

**IDC Weekly Security Narrative: Week of 29 AUG – 05 SEP 2010****RC – NORTH:****1. General Assessment of RC-N AOR**

The number of enemy initiated events in RC-N increased by 17% (42 events this week versus 36 last week) over the last week and when compared to the previous reporting period (22 – 29 AUG 2010). RC-N has seen a steady rise in enemy initiated activity over the last several weeks, generating concerns that this area is becoming a major focus of insurgent operations, especially as the elections approach. Twenty-five (25) of these events were significant in that they caused casualties or were somewhat unprecedented in the recent past. Of these events, nine (9) were IED finds or detonations (including one suicide bombing) and twelve (12) were direct fire or small arms fire incidents, two of which were especially significant (one was a large fire fight between ANSF and INS and the other caused severe ANSF casualties). There was one major election related event in the past week.

Of particular concern as the elections approach is the potential for greater insurgent attacks in Kunduz City, Imam Sahib District, Archi District, Ghormach District and along HWY 1 in Dowlatabad District in Faryab Province. These areas have seen the most concentration of events in the recent past and will likely continue to remain this way.

During the past seven days, Kunduz Province saw the greatest level of violence, with over ten (10) events taking place, including two of particular note. On 04 SEP, a suicide bomber on a motorcycle detonated himself in Kunduz City, killing five (5) ANP and five (5) LNs. The bomber was targeting ANP specifically, but wounded many LNs in the process. On 01 SEP, about 45 KM northwest of Kunduz City, CF came under sustained fire from insurgents. CF, along with Arbakai fighters from the area, repulsed the insurgent attack, killing one insurgent and wounding two others. The remainder of the insurgents was forced to flee. This event follows on many threat reports against Arbakai in the area and comes one day after a similar incident in which Arbakai and CF were attacked but succeeded in repelling the attack.

Faryab Province was the second most active area in RC-N's AOR, with nine (9) events taking place. Over half of these were IED finds or detonations, most of which occurred along HWY 1 in Dowlatabad District in the northern section of the province. There were several events concentrated in Ghormach District in the west, but these consisted mostly of direct or indirect fire events. Of note is an event on 04 SEP in which three (3) ANP were killed. The event was a direct fire

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attack on an ANSF vehicle along HWY 1 that resulted in several wounded and killed.

Of note in Balkh Province, beyond the four (4) events that occurred there (including a large cache of explosives materials found) is 04 SEP event in which over sixty (60) ANP were engaged by a large group of insurgents west of Mazar-e Sharif. The fire fight lasted for some time and resulted in one insurgent and one ANP each injured.

A single event in Baghlan Province, on 03 SEP, is of note. Approximately ten (10) insurgents took twenty-eight (28) IEC trainees hostage for a short time. Twenty-six of these workers were released. The whereabouts and status of the remaining two (2) is unknown at this time. This is a major escalation in the insurgents' attempt to disrupt elections.

RC – WEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-W AOR

The number of enemy initiated events in RC-W decreased, but only by a negligible amount (two events), when compared to the last reporting period. In total, there were sixty-two (62) significant events in RC-W this past week, compared to sixty-four (64) in the previous reporting period.

Twenty-three (23), or about one third, of these events involved IEDs (be they person borne, vehicle borne or emplaced in a static location), making this, by far the most utilized insurgent tactic in RC-W. On 29 AUG 2010, there was a suicide bombing in central Heart city, a rare event, the occurrence of which does not portend well for the security situation in the city or the province as a whole. However, there were many instances of threats, intimidation and outright violence targeting candidates, voters and campaign workers throughout RC-W, including the 29 AUG 2010 kidnapping of ten and murder of five of Fawzia Gilani's campaign workers.

