




ROLL CALL RELEASE

In Collaboration with the ITACG



(U) Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR): Recruiting

(U//FOUO) Terrorists are attempting to recruit new members in the United States and overseas to support their operations, obtain funding, and conduct terrorist attacks. For example, in May 2012, Maryland-based Mohammad Hassan Khalid^{USPER} pled guilty to attempting to use the Internet to recruit individuals who had the ability to travel to and around Europe to conduct terrorist acts, in addition to providing logistical and financial support to terrorists. In prior cases of recruitment, individuals who were willing to participate in terrorist acts became involved with known and suspected terrorists, participated in paramilitary training abroad, or tried to acquire small arms and build explosives.

(U) **Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI)**
Definition of Recruiting: Building operations teams and contacts, personnel data, banking data, or travel data.

(U) **Note:** The Functional Standard v 1.5 defines SAR as "official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity."

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incident from the NSI shared space is an example of an individual being recruited to commit violence. The example is provided for situational awareness and training:

- (U//FOUO) An individual contacted the police to report being approached by two subjects about supplying firearms and participating in an attack on a military installation. The subjects were arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the US Government after being observed conducting surveillance of targets, testing security, and acquiring weapons for the attack. One of the subjects pled guilty to the charges and is awaiting sentencing.

(U) Past Activities Observed in Individuals Recruited to Participate in Terrorism

(U//FOUO) Studies of terrorist actors have identified particular behaviors that have been observed in individuals vulnerable to recruitment or who have been recruited, and were ready to commit acts of violence. Any one of these activities may be insignificant on its own, but when observed in combination with other prior observed behaviors—particularly advocacy of violence—may constitute a basis for reporting.

- (U//FOUO) Acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity, expressed willingness to commit acts of violence, or close association with individuals or groups suspected of violent extremism.
- (U//FOUO) Communication with violent extremists, either through direct contact or virtually, or active participation in violent extremist blogs, chat rooms, and password-protected Web sites.
- (U//FOUO) Interest in paramilitary and explosives training or reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning.
- (U//FOUO) Possession of literature written by and for violent extremist groups on terrorist techniques, including the use of explosives, poisons, firearms and heavy weapons (when combined with other prior observed behaviors).
- (U//FOUO) Involvement by individuals—who otherwise never committed a crime—in theft, fraud, and illegal activities to fund terrorist causes.

(U//FOUO) In addition, individuals or groups attempting to enlist others to participate in acts of violence or terrorism should be reported to authorities.

(U//FOUO) These identified activities have been observed in cases of mobilization to violence, but are not a concrete formula for predicting illegal activity. First Amendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency's suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used as specific suspect descriptions). DHS and FBI are not advocating interference with the rights of law-abiding individuals. There may be a legitimate reason why some of the observed behaviors are present; it is up to you to determine when that is not the case.



(U) This report is derived in part from information reported under the NSI. It is part of a series based on SAR intended to help identify and encourage reporting of activities that, in some cases, could constitute preparations for terrorist attacks.

IA-0031-13

(U) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Homeland Counterterrorism Division, the FBI Directorate of Intelligence, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the Washington State Fusion Center. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector first responders in effectively detecting, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States. Coordinated with the I&A Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch and the Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate.

(U) This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been highlighted in this document with the label (U//FOUO) and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures. Other US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the ISA Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.

(U) Warning: This document contains UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) it is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.