

# **Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain System**

Yvette Clinton, Virginia Foran-Cain, Julia Voelker McQuaid,  
Catherine E. Norman and William H. Sims

With contributions by Sara M. Russell

CRM D0024031.A1/Final  
November 2010

# **20110118177**

Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the global community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them.

On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad.

Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the "problem after next" as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities.

The Strategic Studies Division's charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the following areas:

- The full range of Asian security issues
- The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf
- Maritime strategy
- Insurgency and stabilization
- Future national security environment and forces
- European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral
- West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea
- Latin America
- The world's most important navies.

The Strategic Studies Division is led by Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), who is available at 703-824-2614 or [mcdevitm@cna.org](mailto:mcdevitm@cna.org). The executive assistant to the director is Ms. Rebecca Martin, at 703-824-2604.

Approved for distribution:

November 2010



Dr. Eric V. Thompson  
Director  
International Affairs Group

This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.  
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

Distribution Unlimited: Cleared for Public Release

Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at [www.dtic.mil](http://www.dtic.mil)  
Or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123.

**Copyright © 2010 CNA**

This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-05-D-0500. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014.



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE					Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p> <p><b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b></p>						
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 11-2010		2. REPORT TYPE Final		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain System				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N00014-05-D-0500		
				5b. GRANT NUMBER		
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A		
				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A		
6. AUTHOR(S) Clinton, Yvette Foran-Cain, Virginia McQuaid, Julia, Voelker Norman, Catherine, E. Sims, William, H.				5e. TASK NUMBER 5828		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for Naval Analyses 4825 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER D0024031.A1		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 2500 Defense Pentagon Washington DC 20301-2500				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT  This report presents CNA's findings and conclusions from an assessment of the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) commissioned CNA to conduct this study to satisfy a Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) requiring an independent assessment of HTS (this report is part of a broader assessment being conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, examining socio-cultural research and analysis activities across the Department of Defense).						
15. SUBJECT TERMS  Human Terrain Systems, US Government						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  258	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Knowledge Center/Rhea Stone	
a. REPORT  U	b. ABSTRACT  U	c. THIS PAGE  U			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 703-824-2110	

# Table of Contents

---

Executive Summary.....	1
Introduction .....	9
CNA's Approach to Assessment .....	10
Steps in CNA Analysis .....	11
Chapter 1: HTS Organization and Related Technology.....	15
Introduction to HTS .....	15
Deployed Components: HTS teams .....	17
HTS components in the United States .....	23
Chapter 2: Adequacy of HTS Management Structure .....	41
Description of Management Structure .....	41
Adequacy of the Management Structure .....	44
CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 2 .....	48
Chapter 3: HTS Metrics and Assessments.....	51
Assessments, Evaluations, and Metrics in HTS .....	51
CNA Conclusions and Findings for CDA Element 3 .....	69
Chapter 4: Adequacy of Human Resources and Recruitment.....	73
HTS Structure .....	74
The Job Requirements .....	76
Recruiting .....	86
CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 4 .....	107
Chapter 5: HTS Skills and Academic Networks.....	111
Skills not Resident in Military or Government .....	111
Additional data on Skills not Resident in the Military from Semi-Structured Interviews .....	117
Leveraging Academic Networks .....	119
CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 5 .....	121
Chapter 6: Challenges to HTS Implementation.....	123
Factor 1: Program start-up costs .....	126
Factor 2: Dependence on Contractors and Difficulties with Contract Management .....	130
Factor 3: Ill-Fitting Regulation Issues .....	139
CNA Findings and Conclusions of CDA Element 6 .....	144

Appendix A: HTS Personnel CNA Interviewed for Assessment .....	147
Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Approach and Data Analysis.....	149
Description of the sample and procedures.....	149
Interview Questions.....	149
Analysis.....	152
Comparison of groups .....	153
Data Summaries.....	164
Appendix C: Other "Human Terrain" Organizations.....	213
Appendix D: Collective Task List Memo.....	215
Appendix E: Government Fact Sheet.....	217
Appendix F: Position Descriptions for Human Terrain Teams.....	221
Appendix G: IRAC Report.....	237



# List of Figures

---

Figure 1-1: HTS Organizational Chart.....	16
Figure 2-1: The HTS Management Structure .....	41
Figure 4-1. Actual and Projected Number of teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan .....	73
Figure 6-1: HTS oversight relationship .....	125
Figure 6-2: TRADOC Acquisition and Management Oversight Contract Review .....	133

# List of Tables

---

Table 1-1: Human terrain team (HTT) staffing (as of May 2010) .....	19
Table 1-2: Human terrain analysis teams (HTAT) (as of May 2010) .....	21
Table 2-1: HTS Funding Plan (thousands of dollars) .....	43
Table 2-2: Number of employees managed by HTS managers (non-directorates) .....	45
Table 2-3: Span of Control for HTS Directorates .....	46
Table 3-1: PDT Assessment Products 2007-Present.....	55
Table 3-2: FY10 PDT Plan and Status.....	61
Table 3-3: HTS JIEDDO Approved Objectives .....	62
Table 3-4: HTS Mission Essential Tasks .....	63
Table 3-5: Example of METL, supporting tasks, and MOPs from "Collective Task List" .....	63
Table 4-1: HTS structure .....	75
Table 4-2: HTS staffing as of 18 June 2010.....	76
Table 4-3: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Team Leader position .....	79
Table 4-4: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Social Scientist position .....	81
Table 4-5: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Research Manager position more formally known as a Human Terrain Specialist .....	83
Table 4-6: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Human Terrain Analyst position .....	85
Table 4-7: Other conditions of employment pertaining to all HTS team members.....	86
Table 4-8: Team applicants, interviewees, and hires by BAE for FY 2009 and FY 2010 to date.....	87
Table 4-9: Disposition of HTS Contractor Candidates by Training Cycle Start Date .....	92
Table 4-10: Academic degrees of currently deployed team members and position requirements .....	94
Table 4-11: Areas of specialization of currently deployed HTA personnel and position requirements .....	95
Table 4-12: Areas of specialization of currently deployed RM personnel and position requirements .....	96
Table 4-13: Areas of specialization of currently deployed SS personnel and position requirements .....	98

Table 4-15: Foreign language capability of currently deployed team members .....	101
Table 4-16: Respondents finding teams useful.....	103
Table 4-17: HTS staffing as of June 2010 (Table 4-2 is reproduced here for proximity to the discussion.) .....	105
Table 4-18: HTS Directorates .....	106
Table 4-19: Summary of areas of specialization of currently deployed team personnel and position requirements. ....	107
Table 5-1: Educational requirements and expected hires for HTT positions in CY 2010. ....	112
Table 5-2: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Army civilians .....	113
Table 5-3: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Navy civilians .....	113
Table 5-4: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Marine Corps civilians .....	114
Table 5-5: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Air Force civilians.....	114
Table 5-6: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Other DoD civilians .....	115
Table 5-7: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Total DoD civilians.....	115
Table 5-8: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Navy active duty military .....	116
Table 5-9: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Marine Corps active duty military .....	117
Table 5-10: HTS Relationships with Academic Institutions.....	119
Table 6-1: Current and Projected Numbers of Deployed Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq ...	129
Table B-1. Semi-Structured Interview .....	150
Table B-3: Interviewee responses by group .....	154
Table B-4: HTT Roles and Usefulness .....	165



# Executive Summary

This report presents CNA's findings and conclusions from an assessment of the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) commissioned CNA to conduct this study to satisfy a Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) requiring an independent assessment of HTS (this report is part of a broader assessment being conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, examining socio-cultural research and analysis activities across the Department of Defense).

CNA's assessment of HTS focused on six specific elements of the program as directed by Congress, as follows:<sup>1</sup>

- Overview of HTS organization, including related technology development efforts
- Adequacy of the management structure for HTS
- Metrics used to evaluate each of the components of HTS
- Adequacy of human resources and recruiting efforts
- Identification of skills that are not resident in government or military positions, and how the U.S. Army can leverage academic networks or contracting opportunities to fill these gaps
- Identification of policy or regulatory issues hindering program execution<sup>2</sup>

## Background and Context

The Human Terrain System is a U.S. Army project intended to provide military decision-makers in Iraq and Afghanistan with greater understanding of the local population's cultures and perspectives. HTS deploys Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) of five to nine civilian and military personnel to support brigade, division, and theater-level staffs and commanders with operationally relevant information. The program also provides training for deploying personnel, reachback analysis, and software tools developed by HTS to support socio-cultural analysis. HTS emphasizes the use of tools and approaches commonly associated with the academic disciplines of anthropology and sociology in its efforts to collect and analyze data about local populations.

---

<sup>1</sup> The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Report on HR 2647 originally cites seven elements for the CDA; however, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and congressional staffers agreed that CNA would focus its assessment on the CDA's first six elements cited in the CDA. As a result, this report does not address the issue of integrating HTS capabilities into existing exercises.

<sup>2</sup> Of note, the CDA specified that the assessment provide the data needed to evaluate the criticism and negative reporting about the program.

Nearly four years into its existence, it is clear that the program has had its share of ups and downs. The intent of this assessment is to provide Congress with accurate and objective information on specific aspects of the HTS program and insight into HTS's operations and effectiveness.

## **Findings and Conclusions**

Based on our assessment of the six elements in the CDA, we present the following overall conclusions concerning HTS:

First, the HTS program has been, in many ways, a success. It is a unique and dynamic program, and its leadership and staff have been able to generate a new and innovative capability within a bureaucratic environment that is not always open to such initiatives. In our interactions with HTS personnel and staff, we consistently came across individuals who were deeply committed to the mission, which most likely has also contributed to its successes. The program also has support within the Army leadership. General David Petraeus, who recently became commander of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, is a staunch supporter.<sup>3</sup> There are some indications in the data we collected for this assessment that this capability fills a gap for the war-fighter and therefore has made an important contribution to U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Second, the program remains the target of criticism.<sup>4</sup> Part of this appears to stem from specific incidents and poor decisions that have occurred within the program, such as sending unqualified personnel into combat zones. Our analysis suggests that poor internal communications and the absence of an overall outreach or communications strategy may also be contributing to a misunderstanding of the program's goals and operations. This may also account for some criticism.

Criticism of the program is also reasonable in that during the rush to create, train, and deploy teams, the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the organization in its first several years meant that many of the processes and procedures typically implemented by a new Department of Defense (DoD) program were either not completed or did not take place in the proper order.

---

<sup>3</sup> Motlagh, Jason. "Should Anthropologists Help Contain the Taliban?," Time Online, July 1, 2010. [www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2000169,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0sTDULgls](http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2000169,00.html?xid=rss-topstories#ixzz0sTDULgls).

<sup>4</sup> For numerous reasons, some anthropologists are opposed to the program. To learn more about the nature of these concerns, we recommend the reader refer to the "AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) Final Report on The Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program," Submitted to the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, October 14, 2009. In addition, there is also an active blog community made up of a variety of outspoken individuals who oppose the program.



Third, there are indications that real problems exist within the HTS program. Some of these problems have either been addressed, or are in the process of being addressed. Others have not been addressed at all. There is evidence to suggest that some of these unresolved issues may require a reassessment of where the HTS program resides.

Our assessment indicates that, at least in recent years, the management relationship between the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its HTS subsidiary has been problematic.

It appears that HTS's most significant problems revolve around human resourcing and the level of support provided to HTS by TRADOC.<sup>5</sup> We believe that solutions to these immediate issues exist. We emphasize, however that, these issues are not new. Problems in human resourcing and support have been evident in HTS for years—and little has been done to address them to date. As a result, we conclude that a more fundamental problem may exist: there may be a lack of TRADOC institutional commitment to making HTS a success. Hence, while further exploration would need to be conducted to determine this definitively, it is possible that the HTS mission would be better served if HTS were located elsewhere, but potential alternatives are beyond the scope of this assessment.

While HTS faces significant internal problems, it appears the program continues to have strong support from perhaps its most significant constituent: commanders in the field.

Below we include specific findings regarding each of the six elements of the CDA.

### **CDA Element 1: HTS organization and related technology**

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) manages, supports, and is responsible for the oversight of the HTS program. The components of HTS can be divided into two primary categories: the deployed teams and the continental U.S. (CONUS)-based components that support them with administrative support, training, reachback analysis, and information technology.

Deployed components include:

- *Human Terrain Teams (HTTs)*: support brigade-level commands
- *Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs)*: support division and higher-level commands

---

<sup>5</sup> We are not in a position to make definitive conclusions on this issue since we have been unable to fully confirm certain aspects of our assessment. The personnel within HTS were generally responsive in providing us data in most areas throughout our assessment. We had some difficulty obtaining information (or complete information) from TRADOC G2 Operations (G2 OPS), however, in three areas, they are: issues regarding the BAE recruiting contract, G2-OPS interactions with BAE Systems, and issues regarding TRADOC G2 staffing for the support of HTS.

- *Theater Coordination Elements*: provide social science support to theater headquarters, provide in-theater project management support to teams deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan, and coordinate HTS SSRA capability
- *Social Science Research and Analysis teams*: also at the theater level, hire indigenous organizations to conduct surveys and then analyze and distribute the survey results

CONUS-based operations are located in Newport News, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and include:

- *Project management office, business office, and human resources*: provide administrative and project management support
- *Operations directorate*: provides logistical and administrative support to deploying, deployed, and returning personnel and plans for future personnel requirements
- *Training directorate*: conducts the 4.5-month training program for deploying personnel
- *Social science directorate*: develops policies and research standards, communicates these standards to deployed HTS personnel, and conducts outreach to the military, academia, and the media
- *Project development team*: conducts assessments and gathers lessons learned to improve the HTS project
- *Reachback research centers*: responds to requests for analysis submitted by deployed HTS personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
- *Knowledge management*: has developed a suite of software tools for deployed HTS personnel and is developing additional software and database capabilities
- *Combatant command (COCOM) liaisons*: reach out to regional combatant commands to help them define their requirements for socio-cultural research

The major technology development in HTS has been the MAP-HT software package. MAP-HT, designed to support analysts in the field, has three primary functions: 1) archiving and dissemination of field reports, 2) analysis, and 3) production of analytic reports.

The first version of MAP-HT, version 0.5, was fielded in 2007 and was poorly received. The program was not networked, had a difficult-to-use interface, and relied on Axis Pro—which many considered unreliable software for visual display of information. MAP-HT was retooled and released in 2010. It was fielded in Afghanistan and has been generally well received, although it is too early to know with certainty.

## **CDA Element 2: Adequacy of HTS management structure**

In general, there is reason for optimism about HTS internal management. The management structure has greatly improved in the last 12 months. Of note, there has been the addition of a Chief of Staff, several key replacements in directorates, and the organization is in the process of converting all remaining contractors that currently head directorates into government civilian status.

CNA notes with concern the large number of vacancies in staff positions. This has multiple negative effects on the organization, which we elaborate on in this report.

CNA's biggest concern is the tense relationship between the management at HTS and its parent organization, TRADOC. Some of the problems may stem from personality differences and some from differing visions about the future of HTS. However, it appears that much of the immediate discomfort appears to be the result of the terms of the Army's contract with BAE to supply recruits.

Possible solutions to these problems are:

- Review TRADOC's contract with BAE to determine if there are opportunities to provide more protection to the government, such as specifying measures of performance and effectiveness, and adding quality control for recruiting
- Staff TRADOC G2 OPS adequately to handle HTS oversight support
- Develop stronger pathways of communications between HTS and TRADOC in ways that support transparency and cooperation.

## **CDA Element 3: HTS metrics and assessment**

Since HTS's inception, there have been several internal evaluations and assessments of the program's effectiveness. Few of these evaluations have used formal assessment metrics. The assessments and evaluations that have been conducted since 2007 have varied widely and resulted in an assortment of "products."

We see a number of problems with this. First, it is unclear what the exact purpose and goals of past assessments have been and who the intended audience is. It appears that the Project Management Office was the primary recipient of HTS products and that TRADOC G2 has not received or reviewed HTS assessment products. Second, the current approach has made it difficult to conduct any trend analysis of the program's development. Finally, there is not a formal process for implementing the suggestions/conclusions reached in the various



assessments within HTS. Any organizational change that has come about due to past assessments has been the result of an informal decision-making process.

There has never been a permanent, fully-staffed component responsible for assessments within HTS. A Project Development Team (PDT) directorate, which has a charter to conduct evaluation and assessment, appears on organizational charts, but this directorate has never been formally stood up. As of the writing of this report, the PDT still did not have a permanent staff and plans to hire for this directorate are on hold. In the absence of a permanent staff, past PDT assessments have been conducted by ad hoc teams.

In 2008, HTS launched an effort to develop a more formal assessment process similar to those in other military organizations. As part of that process, new metrics recently have been developed. In 2010, HTS developed the "Collective Task List," which provides Mission Essential Tasks, Supporting Tasks, and Measures of Performance that appear appropriate for measuring organizational progress. An assessment of HTS performance relative to the Collective Task List has not been conducted as of this writing.

#### **CDA Element 4: Adequacy of human resourcing and recruitment**

Human resourcing and recruiting are among the biggest challenges for HTS. Based on our analysis, it appears that many of the currently deployed HTS personnel are underqualified for their jobs. Based on the data we have collected, we estimate that HTS faces resignations of an estimated 80 deployed team members each year out of the current deployed base of 193 persons. This represents an estimated annual loss of 41 percent.<sup>6</sup>

In order to recruit quality personnel, HTS must have a clear understanding of what makes up a successful team. The program must also have control of the recruiting process. Finally, the recruits must be well trained. HTS currently falls short on all counts. Possible solutions include:

- Building a comprehensive personnel database and conducting an analytic assessment of experiences to date to identify the type of person who is most likely to be successful in the demanding jobs on a Human Terrain Team. The findings should then be incorporated into the job descriptions
- Putting HTS in control of the recruiting process. This would likely involve renegotiation of the current TRADOC contract with BAE to give the government more protection and to modify the recruiting process to include face-to-face interviews with HTS personnel before the final hiring decision is made

---

<sup>6</sup> Because HTS does not track these numbers, this number represents CNA's best estimate. To calculate this, we took information from multiple sources and averaged them.

- Monitoring personnel and performance trends to detect and remedy the serious personnel issues that contribute to the high attrition rate. In particular, HTS needs to track the numbers of persons relieved of duty, persons resigning, and number of teams that do not succeed in accomplishing their mission
- Improving HTS training, creating permanent (rather than ad hoc) facilities, and lowering the student-to-faculty ratio, which currently exceeds, and will shortly be twice as high as TRADOC's own standards.

#### **CDA Element 5: HTS skills and academic networks**

The skills needed for HTTs do not appear to be resident in sufficient numbers in the DoD civilian workforce or in the military to fully staff the program. HTS therefore must hire from the general pool available to academia and business to source their personnel requirements. For the longer term, an alternative to relying on the general labor pool might be for the Army to select promising young officers for a training program in social science and send them to an appropriate university for an advanced degree. This approach, however, is not without its potential problems.

Turning to academic institutions to leverage their skills is appropriate given HTS's mission set and is in accordance with the program's overall focus on adapting academic approaches to support operational commanders. It is also worthwhile to leverage academic networks and draw from the expertise, programs, and work of outside organizations to fill gaps within HTS. In practice, however, HTS faces some internal challenges with regard to working with academic institutions that will need to be overcome for these to be successful:

- From an organizational/management perspective, there is not a directorate or individual within HTS responsible for pursuing relationships and partnerships with academic organizations and leveraging networks. The HTS staff struggles to pursue these relationships in the absence of a clear plan and a well-defined entity within HTS that has the authority and responsibilities to oversee these efforts
- There is no strategic communications plan to support HTS in approaching outside organizations. A strategic communications plan would help HTS effectively articulate to outside organizations its mission in a way that can be easily understood by outside partners. In turn, potential partners can easily identify where there may be areas for cooperation and synergies with their organizations

Separate from its internal challenges, HTS also faces negative attitudes within some academic circles. For example, some universities have been reluctant to work with HTS. The degree of reluctance differs among institutions and individuals, but we see this as a long-term challenge for HTS if the organization is going to continue to rely on outside expertise.

## **CDA Element 6: Challenges to HTS implementation**

As a new, innovative program trying to establish itself quickly within a large bureaucracy, HTS has faced many of the challenges and problems faced by other DoD start-up programs in recent years. In particular, three factors seem to have caused these challenges:

- Program start-up costs
- Dependence on contractors/difficulties with contract management
- Existing federal and DoD regulations that are ill-fitted to today's war-fighting environment.

We identified six problems that the HTS program has faced as a result of these three challenges. They are:

1. Recruiting/hiring of unqualified team members
2. High rates of attrition among HTS team members
3. Contract ceiling being reached, halting HTS operations
4. Timecard problems
5. Frustration over permanent duty station assignment for Department of Army Civilians who rotate or transit through Fort Leavenworth
6. HTS program management

Our analysis also illuminates issues potentially affecting the program's relationship to its parent organization, TRADOC. Based on our interviews with HTS personnel, there appear to be several areas where TRADOC support for HTS has been problematic. They are:

- The lack of a detailed budget for HTS to manage
- Contract management and human resource management within TRADOC G2
- Inadequate transition rate of key project manager positions to government civilian positions, given HTS high OPTEMPO

That said, HTS and TRADOC continue to implement reforms. Many of the problems we have identified over the course of this assessment—such as the need to reduce the number of contractors managing the program—are being addressed. Others, such as contract oversight issues, remain. We also note that some of the problems we have identified relate to DoD policies and federal regulations that are beyond TRADOC's ability to resolve by itself.



# Introduction

This report presents CNA's findings and conclusions from an independent assessment of the Human Terrain System (HTS), a U.S. Army project<sup>7</sup> intended to provide military decision-makers in Iraq and Afghanistan with a greater understanding of the cultures and perspectives of local populations.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) commissioned CNA to conduct this assessment to satisfy a Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) requiring an independent assessment of HTS (this report is part of a broader assessment being conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, examining socio-cultural research and analysis activities across the Department of Defense). Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Report on HR 2647 states that<sup>8</sup>:

*"The committee continues to support the concept behind the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) and the overall Human Terrain System (HTS). In the committee report (H Rept. 11-652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY09, the committee expressed support for the expansion of the HTT concept, including to other combatant command areas of responsibility. The committee is aware of anecdotal evidence indicating the benefits of the program supporting operations in the Republic of Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.*

*The committee also notes that a number of press accounts provide anecdotal evidence indicating problems with management and resourcing. The committee finds it difficult to evaluate either set of information in the absence of reliable, empirical data.*

*Therefore the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an independent assessment of the HTS and submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing that assessment by 1 March 2010. The independent assessment should consider the following elements:*

- 1. An overview of all the components of HTS, including related technology development efforts;*
- 2. The adequacy of the management structure for HTS;*
- 3. The metrics used to evaluation each of the components of HTS;*

---

<sup>7</sup> The reader may note inconsistent use of the terms "project" and "program" to describe HTS and to refer to HTS titles of HTS officials in our report. We asked HTS which term to use. HTS officials told us that last year there apparently was a transition from "program" to "project" but we were not able to verify this (HTS officials themselves were not clear). Our inconsistent use, therefore, reflects what we were provided by HTS in our interviews and in HTS documents.

<sup>8</sup> Text from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Report on HR 2647.

4. *The adequacy of human resources and recruiting efforts, including the implications of converting some contractor positions to government positions;*
5. *An identification of skills that are not resident in government or military positions, and how the army can leverage academic networks or contracting opportunities to fill these gaps;*
6. *An identification of policy or regulatory issues hindering program execution;*
7. *The potential to integrate HTS capabilities into existing exercises.”*

Officials from OSD and congressional staffers agreed that CNA would focus its assessment on the first six of the seven elements cited in the CDA. As a result, this report does not address the issue of integrating HTS capabilities into existing exercises.

## **CNA's Approach to Assessment**

In this section we describe the analytical approach we took to our assessment. This approach emphasized the use of empirical data and objective analysis. It also allowed us to focus our research and analysis on the six specific elements in the CDA.

### *The Issue of Obtaining Data from HTS Operations in-Theater*

A significant portion of HTS activities and operations take place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, given the 90 day time-frame we were allotted to conduct this assessment, the CNA assessment team was not able to travel to either theater to conduct our research. As a result, we relied mostly on information we could gather within the United States.

We believe that this assessment, and any future assessments, would benefit greatly from having direct access to HTTs and other HTS components in-theater. In an effort to gain any data regarding HTS in Afghanistan/Iraq that we could, we reached out to two CNA analysts who were in Afghanistan supporting the U.S. Marine Corps at the time of this study. Although they had other duties and responsibilities to the USMC in their jobs as CNA Field Representatives, they were able to provide some inputs from current field commanders on their interactions and impressions with HTTs down range. We include this information in the data we collected in our semi-structured interviews (more below).



## Steps in CNA Analysis

### *Data Collection*

CNA relied on multiple sources of data for our assessment. Again, the timeline for our assessment was limited to 90 days. This relatively short period of time to conduct an in-depth evaluation of a program of HTS's size and mandate, particularly given that much of the organization's activities take place in Afghanistan and Iraq, made access to some information difficult. As a result, we had to limit our data collection efforts in order to stay within our timeframe. With this in mind, CNA used the following data sources and types for our analysis:

### *Documentation*

*HTS Documentation:* CNA contacted the HTS Project Office and requested access to internal documentation relevant to the six elements in the CDA. We were subsequently put in touch with the appropriate people across the HTS organization to coordinate the transfer of data. Specifically, we asked the HTS Project Office to provide us with all soft/hard copies of any documentation concerning the following (please see Appendix A for complete list of HTS officials we interacted with for this assessment):

- Past program overviews and descriptions of HTS
- Organizational Structure: Organization charts (management structure, other)
- Personnel/HR files: job descriptions, recruiting documentation, job analyses
- Current and past assessments and evaluations of HTS (informal/formal, internal/external)

Initially, we also referenced the HTS website for a broad description of the program.

In general, we received data from HTS itself in a timely fashion when we made requests. With regard to several areas of the assessment, we found that data requests to the parent organization, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), were at times returned incomplete or late. In a few cases, we received no response.

*External Sources/Documentation:* In addition to documentation we received from within the HTS organization, we reviewed open source documentation on HTS. We relied on these sources to help us establish a foundational understanding of the program and its history.

To be clear, as requested by our sponsor, our assessment focuses on the six issues in the CDA. As a result, we do not directly wade into the broader debates surrounding the HTS program that are currently taking place on various websites and blogs.<sup>9</sup> However, because the CDA

---

<sup>9</sup> Although there are several, one prominent example is John Stanton's series of blogs on the HTS program available at the website: <http://cryptome.org>.

mentions “press accounts [that] provide anecdotal evidence indicating problems with management and resources,”<sup>10</sup> we needed to familiarize ourselves with these debates. We also used articles and reports available in traditional media sources, such as the *New York Times*<sup>11</sup> and the BBC.<sup>12</sup> These reports also present the broader debates on the program.

A key stakeholder in the current debate on HTS is the academic community, most prominently represented by the American Anthropological Association.<sup>13</sup> To better understand these views, we reviewed documents available within this community, such as the *AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program*.<sup>14</sup> We also found this document to contain useful descriptive background information on HTS as we were initially learning about the program.

Again, information from the above sources provided context for our assessment. It was not used to take a position in the debate; that is not our role. This information served to help us better understand the program itself and the views of the various stakeholders involved from an objective standpoint.

## **Meetings**

*HTS Staff and Personnel:* We conducted meetings with leadership and staff across the HTS organization. The goals of these meetings were to:

- Ask specific questions of the relevant personnel regarding each of the six elements we examine
- Provide deeper context and information on documentation we reviewed from the HTS Project Office
- Verify the accuracy of some of our findings. This was limited primarily to CDA Element 1, which focused on describing the organization.

Throughout our data collection, we sometimes discovered either incomplete data or information that required additional verification. In these cases, we communicated with HTS staff via email and telephone to obtain additional information.

---

<sup>10</sup> Text from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Report on HR 2647.

<sup>11</sup> [www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?\\_r=2&ex=1349323200&en=a13ec15e97920f0f&ei=5124&partner=permalink&expprod=permalink&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?_r=2&ex=1349323200&en=a13ec15e97920f0f&ei=5124&partner=permalink&expprod=permalink&oref=slogin).

<sup>12</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7042090.stm>.

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that AAA does not speak for all anthropologists. There are a number of other professional associations of anthropologists. Information about AAA can be found at [www.aaanet.org](http://www.aaanet.org).

<sup>14</sup> AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program Submitted to the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association 14 October 2009.



We also sought to gain the views and perspectives of multiple staff members on each issue we examined.

*Non-HTS personnel:* In addition to meeting with HTS personnel, we also sought to gain information and perspectives from individuals who have knowledge of, or exposure to, the HTS program, but are not part of that organization. Given our time limit, however, this included only a few individuals.

### ***Semi-structured Interviews***

As another source of data for the assessment and to supplement the information we gathered directly from HTS, we conducted semi-structured interviews with HTS consumers or “customers,” (i.e., commanders who interacted with HTTs/HTATs during their deployment to Afghanistan and/or Iraq and current field commanders). We interviewed a total of 18 “customers” of HTS products during 16 interviews.<sup>15</sup> About half of those we interviewed were brigade commanders; the others included battalion commanders, intelligence officers, and staff at the division level. Given the short timeframe we had for this study, we had to limit the number of interviews we could conduct in order to leave time for our analysis. Should there be follow-on work to this report, we would recommend expanding the pool of interviewees.

For our semi-structured interviews, we developed an interview guide to obtain the HTS customers’ views and perspectives on issues related to the six elements in the CDA. Sample questions included: “What did the HTT do for you? What did they do that was relevant or useful? What was the most effective use of their skills? Where did they fit into the staff structure? How were they managed operationally?”<sup>16,17</sup>

### ***Analysis***

Each member on our team of analysts had skills relevant to one or several of the elements in the CDA. Each analyst devised his/her own approach to analyzing the data as most appropriate for answering the question being asked and the data available for the analysis. The chapters that address the six elements provide additional information on how the analysis of the data was conducted for each.

---

<sup>15</sup> We conducted 15 one-on-one interviews and 1 interview with 3 customers.

<sup>16</sup> Please refer to appendix B for interview guide.

<sup>17</sup> During each interview, the interviewer typed very detailed notes. After the interview, the interviewer read through the notes for accuracy. Themes from the interviews were noted by the interviewer and/or another team member. Due to the subjective nature of analyzing qualitative data, we aimed to cross-check the data (i.e., themes) to ensure consistency. However, due to time constraints, team members were able to cross-check only half of the interviews. In general the team members agreed on the main messages from the interviews. However, more time would be needed to thoroughly check for consistency.



# Chapter 1: HTS Organization and Related Technology

## Introduction to HTS<sup>18</sup>

In response to Element 1 of the CDA, this chapter describes the components of the Human Terrain System, including the related technology development efforts.

The Human Terrain System is a U.S. Army project managed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) intended to provide military decision makers in Iraq and Afghanistan with greater understanding of the local population's cultures and perspectives. HTS deploys teams of five to nine civilian and military personnel to support brigade, division, and theater-level staffs. The project prepares the teams with rigorous and realistic training prior to deployment, and supports them in theater with a CONUS-based analysis support center and software tools for socio-cultural analysis.

The Human Terrain System has been in a constant state of growth since the program started. The program began with a 2006 proof-of-concept plan calling for five human terrain teams to support brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first team deployed to Forward Operating Base Salerno in Afghanistan in 2007. In the initial assessment of this team, the brigade commander and his staff credited the human terrain team with significantly improving their understanding of the local area, which allowed them to interact more successfully with local people.<sup>19</sup> Thus, even before HTS could field its five initial proof-of-concept teams, it received an expanded Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) for more teams.

### *Brief Overview of HTS*

The components of HTS can be divided into two primary categories: the deployed teams and the continental US (CONUS)-based components that support them with administrative support, training, reachback analysis, and information technology. HTS also recently expanded from the CENTCOM theater and provides a liaison officer to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Figure 1-1 summarizes the HTS components.


---

<sup>18</sup> Please Note: This report discusses only the US Army's Human Terrain System. Several other government agencies, military commands, and universities use the term "human terrain analysis" as shorthand for the understanding of people and cultures (see appendix C). These other programs are not affiliated with the US Army's Human Terrain System and are outside the scope of this report.

<sup>19</sup> Human Terrain System Assessment Team. Human Terrain Team Preliminary Assessment Executive Summary. July-August 2007.



Figure 1-1: HTS Organizational Chart



#### Deployed components:

- *Human Terrain Teams (HTTs):* support brigade-level commands
- *Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs):* support division and higher-level commands
- *Theater Coordination Elements:* provide social science support to the Theater HQ, provide in-theater project management support to the teams deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan, and coordinate HTS social science research and analysis (SSRA) capability
- *Social Science Research and Analysis teams:* also at the theater level, hire indigenous organizations to conduct surveys and then analyze and distribute the survey results

#### CONUS-based components:

- *Project management office, business office, and human resources:* provide administrative and project management support
- *Operations directorate:* provides logistical and administrative support to deploying, deployed, and returning personnel and plans for future personnel requirements
- *Training directorate:* conducts the 4.5-month training program for deploying personnel

- *Social science directorate*: develops policies and research standards, communicates these standards to deployed HTS personnel, and conducts outreach to the military, academia, and the media
- *Project development team*: conducts assessments and gathers lessons learned to improve the HTS project
- *Reachback research centers*: responds to requests for analysis submitted by deployed HTS personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
- *Knowledge management*: has developed a suite of software tools for deployed HTS personnel and is developing additional software and database capabilities
- *Combatant command (COCOM) liaisons*: reach out to the regional combatant commands to help them define their requirements for socio-cultural research

The following sections describe each HTS component in more detail. We follow the order above.

## Deployed Components: HTS teams

The deployed teams, or HTTs, are the core of the Human Terrain System. The first team that HTS deployed in 2007 was an HTT and these teams remain the most visible part of the program.<sup>20</sup> As the program has expanded over the past several years, it has also deployed several other types of teams, including human terrain analysis teams (HTATs), theater coordination elements (TCE), and the social science research and analysis teams (SSRA).

### *Human terrain teams (HTTs)*

According to HTS documentation, the current role of the HTTs is as follows:

*"The HTTs are assigned staff to the brigade combat team (BCT) and support the commander with open-source, unclassified socio-cultural analysis, performing a non-combat support role. The HTT's mission is to increase the ability of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads to understand the local populace that they live with and must operate among. The HTT works with the brigade staff to help ensure that the brigade operates with an understanding of the local population and environment. The HTT assists commanders in understanding the operational relevance, or the "so what?", of socio-cultural information as it applies to the military decision-making process."<sup>21</sup>*

HTS expects human terrain team members to support brigade commanders by providing information about the local society and conducting original research among the local population to determine their perspectives and concerns. While the teams spend some time

<sup>20</sup> The first Human Terrain Team deployed in February 2007, in support of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, at Forward Operating Base Salerno in Afghanistan.

<sup>21</sup> <http://hts.army.mil/components.html>.

on base writing reports, briefing the brigade staff at headquarters, and assisting with the brigade's planning process, a crucial part of the human terrain team's work involves direct engagement with local people.

HTS has outlined the following process for human terrain teams' work. According to HTS officials, this is based on lessons learned from teams that have been deemed successful by brigade commanders.

1. *Prioritize efforts:* Work with the brigade commander and his staff to determine priority areas and issues where the human terrain teams should focus
2. *Conduct background research:* Review open-source and classified information available in theater. If needed, contact the HTS reachback research centers for more in-depth information
3. *Create a research plan:* Determine where the team should visit, who they should talk to, and what questions they should ask
4. *Conduct field research:* Conduct primary field research (principally interviews) and write field notes
5. *Analyze field research:* Conduct additional database and background research to determine what else was going on during the time the team was in the field. Determine links, patterns, or trends
6. *Report findings:* Write a research report and create briefing slides for the brigade staff. If appropriate, release the report for further dissemination
7. *Follow-up:* Work with brigade staff to prioritize and plan for follow-on research

A successful HTT should be fully integrated into the unit, and the team leader and field social scientists should become trusted advisors to the commander and staff. HTTs should participate in a variety of working groups and meetings within the brigade. They should receive command and staff direction in the same manner as other attached special staff elements, such as the chaplain or the judge advocate general (JAG). The brigade combat team commander determines the extent of the HTT's interaction and relationships with the rest of the BCT staff and subordinate units.<sup>22</sup>

Unlike those in most US Army units, members of the human terrain teams do not all train and deploy together. Instead, individual team members rotate to the field on varied

---

<sup>22</sup> <http://hts.army.mil/components.html>.



schedules. This rotation schedule is by design and is intended to help the human terrain team maintain the continuity of relationships and knowledge of the human terrain over time. Established human terrain teams provide a bridge between outgoing and incoming brigades, so local area knowledge and relationships are not lost when a new unit arrives.

### **Composition of HTTs Staff**

Human terrain teams are composed of five to nine military and civilian personnel. When fully staffed according to the HTS's concept of operations, they include a team leader, two social scientists, two research managers, and four human terrain analysts. By design, each team should have at least one female member. The human terrain teams travel with interpreters who are hired and vetted by other commands in theater. Since HTS has nothing to do with contracting or managing the interpreters, we do not consider them a component of HTS in this report, even though they are vital for successful interactions with the local population.

The number of teams has been expanding since the start of the program. The expansion is driven in part by the surge in US troops in theater and as more brigade commanders become familiar with what the teams provide. In Afghanistan, sometimes a partial team has been deployed and then augmented as additional personnel complete their training. HTS intends to augment these partial teams until all the new Afghan teams have at least five personnel. The nine person team is still the ideal but a five person team is considered adequate.

The requirement in Iraq has evolved according to the US drawdown strategy. HTS anticipates that as the US forces consolidate into fewer large bases of operation, there will be a need for fewer teams but with more personnel. HTS expects to support each Advisory and Assistance Brigade with the larger HTAT-sized team in FY 2011. HTATs are discussed in the following section.

Table 1-1: Human terrain team (HTT) staffing (as of May 2010)

	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Total</b>
Number of human terrain teams	10	17	27
Deployed HTT personnel	92	65	157

In May 2010, numbers of HTTs were as follows:

- 10 human terrain teams in Iraq
  - 4 in US Division North
  - 4 in US Division Central
  - 2 in US Division South

- 12 complete human terrain teams supporting Afghanistan
  - 4 US Army brigades
  - 1 US Marine Corps regiment
  - 2 NATO brigades
  - Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF)
  - Task Force Phoenix
  - 3 other unspecified units
- Other: 5 human terrain teams are in the process of being fielded to US Army brigades. HTS has sent 2 - 4 personnel to start supporting these brigades while the rest of the team members are being hired and trained.

### ***Human terrain analysis teams (HTATs)***

HTATs support division, regional command, and theater level staffs. According to the HTS concept of operations, they consist of 10 military and civilian personnel fully staffed, including a team leader, two social scientists, three research managers, three human terrain analysts, and an information technology (IT) specialist.

According to HTS, the current role of HTATs is as follows:

“The human terrain analyses teams aggregate and integrate human terrain team information at the division level and conduct further analysis.”<sup>23</sup>

The above statement is more a goal than a statement of what these teams have actually done. Until recently, the HTATs have had limited ability to review HTTs' activities and analysis. As communications and coordination improves between the teams, the HTS program management expects that the HTATs (at the division and higher levels) will be integrating analysis from the human terrain teams operating in their areas and coordinating joint research studies on topics that cross brigade boundaries.

So far, most of the HTATs' efforts have been in direct support of their commands. They work primarily on the military bases at the division or regional command headquarters. They use information collected by human terrain teams and other sources, but do not generally venture off base to conduct their own primary research.

The HTATs (at the division level) do not have operational or managerial control over the human terrain teams (at the brigade level). That is, the HTATs cannot direct the HTTs to

---

<sup>23</sup> “Overview and Introduction to Human Terrain System” by Dr. Michael Weltsch, HTS Afghanistan RRC, 15 April 2010.

conduct specific analysis or research. The brigade commanders determine the human terrain teams' priorities, and the division commanders determine the HTATs' priorities. Through the normal military chain of command, the division commanders set priorities for information and analysis at the lower levels. The HTATs can influence the division commander's priority list, which is then sent to the brigade commanders and used to determine the priorities for the human terrain teams.

Table 1-2: Human terrain analysis teams (HTAT) (as of May 2010)

	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Total</b>
Division / Regional Command-level	3	5	8
Theater-level		2	2
Total human terrain analysis teams	3	7	10

In May 2010, there were 3 human terrain analysis teams in Iraq, one each at US Division Baghdad, US Division North, and US Division South.

In May 2010, there were 7 human terrain analysis teams in Afghanistan, one at each of the 5 regional commands (RC South, RC East, RC North, RC West and RC Capital) and two at the theater level (ISAF headquarters and ISAF Joint Command (IJC)). ISAF stood up Regional Command South West in June 2010, and HTS is planning to send another human terrain analysis team there.

Please see appendix C for a sample of an HTT/HTAT product.

### ***Theater coordination element (TCE)***

*Location:* 1 in Iraq, 1 in Afghanistan

HTS has deployed TCE teams to Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams consist of 11-16 military and civilian personnel.

According to HTS documentation, the TCE provides social science support to the theater headquarters, provides deployed HTS project management support to all teams in theater, and coordinates HTS social science research and analysis (SSRA) capability.

### ***Project Management Office—Forward (PMO-Forward)***

Initially, HTS did not have any project management personnel deployed forward. As the project expanded, HTS recognized the growing need to coordinate personnel moves, provide equipment and IT support, and account for pay, timesheets, and leave requests.

According to HTS, the PMO-Forward:



*“...provides project management support and oversight for HTS elements in theater, responds to and resolves issues related to team administration, logistics and effectiveness, [and] advises on and manages team organization and supports personnel flow in and out of theater.”<sup>24</sup>*

The PMO-Forward coordinates with the project management staff and the operations directorate in Newport News, Virginia, on all of the above issues.

### ***Social science research and analysis management teams (SSRA)***

The SSRA management teams are in Iraq and Afghanistan, co-located with the TCEs. The number of deployed personnel as of June 2010 is: 12 (3 contractors in CONUS,<sup>25</sup> 9 deployed contractors<sup>26</sup>)

HTS contracts support for SSRAs teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deployed SSRA management teams contract with local polling organizations to collect information through polls, surveys, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions. The SSRA management team develops the research plans for the local polling organizations, collects the results, provides initial analysis, and distributes the results to the theater headquarters, supported human terrain teams, and the reachback research centers (discussed below).

The SSRA capabilities are theater-wide assets, and the deployed SSRA management teams are co-located with the theater coordination elements described above. Their primary focus is answering questions for deployed HTS teams. These teams request survey research, and the SSRA managers' scope the survey projects and determine what questions will be asked based on their budget and the availability of local national surveyors.

In Afghanistan, the SSRA has two on-going surveys: the national identity survey and the tribal matrix survey. SSRA asks the same questions to different survey respondents on a 45-day cycle. Based on information requests from specific human terrain teams, they also add new questions to specific areas or country-wide. The results of these two surveys are compiled every 45 days and shared via Sharepoint.

The deployed SSRA management teams and the three personnel at the CONUS-based research and analysis management center review the surveys and survey reports to ensure that appropriate statistical methodologies have been employed and the survey results have been accurately reported.

The social science directorate, described further below, intends to hire an SSRA coordinator to review the SSRA products, look for survey trends over time, and provide long-term peer review of the survey program. SSRA surveyed thousands of individuals and issued numerous

---

<sup>24</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 5).

<sup>25</sup> The "Faces to Spaces.pdf" document lists four CONUS SSRA researchers. Based on personal communications with TRADOC G2 business office on 24 June 2010, there are now 3 CONUS-based SSRA personnel.

<sup>26</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

survey reports. It has provided information to individual teams about individual questions, but to date, no one has systematically reviewed this large body of information.

## **HTS components in the United States**

The components of HTS located in CONUS support the deployed teams with program management, human resources, training, 24 hour analytic support, knowledge management, and information technology. This section describes each CONUS-based component of HTS shown in figure 1.

For each component, we give the location and size (i.e., number of personnel), and describe its current role. If the component's role has changed significantly over time, we describe its evolution.

It should be noted that some of the CONUS based components are split between Newport News, Virginia and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. They were originally all based at Fort Leavenworth. Since early 2009, several components of the Project Management Office (PMO) moved to Newport News to share spaces at a new Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) facility. Ostensibly, the move should have facilitated communication between the PMO and TRADOC, the organization responsible for managing the HTS program for the U.S. Army. We discuss the relationship between HTS and specifically TRADOC G2 throughout the following chapters.

Currently the HR, Social Science, Reachback center, and OPS directorates are split between Newport News and Fort Leavenworth. It is yet to be determined where the PDT will reside as well as the staff for the Social Science Directorate.

### ***HTS project management office***

*Location:* Newport News, Virginia<sup>27</sup>

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 6 (3 military, 2 Department of Army Civilians (DAC), 1 contractor)<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> The HTS project office is co-located with the Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC).

<sup>28</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010. Faces to Spaces is an internal HTS document that describes where each person in HTS is located. Another similar document we use that HTS provided to us is the PERSTAT report from FT Leavenworth. As far as we can tell they contain similar information.

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides overall management, supervision and oversight of the HTS project. Conducts strategic project planning and engagements, develops and manages HTS budget, and supervises and manages project staff."<sup>29</sup>

In general, the HTS project management office's role is similar to the project management role at many other organizations. We discuss the adequacy of the HTS management structure further in our treatment of Element 2.

The Project management office consists of a Project Manager, a Deputy Project Manager, a Chief of Staff, and other support personnel. The Project Manager was recently terminated and replaced (at least temporarily) by a TRADOC military employee. The Deputy Project Manager handles routine issues for the Project Manager. The Chief of Staff oversees and coordinates the activities of the various Directorates.

### ***Business office***

*Location:* Newport News, Virginia (HTS staff) and Fort Monroe, Virginia (TRADOC G2 staff)

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 2 (2 HTS contractors act as liaisons between the HTS project office and the TRADOC G2 business office at Fort Monroe.)<sup>30</sup>

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides project input and acts as liaison to TRADOC G2 on contract and other related business office issues."<sup>31</sup>

The TRADOC G2 business office, part of the TRADOC G2 operations staff, centrally manages financial resources, budgeting, human resources, contracting, and acquisitions for all programs and directorates within the TRADOC G2, including HTS.<sup>32</sup>

The contracting officer for HTS is located in Washington, DC, while a member of the TRADOC G2 operations staff serves as the contracts technical representative. This technical representative was responsible for managing all the contracts for HTS personnel, including the contract for hiring and providing training to all personnel who will deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the human terrain teams. We discuss problems with contract oversight in other sections.

### ***Human resources directorate***

*Location:* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---

<sup>29</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 3).

<sup>30</sup> Source: Discussions with HTS project manager in May 2010 and interview with operations director on 22 June 2010.

<sup>31</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 2).

<sup>32</sup> TRADOC G2 manages the JTCOIC in the same way.



*Number of personnel as of May 2010: 17 (13 military, 4 contractor)*<sup>33</sup>

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides comprehensive personnel and administration support to project management, staff, team members and trainees. Develops and maintains personnel policies and processes, conducts personnel actions in direct support of HTS military, Army civilian and contractor personnel, and coordinates with external personnel and finance organizations as needed."<sup>34</sup>

The human resources directorate is primarily concerned with the day-to-day management of personnel issues at the Fort Leavenworth training center. It deals with any personnel issues that arise during training for contractors, government civilians, and military personnel.

The conversion of contractors to government civilians is a significant part of the human resources directorate's role. As discussed in the previous sections, HTS sends civilian social scientists to Iraq and Afghanistan as members of the human terrain teams. Initially, these civilians were hired as contractors and remained contractors throughout their affiliation with HTS. In January 2009, HTS began to convert these contractors to term government civilians before deploying them.<sup>35</sup> The human resources directorate assists incoming personnel with this transition. We discuss problems that occurred during the transition in Chapter 6.

