


CJCSM 3122.01
14 July 2000
CH 1 25 May 2001

**JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND
EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES)
VOLUME I
(PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)**



**JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318**

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MANUAL

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CJCSM 3122.01
14 July 2000
CH 1 25 May 2001

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) VOLUME I (PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)

References(s): See Enclosure U

1. Purpose

a. This publication sets forth planning policies and procedures to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

b. Specifically this publication describes the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) functions and the environments in which planning for and executing conventional and nuclear joint military operations are conducted. JOPES applies to the development and implementation of operation plans and operation orders prepared in response to National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) requirements. It specifies the policies, procedures, and formats to be used across the spectrum of planning, mobilization, deployment, employment, mobilization, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization as applied to the members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES is applicable across the operational continuum of peace and war.

2. Cancellation. This manual supercedes Joint Pub 5-03.1, 4 August 1993.

3. Applicability

a. Doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, procedures, and guidance established in this publication apply to the Joint Staff, Defense combat support agencies, commanders of combatant commands, Services, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one nation or Service are attached to forces of another nation or Service or when significant forces of one nation or Service support forces of another nation or Service.

b. This manual will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If a conflict arises between the contents of this manual and the contents of Service publications, this manual will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as Chairman) has provided more current and specific guidance to the contrary.

c. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational procedures ratified by the United States. For procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should follow the multinational command's procedures where applicable.

4. Responsibilities

a. A Joint Staff directorate proposal to the Chairman that would change source documentation information reflected in this publication will include, as an enclosure to their proposal, all proposed changes which would need to be made to this publication.

b. Military Services and other organizations will notify the Director, J-3, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted to the Director for Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 20318-3000.

5. Summary of Changes. This is the initial joint manual which replaces Joint Pub 5-03.1. Changes include comments from CINC, Joint Staff, Service, and agency Action Officers (AOs) as well as format and structural changes IAW JSM 5701.01, 28 February 1995. Largest changes include a newly written TPFDD LOI concept in Enclosures G and R, removal of World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) procedures and descriptions, inclusion of

GCCS procedures and descriptions, inclusion of Common Operational Picture (COP) reporting procedures and requirements, and inclusion of terrorist threat reporting and evaluation requirements.

6. Releasability. This manual is approved for limited release. DOD components (to include the combatant commands) and other Federal agencies may obtain copies of this manual through controlled Internet access only (limited to .mil and .gov users) from the CJCS Directives Home Page-- <http://wwwdtic.mil/doctrine/jel.htm>. Joint Staff activities may access or obtain copies of this manual from the Joint Staff LAN

7. Reports Requirements. Reports required by this manual are exempt from normal reporting procedures in accordance with DOD Manual 8910.01M.

8. Basis and Policy

a. JOPES applies to the development and implementation of operation plans and operation orders prepared in response to the NCA or the CJCS. It specifies the policies, procedures, and formats to be used to develop and execute plans for deployment, employment, mobilization, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization by members of the JPEC.

b. This manual is not intended to restrict the authority of the joint force commander from organizing forces and executing the mission in the most appropriate manner to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Guidance pertaining to the employment of forces is not contained in this manual.

c. CJCSM 3122.01 is based on the following primary sources:

(1) Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.

(2) DOD Directive 5100.1, 25 September 1987, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, 24 February 1995, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

(4) Joint Pub 1-01, 14 September 1993, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."

(5) Joint Pub 5-0, 13 April 1995, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."

(5) Joint Pub 5-0, 13 April 1995, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."

(6) Unified Command Plan.

(7) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP FY).

(8) CJCSI 3100.01, 1 September 1997, "Joint Strategic Planning System."

9. Effective Date. This manual is effective upon receipt




S.A. FRY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure(s):

- A - Introduction
- B - Joint Planning Process
- C - Deliberate Planning Process
- D - Review of Operation Plans
- E - Crisis Action Planning
- F - JOPES Administration
- G - Crisis Action Planning Checklists
- H- Phase I - Crisis Reporting
- I - CJCS Warning Order
- J - Commander's Estimate
- K - CJCS Planning Order
- L - CINC's Alert Order
- M - CJCS Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, and Redeployment Orders
- N - CJCS Execute Order
- O - Sample Operation Order
- P - Sample Commanders Evaluation Request
- Q - Sample OPREP-1, Component's Evaluation Response
- R - Hold for Future Use
- S - Protection of Movement Information
- T - Concept Development Formats

CH-1



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE

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CJCSM 3122.01 CH-1

25 May 2001

CHANGE 1 TO CJCS MANUAL 3122.01

1. Holders of CJCSM 3122.01, 14 July 2000, "JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) Volume I, PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES," are requested to make the following changes:

a. Pen-and-Ink Changes

(1) Page 4, Enclosure R: Change "TPFDD Instructions" to "Hold for Future Use."

(2) Page A-4, subparagraph 7.b: Change "(CJCSM 3122.03)" to "(CJCSM 3122.03A with Change 1, 6 September 2000)" and "(CJCSM 3122.04) to "(CJCSM 3122.04A)."

(3) Page A-4, subparagraph 7.c: Change "(CJCSM 3122.02)" to "(CJCSM 3122.02B, 25 May 2001)."

(4) Page C-9, subparagraph 7.b.(3): Change "Enclosure R" to "Enclosure H to CJCSM 3122.02B."

(5) Page C-10, subparagraph 7.b.(4): Change "Enclosure R" to "Enclosure H to CJCSM 3122.02B."

(6) Page C-12, subparagraph 7.c.(2): Change "Enclosure R" to "Enclosure H to CJCSM 3122.02B."

(7) Page E-1, subparagraph 1, 13th line: Delete "and Execution (CAPE)" and replace with "(CAP)."

(8) Page GL-2: Delete "CAPE...crisis action planning and execution."

(9) Write "CH-1" in the right margin by all pen and ink changes.

b. Page Substitution

<u>Remove Page(s)</u>	<u>Add Page(s)</u>
i thru iv	i thru iv
ix thru xii	ix thru x
A-5 thru A-6	A-5 thru A-6
E-13 thru E-18	E-13 thru E-20
I-5 thru I-6	I-5 thru I-6
I-A-7 thru I-A-10	I-A-7 thru I-A-10
I-A-13 thru I-A-14	I-A-13 thru I-A-16
M-A-3 thru M-A-4	M-A-3 thru M-A-4
M-B-3 thru M-B-4	M-B-3 thru M-B-4
M-C-3 thru M-C-4	M-C-3 thru M-C-4
N-A-5 thru N-A-6	N-A-5 thru N-A-6
O-5 thru O-6	O-5 thru O-6
R-1 thru R-4	R-1 thru R-2
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R-E-1 thru R-E-2	
R-F-1 thru R-F-2	
R-G-1 thru R-G-4	
U-1 thru U-24	U-1 thru U-24

2. Summary of the changes is as follows:

- a. Removal of Enclosure R, TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). This guidance is now maintained in CJCSM 3122.02B, 25 May 2001.
- b. Addition of historical support requirement to CJCS Warning Order.
- c. Revision of force protection statement used in deployment orders, warning orders, etc.
- d. Updates to references.

3. When the prescribed action has been taken, this transmittal should be filed behind the record of changes page in the basic document.

4. Releasability. This notice is approved for limited release. DOD components (to include the combatant commands) and other Federal agencies may obtain copies of this notice through controlled Internet access only (limited to .mil and .gov users) from the CJCS Directives Home Page <http://wwwdtic.mil/doctrine/jel.htm>. Joint Staff activities may access or obtain copies of this manual from the Joint Staff LAN.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



S. A. FRY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

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President, National Defense University	5
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

The following is a list of effective pages for CJCSM 3122.01. Use this list to verify the currency and completeness of the document. An "O" indicates a page in the original document.

PAGE	CHANGE	PAGE	CHANGE
1 thru 4	O	J-1 thru J-4	O
i	1	J-A-1 thru J-A-6	O
ii	O	K-1 thru K-6	O
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C-1 thru C-28	O	M-B-1 thru M-B-2	O
D-1 thru D-10	O	M-B-3	1
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F-1 thru F-12	O	M-C-3	1
G-1 thru G-2	O	M-C-4 thru M-C-6	O
G-A-1 thru G-A-2	O	N-1 thru N-6	O
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G-C-1 thru G-C-6	O	N-A-5	1
G-D-1 thru G-D-2	O	N-A-6	O
G-E-1 thru G-E-4	O	N-B-1 thru N-B-4	O
G-F-1 thru G-F-4	O	N-C-1 thru N-C-4	O
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (Cont.)

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T-F-1 thru T-F-6	O		

RECORD OF CHANGES

Change No.	Date of Change	Date Entered	Name of Person Entering Change
Change 1	25 May 2001	23 July 2001	JWFC

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ENCLOSURE A

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This chapter provides an overview of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its use in the joint operation planning process. It describes the JOPES processes and the environments in which planning for and execution of joint military operations are conducted. During this process, commanders and their staff are encouraged to coordinate early and often with their Joint Staff and Defense agency's counterparts as they prepare their plans, the CINC's Strategic Concept, and the detailed supporting annexes.

2. Joint Planning Process. Joint operation planning is a coordinated process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing the mission. In peacetime, the process is called deliberate planning. In crisis situations, it is called crisis action planning. Execution of a deliberate plan is accomplished using crisis action procedures. Joint planning is conducted under JOPES policy and procedures with automated data processing (ADP) support. Joint planning has its origins in the following five interrelated systems that affect the development of operation plans (OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs):

a. National Security Council (NSC) System, which generates National Security Directives (NSDs).

b. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), which, through the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), generates Chairman's Guidance, the National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), CJCSM 3122.02, "Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution", and other joint planning guidance.

c. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which generates the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Program Objective Memorandums (POMs), Issue Books, Program Decision Memorandums (PDM), Budget Estimate Submission (BES), Program Budget Decision (PBD), and the Defense budget.

d. JOPES policy, which consists of CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES Volume II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) with classified supplement.

e. National Disclosure Policy 1 (NDP-1), which provides guidance and direction on information disclosure to foreign nationals and protection of US information assets.

3. JOPES Overview. JOPES is the integrated joint conventional and nuclear command and control system used to support military operation planning, execution, and monitoring (including theater-level nuclear and chemical defense plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and underlying Global Command and Control System (GCCS) ADP support to provide senior-level decision makers and their staffs with enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations. JOPES policies, procedures, and ADP systems provide the mechanisms to submit movement requirements to USTRANSCOM for joint operations and exercises.

4. Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES provides support to and is used by NCA and JPEC decisionmakers and their staffs at all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution. The JPEC includes the following:

a. National Level

- (1) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) Other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (3) Joint Staff.
- (4) Services.

b. Supported Command Level. Unified theater and functional CINCs, and supported commands (including their Service component commands, subunified commands, and joint task forces).

c. Supporting Organization Level

- (1) Supporting commands (including Service component commands and supporting combatant commands).
- (2) Defense combat support agencies.

5. JOPES Methodology. JOPES supports the joint planning and execution process used during peacetime operations, exercises, hostilities/military operations other than war, and war. JOPES procedures provide for various

levels of decision making in deliberate and crisis action planning environments. JOPES includes five operational processes (threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation) governing both deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Together with the two JOPES supporting functions (simulation and analysis, and monitoring), they form the JOPES methodology.

6. JOPES Procedural Principles

a. Single Set of ADP Procedures. JOPES embodies a single set of ADP procedures that, combined with administrative policies and procedures, govern all aspects of military operation planning and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans). This single, networked system ensures that all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary, procedures, and joint ADP support, thus facilitating the transition from planning and training to the effective execution of military operations.

b. Use of Existing or Programmed Capabilities and Resources. JOPES planning is capabilities-based. Military planners use the forces and resources specified for regional or global planning, as appropriate, in the JSCP, CJCS orders, Service capabilities documents, Allied and Coalition agreements, and approved operation plans or operation orders. Using the forces and resources apportioned for planning, the CINCs select those forces they intend to employ within their plans to complete the assigned mission. The comparison of required forces and sustainment against sourced forces and sustainment will identify shortfalls. For contingencies without global implications, planners use the apportioned forces and resources detailed in JSCP for regional plans. For contingencies with global implications, the apportioned forces and resources made available to the supported command will be allocated by the Chairman and combined agencies when necessary IAW international agreements and understandings. Thus, planning in JOPES begins with comparing the force requirements (validated by the Supported Commander) to available (including combat, combat support, and combat service support) and resources apportioned. Supporting commands and agencies, as well as the Services and combined entities, confirm force and resource availability and actively source requirements during the planning process. During this stage in the planning process, relevant personnel and logistic data are needed to assess force sustainability and transportation feasibility, requiring coordination and cooperation with the supporting DOD and appropriate foreign agencies.

c. Shortfall Identification and Risk Analysis. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported commander to identify shortfalls between the validated requirement and the Provided Commander's sourcing at various

points in the planning process. The supported commander then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the Concept of Operation in the plan if the resultant risk is too great.

d. Plans Maintenance. Completed and approved plans will be maintained and updated as required. A new plan is required only when the threat, taskings, forces assigned, resources available, or concept of operations change to the extent the supported commander and the Chairman deem it necessary to develop a new plan. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable. In support of the JOPES goal of developing and maintaining executable plans, commanders will use appropriate methods at their disposal to keep plans current and accurate, including plan maintenance conferences and newsgroups. The time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), which is Appendix 1 to Annex A of the Plan, is on a separate and distinct maintenance cycle and is discussed in Enclosure C, paragraph 8, TPFDD Maintenance.

7. JOPES Procedures, Guidance, and ADP Support. Procedures, guidance, and descriptions of ADP system support necessary to conduct joint operation planning and execution and to support exercises are contained in the JOPES volumes:

a. JOPES, Volume I (CJCSM 3122.01), "Planning Policies and Procedures," provides policy, guidance, and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, approval, and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPODs. Volume I also contains standard formats and minimum content for Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures orders, letters, reports, and the CAP checklists.

b. JOPES, Volume II (CJCSM 3122.03A with Change 1, 6 September 2000), CH-1 "Planning Formats and Guidance," prescribes standard formats and minimum content for operation plans, concept summaries, annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. It is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functional area guidance are contained in the Supplement (classified) to JOPES, Volume II (CJCSM 3122.04A). CH-1

c. Manual for Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) Development and Deployment Execution (CJCSM 3122.02B, 25 May 2001). This manual CH-1 establishes procedures for the TPFDD and for deployment of forces within the context of JOPES in support of joint military operations. JOPES procedures for TPFDD development and the deployment of forces are prescribed in Enclosures A through F and are done so within the context of the six phases of crisis action planning (CAP). This manual includes formats for Course of Action

(COA) Plan Identification Number (PID) announcements, Deployment Estimate Requests, Request for TPFDD Sourcing, and TPFDD Validation. CJCSM 3122.02B, 25 May 2001 also contains a sample TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) and instructions for incorporating contractor deployment requirements into the TPFDD.

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ENCLOSURE B

JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

1. Purpose. This chapter describes the interrelationships of the associated national-level systems for national security policy, military strategy, force and sustainment requirements, and plans and their impact on the joint planning process.
2. The National Security Council (NSC) System. The NSC is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman discharges a substantial part of the statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman regularly attends NSC meetings and presents the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares National Security Directives (NSDs) that, with Presidential approval, implement national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for both military planning and programming.
3. Role of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
 - a. The JSPS (CJCSI 3100.01) is the primary formal means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Staff and the CINCs, carries out planning and policy responsibilities detailed in Title 10, USC. The responsibilities include:
 - (1) Providing advice and assistance to the President and Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces and the preparation of policy guidance.
 - (2) Preparing military strategy, strategic plans, and strategic assessments.
 - (3) Providing advice to the Secretary of Defense on the effect that critical force capability deficiencies and strengths will have on accomplishing national security objectives, implementing policy, and executing strategic plans.
 - (4) Providing advice on program recommendations and budget proposals to conform with priorities established for the CINCs and in strategic plans.

b. The JSPS is a flexible system that forms the basis for interaction with other DOD systems; provides supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS); and provides strategic guidance for use in JOPES. Figure B-1 shows the relationships between various programs and planning documents.

c. The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to systematically review the national security environment and US national security objectives; evaluate risks and threats; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, forces, and programs necessary to achieve national security objectives in a resource-limited environment.

d. JSPS provides for the continuous study of the strategic environment to identify conditions or trends that may warrant a change in the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The principal mechanism for this study is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). A decision to modify the strategic direction of the Armed Forces based on this review would be reflected in the National Military Strategy (NMS) or the Joint Vision.

(1) The NMS articulates how the United States will employ the military element of power to support the national security objectives found in the President's National Security Strategy (NSS).

(2) The Chairman's vision, referred to as Joint Vision 2010, describes the operational concepts and capabilities required of future joint forces. It provides a conceptual template for the conduct of future military operations and establishes a common azimuth for the Services, combatant commands, Defense agencies, and Joint Staff as they develop plans and programs to evolve the joint force to meet future operations requirements.

e. The JSPS products, particularly the NMS, assist the Chairman in providing for the preparation of contingency plans and development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides strategic guidance, establishes requirements, and apportions resources to the CINCs and Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities.

Joint Strategic Planning System




Figure B-1. Key Relationships

4. Linking Programs and Strategy

a. The strategy, plans, and concepts developed within the JSPS must be supported by a programmatic system that identifies, budgets, and acquires the capabilities required.

b. The Chairman translates the Joint Vision and the NMS into programmatic advice to the NCA, synchronized with the key milestones in the DOD PPBS. The Chairman formulates his advice from two sources:

(1) Formal authoritative planning and programmatic advice is provided early in the programming cycle in accordance with the Joint Planning Document (JPD). This early advice takes advantage of the full participation of the combatant commands, Services, and Defense agencies. Because the PPBS

is an iterative process, the JPD begins the new cycle and is congruent with the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) from the previous cycle plus any intervening program adjustments and strategy changes.

(2) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), using the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, also provides the Chairman programmatic advice and budgetary alternatives.

c. These sources are the basis for the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and the CPA. While the JPD and CPR are prepared in order to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the CPA assesses the conformance of the Services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM) forces with the priorities established in strategic plans and to meet the requirements of the combatant commands.

(1) The JPD, the CPR, and the CPA together make up the Chairman's planning and programmatic advice to the Secretary of Defense. Combined, they present the authoritative advice of the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JPD, based on strategic guidance, represents the best possible early authoritative planning and programmatic advice of the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense as he begins the process of developing the DPG. Concurrently, the JPD informs the JWCA and JROC processes of the broad strategic planning and programming direction and priorities of the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) The CPR provides more specificity on programs of greatest concern to the Chairman much later in the DPG process. Finally, building on the information developed in both the JPD and the CPR preparation processes, the CPA provides the Chairman's assessment of the adequacy of the Services' and Defense agencies' POMs and, where applicable, provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on specific alternative program and budget proposals based upon the Chairman's assessment of current and future joint operations requirements.

5. JSPS-Related Assessments. The JSPS provides for timely and substantive participation by the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies in the development of each JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources are allocated, JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate capabilities and assess program and budget adequacy and, where appropriate, propose changes.

6. Major Documents Impacting JSPS

a. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG furnishes the SecDef's programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of Department POMs for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary's program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate (DPE), the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is the major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.

b. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG fulfills the SecDef's statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman written policy guidance for contingency planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman. The CPG focuses the guidance provided in the NMS and DPG and directly impacts the JSCP.

7. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS is a third major national-level system related to the operation planning and execution process. The DOD military strategy formulation and resource management system develops and integrates defense policy, military strategy, Service programs, and the DOD budget. This system's ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. The PPBS, in conjunction with the JSPS, is used to define national military strategy and recommended forces and translate them into budgetary requirements to be presented to Congress. The PPBS encompasses three phases:

a. Planning. The planning phase of the PPBS defines the national policy, military strategy, and fiscally-constrained force requirements to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding projected budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses the JSPS to develop national military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President's consideration. Following review by the Secretary of Defense, the President considers the Chairman's recommendations and makes his strategy and option decision, which is then incorporated in the development of the DPG. The DPG is developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Chairman, the combatant commanders, and others. The final DPG is reviewed by the Chairman, the Chiefs of the Services, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Planning Resources Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for decision and publication. The DPG is the link between planning and programming as it furnishes the Secretary's planning guidance and fiscal

constraints to the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM for the development of their POMs.

b. Programming. The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. With the exception of USSOCOM's special operations (SO)-peculiar requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman by means of an integrated priority list (IPL). The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services' total requirements and include assessments of risk as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of approved strategy and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the CPA. In a coordinated effort, program issues are identified by the combatant commanders and DPRB members and are resolved by the DPRB. The results are promulgated in the Secretary's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

c. Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, budget estimates are prepared by the CINCs and each of the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, USSOCOM, and submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense budget is reviewed by OSD and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure that it is consistent with the fiscal guidance. Changes to the budget are documented in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). During this final phase of budgeting, the Chairman, the Service Chiefs and the combatant commanders assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the Secretary of Defense. Final changes are incorporated with previous PBDs to establish the DOD portion of the President's budget, which is submitted to Congress for funding. When the President signs the congressional appropriations act into law, the Services, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget, forces and capabilities are procured, and the next JSCP is prepared for the Chairman's approval.

8. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with policies and procedures established in a formal DOD-directed, CJCS-selected system: JOPES. JOPES is the single system for military operation planning and execution. JOPES includes policies, procedures, reporting structures, and personnel supported by C4I

systems. JOPES supports and integrates joint operation planning activities at the national, theater, and supporting command levels and interrelates with three other national systems: the NSCS, JSPS, and PPBS. JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into OPLANs, CONPLANS, Functional Plans, and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. It also assists in identifying shortfalls which are converted to joint operation requirements to the PPBS. These shortfalls are used in making national resource decisions that affect the PPBS and the JSPS. JOPES is the mechanism for providing movement requirements to Lift Providers for plans, crises, and all CINC or CJCS-sponsored exercises.

9. JOPES Functions. JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution. Figure B-2 below depicts the five operational functions and the two supporting functions. The operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order from identification of a threat to determination of a strategy that counters the threat, to COA development, to detailed planning, and finally, to actual execution of military operations. The supporting functions relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each. Figure B-3, following page, displays the operational functions and identifies the major inputs and outputs of each.




Figure B-2. JOPES Operational (5) and Supporting (2) Functions

a. JOPES Operational Functions

(1) Identify and Assess Threat. This function addresses procedures for describing threats to national security while continuously monitoring the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decision makers, and determining the specific nature of the threat. Determining enemy capabilities and intentions is emphasized using this function. All organizational levels are supported by this function during deliberate and crisis action planning and execution.

(2) Determine Strategy. Using this function, the NCA, Chairman, and Joint Staff, with appropriate consultation with Allied and Coalition members, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter the threats. This function is used in formulating politico-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and objectives, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs, OPLANs, CONPLANs, Functional Plans, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS WARNING or PLANNING ORDER during crisis action planning situations.




Figure B-3. Functional Processes – Major Inputs and Outputs

(3) Develop Course of Action (COA). In COA development during peacetime, the supported commander develops the CINC's Strategic Concept (CSC) based on Joint Staff and Service planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops COAs based on planning guidance and resource allocation from approved Plans and CJCS WARNING or ALERT ORDERS. Using this JOPEs function, coupled with the JOPEs support function simulation and analysis, force, sustainment, and transportation feasibility are analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands and supporting commands, provide supportability estimates of the CINC's Strategic Concept or COAs to the supported commander. Products from COA development include CINC's Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved CONOPS; the Commander's Estimate, including COAs; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements, with an estimate of required sustainment.

(4) Plan in Detail. This function is used in developing an OPLAN, an operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN) and an OPORD with necessary supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides a detailed, fully integrated schedule of mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities based on the CJCS-approved CSC or COA. Detailed planning begins with the Chairman's guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment or a CJCS ALERT or PLANNING ORDER in a crisis action planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved Plan or NCA-approved OPORD.

(5) Implement. This function provides decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. Force Protection and Operations Security (OPSEC) issues are addressed here, in particular the THREAT LEVEL and terrorist threat in the theater of operations to personnel, facilities, and resources. Appropriate THREATCON levels are evaluated and initiated to provide maximum protection for personnel, facilities, and resources. Additionally, Information Operations (IO) issues are addressed, in particular those actions taken to achieve information superiority, both offensively and defensively. The ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, replanning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS EXECUTE ORDER and

continues through some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

b. Supporting Functions. The two supporting functions previously identified in Figure B-1, monitoring and simulation & analysis, complement the operational functions to complete the conceptual framework of JOPES.

(1) Monitoring. This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources in accomplishing mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of movement, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

(2) Simulation and Analysis. This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.

