SFA process during an ongoing mission. It connects the current ISAF mission to the post-2014. The SFA cycle helps focus on those elements that are of particular importance addressing the retrograde.

2.8 The retrograde mission requires significant planning and is resource intensive; with lower levels of Coalition combat power to apply against the execution




Figure 2-1. SFA Process

of retrograde, ANSF capacity may suffer. As a result, ANSF partners may feel abandoned which may reduce their motivations to cooperate, which in turn could harm ANSF contributions to security. Even when an SFA unit is not retrograding, there will be a thinning up of Coalition assets available in the area of operations (AO), resulting in fewer resources for support and force protection, as well as possibly impacting the atmospherics and mood of the Afghan units and personnel. Operating in such a challenging environment requires SFA units to carefully manage efforts for simultaneous execution of both SFA, retrograde and transition operations. Focused operations empowers commanders to influence ANSF leadership to maintain security operations with less physical assistance, in terms of personnel and assets, from CF thus increasing ANSF self-sufficiency and achieving long term security goals.

2.9 Adaptability is key to SFA success. The challenges posed by operating in a retrograde environment also emphasize the importance of adaptable personnel and teams to ensure mission success. The retrograde challenge points out the importance for SFA unit commanders to identify and rapidly adapt to changes in their environment and in their mission. Adaptability requires thorough, holistic, continuous assessment and appropriate feedback loops that are set up to encourage use and facilitate collection of best practices and lessons learned. Knowledge management becomes very important in this context, as do efficient and flattened communications processes. Even during steady state SFA operations, leadership is critical to adjusting the SFA process during the mission

Afghan Operating Environment (OE)

2.10 Currently, a counterinsurgency (COIN) operational requirement exists in Afghanistan. Both the ANA and the ANP require Security Force Assistance to carry out their roles and responsibilities. ISAF's mission has evolved to the stage where the Coalition will focus on SFA advising while always being prepared to conduct combat operations if required. The primary platform ISAF will use to advise and assist ANSF development will be the advisor and advisor team with sizeable support and enabling organizations. The primary frontline of the ANSF and the face of GIRoA in most rural districts are the police—not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable ANSF institutions at all levels. Therefore, supporting the police is essential. A 2011 Rand study that examined the last 30 counterinsurgencies showed that only eight ended successfully.¹⁴ One of the commonalities of all eight was that they had a functioning police force capable of upholding rule of law.¹⁵ Keep in mind the police are only a part of the rule of law. Police require support from a legal code, judicial courts, and a penal system. Such support provides a coherent and transparent system that imparts justice. Upholding the rule of law also requires other civil institutions and a GIRoA ability to support the legal system. Commanders should ensure that SFA units and advisor teams understand the Afghan formal and informal judicial and penal systems, and robust coordination mechanisms linking their efforts with the larger developmental process exist. If the justice sector does not work, the police will not be able to perform their tasks. The policing spectrum of operations is visualized in the following picture. Certain police units that operate (partly) as paramilitary units, like the General Directorate Police Special Unit (GDPSU) and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), act in the common shared spectrum of police and military operations. Daily cooperation between ANP and ANA is a necessity, and the ATs should facilitate and encourage interaction, realizing this is not a natural tendency for the ANA and ANP.

2.11 SFA-ATs must operate within the context of COIN as development occurs across respective ANSF organizations. An important and often misunderstood aspect of policing is the concept of “the spectrum of policing” which encompasses an array of policing activities. The spectrum of policing has an overlap with the spectrum of traditional military operations, which is referred to as the “green” end of the spectrum for police.

14. Rand study, *Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years*, 2011, p. 27.

15. The eight successful counterinsurgencies were Croatia (1992-1995), Turkey (PKK) (1984-1999), Uganda (ADF) (1986-2000), Algeria (IA) (1992-2004), El Salvador (1979-1992), Peru (1980-1992), Senegal (1982-2002), and Sierra Leone (1991-2002). The commonalities in all eight were pacification, democracy, cost-benefit analysis, border control, strategic communications, civil policing, tangible support reduction, flexibility and adaptability, and continuation and contestation. There were four counterinsurgencies with civil policing in place that failed.



Figure 2-2. Spectrum of Policing

2.12 People tend to view policing only in the context of what they grew up with and live with in their home countries, primarily in developed countries. In most cases, it took decades and, in some cases, centuries to progress to what most of the Coalition believes is “normal.”

2.13 People who have come from mostly peaceful Western countries have a very specific idea of what police should be doing. This is often referred to as Western, civil, core, or community policing. These activities fall to the left, or the blue, end of the spectrum of policing activities (see figure 2-2). Activities in this type of policing include walking a beat, helping a lost child find his way home, arresting a burglar, responding to a domestic disturbance, pulling a cat out of a tree, etc. The TCNs and the other donor nations of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays the salaries of the ANP, mostly come from countries with this Western European and North American policing mindset. The reality is that sometimes, as in the situation with which Afghanistan is dealing, police agencies find themselves leading the fight against the armed insurgency and have scant time and resources to focus on Western, core policing. The situation in the CJOA-A varies from province to province and among districts in the same province. The local conditions dictate where on the spectrum a District Chief of Police (DCoP) or the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) can conduct operations. Donor nations and Coalition forces need to calibrate their policing mindset and look at the police in Afghanistan through the “spectrum of policing”, applying the spectrum to each province and district based on the security conditions on the ground, rather than insisting on a model which can’t be made to work in some areas. As final transition approaches, the police become ISAF’s exit strategy. A functioning police force, supported by the ANA, presents a capable face of the

Afghan government, maintains law and order, and interacts with the Afghan people who provide police, and potentially GIROA, situational awareness at the village and district level.

2.14 In order to reach a state where the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) become the trusted face of security in Afghanistan and where the DCoP continues to be the face of governance, the ANSF must work together in a layered security strategy, whereby the AUP conducts first responder/civil/core policing, concentrating on patrolling, critical incident response, and public service. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) provides public security in the rural areas which are difficult for the AUP to reach. The ANCOP and GDPSU elements provide QRF and special weapons and tactics (SWAT) functions, and temporary personnel augmentation. The ANA provides for the overarching security environment, including route security and in extremis support. In order to facilitate and synchronize this strategy, the operations coordination centers (OCCs) were created, and, in most cases, function, as key nodes where information collected by all ANSF pillars is shared and operations are de-conflicted and coordinated.

Understanding the Operational Environment (OE)¹⁶

2.15 Preparing for a SFA-AT mission involves many levels of preparation. While an understanding of the Security Force Assistance Guide, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) (June 2012¹⁷) is a good start, it is essential that the advisor prepare for his or her mission adequately through a comprehensive understanding of the OE in the target district or province. The current model for preparing units for the SFA mission includes home station training, combat training center (CTC) rotations, and in-country training. Each module is designed to assist the advisor in successfully executing his or her mission. Information about the region's history and culture is augmented with more detailed instruction on the structure of GIROA and the ANSF, their systems, and personal lessons learned. Unfortunately, the OEs in which SFA-ATs currently work are extremely varied and multifaceted. Layers of complexity in the OE include the terrain, the population, the security forces, and the leaders of the district, each apparently more complicated than the previous. Inculcating these aspects into the SFA preparation is a difficult task; yet the payoff and the advantage it yields are significant enough to warrant including it during all phases of mission preparation.

2.16 Creating four distinct components of the OE is a simple way to describe both the level of complexity represented by each and their potential for advisor interaction. These components are: (1) terrain; (2) population; (3) ANSF; (4) leaders in the AO. The components may not be all inclusive and advisors and

16. Conducting SFA in a rural district: understanding the operational environment, MAJ D. Damon Wells, Small Wars Journal 20 Dec 2012.

17. https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/JCISFA_Publications.aspx.

headquarters must be cautious to include all confounding variables into the pre-deployment training or risk sending teams into a district with inadequate preparation. Creating a simple hierarchical model of the key components that an advisor interacts with helps to focus their preparation, and allows teams to prioritize their pre-deployment training in order to be effective advisors as early as possible in their deployment. Interaction with terrain is limited and predictable, thus it is represented at the bottom of the hierarchy. Some major considerations about the terrain in rural areas include its level of support from GIROA and ANSF headquarters, austere road networks, and aspects of the economy, such as farming. The next step up in the hierarchy is the rural population. Advisor interaction with the population is minimal, and is only slightly more complex than the terrain. In a COIN campaign the population is the center of gravity, therefore the local populace is generally caught in the middle between insurgents and ANSF efforts. Time must be dedicated to understanding the population during pre-deployment training and will continue during deployment. In contrast, advisor interaction with the security forces is greater than that of the population. As such, advisors must learn key details about the security forces in their district. Understanding their culture and history, as well as local efforts, achievements, and failures can increase productivity remarkably. Finally, the district leaders are the last step in the hierarchy, due to the frequent advisor interaction and complex variables, i.e., networks, represented by these personalities.

Rule of Law



2.17 Advisor teams need background knowledge in rule of law because their Afghan partners, particularly the police, will interact with the Afghan legal system. The criminal side of rule of law is an overarching concept that includes law enforcement, the justice system, and



detentions. Police are on the leading edge of rule of law – that is, they are the first responders when criminal activity occurs, and, thus, the face of rule of law for GIROA. Police especially need to understand how the work they do – detecting crimes, collecting evidence, and pursuing criminal suspects – aids the prosecution and punishment of criminal actors. GIROA's formal justice system is comprised of elements from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the Attorney General's Office (AGO), and the Supreme Court (SC). All judges are members of the Supreme Court, which comprises the Judiciary branch of the Afghan government. Judges are required to have a university-level degree in law and political science or Shariah, and attend a two year post-graduate training course known as the Stage. All prosecutors are members of the AGO, which is part of the Executive Branch. They must have a university-level degree in law and political science or Shariah, and attend a one-year post graduate Stage separate from the judges. All huquqs (civil mediators) are members of the MoJ, which is also part of the Executive Branch. They specialize in land law, family law, and debt matters. They are required to have a university degree in law and political science.

2.18 Each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces has a provincial primary (trial) and appellate court located in the provincial capital. The number of judges, prosecutors, and huquqs on the tashkil for each of these courts varies by province. Outside of the provincial capitals, each district in Afghanistan has an identical tashkil for one three-judge district court and two prosecutors (one investigative and one trial prosecutor). Most districts have one huquq tashkil position, with the exception of a handful of districts that have two. The primary and appellate courts in the provincial capital may hear all types of civil and criminal cases, including terrorism and narcotics cases. Narcotics cases that involve a certain threshold level of illegal substances are required to be sent to the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in Kabul for adjudication. By contrast, district courts may only adjudicate civil cases and general crimes cases. They must send cases dealing with terrorism, narcotics, and certain other subjects to the provincial primary court for adjudication.

2.19 The formal justice system is more prevalent and higher functioning in urban areas than rural areas. Tashkil fills in the provincial primary and appeal courts are generally significantly higher than are district tashkils. The MoJ, AGO, and SC still have not appointed justice officials for many district positions. Even in districts where justice officials are appointed, many of those district justice officials remain in and work from the provincial center. This is usually due to security concerns in the districts, and is sanctioned by the head provincial justice officials. A critical gap exists where GIROA has failed to provide comprehensive security for its justice officials outside of Kabul. In addition to being better staffed by GIROA, the International Community (IC) has applied a great deal more resources toward justice at the provincial level than the district level. Advisor teams are, therefore, likely to encounter issues fostering and working with the formal justice system in districts with low tashkil fills and in remote villages.



2.20 Advisor teams should be prepared for the possibility that police with limited access to the formal justice system may expand their own role in the rule of law process. For example, in a district with a robust AUP force but no prosecutor or judge present, what do the police do once they arrest someone? By Afghan law, they are required to report any arrest or detention to the prosecutor within 24 hours, and no later than 72 hours from arrest they must turn over to the prosecutor everything they have discovered in the course of their detection. If no prosecutor is appointed or present, the police should report these things to one of the provincial prosecutors. However, in remote areas that have little connection to the provincial center, advisor teams may instead find that the police turn to alternative means of adjudication of criminal cases, such as community-based dispute resolution systems involving mullahs or elders as decision-makers. Community-based dispute

resolution systems are usually based on ethnic codes, such as Pashtunwali, and focus more on restorative justice than punitive justice. They are thus not as well equipped to deal with serious crimes as the formal justice system, and may also be harsher or even completely inaccessible to women. In addition, many communities have expressed resistance to any Coalition force involvement in their community-based dispute resolution mechanisms. Police in a district with no prosecutor may alternatively decide to adjudicate cases themselves, in contravention of Afghan law, rather than invest the effort to send criminal cases to the provincial capital for prosecution.



2.21 Advisor teams should strive to connect the police with the justice system, namely the prosecutor. If a district prosecutor is not present, they should attempt to connect the police with a provincial prosecutor. They should

understand what intelligence or evidence is necessary for a prosecutor to grant a search or arrest warrant, and help the Afghan police unit they advise to develop the intelligence and evidence-gathering skills necessary to perform evidence-based operations. Evidence-based prosecutions moves the Coalition and GIROA away from military intelligence-driven, law of armed conflict detentions that ultimately result in sending detainees into an administrative detention regime, toward police intelligence-driven, criminal arrests that result in prosecution, conviction, and incarceration by the Afghan legal system. Advisor teams will be successful in making this transition only if they understand the role the police play in the overall concept of criminal rule of law, and why the work the police do must be thorough and correct in order to result in successful prosecution of criminals, including criminal insurgents.

Afghan National Security Forces

2.22 The ANSF includes the ANP, the ANA, and the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Responsibility for the development of the ANSF resides within the GIROA through the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior (MoD and MoI) supported by G8 Partner Nations (PNs) and the wider IC. ANSF development focuses primarily on professionalization and sustainment as the ANSF reach the Afghanistan Plan of Record end state and assume full responsibility for security by December 31, 2014.

2.23 The quality of ANSF development is a strategic priority for Transition. In particular, the ANSF continues to face significant challenges in areas including leadership, corruption, staff planning, management, training, literacy, logistics, and procurement. These and other critical issues are currently being addressed by GIRoA and ISAF, but require medium or long-term plans. This is a signal the work needs to be done at the ministry level.

Afghan MoI and Afghan National Police




Figure 2-3. ANP Pillars

2.24 The ANP should be the focus for ISAF engagement as evidenced by the fact that the majority of advisor teams are PATs, and in some areas, have some degree of operational effectiveness in the Transition goals and objectives. The ANP's evolving "Afghan Civil Policing Model" borrows from both globally accepted core policing standards and Afghan culture while adapting to the current kinetic situation. However, the ANP suffers from recruiting issues, literacy, corruption, insider threats, and a lack of effective Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).¹⁸ These challenges resulted in the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) designating 2013 as the "Year of the Police." Under the Ministry of Interior, the ANP consists of the AUP, Afghan Border Police (ABP), ANCOP, Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). The ANP provides security in designated

18. The ANP continues to struggle with the US concept of NCOs. The Afghans still favor a Soviet-style model where junior officers perform what typically is done by US NCOs. Most enlisted police officers will serve a three year contract and leave while the officers tend to stay longer.




Figure 2-4. Police Sub-Pillars

rural villages and is also included in the ANP. (Figure 2-3 illustrates the pillars of the ANP)

Afghan MoD and the Afghan National Army

2.25 ANA development has shifted to providing quality graduates and increasing the number of qualified NCOs, and an ability to enter the last fielding phase goal of reinforcing the sustainability of a more balanced professional force, able to assume






Figure 2-5. ANA Corps Organizational Structure

and maintain security. The ANA consists of the Afghan Ground Forces Command (AGFC), Corps, Divisions, Brigades, and Kandaks subordinate to the Afghan MoD. Further, the ANA is fielding Mobile Strike Forces (MSFs), which is nationally directed and regionally based, and ANA Special Operations.

Afghan Air Force

2.27 The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is an important element of the national defense infrastructure that provides a third dimension maneuver capacity, freedom of action, battle-space situational awareness, intelligence, and air combat support for national military and police forces. Its mission is to provide trained and ready airmen and soldiers to execute critical tasks from the air in support of the ANA, and when directed by the MoD and General Staff, to support by air the civil authorities of Afghanistan at all levels. (Figure 2-6 illustrates the AAF (Air Corps) organizational structure)

Operations Coordination Center

2.28 Generally, OCCs exist at the Afghan regional and provincial levels (e.g., OCC-R or OCC-P) with staffing from the ANA, ANP, and NDS units. There are a number of OCCs on district level (OCC-Ds) where the Afghans have determined they are necessary. OCCs coordinate both security and civil response development in their areas. In some areas, Afghans have established district, municipal, and functional OCCs. (Figure 2-7 illustrates the regional and provincial constructs within Afghanistan.)




Figure 2-6. AAF (Air Corps) Organizational Structure




Figure 2-7. Regional and Provincial Constructs within Afghanistan

ISAF Security Force Assistance Model

2.29 Within ISAF, SFA is the unified action across ISAF to generate, employ, and sustain ANSF in support of GfRoA. SFA encompasses all ISAF actions to develop ANSF operational effectiveness, and includes partnering and advising, as well as provision of support to ANSF units. SFA enables Afghans to take the lead for security and hold key terrain districts and mission required areas that will set conditions for long-term development of the economy, rule of law, and other functions of good governance. At the strategic level, SFA is linked to Transition, while at the tactical level it refers to ANSF capability. Currently ISAF is conducting SFA on two levels.



a) Level 1 SFA: When Coalition units continually advise and assist ANSF units on a daily basis either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity. This can also apply to partnering – key is that the SFA is continuous. Level 1 SFA is seen as the most desirable approach and provides the best conditions for ANSF development.

b) Level 2 SFA: When Coalition units advise and assist on a less frequent basis (determined by Commanders) to ensure the continued development of the ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat, and Coalition resources. Methodologies within Level 2 SFA will become the acceptable approach as ANSF units are assessed as “independent with advisors” and ready to assume full security responsibility and the authority to become battle space owners.

Transition Concept

2.30 Through the Transition process there will be less advising at Level 1 and more advising at Level 2, as ISAF hands over the lead for security operations to the ANSF and it “thins up.” ISAF guidance outlines the procedures to support the ANSF to achieve common security goals, and provides the guidelines for Regional Commands (RCs) and Battle Space Owners (BSOs) to plan and conduct operations in the Transitioning environment. This guidance provides a clear description of the Command and Control (C2) relationships, battle space coordination measures, and an agreed understanding of the ISAF enabler support requirements to the ANSF. ISAF and the ANSF will continue a supporting/supported relationship; however, once Transition has commenced, the ANSF will become the supported command and ISAF the supporting command within that Transitioning area.^{19&20}

2.31 The OCCs are key elements in the conduct of operations in transitioning areas. The provincial and regional OCCs with SFA-ATs support the ANSF commanders in coordinating operations in their area. They are the means through which ISAF support may be requested and pass information amongst the CT. ISAF retains control of battle space management. Land space management and some aspects of procedural joint fires support will be gradually handed over to the




Figure 2-8. Illustration of the ISAF Transition Concept

19. See Combined Directive for Security In Transitioning Areas.

20. ISAF BSO discussed later in this chapter.

ANSF as they become trained, equipped, and proficient practitioners of battle space management procedures, responsibilities, and techniques.

2.32 In Transitioning areas, RC commanders and their ANSF counterparts will carefully assess the ability of the ANSF to assume the lead for security. As the ANSF develop organic capabilities, ISAF will reduce the level of Coalition capabilities provided. ISAF will be prepared to provide in-extremis reaction forces in support of the ANSF throughout the Transition process. As the ANSF becomes more effective, ISAF progresses from “1 to 1 Partnership” to “1 Up Partnership,” where ISAF units partner with ANSF units one echelon higher (e.g., ISAF company at ANSF battalion). All elements of SFA activities will overlap the stages of Transition. When variance in individual ANSF capability exists, ISAF support and its operational posture will not be implemented in strict compliance with a model, but will vary based on conditions. (Figure 2-8 illustrates the ISAF Transition concept)

ISAF Headquarters and SFA Organizational Structures

2.33 The ISAF Headquarters relies on both the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) to man, train and equip, and field ANSF units and on IJC, in its operational role to train, advise, and assist the fielded ANSF. (Figure 2-9 illustrates the basic ISAF SFA organizational structure)




Figure 2-9. ISAF SFA organizational structure (ADS - Afghan Development Section, RCS - Regional Supply Center)

2.34 **Battle Space Owner.** The ISAF military commander and his headquarters have authority for dimension management and ultimate responsibility for the conduct of operations in his AO.²¹ COMISAF is the overall BSO for the Afghanistan area of operations until December 2014. The authority of a BSO is

21. Dimension management describes the function of integration, coordination and synchronization of all operational activities within the designated area of operations.

delegated from the higher commander. Attributes and responsibilities of the BSO include:

- a) Normally RC or brigade commander (may include battalion level)
- b) Holds primary responsibility to ensure ANSF assume responsibility for security in their AOs
- c) Supports the ANSF area of operations commander while retaining specific responsibilities to ISAF
- d) Can be either a Partnered Unit (PU) or Transition support Unit (TSU) depending on level of support required to ANSF
- e) As PU, perform all AT functions for partnered ANSF including periodic assessments
- f) Establish bilateral or multilateral coordination with TCN providing SFA-ATs
- g) C2, support, synchronize all SFA-ATs in their AOs
- h) Provide all SFA-ATs with key Coalition capabilities [enabler support]
- i) Coordinate AT composition requested by TCNs

Coalition Capabilities: Assets and effects that the ANSF do not possess or have immediately available, but are required in order to gain or maintain superiority over a threat. Coalition capabilities include such things as C2 support, joint fires, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, engineer support, logistics support, and medical evacuation. As ANSF operational effectiveness improves and operational reach decreases, the requirements for these enablers will decrease.

2.35 Area of Operations Commander and Area of Operations Support Commander.

- a) Area of Operations Commander. The designated ANSF commander in consideration of priority and primacy of management of security and terrain within defined boundaries in close coordination with the (ISAF) Area of Operations Support Commander.
- b) Area of Operations Support Commander. The designated ISAF commander within defined ANSF boundaries who is responsible for unilateral ISAF activity and providing Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), and coordination support forces to the (ANSF) Area of Operations Commander.

2.36 Security Force Assistance Advisor Team: An ISAF capability consisting of leadership and subject matter experts (SMEs) co-located with or in close proximity of an ANSF unit assessed at any level of effectiveness. Other terms for this type of AT also apply; they are, MAT, PAT, Operations Coordination Center (OCC-AT), Mobile Strike Force Advisor Team (MSF-AT), and Ministry Advisor (MA) teams.²² Core capability requirements for SFA-ATs include:²³

22. Ministry Advisors and their teams may include military, civilian (e.g., Ministry of Defense Advisors - MoDA), and contractors.

23. See Chapter 3: SFA Critical Requirements.

Note: *This information supports understanding across the CJOA-A in context to the U.S. as a TCN*

Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) w/ SFA-ATs. Current construct that has a BCT with attached Advisor Teams formed from another brigade's leadership. One "SFA-AT-provider" brigade can provide purpose-built SFA-ATs (e.g., PAT, MAT, Operations Coordination Center Advisor Team (OCCAT), MSFAT) for multiple BCTs.

Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB): A brigade specifically tailored by the RC to conduct SFA and provide enabler support given a particular environment (threat, ANSF capability, and degree of governance). A Brigade serves as an ISAF BSO, partner on multiple levels, and is a provider of SFA-ATs to develop ANSF and is an enabler to support their assumption of lead security responsibility.

- a) An ability to advise and assist ANSF and OCCs (Institutional and Corps to Kandak)
- b) Capable of advising at lower levels as required
- c) An ability to operate under C2 of ISAF BSO (IBSO)
- d) An ability to provide ANSF direct access to Coalition enablers such as joint fires, intelligence, and medical evacuation through respective BSOs

2.37 Advisor: Serves as a SME within a SFA-AT or at a ministry team aligned with an ANSF unit, OCC, or ministry. Individual advisor capability requirements include:

- a) An ability to advise, assist, and counsel ANSF and ministry counterparts
- b) An ability to observe, evaluate, and report performance of ANSF units or ministry
- c) An ability to communicate between their ISAF superiors and ANSF or ministry counterparts²⁴
- d) An ability to create a professional relationship with ANSF units and ministry officials
- e) Capable of de-conflicting KLEs, tasks, and operations between (PUs, TSUs, and other SFA-ATs)

Military Advisor Team Concept:

2.38 The MAT advises and assists the ANA, and provides a conduit for liaison and command and control. MATs support the operational planning and employment of their ANA unit for developing a self-sufficient, competent, and professional

²⁴. Advisors are not liaison officers (LNOs).



ANA capable of autonomous operations.

2.39 Respective MATs will deploy with the ANA units during operations, including operations outside their originally assigned Corps area of responsibility (AOR). The exception to this requirement is Corps Headquarters MATs. Corps level MATs must have nationally provided internal communications and sufficient force protection capacity to operate outside the garrison environment. ISAF recommends that MATs be deployed for a minimum of six (6) months. (Figure 2-10 depicts MAT command and control construct) Among other things, capability requirements for all MATs include:²⁵

- a) Ability to provide appropriate level of leadership and subject matter expertise for MAT or MSF-AT
- b) Capable of assisting ANA in understanding and applying ANA doctrine and developing ANA training plans
- c) Ability to embed with or in close proximity to the ANA and conduct periodic ANA assessments
- d) Ability to assist ANA in developing autonomous capability (i.e., to perform routine organizational and war fighting functions)
- e) Ability to assist ANA in development, execution, and after action reviews (AAR) of TTPs
- f) Capable of operating under the C2 of the IBSO
- g) Ability to integrate Composite Risk Management (CRM)
- h) Ability to facilitate ANSF access to Coalition capabilities (e.g., joint fires, intelligence, MEDEVAC, Quick Reaction Force, and exercise C2 when required by ISAF)

25. See Chapter 3: SFA Critical Requirements.



- i) Ability to serve as IJC / RC / TSU liaison and C2 link to ANA and, as required, other ANSF
- j) Abilities to assist in coordinating ISAF support to ANSF-led operations
- k) Capable of submitting end of tour report identifying key lessons identified (LI) not later than 30 days prior to completion of MAT relief in place

2.40 ISAF employs or aligns MATs at various levels as outlined in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), at the following levels:

- Afghan National Military Coordination Center (NMCC)	- ANA Brigade
- Ground Force Command (GFC)	- ANA Infantry Kandak
- ANA Corps/Division Headquarters	- ANA MSF
- ANA Corps Engineer Kandak	- ANA CS Kandaks, ANA Headquarters Security and Support Brigade (HSSB)

2.42 Real Life Support (RLS), including, but not limited to, accommodations, meals, and maintenance, are coordinated through their respective RC. For cross-boundary operations, the ISAF BSO assumes responsibility for the coordination of enabler, logistical and other support required in the new AO when it exceeds TCN capabilities. TCNs can find core capability requirements for MSF-ATs in Chapter 3. Additional requirements for the MSF-AT include:²⁶

- a) COMISAF and COMIJC operational control (OPCON) MSF-AT
- b) RC Commanders determine final C2 authority (generally under Tactical Control – TACON of a BSO)
- c) MSF-AT provide status reports to “parent” RC
- d) Provide or coordinate their own force protection
- e) Support MSF kandaks and brigades
- f) Have Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH) with adjacent ATs

26. See ISAF SFA Critical Requirements.




Figure 2-10. MAT command and control construct

Afghan National Police (ANP), Police Advisor Team (PAT) Concept

2.43 Respective PATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise the ANP, provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and, when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit to which they are aligned in order to support the development of a professional, sufficient, and self-sustaining host nation police force.

2.44 PATs provide a valuable tool to advise and assist ANP units to establish a safe and secure environment and enhance the stabilization and reconstruction process. Employment of PATs should be in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors, the most important being the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), and through specialized assets such as the European Union Police (EUPOL).