The human resources directorate also manages transfers of military personnel, both active duty and reservists, from other commands to HTS. HTS brings in military personnel to deploy to teams in Iraq and Afghanistan and military personnel for the HTS offices in CONUS.

HTS published an employee handbook in September 2008. The human resources directorate was to be responsible for updates to the employee handbook and personnel policies and processes. Based on our interviews with the human resources staff, however, they are primarily concerned with solving day-to-day problems, and could not devote significant time to developing new policies or working on updates to policy documents.

### ***Operations directorate***

*Location:* Newport News, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

*Number of personnel as of May 2010: 21 (20 military, 1 contractor)*<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

<sup>34</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 2).

<sup>35</sup> The revised Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in Iraq went into effect in January 2009. This agreement provided significantly fewer protections to US contractors, compared to US government civilians or US military personnel.

<sup>36</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

*Current role according to HTS:* “Provides operations support to deployed human terrain assets and the project staff. Conducts operations planning and execution including HTS force management, synchronizes staff support to deployed elements, and acts as an immediate operational link for HTS personnel in-transit.”<sup>37</sup>

The operations directorate is in the process of evolving from a small staff that only provided support to deployed personnel to a larger directorate that supports the entire lifecycle of HTS operations. The operations directorate now supports personnel from the time they graduate training, through their deployments, and after they return from deployment until they leave HTS or join the project as permanent staff in Newport News or Fort Leavenworth.

As of June 2010, the operations directorate has three primary functions:

- Current operations: CONUS-based support to deployed personnel
- Future operations: Planning for future personnel needs
- Holding company: Pre-deployment support to personnel who have completed training and to returning personnel.<sup>38</sup>

*Current operations:* The operations directorate’s original function was “current operations.” The 10-12 members of the current operations staff sit on the operations floor of the JTCOIC in Newport News, VA, where they maintain 24-hour contact with deployed teams. They also coordinate travel between CONUS and Iraq and Afghanistan and deal with casualties or other incidents.

*Future operations:* In fall 2009, the operations directorate became responsible for planning for future personnel needs. The 2-3 members of the future operations staff coordinate with the project management office-forward for updates on where personnel will be needed and with the training directorate to match personnel to the appropriate teams. They also receive and track the official requests for forces (RFFs) from the US Army G2’s office. Based on these inputs, they determine when and where personnel will be needed and tell BAE Systems (the recruiting contractor) how many new people will be needed in the next hiring cycle.

Until fall 2009, these future operations functions were carried out by the training and human resources directorates at Fort Leavenworth. Moving these future operations duties to the operations directorate puts the HTS management more in line with other US Army commands, where the operations staff is often responsible for the entire lifecycle of the command, from training to planning and execution. In HTS, the training component

---

<sup>37</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 3).

<sup>38</sup> Note that HTS is using the term “company” here in the sense of the small Army unit called a company, rather than in the sense of a corporation. Thus, the “holding company” is an organization unit that “holds” the staff who are in limbo between other assignments (either before or after deployment).



belongs to a separate directorate and there are no current plans to bring training under the operations directorate.

In February 2010, the operations directorate organized a “holding company” to be the managerial unit that “holds” HTS personnel who are in limbo between training and deployment and those who have recently returned from deployment. This part of the operations directorate keeps track of issues that arise while personnel are on vacations and in transit. It assists incoming personnel with any problems that occur when they apply for security clearances. It also deals with any issues that arise during the US Army’s required pre-deployment training at the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC). CRC training is separate from HTS training and is required for all civilians deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.

One management issue that arose during conversations with the operations director is that the project office forward does not report to the operations directorate. Instead it reports directly to the project management office. Thus, there is no way to solve certain problems or make certain decisions at a level below the project management office. In other Army organizations, the deployed project management office would be a subset of the operations directorate (G3) and there would be a chain of command to allow for decision making. The operations directorate currently does not direct the PMO-forward. The PMO-forward began in August 2009, at a time when the operations directorate was expanding.

### ***Social science directorate***

*Location:* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

*Number of personnel as of July 2010:* 4 (4 civilians)<sup>39</sup>

*Current role according to HTS:* “Provides guidance, advice and support to the development and maintenance of social science guidelines and practices within the project. Develops and maintains social science protocols and methodologies, assesses, mentors and develops social scientists assigned to project, and provides direct support to the project on social science related issues.”<sup>40</sup>

The social science directorate has worked on all the issues outlined above, although the directorate originally consisted of only the directorate’s director. HTS brought on a deputy director in mid-November 2009 and an outreach coordinator in early 2010. A publication manager will join the directorate on 1 July 2010. In 2010, the director and deputy director wrote job descriptions for 16 more staff members. These job descriptions are posted

---

<sup>39</sup> Source: interview with deputy director of social science directorate on 23 June 2010.

<sup>40</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to 14 June 2010 (p. 4).



internally, and HTS is looking for returning human terrain team personnel to fill them.<sup>41</sup> Understaffing has hindered the social science directorate from accomplishing its entire mission. We discuss issues with HTS management more fully under Element 2.

Much of the social science directorate's work involves communications. The directorate keeps in contact with the deployed teams to ensure their work meets HTS's standards. It also coordinates with the operations directorate to ensure that the civilian social scientists' needs are met. It also reviews all draft guidance letters sent to HTS personnel.

The directorate also conducts outreach to the rest of the military and academic communities. In 2010, the new outreach coordinator attended several conferences and military exercises to raise awareness of HTS. The directorate also reviews HTS publications for public release. In 2010, deployed HTS personnel published several articles in *Small Wars Journal* and *Military Review*. The directorate also revised the content and design of the HTS website earlier this year.

The social science directorate is also contributing to the redesign of the training curriculum, and improvements to the curriculum design are a significant portion of the directorate's workload in June 2010.

The directorate is also beginning preparations for the 2010 project assessment. As the project development team described below currently has no staffing, the social science directorate will be designing the methodologies and metrics for the 2010 assessment.

---

<sup>41</sup> The social science directorate is currently looking for the following positions (according an interview with the deputy director of the social science directorate on 23 June 2010):

- *A second publication manager*: to prepare and revise HTS materials for publication. This includes the HTS Social Science Handbook, the HTS Commander's Handbook, an internal newsletter for HTS staff, and unclassified papers that can be published in military or academic journals.
- *SSRA coordinator*: to provide quality oversight and peer review of SSRA surveys, analysis, and publications.
- *2 peer review managers*: to review all HTS research plan designs, determine whether they adhere to research and ethical guidelines, and provide mentorship to new personnel who are writing research plans. This person would also gain an overview of on-going studies and would be able to see trends in projects and propose collaboration between teams.
- *Mentoring coordinator*: to mentor trainees at Fort Leavenworth and ensure they understand the role of a deployed HTS social scientist.
- *Best practices coordinator* is responsible for ensuring that all social science activities across the other directorates of HTS are integrated with HTS social sciences best practices
- *Professional practices manager*: to coordinate research ethics across the program.
- *Two additional outreach coordinators*: to attend conferences and make presentations on behalf of HTS, fulfill requests for information about the project, and coordinate HTS participation at military exercises.
- *Communications manager*: to determine communications strategies for working with the media and the public.
- *Ombudsman*: to work with the project development team to identify how to improve HTS's internal structure and processes.
- *Four staff social scientists*: to provide overall social science support.

## ***Project development team***

*Location:* none – ad hoc teams pulled together to conduct assessments.

*Number of personnel as of June 2010:* This directorate currently has no permanent staff. There is a PDT "Chief" in charge of assessments. Please refer to Element 3 on Assessments for additional information on the status of this directorate

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides internal project assessment and manages the organizational change process. Conducts field evaluation of deployed assets, reports results of evaluations and feedback, and in coordination with the staff develops change recommendations."<sup>42</sup>

The team's name is indicative of its function: it provides internal review of the HTS project, to assist the HTS project manager in developing and improving the project. So far, the project development team has focused on improving HTS, and has assessed the project's effectiveness only as a secondary focus. According to HTS, the goal of the team's assessments is:

"...to better understand emerging practices, evolving requirements, and 'lessons learned.' Given that HTS is a new, experimental program, the reporting process is a means to gather information about HTT performance and activities "on the ground" in Iraq and Afghanistan and use that information to improve recruiting, training, logistics, etc. Secondly, the reporting process was intended to assess how effectively the program has met the JUONS requirements, and identify needed improvements."<sup>43</sup>

The project development team is not a standing directorate within HTS. The team has come together with different personnel each year since 2007 to conduct an annual project review.

*Evolution of the team:* The HTS concept of operations included plans for the HTS project manager to assess the original proof-of-concept human terrain teams fielded to Afghanistan in 2007. According to the proof of concept document, the assessment would be a project-funded effort to evaluate the entire the HTS capability, from training to effectiveness in the field.<sup>44</sup>

The first HTS assessment team was drawn from the TRADOC G2's "Devil's Advocate" directorate.<sup>45</sup> This team had five members, including the chief, assistant chief, and three assessment analysts. One of these personnel was military, the other four were civilians.

---

<sup>42</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 5).

<sup>43</sup> Human Terrain System Yearly Report 2007-2008.

<sup>44</sup> In the Department of Defense terminology, the assessment would be a full-spectrum doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) evaluation.

<sup>45</sup> The TRADOC G2's Devil's Advocate directorate's mission is to "assist Army and DOD organizations by conducting independent and unbiased critical review of concepts, other written products, organizational designs, and processes;



HTS internal assessments in 2008 and 2009 were conducted by HTS staff, personnel from other Army commands, and external contractors. The 2010 field assessment is being conducted solely by HTS staff. HTS was not able to obtain military personnel from other commands due to availability and scheduling conflicts, and HTS could not deploy outside contractors to Iraq to conduct the field assessment because recent Iraqi security agreements have made it more difficult to deploy contractors to Iraq.

The former HTS project manager told CNA in May 2010 that he intended to combine the project management team with the doctrine division (which is part of the training directorate). He intended for this combined doctrine directorate to have a permanent staff which could evaluate individual teams in theater, conduct end-to-end project assessments, and gather "lessons learned" throughout the HTS project. However, this reorganization has not occurred.

### ***COCOM liaison***

*Location:* Newport News, Virginia, and Stuttgart, Germany (AFRICOM headquarters)

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 2 military<sup>46</sup>

The combatant command (COCOM) liaison conducts outreach with the US COCOMs to help scope their requirements for socio-cultural research and human terrain teams. COCOMs other than the US Central Command (CENTCOM)—which oversees operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—realize that they need to understand local cultures and local populations in their areas. They want to understand the local societies before conflicts arise, so they can react appropriately if tensions rise.

HTS sent a liaison officer to US Africa Command (AFRICOM) from February to June 2010. This officer worked with the Social Science Research Center at AFRICOM to scope how they could apply the methodology developed by the human terrain teams. Currently, the Social Science Research Center uses primarily open source research to answer the command's questions. In contrast, the human terrain team methodology is focused on conducting original research at the local level and then integrating that new information with previously obtained open source and classified information. AFRICOM understands the value of HTS's

---

and by conducting independent analysis to support transformation." [www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regsr/r10-5-1.htm#Para\\_7\\_13](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regsr/r10-5-1.htm#Para_7_13).

"Devil's Advocate personnel are trained in the design of social science experimentation and social science research; and are proficient in gathering and collecting data for analysis. Personnel are familiar with alternative competing hypothesis methodologies and risk analysis and mitigation techniques. Furthermore Devil's Advocate personnel quantify data to support hypotheses and perform qualitative and quantitative analysis." (E-mail message from HTS, 14 June 2010)

<sup>46</sup> Source: Interview with COCOM liaison 23 June 2010.



approach and has requested 5 human terrain teams from HTS. This request is currently under review.

The COCOM liaison is currently discussing the HTS approach with the other combatant commands, primarily US Pacific Command (PACOM).

### ***Research reachback centers***

*Locations:* Newport News, VA, and Fort Leavenworth, KS

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 41 (1 military, 40 contractors)<sup>47</sup>

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and timely social science based research and analysis accessible across multiple domains in direct support of HTS assets and the organizations they support. Conducts research and analysis, produces research products and coordinates with external research sources. This function is required to ensure teams have a dedicated, robust research capability to enhance and reinforce field research efforts."<sup>48</sup>

HTS has three reachback research centers. The reachback center for Iraq is in Newport News and the Afghanistan reachback center is located at Fort Leavenworth. In August 2008, the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTFHOA) requested an overview brief of HTS so that it could draft its own JUONS. The reachback center for JTFHOA is in Newport News.

The reachback centers support deployed HTS personnel. According to HTS, they've received an average of one request for support per day since January 2009. Depending on the reachback centers' availability, they may take requests from organizations outside HTS, but their primary function is to support the HTTs and the HTATs deployed with brigade, division, and theater-level staffs.

The reachback centers support deployed HTS personnel by answering questions requiring more time or research capacity than the deployed personnel can apply to the question. They work with the team making the request to produce customized reports on specific social, political, economic, historical, and cultural issues.

The reachback centers provide their reports directly to the HTS personnel who request analytical support.

---

<sup>47</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

<sup>48</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 3).

### ***Subject matter expert network***

Current role according to HTS: "The Subject Matter Expert Network (SMENet) is composed of knowledgeable Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who provide additional in-depth research on request. SMEs are used as required to support planning, training, role-playing and research. SMEs provide general support from their home location but may also be invited to travel to Fort Leavenworth, KS, or other locations, as needed."<sup>49</sup>

TRADOC G2, on behalf of HTS, has made contractual arrangements with academic institutions to support Human Terrain System reachback research centers and training program. As of June 2010, about 52 academics were on individual contracts as professional services providers (PSPs) (i.e., consultants) to provide quick-turnaround analysis or expertise.

HTS intended the SME network to be a more formal organization that managed the collaboration between the reachback research centers and academia. At the beginning of the HTS project, in 2007, TRADOC G2 attempted to contract with BAE Systems (as the prime) to create a SME network. BAE Systems was expected to subcontract with academic researchers. Such collaboration proved difficult, in large part because academic social scientists were reluctant to sign contracts with a large defense contractor to provide work for the government.

To alleviate these concerns, HTS then attempted to have the SME network affiliated with academic institutions. Neither the Naval Postgraduate School,<sup>50</sup> nor the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) was able to organize SME networks. GTRI's contract for the SME network ended in February 2010.

At that time, HTS abandoned the idea of a formal SME network organization. Instead, TRADOC G2 has focused on creating individual contractual arrangements with academics. The Iraq and Afghanistan RRCs each have one staff member who coordinates with these contracted experts and determines their specific workloads and projects. TRADOC also contracts for academic SMEs to provide specific training to HTS students on an as-needed basis.

### ***Training directorate***

*Location:* Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 33 (13 military, 20 contractors)<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>49</sup> HTS official website: <http://hts.army.mil/components.html> (accessed 24 June 2010).

<sup>50</sup> An internal "HTS Iraq SMENet Assessment" from 11 March 2008 indicated that the SME network coordinated by the Naval Postgraduate School was not functioning, due to a variety of contracting, hiring, and financial issues.

<sup>51</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

*Current role according to HTS:* provides overall management, oversight and execution of the HTS training program. Trains candidates for service and deployment as team members, supports leader development regarding capabilities, limitations, and employment of the HTS concept, and captures and publishes HTS doctrine, coordinating inclusion into doctrinal publications. This function is necessary to ensure the project meets operational requirements and HTS concepts are institutionalized into military doctrine."<sup>52</sup>

HTS provides all deploying personnel 4.5 months of pre-deployment training at Fort Leavenworth.

The training includes an introduction to HTS and the military, Socio-cultural research, use of MAP-HT software, collective training preparation, collective training with a brigade combat team, and cultural immersion in the specific geographical area to which the individual has been assigned.

### ***Knowledge management***

*Location:* Newport News, VA (and deployed support in Iraq and Afghanistan)

*Number of personnel as of May 2010:* 25 (4 military, 21 contractors)<sup>53</sup>

*Current role according to HTS:* "Provides knowledge management and information technology support to deployed elements and the project staff. Identifies, procures, and fields information technologies that enable the collection, processing, analysis and management of socio-cultural data, develops and maintains the knowledge base infrastructure, and provides direct support to teams for IT related issues"<sup>54</sup>

The knowledge management component of HTS consists of three main parts:

---

<sup>52</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 4).

<sup>53</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

<sup>54</sup> HTS\_Org\_Chart.2.pdf, provided to CNA on 14 June 2010 (p. 2).



1. *Equipment procurement and technical support*: HTS procures laptops and servers to support deployed personnel and provides technical support to HTS personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States.
2. *Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT)*: HTS has developed a suite of hardware and software that is sent out with deployed personnel. MAP-HT spiral 0.5 was deployed with the first human terrain teams in 2007. The HTS knowledge management team, as part of an OSD-sponsored Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) has been developing MAP HT spiral 1.0 for several years. It began to be fielded in Afghanistan in January 2010.
3. *Human terrain knowledge center*: HTS is setting up a knowledge center in Newport News, Virginia, to provide a repository of information for use during pre-deployment training.

### ***Equipment procurement and technical support***

HTS has a knowledge management and information technology (IT) component in the United States. They procure computers for deploying personnel and maintain the hardware and software used at the HTS project office, the reachback research centers, and the training centers.

HTS procures three types of computers for its deployed teams:

- *Travel laptops*: HTS gives all deploying personnel a laptop with the MAP-HT software tools (described below). The human terrain team members can use these laptops as they travel between various bases and combat outposts.
- *MAP-HT Multifunctional Workstations (laptops at unit headquarters)*: HTS also provides heavier and more powerful laptops to each human terrain team, human terrain analysis team, and theater command element. These laptops are intended to remain in command headquarters. With the fielding of the MAP-HT spiral 1.0, these laptops can be connected to the military computer networks in Afghanistan.
- *Data servers*: HTS has also set up several data servers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the research reachback centers in CONUS to store information locally.

HTS also deploys contractors to Iraq and Afghanistan to provide knowledge management and information technology (IT) support. In May 2010, there were 6 knowledge management and IT personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup> These personnel organize information, maintain webpages, back up data, and provide on-site technical support to the deployed HTS teams.

---

<sup>55</sup> Source: "Faces to Spaces.pdf" from HTS in May 2010.

## ***Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT)***

The Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT) toolkit is the HTS program's primary information technology development effort. It has three primary functions:

1. Archiving and dissemination of field reports
2. Analysis
3. Production of analytic reports

MAP-HT is intended for human terrain teams, civil affairs teams, and other analysts who are gathering information and analyzing local populations. It is designed to support analysts in the field: it does not require large bandwidth and it is interoperable with the other software and databases available at the company and battalion levels.

## ***The development of MAP-HT***

HTS deployed the first version of MAP-HT, version 0.5, with the initial human terrain teams in 2007. It began fielding a significantly improved version of the software, version 1.0, in January 2010. MAP-HT version 2.0 is currently under development.

The MAP-HT software is being developed as part of an OSD-sponsored Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) project. This JCTD began in 2006 and HTS has participated in it since its inception. CENTCOM J8 is the JCTD's operational manager, the HTS project office is the deputy operational manager. One of the main goals of the JCTD has been to create databases and software tools that can be used to understand civilian populations (as opposed to the many military tools that are used to find and understand the "enemy.") The MAP-HT JCTD has incorporated requirements from the Human Terrain System, the US Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and other military commands.

The JCTD framework means that the MAP-HT framework is not designed solely to support human terrain teams in Afghanistan. As a proof of concept, civil affairs teams in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, have been using MAP-HT version 1.0 since late 2009. USACAPOC has written an Urgent Needs Statement (UNS) to purchase more MAP-HT hardware and software, so civil affairs teams worldwide can use MAP-HT.

## ***MAP-HT version 0.5***

The original MAP-HT software, MAP-HT version 0.5 was deployed with the initial HTTs and has been given to teams up until this year. It was not widely used by the human terrain teams for the following reasons:

- *It was not networked:* The most significant problem with MAP-HT 0.5 is that it was not accredited for use on unclassified or classified military networks and could only be used on stand-alone laptops. Data, reports, and briefing slides had to be manually transferred between the HTS laptops and the military's networked computers by burning information onto CDs.<sup>56</sup> This fact significantly reduced the usefulness of the HTS-provided laptops, as many deployed HTS personnel found it more convenient to store information and write reports directly on networked computers.
- *It had a custom user interface:* The MAP-HT 0.5 developers created their own user interface, and anecdotal reports indicate that this user interface was not intuitive.
- *It used an older version of Axis Pro:* MAP-HT 0.5 used an older version of Axis Pro, which is now known to be buggy and is considered difficult to use. (The Axis Pro software allows users to visualize information about networks—a key analytical capability for human terrain analysts.) In early 2007 when MAP-HT 0.5 was first released, most Army network analysts were using the Analyst Notebook software, rather than Axis Pro.

### ***MAP-HT version 1.0***

The new version of the MAP-HT software, version 1.0, is an entirely separate software toolkit from version 0.5, and it was developed by a different consortium of developers.

MAP-HT 1.0 had a limited user demonstration in summer 2009 and a general officer review in fall 2009, where it was well received. MAP-HT version 1.0 was fielded to civil affairs teams in Djibouti at the end of 2009, and HTS began fielding it to deployed human terrain teams in Afghanistan in January 2010. As of June 2010, all the human terrain teams in Regional Command South in Afghanistan have received the new software. The human terrain teams in Regional Command East will receive the software from August to October 2010.

MAP-HT version 1.0 has several significant upgrades from MAP-HT version 0.5:

- *Network accreditation:* MAP-HT version 1.0 has been accredited for use on networks in Afghanistan since January 2010. As of June 2010, it is also accredited for use on all US CENTCOM computers, both abroad and in Tampa, Florida. It is not yet accredited for use on computers at the reachback research centers in Newport News, Virginia, or Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. HTS personnel expect the accreditation approval within the next several months.

---

<sup>56</sup> To prevent the spread of computer viruses, the Department of Defense banned the use of USB flash media, such as thumb drives, memory sticks, and camera memory cards on its computer networks in November 2008. The ban was partially lifted in February 2010: government-issued thumb drives and memory sticks may be used, but only if other means of data transfer are unavailable.



- *Civil considerations data model:* The JCTD has spent a significant effort to create appropriate fields for a structured database that can be used to collect information on local populations, including personal relationships, tribal affiliations, grievances, etc. Users can tag the information in new reports to specific people or locations, which allows the information to be displayed graphically on maps or network charts. Before the creation of this data model, human terrain teams and other analysts had no way to archive the linkages that they find between various data sources, because the existing structured databases did not have appropriate data fields in which to store cultural and local population information. These data fields are being integrated into the next version of DCGS-A, so once information is entered into MAP-HT 1.0, it can be shared with other analysts around the world.
- *Interoperability with other databases:* MAP-HT 1.0 is integrated with the primary databases used in theater (TIGR,<sup>57</sup> CIDNE,<sup>58</sup> and DCGS-A<sup>59</sup>). Often, separate database and software tools become stove-piped because they are separate programs of record. The JCDT framework allowed MAP-HT to become interoperable with several separate programs of record so that these other databases can be accessed from a single software tool.
- *Data sharing:* Through MAP-HT, human terrain teams can upload their reports to the TIGR, CIDNE, and DCGS-A databases. This is a watershed development, because HTS reports were previously shared via e-mail distribution lists and specific webpages. Other units in theater and analysts in the United States can now access information on the human terrain teams' work directly. Personal field notes or other non-releasable information can also be stored on the human terrain team member's local laptop and kept private.
- *Integrated with standard analysis software:* The MAP-HT toolkit includes ArcGIS (for making maps) and Axis Pro (for network analysis). These are standard, commercial software packages that are used by others in Army commands. Starting in late 2007,

---

<sup>57</sup> TIGR is the US Army's Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) system. It is designed to be a low-bandwidth data sharing tool for small and distributed Army and Marine units in theater (primary at the company level and below). The TIGR system includes a number of generic reporting formats, so units can report and share detailed information about patrols, key leader engagements, and security incidents. Human terrain team members can enter information from their field research and meetings with the local population into TIGR through the fully integrated MAP-HT software interface.

<sup>58</sup> CIDNE is the Combined Information Data Network Exchange. It is used in Iraq and Afghanistan to record information about significant activities, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct fire attacks. It also includes reports on forensic analysis of IEDs, profiles of IED bomb makers, local leader engagements, psychological operations, and tactical questioning of detainees. It is used primarily at the battalion and higher levels.

<sup>59</sup> DCGS-A is the Distributed Common Ground System—Army. It is the Army's primary system for gathering information from intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance (ISR) sensors, and it includes information about threats, weather, and terrain. As part of the MAP-HT JCTD, it is being expanded to include information about local populations, tribes, and culture. It is widely used by the intelligence community at the battalion and higher levels.

the Army began transitioning from Analyst Notebook to a newer version of Axis Pro. Users can transfer data seamlessly from the MAP-HT user interface to network diagrams created by Axis Pro and to maps generated by ArcGIS. HTS personnel who trained human terrain teams in Afghanistan said that this software integration allows users to convert data between programs much more quickly than before, when they had to access various databases separately and conduct different types of analysis with separate software programs.

- *Standard user interface:* MAP-HT 1.0 uses a standard Windows user interface.

### ***Issues with MAP-HT 1.0***

MAP-HT version 1.0 has only recently been fielded, so an assessment of its utility would be premature. Nearly all of the user feedback and comments about MAP-HT relate to MAP-HT version 0.5. However, we note the following issues that need to be overcome in order for MAP-HT to be used successfully.

- *Learning curve for new users:* As with all new software, there is a steep learning curve to using MAP-HT 1.0. According to the MAP-HT trainers, human terrain team members in Afghanistan could learn the basics of MAP-HT within 1-2 weeks.<sup>(6)</sup> However, social scientists and team leaders who are not already familiar with Axis Pro and ArcGIS cannot learn the advanced functionality of these complex and powerful software tools in such a short time.
- *Each team needs to enter specific, local data into the MAP-HT database:* The MAP-HT database needs this specific, local information in order to be useful to the human terrain teams. MAP-HT 1.0 includes basic information, but does not have the locally gathered information that the human terrain teams have collected about their areas of interest. The MAP-HT trainers who deployed to Afghanistan in early 2010 stated that it took about a week of 10-12 hour days to enter background information for each human terrain team. The trainers noted that this information could be entered by the trainers, the team's own research manager, or analysts at the reachback research centers once the reachback centers have MAP-HT—see below.

---

<sup>(6)</sup> Two MAP-HT 1.0 trainers deployed to southern Afghanistan from January to May 2010. They spent 5 weeks with one human terrain team as a test case.

- Week 1: They trainers explained the system and created a baseline database out of the team's existing products and references.
- Weeks 2-4: The trainers went on a mission (to a specific village) with the human terrain team. They worked through what types of information the team was collecting and helped the team members enter information into the MAP-HT system in real time.
- Week 5: After getting back to the brigade headquarters, the trainers helped the HTT make final products using the MAP-HT software after the mission.

They shortened this training timeline to 1-2 weeks with the other human terrain teams that they trained (by not going out on missions with them).



- *Research managers' role is essential:* Research managers are essential to mitigating the two issues identified above. The average MAP-HT user does not need to enter large amounts of archival data or understand the intricacies of the software packages, because each human terrain team, human terrain analysis team, and theater coordination element should have a research manager to be the knowledge management expert.
- *MAP-HT is not yet at the reachback research centers:* MAP-HT is not yet accredited for use on the military computer networks in Newport News, Virginia, or Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (The HTS knowledge management personnel expect approval within several weeks to several months from June 2010.) When deployed and reachback HTS personnel have MAP-HT, they will be able to work collaboratively with the same databases and the same files. Currently, the reachback centers communicate with deployed personnel via e-mail (or telephone) and simply take requests for analysis that the reachback centers will conduct independently.

### ***Ongoing development of MAP-HT***

MAP-HT version 1.0 has focused on supporting human terrain teams and civil affairs personnel at the battalion-level and below. Thus, it is designed to support the analysis of small, local areas in great detail. It is also designed to operate in low-bandwidth conditions.

MAP-HT version 2.0 will offer expanded capabilities for users in the United States, by integrating with high-powered statistical analysis software (such as SPSS) and allowing the analysis of large, country-wide or international datasets. In addition, the MAP-HT JCTD is investigating the use of a hand-held collection tool, along the lines of an iPad or Android tablet.

To ensure that the software remains compatible with the other Army databases and software, MAP-HT will become embedded into Army programs of record. The JCTD will be transitioning MAP-HT to the DCGS-A and TIGR program offices. The DCGS-A office will become responsible for maintaining the database structure and analytical software capabilities. The Civil Considerations Data Model that structures information about local populations will be fully integrated with the next version of DCGS-A. The TIGR program office will ensure that users can continue to enter reports into MAP-HT in a way that is compatible with future changes to TIGR, the company-level reporting system.

### ***Other knowledge management efforts***

The HTS project office includes two other significant efforts in the knowledge management category:



- *AFPAK tribal knowledge database:* In 2008, the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) began an effort to collect information at the district level for the AFPAK Tribal Knowledge Database. The initial effort involved 21 key districts in Afghanistan. NMEC was unable to complete a data collection effort on this scale and asked HTS for assistance. HTS asked the deployed SSRA teams (described above) to start collecting information at the district level on important people, the judicial system, and the religious power structures. An on-going effort to collect this information at the village level is about 40 to 50 percent complete, according HTS knowledge management staff in May 2010.
- *Human terrain knowledge center:* HTS is establishing a human terrain knowledge Center in Newport News, Virginia, co-located with the Joint Training Counter-IED Integrations Center (JTICOIC). It is expected to be operational by the end of fiscal year 2010. HTS intends for this knowledge center to become a focal point for sharing cultural information with the "generating force," i.e., military personnel who are not currently deployed but who are preparing to deploy. The knowledge center could provide a location for pre-deployment training. It could also serve as a "reachback" research center for deploying units by developing customized informational packages about the regions where units expect to deploy.


## Chapter 2: Adequacy of HTS Management Structure

As requested in CDA Element 2, in this section we describe and assess the adequacy of the HTS management structure. It is important that the reader understand that we were not asked to assess the quality of the managers, but only to comment on the adequacy of the structure.

### Description of Management Structure

Figure 2-1 depicts the HTS management structure. These elements were described more fully in chapter 1.

Figure 2-1: The HTS Management Structure<sup>61</sup>



The HTS organization is geographically dispersed with significant elements in Newport News, VA, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

<sup>61</sup> The Project Development Team (PDT) directorate is not included on this organizational chart. As of the writing of this report, that directorate is not currently staffed. Plans to staff this directorate are currently on hold. Please see Chapter 3 of this report for additional information on the PDT.

## *TRADOC Oversight and Support*

The HTS organization is contained within TRADOC which provides oversight and support. Most HTS decisions of consequence must be approved by TRADOC. TRADOC G2 OPS HR supports HTS in its human resources function. Although HTS maintains an HR office at Fort Leavenworth, the TRADOC G2 OPS HR office at Fort Monroe is the controlling office. The TRADOC G2 Business Office supports HTS by handling contracting and budgets. The TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) also provides support and guidance to HTS.

TRADOC has both a support role and an oversight role. These two roles may sometimes be difficult to reconcile. The TRADOC support in budgeting, contracting and human resourcing relieves HTS of maintaining dedicated personnel for these functions; however, along with the support comes control of critical determinates of HTS success. If the process works smoothly everyone benefits. If it does not, then the subordinate organization (HTS) may suffer.

Friction has been generated over TRADOC negotiation and control of the BAE contract to supply a steady stream of recruits to HTS. Recruits are the lifeblood of HTS and its inability to exert some control over the quality of the recruits has been a long standing issue of contention. As noted elsewhere in this report, many in HTS have long considered recruit quality to be the source of most of their problems. Hence, HTS personnel were disappointed to see the BAE contract renewed by TRADOC in September 2009 apparently without any protection for the government in the event that the contractor supplies substandard recruits and without the participation of the Project Manager.<sup>62</sup>

In our meetings, numerous HTS officials complained that TRADOC G2 OPS is a "roadblock" in that most important decisions must be approved by them. According to multiple HTS personnel with whom we spoke, when TRADOC takes on an issue, it seems to take a long time to complete it. An example often cited was when TRADOC decided to convert all deployed team members from contract status to government employee status in 2009. This was clearly a difficult process and glitches were to be expected. However, the process was far from smooth and many deployed team members did not get paid for an extended period of time. Many HTS employees felt that TRADOC was understaffed to perform the task.

---

<sup>62</sup> The then-Project Manager was detailed to TRADOC on an Intergovernmental Personnel Agreement (IPA). According to an opinion by the Army Staff Judge Advocate's office dated 19 April 2010, detailed IPA personnel may not perform inherently governmental functions. The date of this opinion is about 6 months after the contract in question had been signed.

The then-Project Manager was very concerned that the proposed contract contained no protection for the government in the event the contractor supplied unsatisfactory personnel and that the period of time allowed for competitors to develop bids was far too short to permit effective competition. These and other concerns were later expressed in a report by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) *Review of Human Terrain System*, 12 May 2010. Please refer to Appendix G for the IRAC Briefing.



With regard to the *need* for TRADOC G2 OPS to approve important decisions that is the nature of the organizational relationship. The supervising command, (TRADOC) will normally have approval authority over actions affecting the subordinate command (HTS).

Delays in TRADOC response to HTS's requests for support could well be the result of any number of reasons internal to TRADOC, such as inadequate staffing within TRADOC G2 OPS to meet the increased workload from a rapidly growing HTS, or it may be something else. This is an area we attempted to gain further knowledge on from TRADOC G2 OPS; however, as of the writing of this report, CNA has not received additional information. Thus, we are not able to fully assess this issue.

### ***HTS Budget***

HTS was not able to provide us with a detailed budget. We were provided a general funding plan which is shown in table 2-1. We were told by TRADOC G2 OPS that further breakdowns of the funding were not available.

Table 2-1: HTS Funding Plan (thousands of dollars)<sup>63</sup>

<b>Expenditure:</b>	<b>FY 08</b>	<b>FY 09</b>	<b>FY 10</b>	<b>FY 11</b>
O&M Army:				
CONUS:				
Project Management	9,478	1,631	2,254	1,323
Reachback Centers (RRC)	13,000	5,375	10,383	8,783
Training	8,000	10,474	8,340	7,456
OCONUS:				
Deployed Teams	77,950	72,061	125,752	112,261
SSRAs	25,512	3,000	13,000	18,000
Total OMA Cost	133,940	92,541	159,729	147,822
RDT&E	0	0	0	3,000
OPA	10,060	0	0	4,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>144,000</b>	<b>92,541</b>	<b>159,729</b>	<b>154,822</b>

If this is the only funding plan available to HTS, it does not seem adequate to allow directorates to plan their activities. A more detailed budget might enable the PM and directorates to better manage their respective areas and feel some sense of ownership in the

<sup>63</sup> TRADOC G2 OPS, 18 June 2010.

enterprise. It makes little difference how good the management structure may be if the manager has severely curtailed authority and no budget.

The funding plan indicates that most of the funds are used directly to support OCONUS activities, i.e., deployed teams and the SSRA activity. As a result, the organization has a commendably high “tooth to tail” ratio.

### ***Human Terrain Systems***

The HTS Project Manager (PM) is supported by a Deputy Project Manager (DPM) and a Chief of Staff (CoS). The DPM and CoS work closely together and act to deal with routine issues involving the seven directorates—leaving the PM time to focus on larger issues. Hence, the PM primarily has to deal only with four key subordinates (CoS, DPM, PMO—Forward Iraq, and PMO—Forward Afghanistan). This is not to say that the PM does not sometimes become involved in discussions with the various directorates, just that it is not an everyday occurrence.

The Project Manager—Forward Iraq (PM—Forward Iraq) and the Project Manager Forward Afghanistan (PM—Forward Afghanistan) deal with about 14 and 18 small teams respectively—the actual number is constantly changing over time. The teams are under the operational control of the local command (brigade or division). The two PMO—Forward leaders are responsible for administrative support of the teams, facilitating team support of the host command, and in coordination with the supported command, dealing with problematic personnel.

The individual teams are usually composed of five to nine personnel but may vary. The new normal appears to be five person teams. New teams just being set up tend to have only two or three personnel but will be filled out to five persons. In any event each team has a leader who is responsible for ensuring that the team is providing support to the local commander and that the team personnel are conducting themselves in a responsible manner. The leadership ability of this individual is key to the success of the team.

### **Adequacy of the Management Structure**

Given media reports (at least some of which we believe to be substantially correct) of inappropriate behavior on the part of some team members, it is reasonable to question whether the management is, in fact, adequate to the task. However, it should be noted that not all organizational problems are caused by poor management structure, and so they are not necessarily amenable to correction by adjustments in management structure.



Management experts often use span of control as a means of assessing a management structure.<sup>64</sup> Management expert Peter Drucker recommends a ratio of 1 manager to 7 subordinates. Other experts note that in practice the ratio varies considerably from organization to organization and with the size of the organization. In a 2001 report,<sup>65</sup> the Saratoga Institute finds that the median ratio is 1 to 4 for companies with 500 or fewer employees (about the size of HTS) and 1 to 9 for companies with 2,000 to 5,000 employees. Among factors cited as requiring lower ratios of span of control is geographic dispersion. The dispersed nature of the HTS organization would tend to suggest somewhat lower ratios.

In table 2-2 we show the number of employees managed by each of the primary levels of HTS management. Management within the directorates is shown in a following table.

Table 2-2: Number of employees managed by HTS managers (non-directorates)

Management position	Number of subordinates managed
Project Manager	4
Chief of Staff	7
PM-Forward	14-18
Team Leaders	5-9

The span of control for the Project Manager is at the median of 4:1 common for small organizations. This should not present a problem as long as the PM utilizes the CoS and DPM to handle routine issues with the directorates. There are only two layers of management between the PM and the individual team members (PM-Forward and Team Leader).

At a ratio of 7:1, span of control for the Chief of Staff appears to be on the high side, particularly considering the geographic dispersal of the directorates. However, many military units have a similar structure—though not a similar degree of dispersal. This span of control would be a problem if appropriate staff processes were not in place. However, there is reason for optimism. The current Chief of Staff, who is a military officer, arrived in November 2009. He appears to have established effective procedures to route director's issues through him and hence take the pressure of routine matters off of the PM. Prior to his arrival the position had been held by contractors and it was common practice for directors to take their issues directly to the Project Manager.

At first glance, the numbers for the PM—Forward look quite high until one realizes that personnel being “managed” are actually under the operational control of the supported unit. Hence, the PM-Forward is not interacting with these personnel every day or even every week. Ideally, the commander of the unit to which the team is attached, and his staff, should be

<sup>64</sup> See for example, Drucker, Peter, *The Practice of Management*, Harper, New York (1954) and *The Coming of the New Organization*, Harvard Business Review (1988).

<sup>65</sup> The Saratoga Institute, Workforce Diagnostic System Benchmarking Report, (2001).



responsible for managing the deployed team once they have arrived in theater. The PM-Forward certainly has an administrative role to play and should be involved in monitoring team performance but is not in a position to police the behavior of individual team members.

The ratios for team leaders appear to be near ideal ratios for a small organization—particularly now that 5 persons per team seem to be the new norm.<sup>66</sup> Based on a snapshot of deployed personnel as of May 2010 there are 2 teams out of the total of 32 that were without a team leader at that time. In one instance the team was in the process of a planned drawn down in Iraq. The other instance was a team of 6 persons in Afghanistan that was, at the time of the snapshot, without a trained team leader. During the presumably short period when this position was “gapped” one of the senior team member would be expected to provide leadership.

### ***Directorates***

We also examined the organizational charts of the 7 directorates. We tabulated the span of control for each in table 2-3. With the exception of the Special Projects unit in the knowledge management directorate the employee to supervisor ratios appear to be within or close to Drucker’s optimum range of 7. The Special Projects unit, which manages the SSRA teams, appears to have 13 employees reporting to one manager.

It is also evident from table 2-3 that many staff positions are vacant. This is not a matter of management structure as much as staffing. However, chronic staffing gaps can generate a range of problems over time.

Table 2-3: Span of Control for HTS Directorates

<b>Directorate</b>	<b>Sub group</b>	<b>Employees per supervisor</b>	<b>Comments</b>
HR (Fort Leavenworth)		3-6	
COCOM Liaison		4	
Knowledge Management	Top level	5	
	Systems Administration	1	
	Engineering	4	
	Program Management	4	
	Special Projects (SSRA)	13	Above ideal Drucker ratio; some positions are

<sup>66</sup> Until recently, the normal size of a team was 9 persons and this is still considered optimal. However, in an effort to supply personnel to the rapidly expanding number of teams, HTS has chosen to staff the teams at a nominal 5 persons per team.

Directorate	Sub group	Employees per supervisor	Comments
			vacant
	Operations	3	Most positions are vacant
Operations	Top level	3	
	Current operations	8	
	Future operations	2	
	Det. Fort Leavenworth	3-6	
Social Science		6	Most positions are vacant
RRC		3-6	
Training	Top level	3-6	
	Knowledge	3	
	Facilities	8	Most positions are vacant
	Support	3-8	Most positions are vacant
	Training and Education	6-8	Most positions are vacant
	Doctrine	3-4	Most positions are vacant
	Leader development	4-9	Most positions are vacant
	Exercise Division	4-8	All positions are vacant

### ***Other Considerations***

As noted, HTS is made up of a combination of military personnel, contractors, and government civilians. This combination tends to present management challenges that would not be present otherwise. Contractors, for example cannot give direction to military personnel or to government civilians nor can they be privy to contract details. Contractors, in our opinion, should not be top level supervisors of other contractors because the top level supervisor may need to exercise authorities that contractors cannot.

In table 2-4 we reproduce a table used in another section that describes the personnel status of the heads of HTS directorates.

Table 2-4: HTS Director's Personnel Status

Directorate	Director's personnel status
Operations	Military
Training	Civilian (from contractor to DAC as of June 2010)
Human Resources	Military
Reachback Research Center	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
Social Science	Civilian (from IPA to DAC as of June 2010)
Knowledge Management	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
COCOM LNO	Military

Recent changes have been made in the personnel status of the heads of two directorates but there are still contractors functioning as directors of two directorates. The Reachback Research Center is a case in point. It employs some returning team members who are government employees. The contractor managers cannot direct these employees. For reasons noted above we believe that both the Director of RRC and the Director of Knowledge Management should be converted to government civilian positions. We have recently learned that conversion of these two remaining contractor positions is in process. We view this as a significant development.

## CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 2

We divide our comments into two groups, those with regard to the internal HTS management structure and those with regard to TRADOC support and oversight. Conclusions about budget are deferred to Chapter 6.

### Internal HTS Management Structure

There is reason for optimism about HTS internal management. The management structure has certainly improved in the last year. Since June 2009 the organization has put in place its first non-contractor Chief of Staff, human resource professionals at both the Fort Leavenworth location and in TRADOC G2 OPS, and a well regarded leader in the operations directorate. It is in the process of converting the heads of all directorates from contractor status into civilian or military status. The departure in June 2010 of the HTS Project Manager suggests additional changes to the dynamic at HTS. This change is too recent for us to fairly assess the effects.

We note one instance in the knowledge management directorate where the span of control appears to be excessive. We also note our preference for converting the management of all directorates to government civilian or military status—an action which seems to be well underway.



With those exceptions, we find the HTS management structure to be fairly well aligned to standard business practices. That is not to say that management is excellent—just that major problems do not seem likely to be due to management structure per se.

### **TRADOC Support and Oversight**

Relations between managers in HTS and TRADOC have been tense. This was particularly the case during the tenure of the recently relieved Project Manager. Regardless of where the fault lies, and it may well lie on both sides, this is not a healthy situation for HTS. Perhaps with new management, HTS and TRADOC can move quickly to remove irritants and focus on realizing the mission.

Much of the discomfort in HTS about its relationship with TRADOC appears to be a result of factors with straightforward solutions.

- Review TRADOC's contract with BAE to determine if there are opportunities to provide more protection to the government, such as specifying measures of performance and effectiveness, and adding quality control for recruiting
- Staff TRADOC G2 OPS adequately to handle HTS oversight support
- Develop stronger pathways of communications between HTS and TRADOC in ways that support transparency and cooperation.



## Chapter 3: HTS Metrics and Assessments

Metrics are measurements to gauge an organization's progress in meeting its goals. Metrics can serve a broad range of purposes and support a wide range of organizational stakeholders. They can be used for internal evaluation, for example to measure whether a company is meeting its financial goals, or for external purposes, such as gauging customer satisfaction with an organization's products or services. Metrics are routinely used within military organizations to gauge a command's progress in meeting its operational or strategic goals. It is reasonable to expect HTS to have established metrics to measure its progress and success, not only as a military organization with reporting obligations, but also given its proof of concept status. In addition, as a new, experimental organization, it may also be in HTS's best interest to collect and make readily available data that characterizes its success in meeting its objectives to secure future funding.

CDA Element 3 focuses specifically on the issue of "metrics." When considering the use of metrics, we expand the question to include assessments and evaluations more broadly. The central question for our analysis of CDA Element 3 is: Does HTS conduct assessments/evaluations of its activities and operations, and if so, does the organization rely on metrics to do so? We also consider whether the HTS uses the results/findings of assessments to improve organizational effectiveness.

### Assessments, Evaluations, and Metrics in HTS

An historical look at HTS reveals that, from its inception, there has always been the intent to conduct regular internal assessment/evaluation of HTS activities. This is indicated in the original HTS Concept of Operations (CONOP) dated April 2007:

*"3.7 Project Assessment – PM HTS will use an assessment team that will cover the HTS Proof of Concept, including the HTT currently in Afghanistan. The assessment will be a project funded effort, conducted under the oversight of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation. The assessment team will provide a diverse collection of expert-level, relevant skill sets (e.g. Social Science, Training, Counterinsurgency, Psychology, Behavioral Science etc) that will result in a full spectrum DOTMLPF evaluation of the capability, and measure its contribution to the performance of the BCT. **The assessment execution will be driven by Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance (MOP) developed and validated by the assessment team.** The HTS MOE/MOP will then become the measures against which HTS performance will be evaluated. Each evaluated MOE/MOP will be accompanied by an appropriate recommendation and conclusion. The assessment team will develop and employ the appropriate survey instruments and interview techniques deemed necessary to derive a full and complete evaluation. The assessment schedule will include CONUS/OCONUS unit visits which will be*



*scheduled and coordinated to minimize negative impact on unit missions and support the adjusted deployment schedule and change in numbers of deployed HTTs as directed.*<sup>67</sup>

The CONOP clearly states that MOEs/MOPs will be used as part of the assessments process and specifies that the assessment process will be used to evaluate HTS operations both with CONUS and in Iraq and Afghanistan (at the level of the HTTs).

According to HTS officials, the Devil's Advocate HTS Assessment Team was original conceived to be responsible for conducting assessments. This team was also designed to act as a "red cell" team for HTS. The HTS Assessment Team had five positions, Chief (also referred to as "Director"), Asst. Chief (also referred to as "Deputy Director"), and Assessment Analysts. The following is a description for the team:<sup>68</sup>

*"The Devil's Advocate work center is composed of one military and four civilian assessment analysts. These personnel are educated to the Doctorate level and have a background in research and organizational assessment. Devil's Advocate personnel possess experience in the design of social science experimentation and social science research; and are proficient in gathering and collecting data for analysis. Personnel are familiar with alternative competing hypothesis methodologies and risk analysis and mitigation techniques. Furthermore Devil's Advocate personnel quantify data to support hypotheses and perform qualitative and quantitative analysis."*<sup>69</sup>

The initial Devil's Advocate team assessments were conducted primarily to:<sup>70</sup>

1. Contribute to doctrine development
2. Collect data for "lessons learned."

### ***The Project Development Team (PDT)***

In 2008, the Project Manager hired a new chief and renamed the assessments component of HTS the Project Development Team (PDT), and since November 2008, the PDT has nominally had responsibility for all assessment/evaluation activities within HTS. The goal was to revamp the assessments process in a new direction – to develop the assessment process in a way that not only conducted assessments/evaluations of teams in the field, but that also turned the feedback into information that could be used to promote organizational change.<sup>71</sup>

In the organization's first formal assessment product, *The Human Terrain System Yearly Report 2007-2008*, the PDT function is described thusly:

---

<sup>67</sup> HTS Concept of Operations, April 2007.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Social Sciences Director, 17 June 2010.

