Law Enforcement Arrests Domestic Extremists for Illegal Occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge

Scope

This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide information on the recent arrest of 11 domestic extremists for conspiracy to impede officers of the United States from discharging their official duties through force, intimidation, or threats, in violation of 18 USC §372. This JIB is provided by the FBI and DHS to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. As in any criminal case, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

For the purpose of this JIB, FBI and DHS define domestic extremists as individuals located in the United States who seek to advance political or social goals, wholly or in part through force or violence, in violation of federal law. Note: the mere advocacy of political or social positions, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism and may be constitutionally protected.
Circumstances Leading to the Arrests

On 26 January 2016, the FBI and Oregon State Police initiated a probable cause arrest of domestic extremists associated with an illegal armed occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (MNWR) in Harney County, Oregon.

The FBI and Oregon State Police initially arrested five militia and sovereign citizen extremists on 26 January during a traffic stop north of Burns. The five are identified as: Ammon E. Bundy, Ryan C. Bundy, Brian Cavalier, Shawna Cox, and Ryan W. Payne. During the arrest action, shots were fired by the Oregon State Police, resulting in the death of Robert LaVoy Finicum, according to official information.

Militia extremists Joseph D. O'Shaughnessy and Peter Santilli were later arrested in Burns, and militia extremist Jon E. Ritzheimer surrendered to authorities in Peoria, Arizona for their roles in the illegal occupation, according to official information.

Militia extremists Dylan W. Anderson, Duane Ehmer, and Jason Patrick were arrested on 27 January after leaving the MNWR and surrendering to the FBI, according to law enforcement information.

All 11 individuals face federal felony charges of conspiracy to impede officers of the United States from discharging their official duties through force, intimidation, or threats, in violation of 18 USC §372, according to official information.

Multiple sources with varying levels of access reported on 2 January 2016 that Ammon Bundy and Payne led a group of armed individuals—who later self-identified as the Citizens for Constitutional Freedom (CCF)—to seize the MNWR, located approximately 30 miles south of Burns. Over the next 25 days, group leaders and a growing number of armed supporters made repeated demands that the US Government turn over federally owned property located in Harney County to the CCF for supposed redistribution to local residents. Group leaders simultaneously sought to expand their illegal action to other federal sites in the West.

Following news of the arrests, some individuals peacefully departed from the MNWR, but reporting as of 28 January 2016 indicates that a small group of armed individuals continue to illegally occupy the site, despite requests to leave made by law enforcement and public officials. In response to news of the arrests, some militia extremists and their supporters have called for violence or unspecified nationwide action against law enforcement, federal facilities, and US government employees.

* For the purpose of this JIB, FBI and DHS define sovereign citizen extremists as US citizens who openly reject their citizenship status and most forms of government authority, wholly or in part, through force or violence, in violation of federal law. Note: the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

† For the purpose of this JIB, FBI and DHS define militia extremists as individuals who seek to advance an ideology in which militias act as self-appointed protectors of the US Constitution against perceived threats to liberty emanating from either the US government or other perceived opponents, wholly or in part through force or violence, in violation of federal law. Note: the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.
Possible Indicators of Planned Domestic Extremist Violence

In light of these threats and because the CCF had been urging local residents to occupy other federal facilities, the FBI and DHS urge recipients of this bulletin to use caution during encounters with suspected domestic extremists, and to be vigilant of potential surveillance or pre-operational indicators. Some of these behavioral indicators may be constitutionally protected activities and should be supported by additional facts to justify increased suspicions.

No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action; rather the totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action. Independently, each behavioral indicator may represent legitimate recreational or commercial activities. Multiple indicators, however, could suggest a threat.

- New or increased advocacy of violence in response to the recent events in Oregon—such as vows to avenge the death that occurred during the enforcement action;
- Evidence of planned travel to Oregon—possibly as part of a group—to engage in violence in support of the individuals still present at the MNWR;
- Discussing plans to initiate violent confrontations or armed standoffs against federal entities, similar to the recent Oregon occupation;
- Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or illegal activities combined with active advocacy of violence;
- Demonstrating an unusual interest in or unusual questions about security procedures, or engaging in overtly suspicious actions to provoke and observe responses by security or law enforcement officers;
- Demonstrating an unusual interest in building or site entry points, such as peak days and hours of operation, or in security personnel, surveillance assets (including cameras), or access controls (e.g., alarms, barriers, doors, gates, or locks);
- Demonstrating an unusual interest in site security reaction drills or procedures; causing multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar venues;
- Loitering, parking, or standing in the same area over multiple days with no reasonable explanation;
- Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel or security guards;
- Attention to or avoidance of surveillance cameras;
- Interest without justification in obtaining site plans, ingress and egress routes, and information on employees or the public;
» (U//FOUO) Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or of materials that could be used to produce explosives, such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer; and

» (U//FOUO) Suspicious weapons purchases, such as attempted purchases by an individual providing inconsistent or suspect identification, refusal to fill out the appropriate documentation, or issuance of vague or cryptic warnings that are violent in nature during purchase.

(U) Suggested Protective Measures

(U//FOUO) In light of the potential threats posed by domestic extremists, law enforcement and security personnel should consider protective measures designed to integrate equipment, personnel, current procedures, and information. The following protective measures have been effective in assisting safety, security and counterterrorism efforts:

» (U//FOUO) Increase visibility of armed security and law enforcement personnel in areas adjacent to and in front of security checkpoints to deter unwanted activity;

» (U//FOUO) Maintain awareness of travel and patrol patterns, and, if possible, vary times and routes to avoid predictability;

» (U//FOUO) Exercise caution when discussing travel or personal matters on social media, unsecured networks, or in public settings;

» (U//FOUO) Establish liaison and regular communications with local, state, and federal law enforcement, emergency responders, and public health organizations to enhance information exchange and clarify emergency responses;

» (U//FOUO) Report missing or stolen equipment, including weapons, to the proper authorities;

» (U//FOUO) Raise community awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities;

» (U//FOUO) Be familiar with the “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign and appropriately report all odd or suspicious activity to agency security officers, the Federal Protective Service, or local law enforcement; and

» (U//FOUO) Encourage employees, tenants, and visitors to report anything that appears to be odd or suspicious.
(U) **Report Suspicious Activity**

To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit [http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx](http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx).

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