2.45 The ANP should be able to perform all police related activities in order to restore and uphold the local social order, rule of law and the protection of human and gender rights. Employment of PATs occurs across the AUP, ABP and the ANCOP ANP Pillars; the AACB, the ALP and the APPF are advised through



other units. PAT leadership and team members need to thoroughly understand the roles of each police organization and what their respective missions are. In addition, they need to place their focus on the role of the respective ANP unit they are assigned to advise keeping in mind how their respective police unit interacts with the other units of the ANP. What each

respective mission is will determine the type of training the PAT needs and what approaches need to be taken into consideration when advising.

2.46 TCNs can find core capability requirements for PAT in Chapter 3. Other requirements for PATs include:

- a) Must be purpose-built
- b) Police experience is critical
- c) Civilian Police Advisors (CPAs) must be included
 - 1) SFA-AT PATs are designed to have four CPAs per team
 - 2) Source of CPAs is relevant (any qualified CPA civilian police officers, gendarmerie and civilian contractors).
 - 3) Ideally, CPAs should be embedded as early as D-140 (140 days prior to deployment) or no later than D-90 in Phase I training.

Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) PATs

2.47 The AUP provides a non-specialist law enforcement and security capability at the district, provincial and zone levels. As of the publication of this guide, Minister of Interior Patang has directed Zone HQs to be stood down. Implementation has not been established but is anticipated to be spring 2013. The AUP's roles span a wide spectrum of law enforcement and security tasks. In general, the AUP performs general policing and law enforcement tasks, conducts community policing from a police sub-station, performs routine traffic duties, and performs patrols and mans static and mobile checkpoints in order to promote public safety and to deter, detect, and interdict criminals. The AUP fill the role of community police.

2.48 The AUP also performs a specialist role: traffic police. In some districts, AUP have augmented judicial sector security details. At the district level, headquarters elements in District Centers support and provide C2 to the subordinate units (precincts and/or patrol bases) positioned at strategic locations throughout the district. TCNs can find core capability requirements for AUP PATs in Chapter




Figure 2-11. AUP command and control construct

Note: PATs advise and assist geographically-oriented AUP in the execution of AUP assigned tasks. Provincial and district PATs need to be prepared to deploy within their assigned Province/District, while regional PATs will generally remain at their Regional AUP HQ (Regional PATs advise their respective Regional AUP HQ element).

3.²⁷ The DCoP is the senior law enforcement officer in the district. The DCoP is the face of GIRoA for a great portion of the country, sometimes the only GIRoA official in a district. He manages all of the AUP within district boundaries and interacts with the PCoP for issues affecting his district coming down from the MoI and the provincial level. The DCoP is a key interface with the village elders who work to select Afghans to serve as part of the ALP under the Special Operations Joint Task Force for Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) run Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Once the ALP is trained, they are assigned security duties in their respective villages and coordinate their activities with the DCoP. The DCoP attempts to utilize the ALP along with his assigned AUP as part of an integrated plan to increase the security bubble across the district. The DCoP is where responsibilities for the ALP and policing the community intersect. For this reason, augmented by the fact he is often the face of GIRoA, the DCoP is the most critical


27. See Chapter 3: SFA Critical Requirements.



node in the AUP and arguably, for the MoI.

Afghan Border Police (ABP) PATs

2.49 The ABP secures the land borders out to 55 kilometers within Afghanistan, against terrorists, illegal entry of persons and weapons, and smuggling activities. In coordination with customs authorities, the ABP provides immigration/visa services, establishes and maintains border crossing points, and provides perimeter, building, aircraft, and passenger security at national and international airports. The ABP is organized in six (6) Zones. TCNs can find core capability requirements for ABP PATs in Chapter 3.²⁸ They also have augmented judicial sector security in some districts. At the border crossings there is a close cooperation between ABP and the Afghan Customs Police (ACP).²⁹



28. See Chapter 3: SFA Critical Requirements.

29. ACP is part of the Afghan Ministry of Finance and is therefore not advised by ISAF.

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) PATs

2.50 The ANCOP, an Afghan Gendarmerie-like force, was developed to specifically deal with civil order unrest and to react to insurgents in the remote, high threat areas of Afghanistan. The ANCOP provides civil order presence patrols, a crisis or counter-terror response capability within urban and metropolitan areas, and prevents violent public incidents. The ANCOP is organized into brigades and kandaks that are deployable throughout Afghanistan. TCNs can find core capability requirements for ANCOP PATs in Chapter 3.³⁰ (Figure 2-12 illustrates the ANCOP PAT command and control concept).

Afghan Policing Environment



2.51 The ANP “Policing Spectrum” encompasses an array of police activities, from community patrolling that involves direct interaction with the populace to conducting kinetic counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. This spectrum differs only from a military operation in the overall intent (arrest and prosecution). In contrast, Western countries have a very specific idea of what police should be doing. This is often referred to as Western, civil, core, or community policing.

Note: PATs advise and assist the development of Brigades and Battalions. The ANCOP PATs require an ability to deploy nationwide with their ANCOP units. Due to the specific profile of the ANCOP, the PATs attached to these Police components should include trained Gendarmerie-type elements available within the Alliance, i.e., Carabinieri (ITA), Gendarmerie (FRA), Marechaussee (NLD), Guardia Civil (ESP).

30. See Chapter 3: SFA Critical Requirements.

2.52 Security in Afghanistan means dealing with a protracted insurgency. While some areas are less kinetic, the insurgency is strong in others. In many locations, the various ANP pillars are leading the security fight, which affects the ability of the ANP to focus on civil policing. Kinetic activity levels will greatly influence which policing functions the ANP will focus on in a particular AO.



2.53 Challenges for PAT personnel include adjusting to an ill-defined transition from the ANA in the lead for security to the ANP having primacy for internal security, which requires emphasis and clarity on the Policing function. The most daunting challenge for the PATs is overcoming the reality that military personnel do not intuitively understand the policing problem set. Soldiers advise soldiers well; Soldiers do not advise police well. As a case in point in regards to C2, ANA brigades can direct their kandaks. PCoPs, however, can coordinate with DCoPs, but cannot direct them. In practice, most PAT personnel will have a military background with a military mindset and must adjust how they approach their advising mission. During pre-deployment training and deployment, the PAT must grasp the complexity of the situation and recognize the difference between advising a military unit vice a police unit. A PAT intelligence or logistic advisor has to understand police requirements, which are much different from military and ANA requirements. It is highly encouraged military resourced PATs seek increased interaction with civilian police elements at their home stations to augment their SFA PAT training and education during pre-deployment training. Conditions that PATs will have to adapt to and operate within are:

- a) Poor cooperation between the ANP and the ANA (varies by locale).
- b) Mostly illiterate police force.

- c) Corruption within the ANP.
- d) A severe shortage of Civilian Police Advisors.
- e) Lack of professional development within the ANP.
- f) Over-emphasis on checkpoint security.
- g) Large numbers of police assigned to personal security details (PSDs) for Afghan government officials.
- h) Logistic and supply issues across all ANP pillars (MoI through all ANP levels).
- i) Tribal and ethnic issues within the ANP.
- j) Drug use and illicit trafficking among the ANP.
- k) An unsustainable workforce in comparison to the future available funding.
- l) Lack of training on rule of law, crime scene management, evidence based operations, and forensics.
- m) Lack of police to cover rural areas.



2.54 The current Afghan policing model does not exactly mirror the Western-style standards and capabilities that many at ISAF and in the international community had hoped to see. The model the Afghans currently have is a model that has evolved to meet the needs of the Afghans over the past 11 years. The “Afghan Civil Policing Model”

borrows from globally-accepted, civil policing standards and from Afghan culture, while taking into account the kinetic environment of insurgents, illegally armed groups, and IED threats.

2.55 This model includes security checkpoints, criminal investigations, first responder services, community foot patrols, shuras with local leaders, and other community outreach activities, depending on the resources available, the willingness of the ANP leadership to conduct operations and outreach, and the security situation in a given area.

PAT Composition

2.56 The composition of individual PATs will vary depending on the TCN and the unit for which it is designed to support, regional experience, and capabilities from partner units. Team composition can be amended as determined during



national reconnaissance in coordination with the IBSO and with the approval of ISAF. Ideally, PATs should be able to deploy independently, be logistically self-supporting, and have access to enabler support in order to extract from incidents beyond their capabilities. They should include their full complement of four CPAs and at a minimum no less than two.

2.57 The preferred police expertise are for **AUP**, in order of preference:

- a) Combination of military teams with embedded police expertise either coming from civilian police, or
- b) Full Gendarmerie (type), or
- c) Combination of military teams with embedded military police

2.58 The preferred police expertise are for **ANCOP**, in order of preference:

- a) Full Gendarmerie (type), or
- b) Combination of military teams with embedded civilian police, or
- c) Combination of military teams with embedded military police

2.59 The preferred police expertise are for **ABP**, in order of preference:

- a) Combination of military teams with embedded police expertise either coming from civilian police, or
- b) Full Gendarmerie (type), or
- c) Combination of military teams with embedded military police

Operations Coordination Center (OCC), OCC-AT Concept

2.60 Respective OCC-ATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the OCC Regional and Provincial (OCC-R/OCC-P); and to provide the conduit for liaison, and operational coordination in order to facilitate development of a coherent security coordination structure. Figure 2-12 illustrates the OCC-AT command and control construct. Employment of OCC-ATs includes the following:



- a) Employed to support the development of OCC-R/Ps
- b) Advise their respective OCCs counterparts to improve both individual and collective skills
- c) Embed, co-locate is preferred
- d) OCC-ATs are at fixed locations-based (should not be required to deploy out of their AOR)




Figure 2-12. OCC-AT command and control construct

- e) Required to have sufficient nationally-provided internal communications.
- f) Should possess a Force Protection capability as determined during the national pre-mission reconnaissance.
- g) Should deploy caveat-free for a minimum of six months, although longer deployments are preferable to develop relationships and increase continuity.

Ministry Advisors and Teams

2.61 This group of advisors operates in support of respective Afghan Ministries, such as the MoD and the MoI. ISAF employs a range of ministry advisors from a combination of TCNs, which provide senior uniformed and civilian personnel, including contractors, to carry-out development in Afghan ministries and respective institutional domains. Once selected, these individuals must bring forward executive level talent and capacity to meet the developmental needs of their Afghan [executive] counterparts. (Figure 2-13 depicts the executive domains where ISAF Ministry Advisors and their teams may operate).

2.62 Core capability requirements for ministry advisors and their teams include:

- a) An ability to operate within a joint, interagency, and multinational environment
- b) An ability to operate within and across bureaucratic organizational structures
- c) An ability to understand and apply Afghan strategic, regional, and political

Defense Functions		Public Order and Safety Functions	
Military Defense Civil Defense Research and Development Foreign Military Aid or Assistance		Police, Fire, and Protection Services Law and Courts Prisons Research and Development	
*MoD	*Military General Staff	*MoI	*Police Administration
Strategy and Policy	Operations	Strategy and Policy	Operations
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)	Logistics	Logistics	Intelligence
Personnel and Education	Training (Institutional)	Training and Education	Anti-Crime
Finance	Communications	Personnel	Counter Narcotics
Inspector General (IG)	Intelligence	Finance and Budget	Counter Terrorism
General Council (Legal)	Personnel	Facilities / Prisons	Recruiting
Research and Development (R&D)	Finance and Budgeting	Information Communication	Procurement
Disaster Response/Support	Inspector General	Technology (ITC)	Port of Entry (PoE)
	Legal	Academy	

*Not inclusive of all functions or naming conventions

Figure 2-13. Afghan MoD and MoI Executive Domains

context

- d) An ability to determine, coordinate, manage, and resource requirements in support of Afghan counterpart systems, programs, and processes
- e) An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of project management (PM)
- f) An ability to assess and develop one or more of the domains of ANSF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P)
- g) An ability to serve as Coalition functional staff officers, coupled with an ability to advise and assist respective Afghan counterparts in their functional domains
- h) An ability to assist and provide recommendations on Afghan strategic multinational programs and processes that support the development of the ANSF
- i) An ability to communicate Coalition level strategic key messages and themes
- j) An ability to develop and manage Coalition contract requirements (e.g., contracting officer technical representative (COTR) in support of Afghan counterpart requirements)³¹
- k) An ability to understand and apply the fundamentals of Afghan Enterprise-

31. Ministry Advisors may have contract teams in support and need to be able to influence, shape, and affect contractor statements of work (SOWs) as they relate to the Afghan counterpart's development and transition.

Level Force Management concepts (i.e., Capability Development and Integration)³²

- l) An ability to advise, assist, and serve as sounding boards for executive Afghan counterparts
- m) An ability to develop Afghan human capital and intellectual capacity
- n) An ability to carry out key leader engagements and sustain key leader relationships (KLEs/KLRs)
- o) An ability to research, write, and provide executive level oral perspectives on Afghan policy issues
- p) An ability to assist in the formulation and implementation of Afghan policy, programs, and initiatives
- q) An ability to advise and assist in coordinating, developing, staffing, and implementation of Afghan national level security strategies and documents (e.g., Afghan National Security Strategy)
- r) An ability to understand structures and processes at Corps, Region, Zone level, and below

Figure 2-14 depicts a strategic planning and execution construct for Ministry Advisors.




Figure 2-14. Strategic Planning and Execution Domains

Note: Ministry advisors (MAs) achieve credibility with their Afghan counterparts based on their level of real-world executive experience and subject matter expertise in their respective disciplines. Coupled closely is an ability for the MA to transfer their knowledge, skills, and ability (KSA) to their Afghan counterpart. A logical question for a TCN is - does the MA have the experience that the Afghan counterpart reasonably expects the advisor to have? TCN analysis of MA requirements will push these types questions to the forefront and mitigate risks when selecting and assigning MA.

32. See Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors Guide, JCISFA Feb.

Other SFA-AT Requirements

2.63 Force Protection (FP) Requirements – A TCN should understand the environment that each SFA-AT will operate in. Considerations such as area threat levels, internal threat risk, proximity of ISAF and ANSF forces, and basic logistical and life support infrastructure helps to determine the force protection level required. This must be done during the national level reconnaissance.

2.64 Medical Requirements – The composition of individual SFA-ATs vary depending on the unit for which it is designed to support. Likewise, TCN have the latitude to compose teams based on the skill set needed to conduct successful operations. However, similar to the considerations for SFA-AT force protection, TCN will need to decide on the appropriate level of integral medical support/competencies/qualification that each SFA-AT will need to have (in addition to theater assets), i.e., Combat First Aid, Combat Lifesaver or paramedic qualifications.

2.65 Counter IED Requirements – All SFA-AT personnel are required to be trained to NATO STANAG 2294 – C-IED Training Standards, or equivalent. Also, each SFA-AT is required to have one individual (preferably an advisor) to attend a NATO C-IED Train the Trainer course, or national equivalent, and to have one individual (preferably an officer) attend the NATO C-IED Battle Staff Course, or equivalent course. The above courses should be attended prior to deployment to theater.





2.66 IT and Guardian Angel Requirements – The IT constitutes a hazard to CF on par with the IED threat. IT mitigation includes informed use of Guardian Angels (GAs). GAs are more than just guards. They should be highly trained, observant, well-motivated FP personnel who are deployed in an obvious or non-obvious manner based on the situation. GAs should be highly proficient in close quarters combat skills utilizing both long guns and sidearms; however, as they will be primarily armed with sidearms, emphasis should be given to the use of their sidearm in most situations. GAs are the last line of defense against IT. As such, they are more effectively employed in pairs.

2.67 Other Requirements – COMISAF highly recommends that all advisors, particularly key leaders and communications personnel serving in SFA-ATs at all levels, have an English language capability at 3 (speaking), 2 (understanding), 2 (reading), and 2 (writing) level. This increases the mentoring capability of the SFA-AT, decreases the time required to apply force enablers, and reduces the burden on the TCN to provide other than English to Dari/Pashtu interpreters. In the event that a TCN deploys without the requisite English language capability, TCNs will be required to provide their own Dari/Pashtu interpreters. Additionally, it is recommended that TCNs provide a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and internal vehicle recovery capability within the PAT.

Chapter 3

ISAF Security Force Assistance Critical Requirements

Deploying forces in support of the ISAF Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission in Afghanistan must possess certain critical skills. Advisor teams are consistently at the point of friction, but all units supporting the SFA mission must have a common understanding. The following is a list of critical requirements for units deploying to Afghanistan. More specific guidance should be consulted in documents, such as Annex A- ISAF SFA Mission Essential Task List (METL), Annex B- ISAF SFA Minimum Training Requirements, Annex C- ISAF SFA Commander's Self-Assessment Measures, or other equivalent unit training requirements.

3.1 Deploying units have a responsibility to conduct thorough research on the areas of operation and units they will be tasked to develop. Additionally, the capability to operate and thrive in a COIN environment is essential to enable the training, advising, and transfer of those skills to the ANSF. References and resources will be cited throughout this document and the proceeding annexes. The following list is not exhaustive, however, it is a solid foundation upon which to conduct training, guide operations in theater, and adequately prepare for follow on operations.

There are five critical requirements:

Deploy the Team

Develop Foreign Forces

Protect the Team

Sustain the Team

Redeploy the Team




Figure 3-1. SFA Critical Requirements

The above figure is a simplification of the training and deployment life cycle as it relates to the five critical requirements. Chapter 4 will cover the training and deployment life cycle in detail.

Deploy the Team

3.2 The responsibility for team building and preparation lies heavily on leadership. Selecting the right individuals and equipping them with information that will enable Security Force Assistance units to be more effective. Training is a responsibility shared by individuals, unit leaders, and commanders at all levels in the chain of command. Reference documents such as the JCISFA SFA Planner's Guide, JCISFA SFA Guide, Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces and ISAF SFA METL for more specific information on deploying a successful team.³³

a) Build an effective team

- 1) Select team members based on expertise, advisor knowledge, skill, ability, and mission objectives.
- 2) Organize the team by ability, function, and personality.
- 3) Conduct team building activities, tasks, or functions to solidify a unified effort.

b) Conduct pre-deployment preparation

- 1) Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks.
- 2) Understand and employ planning considerations for the security force assistance environment.
- 3) Conduct pre-deployment site survey (PDSS).
- 4) Conduct area study / intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE).

c) Conduct planning for security force assistance specific missions

- 1) Conduct planning for engaging key leaders.
- 2) Conduct concurrent team planning for operations in accordance with unit SOP.

d) Coordinate and de-conflict with higher/supporting/adjacent units (Coalition and host nation)

- 1) Identify higher/supporting/adjacent units.
- 2) Establish rapport/communication with higher/supporting/adjacent units.
- 3) Advise/influence higher/supporting/adjacent units on security advisor mission and requirements.
- 4) Execute reporting procedures and requirements. Serve as a liaison between Coalition forces and ANSF.

33. Detailed guidance can be located ANNEX A (Team functions and Task 1).

e) Identify and establish rapport with key personnel in the (AO)

- 1) Identify key personnel.
- 2) Establish rapport with key ANSF personnel.
- 3) Identify key local civilian/religious leaders.
- 4) Establish rapport with key local civilian/religious leaders.

Develop ANSF

“Diversity of capabilities, capacities, and responses to any challenge should be seen as a strength, not a weakness, but only if the actions and tools can be used synergistically. This can only happen when all the interested parties adopt a common vision for security built on the foundation of trust and confidence and achieved through coordination, cooperation, and partnering.”

Admiral James G. Stavridis, SACEUR, 15 August 2011

3.3 Developing ANSF is an essential mission that is multi-faceted. Developing ANSF is vital to the SFA mission. Developing host ANSF includes organizing, training, equipping, building/re-building, and advising. Their development allows for a seamless transition from Coalition lead and directed processes to ANSF planning and executing their own processes and functions. Improving development of ANSF is imperative. Other functions and tasks of SFA units enable the ability to develop. Become familiar with ANSF systems and assist HN forces with creation, improvement, training or implementation. Detailed guidance to include self-assessment measures can be found in the following documents: Unit Mission Essential Task Lists, Critical Task Lists, ISAF Minimum Training Requirements, ISAF SFA CONOPS, or other equivalent documents.³⁴

- a) **Organize ANSF.** Assist ANSF to create, improve and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit/organization design, command and staff processes, recruiting, and manning
- b) **Train ANSF.** Assist ANSF to create, improve, and integrate training, leadership development, and education at the individual, collective, and staff levels.
- c) **Equip ANSF.** Assist ANSF to create, improve, and integrate material and equipment procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance throughout the life cycle of equipment.

34. Detailed guidance can be located in ISAF's Critical Task/Capabilities List (Tasks 2-6).

- d) **Build/Re-Build ANSF Infrastructure.** Assist ANSF to create, improve, and integrate facilities and facilities management.
- e) **Advise ANSF.** Advise and assist by providing subject matter expertise, guidance, advice and counsel to ANSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the individual/unit/organization.

Protect the Team

“Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends on diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.”

President Barack Obama

National Security Strategy, 27 May 2010

3.4 Security force assistance places Coalition forces in positions where contact with ANSF is constant. Teams must have an internal force protection plan that also includes mitigation techniques for an insider threat. External force protection, security, and TTPs for conducting operations with and in support of ANSF is also critical. Consult force protection field manuals, ISAF Insider Threat Guide, ISAF Insider Threat and Force Protection SOPs, C-IED manuals, and other pertinent documents for more specific details.³⁵

a) **Develop a force protection plan.**

- 1) Develop a plan for physical security at home base/FOB/COP/etc.
- 2) Integrate ANSF into a joint force protection plan
- 3) Advise ANSF on an enduring force protection plan
- 4) Develop, rehearse and execute unit SOPs for conducting operations with and in support of ANSF
- 5) Conduct and periodically review threat assessments

b) **Develop, rehearse and execute a plan to mitigate the “Insider Threat.”**

- 1) Develop a force protection security plan including but not limited to: employing guardian angels, challenge and passwords, safe areas, force protection conditions.
- 2) Read, understand, and apply mitigation techniques within the ISAF

35. This is not a critical task as explained in ISAF’s Critical Task List, but it is an enduring operational capability. There is no associated task list, but further information can be found in the reference mentioned above.

Insider Threat Handbook.

- c) **Plan, rehearse and execute emergency action procedures.** Ensure the team understands actions during certain emergencies such as indirect fire, enemy attack, insider attack, etc.
- d) **Develop, rehearse and execute a plan to mitigate the IED threat.**
 - 1) Develop and rehearse unit SOPs for C-IED measures
 - 2) Learn, understand, and effectively employ all C-IED countermeasures available in country, to include, but not limited to: metal detectors, electronic countermeasures, EOD capabilities, etc.
- e) **Conduct personnel recovery.** Conduct appropriate SERE training

Sustain the Team

"I don't in any way minimize the threat of insider attacks. It is a grim and insidious business. But, it is not deflecting us from our task and not having any major detrimental effect on our operational impact. The Afghans are facing just as great, if not more, of a threat from insider attacks, so they are as concerned as we are.

Gen Sir Richard Shirref, United Kingdom

BBC Interview 2012

3.5 The security SFA mission requires mental, emotional, and physical endurance. Teams deploying in support of this mission must have processes in place to identify stress and fatigue that may impact the mission. Keeping the team ready and trained for the mission is a challenge and a necessity. For further information, reference ALSA, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces, and JCISFA SFA Planner's Guide.³⁶

- a) **Develop a relationship with supporting units/ organizations/ assets.**
- b) **Coordinate for basic necessities.**
 - 1) Food and water, shelter, transportation, medical support.
 - 2) Coalition enablers such as fires, MEDEVAC, counter-intelligence and other assets may also be required.
- c) **Mitigate culture shock.** Establish team SOPs for identification and guidance

36. This is not a critical task as explained in ISAF's Critical Task List, but it is an enduring operational capability. There is no associated task list, but further information can be found in the reference mentioned above.

for those displaying symptoms of culture shock.

d) **Maintain unit cohesion and morale.**

e) **Develop and implement unit sustainment training plan**

- 1) Sustain cultural training (language, religion, basic culture, etc.)
- 2) Sustain basic and team collective skills (reporting, communications equipment, maintenance, marksmanship, MEDEVAC, medical treatments, patrolling, C-IED, etc.)

Redeploy the Team

3.6 Actions following SFA missions set up the next units for success. Effectively transferring your knowledge of ANSF and their systems allow the next Coalition units to build upon your success. Capturing ANSF progress as well as your own evolution as an SFA unit is imperative³⁷.

- a) Conduct effective transfer of host nation unit, or counterpart, to follow on advisor team. Prepare any necessary turnover reports or documents (Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), hand over take over (HOTO) briefs, etc.)
- b) Prepare historical documentation of your mission.



37. For more specific guidance see: ISAF's Critical Task/Capabilities List (Task 7) and ANNEX D.



- 1) Prepare written AAR.
 - 2) Prepare written lessons learned or record of events/training
 - 3) Prepare biographical information on counterpart and/or unit advised
- c) Utilize redeploying advisors as subject matter experts. Examples include publishing AARs to knowledge portals, visits, or providing assistance to phase one and two training centers

“Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them.”

**Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army
“28 Articles” 2006**

Conclusion

3.7 In conclusion, the identification, training, and implementation of troops contributing to the ISAF SFA mission in Afghanistan is imperative. The window of Coalition influence on a large scale is closing rapidly. Over the next two years, troop levels will withdraw to a reduced force level commensurate with the assigned NATO mission, and thus advisors and all security force assistance contributors must be as effective as possible. All CF are encouraged to utilize the training models, critical requirements, existing doctrine, ISAF guides, after action reviews, and all available information to help guide the manning, training, deployment,

sustainment training, implementation, and redeployment of SFA contributors. Leaving Afghanistan with the capabilities to organize, train, equip, build/rebuild, and implement its own forces is the goal which we must work to achieve. Enabling ANSF to successfully conduct their own operations across the spectrum of counterinsurgency is the desired goal. Utilizing this guide and source documents will allow all contributors to the SFA mission to accomplish their mission with unity of effort and desired results.

3.8 This chapter outlined the basic requirements and capabilities necessary to make a positive impact on the SFA landscape. The following chapter will outline effective training life cycles that will demonstrate effective models for conducting focused SFA training. Utilize this chapter, the following chapter, as well as the source documents and referenced material. This ensures units deploying in support of ISAF's Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan will have a solid understanding of what is required and the pathways to successful preparation.



Figure 3-2. SFA Preparation

The above figure illustrates the knowledge and skills required to conduct security force assistance. The foundation is traditional skills and the continuum culminates with a solid understanding of the ANSF counterpart's job. These skills will allow advisors and enablers to develop ANSF forces along the functions described in this chapter. The training life cycle that gives guidance when and where to train these skills (Phases 1-3) will be described in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4

SFA Training Lifecycle, Training Requirements, and Commanders' Checklists

4.1 Overall training concept




Figure 4-1. Training Concept

4.2 Conducting SFA requires adaptive units led by well informed, culturally astute leaders from which we select our advisors. These advisors must be culturally, tactically and technically proficient for the positions they fill. They must be able to advise on training, operations, intelligence, logistics, coordinate force enablers and handle complex situations, like unit or individual corruption, patronage systems, gender rights, Insider Threat and cultural and religious events inside and outside the theatre that trigger violent responses inside Afghanistan. The current SFA mission reflects the integration of COIN with the development of the ANSF. As transition progresses, ISAF will hand over security operations to the ANSF. Transition reflects the Coalition's shift from supported to supporting role across the CJOA-A. The ISAF mission is rapidly evolving and the NATO ISAF Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) community must also evolve to meet current and future requirements. As the ISAF footprint in Afghanistan is reduced, it is even more important that PDT produce the best advisors possible. Incumbent on all of the ISAF PDT stakeholders is that a coordinated effort is maintained to ensure that our troops are trained and ready to meet the challenges of transition of security responsibility to the ANSF. Other than maintaining their military and functional abilities and skills, this requires a "change of mindset" of troops and staff from supported to supporting roles.

4.3 In recent years, some have described COIN as “graduate-level warfare” in an attempt to emphasize the complexity of the mission; if this description of COIN is accurate, soldiers must start receiving “graduate-level” training in order to properly execute that mission. The practice of training “down” to the lowest rank needs to be discarded. On the contrary, lower ranking personnel should be trained “up” to higher levels. Rather than designing training for a target audience of junior enlisted personnel, training programs need to be targeted for mid-level leadership such as Captains, Majors and NCOs. This also applies to linguistic and cultural preparation for deployments, especially deployments where troops will be working very closely with Afghans in a partnered capacity.

