

OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

1

THE OPERATION BY NUMBERS

6

HAMAS'S MAIN EFFORTS

2

HAMAS

7

CHRONOLOGY OF THE OPERATION

3

STRATEGIC CONTEXT & BACKGROUND

8

ACHIEVEMENTS

4

ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

9

PRELIMINARY INSIGHTS

5

IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS

10

CONCLUSIONS

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**22 (25)
DAYS**



**5,650
SORTIES**



**5,400
BOMBS & MISSILES**



**3,400
TARGETS**



**8
ARMY BRIGADES**



**30,000
RESERVES**



**20,000
ARTILLERY SHELLS**



**~700
HAMAS KILLED**



**820
ROCKETS & MORTARS**




**3 CIVILIANS & 10 IDF
ISRAELIS KILLED**



**1,500 TRUCKS
HUMANITARIAN AID**



**1,720,000 L OIL
HUMANITARIAN AID**



AREA: 360 SQ KM (139 SQ MI) = 41 KM X 6-12 KM (25 MI X 4-7.5 MI)

POPULATION: 1,400,000 (1,260,000 [90%] IN URBAN AREAS)

POPULATION DENSITY: 4,118/KM² (10,665/MI²) [GAZA: 6.86/KM²]

TERRAIN: PLATEAU (SAND AND DUNE COVERED COASTAL PLAIN)



RAFAH (70,000)
[EGYPT, TUNNELS, PASSAGE]



GAZA (400,000)
[MULTI-STORY BUILDINGS, GOVT.]



JABALIA (80,000)
[HAMAS'S STRONGHOLD]



BEIT HANUN (32,000)
[AGRICULTURAL , INDUSTRIAL]



AL-SHATI (90,000)
[BEACH CAMP, MULTI-STORY BUILDINGS]



DAYR AL-BALAH (60,000)
[HIGH DENSITY]

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1987

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HAMAS

[1ST INTIFADAH, OFFICIAL CHARTER]



1992-1993

EXPULSION AND RETURN

[LEBANON, HEZBOLLAH, LEADERS]



1994-1996

SUICIDE ATTACKS BY HAMAS

["OSLO AGREEMENT"]



2001

THE 2ND INTIFADA

[457 ISRAELIS KILLED (40%)]



2003-2004

TARGETED KILLINGS

[HAMAS'S ORIGINAL LEADERSHIP]



2005

ISRAEL'S DISENGAGEMENT

[8,600 RESIDENTS, 22 SETTLEMENTS]



2006

HAMAS WINS THE ELECTION

[HAMAS-74 / FATAH-45]



2006

HAMAS FORMS A NEW CABINET

[PM ISMAIL HANIYA]



2007

HAMAS TAKES OVER GAZA

[ABBAS OUTLAWED HAMAS]



ḤARAKAT AL-MUQĀWAMAT AL-ISLĀMIYYAH

"... HAMAS IS THE CHOSEN NAME OF THE MOVEMENT, WHICH IS A NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE. ITS GOAL IS TO IMPROVE THE TERMS FOR ACHIEVING THE FREEDOM OF THE PALESTINIAN NATION ... HAMAS IS A JIHADIST MOVEMENT IN THE WIDE MEANING OF THE TERM JIHAD ..."

HAMAS'S WEBSITE

HAMAS'S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES



GOVERNMENT
[IN GAZA, SINCE 2006-2007]



JIHAD (TERROR)
[457 ISREELIS KILLED SINCE 2000]



SOCIAL
[DAWA [دعوة]]



IDEOLOGICAL
[PALESTINIAN, ISLAMIST]

HAMAS'S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES



**THE "INSIDE" LEADERSHIP
(GAZA)**



**THE "OUTSIDE" LEADERSHIP
(DAMASCUS)**



**THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP
(GAZA)**

HAMAS'S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES



A PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT
[NATIONALISM]



AN IRANIAN PROXY
[RADICAL AXIS]

MILITARY FORCES IN GAZA



THE MILITARY WING (IZZ AD-DIN AL-QASSAM)
[(10,000) TERRITORIAL BRIGADES]



INTERNAL SECURITY (THE EXECUTIVE FORCE)
[(5,000-10,000), POLICE, SECURITY ETC.]



OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
[(3,000-4,000), PIG, POPULAR RESISTANCE]

HAMAS'S WEAPONS



ROCKETS & MORTARS
(QASSAM [< 20 km], GRAD [= 40 KM])



ANTI TANK ROCKETS & MISSILES
(RPG-7, RPG-29, AT-3, AT-4, AT-5)



IEDs
(SHAWAZ, WIRE)



AAA
(SAM-7, 12.7 mm, 14.5 mm)

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


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

IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS

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CONCLUSIONS




8 YEARS OF ROCKETS





"... PEOPLE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT, WE ARE MOVING FROM A PHASE OF RESISTANCE AND BATTLES TO A PHASE OF CALM. NO. ACCORDING TO OUR CONCEPT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT, THE *TAHDIAH* [CALM] IS A TACTICAL MEANS. IT IS A STEP WITHIN THE RESISTANCE AND IS NOT DETACHED FROM IT ... HAMAS CONDUCTED RESISTANCE FROM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS WHEN IT WAS NOT IN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS A METHOD OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ..."

KHALED MASH'AL, APRIL 25, 2008



WHAT DID HAMAS DO DURING THE CALM ?



**MANUFACTURED
ROCKETS & MORTARS**



**SMUGGLED
ATGMs, AAA & IEDs**



**PREPARED AN EXTENSIVE
UNDERGROUND SYSTEM**



**ORGANIZED
ITS MILITARY FORCE**



**TRAINED
COMBATANTS**



**ENHANCED
THE LETHALITY OF THE ROCKETS**

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"... FOLLOWING HAMAS' VIOLATION OF THE CALM AND THE HAMAS AUTHORITY'S ATTACK ON ISRAELI CITIZENS IN SOUTHERN ISRAEL, ON DECEMBER 24, 2008, THE MINISTERS' COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY RESOLVED TO INSTRUCT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES TO TAKE ACTION TO BRING ABOUT A LONG-TERM CESSATION OF THE ROCKET FIRE AND TERROR ATTACKS ORIGINATING IN GAZA ..."

DECISION OF MINISTERS' COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 24 DEC. 2008



"... THE OPERATION IN THE GAZA STRIP IS DESIGNED, FIRST AND FOREMOST, TO BRING ABOUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY REALITY FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY. THIS IS LIABLE TO TAKE TIME AND EACH ONE OF US MUST BE PATIENT SO THAT WE CAN COMPLETE THE MISSION ..."

PRIME MINISTER OLMERT PRESS BRIEFING, 27 DEC. 2008



"... THE TIME HAS COME TO ACT. WE DO NOT GO TO THIS CLASH GLADLY, BUT NEITHER ARE WE AFRAID OF IT. WE WILL NOT LET TERRORISTS HURT OUR CITIZENS OR SOLDIERS. WE WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY. FOR WEEKS HAMAS AND ITS AFFILIATES LAUNCHED KASSAMS AND GRADS AND MORTAR SHELLS ON THE TOWNS AND COMMUNITIES OF THE SOUTH. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING THIS SITUATION TO CONTINUE ..."

DEFENSE MINISTER EHUD BARAK PRESS BRIEFING, 27 DEC. 2008


ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC PROBLEMS



FIRING (ROCKETS & MORTARS)



SMUGGLING (FORCE BUILD UP)



END STATES

1	HAMAS SEVERLY DAMAGED	5	NO DETERIORATION IN OTHER FRONTS (WEST BANK, NORTH)
2	CONDITIONS FOR BETTER SECURITY REALITY ACHIEVED	6	DISTINCTION BETWEEN GAZA AND WEST BANK RESTORED
3	DETERRENCE AGAINST HAMAS AND THE REGION RENEWED	7	NO DAMAGE TO THE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
4	TERROR FROM GAZA STOPPED (ROCKET FIRE REDUCED)	8	NO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OR IMAGE OF CRISIS

