


**IDC Weekly Security Narrative: Week of 27 SEP – 03 OCT 2010****RC – NORTH:****1. General Assessment of RC-N AOR**

The number of enemy initiated events in RC-N decreased slightly (14 events this week versus 20 last week) when compared to the previous reporting period. RC-N had seen a steady rise in enemy initiated activity over the last several weeks, but this week saw a continued decrease in the number and intensity of incidents. This may be due in part to insurgents exhausting short-term supplies by increasing their activity so dramatically on 18 SEP in order to disrupt the elections. Still, insurgents were able to conduct several somewhat significant direct fire attacks on CF units, especially in the Baghlan – Kunduz Corridor.

Once again, over half these events (8) occurred in the so-called BAGHLAN-KUNDUZ Corridor (the main routes connecting Pul-e Khumri and Kunduz cities). This is the most historically active area in RC-N, though western FARYAB Province (especially QAISER District) remains very active, even with a significant drop in events (just under a quarter of all events in the north took place in this area of FARYAB). BALKH Province experienced three events, including one very crude attempt at surface to air fire.

Insurgents seem to have returned to their favored tactic of direct fire over IED attacks (though several IEDs were found across the north). These direct fire attacks have increased in intensity and effectiveness to some extent. These are concentrated in the BAGHLAN – KUNDUZ Corridor (especially in the districts of PUL-E KHUMRI, IMAM SAHIB and KUNDUZ). While the numbers of attacks in RC-North have decreased significantly from the levels seen just a few weeks ago, there is no indication that insurgents are willing to give up on the influence they have achieved (particularly in the KUNDUZ area).



Graph 1: This graph shows the number and types of attacks by day from 27 SEP – 03 OCT 2010

Significant Events:

27 SEP

SAF and RPG against CF unit IVO IMAM SAHIB, IMAM SAHIB District.

At 27 1659 SEP 10 a CF platoon was attacked with SAF and RPG fire while conducting a patrol north of CHATAL. About five INS were engaged in a short fire fight but retreated due north after a few minutes and the patrol resumed their mission at 27 1715 SEP 10. No casualties or damages were reported. The area north of IMAM SAHIB is known to be an INS stronghold which the INS have secured with multiple IED on access routes and prepared ambush positions. The area is of great importance for the INS as a cross border sanctuary containing supply lines, caches and rest areas.

28 SEP

IED strike against ISAF patrol.

A vehicle of B Btry, 3-6 FA was hit by an IED near KAFTAR KHAN Village 30 km W of PRT MMN. Three (3) ISAF Soldiers were WIA (CAT A) and brought to PRT MMN within 48 minutes. No further casualties or damages were reported. NFI.

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INS attack against ISAF on PUL-E KHUMRI to KUNDUZ HWY.

At 28 2037 SEP 10, a CF supply platoon struck an IED approximately ten KM north of Sahr-e Kohnah. Following the IED strike, INS fired SAF and RPGs at the convoy. The IED disabled one vehicle. At 28 2043 SEP 10, the platoon declared troops in contact (TIC). 10-20 INS engaged the convoy from 400-500 meters to the west of the IED strike. At 28 2046 SEP 10, platoon attempted to recover the disabled vehicle with a wrecker.

At 28 2054 SEP 10, the disabled vehicle's two rear tires are destroyed. No casualties from the IED strike or SAF. At 28 2133 SEP 10, the platoon recovered the vehicle, but had trouble keeping the vehicle hooked up to recovery assets.

At 28 2258 SEP 10, the platoon reconfigured the disabled vehicle and continued to move. At 29 0010 SEP 10, the platoon arrived at OP North. Aircraft escorts conducted a show of force in the vicinity of OP North.

29 SEP

INS attack against ISAF near MAIMANAH.

An ISAF patrol received SAF 30 km NNW of Maimanah and returned fire. Two INS KIA and three WIA were reported. After the situation calmed down, the unit conducted a BDA but could not confirm any casualties.

INS attack against ISAF near SHEBERGAN.

A joint, mounted patrol was attacked with SAF 37 km W of SHEBERGAN and requested CAS.

IED found west of MAZAR-E SHARIF.

A possible IED (7 old mortar rounds) was found 31 km W of Mazar-e Sharif. A Swedish IEDD-team disposed of the possible IED.

INS attack against ISAF near MAIMANAH.

PRT MMN reported an INS attack 38 km N of Maimanah from two enemy positions. No need for additional support. No casualties or damage.

30 SEP

INS attack against ISAF near MAZAR-E SHARIF.

At 30 1500 it was reported an INS attack of SAFIRE 1 mile W of Mazar-e Sharif. An RPG airburst was observed below a C-160 on final approach.

INS attack against ISAF near PUL-E KHUMRI.

Furthermore, at 30 2235 TF Baghlan-e Jadid reported an INS attack 14 km N of Pul-e Khumri. A convoy received RPG and SAF from both sides of the Pul-e Khumri to Kunduz HWY. No own casualties, minor damages to vehicles.

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01 OCT

INS attack against ISAF near KUNDUZ.

On 1st OCT a unit of TF Kunduz received direct fire 8 km W of Kunduz City during an operation in CHAHAR DARAH District, and engaged INS positions with SAF. One INS was KIA. No own casualties or damage were reported.

02 OCT

CF unit finds IED near MAZAR-E SHARIF.

At 02 0645, a CF unit reported that during a joint search operation that the ANA unit with them had discovered an IED 31 km W of Mazar-e Sharif. A Swedish IEDD team was sent to the scene IOT handled the IED on site.

03 OCT

CF unit finds UXO near KUNDUZ.

At 03 1506 OCT a CF platoon and their ANP partners responded to a report of UXO found (RPG round) 12 km N of Kunduz City.

CF unit attacked with SAF/RPG IVO KUNDUZ.

A CF platoon was engaged with SAF and 1xRPG round by INS 7 km West of Kunduz City. ANP returned fire where the INS fire came from and INS broke contact. CF did not fire because they could not gain positive identification on INS location.

CF unit attacked with SAF in PUL-E KHUMRI.

A patrol from a US engineer unit was attacked at 03 0020 OCT IVO CHESMA-I-SHER Village, DAHANAH-YE GHORI District along the Baghlan – Kunduz HWY. PRT Pul-e Khumri was alerted for assistance. The engagement resulted in three soldiers WIA and a vehicle damaged. The wounded soldiers were evacuated to the KUNDUZ hospital in 48 minutes. One of the wounded soldiers died of his wounds.

