Preserving Stability Operations Capabilities to Meet Future Challenges

Biennial Assessment of Stability Operations Capabilities

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This report provides an assessment of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts over the past two years to implement requirements set forth in the 2009 DoD Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*. It highlights significant initiatives currently underway or planned throughout DoD and provides recommendations and key findings to achieve further progress.

The overarching theme of the report is that the Department must learn from previous hard-won experience in stability operations and institutionalize, enhance, and evolve the lessons learned and capabilities acquired by the U.S. military for current and future operations. As part of a risk-balanced strategy, one of the Pentagon’s top priorities should be to prepare for the predominant sources of conflict in the 21st Century, specifically fragile states and the irregular challenges that they spawn. Even if we anticipate participating more selectively in these operations in the future, the U.S. military should capitalize on the adaptation in thinking that occurred as a result of the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by preserving perishable expertise, and retaining key capabilities and the appropriate skill sets for these operations.

I have reviewed the attached assessment on implementing DoD Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, and support its recommendations. Implementation of these recommendations will initiate a process to achieve a more integrated and consolidated approach to sustain stability operations capabilities, and serve to underscore the Department’s continuing commitment to stability operations as a core U.S. military mission.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Executive Summary** ........................................................................................................... 3  
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5  
Major Accomplishments since 2009 ..................................................................................... 7  
Why Sustain Stability Operations Capabilities? ................................................................. 9  
Institutionalizing Change ..................................................................................................... 13  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 24  
**Appendix A: Review of Key Enabling Capabilities** ............................................................ 25
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As U.S. defense strategy shifts from an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for future challenges, the task of promoting stability in a volatile strategic environment remains one of our Nation’s top concerns. Emphasizing more effective non-military means and military-to-military cooperation can help to prevent instability from triggering conflicts, thereby reducing demand for large-scale stability operations aimed at bringing such conflicts to closure. As part of a prudent down-sizing of our posture, the U.S. military must be able to retain otherwise perishable skills, expertise and specialized capabilities acquired as a consequence of its hard-won experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retaining these capabilities requires an enduring investment in people, the wherewithal to institutionalize lessons learned, and the retention of forces that can be quickly regenerated to meet future demands.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has taken positive steps since 2009 toward enhancing its stability operations capabilities. Joint doctrine is now on a firmer foundation; the Services have strengthened relevant proficiencies at the unit level; and investments in civil-military planning, exercising, field-level coordination and capacity-building are noteworthy. Even so, these gains are ad hoc and temporary for the most part and will be fleeting unless affirmative steps are taken to preserve stability operations capabilities in the years ahead.

To help achieve this goal, this report recommends the following specific steps:

- DoD should continue to emphasize stability operations as a core military capability in all of its key policy and strategy documents.

- DoD should continue to make refinements to existing doctrine as new lessons emerge and develop a process to fast-track doctrine that absorbs these lessons based on operational necessities.

- DoD should persist in its efforts to translate such lessons into stability operations-related training and education at all levels. To help sustain civil-military training capacities, it should consider ways of incentivizing U.S. whole-of-government training and exercises, possibly through a pooled funding approach. It could also consider combining multiple exercises into a single capstone event focused on interagency integration.

- In close coordination with interagency partners, DoD should mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity in uncertain and hostile operational environments by continuing to place emphasis upon preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks. We should continue to advocate for increased civilian agency capacity and resources, while also promoting the development of civilian-military capacity of allies and other partners to address stability operations and related activities.

- As defense resources shift back from contingency funding to our base budget, DoD should continue to work with Department of State, interagency partners and the Congress to review the adequacy of legal authorities and funding for the full range of security assistance and coalition support programs requiring coordinated defense, diplomacy, and development
efforts in the stability operations arena. Specifically, the Congressionally-mandated annual review of the Global Security Contingency Fund execution, and other resultant lessons learned documents, could help in mapping out possible legislative changes and in recommending interagency planning process improvements.

To impart momentum to these steps, this report highlights two overarching recommendations for DoD leadership to consider:

- First, DoD should assign a proponent organization to be responsible for stability operations and related capabilities. By assigning such an entity, economies could be realized in support of the Department’s initiatives while ensuring that functions are not lost. Given fiscal realities, assigning this responsibility to an organization that is already invested in stability operations capability is more appropriate than establishing a new organization.

- Second, DoD should use the standard force development process to incorporate capabilities solutions and lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq in developing stability operations concepts, requirements, and ultimately capabilities. A Joint Stability Operations Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) could be formally structured to provide a methodologically rigorous assessment of the current operational capability of DoD stability operations assets, identification of capability gaps, and will assess and recommend suitable feasible and acceptable doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities (DOTMLPF) solution sets to address these gaps. Additionally, it could conduct a detailed analysis of the future stability operations mission environment, identify tactical, operational and strategic capability and capacity requirements, and proffer detailed analysis on how future DoD requirements will be met. The CBA would consider active and reserve component balance and ways to regenerate stability operations capabilities, if required. The CBA process would conclude with a submission of an Initial Capabilities Document and/or DOTMLPF Change Recommendation to the Joint Staff for action.

Finally, this report (in Appendix A) highlights the importance of key enabling capabilities for stability operations in areas such as intelligence support, information sharing, agile funding, capacity-building for the rule of law and civil policing, and DoD capacity for medical support and civil affairs operations.

Taken together, the above-cited recommendations should not be viewed as a comprehensive strategy but rather as an initial step toward preserving the lessons learned, expertise and specialized capabilities developed over the past ten years in Iraq and Afghanistan. They would underscore the Department’s continuing commitment to stability operations as a core U.S. military mission in an era of fiscal austerity.
INTRODUCTION

U.S. Armed Forces have acquired substantial proficiency in conducting large-scale stabilization campaigns over the past decade. Now that our military mission in Iraq is completed, and with the transition to host nation security responsibility now underway in Afghanistan, U.S. forces will no longer be sized for large-scale, prolonged stability operations.¹ In accordance with the 2012 strategic guidance for DoD, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine lessons learned, expertise and specialized capabilities in order to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations, if required, operating alongside coalition partners wherever possible. DoD will also retain the ability to mobilize and regenerate larger forces if future needs arise.²

What steps should be taken to implement this vision for stability operations preparedness? To help answer this question, this report assesses department-wide efforts to implement DoD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations issued in September 2009. Pursuant to that Instruction’s requirement to conduct a biennial capabilities assessment, this analysis highlights significant initiatives underway or planned throughout DoD and provides recommendations for senior leadership on ways to sustain this progress. The analysis presented in this report draws upon a year-long assessment effort that included input from the Military Departments/Services, Combatant Commands (CCMDs), Defense Agencies, OSD and Joint Staff, other U.S. Government agencies, and non-governmental organizations.

Sustaining enhanced stability operations capabilities across DoD is essential to conducting irregular warfare and major combat operations effectively, prevailing in today’s wars, and advancing U.S. national security interests in the 21st century. To address these challenges, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05 provides that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”

Looking back, the impetus for the Instruction, and the Directive that preceded it, was the 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) report, Transition To and From Hostilities. The report noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted stability operations every 18-24 months. More importantly, the Defense Science Board report revealed that the cost of these operations far outstrips the cost of major combat operations in both human resources and treasure.³ The report concluded that these costs can and should be reduced by improving the ability of the U.S. Government to perform these missions.