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

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
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
THE FIRE EFFORT (AIR POWER)



SORTIES



HOURS



ORDNANCE



LEAFLETS DROPPED BY IAF, WARNING RESIDENTS FROM FORTHCOMING ATTACK
[IN ADDITION TO: TELEPHONE CALLS, PGMs, "KNOCK ON THE ROOF", NIGHT ATTACKS, DELAYED ATTACKS]

THE OPENING AIR STRIKE (TARGETS)



A TRAINING CAMP



C² CENTER



C² CENTER & STORAGE FACILITY

THE MANEUVER EFFORT



PARATROOPER BRIGADE (35)
(AL-ATATRA [AGRICULTURAL, URBAN])



GOLANI BRIGADE (1)
(JABALIA [AGRICULTURAL, URBAN])



GIVATI BRIGADE (84)
(ZAYTUN, TEL-AL-HAWA [URBAN])



IRON TRAILS BRIGADE (401)
(NETZARIM [AGRICULTURAL])

THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT [AVOIDING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS]



CRITICAL SUPPLY (FOOD, MEDICINES)



HUMANITARIAN PAUSES



MOVEMENT COORDINATION (PASSAGES)



CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (ELECTRICITY)

THE HOME FRONT EFFORT

[SUPPORTING THE POPULATION, MINIMIZING CASUALTIES, PROVIDING FEELING OF SECURITY]



EARLY WARNING (ROCKETS & MORTARS)
[SENSORS, C², SIRENS]



PASSIVE DEFENSE
[SHELTERS]



COMMUNITY SUPPORT
[SHELTERS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS]



INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC
[CALL CENTERS, PUBLICATIONS, RADIO & TV, INTERNET]

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"... OUR DEFENSE CONCEPT IS MAINLY BASED ON ROCKETS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN USED SO FAR AND ON NETWORK OF TUNNELS DUG UNDER A WIDE PART OF THE STRIP. THE [ISRAELI] ARMY WILL BE SURPRISED BY THE FIGHTERS COMING FROM UNDERGROUND, WELL-EQUIPPED WITH NON-STANDARD MEANS OF WARFARE ... THE CONQUEROR ENTERING THE STRIP WILL FACE TRAINED FIGHTERS POSSESSING MODERN FIGHTING METHODS, SUBORDINATED TO JOINT COMMAND AND GUIDANCE. THE IDF WILL NOT KNOW WHERE ITS TANKS ARE ATTACKED FROM AND WHERE THE ROCKETS AGAINST ITS SOLDIERS ARE LAUNCHED FROM ..."

ABU UBIEDA, ALHAYAT, DECEMBER 17, 2007



"... THE ENEMY SUCCEEDED TO DESTROY SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT CIVIL ONES. REGARDING THE RESISTANCE, IT IS IN A GOOD SHAPE, AS WELL AS ITS INFRASTRUCTURES ... THE OCCUPYING TROOPS SHOULD BEWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPECTED GROUND PENETRATION INTO THE STRIP ... IT MAY CAUSE A SECOND, THIRD OR FOURTH GILAD SHALIT ... THE MOVEMENT WILL NOT BREAK NOR SURRENDER ..."

KHALED MASH'AL, JANUARY 2, 2009



"... WE DO NOT CONFRONT THEM AS WE HAVE DONE ONCE, 10 FIGHTERS ARE GOING TO CONFRONT THEM, AND NOT 100 FIGHTERS, AS IN THE PAST ... SENIOR FIGHTERS (MILITARY LEADERSHIP) ARE HIDING, AND MANY OF THEM HAVE NOT BEEN MOVING FOR SEVERAL DAYS; THEY SIT UNDERGROUND AND IN ARMORED SHELTERS ... SOME OF THEM ARE FULLY ISOLATED FROM MILITARY OPERATION ..."