Between 29 AUG and 05 SEP there was a significant increase in the number of events in Herat Province; nearly a tripling. These events continue to be concentrated in Shindand District, where it is believed they will remain, but there were significant attacks elsewhere in the province. On 05 SEP, at nearly 9:00 PM, there were two rocket strikes in northern Herat City. The rockets seem to have been launched from a vehicle that later detonated due to the failed launch of a third rocket. The rockets seemed to be targeting the Five Stars Hotel in the city and a fuel depot. On 02 SEP, at about 4:00 PM, it was confirmed by the provincial NDS chief that at least four truck drivers who were delivering saffron bulbs as part of GIRoA development effort were kidnapped by insurgents and taken to an unknown location. On 04 SEP two beheaded bodies were discovered in Kushk-e Kohnah. It is believed that local Taliban leader Mullah

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Rauf ordered the executions. On 01 SEP it was reported through ANSF channels in RC-W that a man named Abdullah, AKA Ghulam Yahyah Akbari, recently established two bases in Ab Gharmi village of Pashtun Zarghun District. Reportedly, there are three PAKISTANI suicide bombers with him:

- Mullah Shakib, 27 years old with middle height, long hair and beard and light brown skin.
- Qari Abdullah, 27 years old with middle height, a reddish beard, long hair, and light brown skin.
- Mullah Nasaruddin, 20 years old with middle height, a reddish beard, long hair, and light brown skin.

They intend to conduct suicide attacks targeting UNAMA office, Herat Police HQ, and Herat Airport.

During the same period, Badghis Province saw nearly a third of all the events in RC-W: twenty (20). However, this was not a dramatic increase in the level of activity in this province. Indeed, this was about the normally observed level of events for Badghis in the recent past. Of the three incidents highlighted below, two dealt with threats to candidates. On 02 SEP it was revealed that parliamentary elections candidate No'azam Sadighi of Qal'ah-yeh Now District received a letter, written by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mo'ayed, threatening him and demanding he not participate in the elections.




Figure RC-W 1: This is a photo of the threat letter received by Dr. No'azam Sadighi, a parliamentary candidate in Badghis Province.

On 30 AUG it was reported that Afghan Border Police manning check points in the vicinity of Akazai, in Murghab District were seeking to abandon their posts to insurgents in the area who are under the command of Mullah Isma'il.

Also on 30 AUG, it was reported that a local Taliban leader named Moliy Jammaludin Mansor delivered a threat letter to the people of Bala Murghab, Murghab District, demanding that they move from the area, not cooperate with CF and support the Taliban.




Figure RC-W 2: Letter from local Taliban leader in Murghab District to local residents.

Farah Province had the second greatest number of incidents in RC-W (as with Badghis, about a third of all events), with nineteen (19) events over the last seven days. This is in keeping with recent history in this province. Fourteen (14) of these events were IED emplacements (most of which detonated), as is the case historically in Farah. The greatest area of concentration in the province is in

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Gulestan District, where HWY 522 enters the mountains in eastern Gulestan. Of note this week was an incident on 29 AUG in which a driver participating in a civilian convoy that was related to CF was kidnapped briefly and then found murdered. He was killed by unknown assailants by being shot in the chest.

Ghor Province saw a higher than usual level of activity in the past seven days, with five events recorded, including acts of intimidation against candidates. On the evening of 03 SEP the vehicle of a parliamentary candidate, Haji Qurban, was set alight for unknown reasons. It is believed that this event took place in connection to the upcoming elections. Reporting from 02 SEP suggests that two ANP officers were involved in an IED strike against CF in Chaghcharan District on 30 AUG. The two are connected tribally and via familial links to known insurgents operating in the area. On 30 AUG, Three lieutenants from ANP HQ, Fazl Haq, Salim and Sebaqatullah withdrew from service in ANP. They brought their ANP uniforms and AK rifles. Ten days ago on 19 AUG 2010 Fazl Haq was beaten by COL Abdul Rashid Bashir and was placed in the detention facilities for several days. He was punished in the reported way for disobeying orders. After he was released, he and his colleagues beat one of Abdul Rashid Bashir's bodyguards. The reported ANP officers escaped. It has been reported that they have already taken part in a robbery in the Bayan pass area.

RC – SOUTHWEST:

1. General Assessment of RC-SW AOR

During the past week, there were five hundred and fifty-nine (559) INS events in the RC-SW. This is a slight increase on the level of events from the previous week, which saw five hundred and forty-one (541) events. The areas of most activity were Marjeh, Nad 'Ali, Lashkar Gah, Nahr-e Saraj and Sangin.