RC – WEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-W AOR

In BADGHIS Province, INS activity is focused in BALA MORGHAB area around the security bubble, with DF being the most common type of event. In MUQUR District INS are using a hit and run tactic against FF/ANSF check points. In DARREH-I BUM Village, INS are attacking the Arbakai in a similar manner, avoiding direct engagement.

The insurgent leadership within FARAH Province is currently undergoing reorganization. However, this has not diminished insurgent capabilities as IED

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emplacement coupled with SAF and IDF (that is, a coordinated use of these capabilities) is a common tactic in FARAH.

In GHOR Province the usual stable situation is being disrupted by IED emplacement and direct attacks against ANSF/FF performed by power broker groups and insurgents, as happened in CHAGHCHARAN. In addition, tribal/ethnic conflict will as well hamper the security situation of the area.

In HERAT Province, insurgent activity was lower than in the previous week. It seems the lull in insurgent activity that followed the elections has continued. However, the best description of activity during the last several days is a normal level of activity. The level of activity has returned that which was in place in HERAT prior to the elections.


Most of the events were recorded again in SHINDAND District, where a variety of activity happened, but mainly IED activity (either emplacement, or ordnance found that was likely to be exploited for IED assembly). In addition, there may be another suicide bomber present in SHINDAND District. Neighboring FARSI experienced another event (abduction of Anti-Terrorism ANP Chief) that may be INS related and that would be the second event in two weeks in an area where nothing significant happened for a very long time.

INS have restarted their activity against logistic convoys in SABZAK pass area, this time slightly more to the west like as was the case in a majority of events in 2010, IVO and west of GHORUMBAAW Village. It seems that INS groups are augmenting their ability day by day, and latest reports indicate that already between 20 and 30 individuals can muster for attacks in this area. The situation in both KUSHK and KUSHK-E KOHNAH in the north have calmed down after a very active week and INS have reassumed their usual level of operations of previous months (that is, a couple of SIGACTS per week). However, their presence and influence in the area remains significant.

One IDF event happened in HERAT City, possibly related to the IDF threat present during the last days of pre-election period (reported presence of 5 BM-1 rockets). The point of origin was near the city center, pointing out that INS are able to penetrate the security of the city, but were likely unable to so during the election period.

In addition, the presence of suicide bombers has been reported again. In other districts, some INS groups are present in PASHTUN ZARGHUN / OBEH /ADRASKAN border areas, possibly with foreign elements. It seems that local INS in OBEH are acting among local populace more often than they used to. In addition, there are reports about SAYED MIRZA planning activity gathered.

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Graph 2: This graph shows the number and types of attacks by date from 27 SEP – 03 OCT 2010

27 SEP

Attack on SUPREME convoy in SABZAK area, KARUKH District: A TF Central unit detached to SABZAK PASS was informed by the ANA platoon CDR about INS presence IVO GHOROMBAW village. As reported by ANA, on 27 0530 SEP 10, a civilian convoy (5 fuel trucks), travelling from QAL'EH-YE NAW to HERAT, was attacked by a group of INS (about 20) that used RPGs and AK – 47 to hit the vehicles. Contractors, who were escorting the convoy, suffered 3xKIA, 2xWIA and one vehicle burnt. In addition, US forces, travelling the same route with approx. 100 vehicles convoy in the opposite direction a few hours later, reported that the attack happened in Sabzak Pass just west of GHOROMBAW village. According to them, 5 drivers were injured but is still unknown the extent of injuries; also 1 vehicle was burnt. The convoy continued movement.



Photo of one of the civilian trucks burned in the Sabzak Pass area.

INS attack CF Base IVO SANGATESH Village, MUQUR District: At 26 1604 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that a CF base in SANGATESH was receiving machine gun burst from the west. The CF unit responded to the fire with 12.7MM fire. At 1605, a TIC was declared. At 1650, the enemy fire had ended.

INS attack CF Base IVO LUDINA Village, MUQUR District: At 27 1423 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that a CF base started receiving machine gun and RPF fire from NW heights. One of the RPG dropped close to the perimeter of the FOB (10 m.) They returned fire towards the origin of the enemy fire and a TIC was declared. At 1439, the CF unit performed a ground fire mission using 81mm mortars against enemy. At 1513, fire ceased and the TIC was declared closed.

INS attack on CF unit IVO SINI Village, MURGHAB District: At 27 1053 SEP 10, CF reported that one of their observation posts started receiving SAF and RPG fire. They returned fire and CAS and mortar fire missions were requested. At 1110 TF NORTH performed 1x120mm HE mortar shot and the enemy broke contact.

RC-IED found IVO FARAH City: A CF unit reported that, at 1117, NDS found an IED in a culvert on the right side of RTE 517. NDS cordoned and secured the area and alerted a CF EOD Team. At 1207 the NDS Chief reported that the IED was removed and brought to the NDS compound. The IED was confirmed to be a RCIED consisting of: 5-gallon jug with 40lbs of ammonium nitrate, orange det. cord, improvised blasting cap, RFT-2 receiver and a 12V motorcycle battery. The emplacement of the IED cannot be confirmed because it was removed prior to EOD arrival.

Possible demonstration in CHAGHCHARAN City: Shopkeepers protested the lack of roads and, as a result, closed bakeries and pharmacies. The situation is

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out of the control of the chief of urban development department. The shopkeepers threatened that until some real action will be taken or they be allowed to speak with GIRoA officials, they will not reopen their shops. On 27 SEP 10 at about 1030 in CHAGHCHARAN, during a security shura in the governor office, a crowd of approx. 50 Afghans gathered outside the office.

INS attack CF patrol on HWY 1, MUQUR District: At 27 1431 SEP 10 a CF unit reported that they started receiving SAF at. The unit returned fire and maneuvered to escape. At 1453, a TIC was declared and 1xB-1B was assigned to provide CAS. By 1505, the enemy broke contact. BDA: 1xVEHICLE damaged moderately.

Complex attack on a COMPASS convoy in GULISTAN. On 27 September, at 1350, a COMPASS convoy was ambushed at POLI JANJALI, on HWY1. The ambush was by approximately 20-25 INS using an IED and SAF/PKM. When the convoy was passing POLI JANJALI, the INS initiated the contact by detonating an IED that did not hit any vehicle of the convoy. They followed up with SAF from the mountains' summit to the East of the MSR. No casualties were reported, only partial damage to vehicles.