10. JOPES Planning Process. Joint operation planning and execution is a continuous, iterative process. Based on the Chairman's JSCP planning requirements, the CINCs prepare four types of deliberate plans; OPLANs, CONPLANs (with and without TPFDDs), and functional plans. These plans facilitate the rapid transition to crisis response for potential, perceived, and identified threats to US security interests. Crisis Action planning begins with the deliberately produced plan and continues through military option selection and COA, operation plan, and operations order development and implementation; and ends when the requirement for the plan is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved. Figure B-4 shows the JOPES operational functions aligned with the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.




Figure B-4. Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning Process Functional Alignment

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ENCLOSURE C

DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

1. **Purpose.** This enclosure describes the applicability of JOPES to deliberate planning, describes the deliberate planning process for operation plans, outlines responsibilities and recommended time requirements for the planning cycle, and provides guidance for resolving conflicts.

2. **Applicability.** With the exception of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), JOPES applies to operation plans prepared by CINCs in response to CJCS requirements. Operation plans are prepared in complete format (OPLANs) or in concept format (CONPLANS) as described below. Figure C-1 shows the relationship of the various terms used in JOPES and the planning process in general.

PLANS			
Deliberate Plans / Contingency Plans			Crisis Action Plans
Operation Plans		Functional Plans	
OPLANs	CONPLANS		OPLAN or CONPLAN or OPORD
Use Complete Format ¹	Use Concept Format ²	Use Functional Format	Use JOPES Vol II Format

¹ All applicable plan elements in JOPES Vol. II must be included.

² Plan Summary, Basic Plan, and Annexes A, B, C, D, J, K, V, & Z, at a minimum, are required.

Figure C-1. Plan Relationships

a. **OPLANs.** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan and includes a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, as well as Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. OPLANs are normally prepared when:

- (1) The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

(2) Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through planning.

(3) Detailed planning is required to support alliance or combined planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans by both supporting commands and Defense combat support agencies, establish the feasibility of the plan's concept of operations.

b. CONPLANs. A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPOD. A CONPLAN contains a Plan Summary, Basic Plan, Annexes A through D, J, K, V and Z, and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. A CONPLAN may or may not have an associated TPFDD.

c. Functional Plans (FUNCPLAN). FUNCPLANs involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or nonhostile environment. Examples include plans for disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and continuity of operations. Requirements for these plans may be satisfied by command publications; e.g., USCINCEUR Reconstitution Plan, USCINJFCOM Platform Protection SOP. Unless specifically directed, no requirement exists to submit these plans to the Joint Staff for review and Chairman approval, but information copies will be submitted to the Joint Staff, J-7, for internal Joint Staff distribution. As a minimum, include the following as part of a FUNCPLAN: Plan Summary, Basic Plan, and Annexes A, B, C, D, J, K, V, & Z, and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning.

3. Deliberate Planning Process for OPLANs

a. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process during peacetime conditions and provides the JPEC an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five formal phases (see Figure C-2). These phases produce a family of plans (the supported commander's plan, supporting plans, and plans designed for concurrent execution). Following the five formal deliberate planning phases, the family of plans is maintained. Although planning is essentially a sequential process, the need for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning must be recognized by all concerned in the joint planning process.

b. Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported commander and sourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and

Defense agencies, particularly the designated combat support agencies (DIA, DISA, DTRA, NIMA, and NASA). The sourced forces and sustainment requiring common-user lift are time-phased by the supported CINC and movement is analyzed by USCINCTRANS and appropriate combined transportation entities. The supported commander prepares the various annexes that provide detailed guidance to supported command components and subordinate commanders. The supported commander is authorized to task supporting commands and DOD agencies to participate in the planning process to include submitting supporting plans, as required. The supported command may also request Joint Staff assistance in gaining planning support from agencies outside the Department of Defense. Supporting commands and agencies should be informed of support requirements as early as possible in the planning process.




Figure C-2. The Deliberate Planning Process

c. The format and content for an OPLAN are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

4. Deliberate Planning Process for CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs

a. The planning process for CONPLANs is the same as for OPLANs, except that the CONPLAN process normally omits the resource detail developed in the Plan Development Phase unless it is a CONPLAN with a TPFDD. The planning

process for FUNCPLANS is similar to that used for OPLANs and CONPLANs, but adapted to meet the unique requirements of the mission being planned.

b. The format and content for CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

5. Planning Cycle Responsibilities and Time Requirements

a. JOPES uses a planning cycle that begins with publication of the JSCP. A Plan is effective until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. In general, the deliberate planning cycle takes from 18-24 months to complete. Guidelines for the duration of each phase of the deliberate planning process are provided in paragraph 7 which gives a detailed discussion of each phase.

b. The Joint Staff, in the name of the Chairman, publishes the JSCP and the planning schedules and reviews OPLANs and CONPLANs submitted by CINCs.

(1) JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces, and specifies items of materiel and lift assets available for planning.

(2) Following publication of the JSCP, the Joint Staff, J-7 Conventional War Plans Division, in coordination with the combatant commands, will produce an initial planning schedule for the development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs tasked in the JSCP. The initial planning schedule will be disseminated by message and will set forth submission dates and dates for TPFDD conferences. Throughout the planning cycle, updates will be published if dates are revised.

(3) Reviews of CINC's Strategic Concepts, OPLANs and CONPLANs are conducted in accordance with provisions of Enclosure C.

(4) The Chairman may implement the tasking contained in a TPFDD before formal CJCS review of the PLAN.

c. CINCs develop OPLANs , CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs in response to CJCS requirements, JSCP tasking, and self-determined contingencies; conduct reviews of their OPLANs , CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs and make recommendations to the Chairman regarding their plans' currency, revision, or rescission; submit the CINCs Strategic Concepts OPLANs , CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs to the Chairman for review and approval; submit JCS directed, CINC approved CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs to the Chairman for review; submit CINC directed, CINC approved CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs to the Chairman for information.

(1) Upon receipt and analysis of JSCP tasking and planning guidance, supported commanders determine:

- (a) New plans that require development.
- (b) Existing plans that should be canceled (see subparagraph 5c(2) below).
- (c) Existing plans that satisfy the JSCP requirements (see subparagraph 5c(3) below).
- (d) Existing plans that require revision or further analysis.

(2) Supported commanders may request CJCS approval to cancel CJCS-approved operation plans, including operation plans related to tasks no longer appearing in the JSCP. If the plan is canceled, the supported commanders will retain the plan on file for 2 years. Upon expiration of the 2-year period, the record copy of the OPLAN (less Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) or CONPLAN specified as the permanent record will be retired to the applicable Federal Records Center. Records so retired will be marked with appropriate instructions to ensure their protection against improper release in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, 29 April 1994.

(3) If the requirement for an existing plan is not changed by the JSCP tasking, the supported commander should review the plan to determine whether it is still sufficient and can still pass the tests of acceptability, feasibility, adequacy, and consistency with joint doctrine. (See Enclosure C and the Glossary for discussion of these terms.) If the plan still sufficiently passes these tests, the tasking may be satisfied by a message to the Chairman stating that the plan has been reviewed, analyzed, and can still meet the JSCP tasking. If the CJCS review results in concurrence, a CJCS message or memorandum will approve the plan for the appropriate JSCP period.

(4) In messages commenting on the initial planning schedule, supported commanders may include:

(a) Requests for cancellation (subparagraph 5c(2) above) and statements of sufficiency (subparagraph 5c(3) above). Such requests or statements eliminate the need to comment on planning calendar dates for affected operation plans.

(b) Other planning intentions, including recommendations to place selected major plans in a lengthened planning cycle or in plans maintenance.

(5) Supported commanders will establish a schedule for plans maintenance for existing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and FUNCPLANs in coordination with the Joint Staff, component, subordinate, and supporting commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

d. During a JSCP cycle, additional planning requirements may arise that were not anticipated when the JSCP was developed. Under these circumstances the Chairman will normally task the supported commander, the supporting commanders, and the directors of defense combat support agencies in a personal for (PFOR) message that outlines the new requirement. The new tasking will adhere to JSCP preparation steps in terms of staffing throughout the JPEC prior to submission to the Chairman for approval.

e. During a JSCP cycle, circumstances may arise when the Chairman requires a deliberate plan to be developed in less time than 18-24 months, but these circumstances do not require the initiation of crisis action planning as described in Annex E of this manual. In these cases, there are many considerations that must be taken into account. Below is a checklist for use in deliberate planning under a compressed time schedule.

Ensure that the new (or previously developed) Regional Tasking is staffed/re-staffed through the JPEC to confirm its validity, prior to the initiation of planning.

- Identify all apportioned forces.
- Identify all exercises, plans and TPFDD development that will be effected.
- Establish due date for strategic concept and final plan as soon as possible after regional tasking is assigned (consideration must be given to the importance of the new tasking with regard to ongoing JSCP tasked plan development).
- If plan development is accelerated and will impact on other plans and exercises, ensure the JPEC is informed of CJCS priority given to accelerated plan development.
- Ensure that all JPEC participants are aware that Joint Staff J-7 is the primary OPR to resolve all issues resulting from plan coordination.

- ☑ Consider having the Joint Staff J-7 brief the results of the Strategic Concept review to OSD to accelerate approval of the plan.
- ☑ Schedule the CINC to brief the Concept of Operations to Chairman/Secretary of Defense early in the process to ensure plan development is progressing in the desired direction.

6. Conflicting Guidance

a. CINCs who are also commanders of combined commands or who conduct coordinated planning on a bilateral or combined basis will report to the Chairman any conflicts between the guidance contained herein and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement.

b. The Chairman of the US Section (J-5 GLOBAL/WESTHEM), Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, will report to the Chairman any conflicts between plans developed by the committee and the guidance in this document.

c. If instructions in this document conflict with guidance previously issued by the Joint Staff, other than in the JSCP or that pertaining to bilateral or combined plans, the provisions herein will have precedence pending resolution of the conflict.

d. Guidance approved after the publication of this document that conflicts with provisions herein will be reflected as an immediate change by message or as a change in the next revision of this document.

7. Deliberate Planning Procedures. Procedures for deliberate planning are designed to assist the planning community in the timely, efficient development of OPLANs and to provide a consistent foundation for the Crisis planning process. The phases of the deliberate planning process follow:

a. Phase I--Initiation. Initiation is the phase in which planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and the groundwork is laid for planning.

(1) Task Assignment. In the JSCP, the Chairman tasks the CINCs to develop operation plans, operation plans in concept format, and functional plans. When such taskings are issued by message or other directive, they will normally be incorporated into the next edition of JSCP. The extent of CINC's planning is not limited by JSCP taskings. Each CINC has broad

responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2 and may prepare whatever plans are necessary to discharge those responsibilities. The CINC may decide to prepare an operation plan not required by JSCP, but deemed essential by the CINC. In this case, the CINC has the authority to task forces apportioned to the CINC's theater. The CINC may also decide to prepare an operation plan not required by JSCP that would require forces not apportioned to the CINC's theater. In this case, the CINC must submit the requirement for the operation plan to the Chairman for approval before it is prepared. CJCS approval will include the authority to task required non-JSCP apportioned forces.

(2) Resources. The Joint Staff and the Services identify resources and provide guidance to the supported commander. JSCP, other JSJS documents, joint doctrine, and Service planning documents provide the following: (a) strategic guidance and intelligence, (b) Service doctrine and guidance, (c) resources available for planning, (d) combined information dominance and sharing plan, and (e) priorities for accomplishing tasks.

(3) Review Previous Operations. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), as well as the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) database, should be queried early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise occurrences. A regular review of this information during plan development can alert planners to known pitfalls and to successful and innovative ideas.

b. Phase II--Concept Development. Concept development is the phase in which all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks are derived, COAs are developed and analyzed, the best COA determined, and the CINC's Strategic Concept developed and documented. The sequential steps in this phase are shown in Figure C-3.

(1) Mission Analysis. In this step, the supported commander's analysis of the JSCP tasking results in a mission statement.

(2) Planning Guidance. This step has two major objectives:

(a) Provide the supported commander's staff with enough preliminary guidance to allow work to begin on staff estimates. Representative information might include characteristics of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, the mission statement, assumptions, special weapons, political and psychological considerations, tentative COAs, anti-terrorism/force protection guidance, and a planning schedule.

(b) Make the above information available to the subordinate and supporting commanders and other interested parties through either written directives along the lines of the planning directives illustrated in Appendix A to Enclosure T or a planning conference.




Figure C-3. Concept Development Phase

(3) Staff Estimates. The staff estimates developed in this step provide the foundation for the Commander's Estimate and address the supportability of tentative COAs. Although written estimates are not mandatory, useful formats for key estimates are provided in Appendixes B through F to Enclosure H to CJCSM (CH-1) 3122.02B for use as needed. The following staff estimates may be considered: personnel, intelligence, operations (including OPSEC, force protection/terrorist threat, and military deception), logistics, and C4 systems. The intelligence estimate requires special coordination. In addition to the normal consultation with supporting commanders and component commanders, early coordination with DIA for support provided by national intelligence resources is essential.

(4) Commander's Estimate. The Commander's Estimate summarizes the first three steps during concept development and produces the commander's

decision on a COA to be followed. A sample format is provided in Appendix F to Enclosure H to CJCSM 312202B.

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(5) CINC's Strategic Concept. During this step of the concept development phase, the supported commander prepares a Strategic Concept, which is an expansion of the selected COA, as a narrative statement of how to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. The supported commander may convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties. Convening a concept development conference to review the CINC's Strategic Concept is highly recommended.

(6) CJCS Strategic Concept Review (Phase IIA). The CINC will forward the Strategic Concept, in the format contained in JOPEs, Volume II, Chapter III, to the Chairman for review and approval (see Enclosure C). Once approved for further planning by the Chairman, the CINC's Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. For a CONPLAN, concept review procedures are the same as for an OPLAN. For OPLANs and CONPLANs, this concept of operations will ultimately be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan. The concept of operations is the cornerstone upon which all detailed planning is based. A detailed description of the concept of operations will be included in Annex C to the plan.

c. Phase III -- Plan Development

(1) Beginning the Plan. Plan development is the phase in which the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Upon receipt of the CJCS-approved concept of operations, the supported commander prepares the OPLAN or CONPLAN in the format prescribed in JOPEs, Volume II, and submits it to the Chairman for formal review and approval. During this phase: (a) the supported commander publishes an initial combined information dominance and sharing plan for tentative approval; (b) the supported commander publishes a TPFDD LOI; (c) the force list is structured; (d) the non-unit-related materiel, non-unit related personnel, noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and medical evacuees, enemy prisoner of war (EPW), retrograde cargo, and transportation requirements are determined; (e) the nuclear, civil engineering, and medical support planning is conducted; (f) the TPFDD is developed; (g) shortfalls are identified; (h) transportation feasibility is determined; and (i) all the elements of the plan are documented for TPFDD refinement and preparation of the plan for submission to the Chairman for review and approval. For clarity, the process of plan development will be described according to the sequential steps shown in Figure C-4. In actual circumstances, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or be repeated.




Figure-C-4. Plan Development Phase

(2) Publishing a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). At the beginning of the Plan Development Phase the supported commander publishes a TPFDD LOI. The purpose of the LOI is to tailor the standard TPFDD LOI and the CINC Supplemental LOI to provide specific guidance to the CINC's component commanders and supporting commands and agencies on how to develop the TPFDD. The LOI should be coordinated with affected organizations (e.g., USTRANSCOM, DLA) prior to publication to ensure that the planning guidance is current. As a minimum, the LOI should address the following: the format for force requirement number (FRN) construction, unit line number (ULN) designators for forces and their accompanying supplies, cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN) designators for non-unit related resupply and personnel replacements; material feasibility estimator (MFE) to be used to calculate non-unit related resupply and personnel replacements; force module assignment; priority of air and sea movement for major units; apportionment of airlift and sealift capability between Service components and resupply; standard earliest arrival date-latest arrival date

(EAD-LAD) windows; specific guidance for the planning factors file; resupply record aggregation guidance; retrograde, chemical and nuclear TPFDD guidance; attrition planning factors; standard ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs) for forces and channels of resupply; CINC's Required Delivery Date (CRD); and key planning time lines or milestones and TPFDD points of contact for the supported and supporting CINCs' staffs. The LOI should contain the supported commander's classification guidance and OPSEC planning guidance. Enclosure H to CJCSM 3122.02B should be used as a standard for the TPFDD LOI. CH-1

(3) Force Modules. Force modules are a planning and execution tool that provides a means of logically grouping records, which facilitates planning, analysis, and monitoring. Force modules may include both forces and sustainment. Following are two commonly-used force module types:

(a) OPLAN-Dependent Force Module. OPLAN-Dependent Force Modules are force modules modified or developed by supported CINC or service components to respond to a specific planning task, such as flexible deterrent options or OPLAN Force Module Packages (FMPs).

(b) Force Tracking-Force Module. This force module is OPLAN-dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force Tracking Force Modules, as a minimum, will consist of major Service combat units and are required for all OPLANs. See subparagraph 7c(4)(b)7 below for specific guidance.

(4) Step 1-Force Planning. Force planning is the first step in the Plan Development Phase (see Figure C-4). It is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment with its foundation in the supported commander's concept of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS and Service guidance and doctrine. Force planning consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution or risk analysis of unresolved shortfalls. Force planning is the step in which the Service component commanders time phase their force lists to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. This step includes planning from the point of origin to final destination and inclusion of requirements for joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI). Included in this process is the determination of mode and source of transportation, port of embarkation (POE), en route delays, port of debarkation (POD), Earliest Arrival Date (EAD) and Latest Arrival Date (LAD) with priorities, required delivery dates, CINC's required delivery date, and destinations. Also included in this step should be a review of the applicable sections of the Foreign Clearance Guide to include country and theater clearance requirements. Force protection measures in

place and pre-deployment training requirements should also be reviewed commensurate with the threat level and threat condition of the deployment location.

(a) Forces for Operation Planning

1. Major combat forces apportioned to CINCs for operation planning are designated in the JSCP. Other forces available for planning are listed in certain JSCP annexes and Service documents. Each Service, through the Service component commanders, apportions to the CINCs support forces of all types and combat units not included in the JSCP that are available for planning.

2. The forces specified in operation plans will be those projected to be actually available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. They will not normally exceed:

a. Those major combat forces and other combat and support forces apportioned in pertinent sections or annexes of JSCP.

b. Combat and support forces apportioned by each Service, through its component commanders, as being available for planning in accordance with JSCP or Service planning documents.

3. In cases where forces designated for employment require detailed task organization identification (e.g., airborne, amphibious operations) but no explicit objective has been assigned, subordinate and supporting commanders will specify representative forces for associated force planning.

(b) TPFDD Force Data

1. The force data in the TPFDD will include assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces to be deployed to the area of operations and forces stationed within the area of operations. For global and regional plans, a complete TPFDD will be built and fully sourced to the limit of the actual resources available, normally 90 days. The forces and resources will be refined during TPFDD refinement conferences. The PID of the Refined TPFDD will be identified in Appendix 1 to Annex A in lieu of providing a printed copy. After the TPFDD becomes effective for execution planning with the CJCS approval of the PLAN, the TPFDD will be updated via TPFDD maintenance procedures outlined in paragraph 8. The length of deployments for some regional TPFDDs may be more or less than 90 days. Specific length will be determined by the supported commander in coordination with the Joint Staff.

2. Individual force requirements in the TPFDD will be listed at the highest practicable unit level based on movement requirements.

3. A unit requiring both airlift and sealift modes of transportation from POE to POD will be split into two force records. A unit requiring two or more transportation sources will be fragmented into two or more force records to ensure proper scheduling, manifesting, and tracking in JOPEs. The Service component commanders and individual force requirements in the TPFDD should be listed at the highest practicable unit level. Representatives of the supported command, Service components (for in-place forces), and supporting commands will provide planning information concerning unit origin and ready to load date at origin. This information may be made available in accordance with service guidance and procedures. Coordination between the Service components of supported and supporting commands is encouraged.

4. CINC desires for arrival priority of units in theater are expressed for airlift and sealift as follows:

a. For airlift requirements, use of the priority codes is required and will be used according to the following:

(1) Major unit (or group of units) priorities are established in the CINC's TPFDD LOI and in the JOPEs TPFDD containing a priority code that delineates preferred order of arrival by latest arrival date (LAD) at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD). These two items must be consistent in their application.

(2) A unit in a TPFDD will normally not have its LAD earlier than the LAD of a higher priority unit.

(3) Ready-to-load date (RLD), available-to-load date (ALD), and EAD will reflect real limitations. Where no limitations exist, the EAD should be the same as the ALD to provide maximum flexibility in strategic lift.

b. The priority is determined by the LAD. EAD should be equal to the LAD minus 7 (sealift) or LAD minus 3 (airlift). If LAD is early and these standard EAD/LAD windows cannot be met, a smaller window can be used (i.e., if the LAD for a ULN moving by air is 3, the EAD can be less than the standard 5 days).

5. When a new type unit characteristics report file (TUCHA) is networked, supported commanders' Service components will use the latest release of TUCHA to update their TPFDDs as necessary. The Services are responsible for ensuring TUCHA data are current.

6. As a minimum, when actual unit designations are not available, force requirements will be expressed as either standard type units as described in the TUCHA file or nonstandard units described in accordance with the JOPES reporting structure (JOPESREP). Supported commanders are responsible for allocating force requirement numbers (FRNs) in accordance with JOPES guidance.

7. All Supported Commanders are to organize forces, as appropriate, into force tracking force modules and/or force module packages. These force modules are valuable aids to commands in the review, modification, and evaluation of TPFDDs for both deliberate planning and execution. These force tracking force modules will be listed in the major forces section of the OPLAN description and contain force module identifier (FMID), unit name, required delivery date (RDD), destination, and number and type of major unit equipment. Force tracking force modules need not include sustainment. Each Supported Commander's TPFDD will contain the following force modules to reflect the task organization per Annex A of the OPLAN/OPORD/EXORD.

a. Force modules made up of major combat forces apportioned in JSCP. These forces are defined as follows:

(1) Army

- (a)** Divisions/ACRs.
- (b)** Brigades (Maneuver, artillery, air defense).
- (c)** Patriot BNs/BTRYs with CS/CSS.
- (d)** Echelon above Division CSS Units.
- (e)** Echelon above Corps CSS Units.

(2) Air Force

- (a)** Individual Wings/Composite Wings/Air Expeditionary Wing.
- (b)** Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

(3) Marine

- (a) Marine Air Ground Task Force/Component Force.
- (b) Command Element (CE).
- (c) Ground Combat Element (GCE).
- (d) Air Combat Element (ACE).
- (e) Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).
- (f) Accompanying supplies.

(4) Navy

- (a) Carrier Battle Group.
- (b) Amphibious Readiness Group/Amphibious Task Force (ARG/ATF).
- (c) Non carrier-based squadrons.
- (d) Hospital/medical units.
- (e) Major support forces.

(5) Special Operations. Component Force for each supporting Service.

(6) Other

- (a) Functional Headquarters Element.
- (b) Functional Component Commands.
- (c) Major Subordinate Elements.

b. Deterrent options in support of the OPLANs as reflected in JSCP.

c. Excursions (losing forces) or employment options requiring common-user lift.

d. Other force modules created at the discretion of the supported commander and components.

(5) Step 2-Support Planning

(a) Support planning consists of determining the materiel and personnel requirements and priority of delivery to receive and sustain forces in combat to accomplish the mission. Included are computations of support requirements based on force activity, Service planning guidance, inter-Service and combined support requirements, host nation and coalition/allied support resources, and the time phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander's overall concept of operations. Appropriate DOD agencies and the General Services Administration (GSA) will provide the Services with planning information concerning origin and availability of non-Service controlled materiel. The Services, in coordination with the supported commander, will develop consumption rates for the force for use in establishing nonunit requirements. Consumption rates are related directly to the forces during the life of the OPLAN. The supported commander consolidates subordinate component support requirements in order to time-phase resupply, replacements, and fillers into the area of operations. These data are added to the TPFDD as Cargo Increment Numbers (CINs) and Personnel Increment Numbers (PINs) and are used to assess logistic and transportation feasibility. Nonunit-related sustainment, reported in CINs and PINs, reflects the need for common-user lift. A principal product of support planning is the development of the appropriate annexes to the plan. For example, the principal product of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems planning is the development of Annex J to the plan, with emphasis placed on identifying critical circuit requirements, assessing the need for satellite access, and determining augmentation requirements.

(b) The materiel portion of Service Force Modules currently represents only requirements and should not be construed as a statement of capability to fill those requirements.

(6) Step 3-Nuclear Planning. Time-phased nuclear requirements will be developed as force records in a stand-alone PID.