As for the future, this assessment is founded upon the following key assumptions:

- DoD will be called upon to undertake stabilization missions in the years ahead, either to help prevent conflicts from erupting or to build a secure and stable environment in their aftermath.

² Ibid.
³ Defense Science Board (DSB) report, Transition To and From Hostilities, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 18 and appendix D.
Resources available for this mission will be constrained; therefore:

- The United States will increasingly work through and with partners
- Future responses will require DoD support to other USG agencies and the international community, with the host nation as the focus
- Other USG agencies will play an essential role in the conduct of stability operations, although they continue to experience difficulties in providing sufficient capacity, requiring DoD to fill the gaps
- DoD must provide a full-spectrum approach to complex situations (lethal and non-lethal, defeat and stabilize) \(^4\)

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\(^4\) Adapted from William Flavin, *Finding the Balance: U.S. Military and Future Operations*, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Paper, March 2011, p. 43. The underpinnings for these assumptions will be provided in the section beginning on page 8 of this report.
MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE 2009

1. Stability operations doctrine is on a solid footing with the release of joint publication (JP) 3.07, *Stability Operations*, and JP 3.08, *Interorganizational Coordination*. Both publications reflect an unprecedented degree of interagency input via the joint doctrine development process. The Army published a revised FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, in 2008; and the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are developing *Maritime Stability Operations* (MSTO), scheduled for release in early 2012. Developments in doctrine, training, and education were assisted by a robust lessons learned capability within the Department which has subsequently been expanded to include relevant mission partners outside of DoD.

2. The FY12-16 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance addresses stability operations as part of the Analytic Agenda.

3. Service contributions are noteworthy: The Army has doubled active duty Civil Affairs personnel, created a permanent Security Force Assistance Training Brigade (162nd IN BDE), grown military police and expanded its judge advocate general’s corps. The Air Force has provided two Air Expeditionary Wings to work with the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to advise and assist these countries’ fledgling air forces. In addition, the Air Force plans to field 15 Light Mobility Aircraft and 15 Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance platforms to facilitate the instruction and fielding of developing partner nation air forces. The Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO), established in 2008, addresses policy, planning, and programmatic issues needed to improve Navy proficiency in stability operations and other IW mission areas. The Navy continues to provide forward presence, and military engagement programs such as the Africa Partnership Station have provided maritime support and training to selected countries around the African continent in support of CCMD operational requirements and theater security cooperation plans. Additionally, Marine Corps units deploying to Afghanistan are assessed against the stability operations mission-essential tasks during Enhanced Mojave Viper unit training.

4. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has developed several noteworthy programs in support of requirements received from theater operations including: the Ministry of Defense Advisor’s (MoDA) program, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, and the integrated interagency civilian-military field training program at Camp Atterbury/Muscatatuck Urban Training Center.

5. CCMDs are integrating stability operations and whole-of-government planning situations into their exercises; examples include: USEUCOM’s Austere Challenge 09, USAFRICOM’s Judicious Response, USPACOM’s Talisman Saber 11, and USSOUTHCOM’s Integrated Advance.

6. DoD utilized two different programs to facilitate the environment necessary to build the rudiments of stability through locally-targeted civic assistance in our operating venues. Specifically, DoD employed the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Afghan Infrastructure Program (AIP) to identify and implement more than 25,000 urgent humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and critical
infrastructure projects since September 2009. Through this experience, DoD has developed the training programs, data management systems, and internal management infrastructure to implement agile funding programs in a fashion that delivers positive results while mitigating the inherent risks associated with quick-impact assistance.

7. Planning with civilian agency partners has taken a step forward. Highlights include:

- The USG Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan.
- The U.S. Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq.
- Substantial interagency input to DoD strategic guidance documents has become a major driver of interagency cooperation and has set the conditions for more consultative planning processes at the CCMD level.
- Interagency “Promote Cooperation” events sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff J-5 and supported by DOS and USAID, among other agencies, has become a useful tool for enabling better two-way communication during the development of the CCMD Theater Campaign Plans (TCP).
- The “3D Planning Group,” composed of representatives from DOS, USAID, and DoD, developed processes that improve planning collaboration among the three agencies.

8. DoD has made changes to policy and doctrine to enable commanders at all levels to facilitate information sharing more effectively. Resource Management Decisions for the FY 2012 Program/Budget Review provided $46.8M to fund an enterprise approach to unclassified information sharing.

Assessment: Although the above accomplishments contributed to addressing the operational problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, these gains remain ad hoc and temporary for the most part and will be fleeting unless the Department takes affirmative steps to preserve stability operations capabilities in the years ahead.
WHY SUSTAIN STABILITY OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES?

“We must have a highly professional education system that educates future leaders on the hard earned lessons of this past decade so we don’t repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam of thinking these kinds of operations are behind us.”

General Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Prepared Answers for Senate Armed Service Committee, 21 July 2011

In a rapidly changing and increasingly connected global environment, struggling states pose an enduring threat to U.S. security interests. As we saw in Afghanistan prior to the attacks of September 11th 2001, as well as in Somalia and elsewhere, when countries lack the wherewithal to responsibly address violent non-state actors on their territory, they can become hubs for terrorist activity, transnational crime, illicit trafficking, weapons proliferation and humanitarian catastrophes, all of which could have substantial impact upon international security. Addressing the threats posed by such instability represents a core, if as yet unmet, challenge for the global community.5

From a national security perspective, stability operations is not a stand-alone response but part of a larger repertoire of instruments that the United States and its allies and partners have used to address the problem of failing states threatened by a rising tide of irregular warfare. As the 2010 National Security Strategy specifically declares: “We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.” While these tools can address immediate threats, they must also be closely synchronized with longer-term development strategies aimed at assisting fragile states to move up the pathway toward greater stability, good governance and economic development.

From DoDI 3000.05, the following reiterates this importance: “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission [emphasis added] that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.... DoD components shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans.” The statement that DoD should perform stability operations as a “core mission” represented a significant cultural shift for our military. Changes in institutional culture do not occur overnight, but considerable strides have been made.6

DoDI 3000.05 defines stability operations as “encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Joint Doctrine states that all operations are composed of balanced elements of offense, defense and

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5 These themes were amplified by Dr. Barbara Sotirin, Director J5 GSA, keynote address to Stability Operations Implementation Conference, ANSER, Shirlington, VA, September 14, 2010.

stability tailored to the environment to accomplish U.S. National Objectives. Since stability is a goal that spans various military missions, tasks, and activities, the emphasis varies based upon the operation’s phase and time. In particular, the Instruction stresses that U.S. military forces shall be prepared to conduct stability operations “throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including combat and non-combat environments.”

Figure 1 is a visual depiction of the range of military operations within the spectrum of conflict. Stability operations as conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan can be placed from the middle toward the upper-right of this continuum. Although the Department cannot discount similar future security challenges, the most likely stability operations challenges will be dealt with from the middle toward the lower-left side of the continuum.

