Salafist and Wahhabist Influence in Afghanistan:

Request for Research Summary
1. How did Salafism and/or Wahhabism (possibly to include extremist/politicized Islam in general) begin infiltrating into Afghanistan.

Purpose/Justification
Political and/or extremist Islam was not a significant force in Afghanistan before the 1979 Soviet invasion; how or why did it become such a dominant force (if, indeed, it really is one). A history or survey of known information about how Afghans were proselytized by fundamentalist preachers would add to our in-depth long term understanding-research of the process of religious radicalization in the area.

Bottom Line Up Front
- Fundamentalism, political Islam (Islamism) and extremist Islam are not mutually synonymous. Understanding the difference can be very important in assessing the kind of ideology or behavior that deployed elements may see on the ground.
- There has been relatively little infiltration or proselytizing of foreign extremist or politicized Islam to common people in most of Afghanistan.
- The NWFP and tribal areas in Pakistan, on the other hand, have been host to some of the most important radical Islamists of our time. Exposure to radical ideologies in madrasas, mosques, or refugee camps there is much more likely.
- Although Islam has been an important part of Afghan identity and has played a role in historical events, political Islam is a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan.
- The rise of political Islam in Afghanistan was a result of significant domestic reforms and external geopolitical factors.
- While current support for foreign extremist ideologies in Afghanistan appears to be low, increase in anti-American sentiment would potentially provide a dangerous opening for extremists to increase their influence on ordinary Afghans.

Introduction
Afghanistan is in many ways an unlikely home for radical Islamic ideologies. Afghan religious life until the 1950s was, and in many places still is, traditional, conservative, rural, and mystical. Just as Afghanistan was politically and ethnically highly fragmented, religious life has also varied tremendously depending on region, ethno-linguistic group, and degree of urbanization.
From 1979 onwards, however, radical upheaval of traditional society caused by the Communist revolution and the invasion of a major world power made Afghanistan suddenly the focal point of an international Islamist movement. This movement advocating “political Islam” had formed as a response to colonialism that Afghanistan had never before experienced. The international Islamist movement with roots in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran was completely foreign and as disunited and fragmented as Afghan society. Made up of often contradictory and competing doctrines, it was (and is) a constantly changing loose coalition of groups that unite and splinter in cycles around leaders and ideas in perpetual competition with one another for funding and recruits.\(^2\)

The extreme social, political, and religious fragmentation of both Afghan society and the Islamist movement makes the task of constructing a cohesive narrative about Islamism in Afghanistan a nearly impossible one. This report can only attempt to be an introduction to the issue, a broad overview that should allow the reader to begin to differentiate between various groups and ideologies that have competed for loyalty and ultimately for power in Afghanistan. Some of these groups hoped to use Afghanistan as a springboard for broad social transformation that would affect the whole Muslim world and change the entire geopolitical order; others never aspired to anything more than the creation of a small fiefdom in a single remote valley.

The overview that follows will begin with a brief introduction to Islamist movements. It will trace the development of modern Islamic revivalism and reform movements relevant to the current report, including a brief discussion of fundamentalism in general and specifically of Salafism, Wahhabism, and the Indian/Pakistani Deobandi movements. These primarily traditionalist movements subsequently shaped and were shaped by the distinctly modern Islamist movement (sometimes called “political Islam”) that emerged independently among the educated middle-class in Pakistan and Egypt in the middle of the 20\(^{th}\) century. It was this movement that subsequently inspired the development of political Islam in Afghanistan in the 1960s and '70s at Kabul University and later in exile in Peshawar.

The Communist coup and the 1979 Soviet invasion would fundamentally alter the Afghan political and religious landscape as well as the nature of interaction of all these Islamic movements. Paradoxically, these events and international responses helped to radicalize and militarize the formerly traditionalist groups like the Deobandis while transforming most of the Afghan Islamist political groups into much more moderate, nationalist parties.

The final section of this report will discuss the situation in the NWFP in Pakistan, including the foundation of Al-Qaeda and the roots of jihadist groups active in Afghanistan today, and briefly examine the relationship between ideology and militant activism.

\section*{I. Origins of modern Sunni Islamist movements}

\textit{Fundamentalism and the roots of political Islam}

Fundamentalism is a response to modernity found in all major religions across the world.\(^3\) Faced with a changing system of public values informed by the European model of modernization that emphasized secularization of civil society, education, and government and challenged the authority of religions and their sacred texts, movements of reform and revival arose that advocate a return to “first principles” (fundamentals)\(^1\) of each religion. These early fundamentalist movements in Islam (among them Wahhabism and Deobandism) emphasized acceptance of both the original texts (the Qur’an, the sunna and hadith) and the legal schools that arose to interpret them.\(^4\) These movements advocated reform of Islamic practices in order to purify them of the influences of other religions and of secularization. This kind of fundamentalism in Islam, as in other religions, is primarily conservative and traditionalist, emphasizing the role of the ulama (scholars who have completed a full theological education) and the importance of religious law as a basis for personal morality.

\(^1\) The term “fundamentalism” originated in the United States in the first part of the 20\(^{th}\) century among Christians who rejected textual criticism of the Bible and early Christian texts, the theory of evolution, and generally symbolic interpretations of events of the Biblical narrative. It has come to be applied to movements across religions, but each religion has its own terms for “indigenous” fundamentalisms.
Wahhabism (wahhabiyya) was the earliest of relevant modern reform and revival movements to arise in the Muslim world, appearing originally in Saudi Arabia without direct reference to European influences. Named for its founder Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92), the movement preached the primary importance of the oneness of God (tawhid) and condemned many popular religious practices that al-Wahhab insisted violated the primary principles of Muhammad’s message by directing worship to something other than Allah alone. The movement then and now rejected all forms of Sufism, veneration of saints, holy sites, and any veneration of the Prophet himself. Though it began before the rise of other fundamentalist movements as an internal reform, Wahhabi ideas spread across the Muslim world in the 19th century, and it came to be associated with “extremist” or “fanatical” Islamic ideology in general by both European empires and Muslim governments like that of Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan in the late 19th century. Particularly because of its militant opposition to Sufism, but also because it was a traditionalist movement rooted in the stricter Arab Hanbali school of jurisprudence that was largely foreign to Central and South Asian ulama, Wahhabism did not gain much purchase in these areas (including Afghanistan in particular) until the 1980s, as will be discussed below.