Over the past week, there was one (1) IED attack and one (1) cache find in Reg-e Khan Neshin; there were eight (8) IED attacks, six (6) DF attacks, one (1) SAFire attack, fourteen (14) IED finds, one (1) cache find, and one (1) IDF attack in Garm Ser; there were three (3) IED finds, two (2) UXO finds, three (3) IED attacks, and four (4) DF attacks in Nawah-ye Barakzai; there were fifteen (15) IED attacks, eleven (11) IED finds, one hundred and twenty-eight (128) DF attacks, three (3) cache finds, one (1) UXO find and one (1) SAFire attack in Marjeh; there were two (2) DF attacks, one (1) IED attack, one (1) IDF attack, and four (4) UXO finds in Khash Rod; there were two (2) DF attacks and one (1) IED attack in Washer; there were three (3) IED attacks in Now Zad; there were seventeen (17) DF attacks, seven (7) IED attacks, eight (8) IED finds, one (1) cache find, and two (2) complex attacks in Musa Qal'ah; there were four (4) DF attacks, two (2) IED finds, two (2) IED attacks, and one (1) cache find in Kajaki; there were fifty-one (51) DF attacks, four (4) IED attacks, three (3) SAFire attacks, four (4) IED finds, and two (2) cache finds in Sangin; there were seventy-one (71) DF attacks, twenty (20) IED finds, three (3) IED attacks, three (3) UXO

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finds, one (1) IDF attack, and one (1) complex attack in Nahr-e Saraj; there were one hundred and thirty-four (134) DF attacks, one (1) UXO find, three (3) IED attacks, one (1) cache find, and six (6) IED finds in Nad 'Ali; there were seventy-seven (77) DF attacks, three (3) IED finds, and two (2) IED attacks in Lashkar Gah.

Direct fire attacks remain the tactic of choice, with IEDs used in defense. They accounted for 88% of all events in RC-SW, suggesting a continuing ability by insurgents to mount strong offensive actions. It is likely this will continue in the near future, but it is doubtful it can be maintained for the medium term.




Figure RC-SW 1: These charts show the level of significant events in RC-SW over the last two weeks.




Figure RC-SW 2: This chart depicts the level of significant events in the Central Helmand River Valley over the last four weeks.

In the past seven days, kinetic activity levels within Marjeh District averaged approximately 20 kinetic events in a 24-hour time period. DF attacks were the primary form of insurgent attack, and made up nearly 90 percent of kinetic events. Most DF attacks targeted dismounted patrols with harassing SAF, though static FF positions were the second most popular insurgent targets. Insurgent use of spotters on FF positions is a common enemy tactic, typically utilized to watch for departing patrols to prepare ambushes along designated patrol routes.

IED events in the past 24 hours included an IED find while searching a possible enemy FP from a previous DF attack, which consisted of a PPIED containing 60lb of HME. It's possible that the DF attack was meant to lure FF into the IED at the FP. Additionally; an IED strike on a mounted convoy consisted of an RCIED with an 82mm mortar round. Another 82mm mortar round was found 1KM west of the IED strike, possibly meant to be a second RCIED, however the mortar round was not connected to any type of initiator at the time.




Figure RC-SW 3: This chart depicts significant events in Marjeh over the last week.

Recent reporting confirms previous assessments, that Khash Rud would become a more prominent C2 node and logistical hub. This was caused by INS losing control of Safaar Bazaar and HWY 9 being a significant supply route that connects to Iran and Pakistan. INS are continuing to move south of Safaar Bazaar in areas such as Safar Kalay and Durzay, which INS are using to temporarily replace Safaar Bazaar as C2 nodes and logistical hubs. The upcoming elections have the potential to change LNs perception on GIRoA's legitimacy and competency to hold an uncorrupt round of elections. INS continue to show indications of wanting to disrupt the elections, which would undermine GIRoA's security effort if successful. INS are increasing the brutality of their murder and intimidation campaign, with the beheading of local nationals in Marjeh and Khash Rud. INS will likely increase IED emplacements and conduct complex attacks against ANSF/ISAF static positions along HWY 9.