28 SEP

SAF against an ANCOP colonel in ADRASKAN District: On Tuesday 28th September 2010, at 1000, LTC. RASOOL, A-NTC Deputy CDR, left his home in ANDRASKAN with his bodyguard ZAHAR and his driver ABDUL KHALEQ on an ANP Ford pick up Ranger. They had two AK 47 and they were directed to SAD MANI where Col. RASOOL was going to attend a relative's wedding. The route from Col. RASOOL house to the wedding place it is about 10 km and it takes from 15 up to 20 min. and is the only way to reach that place. At 1215 Col. RASOOL decided to leave the wedding and he brought on his vehicle also 2 of his children (aged 12 and 4). So, on his vehicle there were the driver, the Colonel, sitting near him, the 2 children in the back seat and his bodyguard with his AK 47 in the back of the pick up. When they were going to reach GALEH TOT, on the left, he spotted a "shrain" and close to it there was what he thought to be a Sheppard covered with a blanket. While they were getting closer to the Sheppard he took off the blanket and pointed to the vehicle an RPG. Immediately the bodyguard fired his AK 47 at the man with the RPG. The man with the RPG fired the rocket towards the ANP vehicle but he missed it. The bodyguard kept shooting him without hitting him and he ran away hiding in a little valley on the right side of the road. While this was happening, from the right side of the road another insurgent, dressed in black, started to shoot to the vehicle with a PKM. Col. RASOOL and his bodyguard returned fire to him without hitting him and he escaped on a hill leaving the PKM on the ground. At this stage a Col. RASOOL's relative arrived on the spot with a motorbike. But they were sure that the man with the PKM was not seen escaping and he was still around. When Security Platoon from A-NTC and ANP from Shindand arrived on the spot they cordoned

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an area where there were some houses and where the man that was shooting with the PKM was supposed to be hidden. They found in one of these houses a man with the same clothes and boots of the PKM's shooter. He was arrested. Right now he is detained in ANDRASKAN Police Station IOT be interviewed.

INS attack CF base IVO LUDINA Village, MUQUR district: At

28 1145 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that a CF unit started receiving harassment with RPG and small arms fire (PK) from W and SW origins. 4xRPG were shot from W heights and hit near the NW corner of the compound perimeter. At 1131 hours the CF unit reported they received small arms fire from SW direction.

IED strike IVO CF base, MUQUR District: At 28 1300 SEP 10, a CF unit reported that an ANA vehicle suffered an IED strike. Two ANA soldier were injured in the explosion and were brought to a nearby CF base. 1xANA WIA was MEDEVAC. IED could have been a remote control.

UXO found outside CF base, BALA BOLUK DT. TF SOUTH reported that, at 1220, 1x107mm rocket was found out of the perimeter of FOB BALA BOLUK.

TIC declared after IDF attacks against CF Unit. CF unit reported that, at 1109, CHIN-E FARCI patrol base received a rocket attack. Probable point of origin 300 meters northeast the base, in direction of FAYZABAD VILLAGE. Possible observers were seen approx. 300 m. North of their position; quick analysis of the crater indicated that the rocket came from the vicinity of FAYZABAND Village. At 1315 reported that 1xmortar round landed 150m south and started receiving SAF from CHARMAS/CHAPAK Village. 2xF-15 were launched to support the maneuver. UNK personnel was seen carrying possible mortar tubes. At 1405 all contact had ceased. The ANP had left a weapon in CHAPAK Village, but the ANA refused to go into the village to get the weapon because of a large group of people massing North-East of their location.

29 SEP

IED BLAST & SAF attack in KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: A CF unit reported that, at 29 1115 SEP 10, a motorcycle VBIED exploded against a fuel convoy and after that convoy was engaged wit SAF by UNK number of INS in. No casualties were reported; ABP secured area and ANA/ABP questioned locals to gather information. According to the chief of police, the IED and SAF was aimed at the chief of security and sub governor while they were moving down HWY-8 through the bazaar.

ABP agents captured and killed along HWY 1, MURGHAB District: According to CF unit, at 29 1030 SEP 10, 2xABP agents, that were posted in GOLIJIRAK CP, were stopped by UNK number of INS. The policemen were driving to the hospital because one of them was sick while they were stopped by an illegal

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checkpoint between GOLOJIRAK and Qaleh Naw. When INS discovered they were AB policemen, they were killed. Their bodies have been moved to Qaleh Naw. This event is unconfirmed. According to TF BADGHIS sources 2 ABP, could have been killed by insurgents in the vicinity of ABP CP. One ABP could have been beheaded.

ABP agents killed in MANGAN Village, MURGHAB District: According to OCCR, at 29 0830 SEP 10, the bodies of 2xKIA ABP soldiers belonging to the ABP CP MANGAN were found in the road. They had died of gun shot wounds. The policemen had gone to perform a water resupply mission for the CP. The bodies were recovered and taken to the CP MANGAN, and afterwards to Qaleh Naw.

AHMAD NOOR MONJI has been kidnapped by men of MOLA NAJEEBULLAH: Today at 1700 AHMAD NOOR MONJI, TAYWARAH District DM, has been kidnapped by men of MOLA NAJEEBULLAH, an INS commander.

INS attack CF base IVO LUDINA, MUQUR District: At 29 1745 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that a CF unit started receiving machine gun bursts from North-Eastern heights. TIC was declared. At 1801, declared the TIC over.

IED found in ZEERKOH Valley: On 28 SEP 10, USSOF detached to SANOWGHAN SAFE HOUSE was informed by Arbakai about a possible IED presence in SANOWGHAN area, ZEERKHO valley IVO their check point. As reported by the Commander of the checkpoint, the ordnance was emplaced 200 meters south direction from their position.

30 SEP

INS attack CF base IVO LUDINA, MUQUR District: At 30 0906 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that at 0855 CF unit reported there was a suspicious group composed of 12 PAX in a close north-eastern river bed (Pistachios Valley). At 0900 the CF unit reported that their case was suffering harassment with machine gun (PK) and RPG fire (at least two strikes) from a river bed in the south-east (Ruins Valley). After that, TIC was declared. Positive identification from the probable origins of fire in the Ruins Valley and responded with light and heavy machine gun (7,62 mm and 12,7 mm) and 81 mm mortar fire (1 HE).

Explosion in DUKIN school, PUSHT-E ROD District: CF unit reported that, at 1020, a school in DUKIN Village was blown up by INS during .

Complex attack with IDF, IED strike and SAF in PUSHT-E ROD: A CF unit reported an attack as following: at 1235 saw a group of LN shooting mortars and loading another one. A platoon moved towards the launching location and CAS was requested. In the meantime, the platoon reported that 1xvehicle suffered an IED strike, very close to the area in which LN were preparing mortar tubes. NO

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casualties were reported in the IED blast and QRF was sent on the spot. Some minutes later, in the same point of IED strike, ANA, ANP and ISAF platoon started receiving SAF; ISAF moved towards SAF point of origin.