The fundamentalist movement most directly relevant to Afghanistan was the one founded at the Dar-ul Ulum Deoband madrasa in the United Provinces of British India in the late 19th century, now known as the Deobandi movement. The original Deobandi madrasa was founded in a direct response to other movements in India that advocated collaboration with the British and encouraged European secular education, and by the early 20th century a network of Deoband-trained ulama and their students who taught the Deobandi curriculum blossomed in the Northwest Frontier Province. Curriculum emphasized “classical” materials, using ancient Arabic texts on geometry and teaching medieval medicine and science (the classics of Persian literature). Though linked to Sufism through its founders and many of its followers, it emphasized “scientific” knowledge (ilm) and did not incorporate mystical aspects of Sufism. It rejected veneration of the saints as heresy, but frequently accepted Sufi pir (masters) and murids (disciples) as students and teachers. This was a clear rejection of Wahhabi doctrine, of which these metropolitan scholars were obviously aware.

These conservative Deobandi madrasas were well respected in Afghanistan for the quality and rigor of their scholarship. They became very popular with Pashtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line and with the Afghan monarchs Ammanullah and Zahir Shah in particular, who patronized them generously and employed Deobandi scholars to direct the expansion of Islamic education in Afghanistan. The Deobandis became the primary trainers of traditional Afghan ulama for most of the 20th century at madrasas in primarily Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan as well as other schools scattered throughout Northern India/Pakistan.

These traditionalist Islamic movements initially advocated reforms of Islam that focused primarily on the teaching of ulama themselves, focusing on them as the key for creating an Islamic society that would follow the dictates of Sharia without changing either the basic teachings of religion or the basic political order. While both the Wahhabi and Deobandi movements would become politically active in their own ways (the Wahhabi movement in influencing the Saudi monarchy to enact Islamic reforms and the Deobandi movement in forming political parties active in India and later Pakistan), the movements themselves remained fundamentalist and stress(ed) the authority of fully trained religious scholars (ulama).

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\(^{ii}\) The Pakistani indigenous Ahl-e Hadith movement preaches very similar doctrines but has more modern roots and rejects the schools of jurisprudence entirely. This places them at odds with both the Deobandis and the much more moderate Bareli movement in Pakistan. See section III-IV for information about Wahhabi and Ahl-e Hadith cooperation in Afghanistan during the Soviet resistance. The RRC found no information related to Ahl-e Hadith activities in Afghanistan today.

\(^{iii}\) The Deobandi “networks” associated with the Taliban and other radical militant groups are splintered from both the actual Deoband madrasa in India and from the JUI, the Pakistani political party associated with the Deobandi movement in Pakistan. This will be discussed in some detail below. Similarly, militant groups like al-Qaeda that are sometimes associated with Wahhabi doctrines are not affiliated with the actual Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia.
**Salafiyya**

Towards the end of the 19th century, a distinctly modernist school of thought began to make a decisive break with the fundamentalist *ulama* that would shift the focus of revivalism from the theologians to the common Muslim.^[15^]

Key to this break in tradition was the rejection of the necessity of the four traditional Sunni schools of jurisprudence and *taqlid* (the requirement that judicial opinions rest on legal reasoning already established within one’s school). The most significant change in this regard was the reopening of the “gate of *ijtihad*,” allowing the formation of new legal opinions based directly on the primary religious texts without reference to legal scholarship or the necessity of years of legal and theological education.^[16^]

This significant reform broke ten centuries of theological tradition and created religious movements in two very different directions. The first of these was the modernist movement, which strove to reconcile a personal Islamic belief with modern science, politics, and civil society. The second movement, Salafism, broke with tradition in a very different direction. Originating primarily in Egypt around Jamal al-Din al-Afgani (d. 1898), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), “*salafiyya*” refers to the “pious forefathers” of the first decades of Islam. The Salafists argued that Islamic civilization had fallen behind the West because it had not stayed true to its founding principles and had become weakened by syncretic influences, Sufism, and failure to live according to sharia.^[17^] The remedy they proposed for this situation was not adaptation to “Western” modernity, but a return to a unified Muslim civilization governed by sharia under a restored caliphate.

In spite of their open rejection of Western political models as ideals, the Salafists importantly did not reject the authority of the state or even of secular government. Many other movements influenced by their reforms would go much further, particularly those influenced by the notion that the revival of Islamic civilization depended on returning to the principles of the first centuries of Islam and the rejection of traditionalism of the classically trained *ulama*. In the years that followed, a broad array of Islamic groups would refer to themselves as “Salafist,” regardless of whether they had any actual connection to the *Salafiyya* movement, and this is still true today. The term has come to represent a wide variety of groups that advocate a puritanical interpretation of Islamic traditions, rejection of Sufism and syncretism (in these aspects they are often confused with or overlap with Wahhabis) and an effort to return to a highly mythologized golden age of Islam projected onto the period of the first four caliphs. It is important to recognize, however, that much like the various Islamist groups that will be discussed below, Salafist groups vary widely in their approach to the creation of the modern caliphate, their relationship with Western culture, and their approach to social transformation.^[18^]

**The birth of Islamism**

The movements discussed thus far have shared with the traditionalists a focus on renewal and revival of Islamic society through the lives of individual Muslims. These movements were/are guided by the belief that when individuals submit to Allah and to the sharia, they will by extension create a good Muslim society.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in WWI made the situation the fundamentalist movements had responded to even more dire. In the wake of this defeat and the failure of an international effort to restore the caliphate that had disappeared with the removal of the Ottoman sultan, a new movement independently arose in two different countries that questioned the basic direction of Islamic social reform. Thus modern Islamism was founded in Egypt by a schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna, who created the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928; and by Mawlana Abul-ala Mawdudi, who founded the Jamaat-e Islami in 1941 in Pakistan.^[19^]

Likely the most important Muslim political thinkers of the 20th century, Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Egyptian Muslim Brother (MB) Sayyid Qutb came to believe that individual reform was not enough. They took from

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^iv^ Syncretism is the blending of elements from other religions into the primary religion. In Islam this usually refers to the survival of pre-conversion religious practices or beliefs of a converted population (in Central Asia this would refer mostly to practices that survive from shamanistic Turkic religions or Zoroastrianism).
the Salafists the belief that the key to reforming Islamic civilization was to return to the example of the early Islamic period, the most important element of which, they believed, was Islamic government. Rather than reforming individuals to create an ideal society, they believed that society had to be transformed first through the apparatus of the state and its laws. A good state – that is, a Muslim state – would create a moral society of good Muslims. This was Islamism: the idea that the state itself must be guided by Muslim principles, not just a Muslim leader; the laws of the state would conform with sharia, and thus the organs of the state would enforce sharia.

The Islamists differed from the fundamentalists not only in the direction of their approach and therefore their methodology for revival and renewal, but also very significantly in their demographics. While traditionalists and fundamentalists drew their support from educated clergy and rural conservatives, the Islamists were an inherently modern movement built on a modern base—the educated, urban middle class. Islamists function in a modern idiom, through political parties and the ideology of revolution directed at creating a new society as much as it is to reviving an old one. They are generally much more flexible with questions of sharia (the details of which are to be worked out in the new state according to rational religious principles) and also are more willing to give equal education to women and allow them a greater role in revolutionary activity.