(7) Step 4-Transportation Planning. Transportation planning is conducted by the supported commander and USTRANSCOM to resolve gross feasibility questions (e.g., time phasing) impacting strategic and intra-theater movement. It embraces those aspects of plan development that involve the movement and reception of personnel, materiel, and equipment from POEs to PODs and the subsequent staging and onward movement to final destination. In transportation planning, the supported commanders will use the organic lift

and nonorganic, common-user, strategic lift resources made available for planning by the Chairman (CJCSI 3110.11A, Mobility Supplement to the JSCP) for each planning task. If additional resources are required, the supported commander will identify the additional strategic lift requirements and provide rationale for those requirements.

(a) Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, mobility support facilities, and intratheater transportation assets must be assessed in terms of impact on mission accomplishment. Priorities must be established by the supported commander and, in light of both movement constraints (e.g., assumptions concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction) and the concept of operations, a movement plan must be prepared.

(b) The plan will consider en route staging locations and the ability of the locations to support the scheduled activity including decontamination operations. This information, with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be communicated to appropriate supporting commanders and included in Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex D of the Plan.

(c) EAD-LAD windows will reflect real limitations. Where no limitations exist for airlift requirements, the EAD will be the same as the available-to-load date (ALD) to provide maximum flexibility in strategic lift. Where no limitations exist for sealift requirements, the guidance expressed in paragraph 7c(4)(b)4b should be followed, i.e., not have a LAD earlier than a higher priority unit.

(d) The process for identifying the POD and refining the POE data is as follows:

1. The supported commander enters the POD into the TPFDD.
2. USTRANSCOM identifies preferred POE to the Services.
3. Services source the forces, taking into consideration the CINC-assigned POD and the USTRANSCOM-preferred POE, and identify any support problems to the supported command through the supported Service component. The supported commander, supporting commanders, and the Services reconcile their differences (if any) when an agency deviates from the CINC's guidance and the deviation is challenged by the supported commander. Irreconcilable differences will be referred to the Joint Staff for resolution.
4. USTRANSCOM and Transportation Component Commands (TCC) flow the TPFDD using computer models to determine final POE selections

and assess transportation feasibility. Transportation feasibility requires current analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands, and restrictions. Following all analysis inputs prescribe within the definition of transportation feasibility, the supported CINC is responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable.

5. After coordinated review of transportation analysis by supported CINC and USTRANSCOM, the supported commander may adjust POEs and available to load dates to those recommended by the transportation analysis tool.

(e) Planning for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) is accomplished to ensure closure of forces at the final destination. JRSOI constraints (port clearance, intra-theater movement capacity, staging base limitation, etc.) imposed on strategic force closure must be considered in TPFDD development.

(8) Step 4a-NEO Planning. The supported commander develops time-phased noncombatant evacuation requirements in coordination with the Department of State and USCINTRANS. These requirements are entered into the deployment TPFDD, or into the retrograde TPFDD if a separate TPFDD for retrograde has been developed.

(9) Step 5-Shortfall Identification. The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, resolve them by early coordination and conference with Service component commanders and supporting commanders. If the supported commander cannot resolve shortfalls then these and other limiting factors, along with an assessment of the associated risk, will be submitted to the Chairman for resolution.

(a) To ensure that OPLANs and CONPLANs are valid, they will be based on current and projected resources (forces, support, non-unit related cargo and personnel, and lift assets) and policy for medical evacuation in the JSCP-prescribed time frame. The TPFDD submitted as Appendix 1 to Annex A to the OPLAN will be based on this guidance. The supported commander will notify the Chairman when the commander determines that the resources made available for planning by JSCP or the Services are inadequate to accomplish an assigned task or that serious limiting factors exist. The notification will include:

1. A list of specific force, movement, and non-unit related cargo and personnel shortfalls and other critical limiting factors and how these shortfalls affect mission accomplishment.

2. An estimate of the added risk incurred because of force, movement, and support shortfalls and limiting factors.

3. An estimate of the threat level for which available force and non-unit related personnel and cargo capabilities are considered adequate.

4. If appropriate, recommended changes in missions and/or tasks.

(b) The Chairman and the Service Chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, within the limitations imposed by projected capabilities in the JSCP time frame, completion of an operation plan will not be delayed pending the resolution of a shortfall or limiting factor. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will contain a consolidated list and impact assessment of the limiting factors and shortfalls that have not been resolved by options listed below. The impact assessment should specify the missions and/or tasks that cannot be accomplished because of the shortfalls. The supportability of the CINC's concept of operations should also be considered.

(c) The supported commander may convene a plan development conference to develop initial closure profiles and feasibility assessments to determine if the closure of forces is adequate to meet the proposed concept of operations and if the planning is valid. Coordination among all commands and agencies concerned is essential to make the detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls and limiting factors. Supporting commands and agencies, particularly USTRANSCOM, will ensure that adequate support is provided for plan development conferences. A wide range of options is available to the supported commander to resolve outstanding shortfalls before reporting them to the Joint Staff for resolution. They include:

1. Refining priorities.

2. Adjusting POEs, PODs, routing, and timing.

3. Changing lift mode and/or source.

4. Adjusting prepositioned forces or resources.

5. Enhancing preparedness with base development.

6. Seeking additional assets.
7. Redefining the concept of operations.
8. Concluding contractual agreements or inter-Service support agreements.
9. Arranging for host-nation support (HNS) where feasible.
10. Employing combinations of above.

(10) Step 6-Transportation Feasibility Analysis. The supported commander conducts a gross transportation feasibility analysis during a plan development conference or before submitting the TPFDD for refinement. OPLANs/CONPLANs are considered transportation feasible when the capability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point of origin to the final destination according to the plan. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands, and restrictions:

(a) The supported CINC will analyze deployment; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI); and theater distribution of forces, equipment, and supplies to final destination.

(b) USCINCTRANS will assess the strategic leg of the TPFDD for transportation feasibility, indicating to the Chairman and supported CINC that movements arrive at POD consistent with the supported CINC's assessment of JRSOI and theater distribution.

(c) Following analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC is responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable.

(11) Step 7-TPFDD Refinement. For OPLAN and CONPLAN with TPFDD development, the TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support the other elements of the Plan Development Phase (Figure C-4), Forces Planning, Support Planning, Transportation Planning, and Shortfall Identification, and are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces (to include nonunit personnel), logistics (to include both accompanying supplies and nonunit resupply), and transportation data to develop a TPFDD that supports a feasible and adequate Plan. Data base size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The TPFDD for some

smaller scale contingencies (SSCs) may be refined, if possible using two refinement conferences, a combined Forces and Logistics Conference (since logistics for regional plans are normally not sourced), and a Transportation Conference. TPFDDs are refined at three separate conferences (forces, logistics, and transportation/JRSOI) which may be combined together or omitted, as required, to allow optimum refinement for a single plan or family of plans established for a common planning task. The decision regarding the number and type of conferences is made by the supported commander in coordination with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. TPFDD refinement conferences are conducted by the supported commander with USTRANSCOM support in coordination with the Joint Staff.

(a) Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINTRANS will normally host forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess the adequacy of CS and CSS force apportionment and resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

1. Prior to any forces refinement conference, supported commanders will update force lists against the latest TUCHA file.

2. Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment will be provided to the supported commander by the appropriate service component command before any forces refinement conference.

3. Prior to any forces refinement conference, the Services will ensure the Logistic Factors File and the Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System files reflect current data. The TUCHA file will be updated quarterly in accordance with CJCSM 3150.24 to reflect current force structure and data.

4. Requirements will be sourced by providing commanders at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) prior to a forces refinement conference. JOPES Network Operations Control Center (JNOCC)/Joint Staff/J-3, CSOD, as functional database manager, will monitor and facilitate the transfer of data, as required.

(b) Logistic refinement is primarily conducted by the Service sourcing agencies, DLA, and CINC components under the overall direction of

the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will normally host logistic refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistic refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources provided by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning.

1. The logistic community will begin refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced and adequate force list provided by the supported commander.

2. Prior to logistic refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies involved will develop and/or source facilities and materiel support requirements.

3. Prior to the start of the logistic phase, Services, agencies, supported and supporting commanders will ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and used throughout the logistic refinement process.

4. During logistic refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies involved will resolve problems related to unit and non-unit related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical, evacuee, and resupply records including shortfalls.

5. Prior to convening a logistic refinement conference, USCINCTRANS will assess initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and the Joint Staff and provide the results to conference participants. At the conclusion of a logistic refinement conference, USCINCTRANS will reassess transportation feasibility for the supported commander to ensure the TPFDD is ready for transportation component command (TCC) flow.

(c) Transportation refinement is conducted by the supported CINC in coordination with the Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, Services, and supported and supporting commands. USCINCTRANS will normally host transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the TPFDD flow to ensure they are transportation feasible and consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance. Transportation feasibility analysis considers CONUS, strategic, and theater movement capability. Transportation analysis is accomplished through end-to-end modeling, simulation, and transportation experience. This is a collaborative effort between the supported commander and USTRANSCOM.

1. End-to-end transportation refinement will begin with the supported commander providing a sourced TPFDD to USTRANSCOM for transportation flow.

2. During the transportation conference, participants will resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate combined-transportation requirements and shortfalls. Transportation analysis will be provided and the supported commander will determine if the closure profile is consistent with the concept of operations.

3. At the completion of a transportation refinement conference, the refined TPFDD will be maintained in the JOPES database.

(d) JRSOI refinement is conducted by the supported commander in coordination with USCINCTRANS, Services, Joint Staff, and supporting commanders. The purpose of JRSOI refinement is to use the results of the strategic transportation plan that closed forces at PODs to determine the feasibility of force closure at final destination by the commander. Planning considers such issues as port clearance, intra-theater transportation infrastructure, capability to provide sustainment to forces in transit, and build-up at staging bases. Individually and collectively, such issues impact the overall transportation flow. This refinement is the final step to accomplishing an end-to-end transportation analysis. Upon completion of JRSOI refinement, the supported commander's logistics sustainability analysis will assess the end-to-end transportation viability. The supported commander declares a plan end-to-end executable.

(e) Upon completion of force and logistic TPFDD refinement (normally at the conclusion of the combined Forces and Logistic Conference for all plans), USTRANSCOM will assess the transportation feasibility of the OPLAN. If transportation feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the supported commander, may deem the OPLAN "effective for planning." The term "effective for planning" recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution prior to submission of the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation is predicated on the fact that the CINC's Strategic Concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, current forces have been sourced and approved, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the transportation feasibility check indicated the plan was transportation feasible.

(f) Refinement guidance for regional plans will be published by the supported commanders in their TPFDD LOI prepared during the initial stage of the Plan Development Phase. Refinement guidance regarding major theaters of

war (MTWs) may be published for specific OPLANs or families of OPLANs, as required, to meet current conditions or resolve particular problems. Such guidance will normally be issued by the Joint Staff. The JNOCC may issue guidance in coordination with the Joint Staff for the areas of database construction, database accuracy, and data transfer and update.

1. To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JOPES database, the TPFDD will be intensively managed and updated to ensure database accuracy for ready execution. This intensive management will include scheduled replacement of UICs that are changed or deactivated, TUCHA and other standard reference files updates, and updates of force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structures.

2. Normally, refinement conferences will be attended by representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, the Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, and components.

3. Completed TPFDDs will normally be made available to refinement participants through Joint Staff JNOCC/J-36/CSOD 30 days prior to refinement conferences. Medical working files, personnel working files, planning factors files, ports of support files, and unit consumption factors files will be submitted with the TPFDD.

4. The supported commander certifies that the TPFDD is ready for refinement.

(12) Step 8-Documentation. Concurrent with TPFDD refinement, the supported commander:

(a) Prepares the Plan Summary, Basic Plan, and all required annexes in the format prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

(b) Produces an updated TPFDD including an update against the most recent TUCHA file.

(c) Coordinates with the JNOCC for networking of the TPFDD in JOPES to be available to the JPEC for review.

d. Phase IV--Plan Review. In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN and CONPLAN are assessed and validated. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, reviews OPLANs and CONPLANs. Normally the Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies do not review functional plans

e. Phase V--Supporting Plans. In this final phase, all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and reviewed by the supported commander. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, will be submitted by the supporting command or agency to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless directed by the supported commander. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans.

f. Annex "V", produced during the deliberate planning process and approved by the CJCS, will be converted to a Strategic Concept by an OSD/JS working group for Interagency Pol-Mil Planning. The resulting Strategic Concept will be staffed by the JS and briefed to the Secretary of Defense. When approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic Concept will be presented to the NSC where the Interagency Planning Process will complete the supporting Pol-Mil plan if required.

8. TPFDD Maintenance. The supported commander will schedule and conduct TPFDD maintenance as required to ensure that stages of force deployment are up to date throughout the JSCP effective period. The supported commander will identify TPFDD records for maintenance. As a minimum, the first 10 days of airlift requirements and first 30 days of sealift requirements (based on EAD) will be subject to maintenance. Unless otherwise specified by the supported commander, non-unit records will not be maintained.

9. JOPES Standard Reference File Maintenance. New releases of JOPES standard reference files (TUCHA, Standard Specified Geographic Location File (GEOFILE, etc.)) will be loaded at each site within 30 days after Joint Staff release. TPFDDs will be updated as directed by the supported commander at specified intervals using the latest release of standard reference file data. DISA will monitor the update of the standard reference files and report problems and noncompliance to the Joint Staff JNOCC. TUCHA data accuracy is a Service responsibility.

10. Changes to Operation Plans

a. The supported commander may publish changes to plans for several reasons:

(1) As a result of the CINC's review.

(a) If there is a significant change to an plan concept, the plan will be submitted for Joint Staff concept review before proceeding with TPFDD refinement.

(b) If there are only TPFDD changes or relatively minor changes to the Basic Plan and these do not require a Joint Staff concept review, the changed plan will be submitted, as with CONPLANs, for final CJCS plan review and approval.

(2) To rapidly incorporate new information into a plan, interim changes, clearly identified as proposed, may be issued in message form. This procedure will be used only under urgent circumstances. All changes so issued will be followed by a formal change submitted within 30 days to the Joint Staff for review in accordance with the procedures outlined in Enclosure D. Routine updates for TPFDD maintenance that are accomplished by supported or supporting commanders to maintain currency are not considered to fall within the definition of changes as used in this chapter.

(3) In response to CJCS review comments (see Enclosure D).

b. Operation plans and concept plans are assigned a new plan identification number (PID) each time a plan is published in its entirety (or rolled over to the next JSCP) by changing the two-digit fiscal year suffix. Its fiscal year suffix refers to the JSCP for which the plan is written (see Chapter I, CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II, for a discussion of suffixes). Changes to such plans will be published as consecutively numbered changes starting with 1. A complete rewrite of an OPLAN calls for a new PID and supersedes the old plan and all changes. Changes to the new plan will also be consecutive beginning with "1." Formats for changes are contained in the OPLAN formats, CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

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ENCLOSURE D

REVIEW OF OPERATION PLANS

1. Purpose. This enclosure establishes responsibilities and procedures for the review and assessment of operation plans.

2. Sources of Plans Reviewed. The Chairman reviews plans from the following sources:

a. Operation plans submitted by the CINCs in response to JSCP requirements and other CJCS directives, including:

(1) New operation plans.

(2) Existing plans, as changed.

(3) Existing plans recommended for cancellation (see subparagraph 5c(2), Enclosure C).

(4) Existing plans recommended for continuation (see subparagraph 5c(3), Enclosure C).

b. Combined military plans and planning studies in coordination with comparable authorities of the other nations.

c. Military plans of international treaty organizations. These plans will be reviewed by the Chairman when:

(1) The US military representative to an international treaty organization requests guidance or comments from the Chairman on a plan.

(2) A Major NATO Command (MNC), or other NATO command authorized by a MNC, forwards a plan to the nations concerned for national comment.

d. Other operation plans designated by the Chairman or specifically requested by the Chief of a Service or a CINC.

3. Responsibilities for CJCS Review. The Joint Staff will conduct and coordinate the plan review with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies.

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4. Types of Review. The Chairman will conduct the following types of reviews:

a. Review of CINC's Strategic Concept. This review is conducted at the conclusion of the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to new operation plans or existing plans in which the concept has changed. The following procedures apply to concepts submitted to the Chairman for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of the Strategic Concept, the Joint Staff will determine if the concept is ready for review. The Strategic Concept must be in the appropriate format specified in JOPES, Volume II, and conform with JSCP guidance and joint doctrine. If the concept is not ready for review, the submitting headquarters will be notified by memorandum (or message).

(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Criteria. The strategic concept review will determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned; assess the validity of the assumptions; evaluate compliance with CJCS tasking, guidance, and consistency with joint doctrine; and evaluate acceptability in regard to expected costs and military and political supportability.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be categorized as execution-critical, substantive, and administrative.

(a) Execution-critical comments are major deficiencies that impact negatively on the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, lack of appropriate supporting plans from designated supporting commands and combat support agencies, and major logistic shortfalls.

(b) Substantive comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance, JOPES formatting, and/or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments offered for clarity,

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accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be processed under the provisions of CJCSI 5711.01. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the concept is either:

(a) Approved for further plan development.

(b) Disapproved and requires significant changes prior to resubmission.

(7) Post-Review Actions. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments will be submitted to the Chairman within 30 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety. A supported commander that has substantial justification to request resolution on review comments should forward resolution recommendations in a memorandum to the Joint Staff proponent for the deliberate planning process, the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

b. Review of US Unilateral Plans. This review is conducted during the Plan Review Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to all operation plans. It is a formal review of the entire operation plan, including TPFDD, logistic factors file, updated medical working file, and appropriate Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System files, if applicable. The following procedures apply to US unilateral operation plans submitted to the Chairman for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of an operation plan, the Joint Staff will determine whether the plan is ready for review. The entire operation plan, with the TPFDD, and including annexes and appendixes published separately, must be completed and submitted to the Joint Staff for concurrent review. If the plan is not ready for review, the submitting headquarters will be notified by memorandum (or message) that the review is being held in abeyance pending receipt of the missing elements.

(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30

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days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7) which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Criteria. The Joint Staff will ensure that all elements of the plan are properly evaluated. The general criteria for CJCS review of a plan are adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with joint doctrine. See the CJCS Plan Review Guide, April 1995, for further guidance.

(a) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the JSCP taskings. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine.

(b) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether the plans exceed capabilities of the allocated resources.

(c) The review for acceptability ensures the plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criteria of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Additionally, using this criteria, the plans are reviewed to ensure they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be provided as outlined in preceding paragraph 4a(4).

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be processed under the provisions of CJCSI 5711.01 and CJCSM 3141.01. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either:

(a) Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

(7) Post-Review Actions

(a) Within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander will send a message to the Chairman stating his intentions concerning incorporation of execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items will be submitted to the Chairman within 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change or by the next CJCS review. A formal change incorporating substantive comments must be submitted within 180 days of initial CJCS approval of an OPLAN/CONPLAN. Subsequent submissions of formal changes will be based upon CINC discretion and/or CJCS direction. A supported commander with substantial justification to request resolution of review comments should forward his recommendations in a memorandum to the Joint Staff proponent for the deliberate planning process, the Director, J-7.

(b) Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander will send a message to the supported commander's component commands notifying them of operation plan approval status; operation plans replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and component commands' responsibility to notify supporting commands and agencies of operation plans effectiveness and taskings.

(c) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported command's operation plan review notification message, component commanders will send a message to all supporting commands and service agencies that are tasked within the plan relating operation plan status and effectiveness.

(d) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff will review it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review will be determined case by case.

(e) Supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies are normally reviewed and approved by the supported commander. Supported commanders will advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

c. Review of Combined Plans. Combined plans, planning studies, and plans of international treaty organizations will be reviewed using JOPES procedures insofar as practicable. Nations and organizations outside the US Department of Defense are not subject to the policies and procedures of JOPES. However,

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inclusion of the major elements of JOPES formats should be encouraged to assist with the review. The following procedures apply to combined plans submitted to the Chairman for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of a combined plan, the Joint Staff will initiate the review.

(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Considerations. Combined plans are approved by the US representative during the negotiating development phase. The plan review conducted by the Joint Staff provides recommendations for the development of the next edition of the plan. Comments from the change and/or review should be incorporated during the next plan development cycle. Because combined plans are a product of negotiations between two countries, review comments must be negotiated to conform as closely as possible to the CJCS-directed position for inclusion in the plan. If the supported commander is unable to convince the other country to include the CJCS comments, the CINC will forward the revised wording to the Chairman with supporting rationale. The Joint Staff will coordinate with the Services for resolution of the revised wording. The Chairman will determine whether the revised plan is approved or disapproved. Plans of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command will be reviewed in accordance with SM-387-78, 9 May 1978, "Plans for the Defense of the ROK."

(4) Review Comments. Comments from combined reviews will be defined as follows:

(a) Execution-critical comments are significant comments whose incorporation is considered essential by the Chairman.

(b) Substantive comments are important comments that the Chairman desires to have incorporated into the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments provided for clarity, accuracy, and consistency and to correct minor errors in references, terminology, etc.

(5) Review Completion. The review should be completed within 60 days

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of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either:

(a) Approved. Any shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined in the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

d. Canada-US Combined Plans. These plans are reviewed and approved by the Chairman in coordination with the Services, Defense agencies, and the Canadian National Defense Headquarters. The review comments will follow the definitions for bilateral plans discussed in subparagraph 4c(4) above. The results of the simultaneous reviews are exchanged through the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). The MCC will act as a focal point for negotiating contentious issues between the two countries and will notify Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) (or the appropriate CINC), when the review is completed.

e. Review of NATO Plans. This review is applicable to all NATO plans, except Outline Contingency Operations Plans (OCOPs). OCOPs, which are essentially an executive summary of a plan, will not normally receive a US national review. They will be verified against the corresponding plan and retained for information. The US Representative to the Military Committee may request OCOP review, if required. A US national review will be conducted whenever the appropriate NATO authority forwards for approval a new plan, a major revision to an existing plan, or a major change to an existing plan. NATO authorities may also request a national review of a plan when a period of time (specified in NATO planning directives) has elapsed since initial approval or the last comprehensive review. The following procedures apply to US national review of NATO plans submitted to the Chairman for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon notification by the appropriate NATO authority, the United States will initiate a review of the plan. New plans will normally be reviewed at the "Draft Plan" stage.

(2) Review Responsibilities

(a) The Joint Staff will conduct the US national review of MNC plans, Joint MNC plans, Allied Command Europe (ACE), Major Subordinate Command (MSC) plans, and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) MSC plans. Joint Staff, Service, and Defense agency responsibilities are in accordance with the

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procedures outlined in paragraph 4b for the unilateral review of US plans. Commander in Chief, US European Commander, (USCINCEUR) and Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM), will submit comments for plan reviews of MNC and MSC plans when tasked by the Joint Staff.

(b) USCINCEUR and USCINCJFCOM will conduct the US national review of ACE and ACLANT Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) plans, respectively.

(c) For all ACLANT plans, the US Liaison Officer (USLO) Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), will act as the point of contact for communications between the Joint Staff and ACLANT commands. ACLANT commands will send plans requiring a US national review to the USLO SACLANT, who will in turn notify the Joint Staff and USCINCJFCOM when a national review is required and forward copies of ACLANT plans. The USLO SACLANT will forward US national review comments from the Joint Staff or USCINCJFCOM to the appropriate ACLANT commander.

(3) Review Criteria. The Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, and applicable US unified commands will ensure that all elements of the plan are properly evaluated. The general criteria for US national review of a NATO plan are feasibility and acceptability.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be categorized as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative and will include supporting rationale.

(a) Execution-critical comments are significant comments whose incorporation is considered essential by the Chairman.

(b) Substantive comments are important comments that the Chairman desires to have incorporated into the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments provided for clarity, accuracy, and consistency and to correct minor errors in references, terminology, etc.

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be conducted under the provisions of CJCSI 5711.01 and CJCSM 3141.01. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances dictate.

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(6) Review Results. US national review results will be forwarded via message to the applicable ACE commander for ACE plans and to the USLO SACLANT for ACLANT plans.

f. Legal Review. All types of review will include a review by the appropriate legal office to ensure that operation plans are consistent with domestic and international law.

5. CJCS Contingency Plan Review Program

a. General. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 specifies that:

(1) The Secretary of Defense will provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with written policy guidance annually for the preparation and review of contingency plans.

(2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) will assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing the policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing the plans.

(3) The Chairman is responsible for providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense. Also, the Chairman is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of these deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and strategic plans.

b. Contingency Plan Review Program Taskings

(1) An information briefing will be developed by the supported CINC concurrently with the CJCS review of the CINC's Strategic Concept and during the review of the final operation plan. Following completion of the CJCS review and approval, information briefings by the supported CINC will be available for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff directorate having primary responsibility for the review will be responsible for coordination of JCS and SecDef information briefings with the appropriate CINC.