HAMAS' FIGHTERS, ALSHARK ALAWSAT, JANUARY 15, 2009

HAMAS'S MAIN EFFORTS



URBAN WARFARE



CONTINUOUS FIRING



CC&D (DISAPPEARANCE)



IEDs & ATGMs




INFORMATION WARFARE



LAUNCH FROM URBAN AREA

QASSAM LAUNCHER



HAMAS'S MAP – DEPLOYMENT OF EXPLOSIVES AND FORCES IN AL-ATTATRA NEIGHBORHOOD



A TUNNEL (FOR KIDNAPPING, SMUGGLING & ATTACKING)



WEAPON (AAA) INSIDE A MOSQUE



WEAPONS (ROCKETS) INSIDE A HOUSE



A BOOBY TRAPPED HOUSE

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

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

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CONCLUSIONS







**SURPRISE AIR ATTACK
(100 TARGETS, 4 MINUTES)**



**MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK
(EXTENDED RANGE [40 KM])**



**4 ISRAELIS KILLED
(1 IDF + 3 CIVILIANS [ROCKETS])**



**DEMONSTRATIONS
(MAINLY IN ARAB STATES)**



**CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES
950 SORTIES**



**GROUND FORCES
DEPLOYMENT & PREPARATIONS**



HUMANITARIAN AID



~ 300 HAMAS KILLED






**NIZAR RIAN
TARGETED KILLING**



"... WE JUST WANTED TO TEASE ISRAEL, AND WE WERE SURPRISED BY ITS REACTION ... WE RELIED ON THE ARAB MASS; WE DIDN'T EXPECT ALL THESE CRIMES COMMITTED TO OUR PEOPLE ... WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE IN ORDER TO STOP THE AGGRESSION ..."

KHALED MASH'AL, JANUARY 7, 2009





GROUND MANEUVER



**MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK
(40 KM)**



9 ISRAELIS (IDF) KILLED



**DEMONSTRATIONS
(IN EUROPE & IN ARAB STATES)**



**CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES
(1170 SORTIES)**



**MOBILIZING & TRAINING
RESERVES**



HUMANITARIAN AID



~ 200 HAMAS KILLED



UNSCR #1860

DIFFERENT VIEWS – INCREASING TENSIONS INSIDE HAMAS

"INSIDE"



"... WE WILL POSITIVELY COOPERATE WITH ANY INITIATIVE THAT WILL IMMEDIATELY STOP THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND WILL LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES... WE WILL COOPERATE IN A RESPONSIBLE AND OPEN WAY ..."



ISMAIL HANIYA, JANUARY 12, 2009

"OUTSIDE"




"... WE WILL NOT GIVE UP ON OUR DEMANDS. THE CONTINUANCE BOMBING ON GAZA IS A DESPERATE TRY TO IMPOSE A NEW REALITY ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE... WE NOW SAY NOTHING MORE, OTHER THEN CONTINUING THE RESISTANCE AGAINST AGGRESSION ..."

MOUSA ABU MARZOOK, JANUARY 15, 2009





**ENLARGED GROUND MANEUVER
(INTO THE URBAN AREA)**



**MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK
(40 KM)**



**SAID SEYAM ["NO. 3"]
TARGETED KILLING**



ROCKETS FROM LEBANON



**CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES
(1055 SORTIES)**



**OPERATING
THE RESERVE FORCES**



HUMANITARIAN AID




~200 HAMAS KILLED



FIRE IN UNRWA CAMP

DECREASE OF ROCKET FIRE



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
■ MORTARS	19	18	14	10	15	5	5	7	5	7	2	10	5	2	12	6	5	8	2	11	3	5
■ > 20 Km	1	2	4	6	12	24	1	4	5	4	3	4	5	10	3	4	7	0	6	8	4	14
■ < 20 Km	61	15	64	37	40	38	27	24	26	24	28	11	11	13	7	11	10	9	8	7	20	6

CITY	POPULATION	HITS
ASHDOD	208,900	35
BEERSHEBA	186,800	45
ASHKELON	110,000	75
KIRYAT GAT	47,900	5
YAVNE	32,300	5
NETIVOT	26,100	50
OFAKIM	24,700	35
KIRYAT MALAKHI	19,700	5
SDEROT	19,400	40
GEDERA	17,700	5
	~1,000,000	