Over the past 70 years the Islamist political groups have developed very differently according to the state they attempted to reform and its response to them. Some, like Jamaat-e Islami in Pakistan have been more or less incorporated into the mainstream political establishment and shown themselves willing to form compromise coalitions with groups on both the left and right. Others, like the Egyptian MBs, were brutally suppressed by their national governments and spawned much more radical splinter groups with hardline militant ideologies, as will be discussed in the final section of this report. While there is no conclusive pattern that can be drawn from so many disparate groups that operate in very different national environments, Afghanistan (see next section) provides an excellent example of the way these groups seem to have a tendency to become relatively moderate and nationalist when included in the political process. Those who remained outside of the political process by choice or force, however, have tended to radicalize and internationalize. In spite of a lack of natural popular support for these kinds of groups in Afghanistan domestically, the anti-Soviet jihad and international support for Islamist efforts created an almost ideal incubator for them, as will be discussed in the last section of this report.

With this very brief overview of the origins of Islamic and Islamist reform and revival movements, attention now turns to the development of these movements in Afghanistan itself.

II. Political Islam in Afghanistan

While it may seem natural that Islamist groups led the Afghan jihad against the invading Soviet forces in 1979, the rise of Islamism in Afghanistan was far from inevitable. Islamic idiom had been prevalent in previous conflicts, but the nature of the mujahidin parties and organizations of the 1980s represented a sharp contrast from the past in several ways. This section will outline how the Islamist parties came to dominate the resistance. Notably, domestic political events and external geopolitical factors played a much more significant role than the infiltration or proselytization of foreign ideologies. Ultimately, the Islamists failed to realize their ideology.

Islam in Afghanistan

Scholars overwhelmingly agree that Islam has been a significant aspect of Afghan identity for centuries. As pious Muslims, Afghans observe rites and rituals associated with birth, marriage, burial, fasting, and holy days. They are also familiar with stories about the Prophet Muhammad and his family, as well as Sufi saints. One expert claims that the depth of Afghans’ piety was demonstrated by mujahidin who gave Soviet POWs the chance to convert. A former Afghan minister has gone so far as to claim that “no other Islamic people can claim to be better Muslims than Afghans.”

The purpose of the preceding paragraph is to demonstrate that a society’s religiosity is not necessarily directly related to religion’s role in politics or the desire to adhere to a fundamentalist Islam. Afghan
communities are quite pious and conservative, but there has traditionally been very little support for the
government to define Islam and its role, or for a strict, orthodox interpretation of Islam.\textsuperscript{31}

Throughout history, Afghan leaders have often appealed to Islam to rally support for a particular cause. As early as the 11\textsuperscript{th} century Mahmud of Ghazni waged jihad against Hindus on the Indian subcontinent.\textsuperscript{32} In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Islam was used to rally support among Afghans against the colonial British forces.\textsuperscript{33} King Amanullah, who ruled from 1919-1929, initially increased his legitimacy by waging a short jihad against the British in India, but he was later overthrown by religious leaders who opposed his westernizing reforms.\textsuperscript{34} Despite their success at removing Amanullah, these ulama were content to later support Nadir Khan, Amanullah’s former Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army as the next Afghan leader, instead of one of their own.\textsuperscript{35}

This brief historical overview of Islam’s role in past Afghan politics reveals a few patterns. First, Islamic leaders rarely played a role that was proactive rather than reactive. The majority of uprisings waged in the name of Islam were in reaction to either invasion or westernizing reforms.\textsuperscript{36} Second, leaders of the Muslim community did not aspire to rule the entire country.\textsuperscript{37} They simply helped their king expel foreigners and then returned to their former lives. In the aftermath of Amanullah’s overthrow, “those who had attacked the city quickly returned to their places of origin and resumed their former lives.”\textsuperscript{38} Third, the mobilization of rural Afghans to Islamic leaders in time of war was based more on a leader’s skill or charisma, rather than any particular religious cause.\textsuperscript{39}

David Edwards summarizes the situation like this:

> In previous encounters between Islam and the state, a variety of religious figures had often been involved, but they generally were in agreement about the meaning of Islam and about the sect or school that was most entitled to paramount status… Thus, leaders… could unite other religious figures behind them, in part because they thought of themselves and were thought of by others as scholars, Sufis, and reformers—\textit{not as potential kings.}\textsuperscript{40} [emphasis added]

\textit{The Rise of Afghan Islamists}

In contrast to past Islamic insurgencies, the opposition against the Soviets in the 1980s was quite fractured. There were dozens of resistance groups, and among them many had different ideas regarding the role of Islam in Afghanistan. What generally became known as the Islamic resistance included both Islamist and non-Islamist parties. The non-Islamist parties were lead by traditional Muslim leaders such as ulama or Sufi shaykhs, many of whom actually advocated a return of the monarchy.\textsuperscript{41} Many resistance parties, especially the Islamists, had their own ambitions for ruling Afghanistan after the Soviets left, which became evident when the country descended into civil war following the Soviet collapse.

In order to reconcile past Islamic insurgencies with the rise of Islamist groups in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it is necessary to examine the few decades leading up to the Soviet invasion. The rise of Islamism in Afghanistan was not inevitable. The following events, elaborated below, all served as critical moments that nurtured, and later legitimated, the nascent Islamist groups:

- State cooption of the clergy in the 19\textsuperscript{th}-20\textsuperscript{th} centuries
- Establishment of Kabul University’s Faculty of Islamic Studies in 1951
- Afghanistan’s experiment with political openness in the 1960s
- Daoud coup of 1973
- Khalq coup of 1978

Scholars agree, however, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 finally provided the opportunity for Islamist groups to become a powerful political force, to be discussed in greater detail below.\textsuperscript{42} The significance of the Red Army’s incursion is evidenced by the fact that earlier religious mobilization failed. In 1959, for example, critics of the regime’s unveiling of women were “swiftly repressed,” and the 1975 uprising of the Islamists in the Panjsher Valley against the Daoud regime was also “crushed with ease by the Afghan army.”\textsuperscript{43} The Soviets became a clear enemy against which the entire country could unite, and
because of their prior organization and outside network of support, the Islamist groups were in a position to take the most advantage.

