



ROLL CALL RELEASE

In Collaboration with the ITACG



15 October 2012


(U) Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR): Observation/Surveillance

(U//FOUO) Terrorists often conduct physical surveillance to identify suitable targets, determine vulnerabilities, plan attack methods, or assess the target's security posture. In March 2010, David Coleman Headley^{USPER} pled guilty for his role in the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India by conducting video and photographic surveillance of potential targets, as well as later surveilling Danish newspaper offices—the target of another attack plot.

(U//FOUO) The following SAR incidents from the NSI shared space demonstrate types of behavior terrorists might exhibit during planning or actual attacks. Although none were linked to terrorist activity, we consider the examples relevant for situational awareness and training:

- (U//FOUO) A city utility company reported suspicious surveillance activity at a hydroelectric plant. On six occasions within a three-day period, two vehicles of the same color, make, and model (but with different license plate numbers) were observed traveling slowly on the road adjacent to the plant, stopping at specific posts on the property, turning around, and slowly returning in the other direction.
- (U//FOUO) A prominent hotel in a major metropolitan area reported a male and a female photographing the hotel entrances from a vehicle with Canadian license plates. Security camera footage showed the vehicle moved at least twice to different locations around the hotel while the passenger took photos of the hotel and surrounding restaurants and the driver wrote on a clipboard. No additional information regarding this incident is available.

(U) **Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) Definition of Observation/Surveillance:** Demonstrating unusual interest in facilities, buildings, or infrastructure beyond mere casual or professional (e.g. engineers) interest such that a reasonable person would consider the activity suspicious. Examples include observing through binoculars, taking notes, and attempting to measure distances.



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(U) Headley took surveillance photos of the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai. Above is a photo taken of the hotel during the 2008 attack.

(U) **Note:** The Functional Standard v 1.5 defines SAR as "official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity."

(U) Possible Indicators of Observation/Surveillance

(U//FOUO) The following may indicate suspicious observation/surveillance activity and should be reported to appropriate authorities, but context (time, location, personal behaviors, and other indicators) should be carefully considered to rule out legitimate, non-suspicious activities:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual, repeated, or prolonged observation of infrastructure (for example, with binoculars or video cameras);
- (U//FOUO) Taking notes or measurements, counting paces, sketching floor plans, maps, or diagrams;
- (U//FOUO) Scrutinizing security personnel, shift changes, or facility activities; or
- (U//FOUO) Extended loitering without explanation, particularly in concealed locations with optimal visibility of potential targets.

(U//FOUO) First Amendment-protected activities should not be reported in a SAR or ISE-SAR absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency's suspicion that the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, including evidence of pre-operational planning related to terrorism. Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation should not be considered as factors that create suspicion (although these factors may be used as specific suspect descriptions).



(U) This report is derived in part from information reported under the NSI. This report is part of a series based on SAR intended to help identify and encourage reporting of activities that, in some cases, could constitute preparations for terrorist attacks.

IA-0002-13

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