RC – SOUTH:

1. General Assessment of RC-S AOR

In the past seven days, there were approximately 400 SIGACTs in RC-S, of which over one quarter (130 events) took place in the districts around Kandahar City (Panjwa'i, Zharay, Arghandab and Maiwand). Over all, this was a significant increase over the 337 events that occurred that occurred over the previous reporting period (22 – 29 August). This increase is attributed to several factors: the end of Ramazan, the approaching elections (there is a concerted effort to use intimidation and murder to disrupt the elections in and around Kandahar) and the expected CF and ANSF operations IVO Kandahar City. Within Kandahar City, the insurgents' primary goal remains a significant and well executed intimidation

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campaign, which is assessed to be carried out by a specific, structured insurgent organization responsible for assassinations, murder and intimidation.

Although the vast majority of the above mentioned activity took place in Kandahar Province, there has been increasing violence in both Zabul and Uruzgan Provinces. Insurgents continue to target (but at increased levels) CF and ANSF convoys along HWY 1 with IEDs and some small arms fire (primarily IED though). This is also the case in Uruzgan, though IEDs seem more to be used in this area to protect insurgent havens and cache sites.

Over several days in late August (29 – 31) there were several reported attempts by insurgents to convince the people of Shah Joy and Mizan Districts in Zabul to not take part in the elections. These attempts involved letters and messages played late at night over loud speakers. In one message, insurgents did not urge voters to abstain, but instead demanded they vote for Pashtun candidates over Tajik or Dari speaking candidates.

In Uruzgan, IED strikes are becoming more effective, with three events this past week causing multiple casualties. Most of these were against dismounted troops, which are easier targets, but the large number of casualties (five ANP KIA or WIA in a single event on 29 AUG). Also, IED events in 2010 have eclipsed those of 2009 and are expected to continue to rise.

In the provinces around Kandahar City, direct fire, indirect fire and IEDs remain the primary means of attack for INS in contesting advances into INS support zones. This will continue to occur specifically in the areas of Tabin, Chahar Qolbah-e Olya / Sofla and the Kalacheh. HME factories in Takia and Babur continue to supply the many IEDs available. Recent reporting indicates that the INS are using a new engagement area west of Kalacheh in order to deny CF and ANSF the ability to move north and secure the people in vicinity of Khvajeh Molk. Last week there was the first instance of fuel being used in conjunction with HME as an IED. At present it is not known if this was an attempt to increase the effect of the IED or because of supply shortages. In southern Arghandab the IED engagement area southeast of Deh-E Kochay remained active. We expect this area to remain active in the near future.

In Zharay, INS continue to target PSC's along HWY 1 centered between Howz-E Madad and the Maiwand border. This area will remain an INS attack zone targeting PSC's. Reporting continues to indicate this week that there are ongoing preparations throughout Zharay, especially around Pashmul, of INS planning and reinforcing defensive positions. Attacks on CF were centered around the central Pashmul area this past week. It is also assessed IDF attacks will increase as INS are conducting reconnaissance operations. Intimidation of LN's will continue to increase the TB's support base throughout Zharay, particularly around proposed election sites.

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In Maiwand, INS continue to conduct attacks along HWY 1 in specific attack zones that afford them the best survivability rate and affect the transient population of Maiwand. On HWY 1 INS targeted PSCs and ANSF elements and off of HWY 1 there was an increase in IED attacks specifically targeting CF. Another incident occurred on the 92E in which an IED was disguised as a mile marker. This has occurred three other times since the beginning of July in two other attack zones on HWY 1. We expect insurgent activity to continue focusing on HWY 1 IOT cause CF/ANSF to concentrate on HWY 1 and not focus on logistics routes in the North and South. INS located in Hupal and the surrounding area will continue their IO campaign against CF and GIRoA by exploiting any negative actions of the ANA and ANP.

RC – EAST:

1. General Assessment of RC-E AOR

In the past seven days, there were 248 SIGACTS in RC-E; 64 of which were considered effective. The two areas of highest activity were in the Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman (33% of all activity), and the Wardak - Logar (31% of all activity) regions.

Effective Rate Chart	Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman	Kapisa	Panjsher/ Parwan	Wardak/ Logar	Ghazni	Paktiya, Paktika, Khost
2010	13/80 16%	1/8 13%	0/3 0%	22/76 29%	9/29 31%	19/52 37%
2009	13/67 19%	1/5 20%	1/3 33%	18/50 36%	17/34 50%	16/26 62%

Figure RC-E 1: Shows attack effectiveness over the last week compared to the same period in 2009.