(2) The USD(P) will review the CINC's Strategic Concept and the final plan for operation plans tasked by the JSCP. Following CJCS review and approval, the Joint Staff directorate having primary responsibility for the review will release the CINC's Strategic Concept or final operation plan to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), who may hold these documents for the period of USDP review and information briefings to the Secretary of Defense (if

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required). These reviews will assist USDP in preparing the annual Contingency Planning Guidance.

(3) Upon completion of the CJCS review and approval of the MTW plans, the Chairman will provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of the results of the planning effort, including identification of aggregate strengths and deficiencies associated with the MTW OPLANs. This assessment, prepared by the Director, J-7, in collaboration with the other Joint Staff directorates and coordinated with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, will be structured to meet the requirements of title 10, United States Code, sections 153 (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C).

ENCLOSURE E

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. Purpose. This chapter describes how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive situations, the JPEC follows formally established Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders. CAP provide a guide which can be modified to include combining and/or bypassing phases based on existing circumstances. In doing so, senior leaders must be cognizant of risks associated with the modified procedures.

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2. Relationship to Deliberate Planning. CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to military operations other than war or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for a hypothetical crisis based on the best available intelligence and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it improbable that any deliberate plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds, and every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision making, execution, and redeployment planning as the crisis unfolds and assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. CAP procedures provide the means to respond to any crisis within a constrained time frame. CAP routinely includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate planning whenever possible.

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3. Crisis Action Planning Phases. Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible. The activities of the JPEC are keyed to the time available and the significance of the crisis. Planning procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and progressing through the employment of US military forces. Several points are identified in this sequence where key activities (or decisions) are required. The following describes key activities or phases of CAP.

a. Phase I--Situation Development. An event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. The diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on a possible requirement for military force. Current strategy and applicable operation plans are reviewed.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development. CINCs are tasked, or a CINC is tasked, to develop and recommend COAs or the NCA develops its own COA.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. The NCA selects a COA.

e. Phase V--Execution Planning. A detailed operation order is prepared to support the selected COA. The level of detail is proportional to the time available for planning.

f. Phase VI--Execution. The decision of the NCA to deploy or employ US forces is implemented.

4. Post Execution Activities. Post execution requirements (including preparing detailed after-action reports, assessing results, developing lessons learned, declassifying material, releasing information, and preparing follow-on plan reviews) will be as directed by the Chairman.

5. Operation Plans. In a crisis, existing OPLANs or CONPLANs are reviewed for applicability to the situation at hand. Using CAP procedures, applicable existing plans are expanded or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP procedures are followed to build an OPORD.

6. Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) Responsibilities. Many organizations are involved in planning for a crisis. The composition of the JPEC and roles of members of the JPEC are described below.

NOTE: CAP phases are further defined in the remaining enclosures and appendixes of this volume. Through the inherent flexibility of CAP, the time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis.

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a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. He manages the planning process; provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; and conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs (see Figure E-1). More specifically, the Chairman receives and analyzes reports, tasks commanders to prepare estimates and COAs, reviews those estimates and COAs, resolves conflicts and shortfalls or seeks resolution from the NCA, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The NCA has final responsibility and authority in a crisis. The NCA approves a COA and authorizes the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces. Authority to conduct military operations against a potential enemy, as delineated in the JSCP, rests solely with the NCA, except as authorized under the applicable ROE.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively in their capacity as military advisers, provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when requested.

c. Supported Commander and Service Components. The supported commander, designated by the Chairman, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis. The supported commander is usually the commander of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs. The supported commander begins COA development as soon as he is aware that a military response may be needed and provides an estimate of the situation to the Chairman. In developing a COA, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components, subunified commands, and/or JTFs. The Service component commands will develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFDDs to implement appropriate concepts. The Service component commands will also work within Service channels to identify CS and CSS forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and Reserve component (RC) asset availability. Throughout the crisis, the supported commander will ensure that continuous communications are maintained with the supporting commanders concerning present requirements and anticipated future actions that might affect or necessitate additional support.

CJCS ORDER MATRIX

	ORDER TYPE	INTENDED ACTION	SECDEF APPR REQUIRED
WARNING ORDER	WARNORD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REQUESTS CMDR'S ESTIMATE WITH COAs FOR NCA CONSIDERATION • DIRECTS PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES 	NO (REQUIRED WHEN WARNORD INCLUDES DEPLOYMENT OR DEPLOYMENT PREP ACTIONS)
PLANNING ORDER	OTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BEGINS EXEC PLANNING FOR ANTICIPATED NCA SELECTED COA • DIRECTS PREPARATION OF OPORD OR OPLAN 	NO (CONVEYS ANTICIPATED COA SELECTION BY NCA)
ALERT ORDER	ALORD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BEGINS EXEC PLANNING ON NCA SELECTED COA • DIRECTS PREPARATION OF OPORD OR OPLAN 	YES (CONVEYS COA SELECTION BY NCA)
DEPLOYMENT PREP ORDER	OTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INCREASE/DECREASE DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE OF UNITS 	YES (REFERS TO 5 LEVELS OF DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE)
DEPLOYMENT/ REDEPLOYMENT ORDER	DEPLOYORD/ OTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEPLOY/REDEPLOY FORCES • ESTABLISH C-DAY/L-HOUR • INCREASE DEPLOYABILITY • ESTABLISH JTF 	YES (REQUIRED FOR MOVEMENT OF UNIT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT INTO CINCS AOR)
EXECUTE ORDER	EXORD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IMPLEMENT NCA DECISION DIRECTING EXECUTION OF OPORD/OPERATION 	YES

Figure E-1. CJCS Order Matrix

d. Supporting Commanders. Supporting commanders are designated by the Chairman. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2. Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military COAs and identify the actual units and associated movement data. Additionally, when supporting commanders provide lift assets in support of a COA, they will provide deployment estimates and schedules for those assets. Supporting commanders will ensure that all cargo and personnel requiring transportation during deployment and redeployment operations will be documented in accordance with DOD 4500.32-R, MILSTAMP.

e. Services. The Services are responsible for mobilizing and calling up RC forces, when authorized; providing units, individual filler, and replacement personnel; and sustaining deployed forces.

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f. USCINCTRANS and Components. As a supporting commander, USCINCTRANS is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis) and centralized wartime traffic management, including:

(1) Developing and operating the transportation elements of the crisis action planning and execution system.

(2) Receiving, evaluating, and coordinating global strategic mobility requirements in support of the other unified and specified commands.

(3) Optimizing the use of transportation capability.

g. Other Supporting Agencies. Combat Support Agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTNA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and National Security Agency (NSA), and other US Government agencies, such as Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Transportation (DOT), US Coast Guard (USCG), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), play important roles as part of the planning community in developing, evaluating, selecting, and executing military COAs. These agencies provide information vital to NCA decision making and should be considered early in the planning process; others supply materiel, personnel, or other resources to support the military forces.

7. Communication

a. Oral. Crises that require US military operations and develop with little or no warning may precipitate a rapid series of decisions by the NCA, the Chairman, and the CINCs. As a result, key decisions in the CAP process may be relayed orally. As a minimum, decisions requiring NCA approval will be confirmed by record communications as soon as possible.

b. Newsgroups. The Chairman may direct establishment of a crisis deployment newsgroup and identify those Services, agencies, and commands required to subscribe and monitor the newsgroup, if the supported commander has not already established a newsgroup. The newsgroup chairman is responsible for initiating a polling process to ensure required commands are provided newsgroup authorization if it is a limited access newsgroup.

c. Messages. Crisis reporting and information updates will be provided to the Chairman as necessary using formats prescribed by CJCSM 3150.01.

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d. Data Exchange. The primary means of exchanging detailed force and deployment data is JOPES ADP. JOPES ADP will be used to develop and analyze COAs, to create and modify a detailed deployment database (TPFDD) for managing the deployment and redeployment of forces, and to assist in tracking or monitoring the operation. The supported commander will publish amplifying instructions to the supplemental TPFDD LOI in the appropriate CINC Annex.

e. Collaborative Planning. Collaborative planning tools are used to coordinate crisis action activities among commands. Audio/video teleconference capabilities, shared maps, white board, and shared planning applications are available.

f. Web Pages. Command home pages are used for posting orders, documents, images, briefings, etc., during crisis action planning as an effective medium for coordination and communications.

g. Restricted Access Planning. Certain crises may dictate that access to planning activity be restricted. In such situations, oral communications, special category (SPECAT) messages, and other control procedures will apply (see SM-670-88). The decision to use SPECAT must recognize the tradeoff in benefits between restricting access and the potential for degrading timely planning and liaison. It is critical that JOPES ADP personnel be included in SPECAT channels as soon as the possibility of deployment is foreseen. Deployment data, when required, will be developed using JOPES ADP and will be maintained in the JOPES database by means of close-hold or limited-access procedures. Use of Newsgroup, and access to JOPES ADP during these situations requires the supported commander to determine which personnel and commands require access to such data.

8. Single-Crisis Procedures. As previously discussed, a response to a crisis is normally carried out in six sequential phases. The time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the time spent in each phase can be compressed so that all decisions are reached in conference and orders are combined or are initially issued orally. A crisis could be so time-critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a DEPLOYMENT or EXECUTE ORDER. (See restrictions on oral communications in subparagraph 7a). The following subparagraphs describe key activities during each phase of a crisis, and Figure E-2 (following page) presents a general flow diagram of the CAP procedures.

PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT	PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT	PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION	PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING	PHASE VI EXECUTION
EVENT					
EVENT OCCURS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS	CINC's REPORT/ ASSESSMENT RECEIVED	CJCS PUBLISHES WARNING ORDER	CINC PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COAs TO NCA	CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER	NCA DECISION TO EXECUTE OPORD
ACTION					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC: MONITOR WORLD SITUATION • CINC: IDENTIFY PROBLEM • CINC: SUBMIT CINC's ASSESSMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC: INCREASE MONITORING • CINC: INCREASE REPORTING • JCS: ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION • JCS: NCA-JCS EVALUATION 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC: DEVELOP COAs • CINC: EVALUATE COAs • CINC: CREATE/MODIFY JOPEs DATA BASE • CINC: ASSIGN TASKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE • USTRANSCOM: PREPARE DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES • JCS: REVIEW COMMANDER'S ESTIMATES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CJCS: GIVE MILITARY ADVICE TO NCA • CJCS: MAY PUBLISH PLANNING ORDER TO BEGIN EXECUTION PLANNING BEFORE FORMAL SELECTION OF COA BY NCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC: ADJUST JOPEs DATABASE • CINC: IDENTIFY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS • CINC: IDENTIFY AND ASSIGN TASKS TO UNITS • CINC: PUBLISH OPORD OR CONVERT COA INTO OPORD & SUPPORTING OPORDs • CINC: RESOLVE SHORTFALLS AND LIMITATIONS • CINC: INTENSIFY SORTS REPORTING • JCS: MONITOR OPORD DEVELOPMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CJCS: PUBLISH EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY & DIRECTION OF SecDef • CINC: EXECUTE OPLAN OR OPORD • CINC: MAINTAIN JOPEs DATABASE • JPEC: REPORT EXECUTION STATUS
OUTCOME					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC ASSESSMENT THAT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS • REPORT EVENTS TO NCA/CJCS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COAs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC PUBLISHES COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NCA SELECTS COA • CJCS PUBLISHES SELECTED COA IN ALERT OR PLANNING ORDER 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC PUBLISHES OPLAN (FOR PLANNING ORDER) OR OPORD (FOR ALERT ORDER) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRISIS RESOLVED

Figure E-2. Flow Diagram of the Crisis Action Procedures

a. Phase I--Situation Development. Phase I begins with an event having possible national security implications and ends when the CINC submits an assessment of the situation to the NCA and the CJCS. (See Appendix A to Enclosure H.)

(1) The Initial Report. When a significant event is recognized, a report is submitted to higher headquarters (see Enclosure H). If the National Military Command Center (NMCC) receives the report from a source other than the commander of the unified command in whose area the event occurred, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communication with the CINC and request a report. In his CINC's assessment report, the CINC provides as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily

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available, major constraints to possible force employment to include terrorist threat considerations and force protection requirements, and actions being taken, if any, within existing ROE. As appropriate, the CINC's report also contains a succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander (see NOTE below). A report that initiates CAP may be received by message or voice. Two formal reports that could initiate action are:

(a) CRITIC--critical intelligence communication.

(b) Operational Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE--Event or incident report of possible national interest.

(2) Other Activities. Other members of the JPEC are gathering information and developing an accurate picture of the crisis event.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the pre-crisis situation, or to have military options developed for possible consideration and possible use. Phase II is characterized by increased awareness and reporting and intense information gathering activity. (See Appendix B to Enclosure G.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the NCA with an assessment of the situation from the military point of view and provides advice on possible military action. He reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in the JOPES and evaluates reports from the CINC and other sources. He also establishes, or directs the establishment of, a crisis newsgroup if the supported commander has not already established a newsgroup.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. The CINC continues to issue status reports as required and to report significant actions taken within the existing ROE. The CINC continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The CINC will assess the employment status and availability of theater transportation assets and the infrastructure to conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI). The CINC will establish a newsgroup and announce it by message.

(3) Other Activities. The services participate in the CINC's review of available military forces, when time permits. The Service review will include, as appropriate, actions within service purview to improve force readiness and sustainability and to identify potential Reserve component (RC) requirements.

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USCINCTRANS reviews the status of strategic lift assets and takes action as authorized and appropriate to improve the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets and common-user port facilities.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs, normally transmitted by a CJCS WARNING ORDER, and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA. (See Appendix C to Enclosure G.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During Phase III, the Chairman normally publishes the WARNING ORDER (see sample format, Enclosure H), a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. The WARNING ORDER establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The WARNING ORDER usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using JOPES. A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the WARNING ORDER, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. Finally, the WARNING ORDER directs the supported commander to develop COAs. The supported command should use JOPES ADP and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the WARNING ORDER will be used to describe that COA and request the supported commander's assessment. Time permitting, he may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE for analytical purposes. During the preparation of the WARNING ORDER, the Chairman will use available command and control tools to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission support requirements are adequately detailed. In extremely time sensitive situations, the WARNING ORDER may be issued orally or even omitted. When the WARNING ORDER is omitted, a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER may be issued. When issued in lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the PLANNING or ALERT Orders will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. In response to the WARNING ORDER, the supported commander works with supported command components, subunified commands, and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) and develops

NOTE: The time sensitivity of some situations may require so rapid a response that the normal CAP sequence may be modified. Accordingly, the commander's assessment may serve to indicate his recommended COA; e.g., to function also as the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, normally developed in Phase III, Course of Action Development. In this situation, no formal WARNING ORDER is issued, and the next communication received by the supported commander from the Chairman is the PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER containing the COA to be used for execution planning. A commander's assessment and proposals should be submitted at the earliest possible time to preclude an execution decision that may not consider the commander's position. (See Appendix B to Enclosure I.)

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possible COAs using JOPEs. The amount of time available for planning governs the level of activity. The supported commander manages the use of JOPEs to construct COAs and tasks Service component commanders and supporting commanders to evaluate the proposed COAs by releasing an EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE (see sample format, Enclosure O). The supported commander directs a review of existing OPLANs for applicability. Even if not applicable in full, deployment data extracted from existing plans may be useful. Finally, the supported commander prepares and submits his COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE to the Chairman (see sample format, Enclosure I). It contains one or more possible COAs and the supported commander's recommendation. If time permits, multiple TPFDDs are built and deployment estimates are conducted for each COA. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE may be provided orally.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components. The supporting commanders, directors of combat support agencies, and Service components take action as directed by the supported commander's EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE. Activities will normally include the creation of combat, CS, and CSS lists and generation of a movement requirement estimate. Normally, they are directed to provide the required information in an EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE (see sample format, Enclosure P) or in JOPEs (by developing a deployment database). Sustainment planning will be coordinated with the Services as directed by the supported commander. Sustainment support available from host nation, allied, or coalition resources should be maximized.

(4) Activities of the Services. The Services monitor COA development using JOPEs and begin preliminary plans for providing support forces and sustainment. In addition, the services continue to monitor force readiness and requirements for the Reserve component (RC), taking action or making recommendations to the Chairman, as appropriate.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. Phase IV begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected. The primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the Chairman and NCA. All other members of the JPEC continue their activities as described in Phases II and III. (See Appendixes B, C, and D to Enclosure G.)

(1) Reviewing the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. The Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. Based on the supported commander's assessment, the Chairman prepares to advise the NCA. He concur with the supported commander's recommended COA in whole or in part, direct the supported commander's development of an additional COA, or may develop and recommend a different COA. The Chairman presents possible

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military COAs to the NCA and, following the NCA decision, normally issues the ALERT ORDER.

(2) The PLANNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER (see sample format, Enclosure J) is a message from the Chairman to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE "PLANNING ORDER" IS TO DIRECT THAT EXECUTION PLANNING ACTIVITIES BEGIN BEFORE FORMAL SELECTION OF A COA BY THE NCA. Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The PLANNING ORDER is designed to allow the Chairman additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the PLANNING ORDER may be used in lieu of a WARNING ORDER. When used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER will normally NOT be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

(3) The ALERT ORDER. The ALERT ORDER (see sample format, Enclosure K) is APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE and transmitted to the supported commander and other Members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA. The ALERT ORDER will describe the selected COA, or COAs in unique situations, in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy forces. The ALERT ORDER will also contain guidance, as needed, to change or amplify the guidance provided in the WARNING ORDER. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the ALERT ORDER may be omitted or issued in lieu of the WARNING ORDER. When issued in lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the ALERT ORDER will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the WARNING ORDER.

e. Phase V Execution Planning. Phase V begins when a PLANNING or an ALERT ORDER is received and ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order (Enclosures J, K, and M).

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Execution planning activities begin with the CJCS-issued PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. If (in the case of a PLANNING ORDER) an NCA decision on a COA is still pending, then the Chairman will notify the supported commander by message, newsgroup, or orally (in extremely time-sensitive situations) when the NCA decision is made. The Chairman monitors the execution planning activities

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using JOPES and reviews the supported commander's OPORD for adequacy and feasibility. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, CAP Phase VI, the Chairman will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. During the execution planning phase, the supported commander publishes supplemental instructions to the standard TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that provides procedures for the deployment, replacement, and redeployment of the operation's forces (see Annex R). The LOI provides instructions and direction to the CINC's components, supporting CINCs, and other members of the JPEC. Also, the supported commander converts an approved COA into an OPORD (see sample format, Annex O). The purpose of the supported commander's OPORD is to provide the components, supporting commands, and agencies a detailed operation plan and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. The supported commander also submits the OPORD to the Chairman for review. The amount of time available will govern the level of activity. A primary deployment concern of the supported commander during execution planning is to ensure that early deploying force requirements are adjusted as required in response to the ALERT or PLANNING ORDER and to the current situation. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing. This signals force providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel offices to convert sustainment estimates to requirements based on the most accurate assessments available. When the above actions have been completed, the supported commander will review the TPFDD and validate to lift providers that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. The supported commander also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical resource shortfalls or limitations.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components. Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for the first increment of deployment. Supporting commanders will develop OPORDs to support the approved COA effectively. Tasked supporting Defense agencies will prepare and submit supporting plans to support the approved COA effectively. The Service component commanders work with the Services and their major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements. Service components and supporting commands

also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves) and supporting Defense agencies will schedule movement of appropriate deploying elements.

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS takes action to provide effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD. USTRANSCOM will apply available transportation assets against the transportation requirement identified by the supported commander and will develop feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules. The level of detail will be commensurate with the availability of detailed movement requirements and the time available for planning. USTRANSCOM uses sustainment estimates when available to establish air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel. Once channels are established, any nonunit sustainment estimates previously entered in the TPFDD will be evaluated, adjusted, and diverted to channel movement where feasible. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement.

(5) Activities of the Services. During Phase V, the Services determine mobilization requirements and take action to request the authority to mobilize. The Services also provide nonunit sustainment and recommend the necessary actions to improve manpower and industrial readiness. The Services work with the supported commander's components in establishing or updating sustainment requirements, taking into account the resources available from host nation, allied, and coalition countries. The Service subordinate commands that provide augmentation forces as supporting commands also schedule organic (self-deploying) movements in JOPES database.

(6) TPFDD Time Standard. The objective time standard will be 72 hours from notification and receipt by the supported commander to validation of the TPFDD -- in level 4 detail -- for the first 7 days of the deployment flow. (Note: Based on supported commander guidance, assets deploying from origin to destination on unit organic transportation may not require level 4 detail). The notification from which performance in meeting the time standard can be tracked will be a duly authorized CJCS order (alert, deployment, etc.) after the National Command Authorities (NCA) approve a COA. The specific type of order will be situational dependent. Regardless of the type of order, the coordination instructions within the order will:

(a) Designate the start of the 72-hour period to develop a level 4 TPFDD and validate the first 7 days of the deployment flow. Start time will be provided as a date-time group (DTG), xxxxxxZ MMM YR, to allow transmission and receipt of the message by the supported commander prior to start of the 72-hour period. Should a mission change occur requiring development and

approval of a new COA, the 72-hour requirement will be reset pending the supported commander's receipt of a new COA. [NOTE: If a CJCS alert order is used to initiate TPFDD development, the DTG to initiate a TPFDD build must be synchronized with the operation order (OPORD) due date specified in the CJCS alert order].

(b) Identify organizations that are involved (supported commander, supporting commanders, Services, and agencies) and their responsibilities. Additionally, the message will authorize collaboration and coordination with these organizations.

(c) Identify mission statement, COA, major force list, location forces will be deployed to, timing for deployment, and anticipated duration of deployment.

(d) Direct unit sourcing to meet the approved COA.

(e) Provide a project code (as appropriate).

(f) Provide air movement priority (as appropriate).

(g) Include the following statements:

1. Supported commander. In conjunction with supporting commanders, develop a TPFDD and validate the first 7 days of the mission to level 4 detail. Work will be completed in accordance with timelines established by the supported commander.

2. Supporting commanders. Source and verify units and assist the supported commander in developing a TPFDD with the first 7 days of the mission to level 4 detail within 72-hours of the following DTG (xxxxxxZ MMM YR).

3. C-day/L-hour will be defined in a CJCS Deployment or Execution Order.

f. Phase VI--Execution. Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, normally transmitted by a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER, and continues until the crisis is resolved satisfactorily (see Enclosure M).

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(a) The Execute Order. The Chairman, reflecting the decision of the NCA, publishes the execute order (see sample format, Enclosure N). The

execute order issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, orders the supported commander to execute his OPORD. The execute order is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the execute order may be the only message provided in a crisis. In such situations, the Chairman ensures that the execute order contains the information normally provided in the warning, alert, and planning orders. Throughout the operation, the Chairman monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, CAP Phase VI, the Chairman will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC with guidance on either continuing under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

(b) Deployment Preparation and Deployment Orders. Should the NCA desire to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other preparatory action that might signal a US intent to respond militarily to a situation, a deployment preparation or deployment order will be published by the Chairman (see sample format, Enclosure L). These orders are issued by authority and direction of the secretary of defense and may be issued at any time throughout the crisis. Deployments or preparations for deployment may also be included as part of the warning, planning, or alert orders (see Enclosures H, J, and K) and will always require NCA approval.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. The supported commander executes the OPORD and uses JOPES to manage the force deployments. Incremental force sourcing and lift scheduling continue, with lift providers managing the flow of lift assets in accordance with the supported commander's force and sustainment priorities. The supported commander reports force or resource shortfalls to the Chairman for resolution. The supported commander employs assigned forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components. The Service component commanders work with the Services and their subordinate commands to continue to provide forces and to report movement requirements within JOPES. Supporting commanders and agencies execute their supporting OPORDs.

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS will manage the strategic common user transportation assets needed for movement of forces and sustainment and will report the progress of the deployment to the Chairman and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the

Joint Staff in developing lift allocations and report shortfalls to the Chairman and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the following actions and process (known as the Joint Strategic Mobility Allocation Process (JSMAP)).

(a) The Chairman determines priority of supported commander(s) force closure.

(b) USTRANSCOM analyzes strategic mobility lift allocations needed to meet CJCS priority for supported commander(s) force deployment and redeployment requirements.

(c) USTRANSCOM performs lateral coordination of recommended resource deliberations with supported commanders.

(d) USTRANSCOM forwards coordinated strategic mobility assets allocation recommendation to the Chairman.

(e) USTRANSCOM keeps the Joint Staff, J-4 informed of process and progress.

(f) Strategic mobility Asset Arbitration, (if necessary) will be de-conflicted by joint conference with the Chairman, USCINCTRANS, and the supported commander(s)

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services continue to provide for the sustainment of forces and provide visibility of Service movements in accordance with TPFDD execution.