![Figure 1 – Range of Military Operations](image-url)

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states: “The mission of the DoD is to protect the American people and advance our nation’s interests.” Civilians are responsible for virtually all other aspects of societal organization and functions. In theory, it is easy to stipulate a simple division of labor between military forces and civilians. Yet in practice, it is rarely that simple.

DoDI 3000.05 expands the military mandate. As former Secretary Gates observed: “To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it – to attain a political objective – the U.S. military’s ability to kick down the door must be matched by our ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” Even more so, in today’s environment, the military’s ability to engage prior to hostilities to stabilize a fragile state may influence that state to avoid internal conflict, war with its neighbors, or even conflict with the United States.

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7 As described in Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011.
Whether prior to, in the midst of, or in the aftermath following a conflict, the need for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and reestablish local government and public services will not go away. Even with greater State Department and USAID involvement in stability activities, future military commanders will no more be able to rid themselves of these tasks than U.S. generals were able to do during World War II. To paraphrase what a former U.N. Secretary General said about peacekeeping, it is not a soldier’s job, but sometimes only a soldier can do it.  

An expanded and enhanced USAID and State Department would enable the United States to implement its foreign policy in permissive environments with minimal DoD support. Effective diplomacy and development are highly preferable and come at a much lower cost than military operations. These mission sets are not the purview of the military, but of State, USAID and, at times, civil society. Although DoD has no desire or intention to usurp another agency’s mission sets, we do have a responsibility to ensure that our activities that may have diplomatic or developmental impacts are informed by best practices and lessons learned.

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In uncertain or hostile environments that are beyond the reach of diplomacy, the U.S. military seeks to set the conditions for a secure environment as it did in Iraq and is currently doing in Afghanistan, and even assists in development as it did in Haiti with the UN security force in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake that devastated the country. The unique comparative advantage U.S. forces have in providing security for itself and other U.S. agencies positions the military to be the only actors that can provide humanitarian or development assistance in situations of armed conflict or similar hostile environments. Development and defense go hand-in-hand and must work together to achieve our national security objectives.

U.S. Armed Forces will always be the cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented by other elements of national power. As laid out in the 2010 National Security Strategy, “Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems and work seamlessly with other countries.” However, work remains to foster continued coordination across the various U.S. departments and agencies. Limitations upon civilian agencies to deploy field personnel in sufficient numbers and to operate in uncertain hostile environments means that DoD will be expected take on stability operations tasks until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international organizations. Promoting increased deployable civilian capacity must remain a top DoD priority, but the process will take years, if not decades, and require far-reaching Congressional action with respect to policies, authorities, and appropriations.

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9 Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, December 1994, in a quote attributed to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.

For the Department to conduct and support stability operations effectively, civilian and military leaders need to continue to drive the changes the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary launched in DoDI 3000.05 in order to:

- Emphasize the continued importance of stability operations tasks in virtually all critical DoD missions.

- Mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity by preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks.

- In the wake of our military drawdowns in both Iraq and Afghanistan, ensure that our forces’ counterinsurgency and stability operations expertise and experiences are not treated as an aberration, as they were in the post-Vietnam era. This will be particularly important as stability operations compete with other priorities in an era of tightening defense budgets.

- Complete the intellectual and cultural transformation of military institutions required to deal with the complexities and dangers of an unpredictable security environment.
INSTITUTIONALIZING CHANGE

“Our interests are being threatened with alarming frequency by various forms of political violence subsumed under the heading of low intensity conflict.... We will need the courage to depart from conventional institutional norms and the vision to maintain a pragmatic defense posture increasingly relevant to a world characterized by neither war nor peace.”

Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project
Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, Vol. I
USATRADOC, 1 August 1986

Overall, DoD has made progress in meeting the exigencies of ongoing stability operations and the challenges identified in DoDI 3000.05. Policy and doctrine stand out as areas of positive direction. Other areas, such as incorporating lessons learned into training and education, external partner integration, and force structure have seen improvement. This progress, however, has been uneven, ad hoc, and incomplete. Institutions are slowly inculcating stability operations policy and doctrine into thoughts and actions. Looking ahead, as we enter an era when opportunities for “learning by doing” will be less frequent, and yet the need to be prepared is enduring, our forces must fully institutionalize stability operations capabilities to complete the vision of DoDI 3000.05. This can only happen through a concerted, focused, and coordinated effort that is adequately resourced. This section provides an assessment of efforts toward institutionalization of stability operations capability across the broad spectrum of DoD components.

Policy:

Policy direction for the implementation of stability operations within DoD is in place. The 2005 DoDD 3000.05, reissued in 2009 as DoDI 3000.05, Stability Operations, made stability operations a core military function and provided policy guidance to the Joint Forces and the Military Departments to increase their capability and capacity to conduct such operations. The 2012 strategic guidance for the Department of Defense reinforced that stability operations will remain a primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces. Although U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, DoD will have the ability to mobilize and regenerate key elements of the force as needed.11

Additionally, the 2012 strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of working with allies and partners as key and essential to success. These ideas are also embraced in the 2010 National Security Strategy.12

Recommendations for Policy: DoD should continue to emphasize stability operations as a core military capability in all of its key policy and strategy documents.

Doctrine:

As previously stated, DoD has the requisite doctrine in place that establishes stability operations as a core mission on par with combat operations. The joint stability operations construct first outlined in the 2006 version of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, was based on experiences during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and an emerging Army view documented in its 2008 revision of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. The construct defined stability operations as encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. It also embraced continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout all joint operation phases. The foundational work in JP 3-0 provided the basis for the new JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*, which exploited the construct.

Ongoing implementation of the U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges addresses a wide range of DOTMLPF actions for improving stability operations including, but not limited to, training and education, technical innovation, and the USN-USMC-USCG Maritime Stability Operations (MSTO) doctrine development effort that will complement JP 3-07 and FM 3-07.

Unfortunately, the lengthy delay in the publication of JP 3-07, fully eight years after the invasion of Iraq, has meant that stability operations are not yet broadly understood within DoD, including among the uniformed military. For instance, many still regard stability operations and “Phase IV (Stabilize)” as synonymous, not understanding that stability operations apply across all phases of a joint operation and across the range of military operations. Still others disassociate stability operations from other forms of irregular warfare such as counterinsurgency or counterterrorism when, in fact, stability operations are a vital component of those missions. These misunderstandings are likely to diminish as stability operations doctrine is promulgated and applied in military education and training.¹³

Recommendations for Doctrine: DoD should continue to make refinements to existing doctrine as new lessons emerge and develop a process to fast-track doctrine that absorbs these lessons based on operational necessities.

Incorporating Lessons Learned into Training and Education:

The Joint Staff, J7, and service organizations, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, have been instrumental in translating lessons learned into lessons applied including their incorporation into stability operations doctrine and related Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). With regard to stability operations, the lessons learned process has also expanded to include DoD collaboration with interagency partners, NATO, and non-traditional partners such

¹³ PKSOI brief on leadership and education, Stability Operations Implementation Conference, ANSER, Shirlington, VA, September 15, 2010.
as the NGO community. Additionally, with its relocation to the National Defense University, the Center for Complex Operations has become a hub for the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices in concert with a broad group of national and international stakeholders. Overall the collection and dissemination of lessons learned has been facilitated by various information management tools to include the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) which has recently been extended to interagency partners. Ultimately, however, these lessons learned must translate into lessons applied which are best observed through changes in organizational behavior.

