



Federal Bureau
of Investigation



Homeland
Security

JOINT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(U//FOUO) Florida-Based Violent Extremist Arrested for Plotting Bombing Attack in Tampa

9 January 2012

(U) Scope

(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin is intended to provide information on the 7 January 2012 arrest by the FBI Tampa Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), as part of a planned law enforcement action, of Florida-based Sami Osmakac^{USPER}. Osmakac is charged with attempted use of weapons of mass destruction. This information is provided to support the activities of FBI and DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial, counterterrorism and law enforcement officials to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.

IA-0056-12

(U) **Warning:** This joint FBI/DHS document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior authorization.

(U) **Warning:** This product may contain US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. US person information is highlighted with the label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.

(U) Circumstances Leading to the Arrest

(U//FOUO) On 7 January 2012, the FBI Tampa JTTF arrested Sami Osmakac, 25, of Pinellas Park, Florida, as part of a planned law enforcement operation after he allegedly took possession of explosives, a fully automatic AK-47 assault rifle, ammunition and magazines for the AK-47, a pistol, ammunition and a magazine for the pistol, grenades, and a suicide vest. Osmakac allegedly planned to attack a target in Tampa, according to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.

(U//FOUO) In late September 2011, a confidential source informed the FBI of Osmakac's interest in purchasing flags representing al-Qa'ida. In subsequent conversations, Osmakac allegedly expressed the desire to conduct a violent attack in the Tampa area and asked for assistance in procuring a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), weapons such as Uzis or AK-47s, and an explosives-laden belt to use in a two-stage attack. As part of an undercover operation, Osmakac was introduced to an individual whom he believed to hold extremist beliefs and was able to supply weapons and explosives. All weapons, ammunition, and explosives provided by the FBI had previously been rendered inoperable.

(U//FOUO) According to court documents, during November 2011, Osmakac planned to attack a Tampa area military recruiting center. However, he later changed his plan, allegedly telling a confidential source that the recruiting center did not have enough personnel inside.

(U//FOUO) According to the arrest affidavit, on 1 January 2012, Osmakac drove through the Ybor City neighborhood of Tampa to choose target locations, planning to eventually set off an explosive charge packed in the trunk of a vehicle parked in front of high-end restaurants and nightclubs. All of his pre-operational activities were closely monitored by the FBI.

(U//FOUO) Osmakac allegedly outlined various scenarios in which he would park a VBIED near busy nightspots and return to his nearby hotel room to collect the remaining weapons. He would then return to the scene to detonate the VBIED remotely, and in the aftermath conduct a small-arms attack at a nearby location while wearing a suicide vest. According to a confidential source, Osmakac said he would attempt to take hostages and contact authorities, specifically the FBI, in order to negotiate the release of Muslim prisoners. Osmakac told the same source that he believed that detonating the VBIED before he took hostages would prove he was "not joking." Osmakac allegedly planned to release the hostages and detonate the suicide vest while surrendering to law enforcement after his demands were met, according to court documents.

(U//FOUO) Motivations in Planning the Attack

(U//FOUO) Osmakac, a naturalized US citizen, born in the former Yugoslavia, previously had a positive view of the United States for helping his fellow Muslims in Kosovo in their time of need. He later decided that the United States is his enemy because he believes the United States is killing his fellow Muslims, according to the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.

(U//FOUO) Just before he allegedly attempted the attack, Osmakac filmed a martyrdom video in his hotel room, with a pistol in his hand and the AK-47 displayed behind him. In

the video, he stated his belief that Muslims' "blood" was more valuable than that of non-Muslims and he wanted "pay back" for the wrongs he felt were done to Muslims, according to the affidavit.

- (U//FOUO) In discussions with an under cover employee, Osmakac declined opportunities to back out of the plan.

(U//FOUO) Targets and Tactics Differ Slightly From Recent Homegrown Violent Extremist Plots

(U//FOUO) Disrupted plots by homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) within the past year have primarily targeted government and military facilities and personnel, including a military recruiting center in Seattle, a restaurant frequented by military personnel near Fort Hood, Texas, and the Pentagon and US Capitol building with improvised explosives, small arms, and grenades.*

(U//FOUO) Osmakac, however, allegedly abandoned his plan to attack a military recruiting center for a less secure civilian target which held the potential for a greater number of casualties. His alleged tactics also differed from previous HVE plotting in that he planned to take hostages to achieve a specific goal—the release of Muslim prisoners—and then take his own life by detonating his suicide vest in the proximity of arresting officers.

(U) Outlook

(U//FOUO) The alleged activities of Sami Osmakac highlight the continuing interest of HVEs in executing attacks against civilian as well as military targets in the Homeland. At this time, we have no indication that Osmakac received operational direction from a foreign terrorist organization.

(U//FOUO) HVEs acting alone or in small groups pose a particular threat because of their ability to operate in isolation and use commonly available materials or weapons, which makes them difficult to detect. We remain concerned about the existence of other such individuals inside the United States who may also be planning or attempting to participate in attacks, and urge vigilance from the public and the prompt reporting of suspicious activities to state and local authorities.

(U//FOUO) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack

(U//FOUO) We strongly encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial counterterrorism officials to remain alert and immediately report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue, national monument or icon, or other public

* (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS define an HVE as "a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization."

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

gathering place. Although a single indicator may be a constitutionally protected activity, one or more might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparations for an attack. These possible indicators include:

- (U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to same locations or similar venues;
- (U//FOUO) Discreet use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking consistent with pre-operational surveillance;
- (U//FOUO) Interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
- (U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection systems;
- (U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that could be used to construct an explosive device;
- (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas.

(U) Reporting Notice

(U) The FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI's 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone number 202-323-3300 or by e-mail at SIOC@ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202 282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm> and State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center information may be obtained at <http://www.dhs.gov/contact-fusion-centers>. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response

(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.

(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section by phone at 202-324-3000 or by e-mail at FBI_CTAS@ic.fbi.gov, or I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov.

(U) I&A would like to invite you to participate in a brief customer feedback survey regarding this product. Your feedback is extremely important to our efforts to improve the quality and impact of our products on your mission. Please click below to access the form and then follow a few simple steps to complete and submit your response. Thank you.



(U) Tracked by: HSEC-9.1, HSEC-90.2, HSEC-9.6.2.7

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Homeland Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis
I&A Customer Survey

Product Title: (U//FOUO) Florida-Based Violent Extremist Arrested for Plotting Bombing Attack in Tampa

1. Please select the partner type that best describes your organization.

2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the usefulness of this product?

- Very Satisfied**
 Somewhat Satisfied
 Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied
 Somewhat Dissatisfied
 Very Dissatisfied

3. How did you use this product in support of your mission?

- Integrated into one of my own organization's finished information or intelligence products
 Shared contents with federal or DHS component partners
 If so, which partners?
 Shared contents with state and local partners
 If so, which partners?
 Shared contents with private sector partners
 If so, which partners?
 Other (please specify)

4. Please rank this product's relevance to your mission. (Please portion mark comments.)

- Critical
 Very important
 Somewhat important
 Not important
 N/A

5. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Timeliness of product or support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6. How could this product or service be improved to increase its value to your mission? (Please portion mark comments.)

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name:	<input type="text"/>	Position:	<input type="text"/>
Organization:	<input type="text"/>	State:	<input type="text"/>
Contact Number:	<input type="text"/>	Email:	<input type="text"/>



[Privacy Act Statement](#)
[Paperwork Reduction Act Compliance Statement](#)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY