OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

1. THE OPERATION BY NUMBERS
2. HAMAS
3. STRATEGIC CONTEXT & BACKGROUND
4. ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
5. IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS
6. HAMAS'S MAIN EFFORTS
7. CHRONOLOGY OF THE OPERATION
8. ACHIEVEMENTS
9. PRELIMINARY INSIGHTS
10. CONCLUSIONS
# OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

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22 (25) DAYS
5,650 SORTIES
5,400 BOMBS & MISSILES
3,400 TARGETS
8 ARMY BRIGADES
30,000 RESERVES
20,000 ARTILLERY SHELLS
~700 HAMAS KILLED
820 ROCKETS & MORTARS
3 CIVILIANS & 10 IDF ISRAELIS KILLED
1,500 TRUCKS HUMANITARIAN AID
1,720,000 L OIL HUMANITARIAN AID
AREA: 360 SQ KM (139 SQ MI) = 41 KM X 6-12 KM (25 MI X 4-7.5 MI)

POPULATION: 1,400,000 (1,260,000 [90%] IN URBAN AREAS)

POPULATION DENSITY: 4,118/KM² (10,665/MI²) [GAZA: 6.86/KM²]

TERRAIN: PLATEAU (SAND AND DUNE COVERED COASTAL PLAIN)
RAFAH (70,000)  
[EGYPT, TUNNELS, PASSAGE]

GAZA (400,000)  
[MULTI-STORY BUILDINGS, GOVT.]

JABALIA (80,000)  
[HAMAS'S STRONGHOLD]

BEIT HANUN (32,000)  
[AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL]

AL-SHATI (90,000)  
[BEACH CAMP, MULTI-STORY BUILDINGS]

DAYR AL-BALAH (60,000)  
[HIGH DENSITY]
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1987
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HAMAS
[1ST INTIFADAH, OFFICIAL CHARTER]

1992-1993
EXPULSION AND RETURN
[LEBANON, HEZBOLLAH, LEADERS]

1994-1996
SUICIDE ATTACKS BY HAMAS
["OSLO AGREEMENT"]

2001
THE 2nd INTIFADA
[457 ISRAELIS KILLED (40%)]

2003-2004
TARGETED KILLINGS
[HAMAS’S ORIGINAL LEADERSHIP]

2005
ISRAEL’S DISENGAGEMENT
[8,600 RESIDENTS, 22 SETTLEMENTS]

2006
HAMAS WINS THE ELECTION
[HAMAS-74 / FATAH-45]

2006
HAMAS FORMS A NEW CABINET
[PM ISMAIL HANIYA]

2007
HAMAS TAKES OVER GAZA
[ABBAS OUTLAWED HAMAS]
"HAMAS IS THE CHOSEN NAME OF THE MOVEMENT, WHICH IS A NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE. ITS GOAL IS TO IMPROVE THE TERMS FOR ACHIEVING THE FREEDOM OF THE PALESTINIAN NATION ... HAMAS IS A JIHADIST MOVEMENT IN THE WIDE MEANING OF THE TERM JIHAD ..."
HAMAS’S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

GOVERNMENT
[IN GAZA, SINCE 2006-2007]

JIHAD (TERROR)
[457 ISRELIS KILLED SINCE 2000]

SOCIAL
[DAWA [دعوة]]

IDEOLOGICAL
[PALESTINIAN, ISLAMIST]
HAMAS’S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

THE "INSIDE" LEADERSHIP
(GAZA)

THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP
(GAZA)

THE "OUTSIDE" LEADERSHIP
(DAMASCUS)
HAMAS’S MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

A PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT
[NATIONALISM]

AN IRANIAN PROXY
[RADICAL AXIS]
MILITARY FORCES IN GAZA

THE MILITARY WING (IZZ AD-DIN AL-QASSAM)
[(10,000) TERRITORIAL BRIGADES]

INTERNAL SECURITY (THE EXECUTIVE FORCE)
[(5,000-10,000), POLICE, SECURITY ETC.]

OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
[(3,000-4,000), PIG, POPULAR RESISTANCE]
HAMAS’S WEAPONS

ROCKETS & MORTARS
(QASSAM [<20 km], GRAD [= 40 KM])

ANTI TANK ROCKETS & MISSILES
(RPG-7, RPG-29, AT-3, AT-4, AT-5)

IEDs
(SHAWAZ, WIRE)

AAA
(SAM-7, 12.7 mm, 14.5 mm)
OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

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</tr>
</tbody>
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8 YEARS OF ROCKETS

ROCKETS & MORTARS SINCE 2001

~ 8,000 ROCKETS & MORTARS SINCE 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mortars</th>
<th>Rockets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>155</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>281</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>1513</td>
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</table>
"... PEOPLE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT, WE ARE MOVING FROM A PHASE OF RESISTANCE AND BATTLES TO A PHASE OF CALM. NO. ACCORDING TO OUR CONCEPT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT, THE TAHDIAH [CALM] IS A TACTICAL MEANS. IT IS A STEP WITHIN THE RESISTANCE AND IS NOT DETACHED FROM IT ... HAMAS CONDUCTED RESISTANCE FROM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS WHEN IT WAS NOT IN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS A METHOD OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ..."

KHALED MASH’AL, APRIL 25, 2008
WHAT DID HAMAS DO DURING THE CALM?

- Manufactured rockets & mortars
- Smuggled ATGMs, AAA & IEDs
- Prepared an extensive underground system
- Organized its military force
- Trained combatants
- Enhanced the lethality of the rockets
# Operation "Cast Lead" – A Strategic Overview

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"... FOLLOWING HAMAS’ VIOLATION OF THE CALM AND THE HAMAS AUTHORITY’S ATTACK ON ISRAELI CITIZENS IN SOUTHERN ISRAEL, ON DECEMBER 24, 2008, THE MINISTERS’ COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY RESOLVED TO INSTRUCT THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES TO TAKE ACTION TO BRING ABOUT A LONG-TERM CESSIONATION OF THE ROCKET FIRE AND TERROR ATTACKS ORIGINATING IN GAZA ..."

DECISION OF MINISTERS' COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, 24 DEC. 2008

"... THE OPERATION IN THE GAZA STRIP IS DESIGNED, FIRST AND FOREMOST, TO BRING ABOUT AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY REALITY FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY. THIS IS LIABLE TO TAKE TIME AND EACH ONE OF US MUST BE PATIENT SO THAT WE CAN COMPLETE THE MISSION ...

PRIME MINISTER OLMENT PRESS BRIEFING, 27 DEC. 2008

"... THE TIME HAS COME TO ACT. WE DO NOT GO TO THIS CLASH GLADLY, BUT NEITHER ARE WE AFRAID OF IT. WE WILL NOT LET TERRORISTS HURT OUR CITIZENS OR SOLDIERS. WE WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY. FOR WEEKS HAMAS AND ITS AFFILIATES LAUNCHED KASSAMS AND GRADS AND MORTAR SHELLS ON THE TOWNS AND COMMUNITIES OF THE SOUTH. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING THIS SITUATION TO CONTINUE ...

DEFENSE MINISTER EHUD BARAK PRESS BRIEFING, 27 DEC. 2008
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

FIRING (ROCKETS & MORTARS)  SMUGGLING (FORCE BUILD UP)
AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SECURITY REALITY

DAMAGE TO HAMAS

DETERRENCE

ARRANGEMENT

END STATES

1. HAMAS SEVERLY DAMAGED
2. CONDITIONS FOR BETTER SECURITY REALITY ACHIEVED
3. DETERRENCE AGAINST HAMAS AND THE REGION RENEWED
4. TERROR FROM GAZA STOPPED (ROCKET FIRE REDUCED)
5. NO DETERIORATION IN OTHER FRONTS (WEST BANK, NORTH)
6. DISTINCTION BETWEEN GAZA AND WEST BANK RESTORED
7. NO DAMAGE TO THE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
8. NO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OR IMAGE OF CRISIS
## OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

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IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS

FIRE

MANEUVER

HOME FRONT

INFLUENCE

HUMANITARIAN
LEAFLETS DROPPED BY IAF, WARNING RESIDENTS FROM FORTHCOMING ATTACK
[IN ADDITION TO: TELEPHONE CALLS, PGMS, "KNOCK ON THE ROOF", NIGHT ATTACKS, DELAYED ATTACKS]
THE OPENING AIR STRIKE (TARGETS)