Although there have been some notable advances in achieving either integrated or complementary civilian-military education and training around activities falling within the definition of “stability operations,” the Department is far from where it should be. Positive developments including individual and collective training courses, home station training, and mission readiness exercises have added emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, cultural awareness, and interaction with local populations. Moreover, the principal combat training centers have transformed to address stability and counterinsurgency experiences from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, in addition to preparing for future challenges that may arise.

Stability operations topics are being included throughout the professional military education (PME) system, and stability operations has been listed as a “Special Area of Emphasis” for several years (2005 through 2008) for Joint PME (JPME). Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) have been included within Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) for both Intermediate and Senior-Level Service colleges in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) since 2009. In addition, the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education includes extensive reviews of JPME curricula to ensure JPME institutions are covering JLAs and associated objectives appropriately. In addition to coverage in the core curricula, most JPME institutions have electives available that focus on stability operations.

Nevertheless, these changes must be institutionalized while balancing and developing the qualities needed for operating in complex environments against more tactical and technical competencies. As noted above, an inherent gap exists between lessons learned, the new doctrinal framework and translation into understanding at the institutional, unit and individual educational and training levels. However, to achieve comprehensive organizational culture change, stability operations considerations must be integrated into basic thought processes for a majority of military tasks. The adaptation is a lengthy process that involves development of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), Universal Task Lists (UTL), Mission-Essential Task Lists, standard training scenarios, supporting training materials, and reference handbooks.

Joint Staff, J7, lessons learned sharing initiative with NATO regarding Stabilization and Reconstruction lessons learned began in 2011. The Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) have been useful facilitators linking USG agencies and NGOs. Examples include: PKSOI’s Stability Operations Lessons Learned & Information Management System (SOLLIMS) which is designed to allow U.S. Military, U.S. Government civilian agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, IOs, NGOs, and private sector organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination and integration of lessons learned. USIP facilitates a Civil-Military Working Group to promote greater collaboration between U.S. Government agencies and the NGO community.
Furthermore, although existing policy and doctrine state that all operations will be conducted using a whole-of-government, comprehensive approach, the institutional military training and education base has only been partially successful in incorporating these approaches into their preparation, and mostly on an ad hoc basis. As an example, DoD has worked in partnership with the State Department and USAID to increase military participation in civilian-led stability operations activities as well as pre-deployment training, and alternatively with civilians participating in military training. DoD was the leading advocate for a field training exercise as part of the Foreign Service Institute’s pre-deployment curriculum where it identified a DoD training venue and developed the original training framework for the field training portion. Such training includes coursework at the Foreign Service Institute and field training exercises at Combat Training Centers and Camp Atterbury/Muscatatuck Urban Training Center. This effort has come in response to greater emphasis that the theater has placed on civil-military integration. However, despite these best efforts, integrating interagency partners into exercises and other training events continues to be hindered by different institutional approaches toward training and incompatible personnel policies. Overall, these efforts to integrate civilian-military training are temporary, ad hoc, and lack institutional staying power over the long haul.

**Recommendations for Training and Education:** DoD should persist in its efforts to translate such lessons into stability operations-related training and education at all levels. To help sustain civil-military training capacities, it should consider ways of incentivizing U.S. whole-of-government training and exercises, possibly through a pooled funding approach. It could also consider combining multiple exercises into a single capstone event focused on interagency integration.

**External Partner Integration:**

DoD’s coordination with non-military actors has improved dramatically in the past decade. As a result of lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, doctrine and concepts have been refined with greater attention paid to working with non-DoD participants during stability operations.¹⁵

**Interagency Integration:**

Cultural barriers to interagency coordination have been overcome in some organizations but still exist in many. Even where the cultural climate may be favorable, there is still insufficient institutionalization of the concept. The QDR includes an entire chapter on strengthening U.S. whole-of-government efforts as well as the comprehensive approach with allies and host nations as key elements essential to success.¹⁶ These sentiments are echoed in the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and the 2010 National Security Strategy.¹⁷ DoD recognizes that future challenges will require a whole-of-government approach and has actively sought to include interagency participation in its planning, training, exercises, and operations.

¹⁵ See Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination, June 24, 2011.
¹⁶ 2010 QDR, pp. 57-71.
Although differences in institutional approaches to training and preparing for stability operations continue to complicate interagency planning and operations, the chief barrier to effective coordination remains lack of civilian capacity to surge resources in support of operations. Simply put, there is no civilian agency “bench.” Over the past decade, DoD has dramatically increased requests for personnel from other U.S. departments and agencies to support military training, exercises, planning events, and operations abroad. Although the outcome of any particular request is contingent on many factors, there are simply not enough civilian personnel to match the demand signal for these resources.

Operationally, there remain many challenges to overcome. The scope of activities that fit within DoD’s definition of stability operations is so broad and disparate that it continues to present challenges for coordination and cooperation with the USG interagency and broader stakeholder communities. Many of the activities that fall within stability operations remain well beyond the purview, authorities, and capabilities of most of the military community, creating problems in aligning efforts and in ensuring that USG development objectives are not undermined. This is particularly true of economic growth and governance activities that DoD has undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The USG interagency still has a great deal of work to do in appropriately aligning objectives. The kinds of activities that our military forces carry out under the rubric of stability operations can be implemented to achieve a wide variety of objectives; e.g., counter-insurgency, counterterrorism, disaster response, counter-narcotics, or country engagement in support of other U.S. national security objectives. Unless we can effectively align objectives, it will remain difficult to align activities that fall under the DoD definition of stability operations with similar non-DoD efforts.

Where the military has attempted to undertake some types of stability operations, particularly in situations like Afghanistan and Iraq, they are challenged by:

- Networks of partners on the ground that work at cross purposes;
- Lack of technical competence in cross-cutting disciplines;
- Not fully understanding the sociocultural context into which the projects they develop will be introduced;
- Ability to ensure that projects will be supported;
- Inadequate analysis of second and third order effects;
- Lack of comprehensive understanding of the overall USG mission to empower the local government rather than advertise the presence of U.S. forces; and
- Lack of cross-departmental assessment mechanisms to ensure that we can accurately track stability operations effects over time.18

Several examples of civil-military cooperation stand out to indicate that these barriers to more effective integration are not insurmountable. The USG Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq represent advances in planning that align objectives and synchronize interagency efforts. Placing USAID Senior

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18Observations of Elena Brineman, USAID, Office of Military Affairs, Civilian Agency Perspectives on DoDI 3000.05 Implementation Conference, United States Institute for Peace, April 6, 2011.
Development Advisors at CCMDs and CCMD military representatives in USAID has facilitated integrated planning, programming and problem solving. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (led by OSD with Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School as the implementing partner) opens the possibility for more integrated DoD/DOS/USAID work in helping countries build sound, accountable, host-country institutions. Additionally, there have been advances in the development of tools that facilitate integrated analysis and framing of the problem, which is the first step in achieving integrated efforts. These tools include:

- The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and other interagency assessments that facilitate joint assessment of the risk of conflict; and
- The District Stability Framework (DSF) which facilitates tactical-level stability assessment, programming and evaluation (currently in use by field personnel in Afghanistan and now mandated by DOS, USAID, and DoD).