<sup>69</sup> HTS Concept of Operations, April 2007.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with PDT Chief 2008-present, 28 June 2010

<sup>71</sup> Interview with PDT Chief 2008-present, 28 June 2010.

*"The HTS Program Development Team (PDT) reporting process was not mandated by the JUONS, but was initiated by the HTS program manager as a means to better understand emerging practices, evolving requirements, and "lessons learned." Given that HTS is a new, experimental program, the reporting process is a means to gather information about HTT performance and activities "on the ground" in Iraq and Afghanistan and use that information to improve recruiting, training, logistics, etc. Secondly, the reporting process was intended to assess how effectively the program has met the JUONS requirements, and identify needed improvements."*<sup>72</sup>

### ***Status of the PDT***

As of the writing of this report, the PDT appears on HTS organizational charts as a separate directorate within HTS, complete with a mission. However, in actuality, it appears that the PDT has never actually been created. CNA was told that it is in the proof of concept, but the proof of concept just moved on and this cell was not set up.<sup>73</sup>

At various stages over the past three years, there has been a PDT "chief" position that has been occupied. However, we were told that none of the other PDT/DAHAT positions have ever been filled on a permanent basis.<sup>74</sup> In practice, PDT has been an ad hoc team that comes together every year to conduct an annual assessment.<sup>75</sup>

CNA was told that the reason the PDT has not been permanently staffed is the result of staff shortages.<sup>76</sup>

### ***The Future of the PDT***

According to an HTS official, the most recent Project Manager wanted to expand the PDT beyond assessment to include development and responsibility for organizational change. Before he left the organization, he intended to combine the doctrine division (which was part of the training directorate) with the PDT, to create a doctrine directorate. This entity would have a permanent staff and be able to do evaluations of teams in theater, as well as end-to-end program 'lessons learned' evaluation and implementation of changes.<sup>77</sup>

As of the writing of this report this reorganization is on hold. According to HTS officials:

*"The PDT structure and/or growth decisions have not been made. Those organizational capabilities will be examined in the just initiated Capability Based Assessment directed by TRADOC...The CBA is scheduled to be completed DEC 2010."*<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> The Human Terrain System Yearly Report 2007-2008.

<sup>73</sup> Meeting with HTS Project Management Office (PMO), May 13, 2010.

<sup>74</sup> Meeting with HTS Project Management Office (PMO), May 13, 2010.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with HTS PMO personnel, 18 June 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Interview with HTS PMO personnel, 18 June 2010.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with HTS official, 17-18 June 2010.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with HTS officials, 22 June 2010.

### ***Assessments, evaluations, and metrics since 2007***

This section addresses specific assessments and evaluations that HTS has executed since 2007. Because there has been no permanent PDT staff, again, each year an ad hoc team has been pulled together to conduct assessments/evaluations of HTS. Since 2007, these teams have produced over 55 documents and products that in some way shape, or form, or seek to assess/evaluate various aspects of the HTS organization. The table below lists all products from HTS assessments and evaluations from 2007 through the present that CNA was provided.



Table 3-1: PDT Assessment Products 2007-Present

HTS Document Title	Brief Description	Conducted by	Year	Document Type	Methodology
<i>Human Terrain System Yearly Report 2007–2008</i>	Internal report combining AF and IZ findings	Internal HTS staff	2007 - 2008	Final product	Survey/ interviews/ observations
<i>HTSA-Final.ppt</i>	Covers all elements of program but teams	Report produced by US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC)	2007	Results	Interviews/ observations
<i>Human Terrain Team Trip Report: A “Team of Teams” Prepared by USMA’s Interdisciplinary Team in Iraq</i>	Report produced by US military Academy at West Point faculty after a trip to theater	US Military Academy at West Point	2008	Final product	Interview/ observations
<i>HTT_Trip_Report-Part_Two[2].pdf</i>	Interview reports from trip	US Military Academy at West Point	2008	Results	Interviews/ observations
<i>HTT_Trip_Report-Part_One[2].pdf</i>	Interview reports from trip	US Military Academy at West Point	2008	Results	Interviews/ observations
<i>Project Management Review</i>	HTS provides comments on program issues that need to be addressed	HTS Staff: Report includes feedback from HTS Project Manager on way forward/ solutions	2008	Results	
<i>BAE Operations Evaluation</i>	Report on issues with BAE (recruiting, hiring, and management)	Former HTT Analyst	2008	Results	Informal input
<i>BAE.doc</i>	Pulls together comments from HTSA internal report, PTD report, and Program Management Review	HTS Staff	2008	Results	Reporting

HTS Document Title	Brief Description	Conducted by	Year	Document Type	Methodology
<i>HTS SMENet Report</i>	Data from earlier report on "SMENet"	HTS Staff	2008	Report	Interviews
<b>HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM ASSESSMENT: IRAQ SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING</b>	Analysis of the 2007-2008 survey data	National Security Innovations, INC	2008	Report	Survey analysis
<i>2009 PDT assessment for HASC.pptx</i>	HTS/ TRADOC report	HTS Staff	2009	Final product	Survey
<i>HTT Job Analysis Reports (There are four, organized alphabetically)</i>	PDRI Final product	Contractor: PDRI	2009	Results	Survey/Job Analysis
<i>PDRI Report - HTT Selection Tool Development and Validation Report</i>	PDRI Final product	Contractor: PDRI	2009	Results	Survey/Job Analysis
<i>PDRI Report - Recommended Assessment Tools for HTS</i>	PDRI Final product	Contractor: PDRI	2009	Final product	Survey/Job Analysis
<i>PDT unit interview 09.doc</i>	Interview template	n/a	2009	Protocol	Interview
<i>UCF IST Human Terrain System Report_9.30.09.docx</i>	Report on training, produced by University of Central Florida	Contractor: Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), subcontracts to UCF	2009	Final product	Interviews/ observations/ unknown
<i>PDT Unit Survey 09-1.doc</i>	Survey	HTS Staff	2009	Protocol	Survey
<i>AF02 Assessment.docx</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>AF04 Assessment.docx</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009 (incomplete, no interview with supported unit)	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>IZ-09 PDT Assessment_2009.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations



HTS Document Title	Brief Description	Conducted by	Year	Document Type	Methodology
<i>IZ-15.ver2.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>PDT Unit Interview 09 - IO.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>PDT Team Interview 09 - Dr. John Wiggins v2.docx</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>IZ-12.ver2.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>IZ13.ver1.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>IZ1.ver2.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>HTAT-S.ver2.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>AF06 Assessment.docx</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>AF02 Assessment ver2.docx</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2009	Intermediate product	Interview/ observation
<i>09OCT09_AF2 Team.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Focus group
<i>21OCT09_AF2 CSM Edwards.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>21OCT2009_AF2 TF Cyclone CMR.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>22OCT09_AF2 Emory.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>22OCT09_AF2 TF Cyclone FECC CMR.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview



HTS Document Title	Brief Description	Conducted by	Year	Document Type	Methodology
<i>28OCT09_AF2 TF Cyclne, S3.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>29OCT09_AF2 TF Cyclone CMO.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Metrics
<i>29OCT09_AF2 TF Gladius CMR.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>29OCT09_BAF HTAT RM.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>30OCT09_BAF HTAT Crist.doc</i>	Interview notes for 2009 PDT	HTS Staff	2009	Notes	Interview
<i>2009 PDT assessment for HASC.pptx</i>		HTS staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>HTS PTD 2009 BRIEF (DRAFT 030510).pptx</i>		HTS Staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>FEEDBACK Quotes from 2009 PDT.doc</i>		HTS Staff	2009	Results	Interviews
<i>HTT Integration to unit processes.docx</i>	Survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>PDT HTT SELF ASSESSMENT MATRIX data1.elsx</i>	Survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>PDT UNIT HTT ASSESSMENT MATRIX data1.elsx</i>	Survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>Satisfaction with program elements.docx</i>	Survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Results	Survey
<i>PDT HTT SELF ASSESSMENT CODEBOOK.docx</i>	Coding survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Coding	
<i>PDT UNIT HTT ASSESSMENT CODE BOOK.docx</i>	Coding survey results	HTS Staff	2009	Coding	
<i>PDT_QC_DEC_Brief_(22_mar).ppt</i>	Product of an ad hoc working group	HTS Staff	2010	Final product	Working group
<i>IZ10.ver3.doc</i>	Team report for 2009 PDT2009	HTS Staff	2010	Intermediate product	Interview/ observations
<i>Metrics 12April2010 - OCONUS Team</i>	Proposed Metrics	HTS Staff	2010	Protocol	Metrics

HTS Document Title	Brief Description	Conducted by	Year	Document Type	Methodology
<i>Metrics v2.doc "proposed"</i>					
<i>Draft Metrics v4 8April2010 - OPT CURRICULUM REDESIGN AS BASELINE.xls</i>	Proposed Metrics	HTS Staff	2010	Protocol	Spreadsheet of metrics
<i>HTS-Collective-Task-List_Final_20100521_U-FOUO.doc</i>	Collective task list -draft	HTS Staff	2010	Final product	Task list

### Analysis of HTS assessment/evaluations since 2007

A variety of data collection tools have been used for assessments/evaluations, in particular, we identified:

- Surveys
- Interviews
- Observations
- Working Groups
- Job Analyses
- Informal "inputs" (email, meetings, other opportunities for people to provide input).

The data collection tools vary from year to year. In some cases, it appears that a particular tool was used only once. For example, in 2009 a focus group was assembled, but this appears to have been the only time. HTS uses interviews to gauge the effectiveness of HTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, sending in teams of HTS personnel and contractors to conduct interviews with brigade staff on the effectiveness of their HTS support.

The types of final assessment products have also varied. In some cases, extensive reports are written on the findings of the assessment, as was the case with the Human Terrain System Yearly Report 2007-2008. In other years, a briefing or a less formal report was produced.

Past assessments/evaluations have been conducted by both external and internal teams to HTS. In the most of the assessments, the assessment team has been comprised primarily of HTS personnel. In a few cases, however, other organizations

and some personnel external to HTS have been involved in the assessment.<sup>79</sup> It became impossible for HTS to rely on outside contractors in 2009, when the security agreement in Iraq shifted. Since then, HTS has had to rely on strictly internal teams to conduct evaluations down range.<sup>80</sup> Whether the assessment/evaluation is conducted by an internal or external entity will have some bearing on the objectivity and independence of the evaluation. It does appear, however, that HTS has made serious attempts at tapping into outside organizations, including the West Point report in 2008.

In general, the focus of past evaluations, prior to FY10, emphasized measuring the effectiveness of the deployed HTTs and their success in supporting operational commanders, and less so on the CONUS-based support operations for the deployed units. Each year, the PDT planned and executed a trip for the eight- to nine-person assessment team to Iraq and Afghanistan to collect data for the assessment. There were a few exceptions to this focus on the deployed units, such as the 2008 Program Management Review, which addressed problems across the HTS organization and several 2008 reviews regarding specific issues with contractors.

Recently, however, there may be a shift in this regard. According to HTS officials, the FY10 PDT, for example, has been designed to consider both the CONUS aspects of HTS and the deployed elements, equally.<sup>81</sup>

We note that although HTS officials seem to value brigade commander satisfaction with HTTs as a primary measure of the program's success, we did not identify a wealth of data available from either HTS or TRADOC on this topic. A review of past PDT documents reveals "pockets" of brigade commander feedback on the program – some positive and some negative – over the past several years. We were also given some anecdotal information in meetings and interviews.<sup>82</sup> However, these data do not appear to be tracked over time in any institutionalized fashion.

Based on the number of responses to the surveys conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2007, there appear to be incomplete or weak datasets for some of the PDT assessments - particularly 2009. One reason for this, according to HTS leadership is that the assessment team has faced challenges in accessing teams and the BCTs in theater. The HTS Project Office coordinated field visits for the FY09 PDT through the HTT Team Leader. However, the project office found an unwillingness to support

---

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Interview with HTS official, former PDT Chief, 28 June 2010.

<sup>81</sup> Again, however, the future of the FY10 PDT remains in question and it is too soon to determine whether the Collective Task List will be used as intended.

<sup>82</sup> Data and recent quotes from HTS officials indicate that "brigade commander satisfaction was key and that the program had received positive feedback in that regard."



PDT assessment team visits among several units. At that time, it was also voluntary for a unit to participate in the survey, thus units who were positive about their HTTs tended to participate, while those that had not had positive experiences with their HTTs were not.<sup>83</sup>

### The FY10 PDT

As of the writing of this report, HTS was in the process of conducting its annual PDT. This year's PDT has three phases.<sup>84</sup> The FY10 PDT is intended to look at the HTS program from "end-to-end" – meaning it focuses on both the HTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the HTS program in CONUS. Table 3-2 presents a synopsis of the FY10 PDT.<sup>85</sup>

Table 3-2: FY10 PDT Plan and Status

PHASE	DESCRIPTION	STATUS
<i>Phase 1: Assessment of the HTS Directorates to establish a baseline</i>	This effort has focused on establishing the goals/objectives of the directorates to ultimately establish the goals/objectives of the HTS program itself. This research also aimed to identify problems and issues within the directorates. According to the PDT team, this process will identify problems that can be easily fixed. These problems will be focused on in the near-term for resolution.	Draft of report on phase 1 completed
<i>Phase 2: Surveys, Interviews, and site-visits with HTTs Down-range</i>	Phase two will aim to collect data from the HTTs down-range themselves. A survey has been developed to administer to the HTT personnel, however, at the writing of this report, it has not yet been finalized. In addition, there are plans to conduct phone interviews with HTTs down range as well as to conduct site-visits in theater. A second report will be written on phase 2.	On hold
<i>Phase 3: Analysis and Feedback</i>	Use information from phases 1 and 2 and go back to the directorates to speak to the staff more broadly to come up with ways to better support the development, training, and performance of the HTTs. There will be a third report after phase	On hold

<sup>83</sup> PDT Chief 28 June 2010.

<sup>84</sup> We spoke to a member of the FY10 PDT for all information on this year's effort.

<sup>85</sup> Interview with FY10 Project Development Team member, June 2010.

PHASE	DESCRIPTION	STATUS
	three is completed	

According to HTS personnel we interviewed, the FY10 PDT is on temporary hold. It was indicated to us that the PDT will resume in July 2010.

### *The Use of Metrics in PDTs*

To address the specific question of metrics raised in the CDA, we found evidence that HTS has used metrics in the past; however: "[They] have varied and as a result have not been effective at providing an accurate or consistent representation of HTS effectiveness due to evolving doctrine and standards."<sup>86</sup>

According to HTS, the four JIEDDO-approved project objectives in the original proof of concept from 2007 are the organization's primary metrics. In the first several years of HTS, these project objectives served as the basis for recruiting, hiring, and training and assessment tools. They have been used as a framework to collect data to gauge HTTs/HTATs' success at meeting these four objectives.<sup>87</sup> They are:

Table 3-3: HTS JIEDDO Approved Objectives

1	Provide BCT/RCT commanders with relevant, socio-cultural information and knowledge, and the dedicated expertise to integrate that understanding into their military decision-making process
2	Minimize loss in continuity between unit relief in place/transfer of authority
3	Research, interpret archive and provide cultural information and knowledge to enhance operational effectiveness
4	Maximize effectiveness of operational decisions by harmonizing COAs with target area cultural knowledge

Until recently, these broad objectives seem to provide the only metrics that HTS used on a regular basis to assess HTTs/HTATs down range or CONUS-based operations.

HTS officials indicated that when the Devil's Advocate assessments team evolved into the PDT in 2008, part of this new initiative would be to develop metrics to measure in-

<sup>86</sup> Interview with PDT, Chief 1 July 2010.

<sup>87</sup> Interview with HTS official, 28 June 2010.

theater performance of HTTs. The challenge for HTS with regard to developing metrics has been in "Relating metrics to a formal set of standards for conducting socio-cultural research support to units in combat."<sup>88</sup>

### ***Collective Task List***

On June 3, 2010, the HTS Project Manager wrote a memo formally introducing a document entitled the "Collective Task List."<sup>89</sup> (See appendix D for memo)

*"Collective Tasks primarily guide training, however, HTS is a new organization so this list also identifies for the first time, what HTS teams do in the field. It is the current and approved document which serves as a record for how HTS teams conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research in support of deployed teams."*<sup>90</sup>

The Collective Task List includes three mission essential tasks (METLs), listed in table 3-4:

Table 3-4: HTS Mission Essential Tasks

1	Recruit, train, deploy, and support a dedicated, embedded social science capability
2	Conduct operationally relevant research and analysis
3	Develop and maintain a socio-cultural knowledge base

Each mission essential task is supported by multiple supporting tasks. Each supporting task has a series of measure of performance (MOPs) intended to gauge the organization's progress in conducting the tasks. Table 2-5 gives an example of "METL 1", its supporting tasks, and MOPs.

Table 3-5: Example of METL, supporting tasks, and MOPs from "Collective Task List"

<b>METL 1: Recruit, train, deploy, and support a dedicated, embedded social science capability</b>	
<b>Supporting Task 1.1</b>	Provide and Embedded Social Science Capability: HTS supports an embedded social science capability utilizing a dedicated recruitment, deployment, and training program.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with PDT Chief, 1 July 2010.

<sup>89</sup> This Collective Task List was released approximately 40 days after the CNA assessment began.

<sup>90</sup> Memorandum on HTS Collective Task List, 3 June 2010.



HTS provides support to deployed and deploying teams from the time of their entry into the program, throughout their training, while deployed, and through their redeployment process.	
<b>Measures of Performance</b>	
1	Did HTS establish an efficient recruitment process which supplies the required number of candidates meeting identified knowledge, skills, and abilities requirements? (Y/N)
2	Did HTS leadership maintain and resource a training directorate? (Y/N)
3	Did HTS staff support a process for deployment and re-deployment? (Y/N)
4	Did HTS staff provide a specialized logistics capability necessary to meet HTS team mission set? (Y/N)
5	Did HTS staff provide sustainment functions for all personnel not met by the supported unit? (Y/N)
6	What is the average time required to train and deploy a team? (Time)
7	What is the average time to respond to logistics or personnel requests from a deployed team? (Time)
8	What percent of requests for teams are satisfied? (Percent)
9	What percent of teams are fully manned? (Percent)

As of the writing of this report, the "Collective Task List" is intended to be a stable document, to remain largely unchanged, and serve as a basis around which the organization will develop a more formal operational assessments process – one that begins with a clear mission for the organization and goes all the way down to identifying specific individual tasks against which to evaluate HTS staff and personnel. Given that the future of the PDT is on hold, whether this will occur remains to be seen.

HTS officials indicated, however, that the Collective Task List has been used extensively for training purposes since 2009.

### ***Have past PDTs resulted in organizational improvements?***

In considering assessments, evaluations, and metrics, a key follow up question is whether HTS implements change within the organization based on the results of these processes.

According to an HTS official, there have been changes within the organization as a result of assessments/evaluations since 2007. The following is a list of examples of change within HTS that came about as a result of previous PDTs:

<b>PDT Year</b>	<b>Resulting Change within HTS</b>
2007	The size of the teams in Afghanistan was increased
2007	Trainees were encouraged to engage with the RRC before their deployment
2007	Each team began including one person with a TS clearance per team
2007	Development of taxonomy for tagging and retrieving data from the 2007 report (became part of MAP HT JCTD process, still being worked).
2007	A review of the intellectual property issues for raw materials
2007-2008	Various changes to equipment were made such as the introduction of VSAT communications rather than INMARSAT
2008	The PMO FW was created
2008	Increase of the number of social scientists per team
2008	Creation of an ethics committee and the writing of guidelines
2008	Media Guidance was created
2008	Removal of MAP HT from theater due to functionality issues
2008	Provision of in-theater technical support
2008	Refinement of job responsibilities based on a job analysis
2008	Creation of a consortium (which proved to be untenable in practice)
2008	Discouraging split team operations (e.g., part of the team permanently located at HQ, other team members elsewhere)
2008	Development of doctrinal guidance for the use and placement of HTTs on brigade staffs
2008	Ensuring that all personnel had clearances before they deployed
2008-2009	Structure of personnel utilization (e.g., using returned team members on staff and then deploying them again for a year)

Although the list may seem long, the HTS official who provided these examples commented that these changes did not solve some very serious issues that needed to be addressed within HTS:

*"Many of the major changes we wanted to make (e.g., improving recruiting, alleviating contractor support issues such as insurance and pay prior to DAC transition, increasing the number of program staff prior to DAC transition, increasing government oversight, and adding teambuilding to training) did not occur....these could not be implemented due to TRADOC G2 inaction or contracting issues."<sup>91</sup>*

The decision-making processes that led to organizational changes based on PDT results appear to be informal: the Project Manager routinely handed down PDT results and suggested changes to heads of directorates relevant to their departments and then it was up to them to figure out what changes to make. This was only true, however, for PDT suggestions that could be implemented procedurally (e.g., those things within HTS control). HTS authorities did not include changes to such issues as contract oversight, human resources, and selection of personnel, which were TRADOC G2 functions.<sup>92</sup>

In general TRADOC G2 has not been heavily involved in the PDTs - neither in their planning, organization, execution nor in the implementation of change based on backend results. In FY09, TRADOC was involved in the logistics of getting the assessment teams into theater, but that was the extent of their participation.

In a meeting with TRADOC G2, it was acknowledged that previous assessments had been conducted by HTS personnel and that, from a TRADOC perspective, this was a problem since the organization should not be assessing itself.<sup>93</sup> At one stage, TRADOC G2 reportedly attempted to take over the PDT process, however, the same conflict of interest issue existed with having TRADOC G2 assess HTS since HTS is housed within TRADOC. For a period of time, TRADOC G2 appointed an individual from "Devil's Advocate" to be in charge of PDT. However, during this time (between February 2008 and 2009) no PDT trips took place. Eventually, the Project Manager reassumed control of the program.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>91</sup> Information provided by HTS official, 18 June 2010.

<sup>92</sup> Until 2009, HTS only had a Training Director and an IT/Tech Director (now KM/IT), and a temporary PDT Director.

<sup>93</sup> Meeting with HTS Project Office/TRADOC G-2 staff, 13 May 2010.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with HTS PDT Director, 22 June 2010.



### ***Use of Assessments and Metrics within HTTs/HTATs "Downrange"***

In order to take an in-depth look at the question of whether HTTs/HTATs in Afghanistan or Iraq assess or evaluate themselves, the CNA team would have to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan. We were unable to do so for this assessment. However, we were able to glean a few insights on this matter through our semi-structured interviews with returning commanders. In our interview questionnaire, we included a set of questions intended to gather data on whether, and if so how, HTTs themselves actively sought feedback from the units they support. Below is the feedback we received:

1. Informal assessments of the HTTs seem to have taken place in a number of the HTTs. These appear to have been attempts on the part of the HTTs to solicit feedback from the unit they support on their performance. In one example, an interviewee described a seminar the HTT assembled where they informally asked for feedback.
2. One interviewee explained that the brigade commander provided regular on-going feedback to the HTTs, usually to the Team Leader.
3. Several interviewees commented that the HTTs were keen to implement feedback and were actively trying to correct areas of weakness.

It does not appear that HTTs/HTATs have or use formal or standardized metrics in theater to assess their performance. The majority of our interviewees said they did not know of any existing metrics. That said, interviewees were given the opportunity to suggest possible metrics for HTTs/HTATs. Below is a table of their suggestions:

<b>Suggested Metrics for HTTs Provided by Former Brigade Commanders</b>
Number of products they produce, studies, and assessments
Diversity of products (multidimensional)
How often talking to local people
How much are they interacting with the military at the lowest level (company, platoon)
Ability to adapt to any and all situations
How frequent out with the companies in the villages instead of being at the FOB or COPP.

<b>Suggested Metrics for HTTs Provided by Former Brigade Commanders</b>
Usefulness of products (whether products are great or not doesn't matter if they are not used. If products are used, that is a measure of effectiveness.
Do HTTs members have a "seat at the table" in terms of brigade and division staff?
Increase in [unit's] level of understanding of operational environment (economics, government, tribal)
Types of products
"Effectiveness of [HTS] program is more important than the efficiency." Effectiveness need more subjective as opposed to efficiency which may be objective
How often [they are] updating standing products – tribal structure, personalities in the area – how often update products. Hard to get at quality – that's what is most important.
Integration into the remainder of the staff (they can't be introverted, have to be outgoing people who are self starters – can't be intimidated, need to be profession)
Degree of engagement. "I would say the bread and butter of what they do are the engagements" – while in theater they should be assessed on how often they engage. The problem is that it doesn't go to quality, just quantity.
Did they do what the commander asked them to do and were they value added?
Was the information provided relevant to operations conducted?
Was the information disseminated in a timely manner?
Was the information provided integrated operational planning?
Ability to write and analyze and understand how to research and write a short concise summary of that research.
Confidence to voice opinion and not get beat down to Capt. or Col. Ability to give honest opinion in a tactful way.

Some interviewees, however, questioned the value of using metrics to evaluate HTT/HTAT performance. For example, one respondent explained that he "hated to get into metrics, [it's not about] number of products per week. Once you put metrics, you start training to the test." Others indicated that the situation is too subjective and can't be measured – the only measurement that should count is whether products are being used by the commander.



## CNA Conclusions and Findings for CDA Element 3

Since its inception, there has been a record of regular evaluation and assessment of the program's effectiveness within HTS. Like most other aspects of the program, this has evolved over time. The language appears in the original HTS CONOP supporting the creation of an assessment process in 2007 and, in practice, there has been a history of regular evaluation and assessment of HTS operations.

HTS has not relied heavily on metrics as part of past assessments processes. Those that have been used have evolved over time, and have not been used consistently. According to one HTS official, the challenge for HTS with regard to developing metrics has been in "Relating metrics to a formal set of standards for conducting socio-cultural research support to units in combat."<sup>95</sup> For some purposes – such as recruiting and training – the four mission objectives from the original proof of concept have been treated as metrics (at least in the earlier years of the program).

In 2008, an effort was launched to develop a more formal assessment process similar to those in other military organizations. As part of that process, metrics have been developed, but apparently have not been employed. In 2010, the HTS "Collective Task List" was formally adopted. It provides Mission Essential Tasks, Supporting Tasks, and Measures of Performance that appear appropriate for measuring organizational progress both within the CONUS-based operations as well as the effectiveness of HTTs/HTATs down range.

There has never been a *permanent*, fully-staffed component responsible for assessments within the HTS structure. While a directorate – the Project Development Team – appears on organizational charts and its apparent mission is to conduct evaluations, it has never been formally stood up. As of the writing of this report, it still did not have a permanent staff and plans to hire for this directorate are on hold. In the absence of a permanent staff, past PDTs have been conducted by ad hoc teams:

- The Project Manager has played an influential role in devising the PDT approach each year and assembling a team to conduct the assessment. The results were also briefed to him and it appears he also had strong decision-making powers in terms of how the feedback from each PDT was implemented.
- The organization has had two PDT Chiefs, but their time has not been consistently or permanently dedicated to PDT activities. The PDT Chiefs have

---

<sup>95</sup> Interview with PDT Chief, 1 July 2010.



also played an influential role in the annual PDT, but have never been given a permanent staff to support them in its execution.

- Other individuals within the HTS management structure, at various times, also have been involved in annual PDTs. These have included the Social Science Director, and at one stage someone from the TRADOC Devil's Advocate cell was assigned to lead the HTS PDT.

A broad view of the types of assessments and evaluations that have been conducted since 2007 reveals a "mixed bag" approach: the types of assessment tools and approaches have varied from year to year. This has also resulted in a variety of assessment "products." We see a number of potential problems with this approach

1. It is unclear over time, what the exact purpose and goals of past assessments have been and who the intended audience is. Documentation and interactions with the HTS staff have revealed a variety of objectives behind PDTs. For example, the first assessment, conducted in 2007-2008 was intended for TRADOC G2 to report on how things were going in the program's earliest phases.
2. Another official explained that the project management office PDT process is valuable because it provided a mechanism to learn from the experience of teams downrange to develop the program and it wasn't an 'assessment' per se but a lessons learned process.<sup>96</sup>
3. Using the current approach it is difficult to do any trend analysis of the program because the tool used to assess the program's performance and the final product has changed from year to year. As a result, a clear baseline against which to compare progress has never been established. A common attribute of effective assessment processes is the existence of an established set of conditions/criteria against which to measure organizational effectiveness. In the absence of a baseline, the performance of the organization is being measured in a vacuum and it becomes difficult, if not impossible to gauge progress and change over multiple years. This can cloud decision-making concerning the future of the organization and where/how to implement change and does not support a formal decision-making process to implement organizational change.

Metrics that measure an organization's performance on a regular schedule are a common approach that enables an organization's leadership to track progress over time. The metrics allow the organization to establish a baseline, or starting point,

---

<sup>96</sup> Interview with PDT Chief, 1 July 2010.

from which all future progress is compared. The Collective Task List may serve as such in the future.

There does not appear to be a formal process for implementing the suggestions/conclusions reached in the various PDTs within HTS. Organizational change that has come about due to past assessments have been the result of an *informal* decision-making process that involves a combination of the former Project Manager and directorate heads making changes in areas where they had the ability to do so. This specifically did not include TRADOC G2 functions, namely:

- Contract oversight
- Human resources
- Selection of personnel

As is the case with other aspects of HTS, the assessment process has been challenged as part of a fast-growing program that is in many ways still catching up with itself. In most military organizations, an effective assessment process begins with a clearly stated mission that leads to the development of well-defined tasks that have been vetted and approved by command leadership. This has not occurred within HTS and as a result, assessment managers have been relying on the broadly defined project objectives originally defined in the CONOP. In the absence of clearly defined tasks and standards, the PDT has struggled to conduct effective assessments that measure change and progress over time, in a way that allows the organization to evolve and improve based on past successes and challenges.

Finally, based on our conclusions, CNA would recommend the following should HTS decide to pursue a formal assessment entity within the organization:

- Clearly establish who the intended audience is for the assessment and its purpose.
  - Identify who and what the PDT is evaluating. In other words which part of the organization is the focus: HTTs? CONUS-based operations? Training?
- Standardize assessment tools from year to year to support trend analysis.
- Establish metrics– the Collective Task List may be appropriate (but be realistic about what it useful to measure and what is possible to measure – particularly with regard to gauging HTT/HTAT effectiveness in theater).
- Establish formal mechanisms to ensure the results are fed back into the system to ensure organizational improvement. This should most likely involve management and directors from across the entire organization and not be overly centralized.
- Staff the PDT permanently with at least a permanent director and deputy director.






## Chapter 4: Adequacy of Human Resources and Recruitment

Element 4 of the CDA requests an assessment of HTS's human resources and recruitment practices. The focus of HTS is to supply social science support to operational commanders. The support is delivered by means of HTTs which are attached to the operational commander in the field. The typical commitment to a team is for 4.5 months of training followed by a 9 month deployment, after which the team members are replaced with newly trained personnel. In order to accommodate this relatively high turnover rate, HTS must have a robust human resourcing and recruiting effort.

The HTS program started in FY 2006. The HTS organization has been both blessed and cursed by its own success. Originally envisioned as a pilot project with five teams of five persons each, it was acclaimed by field commanders and requests followed to quickly move the program from pilot status to full operational status. As a result, the program is being expanded as shown in figure 4-1 from 1 team in early FY 2007 to a planned level of 33 teams by the end FY 2010 and 41 teams by the middle of FY 2011.

Figure 4-1. Actual and Projected Number of teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>97</sup>



<sup>97</sup> HTS Operations directorate, Manpower Production Assessment Brief, 25 May 2010.

Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion depicted in the chart above has placed great strain on the organization to recruit, train, and field the necessary personnel.

In this chapter we take a broad look at HTS human resourcing. We examine recruiting but we also look at training and assignment because these elements can either serve to mitigate inadequate recruiting, or conversely, they can exacerbate the recruiting situation. Training outcomes may also provide information about recruit quality. We first describe the HTS structure that must be supported by recruiting. Then we describe the requirements that personnel applying for HTS jobs must meet. Next we describe the recruiting process. We examine personnel data to understand if the recruits do in fact meet the stated job requirements and how well they are doing in training. We also discuss assignment to teams. We then examine the capability of the HTS personnel systems to monitor the quality of recruiting. Lastly we present an overall assessment of human resourcing and recruiting.

## **HTS Structure**

Table 4-1 shows the HTS structure that must be supported by recruiting.

Table 4-1: HTS structure<sup>98</sup>

Type of structure	Elements
Deployed structure:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>envisioned as expanding or contracting as needed</li> <li>theater based</li> <li>funded by COCOMS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human Terrain Teams (HTT)</li> <li>Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTAT)</li> <li>Theater Control Element (TCE)</li> <li>SSRA survey teams</li> </ul>
Enduring Base:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>envisioned as permanent</li> <li>CONUS located</li> <li>funded by TRADOC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Management Office (PMO)</li> <li>Training</li> <li>Knowledge Management / Info Technology (KM/IT)</li> <li>Reachback Research Center (RRC)</li> <li>Human Resources</li> <li>Social Science</li> <li>Operations</li> <li>COCOM Liaison</li> </ul>

The deployed structure is envisioned as expanding or contracting as dictated by operational requirements. It is based in theater and is funded by the relevant Component Commanders (COCOMS). It consists of the HTT, HTAT, TCE, and, as needed, SSRA survey teams.

The Enduring Base is envisioned as a permanent structure and is funded by TRADOC. It consists of the PMO and the various directorates. Imbedded within the KM/IT Directorate is the Social Science Research and Analysis group (SSRA) which conducts surveys and focus groups in theater using indigenous contract personnel. There is also a PMO-Forward (PMO-F) that provides support for deployed teams.

Staffing is constantly changing because of large flows in and out of the organization. Staffing as of 18 June 2010 is shown in table 4-2.

<sup>98</sup> Briefings by HTS Project Manager, *Human Terrain System (HTS) Project Overview* 13 May 2010 and 19 May 2010.



Table 4-2: HTS staffing as of 18 June 2010<sup>99</sup>

Category	Number of personnel			
	Military	Civilians (DAC)	Contractors	Total
Deployed teams	19	174	0	193
Students in training	18	1	113 <sup>a</sup>	132
Holding company	5	66	3	74
PMO and directorates:				
PMO <sup>c</sup>	4	2	3	9
Human Resources	15	0	4	19
Operations	14	1	1	16
KM/IT	0	0	12 <sup>b</sup>	12
RRC	3	0	43	46
Training	23	0	27	50
Social Science	0	4	0	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>555</b>

- These 113 persons are contract personnel for only a few months. By the end of their 4.5 month training period they will normally have been converted to short term government hires; i.e., Department of the Army Civilians (DAC).
- Does not include indigenous persons who conduct surveys and focus groups under contract in theater for the SSRA group.
- Includes the Project Development Team (PDT) which is currently inactive.

As indicated in table 4-2, all deployed personnel are either military or Department of Army civilians (DAC). Prior to 2009 the deployed civilian jobs were filled by contract personnel. Changes made in 2009 to the Status of Forces agreements (SOFA) in Iraq threatened to put deployed contractors at risk and TRADOC made a decision to convert all deployed civilian personnel to government status for their protection. During this process HTS lost about 30 percent of the team personnel either because they did not qualify under the new government criteria or because they chose to resign. Currently, all new civilian hires for team personnel are initially hired as contractors, but are converted to short-term government employees by the end of training.

## The Job Requirements

Recruiting is primarily directed toward filling four types of positions in the HTS as described in the formal position descriptions.<sup>100</sup> These position descriptions are included in Appendix F.

<sup>99</sup> HTS PERSTAT Report, 18 June 2010. Numbers of personnel may differ from that shown in other chapters which reflect earlier time periods.

As a practical matter the formal position descriptions are lengthy and are not very useful in targeting specific individuals for recruiting. TRADOC G2 OPS<sup>101</sup> has prepared summaries of the job duties and qualifications that capture the essentials in a form that can be used by recruiters. These documents draw on the position descriptions as well as the accompanying job vacancy announcements.

### ***Duties of the Team positions***

The persons filling the team positions have extensive duties. They are taken from the TRADOC summaries and are listed below:

- Team Leader (TL) — (formally known as Supervisory Human Terrain Specialist)

Defines critical socio-cultural topics, forecasts information gaps, and initiates comprehensive, unique, and complex research efforts. Directs, provides operational support, expertise, and guidance to the human terrain team activities in all phases, types of socio-cultural primary and secondary social science research, and analysis. Defines overall analytical objectives in relation to existing or proposed policy and identifies required analytical resources. Applies experimental social-cultural theories and mitigating strategies to problems not susceptible to treatment by accepted methods. Develops new research methodologies in assessing the effect of military operations on the local populace and predict the effects on possible future military operations. Makes decisions or recommendations on changing, interpreting, or developing important policies and programs. Provides authoritative advice on effects and feasibility to gain the necessary cooperation and support from outside agencies.

- Social Scientist (SS)

Plans, designs, and authorizes highly complex research projects to provide a framework for collection and analysis. Creates overarching research plans. Conducts and manages ethnographic research, determines methodology, and analysis to develop research instruments for interview protocols and surveys. Provides authoritative advice on all phases, types of socio-cultural research, and analysis to develop a common operating picture of the socio-cultural combat environment for recommendations into the military decision making process.

---

<sup>100</sup> Civilian Intelligence Pers-Centralized, Ft. Huachuca, PD # ST335723, ST335725, ST335726, and ST335727 of 02/02/2010. These position descriptions are for Team Leader, Social Scientist, Research Manager, and Human Terrain Analyst respectively.

<sup>101</sup> Obtained from TRADOC G2 OPS HR, 21 June 2010.

Directs and participates in qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies to include direct observation, visual ethnography, key leader engagement, participant observation, depth interviewing, group or focus group interviewing, surveying, secondary source research, and mixed method approaches. Assesses research processes and methods to improve future research, analysis, and products.

- Research Manager (RM) — (formally known as a Human Terrain Specialist)

Responsible for conducting, developing, and organizing the socio-cultural research, managing the requesting and reporting processes; the information technology and processes and the collective knowledge of the team to enable the production of a common operating picture for a geographical area of responsibility. Identifies socio-cultural data requirements. Analyzes available sources of local socio-cultural information using primary and secondary source research. Collects and aggregates information to identify trends and gaps in the data available during the pre-mission planning phase of research execution. Collects, processes, and stores research products in order to prepare human terrain analyses, estimates, and plans. Produces documents, products, and conducts briefings to provide authoritative advice and insight into order effects of unit decisions and developing mitigation strategies. Conducts all knowledge management functions and distributing it to the supported unit.

- Human Terrain Analyst (HTA)

Collects, reviews, interprets, evaluates and integrates data from multiple sources in assessing the relevance and significance of development in assigned areas. Supports all phases and types of socio-cultural research and analysis conducted in a combat environment. Provides operational support, guidance, and expertise to conduct primary source research and secondary source research. Develops and identifies socio-cultural knowledge requirements, collection plans, information/data requirements, and knowledge gaps. Provides analytical support on socio-cultural issues, regional trends, and developments as they affect objectives. Ensures human terrain collection requirements are identified, validated, prioritized, assigned and monitored to provide theater assessments, long range studies, threat assessments and other finished products as required. Produces documents, products, briefings, and training as requested. Serves as the liaison to the local population.



### ***Qualifications, skills, knowledge and abilities***

The qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities required for each position are shown in tables 4-3 through 4-6 below.

We have taken qualifications for each position from the TRADOC summaries. The qualifications list education and/or experience that the candidates for these positions must have.

We have taken the skills, knowledge, and abilities from the formal position descriptions since the TRADOC summaries appear overly simplified. This is an important point because government job classifiers will use the position descriptions, not the TRADOC summaries when deciding whether or not to convert these personnel from contractor status to government status. The knowledge, skills, and abilities attributes are to have been demonstrated for at least 52 weeks.

The qualifications for these positions are both rigorous and extensive. We show the detail here because understanding the qualifications and skills required is essential in judging the success of the human resourcing process.

Table 4-3: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Team Leader position

Area	Attributes
Basic qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• BA degree in behavioral or social science or related discipline appropriate to the position</li></ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Combination of education and experience that provided the applicant with knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li></ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Four years of appropriate experience that demonstrates that the applicant has acquired knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li></ul>
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Specialized experience is demonstrated experience in critical socio-cultural topics and initiating comprehensive and unique and complex research efforts on relevant topics; such as: directing all aspects of Team activities by leading a Human Terrain System team in all phases and types of socio-cultural research. Overseeing team efforts ensuring integrity of methodologies and approaches across the teams. Defining overall analytical objectives in relation to existing or proposed policy and identifies required analytical resources. Providing direct support to unit decision-making by integrating the team into operations and the military decision making process. Performing long-range planning in support of</li></ul>

Area	Attributes
	<p>existing and projected organizational mission requirements. Ensures that the team meets supported unit requirements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At a minimum your resume must reflect one year of demonstrated experience performing the duties listed above (specialized experience) which must be comparable to the next lower GGE/Band.</li> <li>• Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.</li> </ul>
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mastery of knowledge in social sciences and/or the ability to advise/collaborate on, administer, supervise and perform research in one or any combination of the social sciences.</li> <li>• Expert ability to conduct and supervise socio-cultural research focused on people, their perceptions, identities, social organization, and interdependencies, all of which tend to be dynamic and contextually specific.</li> <li>• Thorough knowledge of the countries falling within at least one Geographical Combatant Command, with particular emphasis on their culture, attitudes, customs, patterns of thought, and history, and a general knowledge of other countries in the world.</li> <li>• Knowledge of the military organizational structures, rules, values, mission, procedures, and decision making process, with emphasis on working knowledge of primary staff and command functions from brigade to division levels.</li> <li>• Highly developed ability to collaborate and coordinate the complex research, analytical, and evaluative skills geared toward social scientific inquiry.</li> <li>• Managerial skill, particularly the ability to manage a large and complex research program that covers different regions of the world.</li> <li>• Knowledge of civilian and military personnel practices.</li> <li>• Ability to supervise, motivate, and cohes a group of subordinates.</li> <li>• Ability to use presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office).</li> <li>• Ability to communicate effectively, verbally and non-verbally.</li> <li>• Exceptional writing and editing ability.</li> </ul>

Table 4-4: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Social Scientist position

Area	Attributes
Basic Qualifications:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SS1: PhD degree in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position. AND Two years of appropriate experience that demonstrates that the applicant has acquired experience in the behavioral or social science field.</li> <li>SS2: MA degree in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position. OR Combination of education and experience that provided the applicant with knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field. OR Four years of appropriate experience that demonstrates that the applicant has acquired knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field.</li> </ul>
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specialized experience is experience demonstrating planning and designing research projects, including long-term and short-term projects to provide a framework for collection and analysis such as; determining the methodological feasibility of research efforts, defining the research objective, formulating the research questions, analyzing knowledge gaps, selecting collection and analysis methods, and developing appropriate research instruments such as interview protocols and surveys. Provides analysis of collected information from local populace perspective. Providing direct support to unit decision-making in the operations and the military decision making process. Providing recommendations about the research's effect and feasibility on military operations to gain necessary cooperation and support.</li> <li>At a minimum your resume must reflect one year of demonstrated experience performing the duties listed above (specialized experience) which must be comparable to the next lower GGE/Band.</li> <li>Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.</li> </ul>
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Professional expert level knowledge in social or behavioral science and advanced skill in applied social science analysis and research</li> <li>Mastery of knowledge and expertise of how to formulate research projects and instruct others how to conduct social science research</li> </ul>



Area	Attributes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive field research experience, particularly in hostile, denied, or dangerous environments.</li> <li>• Expert understanding of culture, society, political system, and economic system and extensive field research application in a cross-cultural environment.</li> <li>• Ability to apply experimental theories and new developments to problems not susceptible to treatment by accepted methods; makes decisions or recommendations significantly changing, interpreting, or developing important policies, and programs.</li> <li>• Technical expert in research design and execution and in the application of data collection instruments (e.g., surveys, interview protocols), data collection activities (e.g., interviews, focus groups, participant observation) and data preparation (e.g., in-depth reports and other written material).</li> <li>• Knowledge of management practices for supervising research projects and research teams (i.e., principal investigator).</li> <li>• Comprehensive understanding of military operations and expert knowledge of how to configure research projects to answer military operational questions related to the human terrain.</li> <li>• Ability to communicate effectively, both verbally and in written form, in English.</li> <li>• Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office).</li> </ul>

Table 4-5: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Research Manager position more formally known as a Human Terrain Specialist

Area	Attributes
Basic Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BA degree in behavioral or social science or related discipline appropriate to the position</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combination of education and experience that provided the applicant with knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Four years of appropriate experience that demonstrates that the applicant has acquired knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li> </ul>
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specialized experience is experience demonstrating collecting and developing information pertaining to human terrain. Developing information requirements such as: collects, processes, and stores team research products, analyses, estimates, and plans. Analyzes incomplete and conflicting information to produce research products that assess socio-cultural environments. Implementing the team's research in compliance with established regulations and guidance. Manages information technology and processes for the team.</li> <li>• At a minimum your resume must reflect one year of demonstrated experience performing the duties listed above (specialized experience) which must be comparable to the next lower GGE/Band.</li> <li>• Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.</li> </ul>
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Comprehensive professional knowledge of social sciences and the ability to use social science techniques in an innovative fashion to deal with significant information gaps that are routinely encountered in the course of socio-cultural research and analysis.</li> <li>• When required, develops new approaches and methodologies to deal with research problems that cannot be resolved by the usual means; uses experimental techniques to deal with unprecedented problems and situations.</li> <li>• Knowledge of information collection requirements, management processes and procedures.</li> <li>• Knowledge of a wide range of research and collection methods and the analytical ability to develop innovative products.</li> <li>• Practical knowledge of information technology systems and knowledge of a wide range of techniques, methods, sources and procedures within the social sciences required to provide knowledge management services and adapt automated systems to</li> </ul>

Area	Attributes
	<p>solve information organization, access, and dissemination problems.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detailed knowledge of information technology processes and of knowledge management procedures.</li> <li>• Working knowledge of database structures and operations; information technology systems and operations; and knowledge management theory.</li> <li>• Knowledge of data collection and processing and working knowledge of data collection activities (e.g., interviews, debriefs, asset management) and data processing (e.g., in-depth reports and other written material).</li> <li>• Effective verbal and written communication skills.</li> <li>• Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office).</li> <li>• Strong writing ability combined with sound editorial skills.</li> </ul>



Table 4-6: Qualifications, skills, knowledge, and abilities for the Human Terrain Analyst position

Area	Attributes
Basic Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BA degree in behavioral or social science or related discipline appropriate to the position</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Combination of education and experience that provided the applicant with knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Four years of appropriate experience that demonstrates that the applicant has acquired knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field</li> </ul>
Qualifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specialized experience is experience demonstrating collecting and developing information pertaining to human terrain. Developing information requirements such as: collects, processes, and stores team research products, analyses, estimates, and plans. Analyzes incomplete and conflicting information to produce research products that assess socio-cultural environments. Implementing the team's research in compliance with established regulations and guidance. Manages information technology and processes for the team.</li> <li>• At a minimum your resume must reflect one year of demonstrated experience performing the duties listed above (specialized experience) which must be comparable to the next lower GGE/Band.</li> <li>• Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.</li> </ul>
Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive knowledge of social science disciplines pertaining to human terrain research and collection methods is required to identify information requirements, accomplish the necessary research to fill these requirements and validate information.</li> <li>• Broad knowledge of a wide range of subjects related to local host nation (i.e., political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, sociological, demographic, and public opinion) is required to make in-depth analysis of significant information to identify new initiatives, changes in emphasis, and new facts affecting Brigade/Regimental Combat Team's objectives.</li> <li>• Skill in production, coordination and dissemination of finished products is required.</li> <li>• Knowledge of the military organizational structures, rules, values, mission, procedures, and decision making process.</li> <li>• Ability to use presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office).</li> <li>• Ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing.</li> </ul>

In addition, all team members are subject to other conditions of employment as shown in table 4-7.

