



# Nuclear/Radiological Outreach



# Bernadette R. Bland, Supervisory Special Agent Countermeasures

Oscar R. Hernandez, SNL IPA Intelligence Analysis

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate
September 23, 2010



### **Overview**

- FBI Jurisdiction
- WMD Directorate
- Nuclear Site Security Program
- Research & Test Reactor Outreach
- Threat Awareness
- Summary



### **FBI Jurisdiction**

- FBI is the designated lead agency for criminal investigation of terrorist acts or terrorist threats inside the U.S. (NSPD-5)
- FBI's highest priority is to detect, prevent and/or disrupt terrorist activities involving WMD
- FBI also coordinates related activities of other members of the U.S. law enforcement community
  - National Joint Terrorism Task Force (point-of-fusion for 48 agencies with access to well over 100 databases)
  - 106 JTTFs in the 56 field offices and 50 resident offices
  - NJTTF Campus Liaison Initiative




### **FBI HQ - WMD Directorate**

- The WMD Directorate coordinates all aspects regarding FBI's WMD responsibilities
- Coordination involves:
  - Other FBI HQ Divisions (e.g. Counterterrorism, Laboratory, Critical Incident Response Group)
  - 56 FBI Field Offices
  - 61 Legal Attaches and international partners
  - Other agencies as needed





# **FBI Field Offices**






### **WMD** Coordinators

- WMD Coordinators are located in all 56 field offices
- Contacted by state and local emergency responders when confronted by a WMD threat or incident
- Act as a conduit to FBI-HQ and the Federal government for technical information, advice and assistance
- Emphasis on pre-event planning and prevention
- Liaison with Federal regional counterparts, and state, county and local response agencies



## **Threat Credibility Evaluation**







Consult with external assets (as needed)

Threat
Credibility
Evaluation
Conference
Call




Initial Notification to WMDOU



**FBI WMDOU** 






<u>Threat</u> <u>Credibility</u> Evaluation



## **Threat Credibility Evaluation Process**





# **Nuclear Site Security Program**

 Ensures that FBI Field Offices are familiar with the nuclear facilities in their territory and have compatible, well-coordinated and exercised plans in place for response to nuclear facility emergencies



# **Program Elements**

- Interagency coordination
- Facility familiarization
- Continuing liaison
  - Facility management & security
  - Local First Responders
- Coordinated contingency plans
- Joint exercises & training



### RTR Outreach

- FBI field offices directed by FBI-HQ to conduct visits to RTRs
- Purpose of visits:
  - Gain facility familiarization, and understanding of the security requirements and technology
  - Establish liaison with key facility personnel
  - Open lines of communication regarding threat/ incident reporting



# RTR Outreach (cont'd)


- Independent initiative of other USG programs, (i.e. DHS/DOE/NRC), however, there is coordination:
- Additional outreach conducted jointly, e.g. Silent Thunder Tabletop Exercise (TTX) Program
- FBI Agents attending Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN for Alarm Response Training

#### **OFFICIAL USE ONLY**



# RTR Intelligence Bulletin

- Increase FBI Domain Awareness
- Assist WMD Coordinators in Outreach
- Raise OPSEC Awareness
- Details
  - RTRs potential source LEU or HEU
  - NRC regulate 42 RTRs
    - 31 RTRs in operation
    - 4 contain HEU
    - 11 undergoing decommissioning
  - DOE has 4 RTRs
    - 3 with HEU
    - 1 with LEU
  - HEU to LEU conversions





## **Threat Awareness**



- Terrorist Interest Persists
- Potential Emergent Threat

In-situ RDDs (Radiological Dispersal Device)

- At storage and end use locations
- During source transit
- Decreases detection probability
- Domain Targets
  - RTRs HEU and LEU
  - What is perceived vulnerable





# **Indicators and Warnings**

- Potential vulnerabilities
- Incidents occurrence
- Targeting and probing
- Internet traffic
- Accessibility
- OPSEC awareness
- Threat awareness





# **Case Study 1: Sharif Mobley**

- Arrested in Yemen in March 2010 on al-Qa'ida related terrorism charges
- Worked as a laborer at several U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) from 2002 to 2008
- Allegedly killed a Yemeni guard during an escape attempt
- Terrorism charges dropped, now charged with murder
- Currently in the custody of the Yemeni government





#### **OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

# Case Study 2: Cesium-137 at University

- Apparent attempted theft of Cesium-137 from a liquid scintillation counter in 2008
- 600lb counter was found upside down on the floor in a damaged condition
- Rear access panel that was held in place by 8 screws was removed
- Scintillation counter was kept in an unlocked room



### **Case Study 3: Gamma Knife at University**

- Visiting physician from Egypt was seen leaving the gamma knife room with a screw driver
- Physician had access code to room but was not authorized unescorted access
- There were scratches on the back of the gamma knife; however, they might predate the event
- The 16 inch flathead screwdriver was reportedly used to attach a camera to a laptop
- Individual terminated from program



### Case 4: Access Incident

- Security system bypassed
- Shared access cards
- Unauthorized entry
- Entry door left open
- Corrective measures





# **Summary**

- Terrorist Interests Persist
- FBI Jurisdiction
- Nuclear Site Security Program
- RTR Outreach
- Indicators
- Emergent Threats



## **Contact Information**

Bernadette R. Bland

**Supervisory Special Agent** 

202-324-7821

B.Bland@ic.fbi.gov

Oscar R. Hernandez

**Senior Intelligence Analyst** 

202-324-6436

Oscar.Hernandez@ic.fbi.gov