On the national level, the establishment of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) – now recast as the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations – and the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) by the Bush Administration were positive steps to increasing interagency integration. The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan, intended to help the Afghan government build capacity to govern effectively at the national and sub-national level, served to highlight the difficulties of increasing civilian expeditionary capacity. Given the current budget climate, this report assesses that any increase in civilian agency capacity (as called for in the QDDR) as unlikely.

Increasing Multilateral Capacity:

Large-scale or multiple simultaneous stability operations can quickly overwhelm the capabilities of any single country—even the United States, whose global responsibilities put many demands on its resources. Indeed, one of the most important lessons from Iraq is that the United States must place a high priority on building coalitions with like-minded countries to conduct stability operations. Important civil and military capabilities are needed to complement and build capabilities of the host nation, and the United States should leverage the contributions from capable and concerned countries and the international organizations it helps to sustain and manage. As part of a U.S. Government-wide effort, DoD should continue its efforts to increase the civilian-military capability and capacity of allies and other partners. One such example is DoD/DOS assistance to NATO’s “Comprehensive Approach.” Forums such as the U.S.-India Joint Working Group on Peacekeeping Organizations, the Annual International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue concerning cooperation on UN peacekeeping operations facilitate the development of core competencies for peacekeeping and stability operations among potential U.S. partners.

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Organizations such as the U.S. Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute have been vital to this outreach.20

NGOs:

With regard to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the primary challenge is to establish trust and effective working relationships with organizations that may be disinclined to work closely with DoD. Through the Working Group on Civil-Military Relations sponsored by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), DoD with USIP and the NGO consortium Interaction developed the Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments. This publication has been followed by the development of table-top exercises to examine these guidelines and provide opportunity for increased dialogue. Going forward, DoD should continue this dialogue with these organizations, document the guidelines in policy, and consider expanding the guidelines to include the development community. Additionally, DoD will need to ensure that this initiative finds its way into the DoD education and training programs.

Private Sector:

The private sector plays a vital role in stability operations. Whether due to conflict, a natural disaster, or some other failure of government, instability within a country can be stemmed by supporting economic growth activities that increase employment and ultimately achieve greater societal stability. DoD should partner with both global and local private sector entities and maintain economic situational awareness when conducting stability operations.

USAID’s A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries highlights the importance of fostering private sector development immediately following conflict, and JP 3-07, Stability Operations, recognizes the importance of economic growth in stability operations.21 Implementing employment generation programs, enabling access to markets, gaining situational awareness from private industry subject matter experts, and tracking various economic conditions or locally procuring goods and services are all examples of how DoD has worked with the private sector in support of stability operations. Geographic combatant commands are growing their capacity to engage and coordinate with the private sector, and DoD should continue to build this capacity, as well as support USAID and the Department of State in rebuilding the economies of post-conflict and/or natural disaster stricken countries.

Recommendations for External Partner Integration:

- In close coordination with interagency partners, DoD should mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity in uncertain and hostile operational environments by continuing to place emphasis upon preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks. We should continue to advocate for increased civilian agency capacity.

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20 As an example: The U.S. Army through PKSOI established an exchange program with the Italian Post Conflict Operations Center to expand stability operations discussions with NATO allies and coalition contributing nations.
and resources, while also promoting the development of civilian-military capacity of allies and other partners to address stability operations and related activities.

- As defense resources shift back from contingency funding to our base budget, DoD should continue to work with Department of State, interagency partners and the Congress to review the adequacy of legal authorities and funding for the full range of security assistance and coalition support programs requiring coordinated defense, diplomacy, and development efforts in the stability operations arena. Specifically, the Congressionally-mandated annual review of the Global Security Contingency Fund execution, and other resultant lessons learned documents, could help in mapping out possible legislative changes and in recommending interagency planning process improvements.

**Force Structure:**

Faced with the requirement to conduct simultaneous stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Military Departments/Services reacted by creating numerous ad hoc structures to deal with the complex environment. Key examples of these responses included Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), Military and Police Training and Advisory Teams, Agribusiness Development Teams from the National Guard, Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), Base Camp Headquarters, Atmospherics Teams, Counter-IED Teams, Afghan Liaison Officers, Female Engagement Teams, Economic and Political Intelligence Cells (EPICs), Stability Operations Information Centers (SOICs), Regional Information Center (RICs), Village Stability Operations augments, and the use of artillery officers in civil affairs missions. It was this lack of institutionalization that caused constant reinvention — from General Chiarelli’s pre-deployment work integrating civilian capabilities in the 1st Cavalry Division back in 2004 to the current Advise and Assist Brigades in Iraq, and most recently the 10th Mountain Division’s Special Skills Initiative in Afghanistan.  

The PRT is one example of an ad hoc structure. It was created in 2002 to help improve stability in Afghanistan by increasing the host nation’s capacity to govern; enhancing economic viability; and strengthening the local governments’ ability to deliver public services, such as security and health care. PRTs were a means of coordinating interagency diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts among various U.S. agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs were intended to be interim structures; after a PRT has achieved its goal of improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow traditional development efforts to occur.

This type of organization has been used in various forms for years and has been discussed in civil affairs courses and been documented in joint doctrine. Nevertheless, because it remains an ad hoc structure, it has not been subjected to the force design and force development regimen. Therefore, its operational concept remains fluid, its structure varies; it places no demand on institutional human resources nor on the training base. There are no demands on the system to provide a trained stream of personnel to fill the slots because those slots are temporary.

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22 Adapted from Flavin 2011, pp. 34-37.
24 JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.
Additionally, given the multi-agency nature of the PRT, these problems are compounded. There is significant institutional resistance toward embracing this concept, yet it is seen as a key element in both OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OIF.

Furthermore, there is a need to reconsider the roles and access to the Reserves more broadly to allow greater access to the low-density, highly skilled capability. The 2012 strategic guidance for the Department of Defense states, “DoD will manage forces in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.”

In another example, the structure of Civil Affairs (CA) has remained under-resourced even though the requirement has always outstripped the capability at least since the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps have assigned artillery officers to do CA missions, signaling a structural imbalance in the force. CA finally achieved the necessary momentum in the effort to reform, relook, and restructure with the release of the 2010 QDR. The 2010 QDR supports increasing the capacity of the CA; thus, by 2015 a new Active and Reserve Brigade will be added to the U.S. Army. A similar initiative to expand CA capacity exists in the USMC. Despite documented success, the Navy is reducing its maritime CA capacity and transferring what remains to the Reserve Component. Nevertheless, the internal design of these organizations does not reflect any of the other whole-of-government initiatives such as the DOS Civilian Reserve Corps nor the DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce that are developing functional area deployable expertise.