Table 4-7: Other conditions of employment pertaining to all HTS team members

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Travel up to 100% of the time, as well as frequently extended duty with long hours under high pressure and generally high-risk job responsibilities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to obtain and maintain a Secret (Top Secret for Team Leaders) security clearance.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successfully pass urinalysis screening</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Must possess and maintain a level of physical fitness which enables them to operate in conditions where they may have to at a minimum:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the summer and cold or freezing conditions during the winter.</li> <li>○ Traverse rough and uneven terrain.</li> <li>○ Must be able to successfully complete Human Terrain training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.</li> <li>○ Endure hostile environment to include persons that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life.</li> <li>○ Work with little or no sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally challenging projects.</li> <li>○ Travel extended distances by foot, military ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous or desert regions.</li> <li>○ Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas away from the elements and animals.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## Recruiting

### *The Recruiting process*

Recruiting for the HTS is done under a firm fixed price contract by BAE Systems (BAE). The current contract was renewed in September 2009 for a five-year effort at \$380 million.

Potential recruits contact BAE or one of their subcontractors or are solicited based on resumes posted at on-line job sites. The job requirements as described in the BAE job employment web site [www.htscareers.com](http://www.htscareers.com) are similar,<sup>102</sup> but not identical to, those shown in tables 4-3 through 4-6.

Interested candidates submit an application for employment. BAE retains these resumes for consideration as needed to fill HTS positions.

<sup>102</sup> Recently this web site appears to have been modified to remove the discrepant information.

The HTS operations directorate forecasts its need for recruits to fill future vacancies and HTS notifies BAE of the need for X recruits to start training on Y month through the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). BAE then reviews resumes and selects promising candidates for interviews. The interviews are normally conducted by phone or internet. Candidates who interview successfully are offered jobs. Those accepting jobs report for training at Fort Leavenworth, KS at the appointed time.

BAE has provided some numbers on their selection process<sup>103</sup> for FY 2009 and FY 2010 to date. These data are shown in table 4-8.

Table 4-8: Team applicants, interviewees, and hires by BAE for FY 2009 and FY 2010 to date<sup>104</sup>

Item	Stage of recruitment process	FY 2009	FY 2010 (to date)
Total applications		1150	1342
Applicants rejected by BAE	in application review	372	531
	in interview	131	271
	total rejections	503	802
Percentage of applicants rejected by BAE		44%	60%
Our characterization of selection process		Loose	Moderately selective

BAE rejected about 44 percent of applicants in FY 2009 and about 60 percent in FY 2010. The apparently increased selectivity in FY 2010 seems consistent with comments by the BAE Program Manager that lead time for supplying the recruits required by HTS has improved recently (lengthened) and that it is the biggest factor in recruiting quality individuals.

Based on the selection ratios in table 4-8 we would characterize the process in FY 2010 as perhaps "moderately," but not "highly," selective. Were we to see the percentage of applicants rejected higher, this would indicate a more selective process.

<sup>103</sup> These numbers do not include recruits by BAE subcontractors.

<sup>104</sup> BAE Systems Program Manager, 16 June 2010.



All civilian recruits for teams must pass through the BAE entry portal. Applicants interested in non-team positions with HTS may apply through a government web site. These persons tend to be Reservists interested in active duty assignments.

Recruits report to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for a 4.5 month training program. Within the first week of training the recruit submits a resume for hire as a short term government employee. The resume is reviewed and either approved or rejected by the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC). Recruits who do not qualify as government employees under current Position Descriptions are released early. Upon successful completion of the training program the recruits are deployed to theatre, currently either Iraq or Afghanistan. In theater, the recruit joins an HTT or HTAT or a TCE.

### *Availability of potential recruits*

In an effort to understand the process and gauge the potential supply of recruits we interviewed the BAE Program Manager,<sup>105</sup> Relevant questions and the BAE responses are shown below.

#### 1. How is recruiting going currently?

BAE would not characterize recruiting as either good or bad but as "involved". Have no problem in finding lots of interested candidates. The problem is sorting out the good from the bad. The recent conversion to GG civilians complicates things a lot. As a contractor, a Senior Social Scientist with 1 year of field research experience could make \$390K-\$420K with differentials and overtime. Most of these people work 80 hour weeks as there is nothing else to do (NOTE: maximum overtime has been cut back to 20 hours per week). As government employees, he estimates that they would get about \$200K-\$250K with differentials and overtime. A very big problem with conversion of contract personnel to GG (DACs) is that although the contract personnel meet all requirements for the HTS teams they don't always meet the government requirements for experience and time in research.

#### 2. Could you supply a larger number of recruits without compromises on quality?

Yes, given enough prior notification time an increase in the number, say from the current 35 to about 50 per month, would not be a problem. The driving factor is the amount of time prior to need that

---

<sup>105</sup> Interview date 28 May 2010.

BAE is notified. BAE wants 45-90 days notification. Up to the last 6 months the notification was typically 2-3 weeks. In the last 6 months it has been about 45-60 days which is better but still not the 90 days they want. He thinks they could even ramp up from 35 per month to even 100 per month over the near term, but thinks that re-enlistment of persons with prior service in HTS would be a better solution long term.

3. How do you get paid for your recruiting effort?

Recruiting costs are recouped as part of the profit coming from the overall contract. They have a firm fixed price contract signed Sept 2009 for a five year effort at \$380 million. They assumed a 12 percent return on sales and are achieving about 8 percent. The contract assumes a constant need of 30-40 recruits per month. The contract is structured to not be constrained by year boundaries. If there were a need for more recruits they could supply them under the existing contract but their service would end before the 5-year term. Alternately the government could add more money to the contract. The contract assumes that the recruits will only be contract employees for 4 to 5 months and then convert to government status. BAE pays the recruit for the 4 to 5 months that they are under contract.

4. Is the economy a big factor?

The weak economy had brought in some recruits but mostly people who had previously expressed interest but didn't actually make the decision. The weak economy has caused some of them to make the decision. Otherwise the economy is not a big deal.

5. Could the BAE contract be restructured to yield a better quality recruit?

The main determinant of recruit quality is notification time. If the recruiters are not rushed then they can diligently comb through the applications and pick the best. If they are not allowed enough time then they will have to be less selective, resulting in lower quality. He thinks that someone in HTS OPS gives the number of recruits needed to TRISA who then gives it to BAE. Notification has greatly improved in the last 6 months as TRISA has worked to smooth out the process.

6. How do you discuss with the applicants the conversion of recruit contractors to DAC status that occurs during the training period?

Each applicant is given a government fact sheet discussing the qualifications for GG. BAE does not feel comfortable talking to

applicants about the government requirements but does hand out the fact sheet. [Fact sheet attached in Appendix E]

### *Quality of potential recruits*

Throughout HTS, managers comment on what they consider to be the poor quality of many of the recruits. Regrettably it is very difficult to objectively judge the quality of the recruits based on their stated qualifications. This is because no analysis has been performed to determine which qualities predict who will be a successful HTS team member. Also, during the contract team era there were no performance evaluations. The current Position Descriptions are based on the best professional judgment by HTS staff of what educational level, experience, and other factors may predict success as a team member. The fact, however, is that nobody really knows, because nobody has done the analysis. We consider this lack of an examination of factors predicting a successful recruit to be a major shortcoming.

That said, there appear to be approaches that could be used to improve the quality of the recruits. Recruits are trained in a team environment and when deployed they work in a team environment. In this setting, factors such as interpersonal relations and ability to work as a team may become as important as formal education and experience qualifications. These and other qualities such as character are inherently difficult to appraise in the phone interviews that are routinely conducted by BAE.

One such approach would be to conduct a face-to-face interview after an initial screening by phone interview. Such an approach should help judge, among other things, the candidate's ability to interact with people—likely an important attribute for someone going to a foreign country and attempting to “map” the human terrain. However the contractor estimates that this added step would cost about \$1,000 per candidate and he has no incentive to spend the additional money. What may potentially be more effective would be for the candidates, after the initial BAE screening interview by phone, to spend one day at the Fort Leavenworth training facility where they could be introduced to the program and be interviewed by former team members. We think that this would be time and money well spent before the hiring decision is made.

Another approach is to use a formal screening instrument. We understand that such an instrument was developed by PDRI<sup>106</sup> (a respected name in personnel selection) with input from former team members but HTS was unable to persuade BAE to implement the instrument.

---

<sup>106</sup> Nicholas L. Vasilopoulos and Erin C. Swartout, Human Terrain Systems: Recommended Assessments Tools for Selecting Human Terrain Team Members, PDRI Technical Report 640, April 2009.



Given the lack of an objective measure of what characteristics predict a successful recruit we will resort to an examination of surrogate measures to assess the quality of HTS human resourcing.

## *Training*

One place that a personnel quality problem might manifest itself is in training attrition or in problems in the process of converting the student recruit contractors to government employees during the training period. We toured the HTS training facility at Fort Leavenworth and examined recent training and conversion records.

The physical plant for training at Fort Leavenworth can be described as Spartan. Until recently, training had been conducted in a group of trailers. The facility has been “upgraded” and now occupies the basement of a small shopping center. The space consists of classrooms for students and cubicles for instructors. When we visited each of the classrooms was occupied with 15-25 students. Many of the classrooms are noisy due to the nature of the air conditioning system—making it very difficult to hear the instructor. During our visit, the instructors were experimenting with a headphone system to enable students to hear them over the air conditioning. This was the first day with the system and it was not working well. Some of the rooms could accommodate more students, but not in an environment conducive to learning. We suggested that this environment might simulate the actual working environment when deployed in the field. The trainers countered with the reasonable point that their end-of-class exercises will simulate the real working environment but instruction is best absorbed in a quiet environment designed to be conducive to learning.

According to the trainers, TRADOC standards for instruction are 15 students per instructor. We observed about 20 students per instructor during our visit. We understand that class size will shortly be increased to approximately double current levels to accommodate an anticipated increase in the monthly flow of recruits. This will balloon the student-to-instructor ratio and is likely to present a serious challenge for the trainers and students.

In brief, training consists of classroom lectures and discussions led by faculty and small group sessions where students work on specific research problems. In these small sessions, the students work as a team would in the field and are overseen by a seminar leader. The seminar leader functions as a coach and mentor suggesting approaches to problems and posing questions about the student’s approach. The team training ends with a CAPSTONE exercise with an active duty unit. The exercise attempts to simulate a deployed team working with a deployed military unit. During the final weeks of training the student is sent through immersion training pertaining to the geographic locale where he/she will be assigned.

We examined training and conversion records for any insights into resourcing problems. The data are summarized in table 4-9 and show, for each class, the number of recruits that started, dropouts during training, total attrition and percentage attrition from all causes.

Table 4-9: Disposition of HTS Contractor Candidates by Training Cycle Start Date<sup>107</sup>

Training cycle started	Numbers of recruits						Percent attrition (%)
	Started class	Resigned	Training drop	CPAC failure	Security hold	Total attrition	
Apr 2009	28	3	1	0	0	4	14
May 2009	37	3	0	3	0	6	16
Jun 2009	34	8	3	0	0	11	32
Jul 2009	46	6	0	10	0	16	35
Aug 2009	50	21	4	3	0	28	56
Sep 2009	17	1	0	1	0	2	12
Oct 2009	21	2	2	0	0	4	19
Nov 2009	30	9	3	4	0	16	53
Dec 2009	Null						
Jan 2010	29	10	0	0	4	14	48
Feb 2010	21	3	0	4	0	???	???
Mar 2010	23	0	0	12	0	???	???
Apr 2010	36	2	2	8	0	???	???

1. These classes have not yet completed training therefore meaningful attrition figures cannot be calculated.

We see from table 4-9 that the percentage of attrition for each training class for all reasons ranges from a low of 12 percent in September 2009 to a high of 56 percent in November 2009. The major drivers of attrition seem not to be training attrition; rather the losses occur mainly due to resignations and CPAC<sup>108</sup> failures (also known as resume failures). Resignations and CPAC failures are losses nonetheless and represent team members who will not be available to fill anticipated vacancies.

The high numbers of resignations and CPAC failures in July and August 2009 may well stem from the same reason—the inability to get the students in contractor status converted to government status. These figures also appear to confirm the comments of BAE that ramp-ups in the number of recruits requested per month (in this instance from about 34 to about 50), unless accompanied by a long lead time notification,

<sup>107</sup> Source: HTS Training and Education Division.

<sup>108</sup> CPAC stands for Civilian Personnel Advisory Center. During the first week of training all students submit resumes for CPAC approval. Upon approval the process of conversion of the student contract personnel to government status is initiated.



likely will result in recruits of marginal quality. Those of marginal quality will of course have difficulty converting from contractor status to government status. Notification may well have been the cause of the problem in the past when prior notification of needed recruits was poor. It is, however, much more difficult to rationalize the large number of CPAC failures in the March and April FY 2009 class cycles (which are not yet finished) at a time when notification is much improved. This result would seem to suggest a problem in BAE matching the qualifications specified by the current Position Descriptions which is the standard that CPAC uses in determining eligibility for conversion to government status. Recent efforts by TRADOC G2 OPS HR to better coordinate candidate requirements with BAE may improve the situation.

Equally problematic is an apparently recent trend noticed by trainers of substantial numbers of recruits resigning at the very end of training—see for example the data of November 2009 and January 2010. The trainers tell us that many of these recruits seemed to have had no intention of actually deploying and were only there to collect pay for 4.5 months and get a security clearance. There is currently no penalty for resigning and the substantial amount of pay collected during this interval may well be attractive, particularly during this economic downturn. With the 4.5 months of training and a security clearance the recruit may also be able to get a lucrative long term job with another contractor.

On the bright side, generally small percentages (about 4 percent) of persons are actually dropped from training. On the surface that result would seem to suggest that recruit quality is rather good. Unfortunately, we cannot draw that conclusion, because it is very hard to get dropped from the training course. The current training course has no tests, no grades, and no measures of performance. Hence it is possible to sit through the course and not get dropped unless the student does something particularly egregious.

To their credit, the training managers realize that serious shortcomings exist. In December 2009 HTS completed a comprehensive review of the training curriculum and identified a wide range of shortfalls. These deficiencies fell into five categories:

1. Educational philosophy
2. Content of curriculum
3. Method of delivery
4. Learning environment
5. Educational assessment

The training directorate has proposed several thoughtful options to restructure and greatly improve the training. These proposals are currently awaiting action by TRADOC.



## *Qualifications of the Individual Team Members*

In this section we examine some of the qualifications of the individual team members. These data consist of information on educational level, academic area of specialization, and language ability. At one time language capability was required but currently it is not considered essential. Certainly additional variables would more accurately describe the qualifications of the team members, but these three were all that HTS could make available in the time frame of our review. This limitation underscores the need for a comprehensive personnel database.

We have compared the qualifications specified in tables 4-3 through 4-6 with those of team members currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In table 4-10 we contrast the academic degrees actually held by team members with the position requirements

Table 4-10: Academic degrees of currently deployed team members and position requirements

<b>Position/Requirement</b>				
Degree	HTA	RM	SS	TL
	(BA degree)	(BA degree)	(MA or PhD)	(BA degree)
Unknown	2*	0	0	0
AA	8*	0	0	0
BA/BS	25	22	0	10
CGSC	0	0	0	1
Ed.D	0	0	0	1
High school	5*	2*	0	0
JD	0	1	1	2
MA/MS	18	20	25	10
	1	1	0	2
MD	0	0	1	0
Mil. course	4*	6*	0	4
Other	2*	1*	0	0
PhD	2	1	18	3
Total	67	54	45	33

\* denotes cases where the degree appears not to meet requirements

A total of 30 out of 199 cases, or 15 percent, *appear* to not meet the current requirements for level of academic degree. However, experience can be used in lieu of formal educational degrees and may have been done in some of these cases—it is impossible to tell from the data made available to us. Also, in many instances these currently deployed personnel were hired when the positions were filled by contractors

and current job descriptions are somewhat different. This is particularly important in the case of the HTA position. Formerly this position had two tracks: research analyst with a BA requirement and a linguist analyst with only an Associate (AA) degree. On balance the 15 percent who appear to not meet the educational degree requirements may or may not be a problem.

We now turn to an examination of the area of specialization associated with the degree.

In table 4-11 we show the comparisons for the Human Terrain Analyst position.

Table 4-11: Areas of specialization of currently deployed HTA personnel and position requirements

<b>Position/ (Requirement)</b>		
<b>HTA</b>		
	<b>(BA in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position)</b>	
Characterization	Area of specialization	Cases
Relevant	Anthropology	1
	International Studies	9
	Middle East Studies	1
	Political Science	6
	Psychology	3
	Sociology	1
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>21 (31%)</b>
Not Relevant	Unknown	3
	Arabic	1
	Business	2
	Civil affairs	1
	Communications	1
	Counter Terrorism	1
	Criminology	1
	Diplomacy	1
	Education	4
	Energy Management	1
	Engineering	3
	English	1
	Finance	1
	Fire & Casualty Insurance	1
	Foreign Service	1
	General	6
	Intelligence	2
	Language	2

<b>Position/ (Requirement)</b>		
<b>HTA</b>		
	Liberal Arts	1
	Literature	1
	Management	3
	Mathematics	1
	Medicine	1
	Military science	1
	Network administration	2
	Photography	1
	Physical education	1
	Physics	1
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>46 (69%)</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>67 (100%)</b>

We have categorized the areas of specialization as “Relevant” (Anthropology, International Studies, Middle East Studies, Political Science, Psychology, and Sociology), and “Not-Relevant” (all other). Different observers might well choose a slightly different list for the “Relevant” category, but there can be little doubt that such specialties as physics, physical education, photography, and network administration offer little insight into the design and execution of social science research. The reader is encouraged to review the qualifications and required skills, knowledge, and abilities listed in tables 4-3 through 4-6 and make his/her own judgments.

From table 4-11 we see that only 31 percent of the HTL personnel appear to have areas of specialization that meet current qualifications. As noted before, we are cognizant that requirements for current position descriptions are not identical to those that were in place when some of the currently deployed personnel were hired. Particularly those hired as “linguist analyst” might well have been qualified based on standards then in place. The data do not permit us to distinguish “HTA linguist analyst” and “HTA research analyst.” In any event there is little doubt that many of the current team members do not meet current qualifications. As of the writing of this report, the BAE web site job announcement continues to describe the no-longer used “linguist analyst” job description<sup>109</sup>.

We next examine the areas of specialization for the Research Manager (RM) position. These data are shown in table 4-12.

Table 4-12: Areas of specialization of currently deployed RM personnel and position requirements.

<sup>109</sup> Recent modifications to the web site appear to have removed this discrepancy.



	<b>Position/ (Requirement)</b>	
	<b>RM</b>	
	<b>(BA in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position)</b>	
	Area of specialization	Cases
Relevant	Anthropology	1
	International Studies	5
	Middle East Studies	1
	Political Science	2
	Psychology/Org. behavior	1
	Sociology	3
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>13 (24%)</b>
Not Relevant	Acquisition	1
	Business	4
	Counter Terrorism	1
	Criminal Justice	1
	Criminology	2
	Education	2
	Engineering	1
	English	2
	Environmental Policy	1
	General	7
	Geography	1
	Government	1
	History	2
	Information Studies	1
	Intelligence	1
	Language	2
	Law	1
	Management	3
	Mathematics	1
	Negotiations	1
	Public Affairs	2
	Science	1
	Security	1
	Writing	1
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>41 (76%)</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>54 (100%)</b>

From table 4-12 we see that only 24 percent of the Research Managers (RM) meets current requirements for area of academic specialization based on our definition of "relevant."

We now turn to an examination of the area of specialization of the Social Scientist (SS) position. These data are shown in table 4-13.

Table 4-13: Areas of specialization of currently deployed SS personnel and position requirements.

	<b>Position/ (Requirement)</b>	
	<b>SS</b>	
	(PhD or MA in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position)	
	Area of specialization	Cases
Relevant	Anthropology	8
	International Studies	9
	Middle East Studies	0
	Political Science	3
	Psychology/Org. behavior	6
	Sociology	1
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>27 (60%)</b>
Not Relevant	Business	1
	Communications	1
	Criminology	1
	Earth Sciences	1
	Economics	1
	History	1
	Language	1
	Law	2
	Linguistics	1
	Management	2
	Medicine	1
	Philosophy	2
	Public Affairs	1
	Religious Studies	1
	Security	1
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>18 (40%)</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>45 (100%)</b>

From table 4-13 we see that 60 percent of the Social Scientists (SS) meet current requirements for area of academic specialization based on our criterion for “relevant.”

The other 40 percent do not meet our criterion of “Relevant.” As noted earlier in a similar context, different observers might well choose a slightly different list for the relevant category, but there can be little doubt that such specialties as Security, Management , Philosophy , and Law, fine professions though they are, offer little

insight into the design and execution of social science research. It is remotely possible that a few individuals with the “non-relevant” specialties have applied themselves judiciously and acquired the knowledge that would have come with a formal degree in a relevant specialty; but we would not expect that to be a large number of persons.

It is unfortunate that no one really knows what the truly relevant specialties are. The research that could answer this question needs to be done.

We now consider the area of specialization of the Team Leader (TL) position. These data are shown in table 4-14.



Table 4-14: Areas of specialization of currently deployed TL personnel and position requirements.

	<b>Position/ (Requirement)</b>	
	<b>TL</b>	
	(BA in behavioral or social science or related disciplines appropriate to the position)	
	Area of specialization	Cases
Relevant	Anthropology	0
	International Studies	2
	Middle East Studies	0
	Political Science	1
	Psychology/Org. behavior	1
	Sociology	0
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>4 (12%)</b>
Not Relevant	Agricultural Science	1
	Biology	1
	Business	5
	Command	1
	Criminal Justice	1
	Education	1
	Energy Management	1
	Engineering	2
	Finance	1
	General	4
	History	2
	Journalism	2
	Law	2
	Management	1
	Philosophy	1
	Strategic Analysis	1
	Unknown	2
<b>Subtotal</b>		<b>29 (88%)</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>33 (100%)</b>

The data in table 4-14 indicate that only 12 percent of currently deployed Team Leaders (TL) has academic specialties in areas that we consider to be relevant. Considering that the Team Leader is arguably the most important member of the team, we view this is a serious shortcoming.

On balance the team members' academic specialties all too often lack real relevance to the behavioral and social science research backgrounds that the teams appear to need and is referenced in the position descriptions and the associated knowledge, skills, and abilities, in table 4-3 through 4-6. The qualifying phrase in the basic

qualifications of “related disciplines” makes a mockery of any effort to get persons appropriate for the job. All disciplines are related, what is important is the degree of the relationship. The “related disciplines” phrase allows virtually any discipline to “qualify.”

Foreign language fluency was at one time emphasized as an important (or desired) capacity for some team positions. That requirement has been dropped because of the difficulty in finding enough persons with foreign language fluency and the required analytic ability. Local units have translators that can be made available to the team.

Nonetheless it seems likely that, all else being equal, an ability to communicate in the local language could be a positive. In table 4-15 we show the distribution of foreign language ability among the currently deployed team members.

Table 4-15: Foreign language capability of currently deployed team members

Language / fluency	Position/(Requirement)			
	HTA (none)	RM (none)	SS (none)	TL (none)
Dari, Pashto, or Farsi / basic	1	4	0	1
Dari, Pashto, or Farsi / proficient	3	1	1	0
Dari, Pashto, or Farsi / fluent	9	3	3	0
Arabic or Kurdish / basic	2	1	3	0
Arabic or Kurdish / proficient	1	1	1	0
Arabic or Kurdish / fluent	28	8	8	0
None	15	28	20	30
Other	5	8	5	2
unknown	3	0	4	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>33</b>

As noted, HTAs are no longer being recruited as “linguist analysts” so the language fluency in this position is likely to decline in the future. A substantial number of Social Scientists report fluency in the local language. The Team Leaders are notable for their lack of foreign language capability. We can surmise that language ability would prove beneficial in interactions with the local population.

### *Other Indicators of Personnel Problems*

We attempted to examine other potential indicators of personnel problems. In particular, we asked HTS how many deployed team members were relieved due to poor performance or bad behavior, how many team members had resigned while on deployment, and how many teams fail to achieve their mission because of personnel

issues. We were told by HTS Operations and HTS HR that HTS does not track those numbers. We consider this lack of interest in such indicators to be a major organizational shortcoming.

We were able to obtain some independent information about these rates from persons within HTS in positions to know. These data are not official and we promised anonymity to those who talked with us. All data were confirmed by multiple sources. *We stress that these are estimates and subject to uncertainty*—but we believe that an informed estimate is better than nothing. Based on these discussions we estimate that about 8 deployed team members are relieved from duty each year and about 80 team members resign while on deployment.

A loss of 8 team members from a deployed base of 193 persons would amount to about 4 percent which is not large. The estimate of 8 team members being relieved from duty each year probably underestimates how many members actually have performance or behavioral problems. This is because actually firing someone is a very complex and time consuming process. Problem personnel are therefore often encouraged to resign which they can do without stigma. Hence some unknown fraction of the estimated 80 resignations is also probably caused by behavioral or performance related problems.

The resignation of an estimated 80 deployed team members each year out of the current deployed base of 193 persons represents a loss of 41 percent. Whatever the nature of the resignation, this loss represents an enormous additional recruiting requirement. Some of these resignations are likely due to reasons such as health or family problems. However, it seems likely that many are due to recruiting persons who for reasons of qualifications or attitude are not appropriate for the mission or to paring them with leaders who are not prepared to lead.

It is reasonable to conclude that such significant problems within teams could contribute to shortfalls in the ability of those teams to achieve their mission. There can be many reasons why a team may fail to achieve its mission and only some of these reasons involve personnel selection. Other factors that could lead to a team failing are that it has a poor relationship with the unit the team is attached to, lack of effective support, leadership deficiencies within the team, and/or poor team dynamics.

While we are unable to establish a causal relationship between problems within HTS teams and the failure of these teams to accomplish their primary mission, we were able to correlate problems within HTS teams and the relative utility that several on site commanders attributed to the HTTs in their operating areas. We collected information on the utility of HTTs via semi-structured interviews of returning field



commanders [discussed in appendix B]. The interviews covered about 64 percent of teams in theater at the time the interviewees were deployed. We categorized responses to the interviews as indicating whether the teams were:

- Very useful
- Varied in usefulness
- Not useful

We reproduce table B-2 here as table 4-16 below:

Table 4-16: Respondents finding teams useful

Category	Number of interviews	Number of unique HTTs	Percent of unique HTTs
Very Useful	5	3	21
Varied in Usefulness	8	8	57
Not Useful	3	3	21
Total	16	14	100

There are large statistical uncertainties on the percentage of HTT by usefulness category; however we can make the following observations:

- Some HTT are very useful but likely only a small percentage
- There are also a small percentage that are viewed as not useful
- Most HTT are in the middle group. HTT were useful but with significant limitations or their usefulness varied over time.

Many of the people we interviewed, including those most critical of HTS, indicated that HTS teams are performing a vital function. They contend that even if only a few of the teams are successful, the good work that the successful teams do is so important that it makes the whole enterprise worthwhile. Please refer to appendix B for a complete analysis of HTT "Usefulness" using data from our interviews.

### ***Team Assignment***

Assignment policies have the potential to partially compensate for quality shortfalls in recruiting. Team personnel train as teams but generally deploy as individual replacements for members who are rotating out of existing teams. The assignment process starts with the PMO-Forward updating their Vacancy Priority List on the 1st and 15th of each month. Then HTS Operations at Fort Leavenworth develops tentative assignments based on student preference and assessments of student

strengths and weaknesses by the seminar leaders. This process offers some possibility of compensating for a student's weakness in specific areas. After review by the Director of Operations and validation by the PMO-Forward the student is notified of the assignment. The goal is to have the notification 60 days before deployment to allow several weeks of training tailored to the specific job assignment. The process appears to be reasonably well designed to place the individual team member in an assignment where he/she might reasonably be expected to succeed.

As noted, team members are currently sent as individual replacements. As a result there is always someone on the team with several months of on-site experience for continuity. The downside of this policy is that team cohesion suffers because the team that trained together is broken up and disbursed. A better balance between the two goals of continuity and unit cohesion might be achieved by using a hybrid replacement model whereby 1/2 or 1/3 of a team would be rotated into place at one time.

### ***Increasing or Decreasing the Number of Contractor Positions***

The large number of contractor positions in HTS has been noted with concern in a recent report by the TRADOC Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC)<sup>110</sup>. The report expressed concern about the performance of inherently government functions and personal services by HTS contract employees.

The process of standing up a new organization within government usually involves extensive use of contract personnel. This is particularly the case when the need for the new organization is urgent and/or requires personnel with specific and uncommon qualifications and skills. It is generally understood that the government hiring process, although carefully done, is slower than the contract hiring process.

A common model in setting up a new organization within government is to use contract personnel in the start-up phase. Then, as the need for the new organization is validated and the managers have had the opportunity to evaluate the performance of the contract personnel, some of the contract personnel are converted to government hires.

In the case of HTS, it is difficult to imagine that the organization could have been up and running as quickly as it was without using a large number of contract personnel. Now about 3.5 years after its start-up the organization still has a large number of contractors. From table 4-17 we see that currently 206 out of 555, or 37, percent of the

---

<sup>110</sup> United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance, *Review of Human Terrain System*, May 2010. Please refer to Appendix G.

personnel are contract employees. The contract employees are concentrated in the categories of Students in Training, Knowledge Management/ Information Technology (KM/IT), the Reachback Research Center (RRC) and Training.

Table 4-17: HTS staffing as of June 2010 (Table 4-2 is reproduced here for proximity to the discussion.)

Category	Number of personnel			
	Military	Civilians (DAC)	Contractors	Total
Deployed teams	19	174	0	193
Students in training	18	1	113 <sup>a</sup>	132
Holding company	5	66	3	74
PMO and directorates:				
PMO	4	2	3	9
Human Resources	15	0	4	19
Operations	14	1	1	16
KM /IT	0	0	12 <sup>b</sup>	12
RRC	3	0	43	46
Training	23	0	27	50
Social Science	0	4	0	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>555</b>

- a. These 113 persons are contract personnel for only a few months. By the end of their 4.5 month training period they will normally have been converted to short term government hires; i.e., Department of the Army Civilians (DAC).
- b. Does not include indigenous persons who conduct surveys and focus groups under contract in theater for the Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) group.

In the case of Students in Training, we see no way other than through the use of contract personnel to meet the quick response needed to fluctuating demands for students. As for KM/IT, this field certainly involves a great deal of technical knowledge and may best be served by a large percentage of contract personnel. The Director of RRC indicates that he needs personnel with specialized knowledge that would be very difficult to obtain except by contract. Also, the RRC needs to be flexible in its areas of expertise to respond to potential new theaters of conflict. This is likely much more easily done with contract employees who can be replaced with others with more relevant areas of expertise should the need arise. The Training Directorate seems to have long range plans to transition to a higher fraction of government hires following the general model of transition from contractor status to government status outlined above.



We were somewhat more concerned about the use contract personnel to run directorates. However, during the course of our assessment 2 of the 7 Directors (training and social sciences) have been converted to government status (DAC). We also understand that efforts are underway to convert the two remaining contractor headed directorates to DAC status. We view this as a welcome development. In table 4-18 we list the directorates and the personnel status of the Director.

Table 4-18: HTS Directorates

Directorate	Director's personnel status
Operations	Military
Training	Civilian (from contractor to DAC as of June 2010)
Human Resources	Military
Reachback Research Center	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
Social Science	Civilian (from IPA to DAC as of June 2010)
Knowledge Management	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
COCOM LNO	Military

As we see it the advantages of using contract personnel are the quicker hiring process and the ability to get specialized skills. The disadvantages of using contract personnel are that they lack the ability to make decisions that are inherently governmental, they are not always responsive to government needs, and they are usually more expensive. In the case of management positions, contractors cannot direct government civilians or military personnel.

### ***BAE Recruiting Contract***

All team civilian personnel are recruited through the BAE contract. BAE has been the prime contractor since the inception of the HTS program in 2006 and their contract was renegotiated in September 2009.

It is a common view among HTS personnel we have interviewed that the quality of the personnel supplied under the BAE contract is substandard and is at the heart of most of the problems in the program. Our data shows that there may be truth in this argument.

To solve the issue of inadequately qualified recruits, what recourse does the government have? The short answer is very little. We have not seen the contract itself, but we understand that it does not provide for any penalties for providing substandard recruits or incentives for providing good recruits. The government seems to have to take whatever BAE provides. With no economic incentives to provide quality, the contractor cannot be expected to always provide top-tier recruits.

Given a contract with no performance incentives, it is imperative that the qualifications for recruits be tightly specified. However, such is clearly not the case. This is illustrated in table 4-19 which summarizes the results from tables 4-11 through 4-14. The data clearly indicate that large numbers of team members have degrees in specialties that are not really “relevant” to the behavioral or social science research required for these positions.

Table 4-19: Summary of areas of specialization of currently deployed team personnel and position requirements.

	Position			
	HTA	RM	SS	TL
Percentage in "relevant" discipline	31	24	60	12
Percentage not in "relevant" discipline	69	76	40	88
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

## CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 4

The human resourcing and recruiting efforts have been adequate in the sense that the organization was successfully stood up and is providing an important function in Iraq and Afghanistan. That this was done in such a short time is remarkable. That said, we see chronic problems in human resourcing and recruiting that, if not addressed, will most likely prevent the organization from reaching its full potential.

HTS as an organization exists solely to supply trained teams to commanders to assist in the commander’s understanding of, and interaction with, the very important human terrain dimension of today’s battlefields. As such, the quality of the individuals recruited and their training is paramount in achieving success in the mission. However, training at best, can only add a finishing touch to the knowledge and experience that the recruits for the teams must have.

### **We see the following deficiencies:**

As part of our assessment we compared the qualifications of recruits to requirements described in the Position Descriptions and job requirement summaries made available by TRADOC. Our general conclusion is that many current team members do not meet the current standards. This is particularly evident in the mismatch of recruits academic disciplines to what might reasonably be considered relevant.

In order to recruit quality teams HTS must: 1) know what one looks like, 2) have control of its human resourcing so that it can shape its workforce in such a way as to

achieve success, and 3) confront rather than ignore current shortcomings. In short, the problems fall into three general areas:

- Understanding the type of recruit who has a high likelihood of success
- Control of the recruiting process
- Confront and address current shortcomings

We will discuss these areas in turn.

1. Understanding the type of recruit who has a high likelihood of success

- During the start-up process HTS had no choice but to use its best professional judgment as to what type of person they needed to fill the team positions. Now, 3.5 years into the program they should be able to do better—but have not. During the last 3.5 years performance data should have been collected on all team members. This data should have been analyzed to determine what qualifications and personal characteristics, if any, increase the likelihood of success in the mission. This information should then have been incorporated into the position descriptions to better define the qualifications needed for the positions. We are cognizant of the fact that the team members were contract personnel during most of the period. That should not have precluded the collection of performance data for research purposes.
- HTS also needs to maintain a personnel database that details the relevant qualifications and personal characteristics of its people. Without such a database, analysis of what types of recruits are most successful is impossible. Such a database does not currently exist.

2. Control of the recruiting process

- The recently relieved HTS Project Manager described his intense frustration at not having control of the human resourcing process. Ultimately he had to accept whatever persons BAE recruited for the program. The source of this problem seems to be a contract without adequate built-in protection for the government. The contractor will of course do what is in the contractor's best interest. It is likely that better personnel could be recruited, but that would cost more and the recruiter has no incentive to spend the additional money. In our judgment the contract needs to be modified to provide more



protection for the government in the event of substandard recruits and to include both performance incentives and penalties for the contractor. The modification should also provide for the one-day face-to-face interview at Fort Leavenworth described below.

- We are very dubious about the wisdom of hiring persons for these difficult jobs with only a resume check and phone interview. It would potentially greatly improve the recruiting process if, after recruits successfully pass the BAE screening process that they be required to spend one day at Fort Leavenworth where they would be given an overview of the program and undergo face-to-face interviews. As part of the process professional screening tests should be employed to assess qualities that contribute to success in theater. The interviews could be conducted by a board made up of seasoned personnel who themselves have been deployed in a team. Only after passing this board would BAE be permitted to hire them. The extra cost to the government for hotel, meals, rental car, and air fare could be less than \$1,000 per person. Considering the cost of eventual failures in terms of salary, training, and mission failure, this additional cost seems reasonable.

### 3. Confront and address current shortcomings

- There are indications that HTS faces serious personnel issues. HTS needs to monitor personnel and performance trends to detect and remedy problems. In particular, the numbers of persons relieved of duty and persons resigning should be tracked. Also, the number of teams that do not succeed in meeting their mission should be tracked.

That HTS has succeeded at all (and it has had some notable successes) is a tribute to the hundreds of men and women who have dedicated themselves to making it happen. Many of the people we interviewed, including the most critical of HTS, indicated that HTS teams are performing a vital function. They contend that even if only a few of the teams are successful, the good work that the successful teams do is so important that it makes the whole enterprise worthwhile.



## **Chapter 5: HTS Skills and Academic Networks**

Element 5 of the CDA asks for an identification of those needed HTS skills not resident in government or military positions and how the Army can leverage academic networks or contracting opportunities to fill those gaps. This is a broad question which, to answer comprehensively would require an extensive gap analysis of Army/HTS skills, the US Government and military, and the academic/research community. To do so properly, this would require a notably longer time-frame than allotted for this assessment.

Still, we wanted to shed some light on the topic and provide some initial findings that could potentially be addressed in subsequent analyses focused on how HTS can leverage outside organizations. Indeed, in the resource-constrained environment of today, it is a worthwhile and pertinent question. In this chapter, we

- Identify what skills are required for the HTT and explore whether they exist in government or military positions
- Assess whether it is possible and reasonable for HTT to leverage these skills
- Describe current, past, and planned HTS relationships with academic networks
- Provide findings based on our analysis into what HTS might consider doing in order to effectively leverage outside academic organizations.

### **Skills not Resident in Military or Government**

The requirements for the positions are described in Section 4 of this report. Generally the only data elements that address requirements for these positions—and which are also available for government civilians and military personnel—are those of academic degree and educational discipline code.

In table 5-1 we summarize the HTT educational requirements and the estimated numbers of new hires for CY 2010.



Table 5-1: Educational requirements and expected hires for HTT positions in CY 2010.

	Position				
				Social Scientist	
	Team Leader	Human Terrain Analyst	Research Manager	SS1	SS2
Degree	BA <sup>1,2</sup>	BA <sup>1,2</sup>	BA <sup>1,2</sup>	PhD <sup>1,2</sup>	MA <sup>1,2</sup>
Expected Hires <sup>3</sup>	41	123	102	70	69

1. Degree in the behavioral or social sciences or related discipline appropriate to the position.
2. Note that a combination of education and experience or experience alone can be substituted for the formal degree if they have provided the applicant with the knowledge of one or more of the behavioral or social sciences equivalent to the field.
3. Estimated as described below.

These requirements are taken from the vacancy announcements provided by TRADOC G2 OPS. The estimated numbers of students that have been or will be recruited in CY 2010 were developed by CNA, but are based on information supplied by HTS operations directorate and HTS Training Directorate. The estimates assume 45 students per class for the rest of the year and a continuation of current ratios of the various team positions.

As shown in table 5-1 the Team Leader, Human Terrain Analyst, and Research Manager all require a BA degree (or equivalent experience) in the behavioral or social sciences or related discipline appropriate to the position. The Social Scientist level 1 requires a PhD and the Social Scientist level 2 requires a MA degree, which must be in the behavioral or social sciences or related discipline.

In tables 5-2 through 5-7 we show data on the distribution of civilians in each service with degrees in the behavioral and social sciences that appear to be appropriate to the position. We characterize the degrees as being in areas thought to have the highest probability of success and those thought to have a lower probability based on observations by the HTS Social Science Directorate. The data on existing Department of Defense (DoD) civilian employees were supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).

Table 5-2: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Army civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	160	95	30
	Area Studies, other	109	93	14
	Criminology <sup>a</sup>	186	18	1
	International Studies	36	36	1
	Near and Middle East Studies	5	6	0
	Sociology	684	66	13
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1180</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>59</b>
Lower	Political Science	992	158	37
	Psychology	1236	244	192
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>2228</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>229</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3408</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>288</b>

a. Criminology is considered a branch of Sociology and is usually taught in the Sociology department of major universities.

The Army is the branch with the largest number of civilians with advanced degrees in disciplines of interest. Navy is the branch with the second largest number persons with advanced degrees in the disciplines of interest, followed by the Air Force and Marine Corps.

Table 5-3: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Navy civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	68	30	21
	Area Studies, other	71	39	3
	Criminology	229	26	1
	International Studies	33	25	1
	Near and Middle East Studies	0	3	0
	Sociology	396	53	4
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>797</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>30</b>
Lower	Political Science	623	117	68
	Psychology	689	135	75
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1312</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>143</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>173</b>

Table 5-4: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Marine Corps civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	8	6	1
	Area Studies, other	10	1	0
	Criminology	17	0	0
	International Studies	2	2	0
	Near and Middle East Studies	0	0	1
	Sociology	50	2	1
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>
Lower	Political Science	72	14	2
	Psychology	117	17	9
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>11</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>14</b>

Table 5-5: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Air Force civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	47	17	6
	Area Studies, other	50	17	3
	Criminology	84	7	2
	International Studies	23	15	0
	Near and Middle East Studies	2	3	0
	Sociology	336	19	4
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>542</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>15</b>
Lower	Political Science	478	128	27
	Psychology	768	121	56
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1246</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>83</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1788</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>98</b>



Table 5-6: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Other DoD civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	39	4	0
	Area Studies, other	51	52	7
	Criminology	143	20	0
	International Studies	22	27	2
	Near and Middle East Studies	1	1	1
	Sociology	263	30	6
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>16</b>
Lower	Political Science	475	134	51
	Psychology	556	99	35
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1031</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>86</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1550</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>102</b>

Table 5-7: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Total DoD civilians

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	322	152	58
	Area Studies, other	291	202	27
	Criminology	659	71	4
	International Studies	116	105	4
	Near and Middle East Studies	8	13	2
	Sociology	1729	170	28
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>3125</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>123</b>
Lower	Political Science	2640	551	185
	Psychology	3366	616	367
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>6006</b>	<b>1167</b>	<b>552</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9131</b>	<b>1880</b>	<b>675</b>

In all of DoD, there are only about 675 PhD holders in these fields of interest, of which only 123 are in academic disciplines thought likely to have a high probability of success on a Human Terrain Team. Many of these 123 are already in an HTT. Based on the estimates in table 5-1 approximately 139 new recruits will be needed in CY 2010 alone and, given expansion plans, likely many more in the out-years. It seems

highly unlikely that HTS could obtain meaningful quantities of the PhDs needed from DoD civilians. Similar considerations apply to persons with MA degrees.

With regard to those with BA degrees, there appear to be about 3,125 who are in areas with a high likelihood of success. However, even for these persons, it must be remembered that they are currently filling position for which they were hired and presumably needed. Although some could probably be obtained on an Interagency Personnel Agreement (IPA), it seems unlikely that large numbers could be obtained year after year in that manner.

In tables 5-8 and 5-9 we show data on the distribution of active duty military with degrees in the behavioral and social sciences that appear to be appropriate to the position. These data were also supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center. Unfortunately similar data are not available for the Army and Air Force.

Table 5-8: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Navy active duty military

<b>Probability of success</b>	<b>Academic discipline</b>	<b>Degree</b>		
		<b>BA</b>	<b>MA</b>	<b>PhD</b>
High	Anthropology	68	1	0
	Area Studies, other	0	0	0
	Criminology	0	0	0
	International Studies	0	0	0
	Near and Middle East Studies	0	0	0
	Sociology	0	0	0
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Lower	Political Science	1894	16	2
	Psychology	514	22	21
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>2408</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>23</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2476</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>23</b>

Table 5-9: Degrees by service Sept 2009, Marine Corps active duty military

Probability of success	Academic discipline	Degree		
		BA	MA	PhD
High	Anthropology	77	1	0
	Area Studies, other	55	1	0
	Criminology	422	4	0
	International Studies	0	0	0
	Near and Middle East Studies	6	0	0
	Sociology	222	1	0
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>
Lower	Political Science	1326	20	2
	Psychology	469	6	0
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>1795</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>2</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2577</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>2</b>

Only one person in the active duty Navy and seven in the active duty Marine Corps appear to have advanced degrees in academic disciplines that are thought to have a high likelihood of success on a Human Terrain Team.

It is interesting that the Marine Corps has about 782 persons with Bachelor's degrees in the fields of interest thought to have a high likelihood of success. This would represent a pool that, if sent to respected universities for advanced degrees, could eventually form a meaningful pool of officers with the technical expertise to conduct serious social science research. It is possible that such a pool might exist in the active duty Army. Unfortunately their data were not available.

## Additional data on Skills not Resident in the Military from Semi-Structured Interviews

We supplemented the above analysis with additional data we gathered on this issue in our semi-structured interviews. Focusing on identifying skills not resident in the military, we included a series of questions on this topic. Our goal was to solicit feedback on what specific skills, if any, HTTs possess that are not available through the unit's military personnel.<sup>111</sup> We also included insights about particular HTT attributes – as opposed to specific skills –that also set them apart from the military.

<sup>111</sup> About half of those we interviewed were brigade commanders; the others included Battalion commanders, Intel officers and staff at the division level. Five of the interviews included commanders and staff who interacted with the HTT in Afghanistan, 10 interviews



One reason that we pursued this line of questioning was to explore the charge that some critics make of HTS that any success the program has had is not the result of a unique role HTTs have played supporting their commander, but rather the result of the fact that in a war zone, a commander will take any additional bodies he is provided and more or less be pleased. This data may shed light on whether or not the teams provide skills that the commander otherwise would not have had without an HTT.<sup>112</sup>

Below is a list of specific skills that our respondents cited:<sup>113</sup>

<b>HTT Skills and Attributes Identified as Not Resident in Military</b>
HTTs bring different skill sets together as part of one team. The military may have all the pieces, but they are not brought together in the same way an HTT is brought together.
HTTs members can talk to tribal leaders. [This is] different from Intelligence Analysts who wouldn't do that because of the mission set. Military folks also can't go out and talk to whomever they want.
Some possess Language skills – in some cases, speak as well as native speakers
Possess a different lexicon than military, see things from a different perspective
Some possess unique ability to reach population – an ability to interact with local people. The military does not train for this.
They look at the problem differently [from the military]. Do not just look at targeting bad guys, also look at what are the social grievances.
Possess special cultural sociological skills not taught in army training program.
They have the ability to get out on the ground.
HTTs have cultural awareness and understanding
Deeply familiar with local customs and historical facts that may otherwise be unknown to a military operator

---

included commanders and staff who had interacted with the HTT in Iraq and one interviewee reported that he had interacted with the HTT in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the "customers" interacted with a unique HTT (with the exception of the interview with 3 customers" and 2 interviewees who interacted with the HTT in Afghanistan).

<sup>112</sup> To be clear, this should not be considered a comprehensive analysis of this topic. Given the timeframe of the assessment, we were working with a small population of respondents. We believe this may be a good first step in understanding the issue; however, additional research and analysis would be required to make definitive conclusions about the unique skills HTTs possess.