US Vehicle struck in an IED: At 30 1444 SEP 10, an IED hit the first US RCP (Road Clearance Package) vehicle of TF Southeast convoy moving from BAKWAH to DELARAM. The vehicle was seriously damaged, the engine was completely destroyed, IVO Mullah NAWAB NIKEH. No WIA no KIA were reported.

PPIED found in BALA BOLUK, IVO CF base: At 0958, CF unit reported that yesterday ANP found a possible PPIED. ANP secured it overnight and CF investigated and confirmed it was a PPIED. PSD (Personal Security Detachment) escorted EOD to SHEWAN Garrison where they linked up with another platoon and escorted EOD team to PPIED location. EOD team confirmed and recovered the IED that consisted in 1XPressure Plate with 30 Lbs of ammonium nitrate aluminum.

PPIED found in PUSHT-E ROD: At 1158 CF unit reported that, at 1158, a PPIED was found. ANA cordoned the area and noticed wires sticking out of the ground.

IED found IVO AZIZ ABAD Village, SHINDAND District: On 30 1640 SEP 10, USSOF informed TF – Central about a possible IED presence 5 km south of AZIZ ABAD Village along HWY 1. ODA received the information by a LN who noticed two people working near a culvert. After the two suspicious people left the site, the LN checked inside the culvert and found a bag. CF searched the area and found, covered by dirt, a yellow plastic jug (10 litres) filled with HME.

INS attack CF Base IVO LUDINA Village, MUQUR District: At 30 1603 SEP 10, TF BADGHIS reported that CF base started receiving machine gun bursts (PKM) from a point of origin in Pistachios' valley. Fire was returned with HMG fire (12,7mm). At 1605, the fire had ceased.

INS activities in TAYWARAH District: On 30 1600 SEP 2010 in TAYWARAH DT, SARPANAK Village unknown number of INS abducted ambulance vehicle which belongs to TAYWARAH hospital. Driver and two midwives were kidnapped also, later midwives were released. Abducted vehicle INS took to KO YAN Village.

01 OCT

ANP agent kidnapped in MUQUR District: According to PRT sources an ANP was kidnapped by INS on 29 SEP 10. The policeman is called DUST MOHAMAD, son of MOHAMAD HASSAN, native of Qaleh Naw and posted to ANP post in JOLOGIRAK. He was kidnapped by Mullah BARAN when he was

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travelling in a public transport vehicle from JOLOGIRAK to Qaleh Naw. The INS stopped the taxi where he was travelling and caught him. He is held in MOHAMMADZAI.

A mine roller struck in an IED on RTE 515, BAKWAH DT: At 01 1600 OCT 10 1 km West of BOWLAKE TAKANAH (BAKWA District, FARAH Province) along route 515, a TF Southeast convoy consisting of civilian truckers, US RCP was hit by an IED.

BAKWAH shopkeepers threatened: During a dismounted patrol in BAKWAH Bazaar, WALI JAN (a BAKWAH Bazaar shopkeeper - brother of ABDULLAH, the BAKWAH shopkeepers supervisor) said that on 01 OCT, during his journey from BAKWAH BAZAR to BAKHTIAR, a group of TB stopped him. They warned him that if he will not close his shop within 3 days they will behead him. During the conversation he heard that the TB leader of this group is HAFIS. The only two more shopkeepers present in BAKWAH Bazaar confirmed that TB has threatened them in the same way. All of them have the intention to leave BAKWAH Bazaar, because the TB threats.

02 OCT

SAF against DSS YAKA TUT, KUSHK (RABAT-E SANGI) District: CF reported that, at 02 0920 OCT 10, a mounted section suffered SAF from 4 to 5 dismounted INS.

INS attack against a civilian truck in SABZAK pass: TF CENTER reported the following info from ANA at SABZAK PASS: last night (at a unspecified time), a civilian truck was attacked and set on fire by INS. The event happened approx 10 Km North of SABZAK PASS.

MINE (UXO) found by ANA NIZAM-E SHAHID District: CF reported that, at 02 0930 OCT 10, ANA found a mine, 1 km south of CF base.

Offensive engagement IVO KHARABA-I-KHWAIA Village, JAWAND District: At 02 0640 OCT 10, ISAF Force/ANA received heavy INS SAF from different directions (West and South sides 500 mt. of the KHARABA-I-KHWAJA MURAD Village). Since the INS fire was heavy and continue, ISAF Force/ANA requested fire support of 4x UH-64 and 2 x B1 CAS and kept the situation under control. During the search ANA detained 5 suspected INS and sized RPGs and Ammos of various caliber. Due to heavy direct fire from the INS position and critical situation (2 xWIA ISAF, 2 x WIA ANA and 5 x suspected INS), International Security Force run a "hot extraction" without capability to recover or destroy the above mentioned sized materials. During operation, TGT area was reached by a large number of INS, with the purpose to support the detainees escape from ANA capture. Protective and supporting behavior by LN to the arrested likely because of his position as TB Shadow Governor of JAWAND

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District. In Qaleh Naw airfield, the 5 suspected INS arrested by ANSF were biometrically enrolled by International Security Force and were handed over to NDS personnel.

Abducted NGO WORLD VISION workers, GHOR Province: 30 SEP10 NGO World Vision convoy was stopped by 2-4 armed men dressed in ANP uniforms in SARE SHATIQ Village on the road from CHAHAR SADAH to CHAGHCHARAN. Armed men on motorbikes stopped the convoy and ordered the truck drivers to MORGHAB valley. World Vision convoy consisted of two trucks and four WV officers. 01 OCT 10 abducted WV trucks and personnel were released.

IDF impacted in PUSHT-E ROD: On 02 OCT 2010, at 0923, CF reported that, 1x107mm rocket dropped out of Afghan DHQ.

IDF during an IED emplacement's observation in PUSHT-E ROD DT: On 02 OCT 2010 CF reported that, at 1013, 4-5 unknown personnel were emplacing IEDs on the road. Immediately CF requested a ground fire mission and CF fired 3x120mm mortar rounds. At 1020 suspicious personnel moved in south direction on motorcycles and stopped 2km far from PUSHT-E ROD, where they started to emplace an IED.

Civil convoy ambushed in GULISTAN District: At about 02 1050 OCT 10 CF informed TF Southeast that a civilian convoy moving toward GULISTAN District was ambushed. TB attacked the convoy and killed the security personnel and the drivers (GULISTAN District, FARAH Province). At least 4 LNs KIA.

IED explosion IVO SHINDAND airfield: According to the information reported by ANP Traffic CDR, Col. GHOLAM SAKHI HOSINI, an explosive device detonated under a truck stopped inside the parking lot in front of ANP Traffic HQ on 02 2320 OCT 10. Nobody got injured. ANP Traffic also reported that ANA personnel manning IRENE 10 CP shot some SAF immediately after the explosion. This is the third similar event reported in the same parking lot from the 25 JUL 2010.