9. Multiple Crisis Conditions. Multiple crisis procedures are used by the JPEC to respond to situations in which more than one crisis is occurring simultaneously. The following procedures define only those procedures unique to multiple crisis situations. These procedures supplement, but do not replace, those found in paragraph 8. Multiple crisis procedures apply when all of the following conditions are met:

- a. CAP procedures are in progress for two or more crises.
- b. Competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability.
- c. The supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources.

10. Multiple Crisis Procedures. The procedures unique to multiple crises are

provided in the following subparagraphs. The procedures are organized by phases as are single-crisis procedures. Within each phase, activities are described for applicable members of the JPEC.

a. Phase I--Situation Development. No procedures unique to multiple crises are established in this phase.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. The key activity in this phase is the exchange of information. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be provided to all the supported commanders involved.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When publishing WARNING ORDERS for multiple crises, the Chairman will allocate forces and resources as necessary. Combat forces will be allocated to supported commanders within each WARNING ORDER. If forces or resources are insufficient, the Chairman will establish planning priorities. The Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed, to allocate the available resources and strategic lift or recommend allocations to the Chairman.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders will develop COAs using those forces and resources allocated for planning. The effect on mission accomplishment of force, materiel, strategic lift, or other resource shortfalls will be defined briefly in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The supporting commanders and Service components allocate CS and CSS forces to the tasked supported commanders. This allocation will be in rough proportion to the CJCS-allocated combat force. If CS and CSS forces are insufficient to meet all tasks, the supporting commanders and Service components will allocate such forces in accordance with priorities established by the Chairman as outlined in subparagraph 10c(l) above.

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS coordinates the preparation of movement requirements and deployment estimates. USCINCTRANS will coordinate with the supported commanders to resolve potential conflicts in the use of transportation assets, to remain within port

NOTE: Multiple-crisis events may occur in a single theater. The supported commander facing two or more crises may apply multiple crisis procedures when the available forces or resources are insufficient to carry out assigned missions simultaneously.

workload constraints, to identify firm movement requirements, etc. Issues that cannot be resolved will be referred to the Chairman.

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services will take action to identify and alleviate anticipated shortages in supplies and forces. The Services will identify and take action to activate needed Reserve units and personnel.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. The primary activity in this phase rests with the Chairman and NCA. In recommending COAs to the NCA, the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will consider, and brief to the NCA, the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. The briefing will include the impact of multiple deployments on strategic lift and other resources. If resources are insufficient to the needs of all supported commanders, the Chairman will brief plans in priority order and recommend that the available resources be based upon these priorities.

e. Phase V--Execution Planning

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The primary activity of the Chairman during this phase is the adjudication of conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift. He may convene the JMPAB or the JTB to resolve resource or strategic lift shortfalls.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders monitor the process as forces and resources are identified (sourced) in all the OPLANs being considered. The supported commanders react to conflicts, dual-tasking of units, and resource shortfalls by modifying the concept of operations or by seeking resolution from the Chairman.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components. The supporting commanders, agencies, and Service components seek to allocate forces and resources without conflict (e.g., dual-tasking units) or shortfalls (e.g., unfilled force or resource requirement). The supported commander will be advised of all known unresolved conflicts or shortfalls.

(4) Activities of USCINTRANS. USCINTRANS will examine port workloads and other factors that may be affected by the execution of multiple plans. USCINTRANS will develop and integrate movement schedules.

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services will attempt to resolve dual tasked units and shortfalls by advising the supported commander and Service component commanders of untasked or substitute units. The Services will

participate in the JMPAB, assisting the Chairman in resolving resource shortfalls.

f. Phase VI--Execution. If a force deployment is in progress and a second, more threatening crisis erupts, the NCA, through the Chairman, may halt existing deployments or order the redeployment of forces. The procedures in Phases I through V of this paragraph apply.

11. Loss of JOPES and GCCS Access. See Enclosure F.

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ENCLOSURE F

JOPES ADMINISTRATION

1. Purpose. This enclosure provides an overview of administration of JOPES ADP support. It describes the administrative functions and responsibilities for a JOPES Site, the JOPES ADP, and JOPES Network Administration.

2. General. JOPES ADP is a GCCS Joint Mission Application System designed to provide operation plan Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) throughout the JPEC. JOPES, a part of GCCS, interfaces with other information systems. JOPES ADP is designed as a near-real-time, multiple database architecture, with data exchanged among its database sites to maintain database synchronization at all locations. Users input data at their primary database site for replication to other database sites as appropriate. The SIPRNET is used to distribute data among database sites. The accuracy and utility of JOPES data are dependent upon the quality and timeliness of updates to the TPFDD and the various Standard Reference Files submitted by the JOPES planning community in accordance with the Joint Reporting Structure. There are two separate operating environments for JOPES ADP support. One is a SECRET High system, the other is a TOP SECRET High system. JOPES ADP technical support and applications are applicable to both systems. Security classification is determined by database content. Processing software is unclassified.

3. JOPES Administration. Responsibility for JOPES administration is shared among individual JOPES sites, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Joint Staff Support Center (JSSC). The functions and responsibilities of each level are delineated below:

a. JOPES ADP and Network Responsibilities. JOPES ADP and network administration is performed by the JOPES Network Operations Control Center (JNOCC) and the JOPES site administrator/ database administrator (SA/DBA). The JNOC exercises functional and technical management for TPFDDs in the JOPES database. It consists of the JNOC Network FM and JNOC TDBM, supported by the NMCC Site SA/DBA. The JNOC supports overall system administration and network operation for JOPES. The JNOC responsibilities are performed under the direction of the J-3, Joint Staff, by the JSSC. Specific responsibilities are as follows:

(1) JNOC Functional Manager

(a) Primary controlling organization for the GCCS-JOPES network. Monitor and coordinate activities between operational and functional users and

technical support agencies. Establish policy and procedures to manage and control the GCCS-JOPES network.

- (b) Initiate and synchronize networked OPLANs.
- (c) Coordinate distribution of OPLAN data to JOPES network sites.
- (d) Change OPLAN type, distribution, or access of networked OPLANs.
- (e) Manage functional analysis of JOPES operational problems in accordance with the GCCS Problem Reporting system.
- (f) Control timing and flow of network transactions.
- (g) Chair the JOPES FM Newsgroup.
- (h) Maintain synchronization for JOPES databases.
- (i) Ensure that the JOPES network supports the vital operational mission of strategic military deployment planning and execution under crisis conditions.
- (j) Develop specific procedures for continued operations during periods of degraded capability. This includes maintaining the integrity and synchronization of alternate databases and uninterrupted performance of all JOPES functional management requirements.

(2) JNOC Technical Database Manager

- (a) Manage network operations, maintain network standard operating procedures, and maintain script software for network monitoring and metrics collection.
- (b) Act as single POC for JOPES network technical related problems. Serve as the technical representative for all JNOC technical actions.
- (c) Notify SA/DBA when database recovery is needed.
- (d) Review and audit transaction flow.
- (e) Chair the JOPES Technical Newsgroup.
- (f) Host JOPES technical training conferences.

- (g) Monitor the installation of GCCS/JOPES software releases.
- (h) Develop and maintain JOPES technical procedures for continuity of operations.
- (i) Maintain a JOPES ADP technical library.
- (j) Provide representation to the GCCS Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).
- (k) Provide 24 x 7 TDBM support when directed by the Joint Staff.

(2) NMCC System Administrator/Technical Database Manager (SA/TDBM)

- (a) Accomplish administration to meet the technical requirements of the JNOC.
- (b) Perform database load, backup, and recovery.
- (c) Support DBMS software installations and acceptance testing.
- (d) Reset index tables for the JOPES database.
- (e) Execute snapshot refresh scripts as needed.
- (f) Create additional tablespace files as needed.
- (g) Provide 24 x 7 JOPES database support.

b. JOPES Site Responsibilities. JOPES site administration is divided between the Site Functional Manager (FM), and the Site System Administrator (SA) personnel. Although in some cases these functions may be performed by the same individual, distinct responsibilities are associated with each function as follows:

(1) Site Functional Manager

(a) Maintain site and functional user permissions to all TPFDDs and/or operation plans and/or series. The Site FM must ensure that permissions and access are only granted to DOD personnel who have received JOPES training appropriate to their required access. Control of these permissions also includes coordination with the local GCCS Information System Security Officer (GISSO) for assignment of general GCCS permissions.

The Site FM also establishes local procedures to process, validate, and control JOPES permissions.

(b) Maintain control of command-unique TPFDDs to include creating, building, loading, updating, downloading, and deletion of nondistributed TPFDDs when appropriate. This includes coordination with local operation plan POCs and TPFDD functional experts to ensure data quality and coordination with the Site SA/DBA on database sizing and file space requirements.

(c) Coordinate file transfer and update of network TPFDDs with the JNOC, including conversion of local TPFDDs into networked TPFDDs as appropriate. Monitor data integrity for updated TPFDDs.

(d) Coordinate with Site SA/DBA to ensure JOPES functional requirements are being accommodated at the site.

(e) Coordinate with the Site SA/DBA to resolve system and user problems, including database recovery.

(f) Coordinate with the JNOC TDBM for JOPES network management.

(2) Site System Administrator/Database Administrator (SA/DBA)

(a) Implement data administration policy to meet the technical requirements of the Site FMs.

(b) Perform database load, backup, and recovery.

(c) Support DBMS software installations and acceptance testing.

(d) Monitor and evaluate DBMS operation and tablespace usage.

(e) Provide 24 x 7 JOPES database support.

c. JOPES Security. There are two separate JOPES ADP systems. One system is SECRET High and the other is TOP SECRET High. The systems are referenced respectively as GCCS and GCCS-T. Display screens and computer printouts will be classified in accordance with their content. The GISSO assigns GCCS and GCCS-T user accounts and passwords. The account name is not classified but the password is SECRET. JOPES users must possess an appropriate SECRET or TOP SECRET clearance. Site FMs are required to coordinate JOPES permissions for all local users at the primary and alternate sites. The Site FM will ensure that all authorized users at sites for which the

local site is a primary or alternate database server site are properly registered for database access and JOPES functional permissions.

d. JOPES Training. Specific JOPES training requirements are strongly recommended for JNOC personnel, Site FMs, and SA/DBAs. Although an in-depth technical knowledge is not required in all areas, an operational familiarity with a wide range of JOPES and GCCS capabilities and a general understanding of supporting technical publications is required. JNOC TDBMs and SA/DBA personnel require more technical knowledge of GCCS software, databases, and procedures. Recommended training is listed below.

(1) Site and JNOC FM

- (a) Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC).
- (b) JOPES Basic Operations Course.
- (c) Additional training as required.
- (d) JOPES Functional Manager Course.

(2) Site SA/DBA and JNOC TDBM

- (a) GCCS and database administration.
- (b) SQL PLUS programming.
- (c) JOPES Basic Operations Course.
- (d) ORACLE database administration .
- (e) UNIX fundamentals.
- (f) Additional training as required.

4. Problem Reports and Change Requests. Problem Reports (PRs) and Change Requests (CRs) are submitted through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Management Center (GMC) Help Desk. The Remedy Action Request System (ARS) is used to manage GCCS problem and change actions to include JOPES applications. PRs and CRs are assigned a GCCS Problem Report (GPR) number. If the GPR cannot be resolved under GMC stewardship, it is escalated to the GCCS Technical Assistance Center (GTAC) where a Global System Problem Report (GSPR) number is assigned and technical engineering action is initiated. Malfunctions of JOPES software that adversely affect operational capability and require urgent resolution may be called incidents. Incidents usually occur when a JOPES software failure results in the loss of a

critical system capability , erroneous data presentation, or the display of unexpected error messages. Incidents are reported as a PR and are prioritized for expeditious correction according to criticality. Desired enhancements to JOPEs capabilities are submitted as CRs. CRs are evaluated, processed for approval, and if approved, developed and scheduled for a future software release. Procedures for submission of these requests are described below.

a. Problem Report. The JSSC maintains an automated system for reporting JOPEs problems and reviewing corrective action status. Any user can submit a PR; however, coordination with the Site FM is mandatory to verify that a problem exists. PRs may be initiated to report either JOPEs hardware or software problems. All PRs will be submitted through the automated GCCS Action Request System (ARS) located on the NMCC host to ensure proper recording and tracking.

b. Change Request (CR). JOPEs software frequently requires changes because of user requirements or procedure changes. Users normally identify these changes to the FMs. If a proposed software change will enhance capability above the design specification, initiating a CR is recommended. CRs may be initiated at any level. However, they should be processed through appropriate CINC and Service channels and forwarded to the Joint Staff (J-33/CSOD) via JOPEs newsgroup or message. CRs may also be entered through the GMC Help Desk using the Remedy ARS application. The Joint Staff and DISA conduct periodic Problem/Change Request Review Board (PCRB) meetings, chaired by DISA, which will address new CRs. DISA will evaluate the proposed CR for functional and technical feasibility, provide cost estimates, and brief the PCRB on its analysis and recommendations. The analysis and recommendations will be added to the active GSPR file. Once approved by the PCRB, the chairman will brief the new proposal at the appropriate Configuration Control Board (CCB). The CCB is responsible for prioritizing CRs and ensuring that current and follow-on JOPEs versions support the operational needs of the NCA, Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, and supporting agencies.

c. Resolution Process. Problem resolution is a step-by-step process of identifying a customer's problem and correcting it as quickly as possible. The Help Desk Analysts will use all the tools at their disposal to resolve any issues at the Help Desk prior to assigning GCCS Problem Reports (GPRs) to the System Analysts. A problem can be escalated when the GMC has exhausted its resources to resolve a GPR. Escalation occurs in two ways. First, the Help Desk can escalate a problem to the GCCS Technical Assistance Center (GTAC) at the Operational Support Facility (OSF). Here the GPR is assigned to the appropriate responsible software developer. The Help Desk still monitors and tracks the progress of this GPR. Second, the Help Desk can escalate a problem to a Global System Problem Report (GSPR) when a GPR has been declared a

GSPR by the OSF. When this happens, the status of the GPR changes to ESCALATED and the GPR is no longer tracked by the GMC Help Desk. The Help Desk is responsible for keeping track of the GPRs to ensure that trouble tickets do not sit idle and are resolved or escalated in a timely manner. Once the problem has been solved, the customer will be notified and asked to try the fix. If the problem seems to be fixed, the GPR will be closed. When the Help Desk is called, the analysts will be using the Action Request System (ARS) to capture and record the information. At the time of the call, the GCCS user should have the following minimum amount of information available.

- Name
- Site ID
- SIPRNET e-mail address
- DSN phone number
- Commercial phone number
- The nature of the problem

(1) After gathering this initial information, the Help Desk Analyst will also be asking questions in an effort to better isolate the problem. Some of the types of questions are:

- Is the problem with a workstation or a server?
- Is the problem with hardware, software, communications, or the network?
- What was the customer doing or trying when the error occurred?
- Was there an error message? If so, what is the error message?
- Does it affect any of the servers? If so, which one?
- What is impact on the sites mission (e.g., high, medium, low)?
- Are there alternate capabilities to continue operating?

(2) After all of the information is recorded, the Help Desk Analyst will give the customer the GPR number. A technician should make a return call within 2 hours for a Priority 1 or Priority 2 problem and within 48 hours for a lower priority problem.

d. GPR Priorities. All GPRs recorded by the Help Desk are assigned priorities by the analysts as set forth by military standards (MILSTD 498). The purpose of the priority system is to set a standardized understanding as to the magnitude of a problem. Priority definitions are as follows:

Priority 1: This problem prevents the accomplishment of an operational mission or mission essential capability, or jeopardizes the safety, security, or another requirement designated as critical.

Priority 2: This problem adversely affects the accomplishment of an operational mission or mission essential capability and no work-around solution is known or the problem adversely affects technical solutions, costs, or schedules risks to the project or to life-cycle support of the system and no work-around solution is known.

Priority 3: This problem adversely affects the accomplishment of an operational mission or mission essential capability but a work-around solution is known or the problem adversely affects technical solutions, costs, or schedules risks to the project or to life-cycle support of the system but a work-around solution is known.

Priority 4: This problem results in operator inconvenience or annoyance but does not affect a required operational or mission-essential capability.

Priority 5: This priority contains all other effects.

e. GPR Status. Once a problem is entered into ARS, the customer may track the problem. Whether the user calls the Help Desk or looks up the status on ARWeb, there is a status field which explains the progress of the GPR. This status is updated automatically by the software when certain items have been completed. Otherwise, the personnel working on the problem updates the status upon completion of an action. There is also a date on when the status was last updated. The following lists each status that is available and what each means.

NEW: A NEW GPR is one that has just been created. ARS assigns the status of NEW to all GPRs that have no Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) designated.

OPEN: An OPEN GPR is one that has been given an OPR, but has not been looked at by any specific analyst. ARS assigns the status of OPEN to a GPR when the OPR field is filled.

ASSIGNED: An ASSIGNED GPR is one that has been given to an OPR and a specific analyst. ARS assigns the status of ASSIGNED to GPRs that have the Assigned To field filled in.

ACCEPTED: An ACCEPTED GPR is one that has been given to an analyst and has been given an expected completion date. ARS changes the status to ACCEPTED when the analyst inputs a value into the Expected Date of Completion field.

PENDING: A PENDING GPR is one that is waiting for some action to take place. For example, a GPR concerning a bad hard drive may be placed into pending while the drive is ordered from the manufacturer. A pending GPR is not actively being worked at the GMC. ARS assigns the status of PENDING to a GPR when the Pending Until field is filled.

ESCALATED: An ESCALATED GPR is one that has been sent to an external process to resolve. The best example is a GSPR. When a GPR is ASSIGNED to a GSPR, it enters an entirely different process. Since the GMC has no control over this process when a GPR is escalated. ARS changes the status of a GPR to ESCALATED when the Developer/Vender and Dev/Vendor Reference # fields are filled in. In the example above, the Developer would be GSPR and the Reference # would be the GSPR number supplied by the OSF.

RESOLVED: A RESOLVED GPR is one that has been fixed by the analyst, but not confirmed by the Help Desk. ARS changes the status of a GPR to RESOLVED when an associated solution is assigned or created for that GPR.

CLOSED: A CLOSED GPR is one that has been fixed and verified with the customer. The Help Desk is the only place that can close a GPR. ARS changes the status of a GPR to CLOSED when the Closed by and Site Rep Contacted fields are filled in. Note, a GPR must have the status of RESOLVED before it can be CLOSED.

5. **TPFDD Management.** Real, exercise, and training operation plans (PIDs) are stored in the same database. Real-world TPFDDs are those directed by the JSCP to deal with potential contingencies. Real-world TPFDDs are usually classified. Exercise TPFDDs are those created to support the CJCS Exercise Program and are usually classified. Training TPFDDs are generally used to complement classroom instruction and should be unclassified. TPFDD permissions, access, distribution, and general management will be in accordance with the following guidance. Specific actions may be tempered by evolving technology and policy or procedures relative to special situations.

a. **TPFDDPermissions.** JOPES functional permissions are granted to allow a user to perform specific functions within JOPES. Each permission must be granted specifically to an individual user ID before the function can be performed. These permissions will be controlled by the FM and are tailored to the specific needs of the user.

b. **TPFDD Access.** During routine operations FMs grant a JOPES user access to one or more TPFDD series; however, access can be restricted to individual TPFDDs, if necessary. In most cases, normal access will be granted

during TPFDD development. Restricted access should be used only for highly sensitive operations when further access will jeopardize national security and will not be used as routine procedure. restricted access plans will be converted to normal access as soon as practicable. Restricted access may be changed to normal access by the local Site FMs. Networked restricted access plans may be changed to normal access only by the JNOC. Coordination between site and network FMs will be required to ensure proper TPFDD management and distribution.

c. TPFDD Storage. TPFDDs may be stored on magnetic storage media separate from the JOPES database, in the JOPES database, and in Service systems supporting the JOPES database.

d. TPFDDs Distribution. A networked PID is one that is located at more than one site. The JNOC will administer networked TPFDDs. Site FMs will administer local TPFDDs. Site FMs will coordinate with the JNOC for further distribution to the JOPES network for all TPFDDs. The JNOC FM can modify the normal distribution scheme to meet operational needs.

e. TPFDD Initiation. Only the JNOC can initiate a networked TPFDD regardless of whether it is restricted or normal access.

f. JNOC Operations. The JNOC acts as the proponent for the operation and maintenance of the JOPES database under the direction of the Joint Staff. The J-3 acts as an agent for the Joint Staff, providing functional direction for JOPES and operational control over JOPES network operations. DISA provides technical management for the maintenance and operation of JOPES software and staffing for the JNOC.

6. Loss of JOPES Access (Single Site). If JOPES fails locally but SIPRNET is functional, the affected command will report the failure via the JOPES FM Newsgroup and follow-up with a voice communication message to the Joint Staff SIPRNET Director and the JSSC JNOC and GMC, other participating CINCs, and agencies. The affected command will coordinate with a backup JOPES site and reestablish access to JOPES. Site Functional Managers will coordinate permissions as required. Access to backup sites will be tested periodically to ensure that authorized personnel have permissions.

7. Loss of SIPRNET Access (Single Site). If the SIPRNET fails, locally but is functioning at other sites, the affected command will:

a. Report the failure via voice to the Joint Staff SIPRNET Director and the DISA Network Operations Center and follow up with a message (use of AIG 8790 is recommended).

b. Coordinate data entry and access to JOPES with the JNOC to establish channels and procedures for reporting and retrieving TPFDD data.

c. Inform the supported CINC of the loss of SIPRNET access.

8. Loss of JOPES Control Facility. If the JNOC primary JOPES GCCS host fails, JNOC will implement the Continuity of Operations Plan by shifting OPCON of the JOPES network to a remote, operational JOPES site. Participating commands and agencies follow procedures established by JNOC to reconstitute JOPES and recover TPFDD data.

9. Loss of SIPRNET at Multiple Sites or Worldwide. As necessary, JNOC will use any available communication link to coordinate and continue deployment planning or effect continued deployment as approved for execution. JNOC will make every effort to keep the supported CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed.

10. Catastrophic failure of GCCS. The following guidelines are established for JOPES to address catastrophic failure of GCCS as a result of Y2K or other phenomena. This section in no way predicts Y2K failure or system-wide catastrophic failure of the scope necessary for the implementation of all procedures outlined below. It is the intent of the Joint Staff to provide the broadest possible guidance to ensure the flexibility of the supported and supporting CINCs to react to fluid situations.

a. In the event of GCCS-JOPES failure the use of GCCS (T) is authorized as a remedial step. Procedures already documented for use of alternate database sites in the event of local database failure will be followed as long as the GCCS SIPRNET remains operational. Once GCCS is confirmed down, managing crisis action deployments is of paramount concern and deliberate planning TPFDD development and exercise TPFDD creation or deployment will be suspended until crisis action deployment procedures have not only been implemented but access priorities have been established.

b. The supported CINC JOPES Functional Manager will determine which methodology will best satisfy mission requirements and direct the use of GCCS (T), phone, fax, carrier, etc., as appropriate. Excel spreadsheets will be used with columns of required information identified by the supported commander's Functional Manager in coordination with lift providers and published as an addendum to Appendix D to Enclosure A of the TPFDD LOI, AOR specific supplemental instructions, for the specific operation in execution.

c. Once restoration of GCCS connectivity and operational use of the SIPRNET is again available, procedures and timelines for transitioning back to standard operating procedures for deployment and TPFDD creation will be at

the direction of the supported CINC JOPES Functional Manager in coordination with the lift provider.

Enclosure G

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLISTS

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Purpose. To provide a general, but not all-inclusive, checklist delineating the responsibilities and duties of the Chairman, the supported and supporting commanders, the Services, Defense agencies, and other organizations that should be considered during the various phases of crisis action planning. The development of expanded checklists by the using organization is encouraged.

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE I--SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

1. Definition. Phase I begins with the occurrence of an event with possible national security implications and ends when that event is reported to the NCA and the Chairman.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Monitor the world situation and evaluate all incoming reports on a developing crisis.

b. Request a report from the supported commander, if not yet received, in whose area the crisis is developing. For close-hold situations, Focal Point system procedures will be used for reporting.

c. Evaluate actions taken by the supported commander within existing ROE and identify supplementary ROE measures. Modifications to ROE will be coordinated with the supported commander and require approval by the Secretary of Defense.

d. Order additional or specific intelligence-gathering activities.

e. Provide overview of the situation to the NCA.

f. Review antiterrorist/force protection requirements. Provide guidance or assistance as necessary to supported and supporting CINCs.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Monitor current events in assigned areas of responsibility (AORs). Report significant events occurring within AORs in accordance with CJCSMs 3150.03, 3150.05, and 3150.06 (see Enclosure H).

b. Take appropriate action within existing ROE, requesting modifications if necessary.

c. Consider and implement appropriate THREATCON measures to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from terrorist threat.

d. Review applicable MOUs where force protection of US military personnel are shared responsibilities between the Ambassador and the CINC.