State Cooption of the Clergy
It became increasingly difficult for ulama to assert themselves in politics as the Afghan state began to appropriate more and more of their functions, beginning in the early 19th century. Rulers like Amir Abdur Rahman declared themselves head of an Afghan Islamic state and took over the legal, educational, and waqf systems that had previously been the domain of the Muslim clergy. The ulama essentially became part of the state bureaucracy.44

The most important consequence of the religious establishment’s cooption by the state is that the ulama stopped serving as the “intermediary between people and the government” and became “deficient as the guardian of Islam.”45 Islamist mujahidin groups were able to argue that this fact discredited their more traditionally oriented opponents after the Soviet invasion. Some of these more moderate groupings of traditional Islamic leaders like the ulama and Sufis became marginalized by the mujahidin supporters, especially after it became clear that the traditionalists advocated a possible return to the monarchy.46

Kabul University
As Olivier Roy points out, the rise of political Islam was often a reaction to colonialism and westernization.47 In Afghanistan, Kabul University served as the place where “westernization was most pervasive.”48 Students from all over the country came into contact with each other and foreign ideologies for the first time. The university employed American and European teachers who encouraged students to think critically and independently, a sharp contrast from traditional Afghan schools. They learned to question their elders both inside and outside the classroom.49

In 1951, as part of its continuing effort to increase its influence, the Afghan state established Kabul University’s Faculty of Islamic Studies, which became the birthplace of Islamist thought in Afghanistan. The department was set up with the help of al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt.50 As a result, several of the professors who taught in the Faculty of Islamic Studies spent some time abroad. Professor Ghulam Muhammad Niazi, who later became dean of the department, studied in Cairo in the late 1950s, where he first came into contact with the ideas of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Upon his return to Kabul, he started sharing these ideas with interested students.51 These reading groups read and discussed the works of the contemporary Islamist thinkers such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayyid Qutb and Pakistan’s Maulana Mawdudi,52 but they did not attract widespread support among Kabul University’s student body.53

Experiment with Democracy: the 1960s
In 1963, Afghanistan’s King Zahir Shah dismissed his cousin, Muhammad Daoud, as the prime minister of Afghanistan and, as part of his regime’s opening up, announced that members of the royal family would no longer be part of his cabinet. Other changes included a new constitution in 1964 and the legal establishment of critical political parties and independent newspapers in 1965.54 These developments were critical for the emergence of political debates in Afghanistan, including the role of Islam in politics.

Notably, one of the prominent parties formed in 1965 was the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).55 Increased communist activism on the campus of Kabul University in the second half of the 1960s resulted in resentment among the university’s practicing Muslims and increased their activity. In 1966, pious Afghans started gathering in a more organized way to discuss the Qur’an and writings of important Islamist scholars, which were now legally available in Kabul’s marketplaces.56 As the PDPA and Maoist groups expanded their provocation of the practicing Muslims, deliberately smoking or eating in front of them during Ramadan, and even engaging in fatal altercations, politics and Islam came to dominate the discussions, and the number of participants gradually grew.57 In 1969, these students formally established the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan.58

Members of the Muslim Youth Organization were proponents of Islamism. Although they won student elections at the university in 1971,59 their success did not reflect countrywide support for politicized Islam.

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v An endowment tied to a religious institution (like a shrine).
The majority of the party’s members were largely from the intelligentsia and scientific schools or departments. Among party members, some joined because of the way the communists’ tactics alienated them, or as a method to counter the “friendlessness and anarchy of the university”— not necessarily because Islamist ideology appealed to them.

What is important to note is the involvement and coming-of-age of the future leaders of the anti-Soviet Islamist groups during this period. People like Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Maulavi Yunis Khales, and Abdur Rasul Sayyaf all played significant roles in the Muslim Youth Organization in the 1960s and 1970s.

1973 Daoud Coup
While Zahir Shah was traveling in Italy, his previously ousted cousin Muhammad Daoud returned to power in a coup d’etat on July 17, 1973. The change in regime had significant consequences for the Islamists, ultimately resulting in their radicalization.

Because Daoud was viewed as a leftist and ally of the Soviet Union, the Islamists feared that he would usher in communist rule in Afghanistan. The Muslim Youth Organization shifted its attention away from the Marxist groups on campus to Daoud himself, and the Islamists’ goal became Daoud’s removal. It should not be surprising that as the Muslim Youth Organization turned to a more explicit role in politics, leaders of the organization began to increasingly argue amongst themselves, and throughout the decade, many splinter groups formed.

With reason, then, Daoud viewed the Islamists and the threat they represented with suspicion and fear. He began to monitor their activities and arrest important leaders. Daoud’s suppression of the Islamists not only further radicalized them as they were forced underground, but many ended up going into exile in Pakistan, which had great consequences for the role the Islamists would play in the Soviet-Afghan war.

The Pakistani regime welcomed the Muslim student leaders with open arms. Because Daoud supported “Pashtunistan,” the idea that the Pashtun areas of both Afghanistan and Pakistan should be united, President Zulfikar Bhutto helped the exiled Islamists. When General Zia ul-Haq came to power in 1977, he supported the Afghan refugees not only because Pakistan continued to be threatened by the Pashtunistan issue, but also because Zia was embarking on an Islamization campaign in Pakistan itself. According to one source, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) started providing military training and funding to Islamists rather soon after their arrival in Pakistan in 1973. The presence of these groups in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s support for them long before the Soviet invasion, would prove critical to the strength of the Islamists after 1979.

Daoud’s crackdown on the Islamists, however, did not significantly impact the majority of Afghans’ daily lives. When the Islamists tried to organize an uprising in 1975, the towns, tribal areas, and the army did not join it. According to Roy, “The people did not see the Islamic political movement as being a bulwark of Islam, any more than they considered the Daoud regime to be pro-communist.”

1978 Khalq Coup
Nur Muhammad Taraki came to power in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, when the Khalq faction of the PDPA stormed Daoud’s presidential palace, killing him and several members of his family. The coup was critical to the Islamists’ future prominence for several reasons. First, the Islamists’ fears of a communist takeover were legitimated. While Daoud may have flirted with the leftists, Taraki was a hard-core communist. The Islamist groups were now convinced more than ever that the central government needed to be overthrown. Because they had been the first to organize an opposition, the Islamists were able to increase their influence.

Second, whereas previously only a small number of Islamists had feared a communist takeover and agitated against Daoud’s administration, the coup and the new regime’s authoritarian implementation of ideological social, educational, and land reforms touched a nerve in a much larger segment of the population. As a result, the number of oppositionists grew, and spontaneous uprisings flared up in many
parts of the country. It is important to note that these new insurgents were not all Islamist. Many of the uprisings were tribal, organized along tribal lines and led by a recognized tribal leader.

Scholars claim that it was the way that the Khalq reforms were implemented, rather than their nature, that caused people to oppose the central government. According to Nancy Dupree, in these early tribal revolts against the regime, “the idea was not really to overthrow that regime in Kabul. It was simply expressing an opinion. This is what many groups have done throughout the Iranian plateau and Central Asian history whenever the king was a bad king—remember, in Islamic political theory a bad king is better than anarchy.” Edwards agrees, remarking that the Islamist parties continued to be unsuccessful in spreading their message. “People were not interested in supporting radical Islam any more than they were interested in radical Marxism.”