03 OCT

IED found IVO SHINDAND DC: On 03 0800 OCT 10, SHINDAND NDS informed TF – Central about a possible IED south of NDS HQ. As reported by NDS personnel, they noticed a battery on the side of the road and the sign that some digging had taken place. TF – C went to the spot. IEDD team approached the site. They found a battery and a receiver in the indicated place and a plastic jug (10 liters) filled with HME, 2xdetonators and some detonating cord.

IED found in NIZAM-E SHAHID (GUZARAH) District: At 03 0836 OCT 10 A police mentoring team found a possible IED in HERAT firing range. After the investigation, TF CENTER IEDD team reported that it was a fake IED.

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INS attack CF IVO SINI Village, MURGHAB District: At 02 1955 OCT 10, TF NORTH reported that their observation post was engaged with SAF by 3-5 INS. They returned fire. At 2004, the TF NORTH mortar platoon at FOB COLUMBUS fired 2x120 MM ILLUM ROUND in support of TF RAIDER. The fire mission ended at 2015.

RC – SOUTHWEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-SW AOR

In the past seven (7) days, there were two hundred and eighty (280) INS kinetic events in the RC (SW) AO.

There was one IED attack and three IED finds in Reg-e Khan Neshin.

There were four DF attacks, six IED finds, and five detainments in Garm Ser.

There were three IED finds, two IED attacks, one DF attack, one UXO find, and two detainments in Nawa-ye Barakzai.

There were fifty-two DF attacks, ten IED finds, five IED attacks, eight detainments, and three cache finds in Marjeh.

There were two DF attacks, two IED finds, one IED attack, two IDF attacks, and two detainments in Khash Rod.

There were two IED attacks and one IED find in Washer.

There were six IED attacks, four IED finds, three DF attacks, four IDF attacks, one SAFire attack, and two detainments in Musa Qal'ah.

There was one DF attack and one IED find in Kajaki.

There were twenty-one DF attacks, twenty-seven IED finds, seven IED attacks, one DF attack, one SAFire attack, and three cache finds in Sangin.

There were thirty-six DF attacks, four IED attacks, two IED finds, two SAFire attacks, one IDF attack, one cache find, and one detainment in Nahr-e Saraj.

There were sixty DF attacks, three IED finds, and one IED attack in Nad 'Ali.

There were twenty-six DF attacks in Lashkar Gah.

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Direct fire attacks have returned as the preferred insurgent method of attack and composed more than 75% of all events in RC-SW this past week. IED events have decreased significantly over the last two weeks. IED finds were about 12% of all events and IED detonations were only about 5% of all events. There were more than twice as many IED finds than detonations, which is higher than normal (though finds are always higher than detonations in RC-SW). This indicates that insurgents continue to primarily use IEDs in a defensive manner to protect leadership and cache sites. There has not been a noticeable shift towards using IEDs in a more "offensive" manner by combining them with direct fire for complex attacks.




Figure RC-SW 1: These charts show the level of significant events in RC-SW over the last two weeks.

Marjeh District SIGACTs 1800D 20100926 to 1759D 20101003




Figure RC-SW 2: This chart depicts the level of significant events in the Marjeh over the last week.

During the past 24 hours, there were ten INS kinetic events in Marjeh District. There were ten DF attacks, two IED finds, and two detainments.

INS continue to utilize harassing SAF attacks against static and dismounted coalition patrols. The primary means of attack against coalition forces remain to be direct fire. Within the reporting period, IED activity has been centered in block 1 and Karez-e Saidi. Throughout the week, there were two reported IED incidents in southern Marjeh, one IED explosion in block 3, two IED finds in block 1, two IED finds along RTE Elephant leaving block 1, and four IED incidents in Karez-e Saidi. Prior to this, there was an approximate two week period in which there was only one reported IED explosion in Karez-e Saidi. This increase in IED activity may suggest that the insurgent fighters are changing their focus. INS will likely continue to utilize IEDs and SAF in an attempt to disrupt coalition operations and undermine GIRoA's legitimacy.





Figure RC-SW 3: This chart depicts significant events in the Central Helmand River Valley over the last four weeks.

RC – SOUTH:

1. General Assessment of RC-S AOR

27 SEP

KANDAHAR

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High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 17 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were:

17 x direct fire events, four IED detonations, two IEDs found and cleared, two indirect fire attacks and a cache found.

Today's level of activity was average for KANDAHAR.

ZABUL

There was a high level of activity today with 3 kinetic events in the AO.

There was one direct fire attack and one IED found and cleared (in Qalat and Shay Joy respectively). There was also a cache (1 x RPG Launcher, 9 x RPG warheads, 21 x 107 mm rockets and 2 x AT mines).

URUZGAN

There was a moderate level of activity today with 3 events.

There were two IEDs found and cleared and one direct fire event.

28 SEP

KANDARHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 13 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were:

7 x direct fire events resulting in 5 x INS KIA and 1 x ANP WIA.

There were 5 x IED strikes today resulting in 3 x ISAF MIL WIA and 1 x ANP WIA.

There was 1 x SAFIRE event today resulting in no hits or casualties.

ZABUL

There was a low level of activity today with 2 kinetic events in the AO.

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In Qalat district, 3.5 km SE of ANP Headquarters, FF found weapons cache while on patrol.

In Shahjoy District, 1.6 km SW of CP Hasan Karez, FF found 1 x IED.

INS emplaced 4 x IEDs on road north of Jamal Khel village in Shahjoy District.

URUZGAN

There was a low level of activity today with 1 kinetic event.

FF suffered SAF from 3-5 INS at 2.2KM E of COP TABAR. FF engaged 2 x INS carrying 1 x RPG and 1 x AK-47. Contact ceased. FF found nothing on BDA and are continuing clearance operation of DORAFSHAN. No casualties reported.

FF found 2 x VOIED (pressure plates), wires, and batteries at 7.3 KM SW OF CP BAZGIR. ANP BIP'd the device.

29 SEP

KANDAHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 14 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were: 8 x direct fire events resulting in 1 x LN KIA, 2 x ISAF MIL WIA, 1 x ANA WIA and 1 x LN WIA.

There were 4 x IED strikes today resulting in 1 x ISAF MIL WIA and 1 x GBR MIL WIA.

There were 2 x SAFIRE events today resulting in no hits and 2 x INS KIA.

ZABUL

There was a low level of activity today with 2 kinetic events in the AO.