ASHKELON



NETIVOT



BEERSHEBA




ASHDOD



SDEROT



GEDERAH



TOWARD A CEASE FIRE



5



**IDF FORCES LEAVE GAZA STRIP
(21 JANUARY 2009)**

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
10

CONCLUSIONS



"... HAMAS WAS BADLY STRICKEN, BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF ITS REGIME. ITS LEADERS ARE IN HIDING. MANY OF ITS MEMBERS HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE FACTORIES IN WHICH ITS MISSILES WERE MANUFACTURED HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE SMUGGLING ROUTES, THROUGH DOZENS OF TUNNELS, HAVE BEEN BOMBED. THE HAMAS'S CAPABILITIES FOR CONVEYING WEAPONS WITHIN THE GAZA STRIP HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. THE SCOPE OF MISSILE FIRE DIRECTED AT THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE AREAS FROM WHICH MOST OF THE MISSILES WERE LAUNCHED ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF IDF FORCES. THE ESTIMATE OF ALL THE SECURITY SERVICES IS THAT THE HAMAS'S CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN STRUCK A HEAVY BLOW WHICH WILL HARM ITS ABILITY TO RULE AND ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR SOME TIME ..."

PRIME MINISTER OLMERT, 17 JANUARY, 2007



END STATES

1	HAMAS SEVERLY DAMAGED	5	NO DETERIORATION IN OTHER FRONTS (WEST BANK, NORTH)
2	CONDITIONS FOR BETTER SECURITY REALITY ACHIEVED	6	DISTINCTION BETWEEN GAZA AND WEST BANK RESTORED
3	DETERRENCE AGAINST HAMAS AND THE REGION RENEWED	7	NO DAMAGE TO THE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
4	TERROR FROM GAZA STOPPED (ROCKET FIRE REDUCED)	8	NO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OR IMAGE OF CRISIS

OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

1

THE OPERATION BY NUMBERS

6

HAMAS'S MAIN EFFORTS

2

HAMAS

7

CHRONOLOGY OF THE OPERATION

3

STRATEGIC CONTEXT & BACKGROUND

8

ACHIEVEMENTS

4

ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

9

PRELIMINARY INSIGHTS

5

IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS

10

CONCLUSIONS

WARNING - UNIQUE STRATEGIC CONTEXT



UNIQUE GEO-STRATEGIC CONDITIONS
(GAZA ENCIRCLED BY EGYPT & ISRAEL)



UNIQUE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
(AIR SUPREMACY, INTELLIGENCE SUPERIORITY)



UNIQUE ADVERSARY
(MULTIPLE IDENTITIES, LIMITED CAPABILITIES)



UNIQUE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
(ISRAEL, BUSH/OBAMA, CHRISTMAS, EGYPT, IRAN)



HYBRIDITY AS A WEAKPOINT
[UNRESOLVED TENSION: GOVERNMENT/DISAPPEARANCE]



REVERSED ASYMMETRY
[FIRE, MANEUVER, FORCE RATIO]



"OPENING AIR STRIKE" (GAMBIT)
[INTELLIGENCE, PREPARATIONS, PLANNING]



CRITICAL MANEUVER
[FRICTION, EXPOSURE, MOMENTUM, TENSION]



POLITICAL-MILITARY COORDINATION
[TIMING, TEMPO, TERMINATION MECHANISM]



SIMULTANEOUS EFFORTS
[MILITARY, POLITICAL, INFLUENCE, HUMANITARIAN]



LEGITIMACY
[EXTERNAL & INTERNAL, STRATEGIC NARRATIVE]



MEDIA COVERAGE
[A CONTROLLED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT]

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CONCLUSIONS



HAMAS GAVE PRIORITY TO GOVERNMENT
[BUT JIHAD IS ONLY UNDER "FREEZE"]



ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE MODERATE CAMP
[BUT, NOT A REGIONAL TURNING POINT]



THE PA FUNCTIONED EFFECTIVELY
[BUT, THE REAL CHALLENGES ARE COMING]



A FAILURE FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
[BUT, NOT A PARADIGM SHIFT]