Recommendations for Force Structure: DoD should use the standard force development process to incorporate capabilities solutions and lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq in developing stability operations concepts, requirements, and ultimately capabilities. A Joint Stability Operations Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) could be formally structured to provide a methodologically rigorous assessment of the current operational capability of DoD stability operations assets, identification of capability gaps, and will assess and recommend suitable feasible and acceptable doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities (DOTMLPF) solution sets to address these gaps. Additionally, it could conduct a detailed analysis of the future stability operations mission environment, identify tactical, operational and strategic capability and capacity requirements, and proffer detailed analysis on how future DoD requirements will be met. The CBA would consider active and reserve component balance and ways to regenerate stability operations capabilities, if required. The CBA process would conclude with a submission of an Initial Capabilities Document and/or DOTMLPF Change Recommendation to the Joint Staff for action.

25 To its credit, the Army acknowledged this imbalance and enacted dramatic restructuring of the force from 2007 through 2015, shifting over 57,000 military occupational specialties from areas such as combat arms to stability operations related fields such as engineers, military police, medical, and civil affairs.

26 The Marine Corps had already taken steps to address the Civil Affairs shortfall prior to the release of the 2010 QDR. In 2008, the Marine Corps added three Active Duty Civil Affairs Detachments (51 members each), one for each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

27 The Navy is moving toward an all reserve structure but increasing operational reserve teams from current 30 to 45 teams.
Establishing a Joint Proponent:

The chief obstacle to institutionalizing stability operations capability is the lack of a joint proponent within DoD. Each of the Services has a role in developing and fielding stability operations forces. But they independently develop their own long-term force development and acquisition programs based on their interpretation of near-term CCMD requirements. This lack of a primary constituent can lead to widely diverse and uncoordinated Service development efforts.

DoD has yet to identify and prioritize systematically the full range of needed capabilities because, until now, most of the Department’s efforts to integrate stability operations have been led by OSD and the Joint Staff. Although these organizations are able to provide high-level guidance, they are inadequately staffed, lack deep enough reach to be able to implement and institutionalize capability effectively, and do not have the knowledge of doctrine, organization, and force generation that a true proponent should have. As a result, the Military Departments are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed to accomplish stability operations effectively in the future.

A related issue is the ability of CCMDs to accomplish tasks specified in DoDI 3000.05. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) are the “customers” of this process and should be the ones to determine future stability operations requirements through the planning process. However, the ability of the CCMDs to determine requirements beyond the near-term is limited, especially when compared with the Military Departments. The Military Departments respond to the CCDR’s near-term “demand signals,” but are still the de facto lead for determining future requirements because they are better resourced.

This is particularly true for implementation of DoDI 3000.05. The office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Geographic CCMDs, and the Military Departments have all designated key positions as stability operations advocates as required by the instruction. The advocates’ primary role is to create a network of people across the Department who can act as agents of change to incorporate stability operations into DoD’s organizational culture. To do this, the stability operations advocates need to be high-level, properly resourced, and have the ability to act as integrators both within their organization and across the Department. Unfortunately, this loose network of advocates, despite many positive efforts, is no substitute for a single integrator, or joint proponent.

The United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and its Joint Irregular Warfare Center were able to provide this integrative function to a certain extent, but with USJFCOM’s disestablishment the Joint Staff now has the lead, albeit with fewer available resources.

The lack of a single integrator means that there are overlapping and redundant organizations focused on the same problem. Each Service maintains its own IW, COIN, or stability operations centers to address operational and tactical-level issues. Additionally, there are many private think tanks and universities drawing Federal funds to analyze problems associated with IW, COIN, and stability operations on behalf of these Service entities. All these organizations compete for resources and attention. The problem is both one of setting priorities and reducing
duplication of effort. The Department should examine how to reduce redundancy and foster integration among these many organizations in order to gain efficiencies.\textsuperscript{28}

This situation resembles the patchwork nature of Special Operations Forces (SOF) throughout their early history, culminating in the 1980s with the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the single integrator and advocate for SOF core activities. However, there is no USSOCOM equivalent for stability operations functions (security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation). Individually, these functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a functional sector. Collectively, as set forth in the National Security Strategy, they are the pillars upon which the USG frames the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. As was the case with SOF capabilities prior to the creation of USSOCOM, these functions are currently spread across the Department, with the result that stability operations capability development is not well integrated or synchronized. Although the USSOCOM model represents an extreme solution to the issue of a single integrator, other less drastic alternatives, such as executive agency or proponentcy, could prove just as effective.

\textit{Recommendations for Establishing a Joint Proponent:} DoD should assign a proponent organization to be responsible for stability operations and related capabilities.\textsuperscript{29} By assigning such an entity, economies could be realized in support of the Department’s initiatives while ensuring that functions are not lost. Given fiscal realities, assigning this responsibility to an organization that is already invested in stability operations capability is more appropriate than establishing a new organization.\textsuperscript{30} Specific authorities and responsibilities would include the following:

\textsuperscript{28}See David Graham, Robert Magruder, et al, \textit{Managing within Constraints: Balancing U.S. Army Forces to Address the Full Spectrum of Operation Needs}, Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA., September 2010, pp. 127-136. The authors suggest ways for the Army to consolidate overlapping stovepipes into one coherent program.

\textsuperscript{29}See Susan L. Marquis, \textit{Unconventional Warfare}, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1997. To military officers grounded in conventional warfare, SOF were often perceived as operating outside the mainstream to little effect, often as a distraction, and therefore as a drain on resources that could better be used elsewhere. The disaster of the Iranian hostage rescue, Desert One in 1980, and the mishaps during the invasion of Grenada in 1983, provided the impetus to focus additional attention and resources on the nation’s SOF capability. Consequently, at the direction of Congress, the Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on April 16, 1987. Congress gave USSOCOM authority, direction, and control over its own budget under Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11). MFP-11 provided the Command with funding authority for the development and acquisition of equipment, materials, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations. These measures, by and large, fixed the constituency issue for SOF. Notably, the focus on the establishment of USSOCOM placed an unintended emphasis on special operations alone and away from low intensity conflict. The result was atrophy in capabilities required for low intensity conflict despite practical experience in various contingencies throughout the 1990s that indicated greater attention was required. (See pp. 184-187).

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- Track and supervise the execution of Directives, 3000.05 and 3000.07 (Irregular Warfare).
- Oversee DOTMLPF development across the Military Departments/Services.
- Assess demand, validate requirements, and establish priorities.
- Exercise proponenty for conceptual and doctrinal thought.
- Prepare and submit budget proposals for stability operations capabilities.
- Ensure the Services develop required capabilities and required force structure to meet identified demand.
- Ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.
- Ensure that there are clear career paths to support stability operations by monitoring officers’ promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education.
- Oversee and provide leadership for education and training in these areas.
- Ensure the readiness of DoD stability operations capabilities.
- Develop readiness metrics for stability operations.
- Exercise proponenty for collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and integrating lessons learned for stability and peace operations.
- Conduct outreach to international audiences in the areas of peace and stability.
- Provide reach-back assistance to deployed forces.
- Develop and refine unique Universal Joint Task Lists and Mission-Essential Task Lists.
- Work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop concepts of civil-military integration with civilian agencies.
- Work with civilian agencies to develop integrated operational capabilities.