4.4 As a baseline, an ISAF SFA-AT mission essential task list (METL)³⁸ and ISAF minimum training requirements³⁹ are established and the type and scope of the additional training must be based on mission analysis. The bulk of the training should be done in phase I, refining and assessing certain shortfalls during phase II. This phase is also suited for remedial training. Before SFA-ATs start phase II, more advanced training should be included on the team and individual level with an emphasis on cross-cultural understanding, language, IT TTPs, low-density military operational specialty (MOS), and depending on the tasking of the team, police




Figure 4-2. Roadmap to Deployment: Recommended minimum time-line SFA life cycle

38. See ANNEX A.

39. See ANNEXES B and C.

know-how. The last adjustments due to operational changes in the designated AO should be trained during phase III. As a best practice, a 14 day left seat, right seat is recommended for the hand over take over (HOTO) of the ingoing and outgoing units.

4.5 The training model has a logical build up where the main part will have a logical, sequential and evolving approach. A commander's checklist is provided for self-assessment for every task in every phase.⁴⁰ The cultural, language, advisor and IT specific training will be integrated from the very beginning up to redeployment.




Figure 4-3. ISAF SFA life cycle

4.6 ISAF SFA life cycle The SFA life-cycle gives an insight about when and what training should take place. A minimum PDT of 147 days is recommended, where the leadership should receive the assignment no later than D-180. Phase I, conducted primarily at home station, should focus on war fighting, COIN and advisory skills. Phase II, conducted primarily at combat training centers, should focus on collective training, and should fine tune and assess the training result from Phase I in order to perform remedial training at home station and to improve the identified shortfalls prior to deployment. All Phase III, conducted in-theatre, training should be considered as either remedial, refresher training, or theater emphasis training. Individuals and units deployed should already be at a high state of readiness. Training resources in theatre are scarce and expensive to the TCN and should be focused on providing current information, not as a catch-all, last-ditch training opportunity. A commander's checklist is provided for self-assessment for every training requirement in every (sub) phase.

a) Best Practices:

- 1) All AT leadership should conduct a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) as early as possible in PDT phase I and participate in the brigade's leadership program.
- 2) Cultural, language, advisory skills and IT specific training front loaded early in phase 1 PDT.
- 3) The ISAF IT guide gives guidance on how to minimize the IT risk and actions prior to, during, and after an attack. A well-developed cross-cultural awareness in combination with the mastering of the IT TTPs form the

40. See ANNEX C. All CDRs should use a checklist IOT assess his own team during the life cycle.

basis of the PDT. This implicates the training of specific small team warrior (patrol) skills, including extensive IT TTP training, like close quarters battle (CQB) skills and other GA skills. The other pillar of the IT PDT exists of mastering your cultural skills. Both pillars should be developed during the entire PDT (phase I, II and III)

4) Minimum throughput time of the PDT cycle

5) Effective manning assignments.

6) No reassignment of SFA-ATs after D-140; this makes it possible to study the human terrain (HT) for the designated AO, link up with the AT in the CJOA-A, and tune the training on the task like PAT or MAT dedicated to the level of the advised ANSF unit.

PHASE 0 Selection Manning PDSS	PHASE I Self learning Home station training Assessment PDSS	PHASE II 162nd 29 Palms CTCs/NTCs Assessment	PHASE II CERTIFEX, FINEX, MRX Assessment	PHASE IIB Advanced Remedial Home station training PDSS	PHASE III Remedial training RSOI PDSS	PHASE III Deployment HOTO RIPTOA Midterm training	Phase IV Redeploy HOTO/EOT Feedback loop into PDT
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Figure 4-4. Phase 0

4.7 ISAF SFA life cycle Phase 0 starts with the receipt of mission of a unit for an SFA mission requiring SFA-ATs and ends when the unit moves from planning to the execution of training for the mission. Phase 0 is primarily a preparation phase but includes two key tasks that are critical to future success of the SFA-ATs – advisor selection, and development of the training plan. Advisor selection guidance must be clearly articulated and vigorously supported by the highest level of command in order to ensure proper selection of personnel. Identified technical expertise gaps must be identified and solutions developed to either cross train personnel to the technical expertise required or alternate sources of fill developed. Development of the SFA-AT training plan occurs in this phase. While outside organizations will assist with the training of SFA-ATs, the primary trainer responsible for the execution of the training plan remains with the unit or sourcing nation and, as such, must be thoroughly developed and resourced. ISAF SMEs can provide a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) in order to assist in developing a proper training plan⁴¹.

a) Key Tasks.

- 1) Selection and manning of SFA-ATs.
- 2) Initial PDSS or contact with unit being replaced.
- 3) Development of an SFA (AT) training plan (embedded with BCT or SFAB training plan if US Army).
- 4) Assignment of advisor personnel to parent unit.

41. Reference to CONOPS SAV/MTTs.

b) **Training requirements** (see minimum training requirements(TR x.x) and assessment criteria, annexes B and C)

- 1) Read and understand COMISAF and GIRoA directives and plans (TR 1.1)
- 2) Build effective Advisor and SFA Advisor Team(s) (TR 1.8)
- 3) Execute all actions and activities within appropriate and authorized processes (TR 4.9)

c) **End state:**

- 1) SFA-ATs are selected and manned using a rigorous informed process (Recommended timeline is NLT D-210 for leadership and D-180 for team members and after D-140 no changes in the team (team is fenced off)
- 2) Manning technical expertise gaps are identified and solutions developed (MOS type training developed for MOS mismatches, pass backs to higher HQs for specific personnel)
- 3) SFA-AT leadership conducts initial PDSS or SVTC with teams being replaced in theater.



Figure 4-5. Phase I

4.8 **ISAF SFA lifecycle Phase I** begins with the execution of training for the SFA mission and ends with the movement to SFA-AT Collective training. Phase I training occurs at home station and consists of individual and collective level training conducted through self-learning as well as unit training plan. The primary focus is on meeting theater required Individual and Collective training requirements, SFA-AT pre-deployment training requirements, and technical expertise cross-training. Many of the SFA-AT pre-deployment training requirements must be started at home station in order to maximize the Collective Level SFA-AT training conducted in Phase II. Assessment of SFA-AT members training must be executed throughout Phase I to ensure that the correct personnel have been selected and the SFA-AT is prepared to execute Phase II Collective Level training.

“My biggest take-away was that in order to be successful as a team, I needed 12 extroverts that could speak clearly, foster relationships, buy into the mission and could tactically protect the group at each point from the 1 o’clock to the 12 o’clock position. By the end of our rotation (PDT) I knew what personnel changes needed to be made, and I made them within the limits placed on me by my command.”

-SFA-AT commander, October 2012.

a) Key Tasks:

- 1) Self-Learning through distributed learning, learning management system and literature reading .
- 2) Home station training
- 3) Conduct PDSS

b) Training requirements *(see minimum training requirements (TR x.x) and assessment criteria, annexes B and C)*

- 1) Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning (TR 1.7)
- 2) Execute all actions and activities within appropriate and authorized processes (TR 4.9)

Develop ANSF

- 3) Understand Counterinsurgency (COIN) (TR 1.6)
- 4) Prepare an area study (TR 1.4)
- 5) Understand the cultural environment (TR 4.3)
- 6) Demonstrate effective communication skills (TR 4.1)
- 7) Demonstrate effective use of interpreter (TR 4.2)
- 8) Understand the requirements to Advise the Development of Afghan National Security Forces (TR 3.1)
- 9) Demonstrate proficient instruction techniques (TR 3.2)
- 10) Understand and demonstrate advisor skills (TR 3.3)
- 11) Understand and conduct negotiations and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) (TR 3.4)
- 12) Conduct study of MoI, MoD and NDS ministerial organizations' structures and functions (TR 1.2)
- 13) Conduct study of the Afghan justice system (TR 1.3)
- 14) Conduct ANSF organizational assessment training (TR 1.5)
- 15) Effectively operate by, with, and through the ANSF and Afghan population (TR 3.5)
- 16) Understand the organization of ANSF (TR 3.6)
- 17) Understand Afghan police requirements (TR 3.7)
- 18) Understand the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police/ (VSO/ ALP) (TR 3.8)
- 19) Understand the training plan for ANSF (TR 3.9)
- 20) Understand the ANSF equipping and fielding plan (TR 3.10)
- 21) Understand the plan to rebuild or build ANSF infrastructure (TR 3.11)
- 22) Understand the narcotics problem in Afghanistan affecting security, governance and development (TR 4.6)
- 23) Understand Afghan cultural norms regarding corruption (TR 4.7)
- 24) Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the ANSF actions (TR 4.8)

Protect the Team

- 25) Conduct force protection training (TR 2.8)
- 26) Conduct medical training (TR 2.1)
- 27) Conduct Survival Evasion Resistance Escape training (TR 2.2)
- 28) Conduct Insider Threat (IT) Training (TR 2.3)
- 29) Conduct call for fire training (TR 2.4)
- 30) Conduct counter improvised explosive device training (TR 2.5)
- 31) Conduct convoy operations training (TR 2.6)

Sustain the team

- 32) Conduct information and media operations training (TR 2.7)

c) **End state**

- 1) Theater pre-deployment individual and collective training requirements completed.
- 2) SFA-AT pre-deployment training requirements to prepare teams for SFA-AT collective training completed.
- 3) Individual and collective level Insider Threat training completed.
- 4) MOS type training for MOS mismatches identified and completed.
- 5) Recommended NLT D-180 SFA-AT specific training begins. NLT D-140 any individual augmentation from outside unit arrives.
- 6) Recommend NLT D-120 SFA-AT personnel locked into teams.
- 7) Individual SFA-AT Team SVTC with replacing team in theater.
- 8) MTT assistance on SFA-AT training from theater or force provider training teams (162nd INF BDE, USMC ATG).
- 9) Individual assessment of SFA-AT members (unit self-assessment) conducted.




Figure 4-6. Phase II

4.9 **ISAF SFA life cycle Phase II** begins with the execution of SFA-AT collective training and ends with home station remedial training and deployment. Phase II training occurs at both home station and national level training facilities. Training is primarily focused on SFA-AT collective level training and evaluation, but individual and collective theater pre-deployment training requirements will also occur. While outside organizations may be used to assist in meeting collective level training and evaluation, training remains a unit or national requirement. Assessment in Phase II is critical, as it will identify SFA-AT personnel who may not be capable of executing advisor duties as well as identifies remedial training

requirements between collective training and deployment. At the end of Phase II the SFA-AT team should be at a high state of readiness, with all training requirements met.

a) **Key Tasks**

- 1) SFA-AT collective training
- 2) SFA-AT Culminating Training Event
- 3) Assessment
- 4) Remedial training
- 5) PDSS
- 6) Deployment



b) **Training requirements** (*see minimum training requirements (TR x.x) and assessment criteria, annexes B and C*)

- 1) Execute all actions and activities within appropriate and authorized processes (TR 4.9)
Develop ANSF Security Forces
- 2) Understand COIN (TR 1.6)
- 3) Prepare an area study (TR 1.4)
- 4) Understand the cultural environment (TR 4.3)
- 5) Demonstrate effective communication skills (TR 4.1)
- 6) Demonstrate effective use of interpreter (TR 4.2)

- 7) Understand the requirements to advise the development of Afghan National Security Forces (TR 3.1)
- 8) Demonstrate proficient instruction techniques (TR 3.2)
- 9) Understand and demonstrate advisor skills (TR 3.3)
- 10) Understand and conduct negotiations and Key Leader Engagement (KLE) (TR 3.4)
- 11) Effectively operate by, with, and through the ANSF and Afghan population (TR 3.5)
- 12) Understand Afghan police requirements (TR 3.7)
- 33) Understand the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) (TR 3.8)
- 13) Understand relevant ANSF equipment (TR 4.4)
- 14) Understand the narcotics problem in Afghanistan affecting security, governance and development (TR 4.6)
- 15) Understand Afghan cultural norms regarding corruption (TR 4.7)
- 16) Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the ANSF actions (TR 4.8)

Protect the Team

- 17) Conduct force protection training (TR 2.8)
- 18) Conduct medical training (TR 2.1)
- 19) Conduct Insider Threat training (TR 2.3)
- 20) Conduct call for fire training (TR 2.4)
- 21) Conduct counter improvised explosive device training (TR 2.5)
- 22) Conduct convoy operations training (TR 2.6)

Sustain the Team

- 23) Conduct information and media operations training (TR 2.7)

c) End state

- 1) Complete Theater pre-deployment individual and collective training requirements.
- 2) SFA-AT Collective training and evaluation conducted.
- 3) Collective level Insider Threat training completed.
- 4) Culminating Training Event conducted.
- 5) Assessment of SFA-AT team members to identify and inform remedial training requirements or replacement.
- 6) Final PDSS conducted.
- 7) Final SFA-AT SVTC with replacing team in theater conducted.
- 8) Remedial training as required.
- 9) Pack and ship equipment.
- 10) Deploy.



Figure 4-7. Phase III

4.10 ISAF SFA life cycle Phase III begins upon deployment of the unit to theater and ends with redeployment back to home station. Phase III training occurs in two (2) sequential steps.

a) **Step one** (1) Occurs immediately upon arrival in theatre and is part of the HOTO process. This Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-movement, and Integration (JRSOI) training is a national responsibility within the theatre of operations. The purpose of this training is to provide the deploying units with last minute, most up-to-date information on changes that have occurred in the units future AO, training on new equipment and any training that cannot or was not trained sufficiently prior to deployment.

b) **Step two** (2) Occurs periodically, as directed by COMISAF and in guidance published by HQ ISAF in ISAF SOP 393-2012, during the course of the deployment within the theatre of operations. This in-theater refresher training focuses on tasks of high importance to COMISAF or to alleviate emerging threats possibly not adequately covered in prior training.



c) Key tasks

- 1) Deploy
- 2) Conduct Theater Specific JRSOI training
- 3) Conduct HOTO (incoming and outgoing)
- 4) Conduct refresher training as indicated by COMISAF
- 5) Provide input into the lessons identified (LI) and lessons learned (LL) cycle

d) **Training requirements** (see minimum training requirements (TR x.x) and assessment criteria, annexes B and C)

- 1) Understand the cultural environment (TR 4.3)
- 2) Demonstrate advising skills (TR 3.3)
- 3) Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the ANSF actions (TR 4.8)

Protect the Team

- 1) Conduct force protection training (TR 2.8)
- 2) Conduct medical training (TR 2.1)
- 3) Conduct Insider Threat training (TR 2.3)
- 4) Conduct counter improvised explosive device training (TR 2.5)

e) **End state**

- 1) Unit leadership and gaining RC possesses a high level of fidelity regarding the capabilities and limitations of the deploying unit
- 2) Deploying unit possesses a high level of situational awareness regarding their partnered units and the operating environment in their AO
- 3) Deploying unit trained on theatre specific equipment
- 4) Unit linked into the LI/LL process and refresher training assets in theatre
- 5) SAV or Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC) to provide latest guidance and TTPs from theater on AO, operations, threat, GIROA and ANSF, and advisor teams.



Figure 4-8. Phase IV

4.11 **ISAF SFA life cycle Phase IV** begins with the redeployment of a unit from theater and ends when the unit enters its reset period. Phase IV allows the nation to capitalize on the expertise gained by individuals in their last deployment. Investment of this personnel expertise into the training for future SFA-ATs will pay dividends in the training efficiency of future forces. Finally, SMEs are absolutely critical to successful training serials; it is of great importance that Nations and Commanders allow personnel, either recently redeployed or within Theatre, to support ISAF PDT when required. The mission cycle is not considered complete before redeploying personnel have contributed to the training of their successors.

a) **Key Task.** Capitalize on the Advisor expertise resident following deployment.

b) **End State**

- 1) Unit identifies select personnel to participate in training future units in a TDY basis.
- 2) The TCN (inter-service) organization, responsible for personnel management identifies and select personnel for future assignment following deployment that uses expertise gained during deployment.
- 3) Manage and track personnel with Advisor experience.
- 4) Advisor personnel LL and TTPs integrated into Knowledge Portal and professional documents.
- 5) Make experienced personnel available through distributed means to assist units in training and theater.



Chapter 5

ISAF SFA Bibliography

5.1 JCISFA Handbooks, Guides, and References.

The JCISFA acts as the SFA center of excellence. JCISFA has an abundance of documents relating to SFA on its website. Specifically, in support of the ISAF SFA Concept, JCISFA maintains the SFA-AT Communities of Interest (CoIs) knowledge portal. The SFA AT CoI provides critical information to support planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Their website is a must for the person (directly) involved in SFA. A registration account is required to download documents.

- a) JCISFA Website: <https://jcsifa.jcs.mil>.
- 1) JCISFA, *Security Force Assistance Handbook*.
- 2) JCISFA, *ANSF Advisor Guide*.
- 3) JCISFA, *SFA Planner's Guide: HN forces Force Development*.
- 4) JCISFA, *Roles and Functions of Senior Advisors Guide*.
- 5) JCISFA, *Afghan MoI Advisor Guide*.
- 6) JCISFA, *Facilities and Infrastructure Guide*.
- 7) Many additional SFA resources, references, and lessons learned.

5.2 Field Manuals

- a) AJP 3.4.4. *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*. 4 February 2011. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-Counterinsurgency.pdf>.
- b) FM 3-07. *Stability Operations*. 1 May 2009. Accessible at: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_07.pdf.
- c) FM 3-07.10 (Also entitled MCRP 3-33.8A for the USMC). *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces*. 10 September 2009. Accessible at: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/Active_FM.html.
- d) FM 3-24 (Also entitled MCWP 3-33.5). *Counterinsurgency*. 15 December 2006. Accessible at: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf.
- e) FM 3-24.2. *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. Accessible at: http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24x2.pdf.
- f) Ulrich, Mark. *Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Counter-Guerrilla's Guide to Defeating Insurgencies and Conducting Populist Centric Operations*. JCISFA. Accessible at: <https://143.84.167.180/Members/Portal/ViewInsight.aspx?Focus=OIL&Insight=329>.

5.3 Recommended Books

a) General Afghan Culture & History

Barfield, Thomas J. *Afghanistan: A Cultural & Political History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. (568 pages)

b) Understanding the Post-2001 Insurgency

Giustozzi, Antonio. *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. (318 pages)

An anthology of 14 articles by various authors: Introduction by A. Giustozzi;

- 1) *The Taliban and the Opium Trade* by G. S. Peters;
- 2) *Reading the Taliban* [local magazines, communications, suicide attacks] by J. Nathan;
- 3) *The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak* [attacks on the 275 schools] by M. O.T. Elias;
- 4) *Loya Paktia's Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity* by T. Ruttig;
- 5) *Roots of the Insurgency in the Southeast* by S. Trives;
- 6) *The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni* by C. Reuter & B. Younus;
- 7) *The Taliban in Helmand: an Oral History* by T. Coghlan;
- 8) *Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan* by M. van Bijlert;
- 9) *Taliban in Zabul* by A.A. Zabolwal;
- 10) *What Kandahar's Taliban Say* [how to interview Taliban] by Graeme Smith;
- 11) *The Taliban's Marches: Herat, Farah, Baghdis and Ghor* by A. Giustozzi;
- 12) *Taliban and Counter-Insurgency in Kunar* by D. Kilcullen;
- 13) *Northern Exposure for the Taliban* by S. A. Moghaddam;
- 14) *The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan* by C. Franco; & glossary.

c) Giustozzi, Antonio, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency*. 2009. (224 pages)

Analysis of the Neo-Taliban insurgency in the post-2001 era, including the neo-Taliban's approaches to recruiting, their organization, their tactics, and their strategy.

d) SFA in Afghanistan

Tupper, Benjamin, *Greetings from Afghanistan, Send More Ammo: Dispatches*

from Taliban Country. 2011. (272 pages)

Tupper writes a heartfelt and thoughtful memoir about his time in Afghanistan in a training team embedded with the Afghan National Army. This aspect of the war in Afghanistan has not been covered in the general news, yet it is arguably one of the most important missions toward the overall goal of internal security for Afghanistan.

Tupper shows how the experiences of an embedded trainer are much different than that of the typical infantry soldier in Afghanistan. His observations about the vast gulf between American and Afghan culture are astute, and the human element is prominent throughout.

5.4 Papers, Reports, and Publications about Security Force Assistance

a) G. Damon Wells. *Conducting Security Force Assistance in a Rural District: Understanding the Operational Environment*. Small Wars Journal. 20 December 2012. Accessible at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/conducting-security-force-assistance-in-a-rural-district-understanding-the-operational-envi>.

Lessons learned of an SFA-AT advising a D-CoP, AUP, and ALP during a 2012 deployment.

b) Captain Colby K. Krug. *When Combat Advising = Company Command*. Accessible at: <http://www.afghanwarnews.info/documents/WhenCbtAdvisingEqualsCompanyCmdKrugOct12.pdf>.

Paper by a SFA-AT team leader describing the mission of advising an ANA kandak. October 2012.

c) Team Renegade. *How We Advise: An Afghan National Army Kandak*. August 2012.

An SFA-AT chronicles their pre-deployment training and their advisory effort with an ANA kandak and provide observations and lessons learned.

d) COL Julian Dale Alford and MAJ Daniel Zappa. *Afghan Advise and Assist Group*. Small Wars Journal. 1 June 2011. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/afghan-advise-and-assist-group>.

e) Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). *Security Force Assistance, Shaping and Mentoring Afghan Police*. (Newsletters 11-18). March 2011. Accessible at <https://call2.army.mil>.

f) USMC LL *Partnering Mentoring Advising* report. 2011.

5.5 Other SFA Websites

a) ISAF-Afghanistan. <http://www.isaf.nato.int>.

b) NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). <http://ntm-a.com>.

c) Ronna-Afghanistan. <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/CAAT/Pages/Public-Portal.aspx>.

d) U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute's Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS).
<https://www.pksoi.org/>.

SOLLIMS is designed to allow US Military, USG civilian agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, IOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned for Peace and Stability Operations.

5.6 (Afghan) Culture resources

a) WebPages

- 1) Skill Level Descriptions for Competence in Intercultural Communication: <http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/Competence.htm>
- 2) Naval Postgraduate School Program for Culture & Conflict Studies: <http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/ExecSumm.html>
- 3) University of Nebraska Center for Afghan Studies: <http://world.unomaha.edu/cas/>
- 4) Peace Corps Culture Training: <http://www.peacecorps.gov/www/publications/culture/>
- 5) University of the Pacific online Culture Training: <http://www2.pacific.edu/sis/culture/>
- 6) Afghan Net: <http://www.afghan-network.net/Culture/>
- 7) Afghan Analyst: <http://afghanistan-analyst.org/>
- 8) Afghan Analyst Network: <http://aan-afghanistan.com/>
- 9) Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: <http://www.areu.org.af/Default.aspx?Lang=en-US>

b) References

- 1) *The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role*. Accessible at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA507713>.
- 2) *Cross-Cultural Strategies for Improving the Teaching, Training, and Mentoring Skills of Military Transition Team Advisors*. Accessible at: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a507715.pdf>.
- 3) *Advisor Influence Strategies: 10 Cross-Cultural Scenarios for Discussion and Self-Assessment (Instructor's Manual)*. Accessible at: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA531634>.

c) Books and Articles

- 1) *Understanding Culture: Operational Pashtunwali*. Program for Culture &

Conflict Studies (CCS) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 2009.

A guide to utilizing the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali) to improve force protection (via defensive Pashtunwali) and to achieve unit objectives (via offensive Pashtunwali).

2) Giustozzi, Antonio and Mohammad Isaqzadeh. *Afghanistan's Paramilitary Policing in Context: The Risks of Expediency*. Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), 2011. Accessible at: http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AAAN-2011-Police_and_Paramilitarisation.pdf.

A historical review of Afghanistan's policing with an emphasis on the post-2001 era.

3) Giustozzi, Antonio. *Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow Government*. PRISM: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, 2012. Accessible at: <http://www.ndu.edu/press/talibans-shadow-government.html>.

Analysis of the Taliban's "shadow" government and their efforts to challenge the legitimacy of the central government through civil means rather than military means.

4) Rosenau, William. *Acknowledging Limits: Police Advisors & Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*. Joint Publication of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Marine Corps University Press, 2011. Accessible at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/police%20mentor_layout%204.pdf.

An in-depth review of the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as police mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007–2009 period.

5) *Local Governance in Rural Afghanistan*. Human Terrain System, 2010. Accessible at: <http://info.publicintelligence.net/HTS-LocalGovernance.pdf>.

Baseline guide for working in rural Afghanistan at the sub-provincial level (primarily districts in the Pashtun Belt) with intros to concepts such as the role of Pashtun tribes.

5.7 Language Resources

a) <http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html>

Free to ISAF CF:

1) *Defense Language Institute*, Monterey, California, USA. <http://hs2.lingnet.org/>.

Headstart2 program teaches a "military focused vocabulary" designed for the military, operating on the tactical and operational level. For an average user, the language program takes between 80 and 100 hours of self-directed study. The software can be downloaded to computer or iPod, used online or DVDs

can be requested. Headstart2 is available in 16 languages, including Dari and Pashtun.

- 2) Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, USA. <http://rapport.lingnet.org>.

Rapport's six to eight hours of training consist of military language modules and cultural awareness lessons that cover history, religion, geography, and basic social exchanges in the target language.

- 3) Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, USA. <http://www.dliflc.edu/lmdsemail.aspx>.

Language Survival Kits (LSKs). LSKs are designed as pocket-sized, quick reference booklets with an audio CD available in 10 different topics per language for deploying service members. The LSKs contain mission-specific vocabulary and simple phrases in topics such as medical terminology, Civil Affairs, Force Protection, and Military Police.

- b) <http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html>.

Free to US Troops:

- 1) *Pimsleur Pashto: Phase I & II*.

- 2) *Pimsleur Dari: Phase I*.

Operation Afghan Language Programs offers mission-critical tools to tear down the language barrier in Afghanistan. Free downloads of Pimsleur Pashto and Dari language programs are now available to US Troops, made possible by Pimsleur Language Programs, the USO, and the Boston Foundation. This program is designed to ease daily communication between US troops and Afghan citizens, and helping to promote understanding, compassion, and goodwill.

- 3) Pimsleur Language courses are known the world over for giving users the ability to begin speaking effortlessly with near-native pronunciation, using common, everyday vocabulary.

- 4) Pashto Levels 1 & 2 and Dari Level 1 all-audio MP3 programs are easy to download for use in the field or on a base. Upon completion, each learner will have attained intermediate proficiency in speaking and understanding Pashto or Dari, and in reading the Pashto or Dari alphabets.

- b) DLI Resources. <http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html>.

5.8 Understanding Insurgencies

- a) Connable, Ben and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, RAND, 2010. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html>.

- b) Stoker, Dr. Donald, *Six Reasons Insurgencies Lose*. Small Wars Journal, July 4, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/six-reasons-insurgencies-lose>.



c) Kress, Moshe and Roberto Szechtman. *Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations*. Operations Research, Vol. 57, No. 3, May-June 2009, pp. 578-585. <http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf>.

d) Insurgency Documents (tag insurgency) on Small Wars Journal. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/search/node/insurgency>.

5.9 Understanding Counterinsurgency

a) ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance, ISAF. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf.

b) Article: 28 Fundamentals of company level COIN. Kilcullen 2006 USA. www.au.af.mil/infops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf.

c) FMFRP 12-15. *Small Wars Manual*. USMC, 1941. <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-15%20Small%20Wars%20Manual.pdf>.

d) U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, January 2009. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>.

e) Jones, Seth G. *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*. RAND MG 595. 2008. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.html>.

