



ROLL CALL RELEASE

INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICE, FIRE, EMS, AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

26 May 2017

(U//FOUO) Food Defense: Product Adulteration Within Reach of Violent Extremists and Insiders

(U//FOUO) Terrorist and violent extremist groups have long expressed interest in poisoning and adulterating food and beverage supplies in the West but rarely use this as a tactic. Nonetheless, recent incidents in Europe and Africa underscore the continued interest by some groups in targeting food products at point-of-sale, distribution, and storage. The mere threat of product adulteration in the Homeland almost certainly would cause psychological and economic harm. While we have not seen any specific, credible terrorist threats against Homeland food production and distribution infrastructure, we cannot rule out the possibility of inspired violent extremists or disgruntled insiders attempting to adulterate or poison food and beverages with commonly available toxic industrial chemicals or crude biological toxins due to the relative ease of product manipulation, especially at the last point of sale, which criminal actors have demonstrated consistently in the past.

- » (U//FOUO) Combative Anarchy/Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI/IRF), an offshoot of Greek environmental terrorist groups, threatened to poison food and beverages made by Nestle, Unilever, Delta Foods, and a named US business in late 2016, leading to mass recalls. The group probably never intended to poison or adulterate the products, but it was likely aware of the economic, safety, and political implications of making such threats.
- » (U) A South African farm worker in early 2017 added 20 liters of gramoxone—a dipyrindinium-based herbicide—to a milk storage tank. While the contamination was detected prior to distribution, the level of gramoxone was likely sufficient to have killed or sickened at least hundreds of people. Separately, a Nigerian man allegedly introduced an unknown poison into the food at a restaurant in Ogoja, Nigeria in late March 2017, killing 2 and sickening 40 others.



(U) FAI/IRF hoax contamination photo circulated during popular protests in Greece in late 2016.

(U) Indicators of Possible Beverage or Food Tampering

(U//FOUO) Some of these activities may be constitutionally protected, and any determination of possible illicit intent should be supported by additional facts justifying reasonable suspicion. These activities are general in nature and any one may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other suspicious behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—they may constitute a basis for reporting.

- » (U//FOUO) Consumption and sharing of media glorifying violent extremist acts in attempting to mobilize others to violence;
- » (U//FOUO) Attempts to purchase restricted chemicals without proper credentials;
- » (U//FOUO) Purchase(s) of large quantities of hazardous, commercially available chemicals without reasonable explanation;
- » (U//FOUO) Parked, standing, or unattended vehicles in the same area over multiple days with no reasonable explanation, particularly in concealed locations with optimal visibility of potential targets or in conjunction with multiple visits;
- » (U//FOUO) Photography or videography focused on food storage facilities, security cameras, gates, barriers, or entry points,
- » (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls, such as alarms or locks;
- » (U//FOUO) Loitering or strange behaviors near buffets, salad bars, refrigerated cases, food production lines, or raw material/bulk food containers with no reasonable explanation; and
- » (U//FOUO) Damaged product seals, wrappers, or packaging of products on shelves or in transport that would indicate tampering.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.nrc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-6.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.4, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.8

IA-0163-17

(U) Prepared by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); FBI, Directorate of Intelligence; and National Counterterrorism Center. Coordinated with NPPD, OHA, HHS, and USDA, FDA-Food Safety and Inspection Service. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector first responders in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States.

(U) **Warning:** This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

(U) All US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.