CONCLUSION

The findings and recommendations presented in this report are the first steps in a longer process of institutionalizing stability operations capabilities across DoD. In this era of fiscal austerity, it is vital that DoD leadership be forceful and consistent in communicating the message that stability operations remain a core mission that the Department shall be prepared to conduct with a proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Accordingly, we urge the Secretary and his leadership team to give favorable consideration to the recommendations contained in this report.

Along with the retention of critical skills and expertise, it is especially important that major DoD components develop a road-map for posture scalability – that is, to rapidly expand the size of the stability operations force if our Nation is forced to make hard choices about when and how to respond to crisis contingencies. Pathways into conflict may be navigated by choice or necessity; pathways out of conflict are much harder to navigate without some form of stabilization posture – perhaps small, possibly large, but always capable – that aims to reestablish a safe and secure environment and mitigate the drivers of renewed violence.
APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF KEY ENABLING CAPABILITIES

This annex details current challenges and recommendations for seven areas of special emphasis: Intelligence, Information Sharing, Agile Funding, DoD Support to Rule of Law, Stability Policing, Medical, and Civil Affairs. Taken together, these areas represent several of the key enablers for successful stability operations.

**Intelligence:**

Stability operations fundamentally depend upon the military’s ability to operate effectively in a foreign society. Therefore, one of the most important intelligence objectives is to ensure that operators in the field have knowledge of host populations: social structure (ethnic groups, tribes, elite networks, institutions, and organizations, and the relationships between them); culture (roles/statuses, social norms and sanctions, values, and belief systems); cultural forms (myths, narratives, rituals, symbols); and power and authority relationships. This information must be appropriately linked to geospatial coordinates and provide a basic map of the human terrain that will improve the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces. The intelligence community has been challenged by fusion of “enemy-centric” and “population-centric” intelligence to support ongoing operations. The development of the “Stability Operations Information Center” (SOIC) provides one such example.

Developed in response to complex operations in Afghanistan, the SOIC concept was meant to facilitate active operations and proactive shaping as part of the COIN campaign. It placed a greater emphasis on winning the population’s support while continuing to target insurgents. This population-centric approach to intelligence in support of stability operations was facilitated by the broad-based sharing of civil-military information. Nevertheless, SOICs are an ad hoc, non-doctrinal, solution conceived as the result of hard-won experience eight years into the war in Afghanistan.31

**Recommendation:** DoD should explicitly address and integrate intelligence support to stability operations across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities in order to provide operationally relevant socio-cultural intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

31 Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, January 5, 2010, pp. 2. “Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to our overall strategy. Having focused the overwhelming majority of our collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how we might influence them, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation of villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers—whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers—U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency. This problem or its consequences exists at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, from the ground level up to headquarters in Kabul and the United States.”
Information Sharing:

There has been a recognized need within the Department of Defense in recent years to enhance national security by establishing an information sharing environment that facilitates the exchange of unclassified information among government personnel addressing common problems across agencies and levels of government. Moreover, DoDI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, recognizes the imperative to develop policies and systems for sharing unclassified information during stability operations among DoD components, relevant U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and members of the private sector, while adequately protecting sensitive information, privacy, and civil liberties.

DoD has made strides to improve policy and doctrine to enable commanders to act as stewards of unclassified data and take advantage of every opportunity to share information with relevant mission partners. Specifically, information sharing is addressed in the 2010 Guidance for Employment of the Force, DoDI 8220.02 on the sharing of information and communications technology, and in Joint Publications 3-07, *Stability Operations*, and 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination.* This information-sharing policy is focused on developing a “responsibility to provide” culture in which unclassified data is readily discoverable and accessible from the earliest point at which it can be exploited by the end user. Operationally, these changes have contributed to breaking down the barriers to effective information sharing.

In addressing its assigned tasks in DoDI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, the ASD/NII and DoD CIO have focused on establishing a funded enterprise service to provide Unclassified Information Sharing (UIS) services to facilitate interaction and cooperation with non-DoD mission partners. Resource Management Decision for the FY 2012 Program/Budget Review provided $46.8M to fund this enterprise approach. The initial implementation of this capability has enabled CCMDs to achieve efficiencies through the integration or cancellation of redundant, “home grown” information-sharing efforts. Recognizing that the need for Civil Information Management (CIM) extends beyond Special Operations Forces, USSOCOM is also sponsoring an initial capabilities document for CIM which is currently assigned to the C4/Cyber Functional Capabilities Board.

Operationally, the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force is sponsoring the creation of an unclassified enterprise capability for the International Security Assurance Force (ISAF) that will bring together U.S., allied, and coalition partners in a single information domain. The domain will combine access to data sources (such as RONNA, Indure, Tabulae, PIX, SharePoint), and others to allow an authorized individual to search across these databases with a single query to produce a consolidated report – which can then be displayed on

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34 Examples include Operation Unified Response (Haiti earthquake relief) and ongoing efforts to improve information sharing in Afghanistan.
a map or graphic using new visualization tools. This will be a significant improvement in speed, accuracy, and quality over the current method of searching individual databases and manually compiling all the information into one text report. A key challenge is to discover and map fully and accurately all the required data sources so that they will be seen properly by this new system. The capability will be delivered in FY12 with full operational capability projected for FY13 after certification testing by the various stakeholders.

Recommendation: DoD should continue to develop tools, policies, and procedural changes to empower operational-level commanders with sufficient authority to share civil-military information more easily with relevant partners when required to ensure mission success or improve planning and integration.

Agile Funding:

Agile civic assistance programs are well suited to mitigate many predominate drivers of armed conflict, including poverty, hunger, inadequate healthcare, poor economic conditions, and failing transportation and electrical infrastructure. Specifically, in COIN or post-conflict stabilization venues, by enabling field-level personnel to identify, coordinate in real-time with foreign and interagency partners, and implement projects, agile funding programs can – if well-managed – address critical humanitarian, security, and infrastructure needs more quickly and effectively than large-scale centrally-funded U.S. development initiatives. Furthermore, by coordinating these projects with large-scale development initiatives, such funding programs can facilitate the economic growth and stability necessary to ensure that large development projects can be sustained and appropriately utilized.

Recommendation: DoD should leverage the guidance, training programs, data management systems, and internal management structures created to manage the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Afghan Infrastructure Program (AIP) to inform the design of future programs and interagency collaboration mechanisms when similar requirements arise in future stability operations.

DoD Support to Rule of Law:

DoD plays a crucial supporting role in the U.S. Government’s rule of law priorities in capacity-building activities and operating venues. Its efforts include both traditional military-to-military engagement and, under special authority in Iraq and Afghanistan, field support for stability, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations. At home and overseas, DoD, through the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies and other means, provides training in international humanitarian law, building accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, rule of law, and human rights.