A TRAINING CAMP

C² CENTER

C² CENTER & STORAGE FACILITY
THE MANEUVER EFFORT

PARATROOPER BRIGADE (35)  
(AL-ATATRA [AGRICULTURAL, URBAN])

GOLANI BRIGADE (1)  
(JABALIA [AGRICULTURAL, URBAN])

GIVATI BRIGADE (84)  
(ZAYTUN, TEL-AL-HAWA [URBAN])

IRON TRAILS BRIGADE (401)  
(NETZARIM [AGRICULTURAL])
THE HUMANITARIAN EFFORT
[AVOIDING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS]

CRITICAL SUPPLY (FOOD, MEDICINES)

HUMANITARIAN PAUSES

MOVEMENT COORDINATION (PASSAGES)

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (ELECTRICITY)
THE HOME FRONT EFFORT
[SUPPORTING THE POPULATION, MINIMIZING CASUALTIES, PROVIDING FEELING OF SECURITY]

EARLY WARNING (ROCKETS & MORTARS)
[SENSORS, C², SIRENS]

PASSIVE DEFENSE
[SHELTERS]

COMMUNITY SUPPORT
[SHELTERS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS]

INFORMATION FOR THE PUBLIC
[CALL CENTERS, PUBLICATIONS, RADIO & TV, INTERNET]
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"... OUR DEFENSE CONCEPT IS MAINLY BASED ON ROCKETS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN USED SO FAR AND ON NETWORK OF TUNNELS DUG UNDER A WIDE PART OF THE STRIP. THE [ISRAELI] ARMY WILL BE SURPRISED BY THE FIGHTERS COMING FROM UNDERGROUND, WELL-EQUIPPED WITH NON-STANDARD MEANS OF WARFARE ... THE CONQUEROR ENTERING THE STRIP WILL FACE TRAINED FIGHTERS POSSESSING MODERN FIGHTING METHODS, SUBORDINATED TO JOINT COMMAND AND GUIDANCE. THE IDF WILL NOT KNOW WHERE ITS TANKS ARE ATTACKED FROM AND WHERE THE ROCKETS AGAINST ITS SOLDIERS ARE LAUNCHED FROM ..."

ABU UBIEDA, ALHAYAT, DECEMBER 17, 2007

"... THE ENEMY SUCCEEDED TO DESTROY SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT CIVIL ONES. REGARDING THE RESISTANCE, IT IS IN A GOOD SHAPE, AS WELL AS ITS INFRASTRUCTURES ... THE OCCUPYING TROOPS SHOULD BEWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPECTED GROUND PENETRATION INTO THE STRIP ... IT MAY CAUSE A SECOND, THIRD OR FOURTH GILAD SHALIT ... THE MOVEMENT WILL NOT BREAK NOR SURRENDER ..."

KHALED MASH'AL, JANUARY 2, 2009

"... WE DO NOT CONFRONT THEM AS WE HAVE DONE ONCE, 10 FIGHTERS ARE GOING TO CONFRONT THEM, AND NOT 100 FIGHTERS, AS IN THE PAST ... SENIOR FIGHTERS (MILITARY LEADERSHIP) ARE HIDING, AND MANY OF THEM HAVE NOT BEEN MOVING FOR SEVERAL DAYS; THEY SIT UNDERGROUND AND IN ARMORED SHELTERS ... SOME OF THEM ARE FULLY ISOLATED FROM MILITARY OPERATION ..."