4. Other Commands and Agencies. The remaining members of the JPEC monitor the developing crisis.

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE II--CRISIS ASSESSMENT

1. Definition. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop possible military COAs.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - a. Continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event.
 - b. Determine if forming a crisis response cell is required. If so, ensure early involvement of the communications planners so that adequate time is available to prepare a C4 Plan.
 - c. Review current strategy and existing OPLANs and CONPLANs for suitability.
 - d. Provide the NCA with current information and advice as to possible military alternatives.
 - e. Initiate Cryptologic Support Plan (CSP) as needed.
 - f. Request the supported commander and the heads of other agencies involved to increase frequency of SORTS reporting.
 - g. Request that Department of State determine the number of US nationals and other civilian noncombatants in the countries involved in the crisis who might require evacuation.
 - h. Request the Services review and evaluate force readiness posture and sustainability and identify possible requirements for the Reserve components (RC).
 - i. Determine if any status of forces agreements, treaties, or legal obligations exist with the governments of countries involved in the crisis or with other regional countries.
 - j. Continue to review the supported commander's ROEs and revise them as necessary.

- k. Review collected information and determine if a military COA is appropriate.
- l. Request USTRANSCOM review strategic lift asset employment availability.
- m. Redirect intelligence-gathering and reporting.
- n. Involve CJCS/PA in early planning and crisis response cell. Provide CJCS/PA with information on the developing situation so that a timely determination of releasable information can be made. Direct CJCS/PA to conduct liaison with ASD (PA) as necessary.
- o. Consider OPSEC implications of all military actions. Issue OPSEC planning guidance, if appropriate.
- p. Review threat(s) to deploying and in-theater personnel. Coordinate appropriate terrorist intelligence requirements.

3. Supported Commanders

- a. Continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the Chairman as directed.
- b. Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting modification if necessary.
- c. Review disposition and location of assigned forces and if needed, increase force posture and force readiness within established authority.
- d. Review Plans for applicability.
- e. Assess theater transportation infrastructure capabilities and advise USCINCTRANS and the JPEC of constraints.
- f. Use JOPES "limited-access" procedures if appropriate. (Ensure NMCC and USCINCTRANS are included on network distribution. Also, include all sites involved in the operation; e.g., Service components, supporting commands, higher headquarters, supporting agencies, and JOPES backup sites.)
- g. Evaluate the status of noncombatants in the area and determine the requirement for a noncombatant evacuation plan.

- h. Advise the US Ambassador or Consul General, as applicable, of the current situation and of any potential hazards.
- i. Develop command Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). Use all available reconnaissance capabilities to gather information. Forward to the national level all unresolved PIRs.
- j. Determine the key friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, and issue an intelligence estimate of the situation.
- k. Establish a crisis newsgroup. If restricted access procedures apply, a restricted access newsgroup will be created.
- l. Initiate an update of the JOPES database as necessary.
- m. Direct the initiation of OPSEC measures, if appropriate.
- n. Review force protection/combating terrorism measures for deploying forces against terrorist threat as appropriate to include threat awareness training requirements upon arrival in theater.

4. USCINCTRANS

- a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.
- b. Review the status of strategic lift assets.
- c. Review antiterrorism/force protection measures for deploying forces against terrorist threat as appropriate to include threat awareness training requirements prior to deploying into the theater.

5. The Services

- a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.
- b. Participate in the supported commander's review of assigned and available military forces.
- c. Review and evaluate the force readiness and sustainability posture and identify possible requirements for the RCs.
- d. Enter the crisis newsgroup and monitor it continuously.

e. Review antiterrorism/force protection measures for deploying forces against terrorist threat as appropriate to include threat awareness training requirements prior to deploying into the theater.

6. Other Commands and Agencies

a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.

b. Enter the crisis newsgroup and monitor it continuously.

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE III--COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

1. Definition. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Publish a WARNING ORDER (see sample format, Appendix A to Enclosure H).

(1) Identify the supported commander, supporting commander, and other command relationships as required.

(2) Define the mission and an anticipated execution day (D-day).

(3) Define objectives, tasks, and constraints to the extent known (e.g., duration of operations, DEFCON or deployability posture, overflight rights, port clearances, existing ROE, anti-terrorist/force protection requirements, public affairs considerations).

(4) Allocate a generic combat force for planning or request the supported commander develop and propose a force requirement.

(5) Provide an estimate of the strategic lift available and strategic lift assumptions or request USCINCTRANS estimate the lift required.

(6) Set a tentative C-day and L-hour or request the supported CINC to propose a C-day and L-hour.

(7) Request the supported commander submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE containing and recommending COAs using JOPES. The supported commander will submit the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE within 72 hours unless the situation is extremely time-sensitive and requires a shorter submission time.

(8) Use the GCCS to interact with USCINCTRANS to ensure mission support requirements are adequately detailed.

b. Continue to review ROE and modify as necessary.

c. Monitor the COA development using JOPES.

d. Review the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE and the DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE; analyze the COAs and recommend a COA to the NCA.
e. Provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, and the President.

f. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning, and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD (PA).

g. Provide OPSEC planning guidance and implement appropriate OPSEC measures.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Designate the commander of a Joint Task Force (when appropriate) in sufficient time for the JTF commander and staff to participate in subsequent phases of CAP.

b. Develop COAs. Task Service components and supporting commanders to analyze and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs.

c. The supported commander provides guidance regarding:

(1) The use or modification of current strategy and an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN.

(2) The use of Service or OPLAN dependent force modules, including force module naming conventions.

(3) Ensure that the sensor plan feeding the Common Operational Picture (COP) meets all requirements for displaying the current PIR and COP requirements.

(4) Determine how to access and maintain common operational awareness, that is, achieve and maintain situational awareness to include the transition from "Normal" to "Crisis" reporting procedures for the COP.

(5) The use of JOPES ADP. (The supported commander will consider the time available, the size of the deployment, and need for accurate deployment estimates.)

(a) Specify TPFDD development and validation coordination procedures. For example, authorize direct liaison between supporting

commands and supported command Service components for purpose of TPFDD development and validation.

(b) Update supported commander and components TPFDD LOI Annex.

(c) Coordinate with supporting commands of force capabilities available to satisfy mission requirements.

(6) Assignment of PIDs.

(7) The requirements for the communications system.

(8) Potential host-nation support (HNS) agreements.

d. In course of action development (COA), consider the availability of logistic support and the physical infrastructure, including HNS and Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA), in the area of operations. Review proposed COAs to ensure compliance with U.S. and international law.

e. Use an EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE (see sample format, Enclosure P) or include the information in the CINC's WARNING ORDER to task the component and supporting commanders to evaluate COAs.

f. Review and evaluate the EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGES provided by the component and supporting commanders and the DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE MESSAGE provided by USTRANSCOM. Complete COA development.

g. Notify USTRANSCOM when TPFDD is ready for preparation of deployment estimate.

h. Publish the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE (see sample format, Enclosure J), providing the Chairman with recommended and alternative COAs and with combat force and strategic lift requirements if requested in the WARNING ORDER.

i. Begin process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights.

j. Identify geospatial information and services requirements to NIMA as early as possible.

k. Identify withhold-shipping requirements for Military Sealift Command (MSC), via USTRANSCOM.

l. Determine, in coordination with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, the type of temporary duty and authorized per diem allowances under which personnel will perform duty.

m. Provide antiterrorist/force protection guidance to include predeployment training requirements.

n. Provide detailed classification guidance (to include data element or elements in conjunction with classification guidance) to the supporting commands, services, and service components.

4. Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components

a. Analyze COAs as directed in the supported commander's EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE or WARNING ORDER. Action will be taken, as directed or as time permits, to:

(1) Identify (or source) the allocated major combat forces and determine their movement requirements and provide movement requirements through Service systems to JOPES.

(2) Generate and source combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces and determine their movement requirements. Provide Level 4 movement requirements through Service systems to JOPES.

(3) Generate sustainment (unit or non-unit related) movement requirements.

(4) Identify related ISSAs.

(5) Create/update TPFDD in JOPES database for COAs IAW standard TPFDD LOI and supported commander and components guidance.

(6) Conduct preliminary sourcing as requested by supported CINC.

(7) Identify and eliminate dual-sourced units.

(8) Provide the periodic status of the JOPES database for COAs and notify supported CINC when applicable portion of COAs in JOPES database is ready for development of deployment estimate.

b. Use an EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE (see sample format, Enclosure Q) to provide the supported commander with force and movement requirements (using JOPEs) and advise the supported commander that the tentative plans to support the proposed COAs are ready for review.

5. USCINCTRANS

a. Activate the Crisis Action Team (CAT) as required.

b. Using JOPEs, assist supporting commander(s) in developing a transportation feasible TPFDD (ensuring movement requirements are complete, developed IAW the TPFDD LOI guidelines, and supportable with allocated lift).

c. Develop deployment estimates as directed in the supported commander's EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE.

d. Provide information on transportation asset availability and port throughput capabilities.

e. Use a DEPLOYMENT EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE to provide the supported commander with a consolidated (land, air, and sea) deployment estimate for each COA. The deployment estimate will identify significant transportation limitations, if applicable (late closures, maximum port workloads, insufficient strategic lift), and other difficulties (insufficient or inaccurate movement data, unsourced units, incomplete data, etc.). This information will normally be required by the supported commander 24 to 36 hours prior to the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE submission.

6. The Services

a. Using JOPEs, monitor COA development and assist Service component and supporting commanders in developing and sourcing force and support requirements.

b. Continue to monitor and take action as authorized to improve force readiness and mobilize Reserve forces.

c. Continue to monitor COP input until the requirement is modified by the supported CINC.

d. Provide antiterrorist/force protection guidance to include predeployment training requirements.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE IV--COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

1. Definition. Phase IV begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - a. Review and evaluate COAs as provided in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.
 - b. Refine, revise, and compile COAs as necessary; develop a new COA if appropriate. Ensure proposed COAs satisfy NCA objectives.
 - c. Present COAs to the NCA, recommend a COA, and provide the NCA with advice as appropriate.
 - d. If a decision of the NCA is pending and the Chairman decides to initiate execution planning, prepare and release the PLANNING ORDER (see sample format, Enclosure K) to:
 - (1) Direct the supported commander to begin execution planning pending a decision by the NCA.
 - (2) Direct any other activity not requiring approval of the Secretary of Defense as desired in response to a crisis (e.g., modify the assigned mission, increase or decrease the forces available for planning).
 - (3) Provide, amplify, or modify the information found in the WARNING ORDER. If a WARNING ORDER was not released, provide all the information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER. (NOTE: For WARNING ORDERS that are not crisis related, the Force Protection paragraph as written in the example WARNING ORDER (Enclosure H, Appendix A, paragraph 12H) applies. Paragraph 7 of the example WARNING ORDER needs to be included only when the WARNING ORDER is crisis related.)
 - e. When a COA (or COAs in unique situations) is selected and approved by the NCA, prepare and release an ALERT ORDER (see sample format, Enclosure L).
 - (1) Announce the decision of the NCA on a selected COA in clear, precise military objectives. If different from that submitted by the supported

commander, describe the COA with sufficient detail to permit execution planning.

(2) Provide, amplify, or modify the information found in the WARNING ORDER. If a WARNING ORDER was not released, provide all the information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER.

(3) Direct the supported commander to begin execution planning.

(4) Direct preparatory force deployments and increases in force readiness as authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

f. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

g. Continue to provide OPSEC planning guidance.

3. Other Commands and Agencies. All other members of the JPEC continue with the activities described in Appendixes A, B and D.

APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE V - EXECUTION PLANNING

1. Definition. Phase V begins when a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER is received by the supported commander and ends when the NCA executes an OPORD.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Monitor efforts to develop the OPORD. Using JOPES, monitor database development and act to resolve scheduling conflicts of dual-tasked units and over commitments. Monitor preparatory and pre-positioning movements.

b. Resolve transportation shortfalls in coordination with USTRANSCOM.

c. Review the supported commander's OPORD. Advise the NCA on the status of the situation and of military forces available to support the contingency. Ensure that the supported commander's intent is understood by the Joint Staff and supporting commands.

d. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

e. Resolve conflicting materiel priorities, through JMPAB, if required.

f. Evaluate a crisis that does not progress into Execution for possible continued planning using deliberate planning procedures in Enclosure D and CJCSM 3122.03, JOPES, Volume II.

g. Coordinate efforts to set a firm C-day and L-hour. Enter the C-day and L-hour in JOPES.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Update CINC Annex of standard TPFDD LOI as required.

b. Review the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER, adjust the plan if required, confirm first increment movement requirements, review deployment requirements, verify that all elements of the communications systems are compatible, and publish an OPORD using OPREP-1 message format (see sample format, Enclosure N).

- c. Review force and unit-related support requirements and validate those requirements in to meet CJCS guidance.
- d. Identify in-place or in-theater forces in JOPES.
- e. Task the supporting commands to source the first increment (7 days of airlift and 30 days of sealift requirements) of the COA or OPLAN and task USCINTRANS to coordinate the overall effort.
- f. Work with supporting commands to identify and resolve conflicts and shortfalls in combat forces or strategic lift.
- g. Work with supporting commands and agencies to resolve critical resource shortfalls or limitations. Advise the Chairman of all critical unresolved shortfalls or limitations.
- h. Schedule, and manifest in JOPES, intratheater airlifts as required.
- i. Schedule MSC withhold shipping from POD to destination in JOPES.
- j. Notify USCINTRANS (via GCCS Newsgroup), after review and sourcing, that the first increment of movement requirements is ready for scheduling.
- k. Validate and submit movement requirements to USTRANSCOM via JOPES in accordance with standard TPFDD LOI.
- l. Use GCCS Newsgroup to provide USCINTRANS and supporting commands with the number of tons per day, by channel, available for nonunit allocated lift.
- m. Report to the Chairman by message the early attainment of or deviations from a specified deployability posture.
- n. Report by message to the Chairman any requirement outlined in CJCSI 3151.01, COP Reporting Requirements, that cannot be met.
- o. Review and refine command procedures for developing and maintaining a COP.
- p. Direct units identified to support the operation to begin SORTS reporting as directed under DEFCON 1 conditions in Joint Pub 1-03.3.

q. Complete agreements for country and theater clearances required for overflight, staging, transit, and refueling for combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft, and for basing rights.

r. Forward OPORD to the Chairman for review.

s. Review and update classification guidance to the supported commands, services, and service components.

4. Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components

a. Review resources and identify critical shortages in forces and logistics to the supported commander and provide recommendations for resolving them. Send information copies to the Chairman.

b. Source the forces based on COA force requirements; establish preparatory and pre-positioning support requirements; report movements and publish OPORDs to support the COA.

c. Continue force shortfall and dual-allocation resolution.

d. Validate first increment of airlift and sealift movement requirements to supported commander and components in accordance with TPFDD LOI.

e. Coordinate sustainment planning between the supported commander and Services.

f. Deploy liaison personnel to supported commands as required.

g. Enter sealift manifest in JOPES for non-MTMC controlled ports and MSC withhold shipping.

5. USCINCTRANS

a. Develop the air carrier and schedule data and sealift schedules to support the deployment requirements.

b. Coordinate TCC efforts to source the first increment movement requirements. Notify the supported commander to validate TPFDD for USTRANSCOM provided units to supporting commanders.

c. Coordinate all required changes caused by conflicts and shortfalls in forces or strategic organic schedules with the supported commander.

d. Pull the initial increment for air (7 days) and surface (30 days) movement requirements. Enter the initial 4 days of airlift schedules within 36 hours after the initial pull. Subsequent airlift schedules will be completed no later than 12 hours after each pull. Initial sealift schedules will be entered when actual ship selection is made and prior to the ship's arrival at its first SPOE. Initial sealift schedules will be entered not later than 48 hours prior to a unit's port call. Follow-on schedules for requirements after the first 30-day increment will be entered 2 weeks prior to ships arrival at the SPOE.

e. Arrange for flight clearances.

6. The Services

a. Develop OPORD if required to support the selected COA, e.g., mobilization.

b. Review resource requirements and identify critical shortages in forces and logistics.

c. Assist Service component and supporting commands in sourcing force and support requirements.

d. Continue to monitor SORTS reporting as requested by the supported commander for forces identified for deployment.

e. Coordinate mobilization needs with supported and supporting commands, including pre-positioning and preparatory movements and establishing mobilization stations, staging areas, or support airfield and port operations.

f. Alert transportation resources.

g. Review installation deployment procedures, call forward procedures, and capabilities to execute anticipated movement requirements.

APPENDIX F TO ENCLOSURE G

PHASE VI - EXECUTION

1. Definition. Phase VI begins with the NCA decision to execute an OPOD and continues until the crisis situation has been resolved and redeployment is completed.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Publish an EXECUTE ORDER with the authority and under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. (See sample format, Enclosure N)

(1) Direct the supported commander to execute the operation.

(2) Provide the execution time for the operation (D-day and H-hour) and reconfirm deployment time (C-day and L-hour) if previously stated.

(3) Provide the final lift and resource allocation.

b. Monitor and analyze mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities, and direct resolution of or resolve conflicts.

c. Revise plan as conditions change.

d. Assess accomplishment of objectives.

e. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

f. Direct supported and supporting commands and agencies identified to support the operation to begin reporting the status of POL and ammunition (e.g., reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants (REPOL), munitions report (MUREP)).

g. Evaluate a crisis event that evolves into a prolonged situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing operations under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and CJCSM 3122.03, JOPEs, Volume II.

h. Resolve conflicting materiel priorities through JMPAB allocation procedures.

- i. Resolve conflicting transportation requirements through the JTB.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Develop (if required) and execute the OPORD in accordance with the direction provided by the EXECUTE ORDER, or deploy forces as directed in the DEPLOYMENT ORDER.

b. Issue an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate commands.

c. Monitor and refine sensor inputs to ensure the sensor plan is achieving the COP reporting requirements and that PIR are being satisfied.

d. Revalidate movement requirements in JOPES and begin first increment deployments (if not previously accomplished).

e. Schedule subsequent increments of MSC withhold shipping.

f. Accomplish TPFDD validation in accordance with TPFDD LOI.

g. Continue to update and prioritize deployment requirements in JOPES database in accordance with TPFDD LOI.

h. Monitor and coordinate with USTRANSCOM for adjustments to transportation allocations.

i. Coordinate reprioritization of lift requirements with USTRANSCOM.

j. Evaluate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) capabilities.

k. Update intratheater lift schedules in JOPES and monitor organic-unit movements.

l. Monitor, assess, and report accomplishment of objectives.

m. Replan or terminate the operation, or redeploy as directed by the NCA, through the Chairman.

n. Report to the Chairman, via the REPOL or MUREP, the status of POL and ammunition assets within the joint area of operations (JAO).

o. Review and approve/disapprove execution critical requests for changes to validated TPFDD requirements, notify USTRANSCOM of approved changes, and revalidate when required.

p. Issue guidance regarding appropriate medical countermeasures to protect personnel.

q. Ensure the command Public Affairs Office provides timely and accurate information to the local media to prevent any public misconception of the planned operation.

4. Supporting Commanders, Agencies, and Service Components

a. Execute the OPORD in support of the supported commander's OPORD.

b. Validate the sourcing of the forces via the chain of command to the Supported Commander.

c. Schedule and report organic movements as required by the supported commander and components.

d. Source and validate the next deployment increment.

e. Update deployment information in the JOPES deployment database as specified by the TPFDD LOI.

f. Report to the supported commander, via the REPOL or MUREP, the status of POL and ammunition assets within the JAO.

g. Enter sealift manifest for non-MTMC-controlled ports and MSC withhold shipping into JOPES.

5. USCINCTRANS

a. Execute OPORD in support of the supported commander's OPORD.

b. Coordinate with MARAD and MSC on activation of RRF and MSC-controlled shipping in support of the supported commander's OPORD.

c. Receive validation of first deployment increment from supported commander and components and schedule movement, adjusting as required.

d. Adjust deployment flow and schedule next deployment increment.

- e. Activate interfaces with GTN to provide planned and actual manifest data.
- f. Report arrivals and departures of air and sealift carriers in JOPES. If unable to provide automated updates through system interfaces, then exception reporting will be followed, e.g., 2 hours for airlift and 12 hours for sealift.
- g. Continue to develop and enter movement schedules into the JOPES deployment database and ensure that the database reflects actual movements.
- h. Provide CINCs with airlift capability estimates in tons per day, by channel, as lift allocations are made or changed.
- i. Provide sealift capability estimates in square feet per 5-day increment commencing with initial establishment of the sea lines of communication (SLOC).
- j. Dispatch USTRANSCOM liaison teams to supported and supporting commanders as necessary.

6. Services

- a. Execute OPORD in support of the supported commander's OPORD.
- b. Update deployment information in the JOPES deployment database as specified by supported CINC's annex to the Joint TPFDD LOI.
- c. Assist Service component and supporting commands in sourcing force and support requirements.
- d. Execute call forward procedures to deploy forces and sustainment in accordance with port calls, coordinate with port operators, and provide in-transit visibility of movements.
- e. Coordinate actual sustainment movement.
- f. Report the status of critical items.
- g. Participate in JTB and Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) deliberations as required.

APPENDIX G TO ENCLOSURE G

MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION RESOURCES
DURING CRISES

1. Purpose. This appendix outlines procedures for management of civil airlift-resources during crisis execution. These procedures have been coordinated between the Departments of Defense and Transportation in consultation with the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J-4). This appendix is intended to provide information to those not having access to Joint Pub 4.0 series publications. The Joint Pub 4.0 series is the overall guidance publication and takes precedence when or if inconsistencies exist between this appendix and Joint Pub 4.0 series documents.

2. Procedures

a. When USCINCTRANS becomes aware that DOD airlift requirements exceed (or will exceed upon realization of some stated condition) the available DOD airlift capability, USCINCTRANS will recommend to the Chairman activation of CRAF Stages I, II, or III. The Chairman will determine what action is needed and forward to the Secretary of Defense a request to activate either Stage I, II, or III. Once CRAF Stage II or III is activated by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, Commander, Air Mobility Command (COMAMC) will call forward the commercial airlift resources in the CRAF for which current requirements exist. COMAMC deals directly with carriers, with information to J-4 (Logistics Readiness Center), USTRANSCOM, and DOT Office of Energy Transportation (OET), on requests for incremental carrier support to meet increasing or peak demands.

b. Should airlift requirements exceed CRAF Stage III capability, USCINCTRANS may seek additional airlift resources through the following means:

(1) Using Foreign-Flag International Aircraft. In special situations, USTRANSCOM may increase airlift capability through utilization of foreign-flag commercial aircraft. Additional foreign-flag airlift may be obtained by the implementation of existing agreements between providing nations and the United States (such as NATO Allied Pre-Committed Civil Aircraft (NAPCAP), Canadian Airlift Assets, or Republic of Korea Civil Augmentation Programs, or by solicitation of additional airlift through normal contracting procedures.

(a) NATO strategic airlift aircraft may be obtained through the NAPCAP. NAPCAP aircraft become available after the North Atlantic Council decides the

rapid reinforcement of Europe is necessary. The availability of NAPCAP augmentation is not tied to CRAF activation. Once activated, requests for NAPCAP aircraft will be made in accordance with implementation instructions signed between the providing nation and the Air Mobility Command.

(b) Strategic aircraft may be obtained from Korean Airlines in the event of a contingency involving the Korean peninsula. Implementation instructions for the use of Korean Airlines during a contingency detail the steps necessary to obtain the use of these aircraft.

(c) In addition, USCINTRANS may request CJCS authority to obtain additional airlift assets from friendly foreign-flag carriers via normal contract procedures. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, USTRANSCOM obtains contracts with foreign airlines through direct procurement methods.

(2) Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). To increase CRAF size when long-term (30 days or more) changes to airlift resource requirements are indicated, USCINTRANS will follow procedures outlined in DOD or DOT Memorandum of Understanding on CRAF. Use of available foreign-flag capability should be requested before efforts are made to expand CRAF sizing.

c. As a routine practice, USCINTRANS will be included as an information addressee on all USTRANSCOM-related message traffic.

d. Any additional civil aircraft made available and subsequently allocated beyond the CJCS allocation to satisfy US airlift requests will be USTRANSCOM-gained aircraft. These unplanned aircraft will be manually incorporated into the airlift flow and the JOPES database subject to any restrictions placed on their use by the providing nation.

ENCLOSURE H

CRISIS REPORTING (PHASE I)

1. Purpose. Crisis reporting, as it applies to Phase I of the CAP procedures, is designed to:

a. Provide, on an urgent basis, timely, accurate, and to the degree possible, assessed information to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Aid in the decision-making process with respect to the employment of US military forces in a crisis situation in support of US national interests.