In RC East this week kinetic activity decreased by 4% (221 this week, 231 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 18% (55 this week, 67 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 23% (221 this week, 180 last year) while attack effectiveness increased by 4% (55 this week, 53 last year). The decrease in kinetics can be contributed by INS intent to stockpile weapons and logistics for large scale attacks near the end of Ramazan and preparing for attacks prior to and during the upcoming elections. The sharp increase in attacks compared to last year can be contributed by the sharp decrease in kinetics last year after the presidential elections as INS exhausted their munitions and supplies during that period.

Recent reporting indicates INS infighting continues in Nangarhar, Kunar, Wardak and Kapisa Provinces. INS are currently refitting for future operations. Multi-

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discipline reporting continues to highlight INS intent to increase suicide attack operations, primarily in the form of a VBIED attack. The threat for this remains high against Ghazni City, BAF, JAF and NE Paktika. Reporting continues to illustrate INS' intent to increase instability within Pro-GIRoA areas in order to disrupt the election campaigning and conduct, and to discredit and delegitimize GIRoA. Additionally, INS have increased the targeting of the local populace who are assessed to be corroborating with GIRoA or are supporting the election efforts. Multi-discipline reporting confirms that current top threat areas in RC-East are concentrated in a) North-East Paktika, b) central Kunar, c) JAF and d) BAF/Kapisa.

In the past seven days, there were 80 SIGACTS in the Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman area: 14x IED Strikes, 6x SAFIRE, 6x Complex, 43x DF, and 11x IDF attacks. Reporting suggests INS fighters in central Kunar are preparing to launch a large-scale attack against a CF base in the next 72 hours. Several INS groups from Asmar, Shigal and Dangam districts plan to participate in the attack. INS fighters have proven in the past that they are able to mass large groups of fighters for attacks on such outposts. CF can expect harassing IDF against bases and DF ambushes on patrols near them. These harassing attacks may occur on the 6th, 7th, and 8th as we enter the end of Ramazan.

In the past 7 days, there were 76 SIGACTS in the Wardak and Logar area: 4x IED Strikes, 1x SAFIRE, 7x Complex, 47x DF, and 17x IDF attacks. There has been a 26% increase in overall kinetic activity between July and August. Direct fire engagements saw the largest increase, with a 60% increase area wide. Of these, the majority of attacks occurred in Sayed Abad District, Wardak Province. There was a 15% increase in Indirect Fire activity, the majority of which occurred in Sayed Abad and Jaghato Districts, Wardak Province. Although there was a 26% increase in overall activity, Logar Province saw a 12% decrease in activity. This decrease in activity is attributed to operations that occurred in late July 2010 and severely disrupted INS in southern Logar.

Overall, in Parwan, Panjsher, Kapisa and Bamyan Provinces, kinetic activity increased by one attack (10 overall), with one attack being effective, as compared to last week with four attacks being effective. During the same time period last year, there were 16 attacks, with five being effective. Kinetic activity has remained at normal op-tempo levels throughout the region. Recent reporting this week has indicated INS intent to focus attacks towards Bagram Airfield (BAF) due to an INS desire to enhance their effective IO campaign in RC-East. Due to the upcoming elections, INS are continuing to increase intimidation tactics against the local populace in order to deter them from voting. INS are also continuing to target election candidates whose views are not aligned with the INS. INS continue to conduct attacks to restrict ANSF and CF freedom of movement in Kapisa Province.

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In Paktiya, Paktika and Khost Provinces, kinetic activity decreased by 4% (55 this week, 57 last week) and attack effectiveness decreased by 31% (18 this week, 26 last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 57% (55 this week, 35 last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 14% (18 this week, 21 last year). The lull in attacks is most likely due to INS planning attacks throughout the area for the elections in mid-September, though we can expect to see at least a modest up tick in activity during the next week as Ramazan comes to a close. There remains an attack threat in Khost for a possible second attack on large CF bases there.