U.S. military personnel have promoted the rule of law since the beginning of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. Army Civil Affairs units, Judge Advocates, and other DoD components have helped build effective judicial systems; promoted respect for, and adherence to, international human rights standards; and trained judges, prosecutors, police, and corrections officials. DoD personnel in recent conflicts have provided support to our interagency colleagues
in embassies and on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in a wide variety of rule of law capacity-building and infrastructure development in order to assist the host nation in developing sustainable legal and civic institutions that will assist all citizens with meaningful access to effective and impartial justice.

The recently developed Rule of Law component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Rule of Law and Detainee Policy (RDP) is working to coordinate with numerous offices and commands with equities in various aspects of rule of law. OSD/RDP is working toward the development of doctrine and training within DoD, and effective and efficient interagency coordination and coordination with allies and partner countries, in order to assist with all USG efforts promoting a culture of rule of law in preventative and post-conflict arenas.

At the Service component level, there is enhanced cooperation with civilian universities on Rule of Law issues. DoD should consider formalizing these relationships to further Rule of Law expertise within the Department.

**Recommendation:** The Department must remain committed to supporting broad-based USG rule of law and governance efforts to ensure that our civilian partners have the necessary support to accomplish their goals. DoD should focus greater attention on coordinating rule of law and governance programming, identifying best practices and lessons learned from the field, providing policy guidance within the Department and across the interagency, and addressing the significant coordination and funding challenges to promote greater mission effectiveness.

**Stability Policing:**

> “I’m not MP. I’m an infantryman, a ranger. I came to this work by accident. In Haiti 1994, there was a firefight and 11 police officers were killed. I had to restart the police force. It was a mess. I went on to Bosnia and Iraq, and worked with the police in both countries. Since 2008, I’ve been an advisor for Afghanistan. I had no guide.”

Lieutenant General (Ret) James Dubik, USA
Remarks to Foreign Police Assistance Event, U.S. Institute for Peace, 8 July 2011

Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful COIN and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is essential to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation’s security forces. However, the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in fragile states. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at the regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground.

Constabulary police units are of special importance. In uncertain and hostile situations, the ability of local police forces to perform normal, non-threatening neighborhood law enforcement
and public safety functions will likely not suffice. But given the importance of winning the population’s trust and support, it is important to have options short of calling in combat forces. In such countries, there is a need for sophisticated paramilitary internal-security forces organized, trained, and equipped to function either as police or as combat units, or as a hybrid of the two in tricky circumstances. Ordinarily, it is best to create such capabilities as a branch of the police, as opposed to an independent third force or part of the military. The strongest argument for this is the need for such forces to work seamlessly with regular police.

**Recommendation:** DoD should better prepare military police advisors, either as part of an Advise and Assist Brigade or deploying independently, by providing them with orientation and instruction on stability policing, local policing, and how and when to transition to local policing in stability operations as part of a broader development and reform effort (based on requisite doctrine). DoD should examine whether to create standby and permanent police advisory capacities under appropriate authorities.\(^\text{35}\)

**Medical:**

There has been recognition within the Department of Defense that the Military Health System (MHS) enables the operational commander to meet his or her objectives in stability operations. MHS then must be prepared to support stability operations throughout all phases of operations and across the range of military operations. Medical support to stability operations includes: supporting efforts to establish or restore medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored; and assessments of the civilian medical and public health systems such as infrastructure, medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, public health programs, and promoting and enhancing the host nation (HN) medical infrastructure. DoD medical stability operations must be planned and executed in close coordination with the host nation and with DOS/USAID. The host nation’s ability to define priorities must be respected. Medical stability operations must also consider or develop medical systems that are within the host nation’s capabilities to sustain. Building partnerships across the interagency and international community is essential.

In response to DoDI 3000.05, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) established the Medical Stability Operations Working Group as a vehicle to address gaps as needed to improve MHS support to stability operations as identified in the Joint Force Health Protection Initial Capabilities Document. With input from the Services and key stakeholders, ASD(HA) conducted a Capabilities-Based Assessment that determined that a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) Change Recommendation (DCR) approach was necessary to address gaps and recommendations to integrate the requisite changes fully into the MHS.

DoD has made strides to improve doctrine and authored DoDI 6000.16, *Military Health Support to Stability Operations*, to provide guidance.\(^\text{36}\) DoD may be required to lead, support, enable, or

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partner with various organizations in the conduct of these missions. Broad global health knowledge and skills will be critical to supporting the development, planning, execution, and evaluation of stability operations. The global health concept goes beyond direct medical care capability and involves multiple disciplines that provide a population with the medical and public health systems required to support and maintain the health of the population.

**Recommendation:** DoD should support recommendations outlined in the Joint Force Health Protection Emerging Mission Sets DCR. There is a need for an organizational entity to coordinate the implementation of medical support to stability operations at the operational and tactical levels. There is a need for an educational and training consortium to facilitate information sharing across the research, education and training, and operational communities to incorporate lessons learned and update education and training programs to ensure that MHS personnel are qualified to provide the expertise required to support stability operations. Additionally, there is a need to adopt a common terminology to identify global health competencies and track personnel with the appropriate knowledge, skills, and experience.

**Civil Affairs:**

CA forces represent the largest pure stability operations capability available to DoD. The joint CA force will have approximately 12,000 CA and support personnel by FY 15. Although CA forces support the full range of military activities and missions, they are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. CA personnel provide unique cultural and regional astuteness, unique area and linguistic capability, and civilian professional skills that generally parallel those found in host nation government institutions. Nevertheless, several factors have affected the ability of CA to support stability operations adequately.

First, institutional barriers exist because the Army proponent for CA resides solely in the special operations community. As articulated in the *Resource Management Decision 700* report signed by the USSOCOM commander, the proponent responsibilities for Army CA should reside within a Department of the Army aligned organization since the Army operationally employs 90% of the CA force structure. Moving the train, man, and equip proponent mission to the Department of the Army will allow the Army to develop, build, and maintain the CA capability and align it with its stability operations requirements.

Second, different training standards for Active and Reserve component CA personnel have resulted in inconsistent CA support to commanders conducting stability operations. For example, Active component CA personnel receive language and cultural training as part of their required basic CA training, but the Reserve component personnel do not. As a consequence, the Army CA force is unable to provide the full linguistic and cultural expertise as outlined in doctrine.

Lastly, the proposed reduction of maritime CA by the U.S. Navy from Active and Reserve operational teams to purely Navy Reserve teams will affect naval CA support to joint stability operations. The projected migration of populations to the littorals makes expertise on the maritime domains, the law of the sea, and marine/fisheries resources a critical component for food security along coastlines. The maritime CA assists host nations to develop maritime
enforcement capability as evidenced by the successful “Community Watch on the Water Program.” Service policy limits the Navy Reserve CA teams to seven months on active duty. Geographic Combatant Commands cannot effectively sustain these security cooperation activities by individually rotating through 15 Reserve component teams.

Recommendation: DoD should sustain current CA force growth. Enable the move of Army CA proponent responsibilities from USSOCOM to a location determined by Department of the Army. Continue standardization of CA training for both Active and Reserve components to reduce tactical and operational capability gaps. Explore solutions to address the gap created by the reduction and migration of maritime CA to the Reserves.