2. Procedures

a. The procedures for initial crisis reporting are provided in CJCSMs 3150.03, 3150.05, and 3150.06.

b. CAP procedures use the OPREP-3 format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

3. Sample Reports. See CJCSMs 3150.03, 3150.05, and 3150.06 for detailed instructions for crisis reports.

4. Information Provided. An OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT report will include:

a. Information on the current situation.

b. Action being taken within the constraints of the commander's current ROE.

c. Forces that are readily available.

d. Time frame for the earliest commitment of forces.

e. Major constraints, if any, on the employment of forces.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE H

SAMPLE OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT

Voice Report

"NMCC this is a USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR Element OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT Over."

"USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR Element this is NMCC send COMMAND ASSESSMENT Over."

"This is USCENTCOM Forward BRIGHT STAR Element 11

Flash

UNCLASSIFIED

OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT

1. Serial 001
2. COMMAND ASSESSMENT. The Blueland XXX Tactical Fighter Wing reported at 030030Z October-XX rebel forces infiltrated Desert West Air Base and detonated explosive charges on two Blueland F-4s and one F-16 causing considerable damage to the aircraft.
3. It appears rebels are being supported by the government of Yellowland.
4. Intentions of Blueland forces unknown at this time.
5. No damage or injury to US forces or equipment in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR.

Confirmation report will follow, OVER."

Message Report Format

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT//BRIGHT STAR//

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

(OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED)

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/OPREP-3PCA¹/USCENTCOM/001//

REF/A/VMG/HQ USCENTCOM/030056ZOCTXX//

AMPN/PINNACLE VOICE REPORT FM FWD BRIGHT STAR ELEMENT TO
NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. () DAMAGE TO BLUELAND A/C. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 030056Z,
(mo/yr)
2. () THE BLUELAND XXX TACTICAL FTR WG REPORTED AT 030030Z OCT
REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED
EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING
CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO ALL A/C.
3. () ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS
ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. () INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
5. () NO DAMAGE OR INJURY TO US FORCES OR EQUIPMENT IN POSITION
FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
6. () ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3P REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

DECL/appropriate downgrading instructions and date here//

¹ If harassment or attack of US forces is involved, the above sample will contain the flagword
FRONT BURNER following the flagword OPREP-3PCA

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE H

SAMPLE OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT/CINC ASSESSMENT

Voice Report

"This is a PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT from USCINCCENT for the NMCC. In response to a report by USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR that an attack by rebel forces on Blueland Desert West Air Base has taken place, US forces in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR will maintain an increased alert posture and will be prepared to assist the Government of Blueland as required. Support will initially be limited to aerial warning and surveillance capability using E-3As and RC-135s currently in place at Desert West Air Base for Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Confirmation message will follow."

Message Report

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC
(OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED)

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT//

REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/12005OZAPRXX//

AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. () REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUELAND A/C AT DESERT WEST
AB. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 12005OZ (mo/yr)

H-B-1

Appendix B
Enclosure HI

2. () USCENCOM FWD (BRIGHT STAR) HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE A/C.
3. () ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. () INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
5. () US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.
6. () SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
7. () ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

DECL/appropriate downgrading instructions and date here//

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE H
REQUEST FOR FORCES MESSAGE FORMAT

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-JOD//

INFO: SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

CSA WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC

CSAF WASHINGTON DC

CMC WASHINGTON DC

COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPD/G-OPF//

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON//J1/J3/J3-JOD/J4/J4-LRC//

USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ1/TCJ3/TCJ4//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ3/ECJ35/ETCC//

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J1/J3/J30/J31/J4/J5//

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ1/SCJ3//

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3/SOJ5/SOJ7//

CINCUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J1/J3/J33/J54/J4-LRC//

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO//J1/J3//

CLASSIFICATION

EXER/EXERCISE NAME//

OPER/OPERATION NAME//

MSGID/ORDER/ORIGINATOR/MESSAGE SERIAL #//

SUBJ/REQUEST FOR FORCES (U)

REF/A/TYPE OF REF/ORIGINATOR/DATE OR DTG/SER #/SPECIAL NOTATION//

AMPN/FREE TEXT TO EXPLAIN PRECEDING REF SET//

POC/NAME/RANK/OFFICE/LOCATION/PHONE//

NARR/THIS IS A REQUEST FOR FORCES. SUPPORTED COMMANDER HAS DETERMINED THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE (SPECIFY COMMAND) AOR MAY BE REQUIRED. REQUEST NCA AUTHORITY TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL FORCES TO THE (SPECIFY COMMAND) AOR.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () PROVIDE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISSION WHICH DEPLOYING FORCES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM.//

GENTEXT/FORCE REQUIREMENTS/

3. () DESCRIPTION. FOR FORCES WHICH WILL DEPLOY AS A UNIT, PROVIDE BASIC UNIT IDENTIFICATION (E.G., 1 X INFANTRY BATTALION) OR DESCRIPTION OF THE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED (E.G., 6 X HARM CAPABLE AIRCRAFT). USE UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST (UJTL) (CJCSM 3500.04) TERMINOLOGY AS APPROPRIATE TO DESCRIBE REQUIRED CAPABILITIES. IN THE CASE OF NON-UNIT DEPLOYMENTS (I.E., INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES OR AD HOC GROUPS OF PERSONNEL), PROVIDE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL REQUIRED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION WHICH SUMMARIZES THE NATURE OF THE DEPLOYING PERSONNEL (E.G., 35 SUPPORT PERSONNEL INCLUDING MOTOR TRANSPORT OPERATORS, VEHICLE MECHANICS, PETROLEUM SUPPLY SPECIALISTS, POWER GENERATION EQUIPMENT OPERATORS, ETC.).

4. () DESTINATION. ULTIMATE DESTINATION OF DEPLOYING FORCES WITHIN THE AOR.
5. () DATE REQUIRED. DATE FORCES ARE REQUIRED TO BE MISSION-CAPABLE AT DESTINATION. DESCRIBE MILESTONES WHICH MAY IMPACT THE TIMELINE FOR FORCE DEPARTURE, ARRIVAL IN THEATER, INTRA-THEATER MOVEMENT, TRAINING, ETC..
6. () DURATION. ESTIMATE OF THE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM LENGTH OF THE DEPLOYMENT.
7. () TRAINING. PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICE TRAINING OR JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TRAINING PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
8. () OTHER. SUPPORTED CINC'S PREFERENCES AND PRIORITIES. IF A PARTICULAR SOURCE FOR FORCES IS REQUESTED, PROVIDE RATIONALE. SPECIFY WHETHER ANY REQUESTED FORCES ARE LD/HD ASSETS AND SUBJECT TO GLOBAL MILITARY FORCE POLICE CONSIDERATIONS. DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS REGARDING THE USE OF RESERVES TO MEET THE TASKING. INDICATE WHETHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED BY DEPLOYING PERSONNEL, ETC.. INDICATE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN EXISTENCE.
9. () FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA TO SUPPORT THIS DEPLOYMENT WILL BE CONTAINED IN PLAN ID (PID) XXXX, FORCE MODULE (FM) XXX. REDEPLOYMENT PID IS XXXXX. NEWSGROUP XXX.XXX.XXX WILL BE USED TO COORDINATE THIS DEPLOYMENT.
10. () IN ORDER TO MEET DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE, REQUEST SUPPORTING CINCS PROVIDE SOURCING VERIFICATION NO LATER THAN DTG TO SUPPORT IMMEDIATE TPFDD VALIDATION UPON RELEASE OF DEPLOYMENT/EXECUTE ORDER.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () ESTIMATED LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS. INCLUDE LOGISTICS ESTIMATES FOR DEPLOYMENT DRAWN FROM PRELIMINARY COORDINATION AND RESEARCH. INCLUDE NEED FOR INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES OR OPENING OF OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S AOR. INCLUDE FUNDING SOURCE RECOMMENDATIONS. INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY CODE RECOMMENDATIONS.

12. () DEPLOYMENT AND TRAVEL TO HIGH TERRORIST THREAT AREAS. INCLUDE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. REQUESTING CINC MUST CERTIFY THE FOLLOWING: "THE TERRORIST THREAT FOR AREAS IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS WILL DEPLOY HAS BEEN REVIEWED. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE PERSONNEL IS CERTIFIED TO BE NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT." THIS PARAGRAPH IS REQUIRED.

13. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE AS APPROPRIATE.

14. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. IDENTIFY ANTICIPATED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, IF DETERMINED.

15. () COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. IDENTIFY PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

16. () POINTS OF CONTACT. LIST SUPPORTED COMMANDER POCS TO INCLUDE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND JOPES AS A MINIMUM.//

CLBY/REASON/DECLON//

ENCLOSURE I

CJCS WARNING ORDER

1. Purpose. The WARNING ORDER will be issued by the Chairman to initiate Phase III--Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNING ORDER can contain a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. The WARNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required.

2. When Issued. The WARNING ORDER will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

3. How Issued. The WARNING ORDER normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is time-sensitive, voice communications or GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass WARNING ORDER information. A voice or newsgroup order may be acted on immediately; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The Focal Point system will be used if the situation dictates. Restricted access SPECAT handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders and agencies. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

a. The CJCS WARNING ORDER generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the WARNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be provided with essential guidance necessary to permit him to commence crisis planning. The WARNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. During

the preparation of the WARNING ORDER, the Chairman will use the GCCS Newsgroup to interact with the supported commander to ensure mission requirements are adequately detailed. Normally, the warning order will either allocate major combat forces and strategic lift available for planning, or request the supported commander's assessment of forces and strategic lift required to accomplish the mission. Additional information should be sent as soon as possible, in message form, referencing the initial warning order.

b. The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE, antiterrorism/force protection considerations, or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be provided as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WARNING ORDER are:

(1) Purpose Statement. Statement that the message is a WARNING ORDER. Indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE and preliminary deployment estimates.

(2) Situation. Short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation. A brief description of the area of operation.

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander's assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander's planning.

(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) Execution

(a) Courses of Action. If the NCA and the Chairman desire that specific COAs be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander will develop the COAs he considers appropriate. Reference will be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN if applicable.

(b) Information Operations Guidance. (OPSEC, Deception, and Electronic Warfare Guidance)

(c) PSYOP Guidance

1. PSYOP Mission. Directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective, or refer to themes in an OPLAN.

(d) Antiterrorism/Force Protection Guidance

1. Review force protection plans to determine measures to be implemented.

2. Evaluate potential for terrorist attack from both the terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation.

3. Review predeployment and theater terrorist training requirements in respect to current threat.

4. Summarize the scope of antiterrorism/force protection operations and methods and resources to be employed.

(e) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority.

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(f) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Service(s) to provide CI element(s).
2. List CI liaison responsibilities.
3. List CI collection requirements.

(g) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population's impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of postconflict transition activities; and enhanced friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socioeconomic services.

(h) Coordinating Instructions

1. Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.¹
2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time but it provides the commander with a relative time frame for planning, based on the NCA perception of urgency.
3. Anticipated duration of operations.
4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

¹ Updated, if required, in a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.

- clearances.
5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port
 6. Use of JOPES.
 7. ROE guidance.
 8. Discuss threat level and training requirements for deploying personnel for supported commander, supporting commanders, and agencies.
 9. Commanders' and supporting agencies' coordination or monitoring instructions.
 10. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders.
 11. Identification of applicable PID(S) and newsgroups.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.
2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known).
3. Load planning factors for each lift resource type, if available (allowable cabin load (ACL); number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted. (The CJCS project code is obtainable from the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB).

(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words or nicknames of the operation.

(g) Reporting instructions, special instructions, and suspenses for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Historical support.

(k) Combat camera guidance.

(l) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance.

(b) Command relationships. Specify the supported and supporting commanders and supporting agencies, coordination instructions, and provide a listing of the NCA approved command relationship the gaining command will exercise (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) over transferred forces (if known and if NCA approval has been obtained at this point in the crisis response).

(c) GCCS Newsgroup guidance.

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION and DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by prevailing circumstances, the WARNING ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; e.g., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations. If the WARNING ORDER contains such information, the first paragraph will state "This is a WARNING ORDER, The Secretary of Defense has authorized. . . ."

7. Sample WARNING ORDER. Appendix A is a sample WARNING ORDER. (NOTE: For Execution or Deployment Orders that are not crisis related, the Force Protection paragraph as written in the example WARNING ORDER applies (Appendix A, paragraph 11H). Paragraph 7 of the example WARNING ORDER needs to be included only when the WARNING ORDER is crisis related.)

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE I

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS WARNING ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL¹

USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE MD

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

CSA WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

¹ AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
CONSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//
AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//
ORDTYP/WARNORD/CJCS//
TIMEZONE/Z//
ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT.XXXX//
HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNITLOC	/CMNTS
/JTF HEADQUARTERS		
/JCSE (JTF SUP DET)		
/198TH MECH BRIGADE		
/2ND ARMOR BRIGADE		
/112TH PSYOP CO		
/CVBG		
/MARITIME PREPOS SHIPS		
/MEF		

/123RD COMP WG

/91 TAS

/312 COMPAERWG//

AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING//

NARR/(THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT COMMANDERS ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY 231000Z NOV ____ USTRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER UPON REQUEST.// ¹

GENTEXT/SITUATION/ ²

1. () THE SITUATION IN ORANGELAND IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY PRO-YELLOWLAND REBELS ON 20 NOV. THE CAPITAL REMAINS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, BUT EL ASSID AIRFIELD SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL HAS FALLEN TO REBEL FORCES. YELLOWLAND, RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR AID BY THE REBELS, FLEW IN ELEMENTS OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD, CONDUCTED TU-22/ BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD AND HAS CONDUCTED TU-22/ BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS AGAINST THE CAPITAL. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AGAINST THE CAPITAL IS AS YET UNDETERMINED. PRESIDENT NOSS OF ORANGELAND HAS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM BLUELAND UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN AT A HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. COL HOMM SUPPORTED AN EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT IN MID-FEBRUARY AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS INCREASED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO REBEL FORCES WHILE DETAINING DISSIDENTS IN CAMPS WITHIN YELLOWLAND. THE LATEST COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWS IN THE WAKE OF HOMMS CALL FOR THE

¹ If DEPLOYMENT Orders or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION Orders are incorporated within a WARNING ORDER, the message must be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense (i.e., THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED. . . .) The Secretary of Defense should then be an information addressee as well as AMEMB and USDAO, if appropriate.

² Situation Assessments will be prepared by or in coordination with DIA.

OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUELAND EFFORTS IN ORANGELAND.

2. () THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

3. () EASTLAND MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING ACCESS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

4. () WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

5. COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ASSIST IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

A. USCINCPAC. THE 15TH MEF AND MPS SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX ARE NO LONGER ALLOCATED TO USCINCPAC.

B. USCINCFJCOM. PROVIDE ONE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF AN AMPHIBIOUS MEF AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO USCINCPAC.

C. USCINTRANS. PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO PROVIDE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.

D. DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

E. DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

F. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS GUIDANCE (OPSEC, DECEPTION AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE GUIDANCE). EACH COA SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIRED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. IN ADDITION TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) DELINEATED IN THE REF, YOUR OPSEC PLANNING SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING EEFI: (PROVIDE ADDITIONAL NCA AND CJCS EEFI, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION).

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE

A. () PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT

B. () PSYOP OBJECTIVES

(1) () PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

(2) () PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

C. () PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

(1) () US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.

(2) () US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

D. () PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID

(1) () STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.

(2) () PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT

E. () PSYOP OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) () DATE TO INITIATE IN-THEATER PSYOP.

(2) () OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

(3) () TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.

(4) () COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

7. () FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. ¹

A. () EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ALL TERRORIST THREATS FOR EACH FORCE DEPLOYMENT COA.

B. () IMPLEMENT FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES APPROPRIATE TO ANTICIPATED TERRORIST THREAT.

C. () DETERMINE PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND THEATER FORCE PROTECTION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.

8. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

9. () COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

10. () CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE.

A. () CA MISSION STATEMENT.

B. () CA OBJECTIVES

(1) () FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(2) () ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

(3) () DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(4) () ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

(5) () SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS.

¹ Paragraph 7 applies only in time of crisis. For non-crisis deployments, paragraph 12H of this sample message fulfills the Force Protection requirements.

(6) () FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

(7) () COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES IN AN OCCUPIED OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.

C. () CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) () OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

(2) () TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.

(3) () COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

(4) () COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS.

11. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR. 2100OIZ NOV

B. () TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR. 2900OIZ NOV

C. () ANTICIPATED D-DAY. 1 DEC _.

D. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. () DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

F. () KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

G. () NO CHANGE IN USCINCCENT ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF IS EXPECTED.

H. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING

UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

I. () SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS. FOR EXAMPLE, USCINTRANS WILL PROVIDE AIR-REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

J. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

K. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.// GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

12. () TRANSPORT

A. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. () ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) () GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 17 NOV IN SUPPORT OF EXECUTION OF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

(2) () AIRLIFT. SUPPORTED COMMANDER (USCINCPAC) FOR OPLAN XXXX MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J, APPORTIONMENT (APPROXIMATELY PERCENT OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITY AT PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND CRAF STAGE II).

(3) () SEALIFT. USCINCPAC CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON USING ASSETS APPORTIONED BY JSCP, ANNEX J, IN THE APPROPRIATE TABLES UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS, INCLUDING USTRANSCOM AND ASSETS FROM THE RRF AND VISA.

(4) () THE JOINT STRATEGIC MOBILITY ALLOCATION PROCESS (JSMAP) HAS DETERMINED THAT A MINIMUM OF PERCENT OF TOTAL AIR AND SEALIFT CAPABILITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOCS.

FURTHER, IF REQUIRED, THE JS MAP HAS APPROVED TWO SETS OF LIFT ALLOCATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT AS FOLLOWS:

(A) () IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX IS IMPLEMENTED ALONE, USCINCPAC MAY PLAN ON ALL REMAINING CAPABILITY PERCENT).

(B) () IF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX AND USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ARE IMPLEMENTED CONCURRENTLY, USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP, ANNEX J APPORTIONMENT UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW. USCINCCENT MAY PLAN FOR ASSETS MADE AVAILABLE AS A RESULT OF DECLARATION OF PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AND ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III (AT APPROXIMATELY USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX C-DAY MINUS 4 FOR CRAF STAGE III). THE AIRLIFT ASSETS INCLUDE UP TO _____ WIDE-BODY CARGO, _____ WIDE-BODY PASSENGER, _____ NARROW-BODY CARGO, _____ NARROW-BODY PASSENGER, _____ C-5, _____ KC-10, AND C-141 AIRCRAFT. IF REQUIRED, SPECIFIC PHASING OF THESE AIRCRAFT WILL BE OUTLINED IN THE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX ALERT ORDER. MODIFICATIONS TO USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX, THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAF STAGE III ASSETS. REGARDING SEALIFT, CLEAN PRODUCT TANKERS LIMITATION; THE JS MAP DEFERS BY-TYPE ALLOCATIONS OF THESE ASSETS PENDING CLEARER DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF NUMBER AND LOCATION OF TANKERS BY TYPE AND CAPACITY. USCINTRANS AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPES AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JS MAP MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JS MAP ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

(C) () USE SUPPLEMENT CJCSI 3110.03, TO DETERMINE LOAD PLANNING FACTORS, WITH DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED BETWEEN ALCON IF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ARISE.

(D) () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. FUNDING WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, VOLUME II, MILITARY STANDARD TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT PROCEDURES, TRANSPORTATION ACCOUNT CODES. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNIT(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE

TO STRATEGIC WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-TIME TO RESPOND TO THE CINC's PRE-C-DAY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL. PRE-C-DAY MOVES PRIOR TO C-2 MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH ORGANIC AND NONMOBILIZED CAPABILITY AND EQUIVALENT CIVIL AUGMENTATION. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S). IF SUPPORTED COMMANDERS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

13. () JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

14. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

15. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS

A. () STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINC(S) DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. LESS THAN FULL MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.

B. () SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

C. () EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

16. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING, IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.

17. () CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUENOSE.

18. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO the CHAIRMAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25.

19. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

20. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

A. () PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA). PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131, OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. () PROVIDE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPLI WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5405.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE. UPON APPROVAL BY OASD(PA), SUCH INTERIM GUIDANCE MAY BE USED IN THE EVENT OF AN INQUIRY REGARDING ANY PART OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPERATION, WHICH MAY HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE PUBLIC OR PRESS. IN GENERAL, THE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) () A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) () A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT. THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM PPAG SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT REGARDING:

(A) () ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH (ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE).

(B) () REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

(C) () ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS.

(D) () REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT.

(E) () RECOMMENDATION FOR MEDIA ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (OPEN ACCESS VERSUS POOLING).

(F) () ESTIMATES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES THAT MAY BE ACCOMMODATED.

(G) () ANTICIPATED GROUND RULES, GUIDELINES, AND ACCREDITATION FOR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

(H) () ANTICIPATED SECURITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.

(I) () ESTIMATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS.

21. () HISTORICAL SUPPORT. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE BY JOINT HISTORIANS AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE HISTORIANS. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH, COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE, AND TRAINING. IMPLEMENT JOINT HISTORICAL AND MILITARY SERVICE HISTORICAL PROCEDURES FOR THE COLLECTION OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ORAL INTERVIEWS OF SELECTED PERSONNEL TO MEET CJCS REQUIREMENTS. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION. DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONIC RECORDS, AND INTERVIEWS WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE ACCESS OF JOINT HISTORICAL AND MILITARY SERVICE HISTORICAL PERSONNEL TO THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND PERSONNEL NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE HISTORICAL RECORD.

22. () COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS, BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, HISTORICAL SUPPORT, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND AS A SECONDARY SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS SYSTEMS VIDEO AND IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CHAIRMAN, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. SINCE COMBAT CAMERA IS AN INTERNAL INFORMATION RESOURCE, NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATION SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL NECESSARY TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDING OF INFORMATION. EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER USING APPROVED METHODS OF DELIVERY COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT ALSO RECEIVES MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS:

ATTENTION: JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER
ROOM 5A518, THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-0001 (RACK 2)

TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS: DSN: 225-7118, COMM: (703) 695-7118

PAGER: NON DUTY HOURS: COMM: (888) 395-4556/4601 (LEAVE NUMBER AND CALL WILL BE RETURNED.)

FAX: DSN 223-4776, COMM: (703) 693-4776.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL

23. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR-CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3.

BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

24. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCJFCOM, USCINCSpace, USCINCTrans, CINCFor USCINCSOF USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSTRAT ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, NIMA, DISA, DLA, DTRA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/Provide appropriate downgrading instructions and date here

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ENCLOSURE J

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

1. Purpose

a. The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS WARNING ORDER, provides the Chairman with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs¹ that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA. Although the estimative process at the supported commander's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and the Chairman for arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

b. Supporting commanders normally will not submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE to the Chairman; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. When Submitted

a. The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNING ORDER, but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman in the WARNING ORDER. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours.

b. Follow-on information or revisions to the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

c. The supported commander may submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE at the commander's own discretion, without a CJCS WARNING ORDER, to advise the NCA and Chairman of the commander's evaluation of a potential crisis

¹ Recommended COAs submitted for NCA approval may be contained in current OPLANs or CONPLANs or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans. Regardless of origin, these courses of actions will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy.

situation within the AOR. This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

3. How Submitted. The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. The message is sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands and combat support agencies, USTRANSCOM, TCCs, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5. Contents

a. The COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE will follow the major headings of a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE of the situation as outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure J but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content. As with the WARNING ORDER, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, a formal COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE may be initially impractical, and the entire estimative process may be reduced to a commander's conference, with corresponding brevity reflected in the estimate when submitted by record communications to the Chairman. Also, the existence of an applicable OPLAN may already reflect most of the necessary analysis.

b. The essential requirement of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE submitted to the Chairman is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the WARNING ORDER will be addressed.

c. The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

(1) Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) Situation and Courses of Action (COA). This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the Chairman is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation.

(a) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

(b) Enemy Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the NCA and the Chairman in evaluating various COAs.

(c) Terrorist Threat. Describe potential terrorist threat capabilities to include force protection requirements (prior, during, and post mission) that can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(d) Own Courses of Action. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed:

1. Combat forces required; e.g., 2 FS, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.

2. Force provider.

3. Destination.

4. Required delivery dates.

5. Coordinated deployment estimate.

6. Employment estimate.

7. Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

(3) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

(4) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For the submission to the Chairman, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs if significant in assisting the NCA and the Chairman in arriving at a decision.

(5) Recommended Course of Action. State the supported commander's recommended COA. ¹

6. Sample COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. The Appendix is a sample of a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

¹ Recommended COA should include any recommended changes to the ROE in effect at that time.