5.10 **Mission Orientation:** The following reports will provide contextual understanding to the current status of the mission in Afghanistan. They will also provide the reader with a better understanding of how the mission will progress through SFA.

a) *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: United States plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces*. April 2012. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf.

b) Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strateg*. US Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>.

c) Katzman, Kenneth. *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance*. Congressional Research Service. 30 November 2012. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf>.

d) Katzman, Kenneth. *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*. Congressional Research Service. 31 October. 2012. <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=725570>.

e) *The Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan From Transition to Transformation*. 8 July 2012. <http://www.usaid.gov/tokyoconference/declaration>.

f) NATO. *ISAF Mission Evolution*. October 2012. <http://www.nato.int/nato>

[static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_10/20121008_media-backgrounder_isaf_mission_evolution_en.pdf](#).

5.11 Ministerial Advising

a) WebPages

- 1) Office of the President of Afghanistan: <http://president.gov.af/en>.
- 2) The Afghan Constitution: http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html.
- 3) Ministry of Interior Affairs Afghanistan: <http://moi.gov.af/en>.
- 4) Ministry of Defense Afghanistan: <http://mod.gov.af/en>.

b) References

- 1) Ministerial-level advisor training effectiveness study 2010 JCISFA 2010.
Report preparing advisors for capacity-building missions USIP 2012
Article ministerial advisors developing capacity Prism2-2 2011 AFG
Article MoD advisors training program MAG 2011 AFG

c) Books and Articles

- 1) *The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World*. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub869.pdf>.

5.12 Police Advisor Team

- a) Ministry of Interior Affairs, Nested Investigation Surveillance Unit Policy Strategy, Kabul, 1 February 2012.
- b) Presentation AFG Nat Police ANP overview
- c) MoI. *Afghan National Police Strategy (ANPS)*. General Bismullah Mohammadi (Minister of Interior Affairs). <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5076>.
- d) MoI. *Brief Information on Borders and Police Border*. <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/3122>.
- e) MoI. *Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)*. <http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5728>.

5.13 Rule of Law

- a) The Afghan Constitution: http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html.
- b) Major Gant, Jim and McCallister, William. *Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura*. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tribal-engagement-the-jirga-and-the-shura>.
- c) *Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura*. Small Wars Journal. 6 June 2010. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tribal-engagement-the-jirga-and-the-shura>.

d) Article: *Asymmetric Justice*. CAAT. 2011 Dec AFG.

5.14 Afghan Local Police

a) Village Stability Operations – 101, The Donovan Review www.stabilityinstitute.com.

b) Article: *Who Will Shoulder the ALP*. CAAT. 2012 Jan AFG.

c) Handbook: *Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police*. JCISFA. 2012 USA.

5.15 S-2 Intelligence

a) DoD. *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*. Joint Publication 2-01.3. 16 June 2009. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_intelligence.htm.

b) DA. *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*. FM 2-22.3, September 2006. http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm2_22x3.pdf.

c) JP 2-01.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations*

Additional (Counter) Intelligence reading

d) Kress, Moshe and Szechtman, Roberto. *Why Defeating Insurgencies Is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations*. Operations Research, Vol 57, No. 3. May-June 2009. p. 578-585. <http://faculty.nps.edu/rszechtm/KressSzechtman.pdf>.

e) Calvin, Matt. *People, Partnerships and Collaboration: Understanding and Improving Intelligence in Counterinsurgency*. Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies, Volume I. Summer 2009. p. 53-73. http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume1/volume1_calvin.pdf.

f) Flynn, MG M. T., Pottinger, CPT M., and Batchelor, P. D. *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*. Center for a New American Security. January 2010. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.

g) Gomez, Jimmy A.. *The Targeting Process: D3A and F3EAD*. Small Wars Journal. July, 16 2011. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-targeting-process-d3a-and-f3ead>.

h) Perry, Walter L., John Gordon IV. *Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies*. Rand Corporation prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2008. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG682.pdf.

i) Reamer, Kevin. *The Importance of Intelligence in Combating a Modern Insurgency*. Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 2. 2009. p. 73-90. <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/3/>.

j) Schrick, MAJ Jeffrey C.. *Effective Intelligence in Urban Environments*. 2008. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486265.pdf>.

5.16 S-4 Logistics, Supply and Maintenance Advising

a) Valeski, LTC Steven. *ANA Logistics System: Getting to Afghan Right*. Military Review May-June 2012. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20120630_art006.pdf.

b) Presentation: *ANSF Logistics Overview*. NATO. Aug 2012. Afghan National Army (ANA) Logistics and Maintenance Publications.

c) MoD, Technology, Logistics, Decree 4.0: Supported and supporting unit policy and support policy. January 2009. Afghan National Police (ANA) Logistics and Maintenance Publications.

d) MoD, Process for the Management of Logistics, Logistics Management Directorate, Jan 2009.

5.17 Medical Training Websites

a) Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC / T3C). http://www.health.mil/Education_And_Training/TCCC.asp.

ANNEX A: ISAF SFA METL

<p>Commanders must determine the requirements for a given SFA mission in terms of the overall capabilities required of the unit or personnel who will perform SFA. In accordance with their responsibilities, nations providing the forces for deployment must ensure the adequate preparation of individuals and units comprising the force for employment by the commander in the execution of the SFA mission. The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment. (SFA Handbook, JCISFA June 2012)</p> <p>Advisors assigned to training missions should receive training on the requirements of developing foreign security forces. The training should emphasize the host nation's cultural background, introduce its language, and provide cultural tips for developing a good rapport. Training should also include protection for troops working with FSF. Advisor trainees must become familiar with FSF organization and equipment, especially weapons not in the advisor's inventory. (FM 3-07.1)</p>		
Subtask:		Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
METL 1: Deploy the ISAF SFA Advisor Team		
Description		
1.1	<p>Build an Effective Team.</p> <p>1.1.1 Select team members based on Subject Matter Expertise, knowledge, skills, attributes and abilities as well as mission objectives.</p> <p>1.1.2 Internally task organize by ability, function and personality.</p> <p>1.1.3 Conduct team building activities, tasks or functions.</p>	<p>1.1.A Team is manned with appropriate quantity and quality of personnel.</p> <p>(A.1) All team members meet ISAF/NATO published rank and position guidelines.</p> <p>(A.2) Team functions in collective task training and exercises prior to deployment.</p>
1.2	<p>Conduct Pre-deployment Preparation.</p> <p>1.2.1 Conduct individual, collective, unit and directed tasks.</p> <p>1.2.2 Exposure to HN weapons and equipment.</p> <p>1.2.3 Conduct in theatre PDSS. 1.2.4 Conduct area study / Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE).</p>	<p>1.2.A Team forms and is familiar with HN AO.</p> <p>(A.1) Team members know ethnic composition and languages.</p> <p>(A.2) Team members know Task Organization of FSF.</p> <p>(A.3) Team members can perform basic operations of HN weapons & equipment.</p> <p>(A.4) Team verifies and validates pre-deployment plan based on PDSS.</p>
1.3	<p>Understand and employ planning considerations for the advisory environment.</p> <p>1.3.1 Conduct planning for key leader engagements.</p> <p>1.3.2 Conduct concurrent team planning for all FSF events.</p> <p>1.3.3 Conduct contingency planning.</p>	<p>1.3.A Team is capable of performing planning tasks on short notice.</p> <p>(A.1) Team has access to AO specific information, to include key host nation personality biographies.</p> <p>(A.2) Team identifies generic Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for the type and echelon of FSF they will advise.</p>
1.4	Participate in Tactical RSOI.	1.4.A All team members complete in-theatre directed training.

METL 1: Deploy the ISAF SFA Advisor Team		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
1.5	<p>Coordinate and deconflict with higher, supporting, and neighbouring units/agencies.</p> <p>1.5.1 Identify higher, supporting, and neighbouring units/agencies.</p> <p>1.5.2 Establish rapport and lines of communication with higher, supporting, and neighbouring units/agencies.</p> <p>1.5.3 Advise higher, supporting, and neighbouring units/agencies on advisory mission and requirements.</p> <p>1.5.4 Execute reporting procedures and requirements.</p>	<p>1.5.A Team identifies and confirms POCs of higher, supporting and neighbouring units/agencies.</p> <p>(A.1) Maintains contact electronically or face-to-face with multiple POCs.</p> <p>1.5.B Team identifies and is familiar with in-theatre reporting procedures.</p>
1.6	<p>Identify and establish rapport with key FSF personnel.</p> <p>1.6.1 Identify key FSF personnel.</p> <p>1.6.2 Establish rapport with key FSF personnel.</p> <p>1.6.3 Identify key FSF civilian and religious personnel.</p> <p>1.6.4 Establish rapport with key FSF civilian and religious personnel.</p>	<p>1.6.A Team has a basic understanding of the human terrain.</p> <p>(A.1) Team has access to biographies of key personalities / influencers.</p> <p>(A.2) Each team member can identify at least one potential motivator of FSF counterpart.</p>
1.7	<p>Identify and operate with appropriate C2 systems.</p> <p>1.7.1 Team internal communication systems.</p> <p>1.7.2 Team external communication systems.</p> <p>1.7.3 FSF communication systems.</p>	<p>1.7.A Team has training and experience with organic and host nation communication equipment.</p> <p>1.7.B Team familiar with and understands FSF communication systems and protocol.</p>
1.8	<p>Establish command post operations.</p>	<p>1.8.A Establish internal security measures, external communications, and means of intelligence dissemination.</p>

<p><i>Some security force assistance operations require organizing new institutions and units from the ministerial level to the smallest manoeuvre unit. Building infrastructure-related capability and capacity—such as personnel, logistics, and intelligence—is necessary for sustaining the new host-nation capacity. Developing host-nation tactical capabilities without the sustainment structure is inadequate. Host-nation organizations reflect their own unique requirements, interests, and capabilities; they should not simply mirror existing external institutions. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p> <p><i>Organize is a SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist FSF in improving its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. Forces must understand the existing security organizations of FSF to better assist them. Subsequently, SFA personnel may help the host nation organize its security forces to meet the needs of its security environment. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p> <p><i>Examples include but are not limited to: Recruiting, Promotion Screening and Selection, Pay and Benefits, Leader Recruiting and Selection, Personnel Accountability, and Demobilization of Force. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p>		
METL 2: Organize Foreign Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
2.1	Determine appropriate operational needs based on bilateral mission analysis.	2.1.A FSF accept joint assessment and plans to be implemented. (A.1) FSF accepts training and strategies. 2.1.B Strategy has desired effects on the operational environment.
2.2	Determine FSF generating and operating requirements, for both generating forces and operating forces. 2.2.1 Understand and advise recruiting operations. 2.2.2 Determine the required FSF generating force functions in order to sustain the organisation.	2.2.A FSF generation and retention support HN mission requirements. 2.2.B Force structure sustainable by HN without assistance of donor nations.
2.3	Design and/or implement organisational structures in consultation with HN. 2.3.1 Meets needs and sustainable capabilities / capacities, in relation to the expected or enduring operating environment, within mission objectives.	2.3.A Perceived as legitimate to HN population. 2.3.B Structures will provide HN population security. 2.3.C Tied to doctrine and sustainability of HN to support. 2.3.D Assimilate cultural themes that includes a cross section of all major demographics.
2.4	Determine or advise material requirements for the organisation.	2.4.A Material enables mission accomplishment within the AOR. 2.4.B Material will be sustainable for HN to support and FSF to maintain.

METL 2: Organize Foreign Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
2.5	Determine FSF development and education requirements. 2.5.1 Tied to or inline with the appropriate doctrine. 2.5.2 Sustainable by HN.	2.5.A Improved troop leading implementation. (A.1) Increase in merit based promotions and assignments (A.2) Decisions based on needs of the units 2.5.B Increased attendance at professional academies (B.1) Academy graduates exhibit improved professionalism.
2.6	Determine / develop appropriate staff.	2.6.A Advisor team understands HN / FSF doctrine and instructs commander and staff. 2.6.B Advisor team has firm knowledge on FSF unit function. 2.6.C Advisor team understands current FSF staff structure. 2.6.D Advisor team assists in development of proposed staff to meet FSF unit function.
2.7	Determine training and development requirements. 2.7.1 Training plan predicate on level HN of literacy. 2.7.2 Determine gaps and seams within FSF organisational construct.	2.7.A Supports appropriate doctrine, available arms and material.

<p><i>Training is conducted in institutions—such as training centres and academies—in units, and by individual personnel. It includes a broad range of subject matter including those issues that make security forces responsive to a civilian oversight and control. (FM 3-07)</i></p> <p><i>One of SFA's missions is to assist FSF by developing programs and institutions to train and educate. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security environment. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p> <p><i>Training in SFA involves many of the individual and collective skills performed in conventional military operations. All levels of training for all components should include values training. Metrics for evaluating units should include subjective measures, such as loyalty to the host-nation government, as well as competence in performance tasks. Advisors know how to evaluate training. However, the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, may be a better measure of training effectiveness. Gauging this acceptance is far more difficult than evaluating task performance. While the operational environment varies widely, FSF and advisors can still establish clear measures to evaluate the training of individuals, leaders, and units. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p>		
METL 3: Train Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
3.1	Determine FSF force operating capabilities.	3.1.A Advisor team understands type, composition and employment of unit within the FSF AOR. 3.1.B Advisor team is familiar with the FSF unit level of training.
3.2	Assist FSF in determining and developing unit training objectives and requirements.	3.2.A FSF understands unit mission and subtasks. 3.2.B FSF has a understandable mission statement from commander. 3.2.C FSF understand how training objectives support mission accomplishment.
3.3	Develop training plans to support training objectives.	3.3.A FSF unit making identifiable progress towards training objectives.
3.4	Develop instruction programme for required blocks and levels of instruction.	3.4.A Training facilitates mission accomplishment. 3.4.B Instruction programmes are in direct support of tasks needed to give clear instructions to all levels of units. 3.4.C Proper references are supplied to personnel attending classes.

METL 3: Train Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
3.5	Ensure instructors are proficient in methods of instruction and appropriate instruction techniques are utilized. 3.5.1 Instructor effectively communicates with the FSF training audience through the use of an interpreter or directly in the HN language. 3.5.2 Instructors understand cultural differences and sensitivities.	3.5.A Material presented is assimilated by FSF unit personnel. (A.1) FSF personnel understand information presented. (A.2) FSF personnel begin to instruct own forces. (A.3) FSF improve capabilities under advisor team guidance.
3.6	Establish and develop FSF trainers through a train-the-trainer process.	3.6.A Advisor team transfers requirement for instruction to FSF. (A.1) HN instructor cadre developed. (A.2) FSF improve capabilities under HN guidance.
3.7	Ensure appropriate FSF standards are developed and applied to all training events.	3.7.A All FSF instructors understand, implement and enforce standards within their areas of expertise.

<p><i>Equipment is accomplished through several mechanisms including traditional security assistance, foreign military support, and donations. Equipment must be appropriate for host-nation sustainment—appropriate to the physical environment of the region and within reasonable appropriations for operations and maintenance—and property accountability procedures. Equipping police forces can be a dangerous and complex process, occurring at numerous, geographically disparate locations across an operational area. (FM 3-07)</i></p> <p><i>Equip is a SFA task encompassing all efforts to assess and assist FSF with the procurement, fielding, and sustainment of equipment. All equipment must fit the nature of the operational environment. The SFA principle of ensuring long-term sustainment is a vital consideration for the equip task. The strategic plan for security force development should outline equipment requirements. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p> <p><i>Appropriate equipment is affordable and suitable against the threat. Forces must be able to train on the equipment. Interoperability may be desired in some cases. A central consideration includes the host nation's long-term ability to support and maintain the equipment. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p>		
METL 4: Equip Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
4.1	Assess current status of FSF equipment on hand and the associated processes.	4.1.A Comprehensive inventories of all FSF equipment have been completed and reviewed. (A.1) On hand equipment matches FSF equivalent of property book. (A.2) Documented shortages identified and addressed. 4.1.B Logistics advisor and team leadership have firm understanding of FSF logistics and maintenance.
4.2	Advise and assist HN equipping and fielding plan for the FSF organization.	4.2.A HN demonstrates knowledge of equipping and fielding plan. 4.2.B HN identifies and prioritizes shortfalls based on operational needs. 4.2.C HN implements, monitors, and adjusts plan accordingly.

METL 4: Equip Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
4.3	Determine appropriate equipment type and numbers that are sustainable and supportable by the FSF (technically, financially, availability, interoperability, accountability).	<p>4.3.A HN demonstrates firm understanding of security force:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - personnel, organisation and equipment (organic and supplied) - technical competence and ability to learn new systems - logistical support apparatus and financial support systems - composition and size of neighboring FSF units, and systems
4.4	Advise and assist FSF accountability and sustainment plan for equipment and resources.	<p>4.4.A FSF Logistical apparatus effectively operates independently.</p> <p>(A.1) FSF accountability inspections are regularly conducted.</p> <p>(A.2) FSF property book is accurately maintained.</p> <p>(A.3) FSF equipment can be tracked by unit throughout the repair process.</p> <p>(A.4) Supplies and equipment can be requisitioned through proper channels as needed by unit and personnel.</p> <p>(A.5) Damaged equipment is identified and placed into maintenance apparatus in a timely manner.</p> <p>4.4.B FSF unit can sustain necessary operations independent of partnered forces logistical and maintenance support.</p> <p>(B.1) FSF unit forecasts logistical needs as dictated by operational requirements.</p> <p>(B.2) Operations are not adversely impacted by lack of logistical support.</p> <p>(B.3) FSF unit does not request advisor logistical support to continue operations.</p>

<p><i>Rebuild and build is a SFA task to assess, rebuild, and build the existing capabilities and capacities of FSF and their supporting infrastructure. This task requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state and operational environment. Some FSF may require assistance in building and rebuilding, while other FSF may only need assistance in building. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p> <p><i>In many cases, particularly after major combat operations, it may be necessary to rebuild—or build—infrastructure to support security forces. This typically includes facilities and materiel but may also include physical plants, information systems, communications infrastructure, transportation, personnel management processes, and other necessary infrastructure. Rebuilding police facilities often differs from rebuilding military compounds. Police stations must be approachable and accessible to the community they support to be legitimate and effective. (FM 3-07)</i></p> <p><i>FSF need infrastructure support. People need buildings for storage, training, and shelter. Often requirements include barracks, ranges, motor pools, and other military facilities. Construction takes time; the host nation needs to invest early in such facilities if they are to be available when needed. Forces must plan to protect any infrastructures, including headquarters facilities, since these building are attractive targets for insurgents. (FM 3-07.1)</i></p>		
METL 5: Build and Rebuild Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
5.1	Assess current facilities for the FSF, using regionally and culturally accepted standards.	<p>5.1.A Each existing facility and system within HN unit AO identified and assessed.</p> <p>5.1.B Assessment conducted utilizing HN expertise involving diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic principles.</p>
5.2	Determine facilities required to be built or improved to meet FSF organization end state.	5.2.A Facilities and systems assessed as existing-adequate, existing-needs improvement or non-existent.
5.3	Ensure unity of effort and integration of infrastructure improvements with country team and other lines of development.	5.2.B HN emphasizes facility maintenance and periodic assessments.
5.4	Consider impacts and unintended consequences when commissioning or executing projects with regard to contracting, project determination, FSF or HN support, labor, timelines, community, etc.	5.3.A Coordination and action are in support of overarching HN plan.
		5.4.A Populace perception of projects in regards to HN government.

<p>Advising host-nation (HN) units and institutions is key to the ultimate success of security force assistance (SFA). This benefits both the state and the supporting external organizations. To be effective, advising requires specially selected and trained personnel.</p> <p>Advise and assist is a SFA task in which advisors work with Foreign Security Forces (FSF) to improve their capability and capacity. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the advisor will be able to influence the FSF. Assisting is providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so FSF can meet objectives and the end state. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and should continue until FSF can establish required systems or until conditions no longer require it. Leaders cannot permit FSF to fail critically at a point that would undermine the overall effort. (FM 3-07 & FM 3-07.1)</p>		
METL 6: Advise and Assist the Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
6.1	Utilize appropriate means for advising FSF.	6.1.A Increased capacity and capability of FSF unit.
6.2	Effectively communicate with your FSF counterpart. 6.2.1 Productive communication feedback loop.	6.2.A FSF unit seeks, accepts and trust advisor team input.
6.3	Effectively communicates with the FSF through the use of an interpreter or directly in the HN language.	6.3.A Materiel presented is assimilated by FSF unit personnel. (A.1) FSF personnel understand information presented (A.3) FSF improve capabilities under advisor team guidance.

METL 6: Advise and Assist the Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
6.4	<p>Build rapport with your FSF counterpart.</p> <p>6.4.1 Develop a rapport plan.</p> <p>6.4.2 Establish a relationship with your FSF counterpart.</p> <p>6.4.3 Employ cross-cultural empathy.</p> <p>6.4.4 Understands FSF counterpart's actions through their perspective.</p> <p>6.4.5 Understand societal influences on counterpart.</p> <p>6.4.6 Gain the trust of FSF counterpart.</p> <p>6.4.7 Understand counterpart's cultural, social and personal filters.</p>	<p>6.4.A Consistent improvement in relationship and trust between advisor team and FSF unit.</p> <p>(A.1) FSF share personal information about themselves and their family with advisor team.</p> <p>(A.2) FSF and advisors utilize recommendations made by the other.</p> <p>(A.3) FSF unit members seek out advisor team members to solicit input.</p> <p>6.4.B Create an environment of cross-cultural communication and sharing.</p> <p>(B.1) FSF willingness to learn about advisor team's culture.</p> <p>(B.2) FSF sharing about their culture and local customs.</p> <p>6.4.C Solutions to problems are developed and implemented by FSF.</p> <p>(C.1) FSF develops the ability to perform the function without support of advisor team or enablers.</p>
6.5	Establish credibility with your FSF counterpart.	6.5.A FSF perceives the advisor team as honest, competent, committed, and courageous.
6.6	Provide and demonstrate value to your FSF counterpart (knowledge, experience).	6.6.A FSF unit seeks, accepts and trust advisor team input.
6.7	Utilize the proper influencing technique(s) at the appropriate times.	6.7.A FSF counterpart positively responds to when and how input is given.
6.8	<p>Understand and employ effective negotiations with your FSF counterpart.</p> <p>6.8.1 Determine the appropriate times and tasks in which to teach, coach or advise your FSF counterpart.</p>	6.8.A Cooperative relationship established between advisor team and FSF counterparts.

METL 6: Advise and Assist the Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
6.9	Effectively influence or advise: higher, supporting, adjacent units and other HN or coalition force contributors in order to achieve the SFA mission objectives.	<p>6.9.A Improved capabilities of FSF unit.</p> <p>(A.1) Increased administrative, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications and medical capabilities.</p> <p>6.9.B More effective interaction between different levels of FSF, higher and subordinate.</p> <p>(B.1) Increased communications between higher and lower levels.</p> <p>(B.2) Increasingly effective operations in AOR.</p> <p>6.9.C Build rapport with member of FSF.</p> <p>(C.1) FSF share personal information about themselves and their family with advisor team.</p> <p>(C.2) FSF utilize recommendations made by advisor team.</p> <p>(C.3) Seek out advisor teams members to solicit input, but FSF make their own decisions.</p>
6.10	Provide subject matter expertise to the FSF on the unit tasks according to mission analysis and counterpart's point of view.	<p>6.10.A FSF counterparts understand and pursue the accomplishment of task, mission, and endstate.</p>

METL 6: Advise and Assist the Foreign Security Forces		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
6.11	<p>Evaluate effectiveness of advisor effort.</p> <p>6.11.1 Assess FSF MOEs.</p> <p>6.11.2 Assess FSF Measures of Performance (MOPs).</p> <p>6.11.3 Assess advisor team MOEs that are tied to the FSF MOPs.</p> <p>6.11.4 Assess advisor team MOPs that are tied to how well the advisor team determines and conducts the organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise tasks.</p> <p>6.11.5 Conduct internal assessment of team actions and interoperability.</p>	<p>6.11.A FSF unit moving incrementally towards self-professed endstate.</p> <p>(A.1) Increase in unit professionalism.</p> <p>(A.2) Increase in unit esprit-de-corps.</p> <p>(A.3) Increase in unit readiness and capability.</p> <p>6.11.B Improved security and stability in AOR.</p> <p>(B.1) Reports of IED incidents in AOR.</p> <p>(B.2) Reports of insurgent / criminal activity in AOR.</p> <p>(B.3) Level of government interaction in AOR.</p> <p>6.11.C Population's perception is that security in AOR has improved.</p> <p>(C.1) Increase of quality direct interaction between local populace and FSF.</p> <p>(C.2) Reports of improvement in government services in AOR.</p> <p>(C.3) Reports of public works projects in AOR.</p> <p>6.11.D. Improved capabilities of FSF unit.</p> <p>(D.1) Increased administrative, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications and medical capabilities.</p>

Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to the home or mobilization station. Before redeployment, a unit conducting SFA inventories all supplies and equipment (jointly, if possible) to be passed on to the foreign unit or the relieving U.S. or multinational unit. These actions ensure all items are accounted for and the custody chain for property and equipment is unbroken. (FM 3-07.1)

METL 7: Redeploy the Team		
Subtask:	Description	Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)/ Self Assessment Measure (SAM)
7.1	<p>Conduct effective transfer with FSF Unit, individual, or counterpart; provide guidance to follow on SFA element.</p> <p>7.1.1 Conduct turnover ceremony with FSF unit.</p> <p>7.1.2 Conduct equipment transfer.</p> <p>7.1.3 Conduct formal, informal awards, recognition and gift exchange with FSF.</p>	<p>7.1.A Team completes and submits turnover package, including detailed Relief in Place (RIP) and HOTO plan, to higher HQ NLT R-30.</p> <p>(A.1) All equipment is accounted for.</p>
7.2	<p>Prepare historical documentation of mission.</p> <p>7.2.1 Prepare written AAR.</p> <p>7.2.2 Prepare written LL, record of events, or training.</p>	<p>7.2.A Team completes written AAR and LL package NLT R-30.</p> <p>(A.1) AAR and LL package submitted to higher HQ NLT beginning of RIP and HOTO.</p>
7.3	<p>Utilize redeploying advisors as subject matter experts.</p> <p>7.3.1 Provide guidance and lessons learned to training centres and deploying teams.</p>	<p>7.3.A Deploying SFA elements have increased knowledge and situational awareness.</p>

Annex B: ISAF Minimum Training Requirements for SFA Advisors and Advisor Teams

Depicted below are the Minimum Training Requirements (MTRs) for SFA-ATs deploying to the CJOA-A. Unless otherwise noted, all team members will possess this individual knowledge, skill, and attitude. Basic combat and force protection skills are the responsibility of the Troop Contributing Nation. This list is augmented by the matrixes that distinguish which advisor [PATs, MATs, OCCATs, and Ministerial Advisor Group (MAG)] should receive the specific training. This enclosure also provides measures of assessment and prerequisites for attendance at Phase 2 training.