Third, Taraki ordered the arrest of many prominent religious leaders, and many others left for Afghanistan. The government’s rhetoric and action against the Islamists helped to increase the population’s awareness about them when they were not well known outside of Kabul. The PDPA demonized the Islamist parties by calling them “brothers of Satan,” a play on words of the Arabic translation of “Muslim Brotherhood.” By focusing Afghans’ attention to the Islamist groups and demonizing their opponents in this way, the communist regime defined the conflict in Islamic terms, making it easier for the Islamist parties to later legitimate themselves.

Finally, as the revolts continued, support for tribal opposition to the communist regime declined as it became clear that tribal organization in Afghanistan did not lend itself well to fighting the central government. Many of the groups turned out to be infiltrated by government agents. The oppositionist tribes also faced the challenge of obtaining weapons. These problems contrasted sharply with the Islamist resistance groups, some of which were highly organized (like Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami) and had the support of the Pakistani government. Moreover, as the deaths of civilians increased, Islam could provide a “framework for comprehending and valorizing the death of innocents” in a way that the traditional tribal codes could not.

While Afghans may not have necessarily believed in the political ideology of the Islamist groups, the Khalq coup and the ineffectiveness of other resistance groups meant that by the spring and summer of 1979, Islam began to trump the importance of tribe in the resistance. In fact, several traditionalist Islamic parties also sprouted up during this time. According to Roy, the traditionalist Harakat party led by Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi was actually the leading party of the opposition in 1980. The Islamists tried to point out that these groups were late-comers to the resistance and discredited by their association with the traditional clergy and royal family.

1979 Soviet Invasion
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, support for the Islamists was not widespread—but the Islamists were in a good position to benefit more than the other Islamic, tribal, or secular parties. The events of the previous decades had allowed the Islamists to learn about political Islam, build a network of like-minded people, develop highly organized parties, mobilize a growing segment of the population, discredit any clergy-based or tribal resistance parties, and receive outside support from Pakistan.

The Soviet invasion strengthened the Islamists’ hand in several ways. Whereas previously the resistance had opposed its own central government, the fight now became one against an outside invader. The atheism of the USSR was perceived to threaten Islam in Afghanistan from the outside for the first time in a long time. As a result, the invasion “stirred all but the most zealous Communist Party members into action of one form or another.”

The Islamist parties in particular benefitted greatly from Pakistani support, which significantly increased. Zia ul-Haq’s administration had already been providing support to the Islamists, exiled in Pakistan since the Daoud coup. Although dozens of Afghan resistance groups formed in Pakistan after the Soviet invasion, including secular and traditionalist Islamic groups, in 1981 Pakistan decided to support only seven Islamic resistance parties in an attempt to unify them and increase their effectiveness. By receiving
exponentially more funding, training, and weaponry than other groups, the strength of these fronts
increased at the expense of the other parties. Tribal fronts, for example, now had to ally themselves with
one of these seven parties in order to receive weapons.84

Among the Islamic parties, however, Pakistan provided the lion’s share of funding and weaponry to the
Islamist mujahidin, especially Hekmatyar, who it believed could be a potential “future leader for an
Afghanistan more closely linked to Pakistan.”85

Additionally, when the U.S. started contributing significant amounts of funding and weaponry to the
mujahidin as the insurgency raged on, Pakistan insisted that it channel this support through its own
networks.86 As a result, Pakistan’s favored groups received proportionately much more support than they
otherwise might have. Again, this benefitted the older Islamist groups.87

Millions of Afghans fled the fighting in Afghanistan to Pakistan. The refugee camps that housed them
were run by only those Islamic parties that Pakistan supported.88 Many madrasas where fundamentalist
ideologies were taught were also established in many of these camps (see section III below).89 In this way
the camps ended up serving as critical recruitment pools to which the Islamists would not necessarily
have had access otherwise.90

_The strength and prominence of the Islamist parties during the Afghan-Soviet war was thus largely
determined by factors other than the popularity of their ideology._ In fact, as late as 1987, the
overwhelming majority of Afghans (72%) surveyed wished to see Zahir Shah return as the ruler of
Afghanistan. Only 12.5% wanted to see Afghanistan establish “a pure Islamic state.”91 According to
Edwards, this clearly “indicated that the majority of Afghans remained unmoved by the Islamic political
rhetoric with which they had been relentlessly assailed for the better part of a decade.”92

**Fate of the Afghan Islamists**

Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Islamist Jamiat-e Islami party, finally came to power in 1992 following
the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan in 1989, the cessation of Soviet aid to Afghan President
Najibullah’s communist government, and several rounds of negotiations between Najibullah, the
mujahidin, and their state sponsors. Rabbani’s presidency, however, did not necessarily represent a
success for Afghanistan’s Islamists or their ideology.

Cooperation between the Islamist groups had been rather tenuous for decades. The enmity between
Hekmatyar, on the one hand, and Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, on the other, was very deep and
personal, and their parties had often attacked each other during the war with the Soviets and
afterwards.93 (In fact, Hekmatyar shelled Kabul daily for periods in the early 1990s.)94 In the effort to gain
the upper hand in the battles with one another, the situation devolved into one in which “the effective
practices, constituencies and strategies of both parties had more to do with ethnic polarization and sheer
political rivalries between their leaders than with [Islamist] ideology.”95 _The pragmatism necessary to
increase their power meant that the Islamists had to make compromises and forge alliances that belied
their original Islamist ideals._ They were transformed into nearly mono-ethnic parties built around
charismatic or influential individuals rather than political issues or ideologies. The issues of competition
between them became framed more as a question of which ethnicity or which individual and his
supporters would control central power in an increasingly decentralized political environment.

Moreover, the Islamist parties, though claiming to advocate political Islam, never clearly elaborated on
their ideological positions.96 Majrooh claimed that the Islamists simply had “no time for political theories.”97
This became very clear during Rabbani’s presidency during which “no measures that could be labeled as
‘Islamist’ were taken by the government.”98

For these reasons, what began as Islamism in the 1960s and 1970s had already dissolved by the 1990s.
One could argue that the ideological paucity of the Islamist parties was masked by their fame during the
Soviet invasion, while their inadequate popularity was substituted with extensive international and
Pakistani support. The continued infighting among the leaders of the Islamist mujahidin groups of the
Soviet-Afghan war throughout the 1990s subsequently discredited them, easing the way for the Taliban to come to power in 1996.  

III. The failure of political Islam and the rise of radical militant jihad

The Taliban emerged independently of the organized political parties as a response in part of the Islamist’s failure to consolidate power and restore order to the country. The young militants who fought for them and to a lesser extent their leadership as well were a product of a changed political and religious environment centered in the NWFP in Pakistan, which had become both the center of the Afghan refugee crisis and the focal point for international involvement in the anti-Soviet jihad.