HAMAS' FIGHTERS, ALSHARK ALAWSAT, JANUARY 15, 2009
HAMAS’S MAIN EFFORTS

URBAN WARFARE

CONTINUOUS FIRING

CC&D (DISAPPEARANCE)

IEDs & ATGMs

INFORMATION WARFARE
QASSAM LAUNCHER

LAUNCH FROM URBAN AREA
HAMAS'S MAP – DEPLOYMENT OF EXPLOSIVES AND FORCES IN AL-ATTATRA NEIGHBORHOOD
A TUNNEL (FOR KIDNAPPING, SMUGGLING & ATTACKING)
WEAPONS (ROCKETS) INSIDE A HOUSE
A BOOBY TRAPPED HOUSE
# OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

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HAMAS KILLED (ACCUMULATED)

- ~ 300
- ~ 200
- ~ 200

TOTAL: 700

ROCKETS & MORTARS

- MORTARS
- > 20
- < 20

BEGINNING MANEUVER
HUMANITARIAN PAUSE (1st)
OPERATING RESERVES

SURPRISE ATTACK
MOBILIZING RESERVES
UNSCR 1860
ENLARGING MANEUVER
CABINET DECISION

PHASE I: AIR STRIKE
PHASE II: MANEUVER

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

27/12 3/1 10/1 17/1

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- MORTARS
- > 20
- < 20
HAMAS KILLED (ACCUMULATED)

TOTAL: 700

SURPRISE ATTACK
MOBILIZING RESERVES
UNSCR 1860
ENLARGING MANEUVER
CABINET DECISION

PHASE I: AIR STRIKE
PHASE II: MANEUVER
BASIC
ENLARGED

BEGINNING MANEUVER
HUMANITARIAN PAUSE (1st)
OPERATING RESERVES

ROCKETS & MORTARS

MORTARS
> 20
< 20

418
210
160

UNCLASSIFIED / FOOUO

DADO CENTER
SURPRISE AIR ATTACK
(100 TARGETS, 4 MINUTES)

MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK
(EXTENDED RANGE [40 KM])

4 ISRAELIS KILLED
(1 IDF + 3 CIVILIANS [ROCKETS])

DEMONSTRATIONS
(MAINLY IN ARAB STATES)

CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES
950 SORTIES

GROUND FORCES
DEPLOYMENT & PREPARATIONS

HUMANITARIAN AID

~ 300 HAMAS KILLED

NIZAR RIAN
TARGETED KILLING
"... WE JUST WANTED TO TEASE ISRAEL, AND WE WERE SURPRISED BY ITS REACTION ... WE RELIED ON THE ARAB MASS; WE DIDN'T EXPECT ALL THESE CRIMES COMMITTED TO OUR PEOPLE ... WE ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE IN ORDER TO STOP THE AGGRESSION ..."

KHALED MASH'AL, JANUARY 7, 2009
GROUND MANEUVER

MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK (40 KM)

9 ISRAELIS (IDF) KILLED

DEMONSTRATIONS (IN EUROPE & IN ARAB STATES)

CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES (1170 SORTIES)

MOBILIZING & TRAINING RESERVES

HUMANITARIAN AID

~ 200 HAMAS KILLED

UNSCR #1860
"... WE WILL POSITIVELY COOPERATE WITH ANY INITIATIVE THAT WILL IMMEDIATELY STOP THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR PEOPLE AND WILL LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES... WE WILL COOPERATE IN A RESPONSIBLE AND OPEN WAY ..."

ISMAIL HANIYA, JANUARY 12, 2009

"... WE WILL NOT GIVE UP ON OUR DEMANDS. THE CONTINUANCE BOMBING ON GAZA IS A DESPERATE TRY TO IMPOSE A NEW REALITY ON THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE... WE NOW SAY NOTHING MORE, OTHER THEN CONTINUING THE RESISTANCE AGAINST AGGRESSION ..."

MOUSA ABU MARZOOK, JANUARY 15, 2009
ENLARGED GROUND MANEUVER (INTO THE URBAN AREA)

MASSIVE ROCKETS ATTACK (40 KM)

SAID SEYAM ["NO. 3"] TARGETED KILLING

ROCKETS FROM LEBANON

CONTINUOUS AIR STRIKES (1055 SORTIES)

OPERATING THE RESERVE FORCES

HUMANITARIAN AID

~200 HAMAS KILLED

FIRE IN UNRWA CAMP
DECREASE OF ROCKET FIRE

- MORTARS
- > 20 Km
- < 20 Km

Average: 60
Average: 30
Average: 23
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<th>CITY</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
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<td>BEERSHEBA</td>
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<td>KIRYAT GAT</td>
<td>47,900</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAVNE</td>
<td>32,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>NETIVOT</td>
<td>26,100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFAKIM</td>
<td>24,700</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRYAT MALAKHI</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDEROT</td>
<td>19,400</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEDERA</td>
<td>17,700</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~1,000,000</td>
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URBAN AREAS 23%
OPEN AREAS 77%
TOWARD A CEASE FIRE

1. ISRAEL & US SIGN MOU (161000)

2. ISRAEL DECLARES CEASE FIRE (172200)

3. HAMAS DECLARES CEASE FIRE (181200)

4. SHARM EL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (181700)
IDF FORCES LEAVE GAZA STRIP
(21 JANUARY 2009)
# OPERATION "CAST LEAD" – A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

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<th>THE OPERATION BY NUMBERS</th>
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<th>HAMAS'S MAIN EFFORTS</th>
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<td>IDF'S MAIN EFFORTS</td>
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<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
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</table>
"... HAMAS WAS BADLY STRICKEN, BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF ITS REGIME. ITS LEADERS ARE IN HIDING. MANY OF ITS MEMBERS HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE FACTORIES IN WHICH ITS MISSILES WERE MANUFACTURED HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. THE SMUGGLING ROUTES, THROUGH DOZENS OF TUNNELS, HAVE BEEN BOMBED. THE HAMAS'S CAPABILITIES FOR CONVEYING WEAPONS WITHIN THE GAZA STRIP HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. THE SCOPE OF MISSILE FIRE DIRECTED AT THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE AREAS FROM WHICH MOST OF THE MISSILES WERE LAUNCHED ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF IDF FORCES. THE ESTIMATE OF ALL THE SECURITY SERVICES IS THAT THE HAMAS'S CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN STRUCK A HEAVY BLOW WHICH WILL HARM ITS ABILITY TO RULE AND ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR SOME TIME ..."

PRIME MINISTER OLMERT, 17 JANUARY, 2007
An improvement in the security reality

Damage to Hamas

Deterrance

Arrangement

End States

1. Hamas severely damaged
2. Conditions for better security reality achieved
3. Deterrence against Hamas and the region renewed
4. Terror from Gaza stopped (rocket fire reduced)
5. No deterioration in other fronts (West Bank, North)
6. Distinction between Gaza and West Bank restored
7. No damage to the relations with Egypt
8. No humanitarian crisis or image of crisis
# Operation "Cast Lead" – A Strategic Overview

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WARNING - UNIQUE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

UNIQUE GEO-STRATEGIC CONDITIONS
(GAZA ENCIRCLED BY EGYPT & ISRAEL)

UNIQUE ADVERSARY
(MULTIPLE IDENTITIES, LIMITED CAPABILITIES)

UNIQUE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS
(AIR SUPREMACY, INTELLIGENCE SUPERIORITY)

UNIQUE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
(ISRAEL, BUSH/OBAMA, CHRISTMAS, EGYPT, IRAN)
HYBRIDITY AS A WEAKPOINT
[UNRESOLVED TENSION: GOVERNMENT/DISAPPEARANCE]

REVERSED ASYMMETRY
[FIRe, MANEUVER, FORCe RATIO]

"OPENING AIR STRIKE" (GAMBIT)
[INTELLIGENCE, PREPARATIONS, PLANNING]

CRITICAL MANEUVER
[FRICtion, EXPOSURE, MOMENTUM, TENSION]
POLITICAL-MILITARY COORDINATION
[TIMING, TEMPO, TERMINATION MECHANISM]

SIMULTANEOUS EFFORTS
[MILITARY, POLITICAL, INFLUENCE, HUMANITARIAN]

LEGITIMACY
[EXTERNAL & INTERNAL, STRATEGIC NARRATIVE]

MEDIA COVERAGE
[A CONTROLLED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT]
# Operation "Cast Lead" – A Strategic Overview

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HAMAS GAVE PRIORITY TO GOVERNMENT [BUT JIHAD IS ONLY UNDER "FREEZE"]

ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE MODERATE CAMP [BUT, NOT A REGIONAL TURNING POINT]

THE PA FUNCTIONED EFFECTIVELY [BUT, THE REAL CHALLENGES ARE COMING]

A FAILURE FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE [BUT, NOT A PARADIGM SHIFT]