1. **Mission**

- 1.1. Read and understand COMISAF and GIRoA directives and plans
 - a) Current ISAF Campaign Plans and GIRoA Campaign Plans
 - b) COMISAF guidance and all tactical directives
 - c) Rules of Engagement
 - d) Human and Gender Rights
 - e) MoI, MoD, and NDS guidance
 - f) Understand your national objectives and C2 relationship with ISAF
 - g) Understand MoI (IPCB) 10 Year Vision and 2-Year Plan
- 1.2. Conduct study of MoI, MoD and NDS ministerial organization structures and functions
 - a) Logistics
 - b) Finance/Budget
 - c) Pay systems
 - d) Force generation
 - e) Recruiting
 - f) National strategy and doctrine
- 1.3. Conduct study of the Afghan Judicial System
 - a) Understand Afghan Constitution
 - b) Understand basic Afghan law related to security, policing and judicial system
 - c) Understand Afghanistan's Criminal Code and rights of individuals
 - d) Understand traditional or informal justice system and its applications
- 1.4. Prepare an area study
 - a) Conduct culture analysis and apply to the operational environment

- b) Conduct demographic study (ethnic, tribal and linguistic makeup of population) of the area (province, district)
- c) Conduct demographic study (ethnic, tribal and linguistic makeup) of the advised/partnered unit
- d) Conduct historical study of area including history of insurgency/conflict in the area and the area's/population's historical relationship to the Afghan central government

1.5. Conduct Organizational Assessment training. Upon completion of this training, individuals must be able to:

- a) Assess the ANSF current capabilities, required capabilities to meet the current and projected environment, and the institutional gaps that must be addressed to enable the ANSF to adequately sustain the desired capabilities
- b) Determine the ANSF developmental gaps and underlying conditions of those gaps
- c) Determine how to integrate viable MoE and MoP into unit specific ANSF and the SFA organization
- d) Determine the current capability and the required capability as they relate to the operational environment

1.6. Understand COIN

- a) Understand COIN doctrine
- b) Understand the problem with traditional military approaches in a COIN environment
- c) Understand the principles of a population-centric approach to COIN operations
- d) Understand the spectrum of conflict in a COIN environment
- e) Understand District Stability Framework (VSO)

1.7. Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning

- a) Determine ANSF missions, roles and responsibilities within the policies, guidance, and directives of the GIRoA, measuring those against ISAF campaign plans in support of ISAF objectives
- b) Conduct a PDSS
- c) Understand the SFA planning process and be familiar with the available SFA planning tools and guides

1.8. Build effective Advisor and SFA Team(s)

- a) Assemble appropriate personnel based upon required area of expertise (e.g. Vertical Engineer, Rotary-Wing Pilot, Law Enforcement Professional) in accordance with required and determined ANSF developmental needs.

These must be selected and cannot be trained after notification.

- b) Ensure requisite rank or status of personnel in relation to the level of interaction and influence desired or required with the ANSF
- c) Select and assign team members according to prior working knowledge and past experience with the ANSF
- d) Select personnel with regional expertise (language and culture)
- e) Ensure Advisor and SFA Team compatibility (team building activities, member attributes)
- f) Structure team according to team functional requirements and expertise
- g) Manage interpersonal and inter-group conflict

2. **Security and Force Protection**

2.1. Conduct medical training

- a) Complete Combat Lifesaver Course (CLS) (for certification) Trauma Medical Course (or equivalent), medical military occupational specialty, Advanced Tactical Practitioner (ATP) certification or Tactical Combat Casualty Care (T3C) certification (Level 1-all deploying combatants)
- b) Preventative medicine training
- c) Environmental health training

2.2. Conduct Survival Evasion Resistance Escape training (SERE)

- a) Basic survival skills
- b) Theater and Service specified additional Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism Training
- c) Advisors identified as High-Risk-of-Isolation or High-Risk-of-Capture (HRI/HRC) require advanced survival and capture resistance training
- d. Develop isolated personnel guidance and personnel recovery requirements

2.3. Conduct IT Training

- a) Cultural:
 - 1) Understand the requirement for cultural adaptability.
 - 2) Understand cross-cultural communication in Afghan context.
 - 3) Understand interpersonal conflict resolution in Afghan context.
 - 4) Understand recent Insider Attack (IA) trends and analysis
 - 5) Understand IT indicators, to include the six human domains
 - 6) Understand the history of Insider Attacks in Afghanistan
 - 7) Understand the importance of Afghan honor and respect (Pashtunwali)
- b) TTPs

- 1) Understand the four types of Insider Attacks and the counter-measure for each
- 2) Develop and practice counter-Insider Threat TTPs
- 3) Practice off-hand and Quick Reaction Drill (QRD) firing techniques
- 4) Understand the employment of Guardian Angels and their effect on relationships
- 5) Develop QRF procedures to localize the response/effects of an Insider Attack

c) Procedural

- 1) Understand the importance of exploitation and EvBO
- 2) Understand the importance of reporting to counter-intelligence operations
- 3) Vet ANSF and local nationals working with CF
- 4) Conduct vulnerability assessment of AOR & practice mitigation techniques
- 5) Develop reporting procedures to address the strategic message after an Insider Attack

2.4. Conduct Call for Fire training

- a) Understand how to call for fire and utilize fire support
- b) Understand theatre restrictions on using indirect fires
- c) Understand COMISAF's guidance on escalation of force
- d) Understand COMISAF's intent to eliminate ISAF-caused Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) across Afghanistan.

2.5. Conduct C-IED Training

- a) Understand how to utilize unpredictability through enhanced mobility and maneuverability (i.e., altering routes, "off-road" driving, etc.) as a tool to reduce vulnerability to targeting from IED planters
- b) Identify indicators of an IED placement
- c) Describe the 5Cs (Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Control, Call)
- d) Identify and describe different IED characteristics and activation methods
- e) React to an IED attack or find
- f) Understand route clearance procedures and equipment
- g) Understand appropriate C-IED reports to include "10-line" IED report
- h) Understand vehicle mounted and man-portable Electronic Counter-measure (ECM) devices (ISAF and ANSF)
- i) Understand Afghan IED reduction capability

2.6. Conduct Convoy Operations Training

- a) Understand basic convoy composition, command and control

- b) Understand route security
 - c) Understand the defense of convoy elements
- 2.7. Conduct Information and Media Operations Training
- a) Understand the definition of Information Operations (IO)
 - b) Understand IO as an integrating strategy
 - c) Understand how IO encourages and discourages human behavior (Note: currently in Afghanistan, there is no difference for ANSF between public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations.)
 - d) Understand COMISAF's guidance regarding troop interaction with media outlets
 - e) Understand guidelines for any interaction with commercial media entities (television and print and social media platforms)
 - f) Understand the potential impact and result on mission readiness (both favorable and unfavorable) that interaction with commercial media entities can produce
 - g) Develop standards for SFA-AT training for ANSF media interaction
- 2.8. Conduct Force Protection (FP) Training
- a) Apply requisite FP and survival skills equivalent to the environment being deployed: Combat Skills Training, Field-Craft, AT/FP, survival skills, mountain warfare, etc.
 - b) Plan for and be able to conduct QRF operations as required
 - c) Plan for integration of ANSF into the Force Protection Plan
 - d) Verify theatre and country travel requirements
 - e) Develop movement plan (with and without ANSF)
 - f) Identify and coordinate with all existing units, organizations and assets that may provide value
 - g) Train and apply vulnerability assessments and operational security measures (e.g. physical, information, personnel security)
3. **Advise**
- 3.1. Understand the requirements to advise the development of Afghan National Security Forces in order to:
- a) Ensure all actions and activities of the Advisor and the ANSF support the legitimacy of GIROA
 - b) Develop credible, capable, competent, confident and committed ANSF
 - c) Develop and maintain rapport with your ANSF counterpart
 - d) Work closely with your ANSF counterpart (e.g. eat, quarter, and operate

together)

3.2. Demonstrate proficient instruction techniques.

3.3. Understand and demonstrate advisor skills:

- a) Understand the role of the advisor
- b) Demonstrate the interpersonal skills that contribute to being an effective advisor, i.e., patience, adaptability, judgment, team player, initiative, etc.
- c) Demonstrate the ability to identify and mitigate friction with your counterpart through effective communication.
- d) Demonstrate the ability to identify when to use compliance vs. commitment, and properly select the appropriate influence technique(s) for the situation
 - 1) Utilize the proper influencing techniques at the appropriate times
 - 2) Understand and employ effective negotiation skills with your ANSF counterpart
 - 3) Effectively influence and advise higher, supporting and adjacent units and other Afghan or Coalition force
- e) Understand the importance of rapport, how to establish it, and how to evaluate how effective it is (e.g. understanding, respect, and trust)
 - 1) Develop a rapport plan
 - 2) Establish a relationship with your ANSF counterpart
 - 3) Employ cross-cultural empathy
 - 4) Understand your ANSF counterpart's actions through his point of view
 - 5) Understand societal influences on your counterpart
 - 6) Gain the trust of your ANSF counterpart
 - 7) Understand your counterpart's cultural, social, and personal filters
- f) Understand how to build credibility (e.g. leadership, expertise, understanding, advice)
 - 1) Establish credibility with your ANSF counterpart
 - 2) Provide and demonstrate your value to your ANSF counterpart (e.g. knowledge, experience, access to enablers)
- g) Understand how to provide value to your counterpart (e.g. training, enablers, power, funding, advice (but only after credibility is established))
- h) Utilize appropriate means for advising ANSF (e.g. limited, embedded, partnering, augmenting)

3.4. Understand and conduct negotiations and KLEs

- a) Understand the requirements to prepare for effective negotiations

- b) Understand Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)
 - c) Understand when, and with whom, to negotiate
 - d) Understand the requirements to prepare for a KLE
 - e) Understand when, and with whom, to conduct a KLE
 - f) Understand the difference between mentoring and advising
 - g) Apply appropriate influence and persuasion techniques during negotiations
- 3.5. Effectively operate by, with, and through the ANSF and Afghan population
- a) Employ cross-cultural communications, advise ANSF, understand ANSF problems, operate among the population
 - b) Understand local hierarchy of needs among the population (how the local population's priorities fall within Maslow's Hierarchy, what is important to the ANSF, etc.)
 - c) Understand and employ local cultural standards and expectations
- 3.6. Understand the organization of Afghan National Security Forces, specifically
- a) ANSF generating and operating requirements, for both generating forces and operating forces
 - b) Organizational structures (tashkils) of the ANSF and GIROA, their sustainment systems, capabilities and capacities.
 - c) Appropriate design of the organization in order to meet operational requirements
 - d) Logistics requirements for the organization
 - e) Leader development needs and education
 - f) Staff development
 - g) Recruiting and retention operations
- 3.7. Understand Afghan Police requirements in order to:
- a) Advise the ANP in narcotics enforcement
 - b) Advise the ANP on Police/Prosecutor (Saranwal) cooperation
 - c) Advise the ANP in collection, exploitation, and use of evidence for investigations, warrants, and prosecutions
 - d) Advise community-based policing
 - e) Advise the ANP on counter-terrorism
- 3.8. Understand the ALP/VSO Program
- a) Understand the ALP plan and present status
 - b) Understand the VSO plan and status
 - c) Understand the ALP fielding and training plan

- d) Understand the role and duties of the DCoP
- 3.9. Understand the training plan for Afghan National Security Forces, in order to:
 - a) Advise on development of ANSF unit mission and sub-tasks
 - b) Advise on development of ANSF Force Operating Capabilities (FOC) that support ANSF mission
 - c) Advise the development of training plans
 - d) Advise the development of blocks of instruction
 - e) Establish ANSF trainers through a “train-the-trainer” process
 - f) Ensure appropriate ANSF standards are developed and used for all training events
- 3.10. Understand the ANSF Equipping and Fielding Plan in order to:
 - a) Assess current status of ANSF equipment on-hand and the associated processes
 - b) Verify the ISAF supported equipping plan for the ANSF organization (tashkil) in relation to the threat
 - c) Advise on appropriate equipment type and numbers (tashkil)
- 3.11. Understand the plan to rebuild or build ANSF infrastructure in order to:
 - a) Assess current facilities for the ANSF using acceptable standards for the region
 - b) Advise on facilities required to be built or improved to meet ANSF organization end-state
 - c) Ensure unity of effort and integration of infrastructure improvements with country team and other lines of development
 - d) Consider 2nd and 3rd order effects when commissioning, or executing, projects with regard to contracting, project determination, ANSF or Afghan support, labor, timelines, community, etc.
- 3.12. Understand and advise on the logistics architecture and processes
 - a) Understand the logistics decrees that define ANSF logistics processes at all levels
 - b) Understand the differences between MoI and MoD logistics systems
 - c) Understand the formal ANSF logistics structure, to include requisition and reception of goods, from the time of submission to the national level to receipt of goods down to the company (*coy*) or precinct level.
 - d) Understand the formal system of forms and records for MoI and MoD
 - e) Understand signs of corruption in the Afghan logistics system, the specific agencies to contact if corruption is suspected, and which classes of supply are most susceptible
 - f) Understand the advisor architecture for logistics in IJC and NTM-A

- g) Understand the “shadow” tracking methodology of forms as Afghans process them
 - h) Understand where online repositories are at IJC and NTM-A for publications, official Afghan memoranda, and other assistance information
 - i) Understand Core Inventory Management System (IMS) capability purposes
- 3.13. Understand and advise on Rule of Law standards, practices and legal references
- 4. Situation Specific**
- 4.1. Demonstrate effective communication skills
- a) Possess a current Second Language Proficiency (SLP) rating (3/2/2/2) in English
 - b) Possess a current SLP language rating (0+/0+/0+/0+) in target language
 - c) Complete 40 hours of language instruction, of which 10 hours must be formal instruction, the remainder may be met through online certification
 - d) Learn the language of the advised unit and the advised unit’s staff, not the population itself
 - e) Advisor Team’s security detachment should learn the language spoken by the local population for convoy operations and crowd control purposes
- 4.2. Demonstrate effective use of interpreter
- a) Understand how to effectively manage, emplace and work through an interpreter
 - b) Understand how to utilize your interpreter as a cultural advisor
 - c) Understand how to utilize your interpreter as a sensor for collecting atmospherics of the advised/partnered unit (i.e., response to event in news)
- 4.3. Understand the cultural environment
- a) Understand the various groups that exist (e.g. clans, tribes, ethnicities) within the AO
 - b) Understand the various social groups (e.g. ethnicities, tribes, political parties) that exist within the advised, or partnered, unit
 - c) Understand the relevant Afghan history
 - d) Understand tribal dynamics, role of religion, customs and traditions in Afghanistan
 - e) Able to identify and discern cultural differences
 - f) Able to gain additional insights on atmospherics that impact the ISAF SFA mission
 - g) Able to interpret the nonverbal behavior of individuals from the ANSF and the population
 - h) Able to advise within the Afghan context

- i) Demonstrate adaptability and display a desire to engage unfamiliar situations
 - j) Apply knowledge of cultural customs to build rapport and enhance communications (e.g. holding hands, drinking tea, eating goat)
 - k) Detect manipulation and deception in interpersonal interactions with the ANSF
- 4.4. Understand relevant ANSF equipment
- a) Operate communications equipment
 - b) Weapons and ammunition
 - c) Vehicles
- 4.5. Commander's Unit Assessment Tool
- a) Understand the CUAT
 - b) Understand reporting cycle and impacts on ANSF readiness
 - c) Understand the Afghan assessment tools [Readiness Reporting System (ANA) and Force Readiness Report (ANP)]
- 4.6. Narcotics
- a) Understand the narcotics problem in Afghanistan affecting security, governance, and development
 - b) Understand the aim of the GIROA counter-narcotics strategy and the roles and responsibilities of ISAF in the fight against the drug issue
 - c) Understand GIROA policy on ANSF drug use and trafficking
- 4.7. Corruption
- a) Understand Afghan norms regarding cultural corruption
 - b) Understand how to handle situations where corruption is involved in the advised unit to include reporting procedures
 - c) Understand the role of patronage systems in ANSF recruiting, manning, promotions, assignments, and other personnel-related activities
- 4.8. Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the ANSF actions
- a) Develop a detailed understanding of how the ANSF is supposed to operate: organizations, doctrine, leadership, training methods, etc.
 - b) Determine and review past engagements, past SFA activities, resources provided, facilities available, etc.
 - c) Review previous SFA AARs, reports and executive summaries EXSUMs from the country of deployment and from the specific ANSF
 - d) Register for and utilize current SFA resources, forums, databases and centers of expertise

- e) Initiate SFA AAR prior to PDSS and submit upon completion of mission
 - f) Provide information through prescribed channels to maintain higher HQ's situational awareness based on observations.
- 4.9. Execute all actions and activities within appropriate and authorized processes
- a) Conduct all operations and activities maximizing unity of effort with all other agencies and organizations: civil-military (CIV-MIL), Other Governmental Agencies (OGAs), non-governmental agencies, other services, Coalition Forces, private contractors, etc.
 - b) All SFA activities must support the ISAF Campaign Plan
 - c) Ensure AT's efforts and initiatives are integrated into the supported Coalition Battle Space Owner's mission, operations and staff processes
- 5. Additional Collective Knowledge, Skills, Attributes, and Abilities for teams at the Brigade level and above:**
- 5.1. Possess a basic understanding of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) TTPs
- a) Understand the definition of FID and the importance of all elements of national power
 - b) Understand Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
 - c) Understand Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Security Sector Reform/ Security Sector Assistance (SSR/SSA)
- 6. Troop Contributing Nation tasks:**
- 6.1. TCN Support
- a) Properly execute information and equipment transfer, utilization of funds, property accountability and disposition, foreign disclosure, approved TTPs, and advisor-authorized activities, e.g.
 - b) Ensure proper utilization of funds and from the appropriate funding source
 - c) Ensure all information, materials, and TTPs have been cleared for foreign disclosure
 - d) Conduct only authorized activities in support of ANSF development
 - e) Ensure all personnel, equipment, accessories are pre-authorized and cleared for movement through Afghan Customs
 - f) Identify and report any potential issues or gaps with the current authorities and processes
 - g) Complete NATO Joint Advanced Distributed Learning (JADL), a web-based e-learning tool at <https://jadel.act.nato.int/>

ANNEX C: SFA Commanders' Self-Assessment Measures

1. Mission

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	Phase 2 Pre-requisite	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
				PAT	MAG	OCCAT	Go	No/Go
1. Mission	1.1. Read and understand COMISAF and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) directives and plans.	X	1.1.A. Current ISAF Campaign Plans and GIROA campaign plans.	1.1.A.1. Current COMISAF and GIROA directives and plans made available and reviewed.	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.B. COMISAF guidance and all tactical objectives.	1.1.B.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.C. Rules of Engagement (ROE)	1.1.C.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.D. Human and Gender Rights	1.1.D.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.E. Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and National Director of Security (NDS) guidance.	1.1.E.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.F. Understand your national objectives and C2 relationship with ISAF.	1.1.F.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
			1.1.G. Understand MoI (International Police Coordination Board, IPCB) 10 year Vision and 2 Year Plan.	1.1.G.1. Reviewed	P0	P0	P0	
	1.2. Conduct study of MoI, MoD and NDS ministerial organizations structure and functions.	X	1.2.A. Logistics	1.2.A.1. Complete directed study of current MoI, MoD and NDS ministerial organizational structures and related government functions.			P1	
			1.2.B. Finance/Budget	1.2.B.1. Complete			P1	
			1.2.C. Pay Systems	1.2.C.1. Complete	P1	P1	P1	
			1.2.D. Force generation	1.2.D.1. Complete	P1	P1	P1	
			1.2.E. Recruiting	1.2.E.1. Complete	P1	P1	P1	
		X	1.2.F. National strategy and doctrine.	1.2.F.1. Complete	P1	P1	P1	

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	Phase 2 Pre-Requirement	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
				PAT	MAG	OCCAT	No/Go	
1. Mission	1.3 Conduct study of the Afghan Justice System	X	1.3.A Understand Afghan Constitution	1.3.A.1. Read and understand Afghan Constitution; complete directed study of Afghan Justice System	P1	P1	P1	Go
			1.3.B. Understand basic Afghan Law related to security, policing and judicial system.	1.3.B.1. Complete	P1	P1		
			1.3.C. Understand Afghanistan's Criminal Code and rights of individuals.	1.3.C.1. Complete	P1	P1		
			1.3.D. Understand traditional or informal justice system and its applications	1.3.D.1. Complete	P1	P1		
			1.4 Prepare an area study.	1.4.A. Conduct cultural analysis and apply to the operational environment.	1.4.A.1. Complete	P1	P1	
	1.5 Conduct Organizational Assessment training. Upon completion of this training, individuals must be able to:	X	1.4.B. Conduct demographic study (ethnic, tribal and linguistic makeup of population) of the area (province, district)	1.4.B.1. Complete	P1	P1		
			1.4.C. Conduct demographic study (ethnic, tribal and linguistic makeup) of the advised/partnered unit	1.4.C.1. Complete. Ministerial advisors should understand dynamics at macro level & know where to go to conduct deeper analysis	P1	P1		
			1.4.D. Conduct historical study of area including history of insurgency/conflict in the area and the area's/population's historical relationship to the Afghan central government	1.4.D.1. Complete	P1	P1		
			1.5.A Assess the ANSF current capabilities, required capabilities to meet the current and projected environment, and the institutional gaps that must be addressed to enable the ANSF to adequately sustain the desired capabilities.	1.5.A.1. AT capable of mapping COA to advise and develop ANSF advised unit.	P1	P1		
			1.5.B Determine the ANSF developmental gaps and underlying conditions of those gaps.	1.5.B.1 Completed Organization Assessment of training identifies current ANSF Strengths and Shortcomings	P1	P1		

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	No/Go
1. Mission [X] Denotes Phase2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Pre-Requirement	1.6 Understand Counterinsurgency	1.5.C. Determine how to integrate viable measures of effectiveness and measures of performance into unit specific ANSF and the SFA organization.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.5.D. Determine the current capabilities and the required capability as they relate to the operational environment.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.6.A. Understand COIN doctrine.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.6.B. Understand the problem with traditional military approaches in a COIN environment.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.6.C. Understand the principles of a population-centric approach to COIN operations.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.6.D. Understand the spectrum of conflict in a COIN environment.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.6.E. Understand District Stability Framework of Village Stability Operations (VSO).	P1	P1	P1		
			1.7.A. Determine ANSF missions, roles and responsibilities within the policies, guidance and directives of the GfRoA, measuring against ISAF campaign plans in support of ISAF objectives.	P1	P1	P1		
			1.7.B. Conduct Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS)	P1	P1	P1		
			1.7 Conduct SFA mission analysis and planning	P1	P1	P1		

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	No/Go
1. Mission [X] Denotes Phase2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	1.8 Build effective Advisor and SFA Team(s)	1.7.C Understand the SFA planning process and be familiar with the available SFA planning tools and guides. 1.8.A. Assemble appropriate personnel based upon required area of expertise, e.g. Vertical Engineer, Rotary Wing Pilot, Law Enforcement Professional, etc., in accordance with required and determined ANSF developmental needs. These must be selected and cannot not be trained after notification. 1.8.B. Ensure requisite rank or status of personnel in relation to the level of interaction and influence desired or required with the ANSF. 1.8.C. Select and assign team members according to prior knowledge and past experience with ANSF. 1.8.D. Select personnel with regional expertise (language and culture) 1.8.E. Ensure Advisor and SFA Team compatibility (team building activities, member attributes) 1.8.F. Structure team according to team functional requirements and expertise. 1.8.G. Manage inter-team and inter-group conflict.	1.7.C.1. AT capable of developing strategies to advise and assist advised ministry and ANSF unit.	P1	P1	P1	Go
			1.8.A.1. Assembled advisors and team delivers the subject matter expertise needed to effectively mentor ministry and ANSF counterparts	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.B.1. Assembled team is staffed with requisite rank and expertise to establish effective rapport and maintain acceptable protocol with partnering and advising ministry and ANSF counterparts.	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.C.1. Complete	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.D.1. Complete	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.E.1. Team demonstrates cohesiveness and Esprit 'd Corps.	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.F.1. Complete	P0	P0	P0	
			1.8.G.1. IAW with prescribed TCN guidelines regarding conflict management.	P0	P0	P0	
				P0	P0	P0	
				P0	P0	P0	

Note 1.1 Minimal Training Requirements for Advisor Teams are denoted by (P0, P1, P2, P3) to indicate during which deployment phase training should be accomplished and measure of performance is evaluated.

2. Security Force Protection

Critical Advisor Requirement		STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					Go	No/Go
Phase 2 Pre-requisite			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG			
2. Security and Force Protection	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	2.1. Conduct medical training.	X	2.1.A. Complete Combat Lifesaver Course (CLS) (for certification) trauma medical (or equivalent), medical military occupational specialty (MOS), Advanced Tactical Practitioner (ATP) certification or Tactical Combat Casualty Care (T3C) certification (Level 1 - All Deploying Combatants)	2.1.A.1. Training equivalency conducted IAW TCN policies and protocols for deploying personnel.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	2.1.B. Preventive medical training.	2.1.B.1. Complete.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	2.1.C. Environmental health training.	2.1.C.1. Complete.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		2.2. Conduct Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) training.	X	2.2.A. Basic survival skills	2.2.A.1. Demonstrate Proficiency.	P1	P1		
			X	2.2.B. Theatre and Service specified Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism Training.	2.2.B.1. Complete.	P1	P1		
			X	2.2.C. Advisors identified as High-Risk-of Isolation or High-Risk-of Capture (HRI/HRC) require advanced survival and capture resistance training.	2.2.C.1. Training is conducted and performed IAW with TCN policy and guidance for deploying personnel.	P1			
			X	2.2.D. Develop isolated personnel guidance and personnel recovery requirements.	2.2.D.1. Conducted/Completed IAW TCN policy and guidance for deploying personnel	P1			
		2.3. Conduct Insider Threat (IT) Training		2.3.A. Cultural					
			X	2.3.A.(1). Understand the requirement for cultural adaptability.	2.3.A.(1)(a). Demonstrate understanding and proficiency in culture and language.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	2.3.A.(2). Understand cross-cultural communication in Afghan context	2.3.A.(2)(a). Demonstrate understanding and proficiency in culture and language.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

Critical Advisor Requirement	Phase 2 Prerequisite	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE									
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go				
2. Security and Force Protection	[X] Dentes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	2.3.A.(3). Understand interpersonal conflict resolution in Afghan context	2.3.A.(3)(a). Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.A.(4). Understand recent Insider Threat Attack trends and analysis.	2.3.A.(4) (a) Review of current threat and trends conducted.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.A.(6). Understand the history of Insider Attacks in Afghanistan	2.3.A.(6)(a) In-depth study of recent case studies focused of post-IT investigation/review.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.A.(7). Understand the importance of Afghan honor and respect (Pashtunwali)	2.3.A.(7)(a) AT capable of integrating concept of Pashtunwali to situations.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.B. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)										
		2.3.B.(1). Understand the four types of Insider Attacks and the counter measure for each.	2.3.B.(1)(a). Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.B.(2). Develop and practice counter-Insider Threat TTPs.	2.3.B.(2)(a). Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.B.(3). Practice off-hand & Quick Reactionary Drills (QRD) firing techniques.	2.3.B.(3)(a). Demonstrate competency in range practice.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.B.(4). Understand the employment of Guardian Angels and their effect on relationships.	2.3.B.(4) (a). Complete review of ISAF HQ SOP 331 Annex E Guardian Angel – Definition and Principles	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		2.3.B.(5). Develop QRF procedures to localize the effects of an Insider Attack.	2.3.B.(5)(a). Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	[X] Dentes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	2.3.C. Procedural										
		2.3.C.(1). (1) Understand the importance of exploitation and Evidence-Based operations (EvBO).	2.3.C.(1)(a). Integrate ANSF responsibilities into IT planning and verify whether they were implemented.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					

Critical Advisor Requirement		STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE									
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go				
2. Security and Force Protection	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Prerequisite	X	2.3.C.(2). Understand the importance of reporting to counter-intelligence.	2.3.C.(2)(a). Demonstrate understanding of unit reports and higher HQ SOPs.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.3.C.(3). Vet ANSF and local nation (LN) personnel working with Coalition forces (CF).	2.3.C.(3)(a). Ensure that ANSF and LN personnel are grated authorization into coalition work spaces <u>only</u> after proper vetting is accomplished.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.3.C.(4). Conduct vulnerability assessment of AOR & practice mitigation techniques.	2.3.C.(4)(a). Vulnerability assessments are reviewed on a periodic bases to ensure proper consideration to current threat and mitigation practices.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.3.C.(5). Develop reporting procedures to address the strategic message after an Insider Attack.	2.3.C.(5)(a). Develop contingency reporting requirements; anticipating getting out in front with strategic messaging following an Insider Attack.							
			X	2.4.A. Understand how to call for fire and utilize fire support.	2.4.A.1. Training conducted during Phase 1/Phase 2 Pre-deployment.	P2	P2					
			X	2.4.B. Understand theatre restrictions on using indirect fires.	2.4.B.1. Complete training addressing ISAF ROE and Joint Fires SOP.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.4.C. Understand COMISAF's guidance on escalation of force	2.4.C.1. Complete training addressing ISAF escalation of force SOP	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.4.D. Understand COMISAF's intent to eliminate ISAF-caused civilian casualties (CIVCAS) across Afghanistan	2.4.D.1. Complete training addressing COMISAF's guidance concerning CIVCAS	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.5.A. Understand how to utilize unpredictability through enhanced mobility and maneuverability (i.e., altering routes, "off-road" driving, etc.) as a tool to reduce vulnerability to targeting from IED planters	2.5.A.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	2.5. Conduct Counter-improvised Explosive Device (CIED) Training.		P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				