In Khost Province, kinetic activity increased by 50% (15 this week, ten last week) and attack effectiveness increased by 67% (five this week, three last week). Compared to last year, kinetic activity increased by 67% (15 this week, nine last year) and attack effectiveness decreased by 29% (five this week, seven last year). This spike in kinetic activity is attributed to events leading up to the recent attacks against CF bases. INS elements are currently in the planning and re-grouping phase. INS continue to maintain increased freedom of movement along the KG Pass in the province. INS affiliated IED activity severely restricted CF freedom of movement along routes in Sabari District, Khost Province. Single source reporting indicated movement of three suicide bombers from Khost Province to Kabul Province likely to target the upcoming parliamentary elections. INS continue to harass local populace by establishing check points in Dowamanda District, aka Shamul District, Khowst Province possibly to minimize LN movement in Haqqani Network safe havens in Dzadran District, Paktiya Province. There are no new reports of reintegration or reconciliation this week. The local sentiment remains the same of pro-GIRoA in areas of where there are strong ANSF/CF presences. Reporting indicates that kinetic activity in the province will spike in the coming weeks and this threat will continue to hold until the end of the election process.

RC – CAPITAL:

1. General Assessment of RC-C AOR

The number of significant events in RC-C increased significantly over the period of 22 – 29 AUG 2010, with seven events recorded (a tripling). Of course, this remains a low level of violence and RC-C remains a relatively secure environment.

During the period of 29 AUG – 05 SEP 2010, the following events took place:

- An illegal checkpoint was reported in DEH SABZ District on 31 AUG.
- A direct fire incident against a mini bus full of Kabul Supreme Court employees in MUSAHJ District on...

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- A rocket attack against ISAF and GIRoA facilities in central Kabul City on ...
- A demonstration was held on ... in order to protest ...
- An IED detonated against ... in MUSAHI District on ...
- An IED was found on ... in MUSAHI District
- An even reported as a direct fire attack in central Kabul City on ... seems to have been a gas line explosion.

Only the attack against the local national GIRoA employees in MUSAHI could be deemed successful. The indirect fire attack on Kabul City on ... was a complete failure and cause only minor damage and no casualties. However, there remains a high level of threat reporting regarding Kabul City. Threats run the gamut from those against the city's usual targets (the Indian Embassy, HQ ISAF, KAIA, etc.) to those targeting the elections and those targeting ANSF in the outlying areas of Kabul (especially in MUSAHI and DEH SABZ).

It is expected that such reporting will increase as the end of Ramazan approaches and coincides with the ninth anniversary of the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud and of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. The possible Quran burning at a Florida church will also likely draw more threats of retaliation and attacks to Kabul City. However, the greatest upcoming event in the city is the 18 September parliamentary election. Much of the recent threat reporting focuses on this event and it provides a significant target for insurgents. Increased threat reporting will invariably lead to an increased number of attacks (or at least attempted attacks) in RC-C.

The Insurgents' inability to successfully execute a major attack has resulted in some prestige loss among insurgent supporters, as well as a loss of initiative. This will intensify pressure for a major, spectacular attack in the run-up to the elections, possibly taking advantage of the Ramazan period as a mobilizing tool for potential suicide attackers (as threat reporting suggests the Haqqani Network is attempting to do). Therefore, the chances for a major, complex attack are in a sense higher after the success of the Kabul Conference, rather than lower.

Despite the general security success for ANSF, the security situation in downtown KABUL remains sensitive but under control.

The latest information indicates some INS groups and suicide bombers have entered Kabul (though these are unconfirmed reports). However, the threat of further IEDs, rocket attacks and suicide attacks remains at a heightened level, particularly against the Presidential Place, GIRoA Ministry Buildings, KAIA, ISAF/CF and ANSF bases, main hotels, guest houses and specifically, historically targeted embassies.

On the other hand INSs keep the capability to conduct a complex attack in KABUL city especially inside PD 2, 5, 8 to weaken the GIRoA legitimacy and to attract international media attention. Therefore isolated actions, mainly

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conducted by TB or HQN assets in KABUL and surroundings, remain burning issues.

We assess that INs watch for opportunities to attack ANSF and ISAF in order to demoralize the public and discredit GIRoA and ISAF. Also they will continue to try to create the perception that GIRoA members and relatives are corrupted and inefficient to govern and unable to cope with the population preoccupations of security. For this purpose ANSF relaxation could be immediately used for acting.

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