Afghan social reforms and attempts at modernization in the 1960s and ‘70s inadvertently turned the country into a battleground for ideologies represented by much larger foreign interests. The Afghan conflict became a proxy war not only between the West and the Communist block, but also, unnoticed or ignored at the time particularly by the West, a training ground and rallying point for increasingly radical groups from the Middle East and Pakistan that had previously limited their focus to issues affecting Pakistan/India relations or the Middle East. The end result of a complex process of internal Pakistani reforms and policies, the Afghan refugee crisis, the influx of foreign radical groups combined with arms and money from the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and stark political instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan was the creation of a virtual incubator for radical militant jihadist groups in the region who eventually emerged with a much broader international agenda than any of their sponsors had ever intended.

Pakistan’s internal reforms

While increasingly relevant to American and NATO interests in Afghanistan, a longer discussion of the Islam and Islamism in Pakistani society and politics is beyond the scope of this report. There are, however, several issues that are unavoidable in this discussion. The first of these is the importance of Zia ul-Haq’s 1978 military coup and the subsequent reforms to the system of religious education his regime enacted.

As part of his general program aimed at increasing the level of Islamization of society and embellishing his credentials as the leader of a Muslim state, ul-Haq’s government quickly introduced reforms that allowed the madrasa system to flourish as never before. The state offered generous funding for new madrasas and secular degree equivalency for madrasa education. These reforms, combined with other social and institutional factors, sparked a tremendous boom in the number of students studying in and graduating from religious schools in Pakistan in the late 1970s and ‘80s. The Deobandi madrasas alone, the most important network present in the NWFP, grew by some 500% in this period. The need for religious scholars with only a mid-level education did not in any way keep pace with the growth of institutions, however, and there were simply not jobs waiting for these students after graduation. This situation gave rise to a serious glut of young men with a religious education but no employment, and at the same time seriously increased the political strength and political activity of the ulama in Pakistan.

This same period of explosive growth of the madrasa system also saw a massive influx of mostly Pashtun refugees into Peshawar and temporary camps in the NWFP. The secular public education system in Pakistan would not have been able to handle the sudden increase of population (most estimates are that around 3 million Afghan refugees settled in the NWFP) without significant increases in funding and personnel, but the secular system was and is underfunded and understaffed in most of the country. Makeshift madrasas hastily set up to serve the refugees as well as established institutions that suddenly accepted many more students had to employ teachers with much lower qualifications than normal to meet the needs for increased personnel, and Pashtun students would usually return to Afghanistan or move elsewhere before completing their education. The hasty assembly of the system and the explosive growth of the Deobandi network in particular created a dramatic de-centralization of the network. Combined with the sudden influx of Middle Eastern radical groups flush with money and enthusiasm for jihad, these factors rapidly catalyzed the spread of radical ideologies.

Arab radical splinter groups and the influx of Saudi money

As the Afghan resistance became a celebrity cause in both the Muslim world and the West, money and arms to be sent on to Afghanistan poured into the NWFP. Along with these came foreign fighters from all
over the Muslim world and significant figures from the most radicalized splinter groups of the Arab Muslim Brotherhoods, including Abdullah Azzam and his former student Osama bin Laden.\(^{69}\)

Azzam had been heavily influenced by the later writings of Sayyid Qutb. Though Qutb’s work had also informed Afghan Islamists like Niazi and Rabbani (see above), these men were older and their encounter with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers had come during a much earlier period, before Qutb had been imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian nationalist government (Qutb was executed in Egypt in 1966).\(^{109}\) Qutb’s later work was influenced heavily by the thought of the obscure medieval Arab scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who, in response to the Mongol threat against Egypt, had formulated a long-rejected legal defense of \textit{jihad} against fellow Muslims judged to be apostate.\(^{110}\) Near the end of his life, Qutb claimed that this reasoning justified \textit{jihad} of Muslims against Muslims, emphasizing the duty of all “faithful Muslims” to fight \textit{jihad} for the establishment of “righteous” Muslim rule in their countries even if their government was Muslim (but not Islamist).

Azzam’s contribution to this was to break out of the nation-state framework and internationalize the struggle, calling Islamist militants to join together and ignore state boundaries. His ideology “transformed radical Islam from a group of disparate movements defined by national borders into a potent (if scattered) force in the international arena.”\(^{111}\) Azzam found in the Afghan resistance exactly the kind of struggle he was seeking. He moved his whole family to Pakistan in 1979 and personally joined in the armed resistance; but he aspired for something much larger. In 1984 he founded the \textit{Mukhtab al-Hidmat} (services center) in Peshawar, which came to organize not only almost all the foreigners who poured into Pakistan from all over the Muslim world, but also a large portion of Saudi money invested in the struggle.\(^{112}\) Azzam personally ran this organization until he was assassinated in Peshawar in 1989, after which his much more radical protégé Osama bin Laden transformed the \textit{Mukhtab al-Hidmat} into al-Qaida.\(^{113}\)

\textbf{The creation of jihadi culture in Pakistan}

It was here in Pakistan that Wahhabi, Salafist, and Arab MB radical Islamist doctrines came together and sometimes blended almost indistinguishably into a kind of “potpourri” of jihadi doctrine, encouraging some elements of the Afghan resistance to militant extremism:

On a doctrinal level, the differences are certainly significant between the MBs and the Wahhabs, but their common references to Hanbalism (the strictest of the four legal schools of the Sunni word), their rejection of the division into juridical schools, and their virulent opposition to Shiiism and popular religious practices (the cult of the saints) furnished them with the common themes of a reformist and puritanical preaching. This alliance carried in its wake older fundamentalist movements non-Wahhabi but with strong local roots, such as the Pakistani \textit{Ahl-e Hadith} (Oliver Roy).\(^{114}\)

The money and support available from these outside actors quickly made its mark on the madrasa system in the NWFP, which became increasingly disorganized and focused primarily on jihad at the expense of any real education. According to Joshua White, who specializes in Islamism in the NWFP:

Quality [of the Deobandi madrasas] deteriorated markedly through the 1980s. The jihadi ideology became more important than mastery of traditional scholarly subjects. The careful and comprehensive curriculum designed by the founders at Dar ul-Ulum gave way to mass education that was decidedly more ideological in character. In one respect, the education system itself changed, from a model which valued extended study under a learned \textit{alim} [pl. ulama], to one that promoted something of a freelance, franchise model. These changes did not take place in a vacuum. They were part and parcel of the jihad in Afghanistan—a conflict which fundamentally altered the face of Deobandism particularly in the frontier.\(^{115}\)