Critical Advisor Requirement		STANDARD		PERFORMANCE MEASURE		PAT				OCCAT				MAG				No/Go	
Phase 2 Prerequisite																			
2. Security and Force Protection	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	X	2.5.B. Identify indicators of an IED placement.	2.5.B.1. Completed counter-IED STX training during pre-mission/pre-deployment training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.C. Describe the 5Cs (Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Control, Call).	2.5.C.1. Completed IAW (2.5.A.1.) above.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.D. Identify and describe different IED characteristics and activation methods.	2.5.D.1. Completed IAW (2.5.A.1.) above.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.F. Understand route clearance procedures and equipment.	2.5.F.1. Overview of CF in-theatre assists and capabilities conducted.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.G. Understand appropriate C-IED reports and include 10 line IED report.	2.5.G.1. Demonstrates ability to prepare C-IED reports and 10-line IED report.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.H. Understand vehicle mounted and man-portable Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) devices (ISAF and ANSF).	2.5.H.1 Familiarization conducted during home station training utilizing organic equipment.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.5.I. Understand Afghan IED reduction capability.	2.5.I.1. Review of current ANSF capability conducted.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.6.A. Understand basic convoy composition and control.	2.6.A.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.6.B. Understand route security.	2.6.B.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.6.C. Understand the defense of convoy elements.	2.6.C.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.7.A. Understand the definition of Information Operations.	2.7.A.1. Demonstrate understanding & proficiency	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X	2.7.B. Understand the information operations as an integrating strategy.	2.7.B.1. Complete practical exercises in support of maneuver operations.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

Critical Advisor Requirement		STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
					PAT	OCCAT	MAG	No/Go
2. Security and Force Protection	Phase 2 Pre-requisite			2.7.C. Understand how information operations encourage and discourage human behavior. (Note: Currently in Afghanistan, there is no difference for ANSF between public affairs, information operations, and psychological operations).	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		X		2.7.D. Understand COMISAF guidance regarding troop interaction with media outlets.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		X		2.7.E. Understand guidelines for any interaction with commercial entities (television and print and social media platforms).	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		X		2.7.F. Understand the potential impact and result on mission readiness (both favorable and unfavorable) that interaction with commercial media entities can produce.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		X		2.7.G. Develop standards for SFAT training for ANSF media interaction.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		X		2.8.A. Apply requisite force protection and survival skills equivalent to the environment being deployed: Combat Skills Training, Field Craft, AT/FP, survival, skills mountain warfare, etc.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X		2.8.B. Plan for and be able to able conduct Quick Reaction Force (QRF) operations as required.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		X		2.8.C. Plan for integration of ANSF in the Force Protection Plan.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
				2.7.C.1. Demonstrate understanding of Target Audience Analysis and how to integrate it into production and dissemination of handouts and radio CDs. Perform face to face messaging and demonstrate proper oversight of commercial radio operations.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				2.7.D.1. Demonstrate understanding of guidance.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				2.7.E.1. Perform practical exercises and interoperability with commercial media platforms.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				2.7.F.1. Demonstrate knowledge of information operations IAW ongoing Ground Forces IO Directorate training standards.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				2.7.G.1. Demonstrate IO proficiency with ministry and GFC IO Directorate oversight.	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				2.8.A.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
				2.8.B.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
				2.8.C.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

Critical Advisor Requirement		STANDARD		PERFORMANCE MEASURE		PAT		MAT		OCCAT		MAG		Go	No/Go
2. Security and Force Protection	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	X	2.8.D. Verify Theatre and Country travel requirements.	2.8.D.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3			
			2.8.E. Development movement plan; with and without ANSF.	2.8.E.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3			
			2.8.F. Identify and coordinate with all existing units, organizations and assets that may provide value.	2.8.F.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3			
			2.8.G. Train and apply vulnerability assessments and operational security measures (physical, information, personnel security).	2.8.G.1. Demonstrate competency in collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3			
			X		P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3			

Note 2.1 Minimal Training Requirements for Advisor Teams are denoted by (P0, P1, P2, P3) to indicate during which deployment phase training should be accomplished and measure of performance is evaluated.

3. Advise

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					Go	No/Go
				PAT	MAT	OCCT	MAG		
3. Advise	3.1. Understand the requirements to Advise the Development of Afghan National Security Forces in order to:	X	3.1.A. Ensure all actions and activities of the Advisor and the ANSF support the legitimacy of GIROA.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			3.1.B. Develop credible, capable, competent, confident and committed ANSF.						
			3.1.C. Develop and maintain rapport with your ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			3.1.D. Work closely with your ANSF counterpart (eat, quarter, and operate together)	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
	3.2. Demonstrate proficient instruction techniques.	X	3.2.A. Deliver quality instruction to ANSF counterparts.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			3.2.A.1. AT is thoroughly prepared for delivery of quality faced instruction and advises ANSF counterparts through the learning process.						
	3.3. Understand and demonstrate advisor skills:	X	3.3.A. Understand the role of the advisor.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			3.3.B. Demonstrate the interpersonal skills that contribute to being an effective advisor, i.e., patience, adaptability, judgment, team player, initiative, etc.						
		X	3.3.C. Demonstrate the ability to identify and mitigate friction with your counterpart by effectively communicating with your ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			3.3.C.1. AT communicates effectively with ANSF counterpart in a manner that fosters unity of effort and rapport; while mitigating friction and animosity.						

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE									
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go				
3. Advise [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training		3.3.D. Demonstrate the ability to identify when to use compliance vs. commitment, and properly select the appropriate influence technique(s) for the situation.	3.3.D.1. AT demonstrates proper techniques to influence counterpart to secure compliance and/or commitment.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	X	3.3.D.(1). Utilize the proper influencing techniques at the appropriate times	3.3.D.(2) (a). AT demonstrates usage of proper influencing techniques to gain buy-in support from ANSF counterpart, when appropriate.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	X	3.3.D.(2). Understand and employ effective negotiation skills with your ANSF counterpart.	3.3.D.(2) (a). AT demonstrates sound negotiation skills when interacting with ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	X	3.3.D.(3). Effectively influence and advise higher, supporting and adjacent units and other Afghan or Coalition force	3.3.D.(3) (a). AT demonstrates proper techniques to influence and advise higher, supporting and adjacent units and other Afghan or Coalition force.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	X	3.3.E. Understand the importance of rapport, how to establish it, and how to evaluate how effective it is (e.g. understanding, respect and trust)	3.3.E.1. AT demonstrates understanding of the importance rapport building and took for evaluating its effectiveness.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
	X	3.3.E.(1). Develop a rapport plan.	3.3.E.(1)(a). AT develops a plan to build and maintain rapport with his ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		3.3.E.(2). Establish a relationship with your ANSF counterpart.	3.3.E.(2)(a). AT has developed a sound and enduring professional relationship with his ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		3.3.E.(3). Employ cross-cultural empathy.	3.3.E.(3)(a). AT demonstrates cultural empathy toward his ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
		3.3.E.(4). Understand your ANSF counterpart's actions through his point of view.	3.3.E.(4)(a). AT demonstrates cultural adaptively with any eye for his ANSF counterpart's viewpoint.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					
				P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3					

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE									
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go					
3. Advise	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Prerequisite	X	3.3.E.(5). Understand societal influences on your counterpart.	3.3.E.(5)(a). AT maintains situational awareness and keeps abreast of the societal influences that impact it ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	Go	
				3.3.E.(6). Gain the trust of your ANSF counterpart	3.3.E.(6)(a). AT has the trust of it ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
				3.3.E.(7). Understand your counterpart's cultural, social and personal filters	3.3.E.(7)(a). AT maintains situational awareness and demonstrates understanding of the cultural, social and personal filters of its ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.3.F. Understand how to build credibility (e.g., leadership, expertise, understanding, advice).	3.3.F.1. AT demonstrates ability to foster credibility with ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.3.F.(1). Establish credibility with your ANSF counterpart.	3.3.F.(1)(a). AT maintains strong credibility with ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.3.F.(2). Provide and demonstrate your value to your ANSF counterpart (e.g., knowledge, experience, access to enablers).	3.3.F.(2)(a). AT works to demonstrate personal tactical and strategic value to his ANSF counterpart; why the relationship is important.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.3.G. Understand how to provide value to your counterpart (e.g., training, enablers, power, funding, advice (but only after credibility is established))	3.3.G.1. ANSF counterpart seeks and respects the professional advice of AT.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.3.H. Utilize appropriate means for advising ANSF (e.g., limited, embedded, partnering, augmenting)	3.3.H.1. ANSF considers all professional avenues for developing solid rapport with ANSF counterpart.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	3.4.A. Understand the requirements to prepare for effective negotiations.	3.4.A.1. AT demonstrates sound negotiation skills needed to influence and advise effectively.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
	3.4. Understand and conduct negotiations and Key Leader Engagement (KLE).					P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					Go	No/Go	
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG				
3. Advise	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Prerequisite		3.4.B. Understand BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement).	3.4.B.1. AT demonstrates understanding of BATNA; leveraging these skill where applicable.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2	Go	No/Go
				3.4.C. Understand when and with whom to negotiate.	3.4.C.1. AT identifies the decision-makers and leverages their influence to best meet negotiation objectives.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.4.D. Understand the requirements to prepare for a KLE.	3.4.D.1. AT understands preparation requirements for conducting KLE with ANSF counterparts.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.4.E. Understand when and with whom to conduct a KLE	3.4.E.1. AT demonstrates that value and importance identifying key personalities prior to conducting KLE.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.4.F. Understand the difference between mentoring and advising.	3.4.F.1. AT is able to differentiate between advising and mentoring.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				3.4.G. Apply appropriate influence and persuasion techniques during negotiations.	3.4.G.1. AT is persuasive and influential during negotiations	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.5. Effectively operate by, with, and through the ANSF and Afghan population.	3.5.A. Employ cross-cultural communications; advise ANSF, understand ANSF problems, operate among the population	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.5.B. Understand local hierarchy of needs among the population (how the local population's priorities fall within Maslow's hierarchy; what is important to the ANSF, etc.)	3.5.B.1. AT understands local hierarchy and its impact on the team's advisory role.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	3.5.C. Understand and employ local cultural standards and expectations.	3.5.C.1. AT understands and anticipates cultural standards and expectations.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
				3.6. Understand the Organization of Afghan National Security Forces, specifically.	3.6.A. ANSF generating and operating requirements, for both generating forces and operating forces.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		3.6.B. Organizational structures (tasks) of the ANSF and GIROA, their sustainment systems, capabilities and capacities.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2					
		X	3.6.B.1. AT demonstrates an understanding of the organizational structures of GIROA and the ANSF.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2				

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE						
				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	
3. Advise	3.7. Understand Afghan Police Requirements in order to:	X	3.6.C. Appropriate design of the organization in order to meet operational requirements.	3.6.C.1. AT understands the appropriate designs of the ANSF.	P1	P1			
		X	3.6.D. Logistics requirements for the organization.	3.6.D.1. AT understands the logistics requirements of its ANSF counterpart.	P1	P1			
			3.6.E. Leader development needs and education.	3.6.E.1. AT has identified the leadership development and education needs of its ANSF counterpart, and has developed a plan for advisory assistance.	P1	P1	P1		
			3.6.F. Staff development.	3.6.F.1. AT has identified staff development needs of its ANSF counterpart, and has developed a plan for advisory assistance.	P1	P1			
			3.6.G. Recruiting and retention operations.	3.6.G.1. AT develops understanding of recruiting and retention methods employed by its ANSF counterparts.	P1	P1			
		X	3.7.A. Advise the Afghan National Police (ANP) in narcotics enforcement.	3.7.A.1. AT advises ANP to increase effective narcotics enforcement.	P1			P1	
		X	3.7.B. Advise ANP on Police/Prosecutor (Saranwal) Cooperation.	3.7.B.1. AT advises Police/Prosecutor (Saranwal) to increase cooperation and effectiveness.	P1	P1		P2	
		X	3.7.C. Advise the ANP in collection, exploitation and use of evidence for investigations, warrants, and prosecutions.	3.7.C.1. AT effectively advises ANP in EBO.	P1	P1		P2	
		X	3.7.D. Advise community-based policing.	3.7.E.1. AT advises its ANSF counterpart on community based operations.	P1	P2		P2	
		X	3.7.E. Advise the ANP on counter-terrorism.	3.7.F.1. AT advises its ANSF counterpart on the processes of criminal intelligence led policing.	P1	P1		P2	

Critical Advisor Requirement		TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
Phase 2 Prerequisite				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go
3. Advise	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	3.8. Understand the VSO/ALP program.	X	3.8.A. Understand the ALP plan and present status.	P1	P1	P1	Go
				3.8.B.1. AT demonstrates understanding of ALP plan and present status.	P2	P2		
		3.9. Understand the Training Plan for Afghan National Security Forces, in order to:	X	3.8.B. Understand the VSO plan and status.	P1	P1	P1	
				3.9.A. Advise on development of ANSF Unit Mission and sub-tasks.	P2	P2		
			X	3.9.A.1. AT demonstrates understanding of ANSF Training Plan and effectively advises ANSF counterpart on units missions and sub-tasks	P1	P1		
				3.9.B. Advise on development of ANSF Force Operating Capabilities (FOC) that support ANSF Mission.	P1	P1		
			X	3.9.C. Advise the development of training plans.	P1	P1		
				3.9.D. Advise the development of blocks of instruction.	P1	P1		
			X	3.9.E. Establish ANSF trainers through a train-the-trainer process.	P1	P1		
				3.9.F. Ensure appropriate ANSF standards are developed and used for all training events.	P1	P1		
			X	3.10.A. Assess current status of ANSF equipment on hand and the associated processes.	P1	P1		
3.10. Understand the ANSF Equipping and Fielding Plan in order to:				3.9.F.1. AT monitors ANSF training process to ensure standards are developed for all	P1	P1		
				3.10.A.1. AT verifies ISAF supported equipping plan is consistent with ANSF organization and its mission and threat.	P1	P1		

Critical Advisor Requirement		TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
Phase 2 Pre-requisite				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go
3. Advise	3.11. Understand the plan to rebuild or build ANSF infrastructure in order to:		3.10.C. Advise on appropriate equipment type and numbers (tashkl).	3.10.C.1. AT advises on appropriate equipment per Taskkil; and offers recommended changes when appropriate.	P1			Go	
			3.11.A. Assess current facilities for the ANSF using acceptable standards for the region.	3.11.A.1. AT assesses current facilities for ANSF and advises with recommendation for improvement.	P1	P1			
			3.11.B. Advise on facilities required to be built or improved to meet ANSF organization end state.	3.11.B.1. AT effectively advises ANSF counterpart and makes recommendations for facilities improvements.	P1	P1			
			3.11.C. Ensure unity of effort and integration of infrastructure improvements with country team and other lines of development.	3.11.C.1. AT works to ensure unity of effort with country team and other lines of development.	P1	P1			
	X	3.11.D. Consider 2nd and 3rd order effects when commissioning or executing projects with regard to contracting, project determination, ANSF or Afghan support, labour, timelines, community, etc.	3.11.D.1. AT effectively works to consider 2nd and 3rd order effects when commissioning projects, and plans ahead to mitigate disruption with construction efforts.	P1	P1				
	X	3.12.A. Understand the logistics decrees that define ANSF logistics processes at all levels.	3.12.A.1. AT understands the logistics decrees that define ANSF logistics.	P1	P1	P1			
	X	3.12.B. Understand the differences between MoI and MoD logistics systems.	3.12.B.1. AT demonstrates thorough understanding of the differences between the MoI and MoD logistics systems.	P1	P1				
X	3.12.C. Understand the formal ANSF logistics structure to include requisition and reception of goods from the time of submission to the national level to receipt of goods down to the company (coy) precinct level.	3.12.C.1. AT demonstrates understanding of the formal ANSF logistics structure from time of submission to receipt of goods.	P1	P1	P1				
X	3.12.D. Understand the formal system of forms and records for MoI and MoD.	3.12.D.1. AT demonstrates understanding of forms and records used by MoI and MoD.	P1	P1	P1				

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

Critical Advisor Requirement		TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	No/Go
3. Advise [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite Training (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Pre-requisite	X	3.12.H. Understand where online repositories are at UC and NTW-A for publications, official Afghan memoranda, and other assistance information.	3.12.H.1. AT is knowledgeable of online repositories and how to access information as needed.	P1	P1		
			3.12.I. Understand the purpose and capabilities of CoreIMS.	3.12.H.1. AT is knowledgeable of CoreIMS purpose and capabilities of CoreIMS at the ANA Corps and ministry level.	P1			
		X	3.13. Understand and advise on Rule of Law standards, practices and legal references.	3.13.A. Understand and advise on Rule of Law standards, practices and legal references.	P1	P1	P1	

Note 3.1 Minimal Training Requirements for Advisor Teams are denoted by (P0, P1, P2, P3) to indicate during which deployment phase training should be accomplished and measure of performance is evaluated.

4. Situation Specific

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
			PAT	MAT	OCAT	MAG	No/Go
4. Situation Specific [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	4.1. Demonstrate effective communication skills.	X	4.1.A. Possess a current SLP language rating (3/2/2/2) in English.	4.1.A.1. Members of ATs use English in all situations.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.1.B. Possess a current SLP language rating (0+/0+/0+/0+) in target Afghan language (Dari or Pashto).	4.1.B.1. Members of ATs use basic local language greetings, and key phrases with local nationals.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.1.C. Completed (40) hours of language instruction, of which (10) hours must be formal instruction, the remainder may be met through online certification.	4.1.C.1. Course of instruction completed.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.1.D. Learn the language of the advised unit and the advised unit's staff, not the population itself.	4.1.D.1. AT converses effectively in the language of the advised unit and its staff.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.1.E. Advisor Team's security detachment should learn the language spoken by the local population for convoy operations and crowd control purposes	4.1.E.1. Language of local population learned by AT's security detachment.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
	4.2. Demonstrate effective use of interpreter.	X	4.2.A. Understand how to effectively manage, emplace and work through an interpreter.	4.2.A.1. AT members able to utilize a local language interpreter.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.2.B. Understand how to utilize your interpreter as a cultural advisor.	4.2.B.1. AT members able to use a host nation interpreter to assist with local cultural understanding.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
		X	4.2.C. Understand how to utilize your interpreter as a sensor for collecting atmospherics of the advised/partnered unit (i.e., response to event in news)	4.2.C.1. AT members able to use interpreter to collect atmospherics.	P1 P2	P1 P2	
	4.3. Understand the cultural environment.	X	4.3.A. Understand the various groups that exist (e.g. clans, tribes, ethnicities) within the AO.	4.3.A.1. Through daily interactions with host nation counterparts, apply knowledge of local, regional, and ethnic customs, practices, and politics in relation to the multi-tiered clans, tribes, and ethnicities in your AO.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	
					P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
			Phase 2 Pre-requisite	PAT	OCCAT	MAG	
						Go	No/Go
4. Situation Specific [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training		4.3.B. Understand the various social groups (i.e., ethnicities, tribes, political parties, etc.) that exist within the advised/partnered unit	4.3.B.1. Through daily interactions with host nation counterparts, apply knowledge of local, regional, and ethnic customs, practices, and politics in relation to the multi-tiered clans, tribes, and ethnicities in your partnered unit.	P1 P2 P3			
	X	4.3.C. Understand the relevant Afghan history.	4.3.C.1. AT members understand 19th, 20th, and 21st century Afghan history and selected other critical periods as required.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
	X	4.3.D. Understand tribal dynamics, role of religion, customs and traditions in Afghanistan.	4.3.D.1. Through daily interactions with host nation counterparts, apply knowledge of local, regional, and national religious customs, traditions, tribal dynamics, and politics as they apply to training operations.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		4.3.E. Able to identify and discern cultural differences.	4.3.E.1. Knowledge of cultural differences are applied in various advising scenarios.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		4.3.F. Able to gain additional insights on atmospherics that impact the ISAF SFA mission.	4.3.F.1. AT members apply observations of the atmospherics into various advising scenarios.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
		4.3.G. Able to interpret the nonverbal behavior of individuals from the ANSF and the population	4.3.G.1. AT members recognize Afghan nonverbal behavior and adapt advising skills to situation.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
	X	4.3.H. Able to advise within the Afghan context.	4.3.H.1. AT members advise host nation personnel in a non-offensive, empathetic manner.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
	X	4.3.I. Demonstrate adapt ability and displays a desire to engage unfamiliar situations	4.3.I.1. AT members are intellectually curious and adapt and overcome to fast moving, ever changing situations.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

Critical Advisor Requirement		TASK		STANDARD		PERFORMANCE MEASURE		PAT		MAG		OCCAT		Go		No/Go	
Phase 2 Prerequisite		TASK		STANDARD		PERFORMANCE MEASURE		PAT		MAG		OCCAT		Go		No/Go	
4. Situation Specific	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	4.4. Understand relevant ANSF equipment.	X	4.3.J. Apply knowledge of cultural customs to build rapport and enhance.	4.3.I.1. AT members build rapport using cultural trademark.	4.3.I.1. AT members build rapport using cultural trademark.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.3.K. Detect manipulation and deception in interpersonal interactions with the ANSF.	4.3.K.1. AT members detect manipulation and deception in interpersonal interactions with the ANSF and apply in adversarial scenarios.	4.3.K.1. AT members detect manipulation and deception in interpersonal interactions with the ANSF and apply in adversarial scenarios.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.4.A. Operate communication equipment.	4.4.A.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	4.4.A.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.4.B. Weapons and ammunition.	4.4.B.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	4.4.B.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.4.C. Vehicles.	4.4.C.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	4.4.C.1. Demonstrate competency during collective training.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
		4.5. Commander's Unit Assessment Tool.	X	4.5.A. Understand the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).	4.5.A.1. Demonstrate understanding how data is collected, understanding of all sections of the CUAT, Ratings Definition Levels (RDLs), and what they mean.	4.5.A.1. Demonstrate understanding how data is collected, understanding of all sections of the CUAT, Ratings Definition Levels (RDLs), and what they mean.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.5.B. Understand reporting cycle and impacts on ANSF readiness.	4.5.B.1. Able to explain the use of the CUAT and what metrics are being measured and where the reports are sent.	4.5.B.1. Able to explain the use of the CUAT and what metrics are being measured and where the reports are sent.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			X	4.5.C. Understand the ANSF Assessment tools (Readiness Reporting System (ANA) and Force Readiness Report (ANP)).	4.5.C.1. Demonstrate ability to explain the Afghan assessment systems, how they are used, and how the metrics are determined and analyzed ICW CUAT reporting.	4.5.C.1. Demonstrate ability to explain the Afghan assessment systems, how they are used, and how the metrics are determined and analyzed ICW CUAT reporting.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
		4.6. Narcotics.	X	4.6.A. Understand the narcotics problem in Afghanistan affecting security, governance and development.	4.6.A.1. Demonstrate understanding of the narcotics problem and its affect on security, governance, and development.	4.6.A.1. Demonstrate understanding of the narcotics problem and its affect on security, governance, and development.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				

Critical Advisor Requirement		TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
Phase 2 Pre-Requisite				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go
4. Situation Specific	[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	4.7. Corruption.	X	4.6.B. Understand the aim of the GiRoA counter narcotics strategy and the roles and responsibilities of ISAF in the fight against the drug issue.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	4.6.C. Understand GiRoA policy on ANSF drug use and trafficking.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	4.7.A. Understand Afghan norms regarding cultural corruption.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	4.7.B. Understand how to handle situations where corruption is involved in advised unit to include reporting procedures.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
		4.8. Maintain situational awareness and contextual understanding of the ANSF actions	X	4.7.C. Understand the role of patronage systems in ANSF recruiting, manning, promotions, assignments and other personnel-related activities.	P1 P2	P1 P2	P1 P2		
			X	4.8.A. Develop a detailed understanding of how the ANSF is supposed to operate: organizations, doctrine, leadership, training methods, etc.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	4.8.B. Determine and review: past engagements, past advising activities, resources provided facilities available, etc.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		
			X	4.8.C. Review previous advisor AARs, reports and EXSUMs from the country of deployment and from the specific ministry element or ANSF.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3		

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					Go	No/Go
				PAT	OCCAT	MAG			
4. Situation Specific [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	Phase 2 Prerequisite	X	4.8.D. Register for and utilize current SFA resources, forums, databases and centers of expertise.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
		X	4.8.E. Initiate SFA AAR prior to PDSS and submit upon completion of mission.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
		X	4.8.F. Provide information through prescribed channels to maintain higher HQ's situational awareness based on observations.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
	4.9. Execute all actions and activities within appropriate and authorized processes		4.9.A. Conduct all operations and activities maximizing unity of effort with all other agencies and organizations: CIV-MIL, OGAs, non-governmental agencies, other services, Coalition Forces, private contractors, etc.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
		X	4.9.B. All SFA activities must support the ISAF Campaign Plan.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
		X	4.9.C. Ensure AT's efforts and initiatives are integrated into the supported Coalition Battle Space Owner's mission, operations and staff processes.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
			4.9.D.1. Demonstrate knowledge of where to obtain SFA materials.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			4.8.E.1. SFA AAR document has been started and continuously updated throughout the deployment.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				
			4.8.F.1. AT leaders know higher HQ reporting requirements and comply.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P2 P3				
			4.9.A.1. AT leaders and members know the importance of synchronizing all activities with relevant organizations in a whole of government approach to mission accomplishment.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
			4.9.B.1. All AT members are familiar with the campaign plan and ensure AT activities are nested to the plan.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
			4.9.C.1. All AT members are familiar with the Coalition Battle Space Owner's mission, operations, and staff processes and ensure AT activities are nested to them.	P0 P1 P2	P0 P1 P1 P2				
			4.9.D.1. Demonstrate knowledge of where to obtain SFA materials.	P1 P2 P3	P1 P2 P3				

Note 4.1 Minimal Training Requirements for Advisor Teams are denoted by (P0, P1, P2, P3) to indicate during which deployment phase training should be accomplished and measure of performance is evaluated.

5. Additional Collective Knowledge

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	Phase 2 Pre-requisite	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
				PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	Go	No/Go
5. Additional Collective Knowledge [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training	5.1. Possess a basic understanding of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) TTPs.	X	5.1.A. Understand the definition of FID and the importance of all elements of national power.	5.1.A.1. Demonstrate comprehensive understanding of partner nation supported, SFAT supporting relationship.	SA	SA			
			5.1.B. Understand Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).	5.1.B.1. Demonstrate understanding of mutually supporting defense and development pillars, discuss a historical example of a unified IDAD success (El Salvador, Colombia, Philippines, etc.)	SA	SA			
		X							
			5.1.C. Understand Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and Security Sector Reform/Security Sector Assistance (SSR/SSA).	5.1.C.1. Demonstrate the institutional capacities necessary for a professional armed force to include meritocracy based, professional military education, the roles of officers and NCOs, police vs military responsibilities, subordination to civilian authority, and respect for human and gender rights.	SA	SA	SA	SA	

Note 5.1 Situation Awareness (SA) denotes recommended checks for Advisory Teams to consider during the phased deployment cycle.