In Shahjoy District, IVO Fob Varner, FF found 1 x IED.

In Tarnakwa Jaldak, IVO CP18B, FF witnessed 3 x INS vehicles (1 x pick-up truck, 2 x jeeps) set up an illegal TCP. FF fired 30mm cannon at the illegal TCP.

URUZGAN

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There was a low level of activity today with 3 kinetic events.

TARIN KOWT. 1 x IED find.

SHAHIDI HASSAS. SAF.

CHORA IVO KALA KALA. CACHE find.

TARIN KOWT IVO PB BUMAN. SAF.

CHORA IVO MASHAL. SAF

30 SEP

KANDAHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 15 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were: 11 x direct/indirect fire events resulting in 1 x CIV WIA (CAT A) who later died of wounds.

There were 4 x IED strikes today resulting in 1 x ISAF MIL KIA, 2 x LN KIA, 2 x ISAF MIL WIA, 1 x ANA WIA and 1 x LN WIA.

ZABUL

There was a low level of activity today with 3 kinetic events in the AO.

In Tarnak wa Jakdak District, IVO FOB VIPER, FF found 3X Russian Mortars without fuses. UXO was taken for safe reduction.

FF received SAF and IDF, IVO Fob Mizan. No casualties reported.

In Shajoy district, FF received 1 x mortar round and 1xRPG round.

URUZGAN

There was a low level of activity today with 1 kinetic event.

FF suffered 1 x IED strike at 2.4 KM SW of FOB DEH RAWOD . No casualties reported and minor damage to the vehicle. The device was confirmed as a VOIED (PRESS) made of a saw blade. C/S will continue mission.

FF discovered possible IED in river bed at 3.5 KM W PB ATIQ. Cordon set and EOD on site.

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01 OCT

KANDAHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 21 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were: 9 x direct fire events, five IED detonations, six IEDs found and cleared and one cache found.

ZABUL

There was a low level of activity today with 3 kinetic events in the AO.

There were two IED detonations (both on HWY 1) and one IED found and cleared.

URUZGAN

There was a moderate level of activity today with 2 kinetic event.

There was one direct fire event and one cache found.

02 OCT

KANDAHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 12 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were: 9 x direct/indirect fire events resulting in 12 x INS KIA and 1 x PSC employee wounded.

There were 3 x IED strikes today resulting in no casualties.

ZABUL

There was a moderate level of activity today with 4 kinetic events in the AO. FF reported IED find followed by INS SAF engagement 10 km SW of FOB Eagle in Tarnak wa Jaldak District.

FOB Lane in Arghandab District received 2 x rockets of IDF. No casualties or damages reported.

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FF found 2 x IED 3.9 km West of FOB Bayloughin Day Chopan District.

FF suffered an IED strike 3.8 km SW COP Al-Masaakin Shah Joy District.

URUZGAN

There was a low level of activity today with 1 kinetic event.

FF located 2 weapons caches at 9 KM SE PB BUMAN. The 1st consisted of 5 x AK-47 MAGs, 1 x grenade (nodet) and a small quantity of 7.62 rds.

The 2nd consisted of 2 x 82mm mortars and 1x rifle. COA C/S with engineer support conducted a pull then BIP of the 82mm mortars and the pineapple grenade from the 1st cache find.

INS engaged FF with SAF from the NE. FF returned fire and intend to move into green zone to utilize cover and move back to PB MUSAZAI which received SAF. 011132D PB MUSAZAI no longer receiving SAF.

03 OCT

KANDAHAR

High levels of INS activity throughout KANDAHAR Province with 12 kinetic events; activity was again focused in the ARGHANDAB District and around the ZHARI/PANJWA'I area.

Total kinetic events throughout the AO were: 11 x direct/indirect fire events resulting in 1 x LN wounded.

There was 1 x IED strike today followed by RPG fire resulting in 3 x ANA WIA.

ZABUL

There was a moderate level of activity today with 4 kinetic events in the AO. In Qalat district, 5.7 KM SW of CP6A, FF suffered 1XIED strike. No casualties and no BDA reported.

At 8.5 KM N of Fob APACHE, Qalat district, SWT spotted 2x INS. INS fled, dropped 2 wrapped bundles. FF moved investigate and detained INS and confiscated weapons. Also, at 7 KM NE of Fob SAGAY GHAR, FF found 2xVOIED with 5gal jug of HME.

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In Arghandab district, 7.5 KM E Fob LANE, IVO TAKATU village, INS engaged FF with 1 x IDF. The round landed 1km south of FOB LANE. No casualties or damage reported.

URUZGAN

There was a low level of activity today with 1 kinetic event.

TARIN KOWT, 5.7 KM NW OF FOB MNBTK. FF found 1 x AT mine in an open field near local residents. FF cordoned the area and EOD was requested.

CHORA, 1 KM NE of ANP CHECKPOINT KALA KALACHORA. INS engaged FF with SAF.

CHORA, 2.4 KM East of COP MASHALL. FF discovered 3 X 82mm Chinese mortars cached in a hay stack.

RC – EAST:

1. General Assessment of RC-E AOR

In RC-East, kinetic activity decreased by 2% (206 this week, 210 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 2% (49 this week, 50 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 28% (206 this week, 161 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 20% (49 this week, 61 last year). Kinetic activity has mirrored reporting as previous reporting indicated INS are attempting to sustain their levels of operation. Additionally, recent reporting highlighted the planning of multiple suicide attacks to include Ghazni City and sporadic areas in Logar. Furthermore, recent airstrikes along the Pakistani border have hindered ISAF's ability to transport supplies through Pakistan as the government of Pakistan has halted all supply movement in Pakistan. Expect kinetic activity to slightly decrease as INS attempt to maintain their operations as well as safe haven.

Overall, in **Parwan, Panjshir, Kapisa and Bamyan area**, kinetic activity has increased from the normal op-tempo levels throughout the region. Recent reporting this week has indicated INS intent to focus attacks towards BAF to garner opportunities for an effective IO campaign. INS are also continuing to stage and conduct attacks against ANSF/CF along main routes in order to limit ANSF/CF FoM throughout the province.

In **Parwan Province**, kinetic activity continues to remain at normal op-tempo levels. The overall trends continue to be INS facilitation into Parwan, INS directing operational focus against BAF, and INS attempting to disrupt ANSF/CF OPS. Reporting continues to indicate INS intent to conduct attacks against BAF. It is likely that INS will attempt to conduct harassing attacks targeting BAF, possibly as a probing attempt to gain knowledge of CF TTPs. Additionally, TB

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CDR, Musa, fled Kohe Safi District to Tagab District, Kapisa. This was likely due to lack of LN support and Taliban Senior Leadership blaming Musa for the recent CF operations. Musa is assessed to be fairly young and inexperienced. It is likely he fled the area in fear for his life. Recent reporting indicates that four Pakistani INS arrived in Kohe Safi to train local INS on IEDs; however, the local populace expressed concern over the presence of the foreigners, stating that they tolerated local INS but they were wary of foreign fighters in their area. In the next week, we will likely continue to see indications of INS intent, preparation and OPS pertaining to the overall trends as well as the INS desire to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks targeting ANSF/CF.

