



# FIRE LINE

INTELLIGENCE FOR FIRE, RESCUE, AND EMS  
In Collaboration with the ITACG



18 January 2013

## (U//FOUO) Terrorist Tradecraft—Impersonation: Use of Uniforms and Credentials

(U//FOUO) Impersonation by assuming the identity, behavior, or appearance of first responders can allow terrorists access to restricted or secure locations, including the scene of emergencies when unchallenged. This access can allow terrorists the ability to conduct pre-operational surveillance or carry out a primary attack or a secondary attack against first responders. The method of impersonation may not be limited to the use of uniforms, clothing, badges and identification; civilian vehicles may be accessorized to appear as legitimate emergency vehicles.

(U//FOUO) Terrorists overseas have used uniforms and identification—such as name plates, badges, rank insignia, unit identification—belonging to military, law enforcement, and emergency services personnel. These items can be purchased, forged, or stolen.

- (U) In July 2011, Anders Breivik wore a police uniform and displayed false identification to gain unauthorized access to the Utoya Island youth camp in Norway where he opened fire on the camp population.
- (U) In May 2011, a suicide bomber in a police uniform successfully detonated an explosive device, killing six people, after gaining access to a closed meeting at a government building in Afghanistan.

(U//FOUO) Accounting for apparatus, equipment, gear, and credentials and securing access to facilities are the first steps in preventing the impersonation of first responders.

### (U//FOUO) Mitigating the risk of first responder impersonation:

- (U//FOUO) Secure station or facility entrance and exit points, including apparatus bay doors.
- (U//FOUO) Limit or lock unattended emergency apparatus.
- (U//FOUO) On a daily basis, account for equipment and response gear; implement a policy for reporting lost or stolen items, including relevant privately purchased personal equipment.
- (U//FOUO) Keep member credentials current, collect or recover credentials from departing members, and establish a reporting policy for any lost or stolen credentials, including online credentials.
- (U//FOUO) Establish a policy to control the sale of “branded” items, including department or station patches, tee-shirts, and jackets.
- (U//FOUO) Stay current on the “branding” of uniforms and equipment used by neighboring jurisdictions and mutual aid companies.
- (U//FOUO) Report, track, and investigate all stolen items in the region.

### (U//FOUO) Possible indicators of first responder impersonation:

- (U//FOUO) Outdated, incorrect, or incomplete uniform, protective gear, or credentials.
- (U//FOUO) Driver of emergency vehicle not knowledgeable about area of responsibility or service.

### (U) Report Suspicious Activity

**(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.** Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

IA-0054-13

*(U) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Homeland Counterterrorism Division, the I&A Field Analytic Support Task Force, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the FBI Directorate of Intelligence. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector first responders in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, and responding to terrorist attacks against the United States. Coordinated with the National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence and Analysis.*

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