6. Troop Contributing Nations

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE					
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	No/Go	
6. Troop Contributing Nations Tasks	6.1. TCN Support	6.1.A. Properly execute information and equipment transfer, utilization of funds, property accountability and disposition, foreign disclosure, approved TTPs, Advisor authorized activities, e.g., FDO, RAO, DISAM, FOO, CERP, SA, 1206, FMS.	X	6.1.A.1. Demonstrate proficiency during collective training.	SA	SA	SA	Go
			X	6.1.B. Ensure proper utilization of funds and from the appropriate funding source.	SA	SA	SA	
			X	6.1.C. Ensure all information, materials and TTPs have been cleared for foreign disclosure.	SA	SA	SA	
				6.1.D. Conduct only authorized activities ISO ANSF development.	SA	SA	SA	
				6.1.E. Ensure all personnel, equipment, accessories are pre-authorized and Cleared for movement through Afghan Customs.	SA	SA	SA	
				6.1.F. Identify and report any potential issues or gaps with the current authorities and processes.	SA	SA	SA	

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

[X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite (Precondition) Training

Critical Advisor Requirement	TASK	STANDARD	PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
			PAT	MAT	OCCAT	MAG	
6. Troop Contributing Nations Tasks [X] Denotes Phase 2 Prerequisite Training	Phase 2 Pre-requisite	6.1.G. Complete NATO Joint Advanced Distributed Learning (JADL). A web-base e-Learning tool at https://jdl.act.nato.int	P1	P1	P1	P1	Go
			P1	P1	P1	P1	No/Go

Note 6.1 Situation Awareness (SA) denotes recommended checks for Advisory Teams to consider during the phased deployment cycle.

Note 6.2 The conditions and standards for the individual Knowledge, Skills, Attributes, and Abilities; collective Knowledge, Skills, Attributes, SFA developmental tasks can be found in the U.S. Joint Security Force Assistance Proponent Office's Guidance on Joint Standards for Security Force Assistance Training or by contacting the POC listed in paragraph 4 of this memorandum.

ANNEX D: SFA Advisor Team Individual Tasks and Checklists

Introduction recommended guidance PAT, MAT and OCCAT team functions and checklists
Guidance for team functions and team's (members) checklists
<p>The advisor team is strongly recommended to produce a baseline ANSF assessment during the PDSS(s) and HOTO. During the first week of deployment the desired end state for the advised ANSF unit should be defined, to include identifying significant milestones during the AT's deployment and where the ANSF unit stands in relation to the desired end state.</p> <p>The next step will be to prioritize the tasks between the team members and give a prioritization for every team member himself.</p> <p>The last step will be to produce daily, weekly and monthly checklists per team member IOT synchronize the team (member)'s priorities.</p>
Step 1: produce the baseline assessment of the advised ANSF unit
<p>The baseline ANSF unit assessment is the result of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">● The PDSS visit: the checklist ANNEX D, Appendix (1) can be used to guide planning● The HOTO: the checklist ANNEX D, Appendix (2) can be used for guidance and to update the data collected during the PDSS● The baseline assessment is the incoming unit's assessment on the advised ANSF unit and is the result of input of both the incoming and outgoing advisors
Step 2: produce the aimed status of the advised ANSF unit at the EOT
<p>The goals and objectives for the advised ANSF unit must be ambitious and realistic. Priorities as set by the higher command are the main driver. Because AT's work in a complex environment, cross checks should be made with adjacent and higher level AT's. The goals and objectives need a certain level of detail IOT provide guidance to the different team members. ANNEX D, Appendix (2) can be used to guide planning. After defining the end state, adequate and logical milestones should be defined.</p>
Step 3: produce the individual team member's checklists
<p>This step produces the checklists for each team member; every checklist prioritizes daily, weekly and monthly advisor activities against desired goals and objectives for the advised ANSF unit. These checklists will drive the synchronization between the team members and provide the needed unity of effort IOT maximize the advisory result.</p>

Recommended Guidance: MAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (MAT)	External (ANA)
Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provides overall direction and guidance to team. ● Responsible for all team operations and actions. ● Ensures team knowledge of Afghan country, region (culture, history, key figures). ● Represents the advisor team to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands, as required. ● Assesses and reports ANA capabilities. ● Leads the team during mission planning. ● Ensures logistical sustainment of team. ● Responsible for overall team security. ● Ensures operations are conducted in a safe manner; conducts risk management. ● Accountable for team equipment, personnel and personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave, etc.). ● Develops team composition according to mission requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA partner unit Commander (CDR): - Command and Control (C2) - Planning - Intelligence - Fires - Movement and Maneuver - Force Protection - Reporting - Logistics/Sustainment - Personnel - Training (TNG) - Development of junior leaders
Deputy Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Supports team leader in execution of overall mission and daily team functions. ● Leads team members in daily routine and ensures that all mission requirements take place. ● Assists in writing and reviewing required reports. ● Ensures mission readiness of all team members. ● Responsible for team protection and life support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart in the execution of assigned duties and responsibilities. ● Advises and assists ANA on roles and responsibilities of assigned personnel. ● Advises and assists ANA on the basic tenets of personnel welfare. ● Provides input on the ANA training and readiness.

Recommended Guidance: MAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (MAT)	External (ANA)
Admin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepares personnel accountability and required reports. ● Maintains and tracks team personnel records and administration. ● Learns and understands ANA administrative structure and processes. ● Assesses ANA administrative function Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personnel accountability and reporting - Personnel replacement - Pay systems - Personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave)
Intel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Internal (MAT) ● Advises team leader on all aspects of intelligence. ● Conducts intelligence preparation of the operational environment in support of mission. ● Prepares the intelligence collection plan. ● Provides routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activities). ● Creates intelligence products. ● Maintains cultural calendar and advises team on ANA key dates and activities. ● Learns and understands ANA intelligence organizations, processes and activities. ● Assesses ANA intelligence capability. ● Assists the team in collecting information for required reports. ● Collects, analyzes and disseminates information for team security (internal/external). ● Provides intelligence input for team training and assessment. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● External (ANA) ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Physical security - Personnel security - Significant activities - Predictive analysis - Intelligence surveillance and recon collection management - Intelligence preparation of the operational environment - Surveillance equipment - Site exploitation - Source operations - Writing intelligence reports - Creating intelligence products - Intelligence dissemination - Targeting - Intelligence fusion

Recommended Guidance: MAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (MAT)	External (ANA)
Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANA organization, functions, systems and processes. ● Advises team leader on all operations. ● Reviews all tactical and operational reports and messaging to higher headquarters. ● Assesses ANA operations and training programs. ● Reviews program of instruction and training plans prior to execution. ● Oversees lethal and non-lethal fires and effects, civil-military operations and information operations. ● Maintains weekly training and operations calendar. ● Establishes operational center / command and control node. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission planning - Task organization - Operational decision-making - Executing operations - Current and future operations - Incident tracking - Reporting - Training requirements, programs and evaluations
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANA logistical system, processes and procedures. ● Assesses ANA logistical system. ● Advises team leader for logistics. ● Processes team logistics support requests. ● Maintains equipment accountability and conducts periodic inventories of team equipment. ● Manages operational funds. ● Manages contracts (as applicable). ● Oversees maintenance on organic equipment. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Maintains accountability and welfare of interpreters. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing and/or maintaining logistics systems - Logistical planning and support to operations - Ammunition management - Fuel management - Training in supply, logistics and maintenance - Submission and tracking of logistics request forms - Contract management - Equipment accountability and distribution - Planning and handling of human remains

Recommended Guidance: MAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (MAT)	External (ANA)
Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANA medical capabilities, resources and infrastructure. ● Assesses ANA medical system. ● Advises Team Leader on mass casualty preparations. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Plans and advises Team Leader on medical evacuation and treatment chain to include capabilities of nearby facilities. ● Provides medical treatment, preventive med, field sanitation, stabilizes patients and prepares for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). ● Maintains and orders medical supplies. ● Principal instructor for medical training. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing sustainable level of medical care - Medical interventions - Preventive medicine and field sanitation - Patient preparation for MEDEVAC - Evacuation procedures - Maintaining and ordering medical supplies and equipment - Mass casualty planning - Training medical personnel
Comm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANA communications systems, nodes and challenges. ● Assesses ANA communications systems. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Advises team leader on communications plan. ● Acts as the communications security custodian. ● Maintains operations of communications and electronic countermeasure equipment ● Establishes tactical and administrative communications nodes. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANA counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communications planning and operations - Communications training - Electronic networks - Maintenance of communication equipment - Communications security

Recommended Guidance: PAT Team Functions.		
Position	Function	
	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provides overall direction and guidance to team. ● Responsible for all team operations and actions. ● Ensures team knowledge of Afghan country, region (culture, history, key figures). ● Represents the advisor team to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands, as required. ● Assesses and reports ANP capabilities. ● Leads the team during mission planning. ● Ensures logistical sustainment of team. ● Responsible for overall team security. ● Ensures operations are conducted in a safe manner; conducts risk management. ● Accountable for team equipment, personnel and personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave, etc.). ● Develops team composition according to mission requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP (AUP, ANCOR, ABP, AACP, ALP and APPF) Afghan Commander (CDR), or District Chief of Police, or Provincial Chief of Police: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Command and Control (C2) - Interaction with local ANA - Afghan law - Planning - Intelligence - Public affairs - Force Protection - Reporting - Logistics/Sustainment - Personnel - Training (TNG) and Training Management System - Development of junior leaders - Crime scene management - Integration with prosecutors
Deputy Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Supports team leader in execution of overall mission and daily team functions. ● Leads team members in daily routine and ensures that all mission requirements take place. ● Assists in writing and reviewing required reports. ● Ensures mission readiness of all team members. ● Responsible for team protection and life support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart in the execution of assigned duties and responsibilities. ● Advises and assists ANP on roles and responsibilities of assigned personnel. ● Advises and assists ANP on the basic tenets of personnel welfare. ● Provides input on the ANP training and readiness. ● Advise and assists ALP District leader (for District AUP)

Recommended Guidance: PAT Team Functions.		
Position	Function	
Civilian Police Advisor	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises PAT team members on the proper role of local law enforcement officers, to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community based policing - Rule of Law - Evidence based operations - Intelligence led policing - Police/prosecutor cooperation - Understanding the roles in the power triangle (the legislative, the executive and the judicial power) - Proper detainee handling - (Counter)corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises ANP (AUP, ANCOF, ABP, AACF, ALP and APPF) on the proper role of local law enforcement officers, to include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community based policing - Rule of Law - Evidence based operations and criminal prosecutions - Intelligence led policing - Police/prosecutor cooperation - Understanding the roles in the power triangle (the legislative, the executive and the judicial power) - Proper detainee handling - (Counter)corruption - Human and gender rights
Admin	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prepares personnel accountability and required reports. ● Maintains and tracks team personnel records and administration. ● Learns and understands ANP administrative structure and processes. ● Assesses ANP administrative function ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personnel accountability and reporting - Personnel replacement - Pay systems - Personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave)

Recommended Guidance: PAT Team Functions.		
Position	Function	
	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
Intel	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Advises team leader on all aspects of intelligence.● Conducts intelligence preparation of the operational environment in support of mission.● Prepares the intelligence collection plan.● Provides routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activities).● Creates intelligence products.● Maintains cultural calendar and advises team on ANP key dates and activities.● Learns and understands ANP intelligence organizations, processes and activities.● Assesses ANP intelligence capability.● Assists the team in collecting information for required reports.● Collects, analyzes and disseminates information for team security (internal/external).● Provides intelligence input for team training and assessment.● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on:<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Physical security- Personnel security- Significant activities- Surveillance equipment- Site exploitation- Source operations- Writing intelligence reports- Creating intelligence products- Intelligence dissemination- Targeting- Intelligence fusion- Interaction with Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI)

Recommended Guidance: PAT Team Functions.		
Position	Function	
	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANP organization, functions, systems and processes. ● Advises team leader on all operations. ● Reviews all tactical and operational reports and messaging to higher headquarters. ● Assesses ANP operations and training programs. ● Reviews program of instruction and training plans prior to execution. ● Oversees lethal and non-lethal fires and effects, civil-military operations and information operations. ● Maintains weekly training and operations calendar. ● Establishes operational center / command and control node. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mission planning - Task organization - Operational decision-making - Executing operations - Current and future operations - Incident tracking - Reporting - Training requirements, programs and evaluations - OPSEC - C-IED operations
Logistics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANP logistical system, processes and procedures. ● Assesses ANP logistical system. ● Advises team leader for logistics. ● Processes team logistics support requests. ● Maintains equipment accountability and conducts periodic inventories of team equipment. ● Manages operational funds. ● Manages contracts (as applicable). ● Oversees maintenance on organic equipment. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Maintains accountability and welfare of interpreters. ● Support team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing and/or maintaining logistics systems - Logistical planning and support to operations - Ammunition management - Fuel management - Training in supply, logistics and maintenance - Submission and tracking of logistics request forms - Contract management - Equipment accountability and distribution - Planning and handling of human remains

Recommended Guidance: PAT Team Functions.		
Position	Function	
	Internal (PAT)	External (ANP)
Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANP medical capabilities, resources and infrastructure. ● Assesses ANP medical system. ● Advises Team Leader on mass casualty preparations. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Plans and advises Team Leader on medical evacuation and treatment chain to include capabilities of nearby facilities. ● Provides medical treatment, preventive med, field sanitation, stabilizes patients and prepares for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). ● Maintains and orders medical supplies. ● Principal instructor for medical training. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing sustainable level of medical care - Medical interventions - Preventive medicine and field sanitation - Patient preparation for MEDEVAC - Evacuation procedures - Maintaining and ordering medical supplies and equipment - Mass casualty planning - Training medical personnel
Comm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANP communications systems, nodes and challenges. ● Assesses ANP communications systems. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Advise team leader on communications plan. ● Acts as the communications security custodian. ● Maintains operations of communications and electronic countermeasure equipment ● Establishes tactical and administrative communications nodes. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANP counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communications planning and operations - Communications training - Electronic networks - Maintenance of communication equipment - Communications security

Recommended Guidance: OCCAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (OCCAT)	External (ANSF)
Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provides overall direction and guidance to team. ● Responsible for all team operations and actions. ● Ensures team knowledge of Afghan country, region (culture, history, key figures). ● Represents the advisor team to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands, as required. ● Assesses and reports Host Nation (ANSF) capabilities. ● Leads the team during mission planning. ● Ensures logistical sustainment of team. ● Responsible for overall team security. ● Ensures operations are conducted in a safe manner; conducts risk management. ● Accountable for team equipment, personnel and personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave, etc.). ● Develops team composition according to mission requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANSF partner unit Commander (CDR): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Command and Control (C2) - Planning - Intelligence - Force Protection - Reporting - Logistics/Sustainment - Personnel - Training (TNG) - Development of junior leaders - Integrating OCC operations with ANA, ANP and NDS operations in region, province and district - Integrating with OCCs below and higher level - Integrating ANA, ANP and NDS personnel within OCC
Deputy Senior Advisor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Supports team leader in execution of overall mission and daily team functions. ● Leads team members in daily routine and ensures that all mission requirements take place. ● Assists in writing and reviewing required reports. ● Ensures mission readiness of all team members. ● Responsible for team protection and life support. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANSF counterpart in the execution of assigned duties and responsibilities. ● Advises and assists ANSF on roles and responsibilities of assigned personnel. ● Advises and assists ANSF on the basic tenets of personnel welfare. ● Provides input on the ANSF training and readiness.

Recommended Guidance: OCCAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (OCCAT)	External (ANSF)
Admin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepares personnel accountability and required reports. • Maintains and tracks team personnel records and administration. • Learns and understands ANSF administrative structure and processes. • Assesses ANSF administrative function • Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advises and assists ANSF counterparts on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personnel accountability and reporting - Personnel replacement - Pay systems - Personnel administration (performance reports, awards, leave) - Manages approved absences from duty (leave, pass, etc.)
Intel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advises team leader on all aspects of intelligence. • Conducts intelligence preparation of the operational environment in support of mission. • Prepares the intelligence collection plan. • Provides routine situational updates (weather, road conditions, and recent activities). • Creates intelligence products. • Maintains cultural calendar and advises team on Afghan key dates and activities. • Learns and understands ANSF intelligence organizations, processes and activities. • Assesses ANSF intelligence capability. • Assists the team in collecting information for required reports. • Collects, analyzes and disseminates information for team security (internal/external). • Provides intelligence input for team training and assessment. • Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advises and assists ANSF counterparts on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Intelligence preparation of the operational environment - Physical security, route security - Personnel security, force protection - Significant activities - Predictive analysis - Intelligence surveillance and recon collection management - Source operations - Writing intelligence reports - Creating intelligence products - Intelligence dissemination - Targeting - Intelligence fusion

Recommended Guidance: OCCAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (OCCAT)	External (ANSF)
Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands OCC organization, functions, systems and processes. ● Advises team leader on all operations. ● Reviews all tactical and operational reports and messaging to higher headquarters. ● Assesses OCC operations and training programs. ● Reviews program of instruction and training plans prior to execution. ● Maintains weekly training and operations calendar. ● Establishes operational center / coordination node. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANSF counterparts on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OCC operations - Task organization - Operational decision-making - Coordination of current and future operations - Incident tracking - Reporting - OCC training requirements, programs and evaluations
Logistics	<p>Internal (OCCAT)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANSF logistical system, processes and procedures. ● Assesses OCC logistical system. ● Advises team leader for logistics. ● Processes team logistics support requests. ● Maintains equipment accountability and conducts periodic inventories of team equipment. ● Manages operational funds. ● Manages contracts (as applicable). ● Oversees maintenance on organic equipment. ● Provides input for training assessments. 	<p>External (ANSF)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANSF counterpart on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing and/or maintaining logistics systems - Logistical planning and support to OCC operations - Ammunition management - Fuel management - Training in supply, logistics and maintenance - Submission and tracking of logistics request forms - Contract management - Equipment accountability and distribution/inventory management

Recommended Guidance: OCCAT Team Functions		
Position	Function	
	Internal (OCCAT)	External (ANSF)
Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands Afghan medical capabilities, resources and infrastructure. ● Assesses Afghan medical system. ● Advises Team Leader on mass casualty preparations. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Plans and advises Team Leader on medical evacuation and treatment chain to include capabilities of nearby facilities. ● Provides medical treatment, preventive med, field sanitation, stabilizes patients and prepares for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). ● Maintains and orders medical supplies. ● Principal instructor for medical training. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assist ANSF counterparts on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing sustainable level of medical care - Medical interventions - Preventive medicine and field sanitation - Patient preparation for MEDEVAC/CASEVAC - Evacuation procedures (Ground/Air/Self Transport) - Maintaining and ordering medical supplies and equipment - Mass casualty planning/Medical Crisis Management - Liaises with local treatment facilities. - Training medical personnel
Comm	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learns and understands ANSF communications systems, nodes and challenges. ● Assesses OCC communications systems. ● Provides input for training assessments. ● Advises team leader on communications plan. ● Acts as the communications security custodian. ● Maintains operations of communications and electronic countermeasure equipment ● Establishes tactical and administrative communications nodes. ● Supports team in execution of overall mission and daily functions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Advises and assists ANSF counterparts on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communications planning and procedures - Communications training - Networks planning - Maintenance of organizational communication equipment - Communications security - Frequency management

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ANNEX D: Appendix 1

PDSS Checklist

“Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one. Ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not, you must start them.”

—Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army,
“28 Articles” 2006

Pre Deployment Site Survey

Prior to deploying, the team leader and/or selected members of the advisor team may get an opportunity to visit the outgoing advisor team in the combat area. Ideally the PDSS is scheduled 60 days prior to the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process and is an extremely useful tool to help the new advisor team understand their operational environment. The PDSS checklist below can help answer many questions regarding ANSF in the area, coalition units operating in the area, and specific points of interest regarding current advisor initiatives, shortcomings, or opportunities to focus advisor effort for the incoming team.

Every advisor team will have differing missions, areas of operation, and units and personalities with which they will engage. Their environment, their relationships, the ANSF level of autonomy, and the level of stability within the AO will help define their mission. Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request for information (RFI) list based on inputs from his team. The checklist in table 21 below provides a basic outline. Team members going on the PDSS should follow the checklist as a guide to focus on their mission and AO. However, it is important for the incoming advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to training/operating with their assigned ANSF.

Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions identified by the team during their preparation for deployment. The checklist can be modified as needed to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning before deployment.

Site Survey Team Mission. The mission of the site survey team is to report on the current ANSF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) conditions. It also clarifies in-country C2 systems/logistics relationships for the follow-on unit’s mission execution and coordinates the in-country reception of the main body.

Site Survey Team Procedures.

1.1 Before departure, the site survey team conducts pre-deployment activities to include:

- a) Obtaining required travel documents (visas and passports) and a copy of the country clearance message sent by the CF embassy, if required, through the

battalion S-2 or S-3.

- b) Ensuring site survey team member medical and immunization records are current.
- c) Determine financial management support (location of supporting finance unit and J8 (funding).
- d) Confirming that all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team's itinerary and are available for coordination.
- e) Receiving and updating the threat briefing as well as reviewing the ROE and Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA).
- f) Conducting a mission analysis and back brief in accordance with unit SOP. The team tailors its mission analysis and back brief to the site survey mission.

1.2 Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the security cooperation officer (SCO) of its arrival and status, and requests an updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and program of instruction (POI) to the SCO for approval and/or modification.

a) The survey team commander and S-3 establish the command relationship with the next-higher in-country CF commander if he is not in the team's normal chain of command. The team commander also briefs the next-higher in-country CF commander on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

b) The survey team commander also obtains any additional guidance from the higher in-country CF commander for the follow-on forces' mission execution. As a minimum, this guidance includes confirmation of the ROE, evasion and recovery (E&R) support, as well as any limitations on the relationships with ANSF counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following areas with the SCO:

- 1) Training objectives.
- 2) Terms of reference.
- 3) Political situation.
- 4) Social customs.
- 5) Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.
- 6) Currency control.
- 7) Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher in-country CF commander.
- 8) Administrative support.
- 9) Legal status in relation to the foreign country [SOFA].
- 10) Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next-higher in-country CF commander.

- 11) The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures between the next-higher in-country CF commander, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor units still in mission preparation. The team commander must also verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission.
- 12) The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics from the next-higher in-country CF commander. He identifies a POC at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center (EOC) of the CF military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during increased threat/emergencies that require evacuation of CF personnel from the AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence support from the higher in-country commander or other CF agencies.
- 13) The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next-higher in-country or out-of country support element. The survey team:
 - i) Identifies the supporting element location.
 - ii) Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on available support. Team should know expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and fulfillment.
 - iii) Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in accordance with the requirements in the survey team operation orders OPODs.
 - iv) Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor team. They identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2, logistics, and MEDEVAC.
 - v) Determines the established communications support-requesting procedures for the follow-on advisor team.
- 14) The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team:
 - i) Identifies the location of any concerned ANSF or CF agencies.
 - ii) Contacts the concerned agency to establish initial coordination.
 - iii) Exchanges information and intelligence. Confirms or establishes communications procedures.
 - iv) Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion into the follow-on advisor mission.
- c) The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and rapport with the ANSF unit commander. The survey team:
 - 1) Briefs the ANSF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher CF

commander.

- 2) Assures the ANSF commander his assistance is required to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.
 - 3) Deduces or solicits the ANSF commander's estimate of his unit capabilities, required training, and advisor assistance to include material requirements. They discuss training: plans, current status, units available, facilities, and any additional requirements.
 - 4) The survey team obtains the ANSF commander's approval of the plan and requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the ANSF commander and survey team commander.
- d) The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the ANSF commander about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does not:
- 1) Make any comment to the host government on possible CF government resources of any kind.
 - 2) Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat, as perceived by the ANSF.
 - 3) Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations.
- e) The survey team analyzes the ANSF unit's status to determine ANSF requirements for advisor assistance. The team:
- 1) Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and/or advisor assistance COAs.
 - 2) Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order of desirability.
 - 3) Determines the unit location and its effects on the populace.
 - 4) Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.
 - 5) Determines the ANSF unit's existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.
 - 6) Determines the compatibility of recommended CF equipment with equipment in the ANSF inventory.
- f) The survey team helps the ANSF unit prepare facilities (training, security, and administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities ANSF has designated for their use during the mission. Any deficiencies that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs need to be identified. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the ANSF commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found.
- g) The survey team commander tentatively recommends the most desirable COAs to the ANSF commander emphasizing how to achieve the desired training and/or

advisor assistance objectives. The survey team commander:

- 1) Ensures the ANSF commander understands the desired COAs are still tentative (contingent on the CF commander's decision).
 - 2) Ensures the higher in-country CF commander is informed of significant findings in the survey of the ANSF unit.
 - 3) Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on advisor team, after obtaining input from the ANSF commander.
- h) The survey team ensures its security at all times, according to the latest threat assessment. The team:
- 1) Fortifies their position (quarters, communications, medical, and command) using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low visibility.
 - 2) Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.
 - 3) Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions according to established ROE and E&R procedures.
 - 4) Maintains communications with all team members outside the immediate area occupied by the team's main body.
- i) Before departing from the AO, the survey team again visits all concerned CF and ANSF staff agencies to clarify any unresolved problem areas.

ANNEX D: Appendix 2

Advisor Team Checklists for HOTO and Assessment of ANSF Unit

Checklist HOTO

Once you have reached your assigned AO, you will most likely start a RIP/TOA schedule which generally doesn't allow for much deviation. As the incoming team, you must be careful to maximize opportunities to learn from your replacements during this time. Observe the outgoing team and learn how their relationships with their ANSF counterpart work. If you are partnered with a coalition unit, understand the roles the ANSF unit will be expected to fill.

Ask lots of questions, but don't question methods until you have walked in their shoes. Remember "there is a reason they are doing what they are doing" your primary consideration is still do no harm. If you are assigned to a new ANSF unit and do not have the opportunity for a RIP/TOA you can still use some of the following tools:

1.1. The operational environment is often diverse, dynamic, and highly volatile. In addition, every area of operation is different and requires an analysis based on political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-people and time (PMESII-PT) that define your area. Understanding these aspects will explain how the ANSF unit operates, define their motivations/perceptions, and can determine ANSF unit effectiveness in the future. Questions for consideration by incoming advisor team include:

- a) **Politics.** What is the dominant political party in your area? Is the government effective at influencing the people? Do the people support? Is there a shadow government in place and are they the source of power? Is there an effective neighborhood action council (NAC) and when/where do they meet? Is the NAC process infiltrated by militia or insurgent sympathies?
- b) **Military.** What ANSF authorities operate in the area? Does the ANSF you advise have jurisdiction? What is the division of labor between civil and military units in your AO? What is the infiltration factor by insurgents and/or militia in the team's assigned ANSF and others in the area? What are the insurgent lines of communications and support? What threats exist and how will they fight your ANSF unit? What coalition units operate in your AO and what can be expected from them?
- c) **Economic.** What is the poverty level of your AO? What is the primary source of income? What criminal activities exploit the AO (racketeering, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, bomb-making)? What collective job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised? What role do your ANSF currently have regarding corruption within the economic arena in the AO? What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?

- d) **Social.** Is there a tribal network in your AO? Who runs the families and tribes? Do the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability, or merely the perception of it? Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and if so, where do they get their support? What is the ethnic breakdown by neighborhood or village? Where do the sectarian fault-lines exist?
- e) **Informational.** Are there any local media in your area? How do the people receive their news? How can I effectively use deception? What is the enemy using to influence information in your area? What is your ANSF doing to promote a positive perception of security? What are ANSF or partnership units doing that detract from promoting a positive perception of security?
- f) **Infrastructure.** What is the current sewage, water, electric, and trash pick-up assessment in your AO? What projects must be supported by your ANSF? What projects require coalition support? What defines your AO—urban or agrarian (what effect does the physical geography have on an insurgency)? What are the road conditions? Are there any political offices, sensitive sites, or otherwise restricted areas?
- g) **People.** Who are the power-brokers within the AO? What civilians are the decision makers (Sheiks, Imams, political leaders, military leaders, teachers, and police)? Are you restricted from interacting with any people in the AO without government approval?
- h) **Time.** Is there a sense of urgency in your AO from the people? How do they view time? What time constraints does your coalition partner unit have? What are the ANSF time constraints?
- i) **Their Legacy.** Finally, your ANSF counterparts will speak of the old team like long lost brothers after their departure. Honor this relationship. They may have thought your predecessors competent or incompetent, but they will usually speak highly of them. Do not speak ill of your predecessors, regardless of your opinion as this will not endear you to your counterparts.