Another assessment from the independent International Crisis Group puts it this way:

As Zia attempted to consolidate this authority through Islamization at home and jihad in Afghanistan, the madrasa system was profoundly transformed. Zia’s Islamization and the Afghan
jihad nurtured many, often mutually hostile, varieties of fundamentalism. Each Pakistani sect, its disciples a much sought-after commodity, closed ranks and fortified itself. As a result, sectarian divisions were militarized... Madrasas churned out hordes of religious graduates with few skills or training for mainstream professions. This growing army of extremists in Pakistan fought the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad alongside the Arabs and Afghans and still serves the cause of jihads from India to Russia.\textsuperscript{117}

The formerly traditionalist and conservative madrasa culture of the NWFP was significantly altered, creating an entire class of professional \textit{jihadis} and mullahs who nurtured and trained them and now had a taste of political power and influence. The jihad had given ordinary mullahs an opportunity to vie for political power in a new way, and to enhance their social position using religious rhetoric applied to secular political issues.\textsuperscript{118} It had in effect created a whole class of poorly educated \textit{ulama} trained in the jihadi madrasas but ill-equipped to actually perform religious duties. These warriors without a war, Vali Nasr argues, “began to stake out their own claim to power, [attempting to satisfy new appetites for] power, status and wealth that Islamization had whetted but left unsatiated.”\textsuperscript{119}

For the Afghans, once the Soviets were driven out in 1989, and all the more when the Najibullah regime fell in 1992, “jihad” lost its original meaning and focus. Lacking an outside enemy on which to focus their attention, the already fractious groups splintered even more.\textsuperscript{120} Jihad became more an enterprise to join than an ideology to believe in. In the aftermath of the social changes in the NWFP and within Afghanistan, combined in particular with the burgeoning illegal narcotics trade that had helped fund the war in Afghanistan after American and international funding decreased in 1989, many mujahidin commanders inside the country devolved into local warlords who continued to profit from both engaging in smuggling of narcotics and licit goods and taxing other smuggling networks in areas under their control.\textsuperscript{121} Many of the foreign fighters trained in the Afghan jihad turned their attention away from Afghanistan and attempted to spread jihad to other countries or join existing conflicts like those in (Indian) Kashmir, Somalia, Sudan, the Balkans, and Chechnya.\textsuperscript{122}

The long role of the Pakistani government in continuing to support extremist groups and employ them to its own ends in Kashmir and in Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this report.\textsuperscript{123} It is significant to note, however, that many of the jihadi madrasas that appeared in the period discussed above continue to operate (some very openly) or have even expanded, making Pakistan still the epicenter of the spread of radical militant ideologies in the region.\textsuperscript{124} The penetration of these groups, particularly the Arab-run organizations like al-Qaida, into local culture appears to have been extremely limited, however, even when al-Qaida was openly operating bases in Afghanistan in the mid and late 1990s.

The Arab militants (as well as other non-Pakistani foreigners) who had remained in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal appear to have been a thorn in the side of the local populations. They had no organization and no objectives, so they busied themselves by occasionally railing against local syncretic practices and saint veneration. Interaction with local populations ceased when bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996. He took control of training camps and separated the foreign militants from the population in order to avoid aggravating his hosts and presumably to keep tighter control over the trainees.\textsuperscript{125}

The militants who trained in the new camps were a “second generation” of radicalism, young men who had generally been recruited in the West where they were studying or working. They seem to often go straight into extremism, without passing through a stage of religious devotion first and only slowly radicalizing, as their older predecessors (including Bin Laden himself) had. This new cadre showed no interest in Afghanistan, did not learn local languages, did not mix with locals, and were generally unaware of and uninterested in their surroundings.\textsuperscript{126}

While no blanket statements about the spread of radical ideologies can be made, in particular in the age of the internet and cell phones that the jihadist groups have shown themselves quite adept at using, the spread of foreign extremism in the immediate region appears to remain centered in Pakistan. It is there that the movement courts a particular culture of young men facing unemployment or underemployment and join not so much an ideology or a belief as they do an entire “enterprise” or a way of life. This
enterprise, in the terms of the jihadi propagandists, provides meaning to their lives, honor to their families and the promise of financial support to their parents through their death as a martyr.\textsuperscript{127}

IV. Conclusion, Analyst’s Comments

The profound attempts to change, modify or modernize Afghan society along the lines of foreign ideologies (the modernization programs of Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan along European lines and the Communist one according to Marxist ideology) sparked resistance that found expression in many different idioms. Some were indigenous, familiar, and local (tribal, ulama and Sufi networks, monarchists) and some, like the Islamists, found inspiration in a movement that responded to more global issues and the experiences of other Muslim countries with European colonialism.

After the Soviet invasion, the Afghan domestic resistance suddenly found itself adopted as a proxy for ideological and political battles against communism and Soviet power by groups as disparate as Egyptian Islamists, Iranian revolutionaries, arch-conservative Saudi groups and the American CIA. Each of these groups came with its own ideologies and each attempted to sway or manipulate the Afghan population in its own way. The Afghans, however, remained disunited.

While Soviets were able to support a relatively consistent cadre of internal elements (and fought with their own military until 1989), the other international players frequently shifted the parties and individuals that they supported, clearly hampering whatever ideological impact they would have wished to have. While Iranian support, for example, went almost exclusively to the Hazaras, the disposition of Hazara politics and the competition this sparked for Iranian sponsorship prevented Iran from gaining any real political or ideological foothold in the country. Similarly, the Saudi Wahhabis developed a network of support to individual commanders like Sayyef and Hekmatyar, and developed links to the more conservative Ahl-e Hadith madrasa network in Pakistan. The movement had a madrasa in Kunar in the village of Panjpir\textsuperscript{128} and had trained Afghan mullahs especially in the provinces of Kunar and Badakhshan. In the course of the war in Afghanistan, some of these mullahs founded small principalities within Afghanistan: under Mawlani Afzal in Nuristan, Mawlawi Shariqi in Badakhshan, and Mawlawi Jamil al-Rahman in Kunar. These minor emirates, however, were quickly overthrown by other warlords, in some cases with the support of other Arab groups in competition with the Saudis for influence.\textsuperscript{129}

As the Soviets withdrew, events in the Middle East drew the attention and the funds of international actors elsewhere, taking their fractured ideological influence with them. In the aftermath what remained after 1992 was a collapsed state in Afghanistan, a failed Islamist movement engulfed in internecine war that frequently victimized the civilian populations it was fighting over, and an increasingly anarchic, decentralized collection of regional warlords whose personal fiefdoms were financed by smuggling and narcotics production.