In **Kapisa Province**, kinetic activity continues to remain at normal op-tempo levels. The overall trends in Kapisa continue to be the facilitation of fighters and logistics, INS targeting FOBs/COPs and CF patrols, and intimidation tactics against the local populace. Reporting indicates INS are operating in a more cohesive manner throughout Kapisa; however, multi-disciplined reporting continues to indicate that INS in Kapisa are attempting to combat local Arbakais. The INS cohesiveness is likely due to similar goals of disrupting ANSF/CF operations while INS are likely attempting to maintain control by eradicating local militias. Additionally, recent reporting indicates TB CDR, Rajab Khan, was replaced by Mullah Zamat. Zamat worked closely with Rajab Khan as an apprentice and is reportedly very knowledgeable on the construction of IEDs. If Zamat is as knowledgeable in constructing IEDs as reported, then it is assessed that we will continue to see IED emplacement along main routes. In the next week, we will likely continue to see indications of INS intent, preparation and operations pertaining to the overall trends as well as the INS desire to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks targeting ANSF/CF.

In **Panjshir Province**, kinetic activity continues to remain low; however, weapons smuggling continues to persist. The OCC-P CDR, COL Rajab Khan, has agreed that the Paranday, Bazarak cache site would be a good place to consolidate the caches within the province. While the consolidation of weapons would be a positive move, some locals are criticizing the idea. Some locals want to preserve their ability to sell the weapons they were keeping as a source of income. With Governor Karim's support, this will likely continue to improve the security situation in Panjshir, and also continue to encourage the locals to cooperate with GIRoA.

In **Bamyan Province**, reporting suggests local populace support for INS in the area remains limited. Reporting also indicates approximately 70 fighters from Tala-wa Barfek (TWB), Baghlan Province are planning to conduct attacks in Kahmard and Sayghan Districts.

In the **Paktiya, Paktika and Khost area**, we are continuing to see INS targeting construction workers along major highways to discourage workers from working for GIRoA. There is an increase in facilitation across the AFPAK border and, in

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just three engagements in Khowst, there were over 65-75x EKIA. It is likely INS throughout this area will only be more demoralized by such attacks, and enemy offensive activity throughout the AO will be almost non-existent during the winter. We can expect, however, for INS to make continued attempts to resupply and at recruiting. It is likely they will begin to look for support from places other than Pakistan. There hasn't been any significant indicators of INS CDRs drawing down from the AOR, sporadic reporting and historic norms suggest that INS are intending to do so. However, INS elements will leave small units behind to sustain OP tempo and safe havens for facilitation purposes. Central Khowst and NE Paktika will continue to remain INS focus for the next few weeks.

In **Khowst Province**, decrease in kinetic activity indicates INS are likely in the planning phase. HQN elements plan on increasing kinetic activity in the interior districts of the province. A likely increase in border activity is expected coupled with increased cross border infiltration of personnel and equipment to sustain OPS. Multidiscipline reporting indicates INS elements are focusing on positioning the majority of the militants IVO border of Paktya Province specifically in Nadir Shahkot and Shamul Districts. INS affiliated local populace intimidation was concentrated in Shamul District and flowing over into Zadran District, Paktya Province.

In **Paktya Province**, kinetic activity increased by two attacks this week. INS continue to conduct harassing attacks against CF in the Zurmat District. When CF return fire, INS run away and cannot be found. Engagements like this can be expected during this time, as INS attempt to give CF/ANSF the suggestion they have more numbers and greater capabilities than they truly do. With the suicide attack on FOB Gardez last week, we do not assess that there will be another large scale attack due to the winter months that are quickly approaching. The main threat in Paktya province will remain to be harassment of construction companies and local populace so that INS can maintain financial stability and support zones.

In **Paktika Province**, kinetic activity decreased. There was a lull in attacks this past month due to locals harvesting crops in the area. Local populace intimidation will continue to remain a focus for the insurgency in Zerok, Orgun, Margha and Shkin areas since the locals have shown resilience against INS pressure. INS will continue to conduct IDF against CF/Arbakai in Bermel to sustain FOM across the border. Therefore, NE Paktika, including Bermel District, will remain to be top threat area for Paktika Province.

Reporting during the week in **Ghazni Province** has indicated INS intent to conduct spectacular attacks. On the 28 September the Deputy Governor of Ghazni Province, along with his son, and three body guards were assassinated along Highway One by a suicide bomber on their way to Ghazni City. This suicide attack further highlights INS intent in destabilizing the government within Ghanzi. Additionally, the similarity in this attack with others of which occurred

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this year is the usage of a motorcycle indicating the possibility of a single cell that operates within the vicinity of the Provincial Capital. INS in Andar District are maintaining a higher level of IED activity than in other areas of Ghazni Province. This is a clear indication that CF operations along HWY-1 have effectively disrupted the IED networks; however IED networks remain active in Andar along ratlines commonly utilized by ANSF and CF. Additionally, recent reporting indicates that INS are emplacing their supplies in local mosques as well as utilizing mosques as a recruitment and staging area in the Andar District. INS are utilizing mosques as a way to communicate to the populace in a more profound way as the populace in the Andar District remains very religious and maintains a conservative belief system.

Overall in **Logar and Wardak**, kinetic activity has increased from the normal op-tempo levels throughout the region. Reporting indicates INS are increasing their emplacements of IED as well as DF engagements against CF in order to disrupt CF operations and maintain support zones.

Reporting during the week in **Logar Province** indicates INS have a growing intent to increase their efforts in order to maintain their support base throughout Logar Province as well as hinder CF operations. INS are attempting to restrict CF FoA and FoM through harassing attacks in attempt to limit CF operations. Recent reporting has indicated that since early October INS are increasing kinetic and non-kinetic operations against CF in Logar. INS are finding new ways to disrupt CF operations and prevent CF from being successful within the Province. Reporting highlights the emplacement of IED along key routes, indicating INS intent to isolate CF from INS supportive villages. Additional reporting has indicated that in the Muhammad Agha District, INS are attempting to destabilize GIRoA by targeting local officials thus hindering GIRoA operations. These actions will further discredit GIRoA's ability to provide adequate security even for themselves.