Evaluating Performance of ANSF Units

1.2 When ANSF reach their desired end state at the tactical level, they should be able to:

- a) Provide a reasonable level of security in the AO without infringing on the population's civil liberties.
- b) Be founded upon the rule of law and operate within the law.
- c) Be able to sustain their operations after Coalition Forces depart.
- d) Effective ANSF should also display the following characteristics and capabilities:
 - 1) **Flexible.** A force that is capable of accomplishing the broad missions required by the GIRoA, not just to defeat insurgents or defend against outside aggression, but to increase security in all areas.

2) **Proficient.**

- i) ANSF that is capable of working effectively in close coordination with each other to suppress lawlessness and insurgency.
- ii) ANSF that is tactically and technically proficient, capable of executing their national security mission.
- iii) ANP that is competent in maintaining civil order, enforcing laws, controlling borders, and detaining criminal suspects.
- iv) ANP thoroughly trained with a modern police ethos to include: security procedures, investigation basics, evidence collection, and court and legal procedures.

3) **Self-sustained.** Forces capable of managing their own equipment throughout its lifecycle (procurement to disposal) and conducting administrative support.

4) **Well led.** Leaders at all levels who possess sound professional standards and appropriate military values and are selected for promotion based on competence and merit.

5) **Professional.**

- i) ANSF that is honest, impartial, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population, operating under the rule of law, and respecting human rights.
- ii) ANSF that are loyal to the central government and serve national interests, recognizing their role as servants of the people and not their masters.
- iii) Integrated into Society. A force that is representative of the nation's major ethnic groups and is not seen as the instrument of just one faction

6) These capabilities support the overall campaign design, and evaluations of ANSF capabilities should reflect the ANSF ability to influence the operational environment in a way that reinforces the overall design. Ultimately, the success or failure of an ANSF unit may rest more on its ability to affect the operational environment in general than on its ability to execute specific tasks.

7) While a campaign design is not a function to be accomplished, but rather a living process, the same holds true for an advisor's evaluation of ANSF success. Metrics for evaluating success should and will change as the insurgency adapts and conditions in the AO also shift. An advisor's ability to implement and maintain the "learn and adapt" imperative will lead to more accurate assessments of ANSF.

8) These two basic questions provide a starting point for evaluating ANSF:

- i) Base your evaluations on the goals of the campaign design and ask "to what extent can the ANSF achieve those goals?"
- ii) Keep in mind the maxims "first do no harm" and "no better friend—no worse enemy." To what extent do the ANSF reflect these maxims?

Assessing ANSF Capabilities

1.3 This list is drawn from FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency. It is meant to serve as a guide for advisors to assess how ANSF units are doing, where advisors can help, and what ANSF and advisors should expect from one another. The questions posed here provide a frame of reference to help evaluate the employment of advisors and whether they are helping to adequately develop the ANSF. These questions combine objective and subjective analysis, but to employ them effectively requires the advisor's interpretation and sound judgment.

a) **Leadership.** Are leaders promoted based on demonstrated competence and performance or based on family ties, party membership, or tribal ties?

1) Do leaders seek to develop subordinates?

2) Do leaders care and seek to maintain the welfare of their subordinates?

b) **ANSF Behavior.** Does the unit act corruptly or abuse its power against the public? Does the force treat all members of the public equally regardless of party or tribe? Do ANSF abuse civilians?

c) **Respect for ANSF Doctrine.** Does the advisor team operate according to an "our way is best" approach or does it seek to promote and integrate ANSF doctrine among the force with which it works?

d) **Training Run by Experts.** Are advisors facilitating training in their areas of expertise?

e) **Focus on COIN Operations.** Do the advisors and ANSF understand COIN and focus on COIN operations?

f) **Focus of ANSF Assessment.** Follow on assessments should start by reviewing areas with restricted resources, determining where resources should be committed or redirected, and deciding whether to request additional resources.

g) **Doctrine Uniformity.** Are doctrine and unit structures standard (and understood) across the ANSF?

h) **War fighting Functions.** Do all ANSF (including police) have appropriate capabilities to achieve their mission?

i) **Doctrine Clarity and Comprehensiveness.** Does doctrine provide clear, complete instructions for discipline, acquisitions, and support activities? Do advisor team leaders and ANSF counterparts understand the doctrine and have it available? Is doctrine written at a level that ANSF commanders can understand? Do advisor team leaders and ANSF commanders understand their responsibilities and obligations for detainee operations?

j) **ANSF Diversity.** Do units reflect ethnic/tribal/religious diversity of the AO? Does desertion or any other negative trend particularly affect one group?

k) **ANSF Recruiting Standards.** Are there clear mental, physical, and moral standards for recruits? Are recruiting areas secure? Have recruits been vetted

against blacklists and known insurgent lists?

- l) **Factionalization.** Are there large pockets of former members of a single illegal unit, tribal faction, or other illegal militant faction within a single unit?
- m) **Promotions.** Are ANSF promoted based on a combination of competence, professionalism, and social status? Does the promotion system result in the selection of competent leaders who are culturally accepted?
- n) **Pay and Benefits.** Are pay scales widely available and understood? Does taxing of subordinates or other corrupt practices occur? Is a death notification and benefit structure in place for ANSF killed or who otherwise die in service? Are corrupt individuals dismissed when they engage in corruption?
- o) **Education.** Do all ANSF receive a basic education, job training, and moral values inculcation while they are serving?
- p) **Officer Vetting.** Are all officers vetted to ensure they do not have ties to radical or insurgent organizations?
- q) **NCO Selection.** Are NCOs selected from the best enlisted ANSF?
- r) **Personnel Accountability.** Are personnel accountability systems in place, understood, and enforced? Do ANSF commanders understand the importance of personnel accountability? Do advisor leaders understand the ANSF commander's accountability system and are they capable of tracking it for signs of corruption or widespread disaffection?
- s) **Demobilization Planning.** Have commanders completed plans for demobilization and transition to civilian life for NCOs / officers who are considered a hindrance to the force? Are transition systems in place for ANSF returning to civilian life after completing their enlistments?
- t) **Garrison Services.** Do garrisons provide housing and basic healthcare for commissioned officers, NCOs, and families?
- u) **Trainer Standards.** Are advisors familiar with ANSF organizations, equipment, and weapons? Do they have some familiarity with local languages? Are advisors effective in using interpreters? Can advisors distinguish between cultural practices and excuses? Do advisors use AARs to help ANSF learn?
- v) **Emphasis on COIN.** Are advisors aware of the additional requirements that COIN places on evaluating and training their units? In addition to evaluating soldier skills, are advisors evaluating subjective measures such as loyalty to the local government and the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption?
- w) **Employment of ANSF Trainers.** Do advisors focus on developing competent cadres to conduct training? Do ANSF personnel conduct the majority of training?
- x) **Basic Competencies of ANSF Units.** Does initial training of ANSF focus on COIN related skills such as first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline? Are leaders

trained on tactics such as patrolling and urban operations? Are training systems in place to teach ANSF personnel ROE and the law of armed conflict? Are ANSF units trained to a standard on the following skills:

- 1) Managing their security.
 - 2) Providing effective personnel management.
 - 3) Conducting logistic (planning, maintenance, and movement) operations.
 - 4) Coordinating indirect fires.
 - 5) Providing for effective medical support.
- y) ANSF Unit Leader Evaluation.

1) Are ANSF officers competent in the following skills:

- i) Intelligence collection.
- ii) Day and night patrolling.
- iii) Point security.
- iv) Cordon and search operations.
- v) Operations with ANA/ANP.
- vi) Treatment of detainees and prisoners.
- vii) Psychological operations.

2) Do ANSF officers understand how to:

- i) Work as a team.
- ii) Develop and take advantage of subordinates' skills.
- iii) Train subordinates.
- iv) Maintain discipline and assume responsibility for one's own and one's subordinates' actions.
- v) Understand and enforce ROE.

z) **Armaments.** Are ANSF (including the police) better equipped than the insurgents they face?

aa) **Advisor Integration.** Do advisors live, sleep, and eat with ANSF units? Is segregation kept at an absolute minimum? Do higher level commanders understand the roles and limitations of advisors, i.e., do they treat them as advisors or do they treat them as command team liaisons?

bb) **Employment of Cultural Understanding.** Do advisors effectively use culture to accomplish difficult tasks? Do advisors live up to the following guidelines:

- 1) Learn enough of the language for simple conversation.
- 2) Be subtle and patient with ANSF counterparts; explain the benefits of an action and encourage them to internalize it; respect their rank.

- 3) Act diplomatically in correcting ANSF while praising successes and helping to instill pride in the ANSF unit.
 - 4) Understand the role of an advisor. Make sure the commander makes command decisions, not the advisor.
 - 5) Keep ANSF counterparts informed.
 - 6) Work to train and improve the unit, even in a combat zone; help the commander establish SOPs.
 - 7) Liaise with multinational assets including air support, logistics, civil affairs, and humanitarian teams.
 - 8) Advise on the maintenance of equipment and supplies.
 - 9) Have a thorough knowledge of appropriate ANSF unit tactics and unit security procedures.
 - 10) Use “confidence” missions to assess training.
 - 11) Stay integrated with the unit (e.g., eat their food).
 - 12) Be aware of operations in the immediate area to prevent fratricide.
 - 13) Insist on ANSF adherence to the laws of war and ROE standards for the treatment of civilians, detainees, and captured insurgents while reporting violations.
 - 14) Be objective in reporting on ANSF unit and leader proficiency with special attention to corruption and incompetence.
 - 15) Trust and fight alongside ANSF units while maintaining flexibility and forward thinking to address future problems not addressed in doctrine.
 - 16) Remember that most actions have long-term strategic ramifications.
 - 17) Maintain a proper military bearing and professional manner.
- cc) **Local Police/Military LNOs.** Do police/military LNOs exist and coordinate military and police actions with their counterparts? Is appropriate detainee coordination conducted between the police and military?
- dd) **Police Visibility.** Is police presence felt 24/7?
- ee) **Police Corruption.** Do effective and adequate mechanisms exist to prevent police corruption? Are corrupt police officers dismissed?
- ff) **Police Detainee Operations.** Are police trained on the appropriate handling of detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Are police trained on the provision of security for both detainees and their handlers? Are police trained to effectively interrogate detainees in accordance with human rights laws? Do police have accountability of detainees?
- gg) **Police Support Personnel.** Do police have trained armorers, supply specialists, communications personnel, administrative personnel, and vehicle mechanics in

adequate numbers to accomplish their mission?

hh) **Joint Police/Military Operations.** In joint operations, do the police and military establish common SOPs, conduct supporting IO, perform combined planning, and ensure command and control interoperability?

ANNEX E: Glossary and Acronyms

DEFINITIONS

1. **Advise.** All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit/organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical, operations and strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.
2. **Advisor.** A subject matter expert (SME) who serves with ANSF to advise, assist and counsel their counterparts. Additionally, they observe, evaluate and report on the performance of their assigned unit. While not liaison officers, they communicate with their ISAF superiors and ANSF counterparts to resolve problems and gain confidence. The advisor's primary purpose is to create a professional relationship based on trust that will inspire and influence their counterparts to effective action.
3. **Area of Operations Commander.** The designated ANSF commander in consideration of priority and primacy of management of security and terrain within defined boundaries in close coordination with the ISAF AO support commander.
4. **Area of Operations Support Commander.** The designated ISAF commander within defined ANSF boundaries, who is responsible for unilateral ISAF activity and providing train, advice and assist, and coordinating support forces to the ANSF AO commander
5. **Assist.** Providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so Foreign Security Forces (FSF) can meet objectives and the end state."
6. **Autonomous Units.** Any ANSF unit without an assigned CF unit providing partnering or advising assistance. An autonomous unit should not be mistaken as a unit assessed as "independent with advisors" or capable of Phase IV transition IAW the OPS/TAC directive.
7. **Battle Space Owner (BSO).** The military commander, who has authority for dimension management and ultimate responsibility for the conduct of operations within the CJOA-A. The authority of a BSO is delegated from the higher commander. Commander ISAF is the overall BSO for the CJOA-A until 31 December 2014.
8. **Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) w/ SFA-ATs.** Current construct that has a BCT with attached Advisor Teams formed from another brigade's leadership. One "SFA-AT-provider" brigade can provide purpose-built ATs for multiple BCTs
9. **Command and Control Relationships.**
 - a) **NATO Tactical Command (TACOM).** The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
 - b) **NATO Tactical Control (TACON).** The detailed and usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks

assigned.

c) **NATO Operational Command (OPCOM)**. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Does not include responsibility for administration.

d) **NATO Operational Control (OPCON)**. The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it nor itself include administrative or logistic control.

e) **US Tactical Control (TACON)**. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or command, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

f) **US Operational Control (OPCON)**. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

10. **Corruption**. The misuse of positions of power for personal gain. State institutions normally manage and contain corruption through effective law enforcement and oversight, in conjunction with a vibrant, functioning civil society. Two variations of the term relate to defensive and offensive measures to confront this

challenge.

- a) **Anti-corruption**—defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and organizations to acts of corruption, to include limited response by military and law enforcement entities.
- b) **Counter-corruption**—offensive measures taken to deter, preempt, and eradicate acts of corruption—real or imputed

11. **Dimension Management.** Dimension management describes the function of integration, coordination and synchronization of all operational activities within the designated AO. The dimensions of air, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and information cannot be considered in isolation and must acknowledge the challenge of forces operating across environmental boundaries. Good command and control across all dimensions is essential for the safe conduct of operations.

12. **Embedded.** SFA ATs that will live within or adjacent to an ANSF compound, even in remote areas and interact with the ANSF unit on a persistent basis. Force Protection and support is paramount for these teams and there must be specifically designed local solutions for the ATs. A “COP within a COP” must be constructed for each team that is embedded. A “COP within a COP” is a construct of a Coalition life support area either within existing Tactical Infrastructure (TI) or Adjacent to TI.

13. **Enable.** Provision of support beyond the capabilities of the security forces. Such critical support is provided by other forces and may include close air support, rotary wing CASEVAC, ISTAR, etc.

14. **ISAF Battlespace Owner (BSO).** The military commander, and associated headquarters, which has authority in battle space management and ultimate responsibility for the conduct of operations within a designated area (OPS/TAC Directive). The authority of a battlespace owner is delegated from the higher commander. The ISAF BSO is normally the Regional Command (RC) or brigade commander, but may be delegated as low as battalion level. BSO hold primary responsibility for ensuring that ANSF transitions into the lead.

15. **Kandak.** Afghan name for ANA Battalion-equivalent unit

16. **Key Leader Engagement (KLE)** is the deliberate, planned and focused interaction with an Afghan key leader in order to achieve a desired effect or outcome. Above all, successful KLE is a prerequisite to successful Strategic Partnering, which is the principal tool in ISAF’s efforts to build capacity and capability within GIROA and the ANSF.

17. **Levels of SFA supporting forces.** Refers to when Coalition units continually advise and assist ANSF units on a daily basis either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity.

- a) **Level 1 SFA.** CF units that provide direct supporting forces will be supporting only one ANSF unit. Direct supporting forces are seen as the most desirable

approach and provide the best conditions for ANSF development.

b) **Level 2 SFA.** CF units that provide support according to request. This refers to when CF units advise and assist on a less frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure the continued development of ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat, and Coalition resources. SFA-ATs that provide level 2 contacts may be supporting more than one ANSF unit.

18. **Local Forces – Terms and Definitions.**

a) **Local Defense Forces (LDF).** Host nation (HN) personnel armed and organized as protective forces. This is the overarching category that includes Civilian Self-Defense Security Forces (CSDF) and Local Security Forces (LSF); includes all elements from ALP to militia.

b) **Civilian Self-Defense Forces (CSDF).** Armed host nation personnel sanctioned by GIROA and/or ISAF and organized as part of counterinsurgency (COIN) or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts. CSDF is a sub-set of LDF. This term is from US FID doctrine for Special Forces. Some examples in Afghanistan are Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS).

c) **Local Security Forces (LSF).** Armed, non-insurgent, host nation personnel organized as protective forces. LSF are not sanctioned by GIROA and/or ISAF but are not necessarily anti-GIROA. LSF are a sub-set of LDF. Some examples in Afghanistan are militia, Arbakai and unlicensed Private Security Companies (PSC).

d) **Arbakai.** Village or tribe-based community policing groups comprised of volunteers and vetted by elders. They are formed to remedy temporary specific problems and then dissolved until another issue must be dealt with. These groups can be any size but are generally relatively small and their members retain their original livelihoods or are supported by their communities temporarily. Should they not have the capability to solve the problem, they are able to call upon a larger force known as a Lashkar, which is comprised of men from the village or groups of villages in pursuit of a common interest.

e) **Militias.** An illegal armed group, loyal to a leader, and not necessarily indigenous to the villages they protect. Militias are not sanctioned by GIROA or ISAF (although they may be loyal to individual GIROA officials). These groups may have origins in the Soviet occupation and have sustained their identity ever since. Militias vary in size up to thousands of members. Militia members are full time fighters who need income to survive. Unless the militia has a patron/leader who can fund them, they will evolve into criminal organizations to satisfy the need to generate income. As they are often not indigenous, the militias have no stake in local security and commonly engage in extortion and harassment of local villagers. Some militias also receive support and funding from

foreign countries.

f) **Afghan Local Police (ALP)**. The Afghan Local Police is an official GIROA program, established through an Afghan Presidential Decree signed 16 Aug 10. The program empowers Afghan locals to protect their villages, through ISAF partnering and with formal command and control through the GIROA Ministry of Interior (MoI) with the oversight of Districts Chiefs of Police (DCoPs). The ALP program follows the Afghan traditional system of justice and security in communities by formalizing the empowerment of villagers into an organized community watch model. ALP guardians are equipped with distinctive uniforms and marked vehicles.

g) **Village Stability Operation (VSO)**. Used to describe the placement of a special operations team in a village to conduct operations to enhance security, development, and governance. The teams live in a house or compound in or near the village, providing a persistent presence that gives the population nearly continuous access to the team and vice versa. Not all VSO will result in the establishment of ALP.

h) **Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF)**. GIROA stated-owned security service provider intended to protect people, infrastructure, facilities and construction projects. The APPF does not have a police mandate to investigate crime or arrest suspects. APPF personnel receive pay and funding through MoI and from the entity that contracts for the security.

i) **Private Security Companies (PSC)**. A legal entity established by an Afghan citizen or in partnership with a foreign natural person or legal entity and which is a registered business and licensed in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan to provide security services. MOI has licensing authority, but not all PSC are licensed. Licensed PSC are an example of GIROA approved LDF, while unlicensed PSC are an example of LSF. Training for PSC is determined by the terms of the various contracts based on the nature of the security mission.

19. **Military Advisor Team (MAT)**. MATs deploy to the CJOA-A to advise and assist the ANA, provide the conduit for liaison and C2, and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANA unit to which they are aligned to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent and professional ANA capable of autonomous operations.

20. **Mentoring**. Is an action between individuals by which the mentor teaches, guides, and advises the other, with the shared goal of building capacity and capability.

21. **Operations Coordination Center (OCC)**. The OCCs Regional and Provincial (OCC-R/P) are responsible for the co-ordination of both security operations and civil response to developing situations in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). For the foreseeable future the primary focus of OCC activities will be directed toward the co-ordination of security operations OCC-Rs function as

regional joint information coordination center while OCC-Ps function as a provincial joint information coordination center.

22. Operations Coordination Center Advisor Teams (OCCATs). OCCATs deploy to the Combined Joint Operations Area – Afghanistan to advise and assist the OCC Regional and Provincial (OCC R/P); provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational coordination in the area of operations in order to facilitate development of a coherent security coordination structure.

23. Partner. Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both NATO and HN security forces. As an HN security force's capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN security force conducts more autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate.

24. Partnering. Partnering involves a unit relationship that spans combined training, planning, and operations. A Geospatial partner is an experienced Geospatial Subject Matter Expert who collaborates with Afghan Geospatial counterparts located in the same battle space in order to achieve operational goals and mission specific tasks. This role is essential to supporting ISAF-ANSF partnered operations and reaching transition objectives.

25. Partner Unit (PU). A partner unit is a maneuver/combat support unit that is co-located with or in close proximity to their Afghan counterpart for planning and conducting operations. They are the cornerstone of the SFA effort. Unit partnerships do not replace advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst ANSF, advisors and the partner unit. Partner units should look to the advisor to identify, shape and facilitate operational partnering objectives and training events. Advisors support US, coalition and partner unit objective, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. Therefore, some level of advisor skills training should be included in the partner unit training program if those units will be conducting SFA activities. Advising requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same SFA goals.

26. Police Advisor Team (PAT). PATs deploy to the Combined Joint Operations Area - Afghanistan to advise the ANP, provide the conduit for liaison and command and control, and when required, support the operational planning and employment of the ANP unit to which they are aligned in order to support the development of a self-sufficient, competent and professional ANP capable of maintaining public order, security and rule of law.

27. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are national entities. PRTs assist in reconstruction, development, governance, and security sector reform efforts. Nested as part of the transition process, the PRT will gradually evolve its

focus from providing direct delivery services to increasing Afghanistan's capability for effective governance and development by building the capacity of sub-national institutions. A PRT will phase out by the time their province exits transition, unless the PRT nation has otherwise made a bi-lateral agreement with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). PRTs and their nations interact with Afghan sub-national officials, UNAMA, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) Office, European Union Police (EUPOL), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations, and Civil Society. Most PRTs report directly to their Embassies and national capitals. In most cases, the military and civilian components of PRTs coordinate with Regional Commanders and Regional SCRs. At the theater-strategic level, the NATO SCR coordinates with the Embassies in Kabul and with HQ ISAF to ensure the civil-military integration of the PRT effort.

28. **Rule of Law (RoL).** Principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself is accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated and which are consistent with international human right principles.

29. **Security Force Assistance (SFA).** Unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security Force Assistance encompasses all IJC actions to develop ANSF operational effectiveness and includes partnering and advising.

a) **Level 1 SFA.** Term refers to when Coalition units continually advise and assist ANSF units on a daily basis either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity. This can also apply to partnering – key is that the SFA is continuous. Seen as the most desirable approach and provides the best conditions for ANSF development.

b) **Level 2 SFA.** Term refers to when Coalition units advise and assist on a less frequent basis (determined by Commanders) to ensure the continued development of the ANSF units. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to the ANSF unit, the capability of the ANSF unit, threat, and Coalition resources. Type 2 methodology will become the acceptable approach as ANSF kandaks (and later brigades) are assessed as “independent with advisors” and ready to assume full security responsibility and authority to become battle space owners.

30. **SFA Brigade (SFAB).** A brigade specifically tailored by the Regional Commander to conduct SFA and provide enabler support given a particular environment (threat, ANSF capability, and degree of governance). Brigade serves as a Battle space owner, partner on multiple levels, and provider of SFA ATs to develop ANSF and enabler support for their assumption of lead security responsibility.

31. **SFA Advisor Team (SFA-AT).** The SFA advisor team (SFA AT) construct that consists of Police Advisor Teams (PATs), Military Advisor Teams (MATs), Operations Coordination Centers Advisor Teams (OCC-ATs), and Ministry Advisors in context to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), their supporting institutions,

and the ISAF Headquarters. Advisor teams operate under the C2 of the coalition battle space owner and have the capability to provide direct access to coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical evacuation, and intelligence.

32. **Train.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

ACRONYMS

AACP	Afghan Anti-Crime Police
AAF	Afghanistan Air Forces
AAR	After Action Review
ABP	Afghan Border Police
ACP	Afghan Customs Police
AFG	Afghanistan
AGFC	Afghan Ground Forces Command
AGO	Attorney General's Office
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ALSA	Air Land Sea Application Center
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan Civil order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Forces
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
AT	Advisor Team
ATP	Advanced Tactical Practitioner
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BAF	Bagram Airfield
BATNA	Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDE	Brigade
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
BSO	Battle Space Owner
C2	Command and Control
CF	Coalitional Forces
CIVCAS	Civilian Casualties

CJOA-A	Combined Joined Operations Area-Afghanistan
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CLS	Combat Lifesaver Course
CN	Counter Narcotics
CNPA	Counter Narcotic Police of Afghanistan
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COTR	Contracting Officer Technical Representative
CQB	Close Quarters Battle
CRM	Composite Risk Management
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command - AFG (former OSC-A)
CT	Combined Team
CTC	Combat Training Center
CUAT	Commander's Unit Assessment Tool
DCoP	Districts Chief of Police
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authority
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Training, Organizaion, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
E&R	Evasion and Recovery
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPM	Embedded Police Mentor
ETT	Embedded Training Team - Non-Afghan Trainers/Advisors Attached To ANA Unit (Usually USA)
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EvBO	Evidence Based Operations
EXSUM	Executive Summary
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOC	Force Operating Capabilities
FP	Force Protection
FSF	Foreign Security Forces
GA	Guardian Angel
GDPSU	General Directorate Police Special Units
GFC	Ground Force Command
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HN	Host Nation

HOTO	Hand Over Take Over
HRC	High Risk of Capture
HRI	High Risk of Isolation
HSSB	Headquarters Security and Support Brigade
HTT	Human Terrain Team
IBSO	ISAF Battle Space Owner
IC	International Community
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
INS	Insurgent(s)
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force In Afghanistan
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target, Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
IT	Insider Threat
ITPM	Insider Threat Prevention Model
ITT	In-Theatre Training
JADL	Joint Advanced Distributed Learning
JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JFCBS	Joint Forces Command Brunssum
JRSOI	Joint Reception, Staging, Onward-movement, and Integration
KAIA	Kabul Afghanistan International Airport
KAF	Kandahar Airfield
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
KSA	Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities
LI	Lessons Identified
LL	Lessons Learned
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MAG	Ministerial Advisor Group
MAT	Military Advisor Team
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
METL	Mission Essential Task List
METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, Civil considerations
MoD	Ministry of Defense

MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MOP	Measures of Performance
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSF-AT	Mobile Strike Force Advisor Team
MRX	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
NAC	Neighborhood Action Council
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NMCC	National Military Coordination Center
NSOCC-A	NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OCC	Operations Coordination Center
OCC-AT	Operations Coordination Center Advisor Teams
OCC-D	Operations Coordination Center-District
OCC-P	Operations Coordination Center-Provincial
OCC-R	Operations Coordination Center-Regional
ODA or ODB	Operational Detachment, Alpha (Bravo) (SOF unit)
OE	Operational Environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORD	Operation Orders
OTERA	Organizing, Training, Equipping, Rebuilding, and Advising
PA	Physician's Assistant
PAK	Pakistan
PAKMIL	Pakistan Military
PAT	Police Advisor Team
PCOP	Provincial Chief of Police
PDSS	Pre Deployment Site Survey
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, People, and Time
PN	Partner Nations
POI	Program of Instruction
PPE	Personal Protection Equipment

PSD	Personal Security Detail
PU	Partnered Unit
QRD	Quick Reaction Drill
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RC	Regional Command
RCIED	Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RFI	Request for Information
RIP/TOA	Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
RSOI	Reception Staging and Onward Integration
SA	Situational Awareness
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transition
SAV	Staff Assistance Visit
SC	Supreme Court
SCO	Security Cooperation Officer
SERE	Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (and Extraction)
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFA-AT	Security Force Assistance-Advisor Team
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOFA	Status-of-Forces Agreement
SOJTF-A	Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSA	Security Sector Assistance
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SVTC	Secure Video Teleconference
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TAA	Train, Advise, and Assist
TACON	Tactical Control
TCCC/T3C	Tactical Combat Casualty Care
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TPOR	Transition Provincial Outlook Report
TSU	Transition Support Unit
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
VSO	Village Stability Operation

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"SFA is a mindset requiring a fundamental change in how we operate and is the method ISAF will utilize to transition into, and maintain ANSF's lead for the security of Afghanistan."

GENERAL J.F. DUNFORD, JR. USMC
Commander ISAF
Kabul, Afghanistan



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