In this environment there does not appear to have been any really significant domestic survival of the foreign ideologies the country had been exposed to during the Soviet resistance. While individuals may have retained their ideals, organized religious ideological platforms or organized evangelism of Wahhabi, Salafi, or even ordinary fundamentalist movements seems to have disappeared in the chaos. This can only be a tentative statement, however, because during this anarchic period we know very little about religious activities that were taking place inside Afghanistan. Such organizations as did have a presence, though, like the Ahl-e Hadith/Wahhabi movement, disappear from Afghanistan during this period (through documented conquest of their areas of influence by other groups), and the RRC found no information regarding their reappearance at a later period.

The Taliban arose from the militant jihadist culture that had been established in Pakistan and enjoyed the support of the Pakistani government, sweeping the warring Islamist parties out of most of the country very quickly. While many of their practices—and not least their willingness to host deeply ideological organizations like al-Qaida—resemble those advocated by Wahhabi and Salafi groups, they have never produced anything like a coherent ideology. Scholars generally agree that they represent more accurately the conservativism of rural Southern Pashtuns (their key demographic) much more than any single Islamist or Islamic ideology. The pieces of ideology that they cobble together to justify their claim to rule
Afghanistan are often religiously incoherent and reflect the kind of patchwork religious education that had been available to them in Pakistan. They were and are clearly influenced at times by more hardline groups that provide them with support and recognition.\textsuperscript{130} But, just as during the Soviet resistance when Arab groups would harass local populations for their “folk” practices or local shrines, ideological efforts like these aimed at “internationalizing” or “purifying” the Islam of local populations appears only to anger them and tend to turn them against the Taliban.\textsuperscript{131}

Regardless of the particular beliefs of the Taliban themselves (or their lack of coherent beliefs), their current base of support in Northwest Pakistan remains a shelter for the most radical and militant ideologies related to Islam in the region. Whatever the presence of these ideologies may be in Afghanistan or the reception that they receive from Afghans inside their home country, it is this base and the web of social networks connecting many areas of the country to that geographic area that represents the most likely avenue of exposure to militant religious beliefs and organizations.

Especially as these militant doctrines evolve into a cult of suicidal martyrdom, those most vulnerable to their influence are young men who have little stake in this world and can be convinced that they can accomplish more by dying than they could if they went on living, as appears to be the key in \textit{Lashkar-e Taiba} (the militant arm of \textit{Ahl-e Hadith}) recruitment in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{132} On the other hand, the successful recruitment in the 1990s by al-Qaida of scores of educated but disaffected young men from relatively well-off families in Europe and the UK for suicide missions against the United States makes it clear that the problem is not one that can be solved by simple economics.

Even the link between ideology and activism is unclear. There are many “Salafi” Muslim revivalist groups like the \textit{Jamiat-e Tablighi} across the world that engage in revival and renewal of individuals. These groups reject jihad and instead focus on \textit{dawa}, “the call” to personal submission to Allah.\textsuperscript{133} The defining characteristic of militant groups is not their theology — that they are Salafi or Wahhabi or even Islamist — but their fetishization of violence, focus on jihad as a war against the West (and India), and the extension of this war even to other Muslim governments or civilians they identify as hindering their ambitions.\textsuperscript{134}

Within Afghanistan, where the rural population is deeply conservative and has shown little interest in political Islamism or foreign religious doctrines, the key vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups is very likely the degree to which anti-Western and specifically anti-American resentment can be mobilized. In other words, it seems likely that the greater danger in Afghanistan does not come from extremist groups converting Afghans to their own interpretation of Islam and therefore mobilizing them against the US for religious reasons; the more pressing danger comes from extremist organizations \textit{taking advantage of anti-American sentiment} to mobilize them as allies of convenience in a cause against a common enemy.
1 For more information see RRC-AF2-08-0019 “Afghan Folk Views on Taliban Islam and Wahhabism;” RRC-AF1-08-0028 “Malang;” RRC-AF1-08-0032 “Sufi Networks;” RRC-HTATAF-08-0008 “Hanafi School and Sharia.”


3 The foundational work on fundamentalism and the modern world is Bruce Lawrence, Defenders of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row 1989); Special thanks to Dr. Harvey Cox of the Harvard Divinity School for direction and references on fundamentalism.


10 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


16 Ibid. 9. See RRC-HTATAF-08-008 “Hanafi School and Sharia” for more detailed explanation of Islamic jurisprudence and its role in Afghan society.


18 Salafists can be divided most importantly into two groups: salafiyya ilmiyya, those who advocate a return to the moral order of the age of the prophet without reference to politics, and salafiyya jihadiyya, militant groups who attack Western targets and believe that they are justified in using violence to defend “the Muslim world” from “Western aggression.” Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, “Disaggregating the Islamist Movements,” presented at “Roots of Islamic Radicalism,” Yale University (New Haven, CT) May 2004.

19 Roy, The failure of political Islam, 35.


22 Roy, Ibid. 36.


26 Ibid; Andrew McGregor, “‘Jihad and the rifle alone’;


33 Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan*, 4.


37 Reshtia, “Commentaries on Dr. Naby’s Paper,” 84.


41 For a general overview of the main seven Sunni parties and their views, see Fuller, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan*, 49-53.


45 Naby, “Changing Role of Islam,” 149.


60 Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” 200.


64 Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 225-278.


67 Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 76.

68 Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan,” vi; Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 76.
69 Haqqani, “Afghanistan’s Islamist Groups,” 74.
78 Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 159-163.
84 Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 165-166.
85 Haqqani, “Afghanistan’s Islamist Groups,” 75.
87 Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 67
89 Haqqani, “Afghanistan’s Islamist Groups,” 75.
91 This survey was conducted by Sayyid Bahaeddin Majrooh, the director of the Afghan Information Center (AIC) in Peshawar, Pakistan. The AIC was the only independent Afghan news source, and it had distributed the survey in almost half of the refugee camps that existed in Pakistan. The respondents represented 23/28 Afghan provinces, Afghanistan’s eight major ethnic groups, and all seven of the Islamic parties. Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 282. In Barnett Rubin’s view, the survey methodology was flawed, and probably reflected more accurately the views of elders rather than Afghan youth. See: Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 339.
93 See RRC-AF2-09-0002 “History of Tanzim Relations” for a more detailed discussion of the differences and rivalry between the two major Afghan Islamist parties.
95 Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” 207.


Ibid, 93.


McGregor, 92.

Ibid, 101; Roy, *The failure of political Islam,* 117.


Ibid, 101; Roy, *The failure of political Islam,* 117.


White, 31.


See all above (123).


Ibid, 51.

Ibid, p. 32-46.


Ibid.


A very recent example of this is the attack on the Rahman Baba Shrine in Peshawar this month that sparked a great deal of local anger. Nasir Khan, "Taliban target shrine sacred to Pashtuns, Sufi poet’s tomb ruined." *The Washington Times,* 14 March 2009.


Ibid, 2-3.