<sup>113</sup> In general, these are not direct quotes from interviewees, please see appendix B for more detailed information on interview data.

## Leveraging Academic Networks

HTS has made efforts to leverage outside academic networks. In our conversations with HTS officials, it appears that the Training Directorate has made the most extensive use of academic networks of all the HTS components to date. Below are the past, current, and planned HTS Training Directorate relationships with academic networks.<sup>114</sup>

Table 5-10: HTS Relationships with Academic Institutions

Academic Institution	Character of Relationship	Time Frame	Status
Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI)	HTS hired GTRI as a contractor to: 1) conduct an assessment of the HTS training curriculum; 2) develop a new training curriculum. In execution, GTRI ended up being sourcing entity for HTS, did not complete curriculum tasks, but relationship "not all bad."	2008 - 2010	Contract terminated
University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO), Center for Afghan Studies	Trains HTS teams for three weeks on various aspects of Afghan culture at UNO - integrated into HTS training curriculum.	2008 - present	Ongoing
University of Kansas	Iraq immersion course – Vision to establish Iraq immersion program modeled on UNO's Afghan immersion program.	2008 - present	Ongoing but still maturing
University of Montana	Potential for University of Montana support to HTS curriculum development	n/a	Just starting to form relationship

With regard to training, the Training Directorate has already been active in pursuing opportunities with educational institutions that can fill gaps in HTS training. With limited resources and a fairly broad mission set to train to, the relationships have the potential to play an important role in preparing HTTs for deployment.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Director of Training, 6 July 2010.

In addition to relationships with academic institutions, HTS Training Directorate has also sought to establish relationships with programs and institutions within the Army/DoD in order to fill gaps. In our conversations with HTS officials, we learned of HTS efforts to leverage the following existing Army/DoD programs to enhance HTS training. Most of these are still in the planning phases and have not been fully implemented:

- Combined Army Center (CAC)
- School of Advance Military Studies (at CAC)
- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
- Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW)

Naturally, there are benefits to working with Army/DoD organizations, particularly those that are within TRADOC providing that TRADOC leadership is supportive of the relationship which, according to Training Directorate staff, has been the case—and increasingly so in recent months.

Aside from the Training Directorate, HTS has described additional efforts to leverage academic networks. Those efforts consist of:

- Conferences, workshops, seminars, classroom visits, and on-line forums.
  - Government and non-Government
  - Academic
  - Professional / Industry
- SME Net (the utilization of subject matter experts from Academia).
  - Tasked by RRC in support of teams
  - Constrained by lack of funding
- Publications
  - Papers and articles
    - The Director of Social Science indicates that they have published about 20 articles
  - Internet Media articles
  - Newspapers
  - Book chapters
  - Interviews in books
- Word of mouth
  - On the job recruiting through participation with teams
  - Colleagues—University and Professional networks
  - Interviews that generate interest
  - Participation in training exercises



## **CNA Findings and Conclusions on CDA Element 5**

It appears that if HTS is to have the necessary personnel, in the near-term, it must hire from the general pool available to academia and business.

An alternative for the long term is for HTS to “grow its own.” Promising young officers could be selected for a training program in social science and sent to an appropriate university for advanced degrees. They might well be required to conduct field research for a thesis in a country of interest. Current programs like the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program could serve as a model. One downside to this approach is that the military officer trained as a social scientist might have more difficulty gaining the trust of the local population than a civilian social scientist. A complete understanding of the implications of a military officer functioning as a social scientist is beyond the scope of our assessment and should be thoroughly investigated before any effort is expended in such an endeavor.

In a resource-constrained environment, seeking opportunities to leverage the expertise, programs, and work of outside organizations is a worthwhile endeavor. With HTS's mission set, and its focus on academic approaches to supporting operational commanders, turning to academic institutions appears particularly wise. Conceptually, this is an effort that HTS should continue to pursue.

In practice, however, HTS faces some internal challenges with regard to working with academic institutions that most likely need to be overcome.

1. From an organizational/management perspective, there does not appear to be a directorate or individual within HTS who has been assigned responsibility for pursuing relationships and partnerships with academic organizations and leveraging networks. The training directorate appears to be considerably ahead of the rest of the organizations in terms of establishing these relationships and these efforts appear to be paying off. However, the individuals involved in pursuing these initiatives are understandably focused solely on how to improve and enhance training – only one of many potential areas where HTS could turn to outside organizations.

When we requested additional information on “non-training related” activities with academic organizations, we were told that there is no one within HTS responsible for overall coordination of these efforts.

2. In the absence of a responsible individual or directorate, there does not appear to be a strategic communications plan that HTS can use in approaching outside organizations. Past CNA analyses of military

organizations seeking to partner with non-military organizations consistently suggest that an effective strategic communications plan is key to forming these relationships. Such a plan would allow HTS to be able to effectively articulate to outside organization its mission in a way that can be easily understood by outside partners. As a result, potential partners can easily identify where there may be areas for cooperation and synergies with their organizations.

Separate from challenges internal to organization, HTS also faces the challenge of negative attitudes within some academic circles towards the HTS program overall. In some of its outreach efforts, HTS has already faced an unwillingness on the part of some institutions or individuals (in particular some within the Anthropological community<sup>115</sup>) to work together. This will most likely differ somewhat from institution to institution and from individual to individual; however, we see it as being a long-term challenge for the HTS in effort to forge relationships with some, but not all, academic organizations.

That being said, an effective strategic communications plan for the program could play a useful role in breaking down barriers in this area and promoting dialogue between HTS and opponents of the program.

Finally, in addition to academic organizations, there are other research institutions that HTS could potentially leverage. For example, there are a number of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) with which HTS could work. Other public research institutions such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Brookings Institution may also be appropriate partners for HTS, particularly in accessing subject matter expertise related to the HTS mission.

---

<sup>115</sup> Although there are some exceptions.

## Chapter 6: Challenges to HTS Implementation

During the course of CNA's assessment, we identified numerous issues that appear to have negatively affected the implementation and operations of the HTS Program over the past four years. While the CDA requested that we focus on policy and regulatory problems, it appears that other, larger forces may also lie behind some of the challenges that HTS has faced since 2006.

Although it has been nearly a decade since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan and seven years since the US invasion of Iraq, these conflicts have required major shifts—in relatively short periods of time—in how DoD fights wars. This has trickled down throughout the services, having major impact on the development of capabilities across DOTMLPF.<sup>116</sup> In addition, the demands for these new capabilities often are immediate. Friction is created when factors such as the size of the DoD bureaucracy, the regulations it must follow, and its often slow time-lines come up against an immediate demand for a capability downrange. The departments, programs, and even individuals responding to these immediate demands within DoD face serious challenges. HTS is a prime example of a new, innovative program created to respond to an immediate need for a capability downrange, but having to do so within an environment that does not always make it easy to be successful.

HTS is not alone, however. Many of the problems the HTS program has experienced are similar to those facing other DoD programs supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Three specific factors that impact HTS in particular that appear to in part stem from DoD responding to an immediate need down-range, but not being ideally equipped to do so effectively are:

- 1.) Program start-up costs
- 2.) Dependence on contractors and the difficulties of contract management
- 3.) Existing/long-standing federal and DoD regulations that are ill-fitted to today's war-fighting environment.

---

<sup>116</sup> Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) refers to the spectrum of issues DoD considers when developing new military capabilities.



Although there may be others, we identified six specific problems or challenges that have faced the HTS program as a result of one, or some combination of the factors listed above:

1. The recruiting of unqualified team members
2. High rates of attrition of HTS team members deployed during conversion to DAC
3. Contract ceiling was reached and HTS operations were halted
4. Timecard problems
5. Determining permanent duty station/no TDY pay for DACS for time spent at Fort Leavenworth
6. HTS program management


As we consider these three factors affecting them and their sum total of their impact on HTS, we remind the reader of HTS's relationship to TRADOC. To understand the challenges facing HTS, it is critical to bear in mind that HTS does not stand alone. It is inexorably linked to its parent organization, TRADOC, and has been since day one.

TRADOC G2 OPS has oversight responsibility and is largely responsible for managing the HTS Program. The HTS Program is physically based at TRADOC, and managed by TRADOC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2), and specifically G2 Operations (OPS). As a result, a discussion of most of the problems and challenges HTS has faced are in some way connected to TRADOC G2 OPS.

Due to this relationship, CNA sought to gain the TRADOC G2 perspective on all the issues we raise in this chapter; however, we found that on many issues, we did not receive a response from TRADOC G2 OPS to our inquiries. As a result, we have identified potential problems, but not come to any definitive conclusions about where responsibility for each problem lies (be it within HTS itself, TRADOC G2 OPS, or elsewhere).


Figure 6-1 below illustrates the oversight relationship between the Department of the Army, TRADOC, and the HTS Program. Figure 2-1 reproduced here for proximity to the discussion details the relationship between TRADOC and HTS.

Figure 6-1<sup>117</sup>: HTS oversight relationship



<sup>117</sup> HTS Project Overview Brief, prepared for and presented to CNA, 19 May 2010, p. 9

Figure 2-1. The HTS Management Structure



We turn now to a discussion of the three factors that appear, at least in part, to be the cause of problems or challenges for HTS.

## **Factor 1: Program start-up costs**

### **Start-up Challenges for New DoD Programs**

In CNA's view, most of the issues that have hindered program execution in the HTS Program stems from start-up costs. This is true for many new programs within DoD. We identified a number of challenges that most new organizations within DoD face that appear to also have impacted HTS, they are:

*Defining itself within a larger bureaucracy:* Before any new program can become a "program of record" within DoD, program managers face the challenge of defining their organization within the larger bureaucracy. They need to respond positively to the ad hoc demand for their products or services while also developing internal policies and procedures that will support the program in the long run. This can stretch the program managers in many directions simultaneously, which will likely impact their ability to be effective managers.

*Establishing an effective relationship with its parent organization:* In order to survive, the new program also must be able to work effectively with the organization in which it is



housed. This is often important because, as is the case with HTS, the parent organization has the resources and therefore responsibility for many of the administrative processes required to get the program off the ground. To work effectively, this requires positive managerial support from the parent organization. The new program must therefore have a good “fit” with the host organization to give the best chance for the program to survive. The management needs of the program and the support organization can conflict with each other under normal conditions and this can be particularly exacerbated, if the program has an operational component.

*Over-Reliance on Contract Support:* New programs are frequently dependent on contractors to start-up. According to a 2009 Congressional Research Service report, *Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan*, contractors are used in many instances because they can be quickly hired and deployed and because they provide expertise in specialized fields DoD may not possess. DoD relies on contractors to fill a particular need and then lets them go when services are no longer needed.<sup>118</sup> As mentioned in Chapter 4, this keeps the costs down as the bureaucracy evaluates whether the new program fills a new long-term requirement and requires developing an in-house program.

The use of contractors has its benefits, but it also has costs. First, especially in the start-up phase of a program where contractors tend to dominate the program, accountability and oversight for the program may be less as government managers may not be able to fully evaluate what the contractor is providing. The contractor may be performing the task in a different location than the managing agency, or in some instances the contractor may be performing an incompletely defined set of tasks.

Second, relying on contractors to transition a new program to a government staffed program may be antithetical to the contractor’s interest. Most contractors would prefer that the contract be renewed again and again, rather than contributing to ensuring that their contract positions become new government jobs. For a program to mature, government leadership must provide oversight and develop the policies and processes that enable the program to become a fully integrated government program of record. In general, such oversight and policy decisions must be made by government officials. Ensuring success of an emerging program also requires investing early in staffing the program’s management with government civilians.

---

<sup>118</sup> Congressional Research Service Report, *Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis*, R40764, Moshe Schwartz, 14 December 2009, p. 2.

### **The HTS Start-up Experience: "Catastrophic Success"**

The HTS Program grew out of a war-time operational need in two theaters. The program almost immediately "went live" from an untested proof of concept plan developed in 2006 and once it became operational the OPTEMPO for both the field teams and the PM Office was extremely high. As a consequence, the HTS program was never able to develop plans and take time to properly define its mission, design the training program, and develop doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) before it expanded. In the words of the former HTS Project Manager the program suffered from "catastrophic success."<sup>119</sup>

The specific problem for HTS resulting from this "catastrophic success" is that it made it very difficult to recruit qualified personnel in time and to provide them with a fully developed training program. Federal regulations and the DoD funding process also constrained the ability to rapidly hire the support staff needed for the expanding program.

### **Program Genesis**

The initial plan was to deploy five test teams. Under this concept, HTS would gather data on those teams which would then be used to define the HTS mission and develop doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). This concept plan was presented to Army and Marine Divisions in Afghanistan and Iraq and immediately generated Operational Need Statements (ONS) from ten brigades, divisions, and Marine Expeditionary Forces.

By the fall of 2006, the program was only fifty-percent funded. This was only enough to produce one team, which was deployed to the 82nd Airborne in Afghanistan in February 2007. Thereafter, HTS began to recruit and train the four other teams.

The first team appeared to have immediate success, and by the next month multiple Operational Need Statements (ONS) were sent to CENTCOM by units in theater. CENTCOM produced its Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) requesting a total of twenty six teams. At the same time, CENTCOM asked that the four remaining teams then being trained be made into five teams and sent to Baghdad by August of that year.<sup>120</sup> The HTS program complied with the request.

The demand for more teams continues. As illustrated in Table 6-1 below, filling the COCOM requests for 2010 would require a total of 35 teams and a further expansion to 41 in 2011. The US Army is now considering requesting HTTs for battalion level

---



<sup>119</sup> Interview with former project manager, 19 May 2010, Oyster Point.

<sup>120</sup> Update to *HTS Project Overview Brief*, received from Deputy Project Manager, HTS, 30 June 2010.

commands for one brigade combat team. Supporting the Army in this way would require an additional 4 teams in 2012, bringing the total to 45. If the concept of HTTs at the battalion level is validated and applied to all units in theater, it has the potential to further expand the need for HTTs by a factor of 3 or 4.

Other COCOMs are also interested in fielding an HTS program. In August 2008, the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTFHOA) requested an overview brief of the program so that it could draft its own JUONS. The HOA Area of Responsibility (AOR) may require HTS to modify its current model perhaps using the SSRA as the essential component to research and collect data to assess which insurgencies may become critical threats. Interagency coordination is still evolving.<sup>121</sup>

Table 6-1<sup>122</sup>: Current and Projected Numbers of Deployed Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;">  <div style="text-align: center;"> <h2 style="margin: 0;">Afghanistan and Iraq Missions</h2> <h3 style="margin: 0;">Current and Projected Numbers of Deployed Teams</h3> </div>  </div>						
<i>Human Terrain System</i>						
	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012
<b>AFGHANISTAN</b>						
BN LEVEL HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS						+4***
HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS (HTTs)	4	6	9	16	23	
HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS TEAMS (HTATs)	1	2	6	7	7	
THEATER COORDINATION ELEMENT (TCE)	0	1	1	1	1	
<b>SUBTOTAL:</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31**</b>	
<b>IRAQ</b>						
HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS (HTTs)	16	10	10	8	6	
HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS TEAMS (HTATs)	4	4	3	3	2	
THEATER COORDINATION ELEMENT (TCE)	1	1	1	1	1	
<b>SUBTOTAL:</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9***</b>	<b>TBD****</b>
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24*</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>40</b>	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p><i>Source of HTS Team Reqts:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. CENTCOM JUONS 0197</li> <li>2. NATO/ISAF FRAGO</li> <li>3. SUPPORTING RFFs</li> </ol> </div> <div> <p><b>NOTES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* During FY09, highest deployed number of teams was 28 (21 Iraq + 7 Afghanistan). Due to drawdown in Iraq in FY09, we ended the year with 24 total deployed.</li> <li>** Includes addl rqmts based on 30K increase</li> <li>*** 4 Bn level HTTs for first E-BCT</li> <li>****Pending theater guidance &amp; implementation schedule</li> </ul> </div> </div>						

18

<sup>121</sup> HTS Program Over Brief, 19 May 2010.

<sup>122</sup> Update to HTS Program Overview Brief, 30 June 2010, slide 18.



## **Factor 2: Dependence on Contractors and Difficulties with Contract Management**

The HTS program could not have gotten off the ground without contractors. However, the heavy reliance on contractors without a requisite increase in government civilians for oversight and policy responsibilities, created management difficulties and limited the integration and maturation of the program within TRADOC.

- All HTS teams deployed from August 2007 until April 2009 were contractors.
- As Table 2-4 repeated here illustrates, until very recently there were no DACs managing the HTS directorates in CONUS. Two managers were finally converted to DACs in June 2010. As of 18 June 2010 58 percent of HTS CONUS based project personnel were contractors.<sup>123</sup>

Table 2-4 HTS Director's Personnel Status

<b>Directorate</b>	<b>Director's personnel status</b>
Operations	Military
Training	Civilian (from contractor to DAC as of June 2010)
Human Resources	Military
Reachback Research Center	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
Social Science	Civilian (from IPA to DAC as of June 2010)
Knowledge Management	Contractor (pending conversion to DAC)
COCOM LNO	Military

### **Consequences of Heavy Reliance on Contractors**

A limitation of contractors in supervisory roles in the HTS program noted in Chapter 2 is that they cannot supervise government civilians or military working for the program. This creates an odd hierarchy, where the manager oversees the people, but cannot evaluate them. In addition, the DACs and military cannot discuss contractual issues with the contractors. If there is an issue with performance of a contractor, but the director of that part of the HTS program also is a contractor, the DACs and military within that directorate would not be able to discuss the issue with him or her. In such a case, that issue would have to go up the chain of command to another military or DAC manager. With so many contractors holding management positions in HTS, it became difficult to supervise the program effectively and monitor the principal contract supporting the program. This kind of "on again off again" management can also undermine authority in the chain of command.

---

<sup>123</sup> In June 2010, HTS program staff in CONUS consisted of 59 military personnel, 7 DACs, and 90 contractors. See table 4-2.

As the HTS program began to mature, there was a greater need for civilian leadership within program management to improve the relationship with the TRADOC and to integrate all aspects of the program (budgeting, contracting, and HR). Only TRADOC G2 had the authority to hire civilians for the HTS program, and controlled the process of converting the management positions within the program. Not only were contactors filling key positions in the PM, but they were also being used by TRADOC G2 to do budgeting, HR, and contract management.<sup>124</sup> During our research, we learned that the Project Manager was still not a DAC after nearly four years in the position.

Members of the HTS PM staff interpret TRADOC's slow transition of contractor managers in the HTS program to DACs as part of the process new programs have to endure before they become more permanent programs.<sup>125</sup>

### **Contract Management**

There are a number of federal, DoD, and TRADOC regulations pertaining to contract oversight and performance of the HTS program that it appears TRADOC should be implementing. We briefly describe these regulations below.

#### **1. Federal and DoD Oversight Contract Regulations**

- DFARS Regulation Subpart 201.6 "Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities", describes the responsibilities of the Contracting Officer Representative (COR). The COR assists in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract. The COR must be a government employee, qualified by training and experience.
  - DFARS 201.602-2, "Responsibilities," also states that COR responsibilities must be in writing and that the responsibilities cannot be re delegated. For that reason, the contracting officer is expected to appoint a properly trained COR.<sup>126</sup>
- FAR Part 46, "Quality Assurance," states that the contract administration office must maintain suitable records reflecting the nature of government contract quality assurance actions and decisions regarding the acceptability of products, processes, and requirements, as well as actions to correct defects. It also states that

---

<sup>124</sup> Phone Interview with HTS PMO Chief of Staff, 1 July 2010.

<sup>125</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2010, Oyster Point; follow-up interviews with Deputy Project Manager, 1 June 2010 and interview with Chief of Staff, HTS PMO, 1 July 2010.

<sup>126</sup> *Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform*, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. D-2010-059, May 14, 2010, p. 17, accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy10/10-059.pdf>

government contract quality assurance assessments (referred in the FAR as QASPs) will be performed when necessary to determine whether services meet contract requirements. QASPs should be prepared in conjunction with the preparation of the statement of work. The plans should specify all work requiring surveillance and the method of surveillance.<sup>127</sup>

We discovered that there was some confusion between HTS and TRADOC regarding COR responsibilities. According to two interviews, TRADOC G2 OPS indicated to HTS leadership that it retained COR responsibilities. Subsequent research revealed that COR responsibilities actually resided with the Federal Acquisition Service within Government Services Administration, in Washington, D.C.<sup>128</sup> Clear specification and communications of oversight and contract responsibilities could eliminate confusion and inefficiencies in the future.

## **2. TRADOC Regulations**

In January 2009, TRADOC announced their program for conducting the oversight of contracts. Regulation 5-14 dated 5 January 2009 announced the Acquisition Management and Oversight (AMO) program as TRADOC's new review and approval process for all contracts. According to Reg. 5-14, the AMO program establishes a standardized set of business rules and processes for the command and at the same time meets the acquisition oversight and inventory requirements set forth by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2008, as well as related DoD and Army implementing guidance. The regulation does not specify what office within TRADOC implements the AMO, however CNA interprets that it is the responsibility of the COR to carry out the business rules and processes specified in the AMO.<sup>129</sup> Even without further insight into the specifics of the AMO, CNA interprets the AMO business rules and processes as including monitoring the spending patterns of the contract.

Reg. 5-14 contains a clear and traceable process for TRADOC to evaluate the performance of a contract.<sup>130</sup> Figure 6-2 below maps out the steps TRADOC CORs and General Services Administration (GSA) Contract Managers would take to fulfill their oversight obligations.

---

<sup>127</sup> Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform, op.cit. p.15.


<sup>128</sup> Discussion with former HTS PM 20 May 2010, Oyster Point; follow up with HTS Chief of Staff, 1 and 19 July 2010.

<sup>129</sup> See TRADOC Regulation 5-14, 5 January 2009, accessed at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/r5-14.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> See TRADOC Regulation 5-14, 5 January 2009, accessed at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/r5-14.pdf>



Figure 6-2: TRADOC Acquisition and Management Oversight Contract Review



### 3. Other TRADOC Regulations

According to TRADOC Memorandum 36-2 of 19 December 2007, the Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) office is responsible for implementing TRADOC's internal audits and for responding to external audits.<sup>131</sup> IRAC also may have responsibility for carrying out the AMO (see #4a below), but it is clear from the IRAC

<sup>131</sup> See Staff Procedures for Audits Conducted by External Audit Agencies, TRADOC Memorandum 36-2, 19 December 2007, accessed at [www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/memos/m36-2.pdf](http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/memos/m36-2.pdf).

website that the office has full responsibility for carrying out all internal audits and facilitating and responding to all external assessments.

### Internal Audits

According to the IRAC website, the office provides the following services:

1. **FULL SCOPE REVIEWS** – Provide an in-depth evaluation of an activity, function, mission, or project. Review scope is broad and usually the most informative and time consuming.
2. **CONSULTING AND ADVISORY SERVICES** – Provide other services such as studies, analyses, information gathering, cost analysis, internal control reviews, and various consulting services.
3. **QUICK REACTION REVIEWS** – Address specific time-sensitive critical issues. Can usually provide the commander or management an answer in a matter of days.
4. **INTERNAL REVIEWS** – Internal reviews can identify specific problems, the cause of the problems, the impact of problems on operations, and recommendations to correct the problems. Internal reviews are based on review objectives that usually include one or more of the following criteria:
  - a. Compliance with laws and regulations.
  - b. Financial operations.
  - c. Economy and efficiency.
  - d. Program results.
5. **LIAISON AND COMPLIANCE SERVICES** – Serve as command's liaison with external audit organizations. Monitor and track external audit activity within the command, facilitate the audit reply process, and conduct follow-up reviews.

As far as we can determine, the TRADOC IRAC office has conducted one audit of the HTS program. This report focused largely on contract oversight and was completed in May 2010. CNA learned of the report from the Director of TRADOC's Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) which oversees many of the HTS program aspects at Fort Leavenworth and is responsible directly to the TRADOC G2.<sup>132</sup> We include an official brief of the audit in Appendix G.

### **Contract Management and HTS**

---

<sup>132</sup> TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), a TRADOC G2 subordinate and Fort Leavenworth tenant, is a key member of the CAC team. TRISA is comprised of Threats, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS), Human Terrain System (HTS), and Wargaming and Experimentation. TRISA provides threat and operational environment analysis to CAC in supporting live-virtual-constructive training, leader development, and concept development through a variety of CAC venues, such as the battalion and brigade Pre-Command Course, FA 30 Course, COIN seminar and UFMCS' Red Team University. Accessed at [www.militarynewcomers.com/FTLEAVENWORTH/resources/02\\_mission.html](http://www.militarynewcomers.com/FTLEAVENWORTH/resources/02_mission.html).



In an effort to better understand TRADOC's oversight of HTS principal contractor – BAE systems, CNA posed a list of questions to TRADOC G2 OPS. Specifically, CNA inquired about what kind of oversight was done by whom.<sup>133</sup> As of this writing, we have not yet received a response.

In our interviews with HTS officials, however, we detected several indications of potential problems with the management of the BAE contract (we refer to them as “potential problems” because we not have ample data to make a full evaluation). These indications appear to fall within three areas: 1) managing the contract 2) recruiting candidates, and 3) monitoring the budget for the HTS program.

Thus far, using the data we've received to date, CNA has not seen clear evidence to indicate that TRADOC reviewed the BAE contract using the process it developed and in accordance with the federal and DoD regulations. It would take several people to implement the process described in Figure 6-2 above and we were not able to identify any officials that took part in such a process. A similar finding was reached in the recent IRAC office audit of the HTS contract.<sup>134</sup>

As the managing organization for the entire HTS program, TRADOC G2 is the responsible agent for managing and reviewing the contract and overseeing the performance of the contractors it hired. While further investigation is required into this issue, CNA was not able to identify processes and procedures that TRADOC G2 implemented to ensure that it was effectively managing, reviewing, and overseeing the performance of the contractors it hired.

Based on our examination of HTS assessments and use of metrics in chapter 3, it appears that TRADOC G2 did not use these assessments to evaluate contract-related issues. HTS conducted numerous assessments of its operations over the last four years and TRADOC personnel participated in the initial 2007 assessment, but did not take the lead in managing the HTS Program Development Teams. When TRADOC G2 assigned an individual from its own “Devil's Advocate” staff to be in charge of an assessment of the program (between 2/2008 and 5/2009) no assessment trips to HTS operational locations were taken. Eventually, the HTS Project Manager reassumed control of the program.

---

<sup>133</sup> CNA submitted list of questions to TRADOC G2 OPS, 28 June 2010. CNA followed up with a phone call to TRADOC G2 OPS who was unavailable. CNA left a message with an administrative assistant requesting a response to the questions. Similarly, TRADOC G2 OPS personnel did not make themselves available to discuss TRADOC interactions with BAE with CNA on 6/21/2010 and 6/22/2010.

<sup>134</sup> The inquiry by the IRAC office was initiated after TRADOC learned of the CDA requirement. The IRAC report on HTS United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance, Review of Human Terrain System, May 2010. A brief of this internal assessment is reproduced here in Appendix G.



Finally, we do not know the extent to which TRADOC G2 was involved in requesting the assessments or in receiving the results, but we observe in Chapter 3 that there was certainly no formal process between HTS PM and TRADOC G2 for implementing the suggestions/conclusions reached in the assessments. We also observe that the informal process resulted in changes in the program or program management and not in the areas that were the responsibility of TRADOC G2, namely contract oversight, human resources, and personnel recruiting and hiring.

### **Management of BAE Contract**

CNA has identified two indications of possible problems with management of the BAE contract:

First, there appears to have been some confusion with regard to who was the Contract Representative (COR) for the contract. When CNA inquired about the management of the BAE contract, the HTS PM staff indicated that TRADOC G2 OPS managed all aspects of the contract. Until a problem with the HTS budget surfaced in late 2008, the PM staff believed the Director of TRADOC G2 OPS was the official COR for the BAE contract. The relationship between the PM staff and TRADOC G2 OPS was based on these guidelines for four years. CNA later confirmed this relationship in discussions with the Director of TRADOC G2 OPS.<sup>135</sup> When a severe problem occurred with the expenditure rate of the HTS budget requiring stop gap funding in late 2008 (discussed below in Monitoring the Budget), the HTS staff learned that TRADOC G2 OPS actually serves as the "technical representative" for the COR and that the actual COR for the BAE contract was a government civilian for the Federal Acquisition Service with the Government Services Administration in Washington, D.C.<sup>136</sup> It appears that the Director of TRADOC G2 OPS may not have effectively communicated its oversight role.<sup>137</sup>

Second, TRADOC G2 OPS appears to have delegated budget responsibilities for the BAE contract to a BAE contractor. If this is indeed the case, it indicates a potential problem: we question the appropriateness of having a contractor from the contracting

---

<sup>135</sup> CNA did not directly use the term "COR" in discussions with TRADOC G2 OPS. We simply asked who was responsible for overseeing the BAE contract. The Director of TRADOC G2 OPS indicated they were the responsible party. At no point in the discussion was anyone else mentioned as having responsibility.

<sup>136</sup> This is in contrast to what HTS PMO had been told and the work relationship and practices that were in place between PMO and TRADOC G2 OPS. Discussion with former HTS Project Manager 20 May 2010 and follow up conversation with HTS Chief of Staff, 1 July 2010.

<sup>137</sup> According to HTS Personnel, the Director of G2 OPS did not convey the correct information about who the actual COR was to the HTS Project Manager, nor to the PM staff.

organization on the TRADOC G2 OPS staff monitoring the contract.<sup>138</sup> We were told that that contractor has recently been made a DAC (June 2010).<sup>139</sup>

### **Recruiting**

As explained in Chapter 4, there have been multiple problems with BAE's recruiting practices. Many candidates for HTS teams sent for training at Fort Leavenworth simply had not been screened properly or misunderstood the nature of the job they were hired to do. As the PMO manager was an IPA he did not have the authority to oversee the contract, interact with the recruiters, or provide formal input in assessing contract performance.<sup>140</sup> Several members of the PMO staff noted that the BAE contract requirements were very general and that there were no specific performance requirements that would make it easier to evaluate the contract performance.<sup>141</sup> The PMO manager notified the Contract Representative within TRADOC G2 OPS of the problems and recommended making the contract obligations more specific when it came up for renewal in 2009.<sup>142</sup> In September 2009, BAE was awarded the contract again. Apparently, the new contract has no additional clarification, and had been given additional tasks to provide for the HTS program.<sup>143</sup>

### **Monitoring the Budget**

As noted above, it appears that problems resulted with regard to the contract's expenditure rate. These directly impacted HTS operations. In December 2008, HTS PMO discovered that the BAE contract was at risk of hitting the "ceiling" established within TRADOC's Core budget. According to HTS PM staff this resulted in a shutdown of training of new HTS teams for four months (December 2008-March 2009). The actual contract COR had regular contact with TRADOC G2 OPS regarding the contract expenditure rate, but according the HTS PMO did not communicate this

---

<sup>138</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2010, Ft. Monroe and follow up discussions with the Chief of Staff, HTS PMO, 1 July 2010.

<sup>139</sup> Meeting Notes 19 May 2010, Ft. Monroe, and follow up discussion with the Chief of Staff, HTS PMO, 1 July 2010.

<sup>140</sup> CNA obtained a copy of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) determination that IPAs detailed to TRADOC could not perform "inherently government functions." The SJA paper notes that there is no "inclusive" list of what is considered "inclusive government functions" and therefore could not rule against TRADOC G2's OPS view that contract management was such a function. See "Memorandum for Colonel John Moore, ACof S, Fort Munroe, Performance of Inherently Governmental Function by Personnel Working for TRADOC under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act" 19 April 2010, in Appendix I.

<sup>141</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2010, Oyster Point, VA.

<sup>142</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2010, Oyster Point, VA; interviews with former HTS Project Manager to Director G2 OPS, Director TRISA, TRADOC G2 16 and 17 August 2009.

<sup>143</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 and 20 May 2010, Oyster Point, VA; The IRAC report on HTS United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance, Review of Human Terrain System, May 2010



information along so that the funding problem could be avoided.<sup>144</sup> CNA was able to track down the Justification and Approval document with TRADOC's official explanation. It states:

The contract "experienced a much higher than originally anticipated usage rate since original award in July 2008. This resulted from a higher than anticipated demand" for HTS personnel. "The influx of this unanticipated personnel increase drove up personnel and other direct costs at a much faster expenditure rate than projected for the balance of the G2 Core requirement on Task Order 08-037."<sup>145</sup>

We received a different explanation from TRADOC G2 OPS about the ceiling issue:

HTS Training was never shut down due to contract ceiling issues. In FY09, a disruption in training occurred as a result of Congressional action. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) validated HTS FY09 funding requirements, but the HTS FY09 appropriation was killed in Congress without prejudice. This resulted in a requirement to initiate a reprogramming action in the year of execution within Army. HTS went before the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) to seek FY09 funding, and FY09 funding of HTS was approved by the AR2B in February 2009, 5 months into FY09. This delayed funding in FY09 resulted in a cancellation of four HTS training cycles with scheduled start dates in December 2008 through March 2009. This four-month disruption in training cycles resulted from Congressional action, not contract ceiling issues.<sup>146</sup>

CNA has not been able to validate either explanation in time to include our assessment of this particular issue, but wanted to note the event because of the large consequences it had on the program.

### **TRADOC Oversight Problems Similar to Other DoD Programs**

According to several recent U.S. Government assessments of contracts in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, TRADOC G2 OPS is not unique in its difficulty of complying with FAR and DFARS regulations to other DoD agencies.<sup>147</sup> Problems identified in a 2006 GAO report on oversight problems of contractors supporting

---

<sup>144</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 and 20 May 2010, Oyster Point and follow up phone interview with Chief of Staff, PMO, HTS Program, 1 and 7 July 2010. CNA did not contact the contract COR at Ft. Huachuaca to verify this viewpoint.

<sup>145</sup> Justification Review For Other Than Full and Open Competition, Contract W91260-06-D-0005, accessed [https://acquisition.army.mil/asfi/justification\\_file\\_viewer.cfm?Seq\\_Nbr=1156&FILE\\_NAME=J%26A.pdf&FILE\\_EXTENSION=pdf](https://acquisition.army.mil/asfi/justification_file_viewer.cfm?Seq_Nbr=1156&FILE_NAME=J%26A.pdf&FILE_EXTENSION=pdf).

<sup>146</sup> Information provided by, TRADOC G2 OPS, 7 July 2010.

<sup>147</sup> Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. D-2010-059, May 14, 2010, accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy10/10-059.pdf>; GAO Report GAO-07-145, Military Operations: High Level DoD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, Dec. 2006; GAO Report GAO-08-436T, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other Actions Needed to Improve DoD's Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future Operations, 24 January 2008; GAO Report, Military Operations, DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency Operations, September 2008, accessed at [www.gao.gov/new.items/d081087.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081087.pdf).



deployed U.S. military forces note some of the same problems discussed above.<sup>148</sup> TRADOC's own findings on oversight problems with the BAE contract can be found in TRADOC's Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC) brief that accompanies this report in Appendix G.

### **Factor 3: Ill-Fitting Regulation Issues**

The rapid demand for HTTs has posed a challenge for recruiting, training, and the need for additional support staff. As noted above, it appears that issues related to recruiting can be traced back to TRADOC and the contract with BAE Systems. However, even if recruiting efforts were successful in identifying and hiring sufficient numbers of qualified candidates, the training staff and PMO staff needed to produce and manage the expansion appears to be constrained by an outdated concept of operations and the corresponding Table of Distribution and Authorization (TDA).<sup>149</sup>

#### **TDA and JUONS Limitations**

The lengthy funding authorization process conflicts with the changing nature of war-time requirements. While the JUONS transmitted war-time needs to the military services, the TDA authorization process has not been correspondingly adapted, and there was no transition plan to meet or support the demand. It was left to the HTS Project Office to fix the shortfalls that resulted in staffing and funding. The process resulted in extended reliance on contracts to fill the staff authorization gap during a time when the program structure needed to mature.

---

<sup>148</sup> The GAO report found:

Too few contract oversight personnel precluded DoD from obtaining reasonable assurance that contractors were meeting contract requirements.

DoD made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite facing many of the same difficulties managing contractors in Iraq that it faced in prior military operations.

Lessons learned on the use of contractor support at deployed locations were not routinely gathered and shared; and

- Improvements had not been made to include more information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment training.

See *Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform*, op.cit., p. ; GAO Report GAO-07-145, as cited in James Terry, "Privatizing Defense Support Operations: The Need to Improve DoD's Oversight and Management", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, 2010, pp. 4-5.

<sup>149</sup> Every organization and activity within the U.S. Army must have an authorization document to reflect an organizational structure supportable by manning and equipping systems. An authorization document states a unit's approved structure and resources and is the basis and authority for requisitioning. Every staff has a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) or a table of distribution and allowances (TDA), or a combination of both that authorizes the staff. MTOEs and TDAs are determined by the unit's mission, environment, or other factors.

An MTOE is a unit's wartime authorization document. TDAs are generally non-combat, non-deployable workload based units. AUGTDAs are augmentation table of distribution and allowances units. See Basis for Staff Organization, extracted from *Field Manual 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations, 31 May 1997, accessed at [http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/simcenter/staff\\_organization.htm](http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/simcenter/staff_organization.htm)

The structure and organization of the HTS program is based on the development and deployment of the first experimental team and a concept of operations plan drafted in April 2007. USCENTCOM's Joint Universal Operational Needs Statements (JUONS) signed in April 2007 which requested the 26 teams provided the basis to develop a TDA for the organization. The 26 team TDA was approved two years later in April 2009. Three years later, this TDA still drives the structure of the organization of the HTS program constraining the ability of TRADOC G2 and the HTS PMO to provide training and manage the program with an ever expanding demand for HTS teams in theater.

This is not uncommon among military programs. Due to the high number of programs and offices that have to "sign off" on the TDA, the normal processing time for TDA approval is two years. As the military is under a "force cap," the HTS Program has to compete against other military organizations that already have an established work force. The HTS Program has to in effect "borrow" billets from other military organizations. Once the TDA is approved, the funding does not appear in the Department of the Army Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) for another two years.<sup>150</sup> New programs need to have some way to pay for themselves in the four years it takes to become part of the POM.

There are a number of factors that determine the TDAs structure and corresponding staffing. According to TRADOC Regulation 570-4, the HTS PMO should have been able to work with TRADOC G2 to review the program's TDA and augment it according to changes in demand and as the mission for the HTS program became clearer.<sup>151</sup> The former HTS Project Manager indicated to CNA that he was warned by TRADOC G2 against augmenting the TDA while it was being processed in 2008 and 2009 even though the additional recruiting, training, management and down range support was needed to fulfill official COCOM requests for additional teams. Augmenting a TDA in process "stops the clock" which results in lengthening the time before the POM funding arrives.<sup>152</sup>

### **Implications of U.S. Security Agreements (SOFA) with the Government of Iraq**

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed with the Government of Iraq in December 2008 had strong implications for HTS team members deployed in theatre.

---

<sup>150</sup> The POM is the culmination of the programming process within the Department of Defense, the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) displays the resource allocation decisions of the Military Departments in response to and in accordance with Defense Guidance. DOD Manual 7110.1 paragraph 38, accessed at <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/basic/man4.html>

<sup>151</sup> "Manpower and Equipment Control: Management of Civilian Manpower," TRADOC Regulation 570-4, 4 August 2005, accessed at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/rcgs/r570-4.pdf>

<sup>152</sup> Interview with former HTS Project Manager, 20 May 2010.



The rapid implementation of the SOFA wreaked havoc on the HTS program because it essentially required members of deployed teams to be converted very quickly from contractors to DACs.

Under SOFA, all defense contractors on duty in Iraq would be fully subject to the legal jurisdiction of the Iraqi Government. Being subject to legal jurisdiction required submitting all visa information to the Iraqi Government. Visa applications contain details such as disclosure of the location of any family residing in the country. This requirement would expose a number of HTS employees who were Iraqi Americans with family still in Iraq to potential threats from warring insurgent factions who may have discovered the connections between members of an American civil-military program and family members in Iraq.<sup>153</sup>

DoD and the Department of the Army responded quickly with the waivers needed to “fast track” HTS contractors down range to U.S. Government employees.<sup>154</sup> The conversion process would be done by Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), consistent with federal government regulations.

TRADOC G2 supported the conversion with one person to answer critical questions about the transition including rate of pay and benefits and provide official support to the teams for the conversion.<sup>155</sup> The one person was quickly overwhelmed by prospective transitioning personnel contacting TRADOC G2 from Iraq and Afghanistan who were being told they would receive less pay for the job they were currently doing and that they had only one month to decide and file the necessary paperwork. Other team members were upset when they found they could not be qualified for their current position according to the Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSAs) associated with the job requirements of their new government positions.<sup>156</sup>

CNA learned that the HTS PMO developed Position Descriptions and KSAs based on the experience of fielding teams for two years. These position descriptions were submitted to TRADOC G2 OPS for use in the conversion process. However, these were not the position descriptions used by CPAC to qualify HTS team members who were already deployed in Iraq. Instead, CPAC appears to have relied on KSAs derived from intelligence specialist position descriptions. Many HTS team members serving in Iraq at the time had no intelligence experience. As noted in Chapter 4, HTS lost

---

<sup>153</sup> Meeting with TRADOC G2 OPS, 20 May 2009, Fort Munroe

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> CNA requested information from G2 OPS on how many HTS teams members were deployed at the time of the implementation of the SOFA for Iraq, and whether the conversion to DAC was being applied to all deployable HTS personnel or just to those who were in Iraq at the time and would be going to Iraq. As of the writing of this report, we have not yet received this information.

<sup>156</sup> Meeting with HTS Chief of Staff and TRADOC G2 OPS, 20 May 2009, Fort Munroe



about 30 percent of the team personnel either because they did not qualify under the new government criteria or because they chose to resign rather than accept the offer to convert to DACs.

We were told that TRADOC G2 OPS ultimately allowed HTS to provide two reservists from their own staff to assist G2 OPS with the human resource issues associated with conversion and with other administrative problems of deployed HTS team members.<sup>157</sup> In the end, it appears that the limited staff support available from TRADOC and HTS may have contributed to the high attrition rate of HTS contract employees following the implementation of the SOFA.

### **Timecards**

One of the largest administrative challenges of the HTS program has been providing guidance to deployed HTS team members on how to fill out federal government time cards. According to several HTS staff members and TRADOC G2 OPS, time cards were frequently rejected and returned to team members with questions regarding the accuracy of their recorded work hours. Managers questioned how team members could work the multiple days with 16 plus hours of work recorded. While it was clear to those authorizing the time cards that a standard 40 hour work week was unrealistic in a war zone, managers needed to verify what the work tempo was to validate the time recorded. The work schedule was defined by Battalion Commanders the teams were attached to, not by HTS or TRADOC managers. But due to their oversight responsibilities, CONUS-based managers needed to regularly review the timecards to make sure the hours recorded were consistent with the work schedule. Over time, this relationship created tensions as many HTS team members did not appreciate the challenges they encountered and the need to validate their work days.<sup>158</sup>

At a minimum, there needs to be sufficient training and perhaps a clearer understanding of the work expectations provided to HTS team members before they deploy and to the managers approving the timecards.

After the conversion to DACs, a secondary problem related to timecards occurred when HTS teams were deployed for longer than the normal 6-9 months. HTS teams in the field had to account for their time according to standard Office of Personnel Management timecard regulations. DACs were subject to a pay cap which limited total pay, overtime and comp time to \$234,000 per year. If the DAC reached the cap, they could no longer work overtime or accrue comp time. However, deployed HTS teams were under the authority of the U.S. military command and were subject to the work

---

<sup>157</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2009, Oyster Point.

<sup>158</sup> Meeting Notes 19 and 20 May, Oyster Point and follow up interview with HTS Chief of Staff, 8 July 2010.

schedule defined by the Battalion Commanders or Division Commanders directly overseeing the HTS teams. A conflict zone cannot be easily broken into work time and time off. The commander relies on the HTS team to provide operationally relevant information regardless of vacation, sickness, or pay caps. Timecards and consequent pay caps limited the support certain HTS team members could provide to their commanders in the field.

### **Permanent Duty Station**

Another administrative challenge has been the Office of Personnel Management's process for determining an employee's permanent duty station. HTS team members start out as contractors when they begin their training at Fort Leavenworth. Once qualified by CPAC and if they complete their training successfully, they become DACs in temporary positions. Their permanent duty station becomes Fort Leavenworth. When they return home after being deployed to theater, they return to Fort Leavenworth to out process, or to their homes (all over the country) for leave, or for sick leave. If they remain with HTS and return to theater, they must go through refresher training at Fort Leavenworth. However, as their permanent duty station is Fort Leavenworth, they are not reimbursed for travel expenses incurred in order to take part in the required training.<sup>159</sup> This regulation appears to be generating significant resentment among HTS employees. If this regulation begins contributing to attrition among qualified HTS personal, it is a regulation that needs to be adjusted to meet the specific requirements of the HTS program.

### **Considering TRADOC's Role as HTS Host Organization**

Given the scale and scope of some of the challenges HTS has faced, it may be worthwhile to raise the issue of whether TRADOC was a good fit to be the parent organization for the HTS program. We see two potential reasons to do so:

First, the HTS program is largely an operational program with a training component designed to meet an immediate war-time requirement residing within TRADOC, the Army's premier institutional training organization.

TRADOC's mission is to:

- Transform recruits into soldiers
- Develop adaptive leaders
- Identify and integrate comprehensive solutions for today and tomorrow's Army, and
- Maximize institutional learning and adaptation.<sup>160</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup> Meeting Notes, 19 May 2009, Oyster Point and 20 May 2009, Fort Monroe.

<sup>160</sup> See TRADOC home page and mission statement at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm>

While TRADOC manages the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC), a program that supports the Joint IED Defeat Organization in Iraq and Afghanistan, *it does not tend to field operational programs into conflict areas.*<sup>161</sup> Therefore, we raise the issue that while TRADOC is most likely well positioned to support the training aspects associated with creating HTTS, it may not be so with regard to many of the administrative needs required to support a program with such a significant operational component.

Second, there appears to be ample evidence that the HTS program has struggled in several areas and that TRADOC has not always provided a successful solution to HTS problems. Unfortunately, given our time constraints and incomplete data from TRADOC, we are not in a position to make conclusions on this issue. As a result, further research would be required to fully understand what has occurred. It could be that TRADOC's OPTEMPO and institutional culture simply may have been at odds with the kind of institutional support the HTS program needed (again, particularly given the focus on operational support required for HTS to be successful). Or it could have been any number of other reasons.

With regard to this issue, we conclude that it is worthwhile to conduct additional exploration to verify whether there has indeed been inadequate support from TRADOC in these areas, and if that proves to be the case, a further consideration of the broader question of whether TRADOC is suitable to house the HTS program.

## **CNA Findings and Conclusions of CDA Element 6**

As a new, innovative program trying to establish itself quickly within a large bureaucracy, HTS has faced many of the challenges and problems of other DoD programs in recent years. In particular, three factors seem to have caused challenges for HTS:

- 1.) Program start-up costs
- 2.) Dependence on contractors and the difficulties of contract management
- 3.) Existing/long-standing federal and DoD regulations that are ill-fitted to today's war-fighting environment.

---

<sup>161</sup> TRADOC is also tasked as the Program Manager of the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC). The JTCOIC prepares soldiers, leaders, and staff in using the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) resources in the conflict zones. (<http://www.tradoc.army.mil/about.htm>)



Although there may be others, we identified six specific problems or challenges that have faced the HTS program as a result of one, or some combination of the factors listed above:

1. The recruiting of unqualified team members
2. High rates of attrition of HTS team members deployed during conversion to DAC
3. Contract ceiling was reached and HTS operations were halted
4. Timecard problems
5. Determining permanent duty station/no TDY pay for DACS for time spent at Ft Leavenworth
6. HTS program management

Some of these problems are also the result of regulatory or policy issues, which we have noted in our discussions.

Our examination of the problems and challenges effecting HTS raise some specific issues with regard to the program's relationship to its parent organization, TRADOC.

Based on our feedback from our interviews with HTS personnel, there appear to be several areas where TRADOC support for HTS has been cited as being inadequate, they are:

- I. The lack of a detailed budget for HTS to manage
- II. Contract management and HR within TRADOC G2
- III. Inadequate transition rate of key HTS management positions to government civilian positions given HTS OP TEMPO.

With regard to contract management, specifically TRADOC has developed processes to oversee and evaluate contracts, conduct internal audits and reviews, and respond to external audits, but CNA is not able to determine if G2 OPS has implemented those processes. However, CNA is able to conclude that TRADOC appears not to have integrated the processes into its standard operating procedures. We conclude that if this had been the case and the BAE contract had received the oversight defined by TRADOC's own process and documents, it is possible the problems mentioned above may have been fewer and less severe.

That said, many of the problems discussed in this chapter are starting to become less severe. TRADOC and HTS have taken several steps in the last few months to redress some of the problems indicated above. For example TRADOC has recognized the need to reduce the number of contractors managing the program. Others, such as contract oversight issues, recently have been the subject of TRADOC internal audits, and hopefully will be resolved by TRADOC in the very near future.

It is also important to note that some of the problems with the program identified in this chapter are beyond the scope of TRADOC's ability to resolve by itself. Such as:

- Problems resulting from federal government regulations such as requiring timecards for HTS employees while deployed
- The consequences of establishing a permanent duty station at Fort Leavenworth for deploying employees
- The consequences of slow federal hiring practices or understaffing and
- The lengthy DoD authorizations and funding process may constrain some programs requested by the U.S. military fighting in two theaters.

## **Appendix A: HTS Personnel CNA Interviewed for Assessment**

CNA met with and/or communicated with over the phone or email with the following people for our assessment. In general, we interacted with individuals multiple times. The first interaction was typically to request information with follow up meetings/conversations to ask specific questions about that information.

1. HTS project manager
2. HTS deputy project manager
3. TRADOC G2 director
4. TRADOC G2 director XO
5. TRADOC G2 director of operations
6. OUSDI representative
7. TRADOC representative
8. HTS Chief of Staff
9. TRISA director
10. TRADOC G2 deputy
11. HTS COCOM director
12. HTS operations directorate director
13. HTS consultant
14. HTS Research Reachback Center Director
15. HTS Knowledge management director
16. HTS social science directorate deputy director
17. HTS training director
18. HTS human resources director
19. HTS social science directorate director
20. HTS social science directorate outreach coordinator
21. HTS knowledge management director
22. Field support manager



23. Senior Engineer
24. HTS knowledge management director
25. MAP-HT trainer
26. MAP-HT trainer
27. Chief, Training and Education Division
28. Director, Project Development
29. HTS OPS, Holding Company
30. HTS, Strategic Plans
31. HTS, Manager Ft. Leavenworth RRC
32. HTS OPS, Pre-deployment and Assignment
33. HTS, Deputy Director, Training Division
34. HTS, Chief of Exercise Division
35. TRADOC G2 OPS
36. TRADOC G2 OPS Human Resources
37. Program Manager, BAE Systems

In addition, CNA conducted semi-structured interviews with commanders and returning commanders from Afghanistan and Iraq. Please see Appendix B for information on these interviews.

## **Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Approach and Data Analysis**

We decided to conduct semi-structured interviews with HTS consumers or "customers," (i.e., commanders who interacted with HTTs/HTATs during their deployment to Afghanistan and/or Iraq and current field commanders) as another source of data for the assessment and to supplement the information we gathered directly from HTS. To accomplish this, we developed a semi-structured interview guide that would provide us the HTS customers' views and perspectives on issues related to the six elements in the CDA. Sample questions included: "What did the HTT do for you? What did they do that was relevant or useful? What was the most effective use of their skills? Where did they fit into the staff structure? How were they managed operationally?"

### **Description of the sample and procedures**

Between May 2010 – June 2010, we interviewed a total of eighteen "customers" of HTS products during 16 interviews (we conducted 15 one-on-one interviews and 1 interview with 3 customers). About half of those we interviewed were Brigade commanders; the others included Battalion commanders, Intel officers and staff at the division level. Five of the interviews included commanders and staff who interacted with the HTT in Afghanistan, 10 interviews included commanders and staff who had interacted with the HTT in Iraq and one interviewee reported that he had interacted with the HTT in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the "customers" interacted with a unique HTT (with the exception of the interview with 3 customers" and 2 interviewees who interacted with the HTT in Afghanistan).

On average, the interviews were less than one hour, but they did range between 30 minutes - 1 hour and 15 minutes. For the most part, the interviewees were very responsive and candid in expressing their opinions. During each interview, the interviewer typed very detailed notes. After the interview the interviewer read through the notes for accuracy. Themes from the interviews were noted by the interviewer and/or an additional team member. Due to the subjective nature of this kind of data, we cross-checked the information, (i.e., themes) to ensure consistency. However, due to time constraints, team members were only able to cross-check half of the interviews. In general the team members agreed on the main messages from the interviews.

### **Interview Questions**

The interview questions are listed in table B-1.

Table B-1. Semi-Structured Interview

<p>1. Background on project – Our goal, our timeline, info given to us to date</p> <p>CNA is conducting an assessment of the Human Terrain System Program. This assessment is in response to a Congressional directive. We are working very closely with the HTS Project Office to coordinate our data collection efforts. This office is aware that we are attempting to interview “customers” of HTT/HTAT products and analysis in theater as part of our assessment.</p> <p>We would like to ask you a series of questions about your experiences with HTTs/HTATs during your deployment.</p> <p>All answers will be kept confidential. We will not be sharing your information outside the five-person assessment team.</p>
<p>2. Background Information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Where were you deployed?</li> <li>b. When were you deployed?</li> <li>c. What was your position?</li> </ul>
<p>3. Contact Information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. When were you in contact with HTS? (while deployed, pre/post deployment)</li> <li>b. Did you know about HTS before the team introduced themselves in theater? If yes, how did you find about them? (If someone gave them a product, what was it and who gave it to you?)</li> </ul>
<p>4. Roles and Missions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. What do you see as the mission of the HTS program?</li> <li>b. What role did you think the HTT would play when they arrived? (Analysts, Data collectors, Cultural advisors?)</li> <li>c. What role did they play? Analysts? Data collectors? Cultural advisors?</li> </ul>



5. Interactions and Usefulness:

- a. How frequently did you interact with the HTT? (Every day, several times a week, once a week, once a month, every couple months)
- b. How often did you meet with HTT team lead, HTT team members, HTAT?
- c. What was the content of your meetings?
- d. How often did you use their products (reports, briefing slides)?
- e. How were their products useful?
- f. How often did your staff interact with the HTT?
- g. What type of feedback did the staff provide regarding their interactions with the HTT?
- h. How often did your staff use the HTT products?
- i. What type of feedback did the staff provide regarding their use of the HTT products?
- j. Were you aware of HTT reachback?
- k. How often did you use reports from reachback?
- l. How useful were the reports?

6. HTT Personnel:

- a. How many people were in your brigade's HTT?
- b. What kind of backgrounds did they have?
- c. What did you think about the number of people on the HTT? The right number of people on the team? Too many? Too few?
- d. Follow-up (e.g., What made it so that there were the right number of people. if too many – why did you think that? too few – how could you have used more?)

7. HTT's Skills and Contributions:

- a. What did the HTT do for you? (Produce products such as briefings or reports, e.g., cultural assessments or local leader biographies; quick-turn (< week), medium-length (< month), or long-term research (> 1 month); conduct surveys and interviews with local nationals; participate in key leader engagement)
- b. What did they do that was "relevant" or "useful"?
- c. How would you evaluate their mix of skills to accomplish their mission?
- d. In your opinion, what was the most effective use of their skills?
- e. What skills or perspective did they bring that was not provided by intel analysts, FAOs, I/O, PsyOps?
- f. How did their skills overlap with other analysts or military personnel?
- g. How do you think the HTT's skills can be integrated into a standard military training?
- h. Should HTT skills be integrated into a standard military training?

<p>8. HTT Fit to the Staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. How did the HTT fit into the staff structure? (e.g., did they report to the Commander, S2-intel or S3 shop) Where were they organizationally? Logistically?</li> <li>b. Who decided where they fit in?</li> <li>c. How were they managed operationally? Who managed what they did on a daily basis?</li> </ul>
<p>9. HTT Management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. How was the HTS managed programmatically? (what is your impression of how HTS back in the states managed HTT) Did you have any issues with the HTS Project Office?</li> </ul>
<p>10. HTT Training:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. What did you think of the appropriateness of HTT members' pre-deployment training? That is, were they prepared when they arrived? If not, why not?</li> </ul>
<p>11. HTT Assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Were you or someone in your command asked to assess HTS? If not you, who assessed them?</li> <li>b. How did they approach this assessment? What did they look at? What did they say? Who asked them to evaluate /assess HTS</li> <li>c. What are some good metrics to think about when considering the success of this group?</li> </ul>
<p>12. Policy Issues:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. What type of policy issues hindered program execution? What were things that you wanted the HTT to do that they could not do, due to policy restrictions?</li> </ul>
<p>13. Follow-on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. We would like to learn more about HTS. Who else can we talk to? So far we have developed a research plan that includes talking to customers, HTT managers and team leaders, HTT members themselves, as well as training staff (including trainers and curriculum developers).</li> </ul>

## Analysis

We divided the interviews with HTT customers into 3 groups based on how useful the customers reported that their HTT was to them during their deployment. The groups were:

- “HTT was very useful”
- “HTT varied in usefulness” and
- “HTT was not useful”.

These categories are obviously somewhat imprecise, the HTT members did not quantify the usefulness of their HTT, nor did they classify the HTT as falling into one of the three groups. We categorized the HTT's into one of the three categories. The group labeled as "very useful" included interview responses where the HTT was very useful (e.g., in terms of cultural advising and/or products) AND the respondents did not report any major limitations. The group labeled as "varied in usefulness" contains cases where the interview responses were sometimes useful and sometimes not useful. It also includes those who reported variable usefulness at different points in their deployment. Some respondents also reported very useful aspects of the HTT but then also reported significant limitations (e.g., the need to have improved military or pre-deployment training). The group labeled as "not useful", either provided extremely limited usefulness, or provided no products or cultural advice that was useful.

Numbers of interviews and numbers of unique HTT in each group are shown in table B-2.

Table B-2: Interviews grouped by usefulness

Category	Number of interviews	Number of unique HTT	Percent of unique HTT
Very Useful	5	3	21
Varied in Usefulness	8	8	57
Not Useful	3	3	21
Total	16	14	100

Most of the interviews covered deployments in 2008 and 2009, with the median deployment beginning in Dec 2008. The number of HTTs in theater has varied from 1 at the inception of the program to 32 currently. The average number of HTTs in theater at the beginning of the interviewee's deployment was 22. Hence the 14 unique HTTs covered in the interviews represent about 64 percent of the HTTs in theater at the time the interviewees deployed.

There are large uncertainties on the percentage of HTT by usefulness category; however we can make the following observations:

- Some HTT are very useful but likely only a small percentage.
- There are also a small percentage that are viewed as not useful
- Most HTT are in the middle ground, i.e., HTT capabilities were useful, but there were also significant limitations (or HTT's usefulness varied between time points)

## Comparison of groups

In this section we compare and contrast the responses from the group that considered HTT "very useful" with those considered who considered HTT "not useful".



In table B-3 we list the responses of these two groups. Following the table we discuss the responses.

Table B-3: Interviewee responses by group

	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
Views of the Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “I’m clearly a supporter of the program” Wanted his staff to operate and take advantage of the HTT.</li> <li>• Doesn’t think HTT should be scaled down</li> <li>• “HTTs overall value is very positive”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Army should not continue the human terrain teams. Thinks they should have a couple cultural advisors assigned to each commander</li> <li>• “I believe in the [HTT] program... it just wasn’t set up in the time we were there.”</li> <li>• “... I think the concept is very sound in what they [the HTT] are doing; critical to their success is gaining the trust of the unit they will be assigned”</li> </ul>
Usefulness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HTT provided analyses of human terrain, also worked with EPR and helped to understand the political make up. Provide linked diagrams, could be used to go to Sheikh with greater insight and use them to gain more intel or gain leverage.</li> <li>• Helped commanders become SMEs in AO. They did non threatening analyses, “empowered me to go to district governor and provide specific information”. They provided a layout of all the tribes on a map in his AO.</li> <li>• Saw HTT as a great help. They were actively involved in non-lethal targeting meetings.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Didn’t use their products – it was not what they needed. They were not capable of doing cultural advising – the advice was not relevant.</li> <li>• “HTT [is] not as good as it could be...what I wanted it to be...that aspect on the cultural human dimension in your area of responsibility.” With only one person – the HTT could not cover the entire battle space and the papers were not what he needed to make decisions.</li> </ul>
Skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The fact that they had team members with personal experience in Iraq was critical”</li> <li>• Absolutely, good variety [of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not able to perform at the level he wanted (to be a cultural advisor), they “did not have skill set to adapt fast enough to the</li> </ul>

	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
	<p>skills]. If one wasn't suited to go out, they would manage everything on the FOB.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had right mix...research analysts as team members were not as valuable. Felt most effective use of their skills was following commanders lead.</li> <li>• Felt they had a good mix of skills to complete the mission</li> <li>• Team was well rounded, &amp; the "quality of linguists that the team had was most impressive, allowing them to engage with locals and key leaders in a manner that is sometimes not accomplished by military units".</li> </ul>	<p>environment on the ground". He also had a problem with the methods they use for data collection – the HTT were taking a western survey and applying it to a Middle Eastern society.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The one HTT he had did a good job at assessing and giving perspective e.g., "here is what we are seeing in your operational areas" If he had that capability across the province he could look at trend lines and determine where to put resources (unfortunately only had one HTT most of the time).</li> </ul>
Uniqueness of skills	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HTT was specific to Iraq and area operated in. Had non-military view points (think outside the box) and talked to locals not in uniform.</li> <li>• Skills didn't overlap at all – HTT were filling a void – "not one time did I say to myself oh, I've hear that from somebody else."</li> <li>• HTT skills do not exist in the Army – no one in the military has the job to do what the HTT did – there is a need for more people to do this job.</li> <li>• Felt HTT had a unique ability to reach into the population and find their issues quickly. Non-lethal targeting requires different skill set than lethal targets- no training in the military on how to interact with local people.</li> <li>• Had ability to engage with locals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civilians give a different perspective and that is what every organization needs and welcomes). Although the function to analyze human terrain is needed, a team is not.</li> <li>• Military folks are more generalists. HTT brings more detail, experience and reach back capabilities.</li> </ul>

	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
	and key leaders in a manner that is sometimes not accomplished by military units. Operating in civilian clothing gave them an edge in the area they were operating in.	
Views about the background of team members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defaulted to Arab Americans who had great cultural insights.</li> <li>• Background not as important as them having an interest – he felt they had an interest and a knack for doing that kind of work. They were very flexible, adaptive which was very important</li> <li>• Thought the research analysts were not as valuable.</li> <li>• Team was well rounded, &amp; the “quality of linguists that the team had was most impressive.” Having former military was also helpful.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Felt they were stronger individually then as a team – wanted to have the ability to split them up. Wanted someone with a strong academic background (understand the discipline that is related to human terrain) or a strong regional background. The issue was that they didn’t have real world experience in the region.</li> </ul>
Limitations of the Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There was turn over on the team, never got a chance to work with some new members. Believes that an analyst on HTT without the personal experience will not necessarily be a great value.</li> <li>• Wanted more HTT (his own dedicated HTT at the BN level)</li> <li>• Too few HTT – thought they should be battalion asset, to avoid spreading them too thin, they only worked with two of his Battalions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HTT did not understand role and responsibilities. Not able to perform at the level he wanted- advice, products and reach back was not relevant.</li> <li>• HTT was in an accident shortly after arrival and there was a policy change and most of them quit. Needed more HTT. He felt HTT should have been redistributed from other brigades (e.g., Baghdad) to meet his needs.</li> <li>• .HTT came last 2 months of 15 month deployment. He and his staff had more knowledge of the human terrain then the HTT. HTT did not provide him any products when he was deployed</li> </ul>



	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operated through the team leader (former Army, who had close relationship with EPRT, they did not need a lot of guidance). The team members divided themselves up...didn't see HTT as separate element – they were integrated with operations, intelligence staff, all working together. Two HTT were located with the Battalion to provide support. No personality conflicts that he was aware of.</li> <li>Advantage of the team was that they had former military members as the team lead and data collectors/analysts. This allowed them to report the data in a manner in which military units are used to viewing – allow info to be used quickly and efficiently.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Team leader took a behind the scenes role and “just sort of managed the team...he wasn't valuable on the cultural advise.” The HTT was not flexible enough – the team leader was wed to the idea of keeping the team together instead of focusing on the commanders. HTT were unwilling to incorporate their efforts into a greater effort (of the unit). The S3 and team leader managed them but they didn't always agree. They had disagreements on the methods that should be used.</li> <li>Interactions with the HTT did not start off well – HTT arrived late to go out on convoys and his staff would either wait for them or leave without them. They had to send one of the PhDs home because he was working on his own agenda.</li> </ul>
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Would have preferred for them to train with the unit prior to deployment. Nothing that he saw made him feel that they lacked training. Didn't find lack of military culture to be problematic.</li> <li>HTT knew how to defend themselves and they trained on the equipment just like they were one of the soldiers “they kind of blended in”</li> <li>With regards to training felt they were all able to do the work – several team members had</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thought they needed to train with the unit as much as they could before they deploy. Also thought they should have specific country training.</li> <li>HTT at the brigade have to be jacks of all trades – they should know cultural and economics. HTT should train at NRC and get awareness before – to do a mission rehearsal.</li> <li>Team members okay in term of the training.</li> </ul>

	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
	<p>been in Afghanistan for more than two years. New HTT went on training “check rides” with more experienced HTT.</p>	<p>Thinks they need to go to individual replacement task training that all IAs go through. Should come in having done the data mining and preparation and have an understanding of the operational environment of the unit they intend to support.</p>
Summary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Had HTT members who provided him with cultural advising, gave him useful information, had a good team leader who did not need much guidance. Analysts without experience are less valuable.</li> <li>• HTT provided them with a lot of information on the tribes, information was useful, thought they had the right skills set, training. Only limitation discussed was that he wanted more HTT</li> <li>• HTT were a great help and provided them with executive briefings, tribal information, only limitation discussed was that he wanted more HTT.</li> <li>• Feedback provided regarding the HTT was positive – helped with non-lethal targeting and focused on the tribes and relationship –and understanding the “population’s issues”. Only limitation mentioned was that they wanted more HTT at the BN level.</li> <li>• Information provided was all positive – personal and profession – former military and impressive linguistic skills.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did not have a good experience with the HTT. He did not have team members who were capable of doing the cultural advising. Furthermore there were disagreements in how the staff should be utilized between the S3 and the team leader. The team leader was did not allow for the team to be split up. He does not think HTT should continue – thinks that there should be a couple advisors for each commander but not an entire team.</li> <li>• Did not have a lot of interaction with the HTT. He didn’t seem to be overly positive or negative. He did state that he thought it was a sound concept. The limitation he mentioned was the team members showing up on time.</li> <li>• Thought the one HTT he had was good, but would need more HTT members to be useful (in terms of provided human terrain analyses across the battle</li> </ul>

	Useful (n=5)	Not Useful (n=3)
		space).

### *"HTT was very useful"*

The five interviews included in this group reported very positive experiences with their HTT and limited negative experiences.

*Usefulness.* While all five interviewees described the usefulness of the HTT, one commander stood out in how he portrayed the usefulness of the HTT. This commander mentioned that he expected the HTT to provided analyses of human terrain (insight into culture and religion) and they did that, but what he did not expect was that the HTT also helped him to understand the political makeup (in the region) and they became integrated and worked with the EPR reconstruction team. He provided examples of how the HTT was useful to him:

"I relied on the HTT....[they] became my principal point of contact for understanding the Sheikh and the familial and political linkages... [the] relationship that HTT had developed with the local Sheikh facilitated my being able to get inside and gain access to certain Iraqi leaders that I might not have had access to... [I] could compare linked diagrams that HTT created with the treats side. Information could be used to go to Sheikh with greater insight and [I could] use them to gain more intel or gain leverage."

Similarly, another interviewee also stated, "the HTT was able to do non-threatening analyses, [it] empowered me to go to [the] district governor and provide specific information....It helped me to know what I was doing." This interviewee also expressed that the HTT helped commanders become SMEs in their Areas of Operations (AO) and that the HTT provided a layout of all the tribes in their AO and advised him on how to conduct operations (regarding the tribes). It was evident across the interviews that the HTT played a significant role in providing detailed cultural, tribal, and relationship information that was valuable to the customers.

*Skill set.* All interviewees agreed that the HTT had the right mix of skills to complete the mission. One interviewee stated that the HTT was well rounded and that "the "quality of linguists that the team had was most impressive, allowing them to engage with locals and key leaders in a manner that is sometimes not accomplished by military units". Another interviewee mentioned, "The fact that they had team members with personal experience in Iraq was critical". This interviewee also expressed that he tended to default to those who were Arab American and had great cultural insights. While the majority of the comments about the HTT were positive, two of the interviewees conveyed that the analysts (who did not have the personal experience in region), were not as valuable as those team members who did. On the contrary, another interviewee said that the background of the HTT was not as important



as them having an interest. This interviewee indicated, “They had an interest and a knack for doing that kind of work”.

In addition to having valuable skills, all of the interviewees expressed that the HTT has a skill set that is unique and/or does not overlap with the military. For example, one stated that the skills didn’t overlap [with the military] and that the HTT were filling a void, “not one time did I say to myself oh, I’ve heard that from somebody else.” Another stated, “HTT skills do not exist in the Army – no one in the military has the job to do what the HTT did – there is a great need for more people to do this job.” Several also discussed how the HTT had the ability to engage with locals and leaders. One stated, “HTT had a unique ability to reach into the population and find their issues quickly.” A couple also mentioned the advantage of the HTT being in civilian clothing and another stated that having civilians on the team was valuable as they provided non-military view points and they were able to “think outside the box”. These interviewees all agreed that the HTT has a unique skill or capability that is not being provided by the military/Army.

*Management/Team dynamics.* While some interviewees in the other groups (“usefulness varied” and “not useful”) reported resistance from the HTT or team leader when they attempted to split up the HTT, one of the commanders reported that this was not an issue. He sent a couple HTT to support the Battalion. However, for the most part, he did not direct the HTT to be split up, he defaulted to the HTT to split themselves up. The commander also pointed out that he did not see the HTT as a separate element; he saw them as integrate with operations, intelligence, etc – all working together. However, the fact that the HTT was flexible and allowed their team to being split up may have contributed to this interviewee’s positive experience with the HTT.

Another factor that seemed to contribute to the usefulness of a couple of the HTTs, was former military experience. One of the HTT’s team leader was former Army and the interviewee reported that the leader did not need a lot of guidance. Another interviewee discussed that having former military members as the lead and as data collectors/analysts, allowed them to report the data in a manner in which military units are used to viewing – they allowed the information to be used quickly and efficiently. None of those interviewed reported any personality problems or issues with their HTTs.

*Training.* Three of the interviewees discussed the training of the HTT. All of them thought that the HTT had been adequately trained. One mentioned that he would have preferred for the HTT to have trained with the unit prior to deployment, but he didn’t find lack of military culture among the HTT to be problematic.

*Limitations.* Although the interviewees expressed very few limitations or criticism of the HTT, a couple of the interviewees discussed that they would like more HTT team members. In

particular, two Battalion commanders stated that they thought the HTT should be a Battalion asset. The only other limitation mentioned was that HTT analysts without personal experience may not be as valuable as those HTT members with personal experience in Iraq.

*Overall.* Across these five interviews, respondents continuously provided positive feedback about the program. One stated, "I'm clearly a supporter of the program" "I have few criticisms, I think it is an important program and I wanted my staff to operate and take advantage of the HTT..." Another expressed "[it] boggles my mind that there is talk about scaling down the human terrain teams....[it's] criminal that we don't have HTT at the battalions or company level.....Commanders who recommend against it....I say they are ignorant on what the HTTs can bring, they must have had a personality conflict."

### *"HTT was not useful"*

In comparison to the other interviewees, three customers of the HTT reported that their HTT was not useful.

*Usefulness/Skill set.* The reason for the HTT's lack of usefulness varied between the interviewees. Two of the customers did not have a full HTT during the entire duration of their deployment and that contributed to their lack of usefulness. The other customer was dissatisfied with the HTT's inability to provide cultural advice and they were not able to meet up to his expectations. Details of each of the customer's evaluation of the HTT's usefulness and skills are described in the following paragraphs.

One customer's HTT was in an accident shortly after their arrival and some HTT were sent home. Most of the remaining HTT quit after a policy change, leaving him with only one HTT member the majority of the time he was deployed. He thought the one HTT member did a good job doing an assessment and providing him information about his operational area; however, this information had limited use because he needed the HTT to cover the entire battle space (and that was not possible with just one person). He stated that if he had that capability across the province he could look at trend lines and determine where to put resources. He thought that the HTT individual probably helped the company commander, but in general he found that products were not personally useful and that the papers he received were not what he needed to make decisions. He stated, "HTT [is] not as good as it could be...what I wanted it to be...that aspect on the cultural human dimension in your area of responsibility." Nevertheless, he did think that HTT had unique skills – he stated that HTT may be privy to certain information from local Iraqis, that the military may not be privy too. He also expressed that the HTT is not constrained by a boundary and thinks that it is good to link the HTT to the S2, to confirm their intel. He felt that HTT can give perspectives on relationship, networks and links and to give another perspective other than the military.



The other customer with limited interactions with the HTT had been in theater 13 months (of his 15 month deployment) when his HTT arrived. At that point, he and his staff knew more about the human terrain in his region than the HTT. As a result, the HTT did not provide him with any products nor was he able to assess their skills during his two month interaction. In terms of the uniqueness of skills, he stated that military folks are more generalists and that HTT brings more detail, experiences and reach back capabilities.

A third customer did have a full HTT team during his deployment. However he attributed their lack of usefulness to the HTT's skill level – in particular, their inability to provide cultural advice. He expressed,

“[the HTT] were not capable of doing the cultural advising.... We tried to listen to their advice but it was disruptive – not relevant....They wanted to move as team – collect survey and data – [but] most valued added would have been to align [each individual HTT person's expertise] where needed, not as a team.. [HTT] should let [the] command determine where each individual should go.

The commander also expressed that that HTT products and reachback were not useful as well. He discussed,

“I didn't use their products....just wasn't what we needed...it was just too basic information. The team was a few years behind what the current operational demand was...[Reachback reports] were either too generic or too conceptual in that they didn't apply to tribal tensions or things currently on the ground...”

The commander also stated that the HTT did not have the skill set to adapt fast enough to the environment on the ground and that he also had a problem with the methods that the HTT used for data collection. He described that the HTT would take a western survey and then apply it to the Middle Eastern society—he felt that this was problematic. When asked about the value of having civilians as part of the HTT, he stated that civilians give a different perspective and that is what every organization needs and welcome. However, this commander also expressed that while the function to analyze human terrain is needed, it is not necessary to have a team. This commander believes that reducing the HTT to a couple cultural advisors assigned to a commander would be the most beneficial.

*Management/Team dynamics.* Two of the interviewees expressed some challenges in managing the HTT. For one of the interviewees, the issues tended to be minor as he only interacted with the HTT during the last 2 months of his deployment. This customer informed us that within the first 3 weeks after the HTT's arrival, one of the PhDs had to be sent home “because he was working on his own agenda”. This interviewee also reported that the initial



interactions with the HTT did not start off well. They would arrive late to go out on convoys and sometimes his staff would leave without them.

The other customer's challenges with the HTT's team leader and his ability to manage them, seemed to impact HTT's usefulness and his overall views of the HTT. This commander expressed frustration with his inability to split up the HTT. He stated that the HTT was not flexible and that the team leader was "wed to the idea of keeping the team together" instead of focusing on the commander's needs. He also expressed that the HTT was unwilling to incorporate their efforts in to the greater efforts of the unit. While the S3 was the one who gave the HTT day to day advice on what they should be doing, the team leader also gave advice and the two did not always agree. The commander also reported that there were also disagreements between the HTT and the unit staff on the methods that should be use. The commander stated that there had to be compromises between the two groups. Customers in the "useful" group did not report these struggles with their HTT leaders or team members.

*Training.* All of the commanders felt that the HTT should have training prior to deployment. The type of training the commanders mentioned including training with the unit as much as they can before they deploy, getting specific country training and having an understanding of the operational environment of the unit they intend to support.

*Limitations.* The limitations of HTT have been discussed throughout this section. To recap, the main limitation for two customers was that they did not have a full team for the duration of their deployment. The other customer who did have a full team expressed his dissatisfaction with the HTT's cultural advising skills and his inability to split the team up and utilize them the best way he saw fit. This customer also believed that the HTT did not understand their role and responsibilities – contributing to their lack of usefulness. Another limitation mention by another interviewee was that he thinks it is critical for the HTS to redistribute assets where the needs are greatest. For example, when his HTT were in an accident, he thought he should have received HTT from an area (e.g., Bagdad) where the needs were less critical. Additionally he expressed that HTT capabilities that are needed for the unit/commander should be aligned with individuals' backgrounds. For example if the brigade covers a region that includes Kurds, Shia or Sunni, then the HTT should include someone with expertise for each of those groups.

*Overall.* Although these 3 interviewees did not find their HTT useful, only one strongly opposes the continuation of the program. This interviewee stated,

"As brigade commander, I would not tell the Army to continue the human terrain teams. It was not meeting...the mission on the ground....My position is clear, I think it [HTT] was an idea that is no longer relevant for the requirements and current operational environment and my suggestion is more to minimize the number [of

HTT] and get better expertise to advise the command and work directly for the field commander they are assigned to.... If [the] commander cannot have flexibility to assess the asset and utilize them the best way they see fit then it constrains the commander.”

The other two commanders still support the idea of the HTT, despite the fact that they didn’t find their particular HTT to be useful. One commander stated, “In general, I think the concept is very sound in what they [the HTT] are doing; critical to their success is gaining the trust of the unit they will be assigned to early on.” The other commander expressed, “I believe in the [HTT] program... it just wasn’t set up in the time we were there.”

## **Data Summaries**

We prepared several summaries of the data to address specific issues. These summaries are shown in the tables below. They included:

- HTT Roles and Usefulness: Table B-4
- HTT Skills: Table B-5
- HTT Skills (Uniqueness, Overlap, and Incorporation into the Military): Table B-6
- HTT Recruiting and Training: Table B-7
- HTT Fit: Table B-8
- HTT Management: Table B-9
- HTT Policy Issues: Table B-10

Table B-4: HTT Roles and Usefulness

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
Brigade Cdr.	Provided cultural awareness, help integrate products and reach back capabilities into (non-lethal) operations Saw their role as more cultural advisors, but acknowledge they collected data...	Some products were more useful than others "most important was providing a cultural perspective to what we were seeing." (but also mentioned the need to have analysts). The expertise by some of the team members, some linguists who spoke the language and the reachback capabilities back in the states – that was also critical.		HTTs main role was cultural advising – a few key people really help him with cultural awareness. Thinks more military training would be useful.
Brigade S2	More of data collectors and cultural advisors than analysts. Provided insight into particular tribal areas; if had insurgents – they knew the players and knew how they were linked culturally; they engaged with the local population; provided data for targeting meetings.	"They are a tremendous asset to the non-lethal assessment" Products were useful – may directly impact operation or have good information about the region. But not frequent enough for active targeting, for cultural understanding (e.g. assessment) they were very useful. Could access reports from website.	Thinks it is a very useful program.	Although HTT provided good information – they didn't get a lot of products – the HTT withheld products due to retaliation.
Battalion Cdr.	Data collectors (talked to locals) and cultural advisors (at meetings). They were actively involved in non-lethal targeting meetings - briefed	He used their products at least weekly as part of non-lethal targeting process.		



	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	the BN commander and team. The HTT had written longer reports on the tribes. They did “quick responses” to specific questions from the brigade commander and visited particular areas. They’d go out when the BN was working with village – HTT would talk to other people in the village, including women.			
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff	All 3 roles. HTT members met with tribal elders and identified sources of instability; as advisors - how to address tribal elders, as planner: tell you how to conduct an operation, “don’t take sides with one tribe as it will cause a feud with another”. Give the bigger picture – influence of the bigger tribes. Did a layout of all the tribes on a map in AO. Gave him something to look at when I driving	Helped commanders to be SME in AO, One had a lot of tribal conflict but only one side of the story-HTT did a non threatening analysis, and empowered him to go to district governor and provide specific Information; used their products before he transition; was able to turn over a better AO to next commander. Used products weekly.		

	Role of HTT/ What they did	Usefulness	Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview	Overall comments by interviewer
	in his AO			
Battalion Cdr.	Wanted to mix lethal and non lethal together. Utilized 4 HTT regularly (sent them with the platoons). They: assessed if projects had been sustained (e.g., if a school was built, was it still running), talked to average people on the street/ local population – get assessment about how Iraqis thought things were going; confirmed previous findings from info collected earlier (continuity books and reachback); got demographics. HTT would provide information at targeting meeting on individuals nominated as targets.	HTT produced a lot of products that ranged in usefulness. Most useful –one page slide on individual targets (e.g. tribe, family dealings). Demographic about the region wasn't that useful. Some products were too long (80 page pp) and already had. Last 2-3 months didn't use HTT as much as at first. A lot of questions to locals had already been asked. In theater – all the tools HTT used, several units before had already used - were reinventing the wheel.		He used HTT regularly to go out with the platoons – however HTTs have already been in the region so he would ask them to go to the continuity books and reach back first and then build upon that information when they went out and talked to locals.
Division staff	All 3 roles, - initially data collectors. Key members became part of the non-lethal targeting working group. Did a lot of nodal analyses - relationships of the	Initially – the HTT weren't useful ( e.g., "Who is Abdul? What is his role?" "I would get a 65 paper back on the guy and his relationship to tribe – I don't have time to read a page let alone 65 pages") but with time the HTT	Thinks HTS is a worthwhile program; it helped him and his commander. The training and recruitment needs a lot of work and the military needs to	In my opinion – this person would be a good case study on examining how a commander and/or staff worked with HTT to get

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	civil leaders, did reports, papers, & briefings; cultural assessments, biographies. Needed to properly integrate – “it is not the product it is the input and participation that is much more important”. Better teams would identify the biggest problem through interviews and research and build a database about what is affecting that problem and work backwards - learning about environment and what matters to the commander. How teams evolved: “we coached them to being a key player”.	understood what the commander wanted – more solution based and they became more useful (e.g., part of key leader engagement...“that was quite a help”). At the beginning HTT not invited to the working group, didn’t produce actionable or focused recommendations. At the end, they were completely integrated with the nonlethal targeting process.	be harder on their operation center. HTS need more military organization.	them to be where they wanted. They went from completely useless to be completely integrated.
Brigade Cdr.	Expected one of their roles to interact with the tribes and separate out good guys from the bad guys. He did not see their role as to understand the full picture...– The role they played: gathering information,	Saw HTT as great help They produced long papers and briefings but thought executive briefings were the best. They produced every 2 weeks or 10-15 a year. HTT also briefed local commanders on situations in the AO.		



	Role of HTT/ What they did	Usefulness	Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview	Overall comments by interviewer
	advisors.			
Battalion Cdr.	A little bit of everything, each team was different, some were more data collectors, some were able to be advisors – depending on their skills. Agricultural understanding some had – so driven by their background and expertise. It was a mixture. Analysis, data collection interacted with population.	Ability to push them down to the battalion was beneficial. At the brigade level they didn't have the right focus to provide the bang for the buck – partly the commander's fault, but also the HTT's fault. Guidance from commander was not specific. He did not figure out how to use them. Understanding how to present the information to the commander- there was a lot a struggle with this.		
Brigade Cdr.	HTT helped them understand the political makeup & worked with the reconstruction team – HTT became principal point of contact for understanding the sheikhs and the familial, political linkages; tended to default to those with cultural expertise and knew the language (had great cultural insight), also saw them as data collectors and	Found the HTT to be very helpful; used products once a week, staff used them every day thinks HTT is an important program and wanted his staff to take advantage of them. Personal preparation was critical; they linked diagrams between the local community and he could compare that to the threats side and occasionally see intersections in tribal linkages and threat networks on the intel side and provide them with leverage points. [Could use] a sheikh in	"I'm clearly a supporter of program" – did 2 tours in Iraq – during 1 <sup>st</sup> deployment, the things I wish I had - knowledge or had insights to – I would have gained so much with HTT. Thinks program is very valuable. Don't think it should be subordinated to military command.	This would be a good case study for someone who had a really good experience with HTT.

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	analysts; HTT was integrated with other staff (intel, operations) and teams. They produced biographical sketches, linked diagrams, social economic links, tribal linkages to understand tribal dynamics; they provided briefings and personal preparation when meeting with Iraqi leaders.	local town, use him to assist and gain intel on terrorist network, sometimes linkages were more clear because of HTT and then go to sheikhs who were neutral... with greater insight go to them [the sheikhs] and work them to gain more intel or gain leverage on areas trying to advance.		
Battalion Cdr.	More cultural advisors - did a lot of data collection & analyses, mainly tribal in nature – (e.g. detailed analyses of 1 tribe & analyses of area where they had IEDs to see who was supporting people in the areas). HTT also met with tribal leaders to gather atmospheric. HTT would talk for 4-5 hours with a person in coffee shop, take a day to write up the engagement. If they focus on one tribe, have 4-5 engagement it	HTT didn't directly support him – only used products that HTT created for others. Obtained biographies and studies on the shared portal that HTT had produced for the brigades. Thought reports from reachback were useful -it provided a Macro look of what was going; used HTT reports prior to meeting key [Iraqi] leaders to ask what is going on with X. Felt Iraqis are frustrated when new Americans come in and ask same question. The more information you already knew the more information you left with.	"I think it's a good program but a lot of things [HTT was] tasked to do we could have done on our own" Thought some units should have HTT do higher level analyses. Felt brigade needs to fuse info from HTT with Intel, operations, & commanders key leader engagements. If unit not able to analyze the info from HTT than HTT is not being effective.	As Battalion commander he didn't have direct support from HTT. It appeared that he go some use out of the products but may have had a better experience if he had direct support.

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	would take 2-4 weeks for engagements, analyses and product.			
Brigade Cdr.	They didn't do this for me because they came too late (came last two months of 15 month deployment). Took HTT on his key leader engagements to understand the environment. He introduced them to the operational environment. His staff provided them with products on networks, insurgency, key leaders, etc.	HTT came too late to help him and as a result he had better situational awareness than the HTT. He asked HTT to be continuity and the awareness gap when new unit comes. His interactions with the HTT did not start off well – HTT arrived late to go out on convoys and his staff would either wait for them or leave without them.		He did not really use the HTT because they came the last 2 months of his 15 month. His staff had to be the ones out there assessing the human terrain. If he was deployed again and had an HTT – it would be interesting to see how his experiences and/or view of the HTT would change.
Brigade Cdr.	He was disappointed in the team – felt they didn't understand their role and responsibilities. The HTT was not performing at the level he needed – he wanted the HTT to be better cultural advisors for how their operations were working and to analyze reactions	He didn't use their products – they were too basic, information was behind the time and products were not relevant. Reachback – wasn't relevant to the problems on the ground. "They were not capable of doing the cultural advising" HTT advice was not relevant.	Thinks HTT is an idea no long relevant for the requirements & current operational environment – thinks they should minimize the number and get better expertise to advise the command. If commander doesn't have	This would be a good case study for someone who had a really bad experience with HTT. I felt bad for this commander because he got a team that was not fit for his needs; other commanders got people who were really



	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	of the local people and advise him and help with planning and preparation and development of programs (including cultural sensitivities). They lacked the cultural advising piece. HTT were not “insubordinate” but they didn’t have the skill set required and the ability to adapt fast enough to the environment on the ground.		flexibility to assess the asset [a person, or the HTT] and utilize them the best way they see fit, then it is constraining the commander. “They were not capable of doing the cultural advising.” HTT advice was not relevant.	great at the cultural advising. I wonder how the skill sets differed and how the team leaders may have differed in how they support the commander. His view of the HTT appears to be based on his bad experience....if he had great cultural advisors, perhaps his view of HTT would be different.
Division G3	Cultural advisor – at brigade level - Integrated them into preconstruction team – linking entities – better aware of what people need. HTT produced diagrams & tribal trees, did leader biographies, cultural assessments, special reports, e.g. political time for elections...turned to HTT for their	HTT was trying to sort through their purpose. The brigade didn’t know what to do with them so he took 2 for his battalion. The two HTT were able to uncover families and tribes that “I didn’t know existed... for 15 months”. [HTT] were used everyday by the staff, because whether there was a project or a targeting operation or analyzing election stressors, the HTT were guys who know who to	Organizations change every 12 months, HTT change every 12 months. I personally see them as long-term continuity. On paper may say purpose of HTT, ..the vision is not fully developed and not properly – equipped, or organized.	

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	assessment – intelligence perspective, cultural perspective, media perspective – commander can be more informed. HTT produced. The HTT analyzed and figured out the linkages that caused tension between two local government officials.	talk to – they collaborated more than military people – no rank structure. Used products – numerous times give them specific questions... need research, “when in doubt go to HTT”. Reachback capabilities were useful – if gave then a problem and told them to research – see if HTT had a different view or if they confirmed what he already thought. [HTT] gives a cultural perspective through analyses – The [HTT] are a sounding board. At HTAT - Database that our guys did was effective – useful across the division.		
Brigade Cdr.	The person was a data collector, not a cultural advisor. They gave another set of sensors in the cities we were in. clearly a non-lethal perspective. They did assessment of an area - how people interact in their environment, are people being helped? Is what we are doing beneficial? Ask the average person	I believe in the [HTT] program it just wasn't set up in the time we were there. Challenge – HTT got in an accident, 2 months after filled the team. Then a policy changed and most of them quit. Only had one guy, sent him out with unit, he was able to do some work – but with only one guy wasn't able to do anything at brigade. “Did he help the company commander?... sure” –		

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	<p>what do you think? “here is what we are seeing in your operational area” – how is this nested with your plan?” If had that capability across the province could look at trend lines.... where I didn’t need focus, where people are on board with Iraqis and what areas weren’t. They did leader biographies, provincial reconstruction team, dealt with Iraqi commander, PRT– met with governor and ministry– get dimension and look along lines of effort of culture of the leader – Kurds, Sunni. They are a civilian entity – if passionate about what they do – they gave another resource to that brigade commander, [that he can use] – sustainable security and progress.</p>	<p>but [we] wanted someone to cover the entire battle space – need someone more holistic, [we] got a few papers – they weren’t what we needed to make decisions to the end state. There was one [HTT] the majority of the time. How often used products: Had a weekly working group that took [HTT] products and put in overall assessment and they briefed him every month. Usefulness of Products: For him, they were not that useful, though he thinks they were useful for Battalion &amp; company commander. He wanted [HTT] to help him at brigade level ...see operation level and identify through their assessment where to put focus and where not to. The experience with HTT, [its] not as good as -what I wanted – to be that aspect on the cultural human dimension in you AOR.</p>		
MCIA	Initially thought HTT was an active duty element performing much	Relevant or useful? Absolutely. I think the mission of the HTT will be a significant factor in		



	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	of the same tasking as the MCIT. However, their mission is much more focused and more extensively trained in social science and ethnographic research. The makeup of the HTT is more focused on the academic aspect of the human terrain. We worked jointly with the team to obtain much of the same information. We also exchanged products we had available with products they had to gain a broader perspective from either side.	the overall success of the MCIT as well. The two elements should continue to work closely in future operations.		
MCIT	The team was very personal and professional. The advantage the team was having former military members as the team lead and data collectors / analysts. This allowed them to report the data in a manner in which military units are used to viewing, which in turn allowed for the	Team was well rounded; quality of linguists was most impressive, allowing them to engage with locals & key leaders in a way that is sometimes not accomplished by military units. We shared info collected over a wide variety of topics, conducted interviews together, conducted 2 atmospherics patrols together, and the HTT team provided us with		

	<b>Role of HTT/ What they did</b>	<b>Usefulness</b>	<b>Overall Impression – as reported at end of interview</b>	<b>Overall comments by interviewer</b>
	information to be used quickly and efficiently.	all of their debriefs, key leader engagement interviews, etc...		

Table B-5: Skills

	<b>Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]</b>	<b>Skills – most effective</b>	<b>Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]</b>
Brigade Cdr.	Thought the makeup of the team was right – need both cultural advisors and analysts.	[Not explicitly asked but stated earlier that he valued those with cultural knowledge and could speak the language.]	
Brigade S2	They had a pretty good skill set there. I think they could have used a couple more intel analysts, because what they could have done was focus products more as an analytical tool instead of data collection. Would have helped to formulate [the HTT product?] into a way where a commander could take it [information they collected] and run with it.	The way they dissected cultural & tribal differences in the area. If an area had the basics identified, they would be best utilized by engaging established leaders & understanding what the Iraqi leaders want and what they see as their future and how they plan to get there. This info could to help the commander decide what resources to employ there.	
Battalion Cdr.	N/A	[Response written for this question was identical to another interviewee... I pull this statement from “what was useful”]: they had a unique ability to reach into the population and find the population’s issues quickly. They could find out “what makes people tick” better than a rifleman.]	
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff	Absolutely, good variety. If one wasn’t suited to go out, they would manage everything on the FOB. Young men and women on tactical foot patrols only way to get their information. One that worked with us. I think he was an anthropologist, tour guide in China, fluent in Dari 2 years in Afghanistan.	[Response written for this question was identical to another interviewee... I pull information from other sections to discuss skills more generally] Smart enough to talk to company commanders; Academic background wasn’t important to him more important if had an interest	



	<b>Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]</b>	<b>Skills – most effective</b>	<b>Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]</b>
	He was able to speak without an interpreter most of the time. Others were very flexible going out on extended patrol, very adaptive. Very important.	in this. Felt they had an interest and a knack for doing that kind of work.	
Battalion Cdr.	Give them a 90. Ones he worked with came in with an open mind. When he explained what they can do wanted them first to find the information in continuity books and research and then he wanted HTT to go with platoon to see if information was still valid.	N/A	Would like them to come in with an open mind and give capabilities brief and ask “what can I provide for you” – felt they were demanding “you need to take me here and there” other teams were different – personality. [HTT seemed anxious to be on the ground instead of doing research first on information already collected.
Division staff	[response moved to –skills lacking column]	Getting out and doing interviews, when focused properly, down and dirty guy on street and leaders at local levels and building relations – that was most effective brigade level. At division HTAT - taking results and refining analyses. Felt biggest skill set lacking was the ability and knowledge of military decision making process.	The ability and knowledge of military decision making process (e.g. how do staff work a problem out). HTT didn’t know the difference between G3 and G4 (operations and logistics). To be effective have

	<b>Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]</b>	<b>Skills – most effective</b>	<b>Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]</b>
			to understand everything about the team.
Brigade Cdr.	Stated yes – right mix. [Also included info from Q6] HTT – team leaders were retired officers, PHD/ military officers and PhD anthropologists, also had research analysts as team members but were not as valuable.	Felt most effective use of their skills was following commanders lead.	
Battalion Cdr.	They probably did [have a good mix of skills] but didn't interact enough to say about the ones at the battalion.	AFGHANISTAN – J2XO, that was his job – brigade commander – HUMINT might be a logical link, They're at the tip of the spear in terms of interacting with the population. Not – most beneficial for them to link up the S2 shop.	
Brigade Cdr.	"I think the strengths – the fact that they had team members with personal experience in Iraq was critical. Team member was an Iraqi American; anthropologist reviewing Arab culture was critical..... Analysts on HTT isn't going to provide extra than regular analysts , unless has requisite experience that makes them value added."	[Not explicitly asked – but other skills he discussed in the interview included:] His HTT had an Arab Am. physician who was "superbly capable of making personal relationships" – understanding agendas at play. Due to relationships HTT had with locals they facilitated him getting inside and to gain access to certain Iraqi leaders that he may not have had access to.	
Battalion Cdr.	Thought they had the right mix of skills but not enough [I think he was referring to enough people]. The academics to write the reports, analyze and knew the questions to ask.	Most effective use of skills: when they talked with ordinary people; he used that information to confirm what he was finding out there through his engagements. "Like sitting	

	Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]	Skills – most effective	Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]
		in a coffee shop talking to people – that is what I value – I couldn't do that because I'm a power figure, I can't stroll in the coffee shop and ask people questions...they [HTT] could and they got very good information." HTT may skills will not be the most effective if the brigade picks the wrong area for them to focus on.	
Brigade Cdr.	I don't know enough about them.		
Brigade Cdr.	Needed someone with a strong academic background or strong experience in the regional background. Felt either one would be great value and very different – “not worried about personality it wasn't personality”. Needed [We need someone with a]...discipline more focused on political science or international relations – [that would be] very valuable to commanders on the ground.	N/A	[Information was taken from other places in the interview:] They weren't flexible to adjust the team to meet demand of the unit or brigade – “the team leader was wed to idea of keeping the team together instead of focusing on commanders.” He also had issues with the method HTT used for data collection (can't take a western survey and use in a middle eastern society).
Division G3	Right people for job? Retired detective – did link	Most valuable skills: “That is hard. I think the sociologist	



	<b>Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]</b>	<b>Skills – most effective</b>	<b>Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]</b>
	<p>diagrams effectively – he was probably too ambitious – [I] wanted him to be more of a thinker. The Arab cultural expert – may be an Iraqi citizen but been out of US for long time.</p> <p>As long as a leader can shape them the team can be okay or great – if don't have motivated individuals or great leader – [HTT] may be less than what you expect. The screening process – trying to feel slots, have to build them the best I can.</p>	<p>– just understanding the social aspects, study culture, study people – that is probably the most important...”</p> <p>Most important: They can read people a little better, (American – Caucasian spoke Arabic) impressed the Iraqis – able to talk to them and had a dialogue focused at answering question – knew how to talk to them and from social perspective as infantry officer – had a different slant on things – recommend how to think about things — gave good and accurate perspectives in her reports in a short time.</p>	
Brigade Cdr.	<p>Initially it was fine, as progressed throughout the year thought “do we need to adjust skill set?” They could reachback, but problem is that there is no situational awareness and assessment for now – good for historical [information]. I think overtime the point I made – is adjusting the composition of the HTT to match the capabilities needed.</p> <p>From combat to stability to rule of law, can plug and play capabilities over the year.</p> <p>Instead of here is 5 HTT guys for a year, instead as thinks the people should change based on needs.</p>	<p>[This was not explicitly asked]</p> <p>HTT at brigade have to be jacks of all trade – they should know culture and economics, HTT should train at NRC – and get awareness before – Mission readiness center/combat training.</p>	
MCIA	HTT has a good start. There should be an added asset that	The ability to operate as a non-military unit; “the	

	<b>Skills – right mix [Some interpreted as the right mix of people on the team – other focused on the skills HTT were lacking]</b>	<b>Skills – most effective</b>	<b>Skills – lacking [not typically asked explicitly]</b>
	is able to collect and report HUMINT information to the IC – info may not reach all channels of Intel community because of this.	civilian face of the team is more approachable than that of the typical military face the local population is accustomed to seeing”. “HTT has several extremely capable and educated individuals that are highly trained in knowing the culture and the people of the area they are researching; however, they lack the self supporting security and collection assets of a military unit.”	
MCIT	Felt they had a good mix of skills to complete the mission		

Table B-6: HTT Skills (Uniqueness, Overlap, and Incorporation into the Military)

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
Brigade Cdr.	What HTT brings is that they can have all the different components (skill sets) together as part of one team, the military may have all the pieces e.g. FAOs, the analysts etc but they are not brought together in the same way that HTT is brought together.	All those FAOs, are not trained in the cultural, geographical historical background to provide you with that perspective. An analyst can read history or look at info he receives, but doesn't have cultural historical background context lenses for looking at what is going on. FAOs – not available at the brigade level.	The elements are there in the military, the FAO, intel, analysts, IO all those are there, it is a matter of pulling all those capabilities in the team and I think that is what [HTT] team does— pulls all those skill sets together.	Should the team be military vs civilian: Ultimately the HTT team is very useful, a lot of capabilities are within military, weakness of [HTT] team is that members.... all depends with how familiar they are with the structure and procedures used by the military and it takes time for them to understand how the military operates. If had active duty team effectiveness would go up exponentially.
Brigade S2	HTT could talk to tribal leaders –intel analyst wouldn't do that because of mission set. Military folks can't go out and talk to whoever	Initially there is overlap in the background information (e.g. cultural attributes) that HTT and the analyst have; however, during the deployment the military analyst	They integrate HTT skills into training to a degree, military doesn't have time to do engagement 24-	Doesn't have a preference regarding who runs HTT – stated that civilian provide a



	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	they want, there is more structure. HTT has more flexibility. A few of the people on the team were native speakers. – stated that civilian provide a different lexicon from the military and that is great, Some have a wealth of knowledge – more than analyst would have.	doesn't have the time to go out and prove or disprove or gather additional information (e.g. cultural, economical, political); however, the HTT can go and gather this additional info.	7 (response to question about integrating HTT skills into military training).	different lexicon from the military and that is great, Some have a wealth of knowledge – more than analyst would have.
Battalion Cdr.	HTT provided info on the tribe's history & relationships – felt they had a unique ability to reach into the population and find the population's issues quickly. PsyOps does messaging, and needs info from HTTs, but they don't know how to engage locals – non-lethal targeting requires different skill set than lethal targets- there is no training in the military on how to interact with local people.		N/A	N/A
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff		Didn't overlap at all, they were filling a void; not one time did I say to	Absolutely; training us how to do their job?	Importance of having a civilian, green

	7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians	7f. Overlap/Duplication	7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military	7h. Should be incorporated?
		myself oh, I've heard that from somebody else. We had cultural advisors, but their skills were unique, they spoke about it in a different way, not redundant.	Should this be fully staffed by civilians? No not a green suit. Our job is to destroy, having that civilian there... I think it's better having civilians that were tied up doing army stuff. They should be integrated into MCO, have a battalion level social scientists, constantly giving me reports, areas we could potentially go to, giving us historical context. Getting guys to think out of the box. Green suits would lose a little bit. Army training would water it down. Lose something. Better than nothing, but lose something.	suiter concentrating on the enemy. Give a people centric perspective. It's essential, cannot be filled by any green suiter.
Battalion Cdr.	Yes – from the education they have – it would be hard press for the army to have that experience. Had guys with doctors	No didn't see as being redundant – saw as second set of eyes – they worked very well together – tight knit group – they had daily interaction together...that helped out	[I] think the military could easily run the HTT. One issue was that – sometime had a social scientists –	It would be difficult to be purely military active duty.

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	and PhD – social science, PhD economics, agricultural – they were very educated.	a lot. Wasn't redundant.	they didn't have a military background and others did, didn't take too long to get. The army could conduct the mission.	
Division staff	Unique skills they bring is how they look at the problem – they don't just look at targeting bad guys – also look at what are social grievances that are associated with what they think. HTT brings psychological - anthropological – different perspective, what is really going on and give commander advice on how to mitigate grievances.	Sometimes civil affairs and psych/Ops guys, but noting that I would consider a waste; need a certain level of duplication to make sure not missing stuff.... If totally relying on one team for everything.		If integrated HTT skills into military – lose the ability to capture the academic portion. Typically military training, operations, lends themselves to this training, but I think we would miss the point. The point is to get a civilian perspective from academics on the battle field – that is niche that HTT does. Civil affairs does a lot, key leader engagement but LOST perspective



	7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians	7f. Overlap/Duplication	7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military	7h. Should be incorporated?
				when have purely a military guy doing that function ...it would be bad. Spend more time with civilians training them on military (e.g., more adaptable and flexible more team players, integration). Don't make military guys more civilian.
Brigade Cdr.	HTT skills do not exist in the Army – no one in the military has the job to do what the HTT did – there is a great need for more people to do this job.			
Battalion Cdr.		Did not overlap. Location – if they have been in the SCIF we would have benefitted much more, and I could have better measured what my analysts lacked and what they brought – Team non-Lethal THIS IS WHERE THEY SAT. Not in the 2 shop – good spot for them but analysts should have been in the SCIF.		Language, and culture – if we put them in green suits we can sustain this, we need them to be able to get into the culture, either in the states or abroad that they can

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
				immerse themselves on a daily basis – green suits it doesn't work. Need the guy to be culturally immersed – that's not reportable like jumping out of a plane. Not confident the army can properly manage these people – data collectors, the army loses control. Not confident that the army has a better plan, we'd still need those people and skills to do the job.
Brigade Cdr.	What HTT brings that is not present on intel staff – special cultural sociological skills, not really taught in our training programs. HTT was specific to Iraq and area operated in. Had level of specificity. In most cases HTT non-	I had no FAOs – in tactical brigades none – if had FAO, may have had skills duplicated. Standard analyses, link/ network may overlap with intel staff. To a degree, some aspects of HTT supported by interpreters – Americans with clearances who were normally of Iraqi descent – provided some cultural insight with	The answer is yes, but lose something. Value of HTT is that they are not in the military. HTT value – the lower end of spectrum of conflict – understanding dynamics. "Value of HTT –	Values that HTT is civilian. Doesn't think that the HTT should become more like the military.

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	military – that was helpful – good to have that. Helpful to have those views, team members were civilians – non-military view points. HTT – when interact with community – talk to local leadership and not in uniform and not in a weapon and more approachable than military. With in-staff processes – military it is structured and effected to make analyzed decision – civilians in the mix – freed up by staff process, HTT can think out side of the box and that may not be apparent to other military staff.	personal experience even though not academic. Overlap with analysts has been mentioned before.	outside of military model in some ways” Challenge is not to change their structure but to educate officers to the value of bringing in other perspectives. Adapt military.	
Battalion Cdr.	HTT were able to get out on the ground, intel analysts sit in room and analyze other people’s reports. The FAO – they are at strategic level at embassy. Civilian vs. military – HTT? I like having civilians because when they meet	The MI [military intelligence] – methodology debate – debate over the role of HTT and that they are not supposed to be intelligence. Some things HTT did were similar to MI analysts in the diagrams, computer programs, and reports. But they used different sources (unclass vs class and HTT used personal	Can incorporate HTT skills at the Lt./ /junior company officer level - he relied on junior officers for engagements but they ask leading questions – they need to be trained on interviewing	Civilian vs military – HTT? I like having civilians because when they meet with Iraqi civilians they are not talking to a soldier, they are not dressed like a



	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	with Iraqi civilians they are not talking to a solider, they are not dressed like a solider and interact with HTT in a different way. If I wanted that capability in green clothes, trained them and send them out and do that.	engagements). – Didn't see this as duplication. Some overlap with interpreters – they knew about the culture more than how an academically trained sociologist from the US, but they were not really academics. Analyses wise – the interpreter would use “gut” and not facts for analyses].	skills that HTT has At the analyst level – “we are on parity in terms of techniques use”. The analysts [HTT and intel analyst] share information — how to network – they don't need to be trained on the skills that the HTT have. At a sr. level – field grade – the cultural – generic framework for culture- how do cultures work- how power is used shared or distributed? We come from America and understand how power flows [in the US] - when go there [to Iraq] if trying to apply the same method [as you would in the US] then you will fail – [need] holistic approach to figuring out how things work,	solider and interact with HTT in a different way. If I wanted that capability in green clothes, trained them and send them out and do that. . The issues with having civilians – is them having their own opinions (with military – your opinion doesn't count) their [the HTT team member's] ideology may impact their opinion – “the war is wrong” and that impacts their product – downside to using their products. With military – just want facts.

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
			mechanics of culture. [Based on the notes I have, it is not clear if he thinks that the senior level individuals need this type of training or not].	
Brigade Cdr.	In general, I think the concept is very sound in what they [the HTT] are doing; critical to their success is gaining the trust of the unit they will be assigned to early on.	Yes,[ I think there is overlap] I think some of it is intel and some [with] analysts, some operations and psychological affairs. However, military folks are more generalists. HTT brings more detail, experience and reach back capabilities.		
Brigade Cdr.	Value of Civilian for Human Terrain? Because civilians are part of the team...it gives them a different perspective on the program, instead of just a soldier – that is what every organization needs and welcomes.	He doesn't see overlap as a problem – his problem is that the HTT was acting as their own "stand alone" team and they weren't incorporated in with the command's effort – as a result it ended up with duplication of efforts – he saw this as different from overlap.	In regards to incorporating HTT skills into military training – he felt that understanding the cultural environment is already part of the military training "we train on this constantly."	"I think its a way to go [have military in the field doing the job of HTT] – whether it is civilian or DoD – DoD needs to do it- I don't think it should be contracted out and I believe that even at the lower level uniform folks can do it." "I don't think HTT is valuable is to have – I think

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
				the function to analyze human terrain is essential, my unit we did that". Having a civilian advisor given a specific location, mission deployment would be helpful to help make up for lack of training in real time exercise. Value of Civilian for Human Terrain? Because civilians are part of the team...it gives them a different perspective on the program, instead of just a soldier – that is what every organization needs and welcomes.
Division G3	There are none- they all have the	You also have in Army – the red team – purpose is	Yes ...in a lifetime of	No, I don't think the



	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	<p>same skills - view primary mission of HTT to be long term data base managers of the societal aspects of the area they operate in. Majority of military – culturally lacking because most people don't interact with many cultures – nothing in the Army that trains them to be culturally aware. HTT was something to fill that void. HTT – has improved commander ability to be culturally aware. Now HTT normally speaks about the impact of local people, but 4 years ago it was the brigade commander.</p>	<p>an advisor to commander and staff – to look at what they are doing from an enemies' perspective... basically a human terrain team. Become cultural and society experts and gov experts so that we can advise and made recommendations. Thinks this may duplicate HTT efforts. Both part of Leavenworth.</p>	<p>training. If look at everyone that deploys – most commanders put out reading lists – how many are about culture? [culture is not the focus of the commanders]. In the first Calvary division – they hired cultural advisors for every combat battalion in the division, the brigade had an advisor – who lived with them for an entire year - helped shaped the exercise, role played interviews, -gave feedback. Taught them how to get through Iraq – but not part of standard military training. There is a need to develop the military to be culturally aware.</p>	<p>military should do it [in the field doing the job of HTT] from perspective of – see them [HTT] more tied to the state department more than military.</p>
Brigade Cdr.	<p>Intel collection – regardless of what you call it, is gathering info</p>	<p>There are like skill sets in Army, we have overlap. Overlap doesn't bother me- they are not wearing a</p>	<p>That's the point about integrating into mission</p>	

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
	about the environment (high value targets, who are placing bombs), but [Intel] is not good at talking to Iraqis in the neighborhoods. S2 probably won't get info that HTT could be privy to. HTT isn't constrained by a boundary. HTT can give perspectives on relationships, networks and links. I think it is great [having civilians]. I think we need to be more comfortable in the Army with civilians working within us ...they give perspective but they need to understand the military culture.	uniform and not in military. Both may see the exact same thing but interpret it differently.	readiness, get them [HTT] embedded. If commander thinks it is important it will get done. The ones slide off to side that is why HTT doesn't get used.	
MCIA	The added benefit of a trained social scientist and individuals that are deeply familiar with local customs and historical facts that may otherwise be unknown to the average military operator.		The MCIT is testing this theory. It is difficult to implement training to a military unit over a period of a few short months that an HTT brings as lifelong skills. I	

	<b>7e. Skills not provided by other in military/Value of Civilians</b>	<b>7f. Overlap/Duplication</b>	<b>7g. Can Skills be Incorporate into Military</b>	<b>7h. Should be incorporated?</b>
			don't think any amount of pre-deployment training can replace what the HTT processes naturally.	
MCIT	Team was well rounded, & the "quality of linguists that the team had was most impressive, allowing them to engage with locals and key leaders in a manner that is sometimes not accomplished by military units." The fact that the HTT operates in civilian clothing I believe gave them an edge in the area we were operating in. This does not imply that this works every time, but it did for this instance.		Yes, our team has had some of the same training, and I believe the overlap is critical. The advantage we have in uniform is the access and acceptance that is sometimes not provided to civilians, so a mix of military and civilian personnel on a HTT team would be a better combination.	



Table B-7: Recruiting and Training

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
Brigade Cdr.	Discussed having the unit & HTT team train together prior to deployment. "Team has opportunity to see how military conducts operations and what to expect from the brigade combat team". They will start to develop relationships with each other prior to deployment.	You can't just provide more general cultural training; need more specific training to the region you are going – e.g., the key players, and specific information on the region - anything from economics to population centers, key tribals or key tribes in their region.	Emphasized that there needs to be more training of HTT on the military structure, operations and objectives. Felt they should understand the military campaign plan [also mentioned in another interview] – so team can understand how they can fit in.	Didn't really comment on the extent to which it was an issue.	The HTS should know the specialties of the HTT members and when the teams are formed HTS should send people to the regions that align with their cultural expertise e.g. if an HTT member knows about the relationships between the Sunni and Shiites, it would be better to send them to Bagdad or the north than to Southern Iraq
Brigade S2	Paramount to be teamed up with division early on so expectations can be identified early – get them into pre-deployment training so they		The team that I had – they were prepared they were already in theater and we got them from another area Not sure what type of training they had.	She didn't report an issue with their training. Felt team was prepared.	

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
	can be better prepared....and first few months is not figuring out what the commander wants.		How was there knowledge of military? It was adequate – team lead was ex military so yes.		
Battalion Cdr.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff			Understood how to defend themselves and trained on our equipment just like they were one of the soldiers, they kind of blended in Former field guy and his pre-deployment training he blended in nicely, we went over some SOPs that's all.	They didn't report an issue with their training.	
Battalion Cdr.			"I think, I'm not sure what type of training they had but I think..., from what I saw training they saw was adequate". "As Battalion commander – didn't interact as much... I	He didn't report an issue with their training.	

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
			thought they were well trained."		
Division staff			With regards to training – thought the research and analyses were fine – but thought they needed to broaden integration and knowledge of the military – what are they expected to do to support staff in decision making cycle. Felt HTAT needed "Basic military 101" Felt that there is not a lot of time in training the HTT team and team building. Guys will be in combat environment and he feels they don't do enough at Leavenworth to build a team, build camaraderie - things military based on. Feels they need to bring in successful team	HTAT not trained to look at the information they are getting from the different HTTs and identifying similarities or things that the commanders should be aware of. e.g. 2 HTTs may have indentified a particular person, but will never know because that information is not shared. Another issue is that someone may be trained at Leavenworth to be HTT but when they get to theater may be on the HTAT.	There was a lot of turbulence on the team – talented people had to be sent home.– felt HTS threw people together who didn't work well together. The HTT had a wide range of very smart people but some not suited for the position – recruitment process is difficult – there is high demand and HTS did not think early on of telling people "no thanks". Thinks HTS needs to do more with kicking people out of program that won't cut it in Iraq – they should get them out



	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
			leaders and members to Leavenworth to help with training.		before they deploy.
Brigade Cdr.				With regards to training felt they were all able to do the work – several team members had been in Afghanistan for more than two years. New HTT went on training “check rides” with more experienced HTT.	
Battalion Cdr.			Understanding how to present the information to the commander- there was a lot a struggle with this. Not sure they got great guidance on this – not sure what their lane was. Waiting for guidance – this was partially personality. Commander had a strong personality – so	They were prepared for their niche.	

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
			this was a factor.		
Brigade Cdr.	HTT didn't go through training with brigade – but would have preferred that prior to deployment.		<p>Didn't see their training &amp; not aware of it. "Nothing that I saw on the ground that made me feel that they lack [training]". Team lead had great knowledge of military; some team members didn't have knowledge of military culture...not a problem ... everyone has their skill set. They have to get out and talk and to be comfortable of subordinates moving them around; [HTT] never had any problems with it. Those who moved them around didn't expect them to have military skills and soldiers would provide military security aspects.</p>	He didn't have a problem with their training, nor did he expect that they would have knowledge of military structure – this wasn't an issue for him.	He didn't have any personality issues – he admits it is possible that there may have been personality issues among others, but that personality issues from his perspective did not effect the value of HTT.

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
Battalion Cdr.	Thought training was appropriate – the HTT joined them at NTC. HTT didn't have practical experience so he got them out to work on SOP – how to put into practice. He talked to team leader about things developed at NTC and how they were operating in Iraq – taking from classroom to execution. The problem was that many of the HTT who trained with him at NTC were sent to other places and they “were no longer a team that trained together.”				HTT who went through same training were pulled apart... problem with personality problems experienced in theater – have civilians who say they are done and quit. Another down side to using civilians – they can say I'm done and then we have to back fill.
Brigade Cdr.	As general rule, they need to go to individual replacement task training [I'm not sure if I got the name right] that all IAs go through.	They should come in having done the data mining and preparation and have an understanding of the	Need to understand how to fit into military operations convoy, and have protection equipment.	Team members were okay in term of the training – ones he interacted with.	He had to send one of the Phds home because he was working on his own agenda [This was in the



	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
		operational environment of the unit they intend to support.			first 3 weeks]. [The Phd] went to meetings and [staff would] ask him to do things; from the interactions with his staff they determined the PhD was on his own agenda.
Brigade Cdr.	HTT needs to train with the unit as much as they can before they deploy.	Felt HTT should have more specific country training.			They need someone with a discipline more focused on political science or international relations – thinks that will be very valuable to commanders on the ground.
Division G3			Not sure what training consists of because they are not combat soldiers or making contact with the enemy – can't say that anything was lacking because I don't know what they		

	<b>Predeployment Training</b>	<b>Country Specific training</b>	<b>Military training/Other training</b>	<b>Was training an issue?</b>	<b>Recruiting issues</b>
			did specifically.		
Brigade Cdr.	HTT should train at NRC-Mission readiness center/combat training. Do a mission rehearsal – they want all entities that support the unit (including HTT) replicated. It gives the unit/ commander an idea of what HTT can do. It doesn't have to be the same HTT team during predeployment training but just get exposure and have products integrated.	HTT at brigade have to be jacks of all trade – HTT Need to know where they are going [in Iraq] and should have good mastery of the operation area in – political, economical, security, rule of law ...they should know culture and economics. [prior to deployment].	The HTT are really relying on the unit they are with to get them on board. If HTT understands lines of operation and end state, they can take expertise and provide information to commander, can do that if know the environment they will work. They should have more medical training – if in engagement, should provide life saving measures, some [standard?] military training that they should go through. They give perspective but they need to understand the military culture.		Had heard that some commanders had personality problems – but he didn't have any issues – they were all "user-friendly".
MCIA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
MCIT	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table B-8: HTT Fit

	<b>Staff Structure</b>	<b>Who decided</b>	<b>Who managed</b>	<b>How managed operationally</b>
Brigade Cdr.	They reported to the XO as separate staff section but integrated their work, (weekly meeting with S2, Civil affairs, met on a daily basis)	The XO decided.	HTT Leader	On a daily basis the HTT team lead assigned the HTT Team members work.
Brigade S2	They worked directly for the Fire – Arm staff.	The commander.	Fire support officer.	The fire support officer would coordinate with team lead on the frequency report [I'm not sure what that is?] and areas [off the base] they would go to.
Battalion Cdr.		Not asked.		When HTT visited the battalion HQ, they worked with the non-lethal targeting team. If they were visiting local people, a company or platoon took care of the logistics.
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff	"Didn't really fit in." [It seemed that initially were part of S2 but he wanted them to be own function -S10] Wanted them as a free thinker – not part of the intell function.	Not asked.	Brigade leader	
Battalion Cdr.	Brigade level – reported to S3 and Battalion level	Brigade XO and S3.		"I think at brigade – XO managed but not 100 percent sure. I just had 4 guys attached to my Battalion – anytime we needed them for a mission they were there."



Division staff	G7 - key leader engagement. (maybe changed to G9?). Previously in G2 "[We] didn't want them as another way to catch bad guys."	Commander and chief of staff at division level	He did as the director of civilian capacity cell.	
Brigade Cdr.	They worked for the commander (through the XO). By orders, they are not combined with the intel shop. We sat them with Plans/Fires team.			Either they came up with their own mission and made their own way by "hitchhiking" with some military unit or the Commander tasks them with a specific question and provides transport and protection.
Battalion Cdr.	NON-LETHAL TEAM – couldn't put them in the SCIF clearances to go into SCIF.			Team Lethal Lead – Deputy Commander Over All Non-Lethal. COL-level. Either him or the Commanders. The S7 – IO officer would have been the guy.
Brigade Cdr.	Through XO - they were special staff – did not answer as S2 or S3, from staff perspective. I had deputy commander, functionally divided staff – political economic and social side.	He made decision - alternative would be subordinate to S2; made decision not to put them in S2 b/c didn't want to make them an intel tool –HTT also supports operations & logistic.	My XO.	Team lead [was a ] Col – didn't require a lot of active management.
Battalion Cdr.	Our work under BTC 9 – Civilian Military Operations – worked under staff supervisors.	Commander did.	CMO.	Team leader was supervised by CMO, but under brigade commander.

Brigade Cdr.	Reported to information officer and civilian officer – the XO was responsible for them.	He made decision.	His information officer.	
Brigade Cdr.	They reported to the S2 and also the S3 – organizing the planning and preparation. Team leader was to report to XO. If had an issue – commander related, the XO was designated to handle concerns for attachments belonging to brigade, because I was not readily available	[I think he decided].	S3.	The S3 was the one who analyzed the team and gave day to day advice on where to put them. The team leader would give advice where they thought they [the HTT] should be used – they didn't always agree – sometime there was comprises – sometimes the team used their [the HTT's] methods but then it [the HTT methods] wasn't timely enough or helpful. [There seemed to be some disagreement about how the HTT members should do things].
Division G3	Civil officer – at the brigade - team leader reported to commander – and worked with CMO section. At division level – team worked under team leader, but at division level team leader spoke everything day fire support officer.		HTT leader	The team leader managed them on day-to-day. We had one that couldn't organize and another that was phenomenal. They [the HTT] were less productive when didn't have good team leader, but no one from the military stepped in and acted as a team leader.

Brigade Cdr.	They were linked into the S2 or S3 – reason did that – if put into S2 and put in S3 focus is operations, DOC – is an O6, others were majors. They were integrated into brigade processes.	He did	DOC	
MCIA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
MCIT	The team was working for the RCT staff, and forward deployed to the battalion battlespace in Musa Qal'ah.			



Table B-9. HTT Management

	<b>Question 9: How HTS managed; Any Issues?</b>
Brigade Cdr.	I don't know about that.
Brigade S2	I really am not in position to judge that.
Battalion Cdr.	Not asked.
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff	Not sure how managed back in the states, team leader organized in country, they all kind of worked together, they fed off each other.
Battalion Cdr.	I have no idea.
Division staff	Horribly, TCE (Theater Control Element – intervening level) would move personnel around without asking (e.g. social scientist whines and TCE would move them). The TCE would conduct independent investigations. When send civilians and soldiers downrange they are given to that tactical commander, the HTS was very often guilty of going against the spirit of that relationship. (e.g., conducting sexual harassment assessments without letting me know) – detracting to mission. HTS was no help to me at all.
Brigade Cdr.	
Battalion Cdr.	No. No interactions
Brigade Cdr.	<p>My impression that program was under fire, not management of HTS back in states as much as HTS back in states [wanting to] gain information to maintain efficacy of program. There were many powers that be that honestly were skeptical of program. Leavenworth was trying to justify – they would contact me – I'm a proponent of program.</p> <p>Did you have any issues with the HTS Project Office? No. had no issue with HTS – only interaction was queries about program</p>
Battalion Cdr.	I felt there was a central program that was managing selection and thought it was structured but once I was in theater – there didn't seem to be the same structure. People were taken away and added back, so I'm not sure how it is done in theater – other than the division HTT manager (a retired COL) - he would made the decisions on assignments and reassignment.... and it didn't seem logical that they would tear the teams apart and replace [people] with someone just coming into theater.

Brigade Cdr.	
Brigade Cdr.	I had no direct contact with HTS.
Division G3	We usually worked with team leader if there was an issue. Interacted with HTS a little when trying to get people hired, can't report on how effective HTS was. A few people who went through the process – risks, finances, when got done with program [before leaving for Iraq, determined that] – economically wasn't feasible – surprised... another person I introduced to HTS – once they started working – HTS realized they didn't have a secret clearance and can't be here. They have to have a secret clearance to be on the team – a lot of stuff we do is secret, but technically none of is. Trust interpreters and they knew more about the area 5-6 years (want people on HTT but didn't have clearance so they couldn't join the team).
Brigade Cdr.	No – For me, when someone gives me a unit, when INNU [have not idea what INNU is] brought 6 battalion grew to 9, expected them to be trained in core competencies, my expectation for HTT – don't expect to have to train them. That is why it is important –HTT needs to get up to speed on environment before they get there [to Iraq]. Here is some of the personalities that we see, if come up and have never been to the province, spend a month trying to figure it out, a month is a long time things can change, but if already have foundation of the area makes it easier.
MCIA	N/A
MCIT	N/A

Table B-10. Policy Issues

Brigade Cdr.	I don't recall. They [HTT] did go out and accompany some patrols.
Brigade S2	No, we were able to get them out and able to travel with convoys – main problem was just their pay. [There were issues with team not getting paid and as a result they withheld products in retaliation]. Respondent mentioned earlier that they could not split the HTT into smaller groups and that the HTT template is that they will not be decentralized. Had to work within this template.
Battalion Cdr.	N/A
Battalion Cdr. and S2 staff	No, if anything it was us trying to scale them back
Battalion Cdr.	No.
Division staff	No nothing. There was confusion...catfights between HTAT and TCE on database management, lead to investigations, accusations, it involved – building a database. My team was doing a good job but perspectives on rights ....members of TCE and [I think TCE] sabotaged HTAT database – led to fights. Claimed that it was policy.
Brigade Cdr.	N/A
Battalion Cdr.	No. Policy issues.
Brigade Cdr.	None that impacted me directly. Aware on the anthropological side –ethics of HTT as targeting tools. I wasn't effected, [didn't effect] the teams desire to operate.
Battalion Cdr.	In theater, we had to secure them – their movements everywhere they went, if going to meeting had to provide security but I was willing to pay the price, I know other commanders do not want to pay that price – I would have gladly given support for their work.
Brigade Cdr.	Not familiar.
Brigade Cdr.	I think the one about breaking up the team – I didn't pursue – my brigade XO had plans to redesigned the physical layout and that was met with resistant [from the HTT]. [He really wanted to split the teams up and place HTT individuals where he could best utilize their expertise (e.g. put on with S2, put another one somewhere else). The HTT team leader was resistant to this and he



	had to place the HTT where they could all be as a unit.
Division G3	Not that I can remember, – I thought for a while they were not allowed to leave or live on small bases.... Then what good are you?
Brigade Cdr.	<p>The friction we had was getting other HTT to backfill, not sure if there was a policy, if there was it didn't work. Ask them [HTS] to look at how they man and replace – when other capabilities are there.</p> <p>Had heard that some commanders had personality problems – but he didn't have any issues – they were all “user-friendly”</p> <p>Challenge – they [HTT] got in an accident, 2 months after filled the team. Then the policy – permanent [not sure what the policy was] changed, most of them quit – had one guy, sent him out with unit, he was able to do some work – [with] only one guy wasn't able to do anything at brigade. “Did he help the company commander?... sure” – but [we] wanted someone to cover the entire battle space – need someone more holistic, [we] got a few papers – they weren't what we needed to make decisions to the end state. There was one [HTT] the majority of the time, but the most we had was 3. I don't really know what level of manning [they] got when I gone.</p>
MCIA	N/A
MCIT	N/A



## Appendix C: Other "Human Terrain" Organizations

The following list provides a sample of other organizations that use the term "human terrain." It is representative only—it is not intended as a comprehensive list:

- *National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)* has a Human Terrain Analysis Pilot Project.<sup>162</sup>
- *US Central Command (CENTCOM)* has a Human Terrain Analysis Team working in support of its Afghanistan and Pakistan Center of Excellence.
- *Special Operations Command (SOCOM)* formed a Human Terrain Analysis Team in 2006.
- *Job descriptions for "all-source analysts" or "cultural analysts"*: A variety of other military commands and civilian contractors are seeking analysts who will study the "human terrain" as part of their jobs.
- *Certificate program for "human terrain analysts"*: The Socio-Cultural Intelligence Analysis (SCIA) company offers certificate programs to train "socio-cultural analysts" and "human terrain analysts."<sup>163</sup> Dr. Johnson also teaches a three-day seminar called "Human Terrain Analysis" at George Mason University. This course is part of George Mason University's Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Certificate Program.<sup>164</sup>
- *The Laboratory for Human Terrain at Dartmouth College*: This academic group is working to develop human terrain technology, including computational models and new ways of visualizing the links between people and organizations. It takes a broad definition of "human terrain technology," stating that it "has applications in: international affairs and geopolitics, pre- and post-conflict modeling, culture modeling and dynamics, tactical military operations, e-commerce, online communities, and financial market systems."<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> For more information, see:

<sup>163</sup> [https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/Pathfinder/jan\\_feb\\_10/Documents/Jan\\_Feb\\_pathfinder.pdf](https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/Pathfinder/jan_feb_10/Documents/Jan_Feb_pathfinder.pdf)

<sup>164</sup> <http://www.sciasolutions.com>

<sup>165</sup> [http://www.ocpe.gmu.edu/programs/gis/human\\_terrain.php](http://www.ocpe.gmu.edu/programs/gis/human_terrain.php)

<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~humanterrain/index.html>





# Appendix D: Collective Task List Memo



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND  
HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM  
731 MCCLELLAN AVENUE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 64027-1350

ATIN-HT

03 June 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Human Terrain System (W6GXAA), Training and Doctrine Command

SUBJECT: Human Terrain System (HTS) Collective Task List

BLUF: Attached is the Human Terrain System Collective Task List. Collective tasks primarily guide training; however, HTS is a new and unique organization so this list also identifies, for the first time, what HTS teams do in the field. It is the current and approved document which serves as a reference for how HTS teams conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research in support of deployed units. These processes and tasks supersede previous documents (e.g. task lists and handbooks) and serve as the basis for future doctrinal and training development (see TRADOC Regulation 350-70).

1. Over the last year significant work has gone into researching and developing what HTS deployed teams do in order to support the war-fighter. This project-wide effort utilized data from ongoing debriefs of returning personnel, interviews with deployed teams, Project Development Team reports, HTS staff input, and team products. These sources were the primary inputs that the Operational Planning Team (OPT) examined in order to find and develop lessons learned and best practices. After initial identification and development, the resulting team processes were staffed through returned team members, HTS staff, and other personnel for review. This review recently culminated with the HTS Curriculum Re-design meeting, in February 2010, which brought together over 50 experienced personnel from all areas of HTS to further refine and develop team processes.

2. In order to ensure proper training, management of personnel, and mission success it is vital that all Army units develop a Mission-Essential Task List (METL). A mission-essential task list is a compilation of tasks that an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission (see FM 7-0, Chapter 4). Due to the unprecedented nature of the HTS mission, it was necessary to first develop our individual and collective tasks because there was no existing doctrine covering our unique mission requirements. Using a bottom up approach and the process mentioned above, HTS staff developed an Individual Task List based on team position. From that list a Collective Task List was then derived and organized into Task Groups. This process was done utilizing some of the very same methods which HTS teams employ in the field (e.g. pile-sorting and text analysis) to ensure that it was representative of the cumulative experience of our talented personnel and their deployed activities.

3. The resulting Collective Task List identifies the 7 major task groups in the HTS Research Lifecycle (see task groups 1.2.1 thru 1.2.7) and the 75 tasks, under these groups, that HTS teams do when accomplishing their mission. The concepts and terms utilized in this document establish a common point of departure for all HTS personnel and should bring unity to HTS understanding of what we do to support the war-fighter.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is HTS Doctrine, Mr. Britt Damon at e-mail: [britt.l.damon@us.army.mil](mailto:britt.l.damon@us.army.mil) or COMM: 913-684-3952.

5. Thank you for all that you do, each and every day.

ATTCH:  
Human Terrain System Collective Task List - Version 1.0

  
STEVE FONDACARO  
Project Manager  
Human Terrain System





# Appendix E: Government Fact Sheet

The following text is from the Government Fact Sheet distributed by BAE Systems. It describes the intent to convert the student contractors into government hires, the grading levels, pay, and tax information.

## Government Fact Sheet

### **Human Terrain System – Transition of personnel to Government Service**

*\*The information contained in this document was provided by the United States government in regards to the Human Terrain Systems Program. For further information please contact the government civilian personnel office.*

### BAE Temporary Hires and transition to IA positions

**In response to the Government's desire to hire deploying HTS teams as Term-IA employees in order to mitigate the risks and issues that surround the Iraqi SOFA agreement, the following plan is being put into place:**

1. BAE will continue to recruit and select HTS Candidates as temporaries during the initial CONUS training period at Fort Leavenworth which will allow:
  - Candidates to be afforded the same protections and privileges as the deployed US Military forces.
  - HTS Candidates to begin classes in an expeditious and orderly fashion.
  - The training and assessment of potential deploying HTS candidates/teams.
  - Time for the necessary Term-IA transition paperwork, physical, and clearance processing to occur for Candidates that are qualified and selected to deploy in an HTS role.
  - A better transition and hand-off between BAE and the Government.

**The Government's intention is that all Human Terrain System Team positions deployed in theatre are to be filled as Government Service, NTE 14 Month Term Hires positions**

- Government Term Hire = Department of the Army government civilian position with all privileges and protections, valid for a period not to exceed 14 months but can be extended up to 4 years. It is not a permanent IA position.
- Contract personnel in HTS training will be considered for Government service upon successful completion of HTS training criteria, meeting the medical requirements for deployed civilian personnel, the requirement for obtaining and maintaining SECRET level security clearance, and the acceptance of an emergency essential position (E-E).

**Government service mitigates a number of issues currently detracting from mission execution:**

- Medical care will be provided by local military medical services.
- Government term hires are afforded the same protections from prosecution by local national law as are uniformed military personnel.
- Government hires fall under the same legal requirements as uniformed personnel and with the support of the command may carry weapons if approved.
- Creates a much closer relationship with the Soldiers in the units we support.
  - Enables partnership on all operational planning and discussion.
  - Eliminates overt/covert friction w/ military based on ingrained, negative stereotypes of contractors.
  - Higher status for all in theater support (e.g. intra-theater military airlift).

### **Details for Basic IA pay rates**

1. **Basic Pay** is the common denominator for Danger Pay and Post Differential Pay computations. Actual pay received will include Base Pay + locality pay (see para 3).

2. **Government civilian grades, entry levels, basic annual salary are as follows:**
  - Human Terrain Analyst IA-0101-03 \$60,274
  - Human Terrain Specialist IA-0101-03 \$71,674
  - Social Scientist IA-0101-04 \$84,697 or \$98,812  
(depending on qualifications)
  - Supervisory Terrain Specialist IA-0101-05 \$99,628
3. **Locality Pay:** Actual IA Pay rates. Because you will all be assigned to Ft. Leavenworth, KS, you will be authorized an additional 14.16% of basic pay rate, as locality pay.  
Actual annual salary is as follows:
  - Human Terrain Analyst IA-0101-03 \$68,809
  - Human Terrain Specialist IA-0101-03 \$81,823
  - Social Scientist IA-0101-04 \$96,690 or \$112,804
  - Supervisory Terrain Specialist IA-0101-05 \$113,735
4. **Danger Pay:** By law, 35% of basic pay annually (see para 2) above)
5. **Post Differential Pay:** By law, 35% of basic pay annually (see para 2) above).
6. **Overtime Pay:** Overtime pay up to 20 hours per week is authorized and will be computed at the standard rates (in para 3 above), by grade. Time and a half rate for overtime does not apply because Federal employees overseas are exempt from the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Therefore, the overtime hourly rates listed at the government website do not apply to government employees stationed overseas. By law, the only band authorized a separate overtime hourly rate is IA-3 and then only those at the GGE11 level or below.
7. **Compensatory Time:** All additional hours worked on mission over and above the 60 hours per week authorized, will be covered on an hour for hour basis as compensatory time that can be taken upon return to CONUS as paid time off. It will be computed against the annual pay cap at the hourly rate, by grade (in para 3).
8. **Federal Pay Cap:** Federal pay is currently capped by law at \$212,100 annually. This means no Federal employee can receive compensation that exceeds this figure in a single calendar year. This includes all pays combined (danger, post differential, salary, compensatory time etc). Any amount earned in the calendar year that exceeds this amount will be deferred payment until the next calendar year (where it will count against the same pay cap for that year). This becomes a significant issue only for the rare individual who begins government service on 1 Jan and remains in status overseas through 30 Dec.
9. All the above figures are valid before elective decisions on medical/dental, insurance, and the Federal Spend Thrift Plan (government 401K equivalent) are made by all employees, each to suit their own personal situation. These decisions will result in associated deductions to salary due each pay period. Compensation deducted for elective benefits or tax purposes still counts against the Federal cap (per para 8) above.
10. **Tax:** Under federal law, government civilian salary earned overseas is subject to federal tax. Tax exemptions on salary earned overseas in war zones currently enjoyed by contractors and uniformed Soldiers have not yet carried over into law for government civilians.
11. **Potential Annual Earnings as Government Term Hire:** \$236,160 (Exceeds pay cap.  
However, consider that a standard max tour in theater is 9 months, and this cap is avoided.)

**\*\* This does not count compensatory time for all hours over and above 60 hours/week, and before deductions for tax, and elective benefits options.**



### **HELPFUL LINKS AND INFORMATION**

**Army Benefits Center – Civilian (ABC-C) – Information, Links, and Enroll in FEHB (60 day limit), FEGLI (31 day limit), and TSP Contribution (no time limit)** [www.abc.army.mil](http://www.abc.army.mil), or by phone at 1-877-276-9287

**Federal Employee Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP) (60 day limit)**

General Information: 1-866-639-3917

Enrollment: 1-877-888-FEDS (1-877-888-3337), TTY 1-877-889-5680

[www.benefeds.com](http://www.benefeds.com)

**Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) – Plans and Premium Information**

[www.opm.gov/insure/06/](http://www.opm.gov/insure/06/)

**Federal Employee Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) – Information and Premium Calculator**

[www.opm.gov/insure/life/](http://www.opm.gov/insure/life/)

**Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) – Information, Account Access, and Fund Allocations**

Phone: 1-TSP-YOU FRST or 1-877-968-377 [www.tsp.gov/](http://www.tsp.gov/)

**Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) – Information**

[www.opm.gov/retire/html/library/fers](http://www.opm.gov/retire/html/library/fers).

**My Pay – Leave and Earning Statements** <https://mypay.dfas.mil/>

**Civilian Personnel On Line (CPOL) – Employment, Resumes and Additional Information**

[www.cpol.army.mil](http://www.cpol.army.mil)

### **Support Action Group:**

- During the transition process, the following key personnel will provide additional assistance and support in answering any questions you might have.
- Please submit any questions via e-mail and a response will be provided within 24 hours:
  - Carina Miller, HR, HTS  
[Carina.miller@us.army.mil](mailto:Carina.miller@us.army.mil)  
or
  - Robert Hart, DCIPS Program Manager  
[Bob.hart1@us.army.mil](mailto:Bob.hart1@us.army.mil)  
or
  - CPT Williams POC info  
[Jolvy77@jricp@osis.gov](mailto:Jolvy77@jricp@osis.gov) or [James.e.williams6@us.army.mil](mailto:James.e.williams6@us.army.mil)  
or
  - CPT Nathan Gardner POC info  
[Jolvx03@jricp.osis.gov](mailto:Jolvx03@jricp.osis.gov) or [Nathan.gardner@us.army.mil](mailto:Nathan.gardner@us.army.mil)

*\*The information contained in this document was provided by the United States government in regards to the Human Terrain Systems Program. For further information please contact the government civilian personnel office.*





# Appendix F: Position Descriptions for Human Terrain Teams

This appendix contains Position Descriptions for the Team Leader, Social Scientist, Research Manager, and Human Terrain Analyst positions.

## *Team Leader Position*

Position Description

PD#: ST335723

Replaces PD#:

Sequence#: VARIES

SUPERVISORY HUMAN TERRAIN SPECIALIST

IA-0101-05

Servicing CPAC: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERS - CENTRALIZED, FORT HUACHUCA, AZ

Agency: VARIES

Army Command: VARIES

Command Code: VARIES Region: WEST

Citation 1: OPM SERIES DEF., GS-101, AUG 2002

Citation 2: CIPMS PGS, PART 3 FOR SUPV/MGRL POSITIONS, JUN 90

Citation 3: CIPMS GUIDE FOR CLASSIFYING GS POSNS, PT 2, APPEN A, JUN 90

PD Library PD: NO

COREDOC PD: NO

Classified By: MAXIE MCFARLAND (MIB)

Classified Date: 02/02/2010

FLSA: EXEMPT

Drug Test Required: VARIES

DCIPS PD: YES

Career Program: 16

Financial Disclosure Required: NO

Acquisition Position: NO

Functional Code:

Requires Access to Firearms: VARIES

Interdisciplinary: NO

Competitive Area: VARIES

Position Sensitivity: VARIES

Security Access: VARIES

Competitive Level: VARIES

Target Grade/FPL: 05

Career Ladder PD: NO

Emergency Essential: YES

Bus Code: VARIES

Personnel Reliability Position: VARIES

Information Assurance: N

Influenza Vaccination:

PD Status: VERIFIED

Position Duties:

This is a DCIPS position. Supervises and leads all aspects and functions of the Human Terrain team (HTT) to ensure mission accomplishment. Serves as Brigade or higher Command Staff's primary spokesperson responsible for direct support to unit decision-making by integrating the team products into operations and the military decision making process (MDMP).

1. Defines, with the social scientist, critical socio-cultural topics and initiates comprehensive and unique and complex research efforts on relevant topics. Directs all aspects of Human Terrain Team activities by leading a Human Terrain System team in all phases and types of socio-cultural primary source research (data collected directly by HTT) and secondary source research (data collected from completed research of others) and analysis. In collaboration with the social scientist, supervises research functions and sets quality standards for the research, analysis, and writing of the team. Approves or returns for revision all studies and other documents produced by the team for distribution. Responsible for the technical soundness of all studies, which involve specialized research of an extremely high intellectual level. Oversees team efforts ensuring integrity of methodologies and approaches across the teams. Defines overall analytical objectives in relation to existing or proposed policy and identifies required analytical resources. Forecasts information gaps and initiates development of comprehensive research efforts to address these gaps. Evaluates the Human Terrain against friendly and enemy courses of action. Provides operational support, guidance and expertise to enable the team to conduct primary and secondary social science research. Applies experimental social-cultural theories and mitigating strategies to problems not susceptible to treatment by accepted methods. Develops new research methodologies in assessing the effect of military operations on the local populace and predict the effects on possible future military operations. During the research planning and design process, evaluates resources, determines feasible research efforts, identifies mission requirements, evaluates the research environment, and establishes timelines. During the pre-mission planning phase, performs mission analysis, coordinates with the supported unit, tasks, organizes the team, and oversees logistical support. Approves and disseminates cultural products to include assessments and informational reports. Serves as the primary interface between the HTT and the unit commander. The employee makes decisions or recommendations significantly changing, interpreting, or developing important policies and program. 40%
2. Ensures the integration of Human Terrain into the planning processes. Provides Human Terrain estimates to the unit commander during initial mission analysis. Briefs staff on pertinent socio-cultural effects in the area of operations. Assist the BCT staff in developing courses of action (COA). Represents the Human Terrain team during planning meetings. Analyze orders to determine the commander's intent in reference to the Human Terrain. Provides direct support to unit decision-making by integrating the team into operations and the military decision making process (MDMP). Throughout this process teams aid commanders and staff by providing insight into first, second, and third order effects, providing situational awareness and developing mitigation strategies. Extensively interprets broad and at times non-existing guidance to develop applications of socio-cultural information to specific areas of the MDMP. Presents and defends socio-cultural data and findings, controversial issues, policy matters and major socio-cultural trends and changes. Provides authoritative advice on the research's effect and feasibility on military operations to win support from outside agencies for the HTS's programs. Identifies known supported unit socio-cultural information requirements, the most effective way to integrate into the MDMP, and the most effective products to communicate research findings and recommendations. In addition to the production and dissemination of the socio-cultural products, recommends most effective utilization of products for the integration of socio-cultural information to support military intelligence decision making process. Performs long-range planning in support of existing and projected organizational mission requirements. Make assessments as to overall resource capability to answer existing/projected requirements, and identifies resource shortfalls. Ensures that the team meets supported unit requirements. In conjunction with other members of the team, participates during working groups and mission planning. Coordinates within the command and with staffs at all applicable levels. 25%
3. Supervises the team's efforts, integrating the HTT into the BDE and/or higher level staff and ensuring that collected information is utilized in the military decision-making processes. Ensures the HTT integrates its activities with the Brigade's missions and unit movements. Supervises, manages, and coordinates personnel and resources. Executes the full range of human resources supervisory functions, and enforces regulations and policies governing



prohibited personnel practices. Coordinates with HTS Staff on all pertinent matters, including the Program Management Office Forward and HTS Operations Directorate. Fosters input from all contributing team members, resolves intra-team conflict, and mentors and coaches team members. Ensures the maintenance of an effective affirmative action program. Directs, coordinates, and monitors group activities to ensure timely and effective completion of work; provides coaching, mentoring, and timely and constructive feedback to HTT team members and HTS staff to develop their full potential; motivates HTT team members, inspires work ethic and dedication, and obtains cooperation and commitment toward the group's goals; encourages creative tension and differences of opinions; anticipates and takes steps to prevent counterproductive confrontations; manages and resolves conflicts and disagreements in a constructive manner; develops and maintains collaborative working relationships with others; works with others to achieve goals; encourages and facilitates cooperation and group identity; develops and maintains effective networks, coalitions, and liaison relationships with others. Fully responsible for the technical aspects of research process and products. Has authority to alter the organization of work within the team in order to accomplish research objectives, and guides subordinates in the achievement of assigned research tasks. 25%

4. In conjunction with other members of the team, produces documents, products, and briefings for the military unit as required and presents them at to the supported unit and other audiences. Provides unit specific and relevant socio-cultural training as requested. Reviews products for accuracy, relevance, timeliness, soundness of analysis and adherence to both commander's intent and the broad guidelines of national policy. Identifies requirements for new data bases and information sources. 10% Performs other duties as assigned.
5. **FACTOR A. GUIDELINES Degree A-5, 95 Points** Exercises a very high degree of originality and sound judgment in formulating, evaluating, and monitoring HTS research due to the nature of the guidelines available for the conduct of human terrain research and tasks which enter uncharted areas of social science research and applications.. When new research products are developed, there are no precedents/guidelines on which to base or predict expected results and none that can be used to develop appropriate criteria, methods, procedures, and techniques especially as they apply to the MDMP. Basic guidance comes from the commander of the supported unit and the Activity and often there is limited guidance regarding how vaguely stated requirements are to be translated into concrete recommendations for courses of action in support of military operations. Exercises judgment and ingenuity for recurrent requirements for the supervision of the research portion of extremely sensitive and creative programs in support of national policy. Guides team in the analysis of unique problems, and in developing new and improved techniques and methods to adapt HTS' mission to foreign policy objectives.
6. **FACTOR B. SCOPE AND VARIETY OF OPERATIONS B-2/3, 85 points** Incumbent directs and coordinates a number of different activities in support of the needs of the supported unit. Responsible for planning and supervising the work of an element or work center for which the programs and objectives are clearly defined and the organizational structure of the team is fully established. Supervises work in the social sciences requiring knowledge of various social sciences. Incumbent is responsible for the quality and timeliness of all research products that are released by the team. Must often shift work assignments and adjust organizational structure to accommodate sudden changes in work priorities dictated by unpredictable events. Responsible for efficient management of employees, often in a high pressure environment.
7. **FACTOR C. WORK RELATIONSHIPS C-5, 95 Points** With respect to research and analysis, incumbent represents the Activity in all forms and at all levels as required for the purpose of discussing policy matters and major changes in program emphasis. Provides authoritative advice on their effect and feasibility, to gain necessary cooperation and support, or to persuade to action. Assessment of the Activity's capabilities in those spheres is authoritative. Once a position is settled upon internally, incumbent is expected to win support from outside agencies for the Activity's programs. Regular person-to-person work contacts are maintained with officials within the Activity and with staff officers and planners at all levels from the brigade, division through the theater command, Department of Defense, and National Agency



levels. The last category includes meetings and liaison with officials at the Department of State, DIA, and CIA. Contacts with general officers and their civilian equivalents are not infrequent. When called upon, helps to develop and present the Activity's position to bodies as high as the National Security Council, and to high officials, both American and foreign, in the United States and abroad. Maintains regular contact with nationally recognized members of the academic community.

8. **FACTOR D. SUPERVISION-EXERCISED D-3, 95 Points** Provides for all Of the personnel and administrative functions for an independently functioning professional research team. Performs all of the supervisory functions and approves civilian and military award recommendations and makes management performance evaluations and promotion recommendations. Sets quality standards for the research, analysis, and writing of the team. Recommends approval or returns for revision all studies and other documents produced by the team for distribution. Incumbent has substantial responsibility for the technical soundness of all studies, which involve specialized research of an extremely high intellectual level. Has authority to alter the organization of work within the team in order to accomplish assigned missions, and guides subordinates in the achievement of work objectives. Plans for and make changes in the organization of work to achieve efficient and economical operations within allowable costs, staffing level, and policies. Has the authority to define the standards for the work and to prepare and issue internal instructions and procedures for its accomplishment. Responsible for the technical soundness of work which they supervise. Provides inputs to supervisors on budgeting requirements of the team based on anticipated workload and production capability.
9. **FACTOR E. COMPLEXITY OF WORK SUPERVISED, 70 Points** The highest level of non-supervisory work supervised in subordinate work units is GG-14. **TOTAL POINTS = 440 395-444 = GG-15** Knowledge, Skills and Abilities: Mastery of knowledge in social sciences and/or the ability to advise/collaborate on, administer, supervise and perform research in one or any combination of the social sciences. Expert ability to conduct and supervise socio-cultural research focused on people, their perceptions, identities, social organization, and interdependencies, all of which tend to be dynamic and contextually specific. Thorough knowledge of the countries falling within at least one Geographical Combatant Command, with particular emphasis on their culture, attitudes, customs, patterns of thought, and history, and a general knowledge of other countries in the world Knowledge of the military organizational structures, rules, values, mission, procedures, and decision making process, with emphasis on working knowledge of primary staff and command functions from brigade to division levels . Highly developed ability to collaborate and coordinate the complex research, analytical, and evaluative skills geared toward social scientific inquiry Managerial skill, particularly the ability to manage a large and complex research program that covers different regions of the world. Knowledge of civilian and military personnel practices Ability to supervise, motivate, and coheses a group of subordinates Ability to use presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office). Ability to communicate effectively, verbally and non-verbally. Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office). Exceptional writing and editing ability  
**Conditions of Employment:**
  - A. Employee must be able to obtain and maintain a Top Secret security clearance based on an SBI with eligibility for sensitive compartmented information (SCI).
  - B. In accordance with Change 3 to AR 600-85, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program, employee must successfully pass a urinalysis screening for illegal drug use prior to appointment and periodically thereafter.
  - C. Performs temporary duty (TDY) travel up to 100% of the time.
  - D. This is an emergency essential position that ensures the success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after a mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. Incumbent may be required to deploy, on very short notice, to potentially high-threat, hostile OCONUS environments and to undergo specific training and immunization requirements as appropriate for OCONUS deployments. Anthrax vaccination will be required. Incumbent may be required to perform duties under austere and potentially hazardous conditions during exercise and real-world crisis deployments.

Position also requires travel (100% of the time), CONUS and OCONUS, as well as frequently extended duty with long hours under high pressure and generally high-risk job responsibilities.

- E. Possess and maintain a level of physical fitness which enables them to operate in conditions where they may have to, at a minimum:
- 1) Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the summer and cold or freezing conditions during the winter
  - 2) Traverse rough and uneven terrain.
  - 3) Endure hostile environment to include persons that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life.
  - 4) Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally challenging projects.
  - 5) Travel extended distances by foot, military ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous or desert regions.
  - 6) Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements, animals.
  - 7) Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day.
  - 8) Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.
- F. Must be able to successfully complete Human Terrain training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Position Evaluation:

02/17/2010 - Updated conditions of employment from Secret clearance to Top Secret clearance with SCI access and drug testing requirement per management request. Updated Factor E from 65 to 70 points based on change to highest grade level supervised. Total points increased by 5 points from 435 to 440. MIB Interpolation of Factor B, Scope & Variety of Operations - Nature of supervisory/managerial workload and authority B-3,  $95/2 = 47.5$  - variety of functions of the organization supervised (more than one kind of work present) B-2,  $75/2 = 37.5$   $47.5 + 37.5 = 85$  points



## ***Social Scientist Position***

Position Description

PD#: ST335725

Replaces PD#:

Sequence#: VARIES

SOCIAL SCIENTIST

IA-0101-04

Servicing CPAC: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERS - CENTRALIZED, FORT HUACHUCA, AZ

Agency: VARIES

Army Command: VARIES

Command Code: VARIES Region: WEST

Citation 1: OPM SERIES DEF., GS-101, AUG 2002

Citation 2: CIPMS PGS, PART 2 FOR NON-SUPERVISORY POSITIONS, JUN 90

Citation 3: CIPMS GUIDE FOR CLASSIFYING GS POSNS, PT 2, APPEN A, JUN 90

PD Library PD: NO

COREDOC PD: NO

Classified By: MAXIE MCFARLAND (MIB)

Classified Date: 02/02/2010

FLSA: EXEMPT

Drug Test Required: VARIES

DCIPS PD: YES

This description is to be used for Title 10 Excepted Service, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System positions only.

Career Program: 16

Financial Disclosure Required: NO

Acquisition Position: NO

Functional Code:

Requires Access to Firearms: VARIES

Interdisciplinary: NO

Competitive Area: VARIES

Position Sensitivity: VARIES

Security Access: VARIES

Competitive Level: VARIES

Target Grade/FPL: 04

Career Ladder PD: NO

Emergency Essential:  
YES

Bus Code: VARIES

Personnel Reliability Position: VARIES

Information Assurance: N

Influenza Vaccination:

PD Status: VERIFIED

Position Duties:

This is a DCIPS position. As Social Scientist, designs the research and analysis protocols based on the Commander's concept of operation and oversees and the research and analysis process in coordination with the team. Reviews, adjusts, and authorizes the final form of all deliverables to the brigade/regiment or appropriate level of command. Advises the Commander and staff in all human terrain matters and serves as a primary interface for the presentation of these deliverables. Recognized in the social science community as the technical subject matter expert on applied social science in support of military operations.

1. Plans and designs highly complex research projects, including long-term and short-term projects to provide a framework for collection and analysis that is driven by supported unit requirements and aids in the production of socio-cultural understanding. Creates an

overarching research plan that guides the research efforts and design of the team that guide the research effort for discrete issues and projects. Determines the methodological feasibility of research efforts, defining the research objective, formulating the research questions, analyzing knowledge gaps, selecting collection and analysis methods, and developing appropriate research instruments such as interview protocols and surveys. Conducts & manages ethnographic research, methodology and analysis. Analyzes the area of operations against socio-cultural data. Assesses other characteristics of the operational environment (leaders, population, demographics, social, ethnic, and religion, etc); Assesses how the population views the Coalition as well as the adversary; Assesses the local population's interests and issues and what impact planned activities might have on operations; Identifies areas of contention within society; Provides analysis of collected Human Terrain information from local populace perspective. Advises the team in all phases and types of socio-cultural research and analysis conducted by the team in a combat environment to include primary and secondary research to develop a common operating picture of the socio-cultural environment which will be aggregated at progressively higher echelons. Continuously oversees the assessment of research processes and methods which includes assessing the relevance and outcomes of the research for the supported unit and identifying procedural improvements to facilitate and improve future research, analysis, and products. Directs and participates in qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies to include direct observation, visual ethnography, key leader engagement, participant observation, depth interviewing, group or focus group interviewing, surveying, secondary source research, and mixed methods approaches. 50%

2. Provides direct support to unit decision-making in the operations and the military decision making process (MDMP). Provides insight into first, second, and third order effects, providing situational awareness and developing mitigation strategies. Identifies known supported unit socio-cultural information requirements and provides authoritative advice on the most effective way to integrate into the MDMP, and the most effective products to communicate research findings and recommendations. Participates during working groups and mission planning. Presents and defends socio-cultural data and findings, discusses major socio-cultural trends and changes. Provides recommendations about the research's effect and feasibility on military operations to gain necessary cooperation and support. Coordinates the Cultural Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE) and Cultural Data Collection Activities. Advises the HTT and staff on the socio-cultural components of the operational environment. Participates in the planning processes. Guides team in the development of Information Operations (IO) Annexes; Identifies socio-cultural data and knowledge gaps and specified and implied socio-cultural data requirements. (40%)
3. Produces documents, products, briefings and instruction for the military unit as required and presents them at academic and DoD venues. Advises the HTT and staff on the socio-cultural components of the operational environment. Briefs staff on pertinent socio-cultural effects in the Area of Operations. Provides unit specific socio-cultural training as requested. Reviews products for accuracy, relevance, timeliness, soundness of analysis and adherence to both commander's intent and the broad guidelines of national policy. (10%) Performs other duties as assigned.
4. **FACTOR A. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGES DEGREE A-8, 95 POINTS** Professional expert level knowledge in social or behavioral sciences and advanced skill in applied social scientific analysis and research. Mastery of knowledge and expertise of how to formulate research projects and instruct others how to conduct social science research. Extensive field research experience, particularly in hostile, denied, or dangerous environments. Expert understanding of culture, society, political system, and economic system and extensive field research application in a cross cultural environment. Ability to apply experimental theories and new developments to problems not susceptible to treatment by accepted methods; makes decisions or recommendations significantly changing, interpreting, or developing important policies and programs. Technical expert in research design and execution and in the application of data collection instruments (e.g. surveys, interview protocols), data collection activities (e.g. interviews, focus groups, participant observation), data preparation (e.g., in-depth reports and other written material). Comprehensive understanding of applied research



methods and expert knowledge of how to configure research projects to answer questions related to practical matters. Knowledge of management practices for supervising research projects and research teams (i.e. principal investigator). Comprehensive understanding of military operations and expert knowledge of how to configure research projects to answer military operational questions related to the human terrain. Ability to communicate effectively, both verbally and in written form, in English. Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office).

5. **FACTOR B. GUIDELINES DEGREE B-4, 70 POINTS** Operates under broad and very general strategic directions that are nonspecific. The nature of the guidelines available for the conduct of human terrain research and analysis varies greatly depending on the research, operational, or planning mission that is being undertaken. Tasks performed enter uncharted areas of social science research and applications. Often there is limited guidance regarding how vaguely stated requirements are to be translated into concrete recommendations for courses of action in support of military operations. Employee interprets and uses extensive judgment in implementing the intent of any guidelines within the framework of the organizational vision and mission. Recurrent requirements for supervision of the research portion of extremely sensitive and creative programs in support of national policy.
6. **FACTOR C. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY AND EFFECT OF DECISIONS DEGREE C-4, 70 POINTS** Employee makes decisions and initiates actions that involve the interpretation of policy or the setting of precedents. Makes authoritative determinations regarding research findings and advises on technical social science issues. Decisions and commitments often involve large expenditures of resources and have a strong impact on important programs. Work consists of broad functions with enduring requirements and duration of effort that often requires phasing. Incumbent must plan for multiple lines of operation and consider multiple courses of action and potential conflict and cooperation with internal elements and external agencies. Develops and supervises research on foreign countries which requires coordination and development of contacts across a wide range of scientific, academic, commercial and government agencies.
7. **FACTOR D. WORK RELATIONSHIPS DEGREE D-4, 55 POINTS** Regular person-to-person work contacts are maintained with officials within the Activity and with staff officers and planners at various levels of military/DoD commands and Department of State levels; from Brigade/Regimental through the theater command, Department of Defense, and National Agency levels. The last category includes meetings and liaison with officials at the Department of State, DIA, and CIA. Contacts with general officers and their civilian equivalents are not infrequent. When called upon, helps to develop and present the Activity's position to bodies as high as the National Security Council, and to high officials, both American and foreign, in the United States and abroad. Maintains regular contact with nationally recognized members of the academic community.
8. **FACTOR E. SUPERVISION RECEIVED DEGREE E-5, 75 POINTS** The supervisor generally provides only administrative direction, with assignments only in terms of broadly defined missions or functions. The employee has responsibility for planning, designing, and carrying out programs, projects, studies or other work independently. Supervisor is kept informed of significant developments. Completed work is reviewed only from an overall standpoint in terms of feasibility, compatibility, effectiveness or expected results, and for its contribution to the advancement of research. **TOTAL POINTS: 365 POINT RANGE: (340-379) = GG-14**  
**CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT** 1. Must be able to obtain and maintain a Secret security clearance. 2. Performs temporary duty (TDY) travel UP TO 100% of the time. 3. This is an emergency essential position that ensures the success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after a mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. Incumbent may be required to deploy, on very short notice, to potentially high-threat, hostile OCONUS environments and to undergo specific training and immunization requirements as appropriate for OCONUS deployments. Anthrax vaccination will be required. Incumbent may be required to perform duties under austere and potentially hazardous conditions during exercise and real-world crisis deployments. Position also requires travel, CONUS and OCONUS, as well as frequently extended duty with long hours under high pressure and generally high-risk job responsibilities. 4. Possess and maintain a level of physical fitness



which enables them to operate in conditions where they may have to, at a minimum: a. Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the summer and cold or freezing conditions during the winter b. Traverse rough and uneven terrain. c. Endure hostile environment to include persons that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life. d. Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally challenging projects. e. Travel extended distances by foot, military ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous or desert regions. f. Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements, animals. g. Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day. h. Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.

9. Must be able to successfully complete Human Terrain training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Position Evaluation:

Not Listed

## ***Research Manager Position***

### Position Description

PD#: ST335726

Replaces PD#:

Sequence#: VARIES

HUMAN TERRAIN SPECIALIST

IA-0101-03

Servicing CPAC: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERS - CENTRALIZED, FORT HUACHUCA, AZ

Agency: VARIES

Army Command: VARIES

Command Code: VARIES Region: WEST

Citation 1: OPM SERIES DEF., GS-101, AUG 2002

Citation 2: CIPMS PGS, PART 2 FOR NON-SUPERVISORY POSITIONS, JUN 90

Citation 3: CIPMS GUIDE FOR CLASSIFYING GS POSNS, PT 2, APPEN A, JUN 90

PD Library PD: NO

COREDOC PD: NO

Classified By: MAXIE MCFARLAND (MIB)

Classified Date: 02/02/2010

FLSA: EXEMPT

Drug Test Required: VARIES

DCIPS PD: YES

This description is to be used for Title 10 Excepted Service, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System positions only.

Career Program: 16

Financial Disclosure Required: NO

Acquisition Position: NO

Functional Code:

Requires Access to Firearms: VARIES

Interdisciplinary: NO

Competitive Area: VARIES

Position Sensitivity: VARIES

Security Access: VARIES

Competitive Level: VARIES

Target Grade/FPL: 03

Career Ladder PD: NO

Emergency Essential: Yes

Bus Code: VARIES

Personnel Reliability Position: VARIES

Information Assurance: N

Influenza Vaccination:

PD Status: VERIFIED

### Position Duties:

This is a DCIPS position. Serves as Human Terrain Research Manager responsible for conducting socio-cultural research managing the requesting and reporting processes; the information technology and processes and the collective knowledge of the team to enable the production of a common operating picture for a geographical area of responsibility.

1. Supports a Human Terrain System team in all phases and types of socio-cultural research and analysis conducted by the team in a combat environment. Identifies specified and implied socio-cultural data requirements. Analyzes available sources of local socio-cultural information using both primary source research (data collected directly by HTT) and secondary source research (data collected from completed research of others). Receives assignments for information collection. Integrates the human terrain collection plan with the unit activities, participates in de-briefings and interacts with other key organizations and



agencies in the AOR. Collects and develops information pertaining to human terrain. Develops Human Terrain information requirements. Serves as secondary collector of Human Terrain data from supported forces. In conjunction with other members of the team, provides support to unit decision-making in the operations and the military decision making processes (MDMP). Participates in the processes in collaboration with team that aids commanders and staff by providing authoritative advice and insight into first, second, and third order effects of unit decisions, providing situational awareness and developing mitigation strategies. Presents and defends Human Terrain Team's position on socio-cultural issues and keeps abreast of current events and cultural issues, regional trends and developments as they affect the military objectives and mutual concerns of the United States and host nation. Assists in identifying known supported unit socio-cultural information requirements, the most effective way to integrate into the MDMP, and the most effective products to communicate research findings and recommendations. 30%

2. Develops, organizes, and manages the collective socio-cultural knowledge of the team to enable the production of a common operating picture for an area of operations by integrating human terrain collection plan with unit intelligence collection plan. Supervises the creation of the human terrain baseline assessment during the research planning and design process. Collects and aggregates information to identify trends and gaps in the data available during the pre-mission planning phase of research execution. Maintains the Human Terrain component of the Common Operating Picture (COP) using the Cultural Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE). Collects, processes, and stores team research products, classified and unclassified, published and unpublished, in order to prepare human terrain analyses, estimates, and plans. Analyzes incomplete and conflicting information to produce research products that assess socio-cultural environments, anticipate trends, and forecast likely results of US and Coalition actions. Compiles, categorizes, labels, and stores team research products appropriately to enable easy storage in the Human Terrain Data Bases and timely retrieval of information from those data bases. In conjunction with other members of the team, produces documents, products, and briefings for the military unit as required and presents them to the supported unit and other audiences. Provides unit specific socio-cultural training as requested; and reviews products for accuracy, relevance, timeliness, soundness of analysis and adherence to both commander's intent and the broad guidelines of national policy. Interfaces with the unit, attends unit meetings, boards, working groups, etc 40%
3. Manages the team's Requests for Research (RFR) from Subject matter experts (SMEs), the Reachback Research Center (RRC) and intra-theater resources. Conducts all knowledge management functions for the team including tracking, tagging and archiving all information gathered by the team and distributing it to the supported unit. Converts the Social Scientist's tasking instructions into functional research assignments to include requests for research (RFR) back to the reachback cell. Develops and implements the team's research requesting and reporting process, in compliance with established regulations and guidance to enable trend analysis and knowledge transfer. Identifies reporting requirements during the research planning and design process, and reports all products associated with the team's research activities in accordance with agreed upon timelines and procedures. Submits requests for Research (RFRs) (similar to Requests for Information) to the Reachback Research Center (RRC) and for the Social Science Research & Analysis activity (SSRA). Communicates with the team and the RRC in order to clarify and refine the intent of the request, obtains status updates on the progress of the research, and identifies a formal feedback mechanism upon completion of the research for both the requestor and the researcher. Manages information technology and processes for the team, including setting up and maintaining the information technology (IT) structure. Identifies IT requirements and procures field-expedient solutions when necessary to meet the requirements of the team; provides training and assistance to team members on IT systems and processes as required; and coordinates with supported unit IT personnel to ensure the cross-functionality of IT systems and processes. 30%  
Performs other duties as assigned.
4. FACTOR A. ESSENTIAL KNOWLEDGES Degree A-7, 80 Points Comprehensive professional knowledge of social sciences and the ability to use social science techniques in an innovative fashion to deal with significant information gaps that are routinely encountered



in the course of socio-cultural research and analysis. When required, develops new approaches and methodologies to deal with research problems that cannot be resolved by the usual means; uses experimental techniques to deal with unprecedented problems and situations. Knowledge of information collection requirements management processes and procedures. Knowledge of a wide range of research and collection methods and the analytical ability to develop innovative products. Practical knowledge of information technology systems and knowledge of a wide range of techniques, methods, sources and procedures within the social sciences required to provide knowledge management services and adapt automated systems to solve information organization, access, and dissemination problems. Detailed knowledge of information technology processes and of knowledge management procedures. Working knowledge of database structures and operations; information technology systems and operations; and knowledge management theory. Knowledge of data collection and processing and working knowledge of data collection activities (e.g., interviews, debriefs, asset management) and data processing (e.g., in-depth reports and other written material). Effective verbal and written communication skills. Ability to use relevant presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office). Strong writing ability combined with sound editorial skills.

5. **FACTOR B. GUIDELINES** Degree B-4, 70 Points Guidelines exist in the form of manuals, unit policies, DoD and Department of State policy directives, and national policies. These guidelines are often too vague to provide a blueprint for action. Uses judgment and interpretation of the guidelines, and often must be innovative in producing studies and plans. Production requirements often call for the conduct of research and analysis that breaks new ground in the application of existing methods. Resourcefulness required when deviating from traditional methods or researching trends in order to resolve ambiguous or difficult issues, and extrapolate information to reach conclusions and develop new methods. Recommends or produces products that may go to their supported unit, the program or external audiences.
6. **FACTOR C. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY AND EFFECT OF DECISIONS** Degree C-4, 70 Points The purpose of Human Terrain System teams is to support military decision making using products and briefings based on the analysis of primary and secondary source data on specific political, cultural, and economic developments in assigned areas. Prepares draft products, final products, and planning documents that are authoritative in the military community, with respect to human terrain. Makes authoritative determinations and advises on technical problems. Decisions and commitments have a strong impact on important programs. Errors can have serious consequences both in general and within their theatre of operations. Undertakes exploratory research projects. Represents the activity at other US agencies and abroad as senior specialist in their fields whenever called upon to do so.
7. **FACTOR D. WORK RELATIONSHIPS** Degree D-4, 55 Points With respect to research and analysis, incumbent represents the Activity in all forms and at all levels as required. Regular person-to-person work contacts are maintained with officials within the Activity and with staff officers and planners at the theater command, Department of Defense, and National Agency levels for the purpose of giving or obtaining information on non-routine problems requiring not only explanation or interpretation of facts but also discussion of implications and inferences in order to gain concurrence or cooperation to persuade to action. Includes meetings and liaison with officials at the Department of State, DIA, and CIA. Contacts with general officers and their civilian equivalents are not infrequent. When called upon, helps to develop and present the Activity's position to bodies as high as the National Security Council, and to high officials, both American and foreign, in the United States and abroad. Maintains regular contact with nationally recognized members of the academic community.
8. **FACTOR E. SUPERVISION RECEIVED** Degree E-4, 55 Points The Team Leader sets the overall objectives and resources available. The employee and supervisor, in consultation, develop the deadlines and projects. The employee is responsible for planning and carrying out the assignment, resolving most of the conflicts that arise, and interpreting policy in terms of established objectives. The supervisor is kept informed of progress and any controversial matters. Finished work and methods are reviewed for accuracy and effectiveness and for compliance with complex instructions and guidelines. However, due to the complex environment in a Combat Zone, on some occasions, incumbent will be in situations where

they will have wide latitude and nearly non-existent supervision TOTAL POINTS: 330 POINT RANGE: (295-339) = GG-13 Conditions Of Employment

- A. Must be able to obtain and maintain a Secret security clearance.
- B. Performs temporary duty (TDY) travel UP TO 100% of the time.
- C. This is an emergency essential position that ensures the success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after a mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. Incumbent may be required to deploy, on very short notice, to potentially high-threat, hostile OCONUS environments and to undergo specific training and immunization requirements as appropriate for OCONUS deployments. Anthrax vaccination will be required. Incumbent may be required to perform duties under austere and potentially hazardous conditions during exercise and real-world crisis deployments. Position also requires travel (100% of the time), CONUS and OCONUS, as well as frequently extended duty with long hours under high pressure and generally high-risk job responsibilities.
- D. Possess and maintain a level of physical fitness which enables them to operate in conditions where they may have to, at a minimum.
  - 1) Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the summer and cold or freezing conditions during the winter
  - 2) Traverse rough and uneven terrain.
  - 3) Endure hostile environment to include persons that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life.
  - 4) Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally challenging projects.
  - 5) Travel extended distances by foot, military ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous or desert regions.
  - 6) Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements, animals.
  - 7) Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day.
  - 8) Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear; this may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.
- E. Must be able to successfully complete Human Terrain training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Position Evaluation:

02/17/2010 - Updated intelligence to information in one sentence. MIB.



## ***Human Terrain Analyst Position***

Position Description

PD#: ST335727

Replaces PD#:

Sequence#: VARIES

HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYST

IA-0101-03

Servicing CPAC: CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERS - CENTRALIZED, FORT HUACHUCA, AZ

Agency: VARIES

Army Command: VARIES

Command Code: VARIES Region: WEST

Citation 1: OPM SERIES DEF., GS-101, AUG 2002

Citation 2: CIPMS PGS, PART 2 FOR NON-SUPERVISORY POSITIONS, JUN 90

Citation 3: CIPMS GUIDE FOR CLASSIFYING GS POSNS, PT 2, APPEN A, JUN 90

PD Library PD: NO

COREDOC PD: NO

Classified By: MAXIE MCFARLAND (MIB)

Classified Date: 02/02/2010

FLSA: EXEMPT

Drug Test Required: VARIES

DCIPS PD: YES

This description is to be used for Title 10 Excepted Service, Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System positions only.

Career Program: 16

Financial Disclosure Required: NO

Acquisition Position: NO

Functional Code:

Requires Access to Firearms: VARIES

Interdisciplinary: NO

Competitive Area: VARIES

Position Sensitivity: VARIES

Security Access: VARIES

Competitive Level: VARIES

Target Grade/FPL: 03

Career Ladder PD: NO

Emergency Essential: YES

Bus Code: VARIES

Personnel Reliability Position: VARIES

Information Assurance: N

Influenza Vaccination:

PD Status: VERIFIED

Position Duties:

This is a DCIPS position. The primary purpose of this position is to serve as a Socio-cultural Research Analyst performing tasks relative to Human Terrain analysis and production for one or more foreign countries. Collects, reviews, interprets, evaluates and integrates data from multiple sources in assessing the relevance and significance of development in assigned areas. Participates in human terrain knowledge exchange at Brigade/Regimental Staff and other executive level meetings.

1. Serves as a Human Terrain Analyst performing tasks relative to socio-cultural analysis and production to support Brigade/Regimental Combat Team theaters of operations. Collects, reviews, interprets evaluates and integrates data from multiple sources in assessing the relevance and significance of development in assigned areas. Plans and carries out all assignments necessary to process all source material and produce pertinent human terrain knowledge for assigned areas. Reviews the case files for operations in order to evaluate the



significance of the information collected.. Supports a Human Terrain System team in all phases and types of socio-cultural research and analysis conducted by the team in a combat environment. Provides operational support, guidance and expertise to enable the team to conduct primary source research (data collected directly by HTT) and secondary source research (data collected from completed research of others). Acts as primary collector of human terrain data from supported unit. Collect and analyze socio-cultural data in conjunction with other members of the team in order to fulfill the supported unit's socio-cultural knowledge requirements Develops a Human Terrain collection plan and information requirements. Analyze unclassified and classified socio-cultural data. Assist in the development of the Information Operations Annex. Identifies socio-cultural and knowledge gaps. Identifies specified and implied socio-cultural data requirements. Analyze the Area of Operations (AO) against socio-cultural data. Analyze available sources of local socio-cultural information. Assess other characteristics of the operational environment (leaders, population, demographics, social, ethnic, religion, etc). Provides analytical support on the Human Terrain Team's position on socio-cultural issues as well as keeps abreast of current events and cultural issues, regional trends and developments as they affect the military objectives and mutual concerns of the United States and host nation. Determine indicators and specific information requirements for supporting Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), Decision Points (DP) and Named Areas of Interest (NAI). Serves as liaison to the local population as required by team or unit. Obtains, develops and maintains connections with the local population. 65%

2. Ensures human terrain collection requirements are identified, validated, prioritized, assigned and monitored. Provides input into Brigade/Regimental staff annexes, theater assessments, long range studies, threat assessments and other finished products as required. Identifies human terrain production requirements to supervisor. Participates and assists in potentially sensitive special projects. In conjunction with other members of the team, the Operations Manager produces documents, products, and briefings for the military unit as required and presents them at to the supported unit and other audiences. Operations Managers provide unit specific socio-cultural training as requested. The Operations Manager reviews products for accuracy, relevance, timeliness, soundness of analysis and adherence to both commander's intent and the broad guidelines of national policy. Provides socio-cultural training for the unit staff and subordinate units as requested. 35% Performs other duties as assigned.
3. Factor A. Essential Knowledges - Degree A-7 80 Points Extensive knowledge of social science disciplines pertaining to human terrain research and collection methods is required to identify information requirements, accomplish the necessary research to fill these requirements and validate information. Broad knowledge of a wide range of subjects related to local host nation (i.e. political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, sociological, demographic, and public opinion) is required to make in-depth analyses of significant information to identify new initiatives, changes in emphasis; and new facts affecting Brigade/Regimental Combat Team's objectives. Skill in production, coordination and dissemination of finished products is required. Knowledge of the military organizational structures, rules, values, mission, procedures, and decision making process. Ability to use presentation software (e.g., Microsoft Office). Ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing.
4. FACTOR B. GUIDELINES B-4, 70 Points Guidelines include general policies, goals and objectives. Incumbent must interpret them to plan research projects, determine analytical methods to be used, and execute information integration techniques. Guidance from supervisor is in the form of oral "strategy sessions" and is limited to highly sensitive negotiation assignment only. Incumbent always faces unknowns while supporting visiting US officials and must provide on-the-spot briefings and demonstrations and on-the-spot analytical answers to the Commander and his staff.
5. FACTOR C. Scope of Authority & Effect of Decisions - Degree C-3 50 points Incumbent makes decisions concerning Human Terrain and other activities of Brigade/Regimental Combat Team, based on interpretation of current directives, procedures and tasking of single or multi collection assets. Recommendations are made concerning issues that are complex and difficult to review. Incumbent's informed opinions and analysis of comments are vital to

effective policy making and operational decision making. Erroneous recommendations could impair the effective accomplishment of the Brigade/Regimental Combat Team's objectives.

6. FACTOR D. Work Relationships - Degree D-3 35 Points Frequent contacts are made with co-workers, staff of other offices within the headquarters and personnel of various US and host nation agencies. The incumbent establishes and maintains work relationships to obtain and provide information, clarify issues, and negotiate information exchange policy.
7. FACTOR E. Supervision Received - Degree E-3, 35 Points The Team Leader makes assignments by defining objectives, 'priorities, and deadlines, and assists employee with unusual situations .which do not have clear precedents. The employee plans and carries out successive-steps and handles problems and deviations in the work assignment in accordance with instructions, previous training, or accepted practices in the occupation. Finished work is reviewed for accuracy, quality, and compliance with more complex instructions and guidelines. Total Points: 270 Grade Level GG-12 (245-294) CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

- A. Incumbent must be able to obtain and maintain SECRET Security Clearance required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position.
- B. Travel CONUS and OCONUS constitutes 100% of the time and may be on very short notices.
- C. This is an emergency essential position that ensures the success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after a mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. Incumbent may be required to deploy, on very short notice, to potentially high-threat, hostile OCONUS environments and to undergo specific training and immunization requirements as appropriate for OCONUS deployments. Anthrax vaccination will be required. Incumbent may be required to perform duties under austere and potentially hazardous conditions during exercise and real-world crisis deployments. Position also requires travel, CONUS and OCONUS, as well as frequently extended duty with long hours under high pressure and generally high-risk job responsibilities.
- D. Possess and maintain a level of physical fitness which enables them to operate in conditions where they may have to, at a minimum:
  - 1) Tolerate heat well in excess of 110 degrees in the summer and cold or freezing conditions during the winter
  - 2) Traverse rough and uneven terrain.
  - 3) Endure hostile environment to include persons that may cause bodily harm, injury or loss of life.
  - 4) Work with little sleep or rest for extended periods of time in support of physically and mentally challenging projects.
  - 5) Travel extended distances by foot, military ground vehicles, and air transport into mountainous or desert regions.
  - 6) Sleep on the ground in environmentally unprotected areas from the elements, animals.
  - 7) Carry 40-75 pounds of gear and personal protective equipment for 10-16 hours a day.
  - 8) Conduct a variety of tactical maneuvers in personal protective gear, which may include: entering and exiting a combat vehicle, conducting a security halt, and responding to direct and indirect fire.
- E. 5. Must be able to successfully complete Human Terrain training at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Position Evaluation:  
Not Listed



# Appendix G: IRAC Report



*United States Army Training and Doctrine Command  
Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance (IRAC)*

## Review of Human Terrain System

**Results Briefing  
12 May 2010**

This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under E.O. 13526, Example 5 applies.



## Review Objectives

---

- **Overall Objective:** Determine if an adequate framework for contract management and oversight is in place and working for the Human Terrain System (HTS). Specifically, evaluate the following areas:
  - **Objective A:** Adequacy of the HTS performance work statement and quality assurance surveillance plan.
  - **Objective B:** Performance of inherently governmental functions and personal services by HTS contractors.
  - **Objective C:** The recruiting and training model for HTS, whereby a contractor recruits and employs individuals in training, and associated costs of attrition.
  - **Objective D:** Progress on a follow-on contract solution for the HTS contract.

# Scope and Methodology

---

- Interviewed key HTS personnel, including the G-2 Operations Director and Deputy Director, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Director, HTS Project Manager, and other HTS personnel (including contractors) at Fort Leavenworth and Oyster Point.
- Interviewed General Services Administration's (GSA) contracting office personnel and reviewed contract documentation they provided.
- Compared current G-2 procedures against TRADOC Regulation 5-14 (Acquisition Management and Oversight) and other acquisition guidance and policies.
- Assessed the sufficiency of the current performance work statement (PWS), quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP), and surveillance activities.
- Identified HTS outputs to include workload and performance metrics.
- Developed a QASP template including inspection plans for the outputs developed.
- Reviewed the HTS structure for instances of contractors performing inherently governmental and personal services work.
- Evaluated the current recruiting and training models and calculated the attrition rate and lost costs of attrition.
- Conducted this review on a quick reaction basis but followed standards in AR 11-7 (Internal Review Program). These standards require that we plan and perform the review to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions.

## Results in Brief

---

- The contract management and oversight framework for the HTS contract needs significant improvement. We recommend re-competing the current contract as soon as possible.
  - The PWS and QASP have significant deficiencies that weaken the government's ability to hold the contractor accountable. Lack of detail in the PWS likely limited competition to the incumbent contractor.
  - The surveillance personnel structure is inadequate to accommodate an extensive and dispersed workload and isn't in line with the surveillance plan approved during the July 2009 Executive Contract Approval Board (ECAB).
  - Contractors are playing too prevalent a role in the HTS workplace which makes it very likely they are performing inherently governmental functions and executing the contract as personal services.
  - There are weaknesses in the recruiting and training model because there are insufficient metrics in place to hold the contractor (to include students, instructors, and recruits) accountable for performance.
- To assist in making the needed improvements, IRAC has proposed a surveillance personnel structure, developed inspection plans, identified outputs to include in PWSs, and determined key actions needed for the follow-on contract.



# Results

## PWS/QASP

---

- **Objective A:** Evaluate adequacy of the HTS PWS and QASP.
- **Conclusion:** The PWS and QASP have significant deficiencies that weaken the government's ability to hold the contractor accountable. Lack of detail in the PWS likely limited competition to the incumbent contractor.
  - The PWS needs extensive revision to include more detailed outputs, performance metrics, and workload data.
  - The QASP is an ineffective guide to ensure adequate contract surveillance. It needs to be more output-oriented and include detailed inspection plans.
  - The task order needs a dedicated contracting officer's representative (COR), armed with an improved QASP and adequate time to conduct surveillance.
  - Surveillance procedures need to focus more on inspection of outputs rather than ensuring the contract workforce is in place.
  - Twenty vendors participated in the bidders conference, but the incumbent contractor (BAE Systems Technology Solutions & Services Inc.) was the only vendor to bid.

# Results

## PWS/QASP

---

- **Surveillance personnel:**

- In the July 2009 ECAB, the DCG TRADOC approved the HTS contract action based on assignment of a separate COR (G-2 originally proposed having the Operations Director as COR for HTS, Operational Environment/Core, and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device). G-2 briefed that the TRISA Director would be the COR. We found that the Operations Director was acting as the Army *technical representative* for all three task orders.
- Under the terms of the GSA Interagency Agreement, G-2 should have nominated and GSA would have appointed a COR from G-2.
- The complexity/scope of the HTS contract requires a COR with adequate time (not GG-15 or SES level) for the extent and detailed level of surveillance work required for such an extensive and dispersed workload.
- We believe the COR also needs support from quality assurance evaluators to be located at the multiple sites and directorates.

# Results

## PWS/QASP

---

- **Surveillance conducted:**

- There is inadequate surveillance and oversight of the HTS contract, primarily due to the inadequate PWS and QASP and lack of government personnel.
- Actual surveillance has consisted of: the G-2 technical representative talking with HTS directors on a daily basis (many of whom were contract employees); faces to spaces checks of contractor labor hours; and quarterly customer satisfaction surveys and performance assessment meetings.
- Government personnel are not formally evaluating contractor products or services.
- Contractors are acting as subject matter experts and determining their own workload and assignments.



# Results

## PWS/QASP

---

- **Competition:**

- Twenty vendors participated in the bidders conference, but the incumbent contractor (BAE) was the only vendor to bid.
- The vendors' questions in response to the request for quotations indicate that the PWS failed to sufficiently delineate requirements to enable non-incumbent contractors to bid. An amendment to the request for quotations (RFQ) included 30 questions asked by vendors, with only 3 answered.
- It is highly unlikely that any contractor other than the incumbent could have made a proposal and prepared a cost estimate without the answers to these questions. Examples of critical questions are on the next slide.
- BAE's proposal in response to the RFQ outlines the entire HTS program and provides significantly more detail about the required work than the PWS.
- The base BAE contract, against which GSA issued the current HTS work, doesn't include any GSA special item numbers for training, despite the significant amount of training-related work being done. While the GSA contracting officer approved the use of this contract, we believe the current HTS workload could be viewed as outside the scope of this contract vehicle.
- Work from two other contracts worth about \$21M annually has merged into the BAE contract without competition. While it may have been G-2's intention for the BAE contract to cover this work, the PWS doesn't adequately address the associated requirements for this additional work.

# Results

## Inherently Governmental Functions/Personal Services

---

- **Objective B:** Determine if HTS contractors are performing inherently governmental functions and personal services.
- **Conclusion:** It's clear that contractors are playing too prevalent a role in the HTS workplace which makes it very likely they are performing inherently governmental functions and executing the contract as personal services.
  - Contractor influence over the policy and direction of the HTS program is significant—giving the appearance that contractors are making decisions for the government.
  - The key elements for determining personal services are present with limited actions being taken to mitigate the associated risks.
  - Action to put Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) into supervisory positions is a step in the right direction.
- While we didn't do a full scope "audit" in this area, we believe there are significant signs that actions should be taken to ensure contractor personal aren't performing inherently governmental functions or personal services.

## Results

### Inherently Governmental Functions/Personal Services

---

- Inherently governmental functions:

- Inherently governmental functions are defined as those functions so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government employees. They require either the exercise of discretion in applying government authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the government. (*This is a policy not legal determination.*)
- Contractor influence over policy and direction of the program is evident by key positions held by contractors:
  - Director, Training Directorate (being replaced by DAC).
  - Chief, Training and Education Division (being replaced by DAC).
  - Director, Knowledge Management (being replaced by DAC).
  - Director, Research Reachback Center.
  - Chief, Doctrine Development.
- Having an HTS Program Manager filled by a person “detailed” under the provisions of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) means the person remains an employee of their permanent organization. Therefore, it’s not appropriate for them to perform inherently governmental functions (per 19 April 2010 SJA legal opinion). However, they can supervise government employees.
- The limited government personnel working in this program are put into awkward positions. They are often called upon to be the government representative in an area for which they aren’t the lead (because all the work done up to the decision point was done by contractors) or appear to be working for contractors.



# Results

## Inherently Governmental Functions/Personal Services

---

- Personal services:
  - Personal services denotes an employer/employee relationship which is prohibited between government and contractor personnel. Personal services can occur based on how the contract is written but more often occurs based on how the contract is executed.
  - The HTS contract, like many of the contracts we review, has many if not all of the critical elements present:
    - Contractor performance on site.
    - Government furnished equipment.
    - Services integral to the organization's mission.
    - Need for services exceeds one year.
    - Nature of services requires direct or indirect government direction or supervision.
  - The key way to mitigate the risk of the contract being executed as personal services is to establish clear guidelines/procedures for tasking, assigning work, and transmitting information to contractor personnel. The procedures should make sure the contractor's lead supervisor assigns work to contractor personnel.
  - We learned during interviews of contractor personnel and the contractor's lead supervisor that these procedures aren't established.
    - The contractor's lead supervisor isn't involved in assigning work to contractor employees.
    - In many cases, contract personnel are subject matter experts who determine their own workload (making them appear to be government employees).

# Results

## Recruiting and Training


---

- **Objective C:** Evaluate the recruiting and training model for HTS, whereby a contractor recruits and employs individuals in training, and associated costs of attrition.
- **Conclusion:** There are weaknesses in the model because there are insufficient:
  - Metrics in place to hold the contractor (to include students, instructors, and recruiters) accountable for performance.
  - Assessment tools for learning objectives related to the 187 individual and 42 collective tasks recently added to the HTS curriculum (although the ongoing curriculum redesign is attempting to correct this).
  - Mechanisms to determine the effectiveness or success of the training downrange.
- HTS personnel told us that “anecdotal” feedback suggests that one-third of the teams have been successful downrange, one-third have done okay, and one-third were unsuccessful.
- We validated attrition data on students released or who quit the program before deployment and estimated the associated lost costs:
  - For 2008, we estimate attrition costs to be about \$7M. The attrition rate was 30 percent.
  - For 2009, we estimate attrition costs near \$9M. The attrition rate was 34 percent.
  - The \$2M increase in lost costs between 2008 and 2009 is attributable to a 4 percent higher attrition rate, a larger number of students, higher salaries, and higher travel costs.

# Results

## Recruiting and Training

Attrition Factors by HTS Labor Categories



U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command  
Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance



# Results

## Follow-on Contract

---

- **Contract fees:**
  - GSA charges four percent to award and administer the HTS task order while MICC wouldn't charge TRADOC for these services.
  - G-2 is paying about \$2.67M per year for GSA to administer the task order when sufficient personnel to administer contracts of this size should cost about \$712K per year.
  - If MICC is used, there are potential savings of \$1.96M per year or \$11.7M over six years.
- **Recommended re-compete option:**
  - Submit an ECAB package to extend the base period of performance by six months (don't exercise any option years on the current contract).
  - Redo the HTS PWS and QASP and submit it to G-8 for ECAB approval before September 2010.
  - Have MICC do a "directed acquisition" to a GSA schedule or other existing contract that is within scope. MICC would administer the task order.
  - Implement changes to the COR and surveillance structure as discussed in this briefing.