Reporting during the week in **Wardak Province** has indicated the preparation of multiple ambushes within the Salar Village, Sayed Abad District. Salar Village has remained a hotspot for kinetic activity against CF; this is likely due to the population's negative sentiment towards CF. Furthermore, INS have been manufacturing IED within the Tangi Valley in order to prevent CF from operating effectively within a known INS C2 node for operations. In essence, as INS prepare for attack and continue to manufacture weapon we can expect INS to sustain operations in the coming weeks.

In the **Nangarhar, Nuristan, Laghman and Kunar area**, reporting has indicated multiple meetings are ongoing with INS leadership and attacks are expected to continue at the same op-tempo in the coming weeks. The majority of attacks within the last 7 days have been targeting CF FoM which were mostly ineffective. While there were fewer attacks against CF bases, attack effectiveness was significantly increased (31% when targeting bases compared to 7% attack

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effectiveness against patrols). However, reporting has also indicated further fractures between INS organizations such as between TB in C Konar and TNSM within S. Konar.

In **Nangarhar Province**, reporting has indicated several caches within W. Nangarhar and IVO Chaparhar District (KTD), indicating that, while INS leaders are currently conducting meetings, INS maintain the capability for further attacks and are likely awaiting guidance. However, the void in leadership within Khogyani and Sherzad have yet to be filled, and INS attacks are largely ineffective.

In **Nuristan Province**, there have been no attacks within the last 7 days. However, reporting currently indicates the presence of suicide bombers, a small presence of out of area fighters and the buildup of local fighters in the area. INS will possibly utilize these assets to conduct an attack against FOB Kalagush to further restrict the PRT to FOB Kalagush, thereby denying CF's greatest asset to locals to sway public sentiment.

In **Konar Province**, INS show few indications that they are preparing yet for the winter, and the predominate trend is plans for attacks and efforts to expand capacity. In N. Konar, attacks have decreased in the last week, and reporting indicates the possibility that some CDRs are turning their attention to Bajaur Agency, concerned with the threat of PAKMIL operations. In C Konar, attacks have increased and reporting indicates that INS are focusing efforts on IED capabilities and emplacement. Limited propaganda reporting indicates friction between provincial TB leadership and TNSM influence under Abdul Wali. If legitimate, the tensions between the two organizations could potentially fracture coordination in facilitation operations, decreasing the capability of the INS in C Konar to maintain the current OP-tempo. Of note is that there are few reports of tensions between these INS networks in N. Konar, indicating that the issue is rooted in personality instead of organizational differences. Additionally, in S. Konar INS are allegedly still planning to conduct a spectacular attack IVO FOB Joyce in Sarkani District, despite the focus on the PR event within Chowkay District. In the coming weeks, INS will likely sustain efforts to maintain kinetic activity and begin to prepare for winter as the weather turns.

In **Laghman Province**, the primary trend is INS conducting preparatory meetings. Reporting indicates TB are planning to distribute anti-ANSF/CF night letters throughout the province. Additionally, INS maintain their focus on controlling local nationals in Alingar District through the use of illegal checkpoints and intimidation. TB continue to threaten fuel trucks along HWY-7 and reportedly attacked one in the course of the week. Over the next week INS will likely continue to plan and stage for further attacks, limited CF FoM along the roads and denying CF access to the valleys.

RC – CAPITAL:

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1. General Assessment of RC-C AOR

The number of significant events in RC-C decreased significantly over the period of 27 SEP – 03 OCT 2010, with a single event recorded (a decrease of five events from the last reporting period). Of course, this remains a low level of violence and RC-C remains a relatively secure environment.

During the period of 27 SEP – 03 OCT 2010, the following event took place:


- At 290300D SEP 2010, 2 INS who were planting mines on Kabul–Logar roadside, in the area of Dasht-e Saqawah in Chahar Asiab District, died due to mine explosion. There was an ID card found on the spot which belongs to the one of them that shows he is from Dashtak Village, Logar Province.

The security posture has decreased from its heightened posture to its normal level after the Parliamentary Elections ended. The improving security situation in Kabul and increasing professionalism of ANSF, extremists support of ISAF to ANSF will probably prevent INS attacks, especially direct fire events in RC-C AOR. For that reason, INS could try to conduct IDF attacks against HVTs. They are likely seeking a success due to recent reports suggesting diminishing prestige and self-confidence among their supporters stemming from their inability to successfully execute a major attack during past events such as Mujahideen Victory Day (28 April 2010), Consultative Peace Jirga (2-4 June 2010), Kabul Conference (20 July 2010), Independence Day (19 August 2010), and finally Parliamentary Elections (18 September 2010). INS could also aim to weaken GIRoA legitimacy in case their candidates would not win the elections. They could also begin a propaganda campaign alleging that elections are illegitimate. Consequently, the security situation will be sensitive in the coming days and continue its sensitive posture during the post election period until the preliminary and final results are announced (at least until the end of October).

Considering the threat for Kabul, no major attacks which caused a lot of casualties and damages have occurred for three months. The last major complex attack occurred about six months ago, the last major suicide attack occurred about four months ago and the last major SVBIED attack occurred about three months ago. Given the fact that in five months there were significant past events such as Mujahideen Victory Day (28 April 2010), Consultative Peace Jirga (2-4 June 2010), Kabul Conference (20 July 2010), Independence Day (19 August 2010) and finally Parliamentary Elections (18 September 2010) held in Kabul in a secure environment, this demonstrated that the effective security measures taken in full coordination and solidarity between RC-C and ANSF prevented INS from disrupting these significant events and disrupting the overall security in Kabul. It also demonstrated security force willingness, decisiveness and capability to provide security in Kabul Province.

Despite the threat reporting concerning SVBIED threats, there are currently no corroborated threat streams about a major attack in RC-C AOR. However, we assess that INS are disappointed in the failure to disrupt the Parliamentary Elections in Kabul. For the next period, we assess that as commanders come under greater pressure from senior HQN leaders and the TB, INS will plan to attack strategic GIRoA, ISAF, and international targets in RC-C AOR to generate fear among populace and create propaganda that discredits GIRoA/ISAF security effectiveness.

Threat warnings received throughout the last week show INS intention to attack ANSF/ISAF, CF, GIRoA assets in Kabul Province. INS could attempt to launch rocket attacks from the east and south of KABUL City and continue to attempt to conduct suicide attacks on the places where they could attract media attention such as the Presidential Palace, Embassies, Key Ministries and Parliament, in order to destabilize the situation and spread fear among the residents of Kabul City and Government Officials.



Threat Warnings by Type over the Last Seven Days