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE J
SAMPLE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE ¹

IMMEDIATE (OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6

DRAFTER: LTC CHUCK SWANSON, USA CCJ7, EXT 53046

¹ Sample shows OPREP-1 format. Narrative information of COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE does not have to be reported via an OPREP-1. If JOPEs is not available for reporting force and deployment data, formatted messages in accordance with JOPEs will be used (see Enclosure B).

USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCCENT//

SUBJ/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE ()//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ____ /____/NOTAL//

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//

REF/B/DOC/USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

RMKS/1. () MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).

2. () SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

A. () THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND, BLUELAND, AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN HIGH BECAUSE OF OVERT YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE COUP ATTEMPT, YELLOWLAND ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REBELS, AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. ALL OF THESE ACTIONS AGAINST BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND BY YELLOWLAND REQUIRE PRUDENT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

B. () ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

C. () USCINCCENT HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS (COAs):

(1) () COA 1. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND

RECONNAISSANCE WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. I MEF TO DEPLOY VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.

(2) () COA 2. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. HOLD MEF AND ARMY BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB.

3. () ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.

4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COAs

A. () COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE CG, I MEF (FORWARD) AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS, PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (__ DAYS AIRLIFT AND __ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE. EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

B. () COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (___ DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___ DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES. IT PROVIDES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA. ITS PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL. HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEF AND ARMY BDES COULD BE

MINIMAL AS MPS AND MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL.

5. () DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 1.

6. () REMARKS. FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA 2).//

DECL/Provide appropriate downgrading instructions and date here//

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ENCLOSURE K

CJCS PLANNING ORDER

1. Purpose. The PLANNING ORDER may be issued by the Chairman to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The PLANNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman.

2. When Issued. A PLANNING ORDER is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the CAP while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA (also see Enclosure K).

3. How Issued. A PLANNING ORDER is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communications or GCCS Newsgroup can be used to pass PLANNING ORDER information; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or newsgroup orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders and agencies. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

a. At the Joint Staff level, the PLANNING ORDER generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the PLANNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The PLANNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. Normally, the planning order will allocate major combat forces and strategic lift available for planning. Additional information should be issued as soon as possible in message form and reference the initial planning order.

b. The PLANNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships and, if applicable,

tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman, will also be provided as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the PLANNING ORDER are:

(1) Statement that the Message is a PLANNING ORDER. State that the message is a PLANNING ORDER and indicate specific taskings or requests to supported and supporting commanders and agencies, such as the deadline for receipt of the OPERATIONS ORDER. If not previously requested in a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE REQUEST ORDER, task USTRANSCOM to provide a preliminary deployment estimate and force closure profile to the supported commander and inform the Chairman.

(2) Situation. A short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation.

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander's assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander's planning.

(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. The Chairman will specify a COA to be planned. Reference may be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN.

(b) Information Operations Guidance (OPSEC, Deception, and Electronic Warfare Guidance). Provide guidance similar to that in the WARNING ORDER.

(c) PSYOP Guidance

1. PSYOP Mission. Give directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perspectives and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to theme in an OPLAN.

(d) Antiterrorism/Force Protection Guidance

1. Review force protection plans to determine measures to be implemented.

2. Evaluate potential for terrorist attack from both terrorist organizations supporting threat and those not supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation

3. Review predeployment and theater terrorist training requirements in respect to current threat.

4. Summarize the scope of antiterrorism/force protection operations and methods and resources to be employed.

(e) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority.

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(f) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Service(s) to provide forward CI element(s).

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(g) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population's impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host-nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating post-conflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitate postconflict transition activities; and enhance friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socioeconomic services.

(h) Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.¹

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This date may be tentative at this time, but it provides the commander with a relative time frame for planning, based on the CJCS perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances, and revisions to existing ROE.

6. USTRANSCOM coordination and monitoring instructions.

7. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders.

¹ Updated, if required, in ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.

(i) Classification Guidance. Provide detailed classification guidance (to include data element or data elements in conjunction with classification guidance) to the supporting commands, Services, and Service components.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known).

3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource, if available (ACL; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for repositioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (CJCS project code obtainable from JMPAB.)

(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words and code numbers of the operation (if applicable).

(g) Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Historical support.

(k) Combat camera.

(l) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) Combined Information Dominance and Sharing

(a) Communications guidance. See sample format for detail.

(b) Command relationships. Include a designation of supported and supporting commanders, coordination instructions, and listing of the command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) being proposed for NCA approval that the gaining commander may exercise over transferred forces and the locations where the transfer will be effective (normally the AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

(c) GCCS Newsgroup guidance.

(d) Information sharing with foreign entities must be clearly outlined and justified, providing details of: specific data elements to be shared with specific foreign entities; specific conditions under which each data element will be shared; specific data element contents that will not be shared with specific foreign entities; and specific or potential ramifications to information dominance/warfighting capabilities if information is not shared; specifics on policies and mechanics for information dispersal, information acceptance, and information security.

6. Sample PLANNING ORDER. Appendix A provides a sample PLANNING ORDER.

APPENDIX TO ANNEX K

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS PLANNING ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ¹

USCINCFROM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCSTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIA WASHINGTON DC

DIRNSA FT GEORGE MEADE MD

HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

¹ AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
COMMARFOREUR
COMMARFORSOUTH

USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCS MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

NARR/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE AND CJCS WARNING ORDER//

ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//

AMPN/PLANNING ORDER ¹ --MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BLUELAND//

TIMEZONE/Z//

ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCCENT.XXXX//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

¹ A PLANNING ORDER may be issued without a WARNING ORDER.

DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUELAND EFFORTS AGAINST ORANGELAND AIR ATTACKS.

2. () THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND WILL PROVIDE HOST-NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

3. () WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT SHIPPING AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

4. () COURSE OF ACTION. CONDUCT DETAILED PLANNING FOR COA NUMBER ONE AS CONTAINED IN REF A. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ESTABLISH US AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION, CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND US AND BLUELAND SHIPPING, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, ATTACK ORANGELAND AIRFIELDS AND PORTS AS NECESSARY, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED SHORT OF MAJOR LAND ATTACKS IN ORANGELAND.

5. () USCINCPAC. MAINTAIN ONE CVBG AND ONE ARG OR MEU IN THE NAS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. BE PREPARED TO AUGMENT COMIDEASTFOR WITH NTDS AND MISSILE-CAPABLE ESCORTS IF DIRECTED. BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER THESE FORCES TO USCINCCENT OPCON WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA.

6. () COMACC. BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AND TRANSFER FIGHTER SQUADRONS, RESCUE SQUADRON, AND E-3A AIRCRAFT TO USCINCCENT. TRANSFERRED FORCES SHOULD PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCINCCENT OPCON UPON ENTERING USCINCCENT AOR.

7. () DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

8. () DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

9. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS GUIDANCE (OPSEC, DECEPTION, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE). IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT FORCE MOVEMENTS WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE, AND OPSEC PROCEDURES THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND EXERCISE ARE IMPERATIVE. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) ARE: (AS SPECIFIED IN OPLAN OR OPORD).

10. () PSYOP GUIDANCE

A. () PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT.

B. () PSYOP OBJECTIVES

(1) () PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

(2) () PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

C. () PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

(1) () US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.

(2) () US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

D. () PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID

(1) () STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.

(2) () PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.

11. () FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE.

A. () IMPLEMENT FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES APPROPRIATE TO ANTICIPATED TERRORIST THREAT.

B. () DESCRIBE POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREAT BOTH SUPPORTING CONVENTIONAL THREAT AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL TERRORIST THREATS NOT SUPPORTING THE THREAT.

C. () define pre-deployment and theater force protection training requirements.

12. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

13. () CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE

A. () CA MISSION STATEMENT.

B. () CA OBJECTIVES

(1) () DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(2) () ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

(3) () SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

(4) () FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(5) () ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

(6) () FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

C. () CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) () OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

(2) () TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.

(3) () COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

14. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 280001Z NOV ____ REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH THE SUPPORTED CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO THE CHAIRMAN.

B. () TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 30 NOV ____.

C. () SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 230400Z NOV ____.

D. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION IS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. () USTRANSCOM WILL MANAGE DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF USCINCCENT.

F. () DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE ARE AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

G. () KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

H. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

15. () TRANSPORT

A. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY IS 1B2.

B. () APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) () AIRLIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM ASSETS. SEALIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET FORCE PLUS THE RRF.

(2) () USTRANSCOM AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPE AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JTB MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

16. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNITS(S) MUST IDENTIFY A SPONSORING COMMAND AND PROVIDE THE RELEVANT ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION/PROJECT CODE FOR FUNDING MOVEMENTS. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S).

17. () JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (INCLUDING NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.
18. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.
19. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
20. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS. DOD PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO CARRY A VALIDATED PASSPORT WHEN DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND.
21. () UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BIRDMAN.
22. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. CINC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES AS REQUIRED. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED CJCSM 3150.01. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES. SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO THE CHAIRMAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25.
23. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCENT OPLAN XXXX.
24. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
 - A. () PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION (BEYOND ANY APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE THAT MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM CJCS WARNING ORDER TASKING) IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL APPROVED BY OASD(PA). PUBLIC AND MEDIA INQUIRIES, BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG), IF APPLICABLE, SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131 OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. () PROVIDE DETAILED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE WILL CONFORM TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5404.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, AS FOLLOWS:

(1) () REFERENCES. IDENTIFY PERTINENT MESSAGES OR DOCUMENTS.

(2) () OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE REFERENCES, THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT, AND ANY EXISTING OR ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS.

(3) () COORDINATION INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE; CONFIRM THAT IT HAS BEEN FULLY COORDINATED AND THEATER-APPROVED; REQUEST ASD(PA) APPROVAL AND SPECIFY THE DATE IT IS REQUIRED FOR USE.

(4) () PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH. RECOMMEND ACTIVE OR PASSIVE APPROACH FOR THE OPERATION.

(5) () PUBLIC STATEMENT. PROVIDE A STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE OPERATION. THE STATEMENT WILL BE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE IN AN ACTIVE PA APPROACH OR FOR RESPONSE TO QUERY IN A PASSIVE PA APPROACH.

(6) () QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. PROVIDE A LIST OF PROPOSED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS.

(7) () CONTINGENCY STATEMENT. PROVIDE A CONTINGENCY STATEMENT TO BE USED BEFORE RELEASE OF THE FINAL PAG. THIS STATEMENT MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT PROPOSED EARLIER IN THE INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE RESULTING FROM THE CJCS WARNING ORDER TASKING.

(8) () MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION. PROVIDE OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION INCLUDING:

(A) () MEDIA INFORMATION CENTERS. COMPOSITION, RESPONSIBILITIES, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES, ETC.

(B) () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. DESIGNATION OF SOLE APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS-RELATED NEWS

MATERIALS, PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE AND/OR CLEARANCE OF INFORMATION, HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS (IF APPLICABLE), ETC.

(C) () MEDIA COVERAGE. STATE WHETHER MEDIA COVERAGE IS ENCOURAGED OR SOLICITED, GIVING RATIONALE, NEWS MEDIA TRANSPORTATION INSTRUCTIONS, POINT OF CONTACT AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SUCH REQUESTS, REQUIREMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (VALID PASSPORT, WORKING MEDIA VISA), LOCAL ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS, FUNDS FOR FOOD, LODGING, RETURN-TRAVEL (IF MILITARY AIR IS NOT AVAILABLE), ETC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING MEDIA REQUESTS FOR ACCOMPANYING TRAVEL BEFORE THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OPERATION, ETC.

(D) () DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL. IDENTIFY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LOCAL GROUND AND/OR AIR TRANSPORTATION, SPECIAL CLOTHING OR EQUIPMENT TO BE PROVIDED, MESSING, BILLETING, PROTECTION OF MEDIA EQUIPMENT AND GEAR, LOCAL ESCORT REQUIREMENTS, AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT OF FILING OF POOL PRODUCTS. IDENTIFY THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT SHOULD THE POOL BE ACTIVATED.

(E) () INTERNAL MEDIA AND AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE. IDENTIFY ASSISTANCE THAT WILL BE PROVIDED, DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (TO INCLUDE WHETHER ESCORTS ARE NECESSARY), SCREENING OF VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) MATERIALS UPON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SPONSORING COMMAND POC FOR HANDLING INTERNAL INFORMATION MATTERS, ETC. ALSO INCLUDE GUIDELINES FOR ARMED FORCES AUDIOVISUAL TEAMS DOCUMENTING THE OPERATION.

(F) () MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES. IF KNOWN IN ADVANCE, PROVIDE CHRONOLOGY OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL EVENTS THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO MEDIA.

(G) () MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONS. INDICATE ANY OTHER PROPOSED PA ACTIVITIES OR CONSIDERATIONS.

(H) () POINTS OF CONTACT. IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATING POCS NAME AND PHONE NUMBER.

(I) () DECLASSIFICATION INFORMATION. PROVIDE DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LAST PART OF THE MESSAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBSECTION 4-207 OF DOD 5200.1-R.

25. () HISTORICAL SUPPORT. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE BY JOINT HISTORIANS AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE HISTORIANS. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH, COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE, AND TRAINING. IMPLEMENT JOINT HISTORICAL AND MILITARY SERVICE HISTORICAL PROCEDURES FOR THE COLLECTION OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND ORAL INTERVIEWS OF SELECTED PERSONNEL TO MEET CJCS REQUIREMENTS. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION. DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONIC RECORDS, AND INTERVIEWS WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE ACCESS OF JOINT HISTORICAL AND MILITARY SERVICE HISTORICAL PERSONNEL TO THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND PERSONNEL NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE HISTORICAL RECORD.

26. () COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, HISTORICAL SUPPORT, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CHAIRMAN, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND

FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS.
ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS:

ATTENTION: JCCC
ROOM: 5A518 PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000 (RACK 2)

TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS: DSN: 227-2960, COMM: (703) 697-2900
FAX: DSN: 223-4775, (703) 693-4775
PAGER: NON DUTY HOURS: COMM: (202) 542-2579/2533 (LEAVE
NUMBER AND CALL WILL BE RETURNED.) //

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

27. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSI 6110.01. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION; INCLUDING THOSE OF SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

28. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCJFCOM, USCINCSTRAT, USCINCSpace, AND USCINCTrans ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. (COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. DISA, DTRA, DLA, NSA, NIMA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES.) FORCES TRANSFERRED FROM USCINCPAC AND COMACC TO USCINCCENT WILL PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCINCCENT OPCON. COMACC FORCES WILL PLAN TO TRANSFER AT THE USCINCCENT AOR BOUNDARY. LOCATION AND TIME OF TRANSFER OF USCINCPAC FORCES HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED BY THE NCA.

29. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JOINT STAFF INFORMED USING COMMANDERS SITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.//

AKNLG/Y//

DECL/Provide appropriate downgrading instructions and date here//

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ENCLOSURE L

CJCS ALERT ORDER

1. Purpose. The ALERT ORDER will be issued by the Chairman. The ALERT ORDER requires SecDef authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning.

2. When Issued. An ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility. The ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following receipt of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the ALERT ORDER may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a PLANNING ORDER has been issued (also see Enclosure K).

3. How Issued. The ALERT ORDER will be issued by record communication, normally using a precedence of IMMEDIATE. In a particularly time-sensitive situation, a FLASH precedence or an emergency action message may be appropriate. Oral or GCCS Newsgroup notification should be made but must be followed by record communication.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders and agencies. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

a. The specific contents of the ALERT ORDER may vary widely, as with the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPORD may be necessary.

b. The ALERT ORDER will generally follow the major paragraph headings of an OPORD and may include any or all of the information listed in subparagraphs 5b(l) through (6) below. For valid information previously covered in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, reference to the order is sufficient. Information that is not applicable or is irrelevant to execution

planning may be omitted. Where an OPLAN is applicable, only minimal information such as the target date for execution or changes in ROE may be necessary. The following format is designed to serve as a checklist for guidance information that may be relevant. It is not intended as a listing of mandatory information, and unnecessary headings should be deleted in situations where they are not required.

(1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the ALERT ORDER. Indicate specific taskings or requests to supported and supporting commanders.

(2) Situation. A description of the current politico-military situation as developed in the latest DIA intelligence assessment. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning or not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished. It may or may not have changed from the anticipated mission previously provided in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER or the estimate of the supported commander.

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. The COA as finally approved by the NCA in clear, precise military objectives. This will be the basis for the concept of operation of the supported commander.

(b) Combat Forces. A listing of the combat forces approved for the operation.

(c) Strategic Lift Pre-Positioning. Authority, if appropriate, to pre-position lift assets preparatory to deployment operations.

(d) Information Operations Guidance (OPSEC, Deception, and Electronic Warfare). When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Appendix A, Enclosure I, subparagraph 5f.

(e) PSYOP Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure H, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(c).

(f) Antiterrorism/Force Protection Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, Appendix A, paragraph 7.

(g) Intelligence Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER, has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(e).

(h) Counterintelligence Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(f).

(i) Civil Affairs Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(g).

(j) Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour for deployments. ¹
2. Proposed M-day for mobilization.
3. Target D-day for execution.
4. Estimated duration of the operation.
5. DEFCON or deployability posture.
6. Operational constraints, including any special ROE and anti-terrorist/force protection issues for this specific operation.
7. Release of SIOP-committed forces.
8. Unit combat readiness criteria.
9. Authorization for direct liaison between commands.

¹ The Chairman or designated agent coordinates the proposed date with USCINTRANS and the other CINCs as required and recommends changes to C-day and L-hour, if required. The Chairman will establish or issue a firm C-day and L-hour. One C-day and L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. In establishing L-hour, effort should be made to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

ORDER. (k) Public Affairs Guidance. See CJCS WARNING or PLANNING

ORDER. (l) Historical Support Guidance. See CJCS WARNING or PLANNING

ORDER. (m) Combat Camera Guidance. See CJCS WARNING or PLANNING

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.
2. Maximum numbers and types of strategic lift resources available.
3. Load-planning factors for each type of lift resources.
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

(b) Force activity designator (FAD) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted.

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.

(d) Personnel deployment criteria.

(e) Code names and code numbers of the operation.

(f) Reporting instructions.

(g) Classification and declassification guidance.

(h) Known logistic constraints.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Specific guidance on request of CJCS-controlled assets.

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commanders and agencies and coordination instructions.

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary).

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS or DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by circumstances, the ALERT ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; e.g., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations.

7. Sample ALERT ORDER. The Appendix is a sample ALERT ORDER.

NOTE: Items previously provided in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER and/or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER need not be repeated unless information has changed.

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE L
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS ALERT ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL ¹

USCINCFROM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCSTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS: PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC: DDO/

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

¹ AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON-DC
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
CONSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL

COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFOREUR
COMMARFORSOUTH
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
CDRJCS MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOVL___/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV ___/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/DOC/USCINCCENT/-//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION.

USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

ORDTYP/ALORD/CTCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS
AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

SUPPORTED CINC OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED
BY 301000Z NOV ____./ / ¹

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 1 AS
CONTAINED IN REF B.

4. () MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.

5. () USCINTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE
CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

6. () OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS
WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING
ORDER.

10. () CI GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

11. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 290001Z OCT _____. REQUEST
USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND
FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO THE CHAIRMAN.

¹ In addition to narrative information, the OPORD may contain a summary of major combat forces as allocated in the WARNING ORDER. The primary method of passing force and deployment data is JOPES online, with formatted messages as a backup.

B. () TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 1 DEC ____.

C. () SUPPORTING COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 280400Z NOV MOVEMENT SCHEDULES¹ REQUIRED BY 290400Z NOV ____.

D. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

E. () OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS PER WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER.

F. () CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO FORCE PROTECTION AND TERRORIST THREAT IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL THREAT TO PERSONNEL.

G. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

12. () TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 17 NOV _____. AIRLIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE III (EFFECTIVE PROPOSED C-DAY MINUS 4). SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

A. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. () ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE I IS PRUDENT GIVEN THE LIFT REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USCINCENT OPLAN XXXX. ACCORDINGLY, STRATEGIC ASSETS FROM CRAF STAGE I ARE MADE AVAILABLE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. AS NOTED IN THE WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER, USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAF I ASSETS. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE THAT USCINCENT OPLAN, XXXX SUPPORT WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX FLOW.

13. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD). SEE CJCS WARNING AND PLANNING ORDER.

14. () THE USE OF JOPEs IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES SUBMIT AND REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE (USCENTCOM) STANDING TPFDD LOI. (197SK) AND (197RP) TPFDDs HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. All TPFDD COORDINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE (CENTCOM.JOPEs.OPERATIONS) NEWSGROUP.

15. () FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

16. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

17. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

19. () CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

21. () HISTORICAL SUPPORT GUIDANCE. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION OF THIS OPERATION REQUIRED. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

22. () COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

23. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

24. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE NCA HAVE APPROVED USCINCCENT EXERCISE OF OPCON OVER USCINCPAC AND COMACC FORCES TRANSFERRED FOR THIS OPERATION. FOR COMACC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON THEIR ENTRY INTO USCINCCENT AOR. FOR

USCINCPAC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON EXECUTION OF THE
OPERATION.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/Provide appropriate downgrading instructions and date here//

Note: The primary method of passing above data is via GCCS newsgroup with formatted
messages as a backup.

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ENCLOSURE M

CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS, DEPLOYMENT ORDERS,
AND REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS

1. Purpose. A DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER can be issued by the Chairman, after authorization by the Secretary of Defense, to:

a. Increase the deployability posture of units.

b. Decrease deployability posture of units.

c. Deploy forces. ¹

d. Redeploy forces. ²

e. Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

2. When Issued. The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER will be issued upon decision of the NCA to commence preparations for the conduct of a military operation (see Figure M-1). It may be issued at any point in the CAP development process. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT Orders may be incorporated within WARNING Orders, PLANNING Orders, ALERT Orders, and Execute Orders, if appropriate, and approved by the NCA. Incidentally, one goal of the system that is often lost in the process is to reserve the EXORD solely for initiating or terminating the employment of U.S. military forces. An EXORD (or EXORD MOD) is often used incorrectly to change force structure during an operation. The DEPORD is the appropriate instrument for this type action.

3. How Issued. The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER is normally issued by message through the Defense Messaging System (DMS). If the situation is sufficiently time sensitive, voice communication can be used first to pass information. A DMS message will be forwarded as soon as practicable. Use of an AIG is elective and not mandatory.

¹ For Deployment Preparation Orders, Deployment Orders, and Re-deployment Orders that are not crisis related, the Force Protection paragraph as written in the example WARNING ORDER (Enclosure H, Appendix A, paragraph 12H) applies. Paragraph 7 of the example WARNING ORDER needs to be included only when the Order is crisis related.

² Procedures for the redeployment of forces are the same as those to deploy forces.

4. Addressees.

a. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders and agencies. Information addressees will include the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, Defense agencies, and others as appropriate. Interested commanders, heads of Defense agencies, and component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

b. Action recipients of the implementing order should include the same addressees as the implementer in their responses to ensure that appropriate agencies are kept informed.

5. Contents

a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPOD, most of the guidance necessary for deployment preparations will have already been passed to implementing commands in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, or ALERT ORDER.

b. If a crisis situation requires an increase in deployability posture, movement of forces, or establishment of a JTF (not addressed in WARNING ORDERS, PLANNING ORDERS, ALERT ORDERS, or EXECUTE ORDERS), the DEPLOYMENT or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER must pass all essential guidance to effect these actions. This order will, in the first paragraph, include the appropriate authority; e.g., THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES.

6. Sample CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION, DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS. See Appendixes A, B, and C.

NOTE: The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER and DEPLOYMENT ORDER are provided in CAP to permit the above changes at any time in CAP procedures sequence, independent of WARNING Orders, PLANNING Orders, and ALERT Orders, and to reserve the EXECUTE ORDER solely for initiating or terminating the employment of US military forces. A DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER can be used to propose C-day and L-hour. A DEPLOYMENT ORDER may be used to indicate the CJCS established C-day and L-hour.

1

<u>DEPLOYMENT ORDER MATRIX</u>		
SUPPORTED COMMANDER REQUESTS	DEPLOYMENT ORDER REQUIRED	SECDEF APPR REQUIRED
ADDITIONAL FORCES (e.g. IMEF TO CENT COM)	YES	YES
DEPLOY PART (S) OF UNIT (S) (e.g. A SQUAD TO CENT COM)	YES	YES
INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT (NOT FORCE AUGMENTATION OR UNIT REPLACEMENT)	YES¹	YES¹
RESUPPLY, SUSTAINMENT, NON-UNIT RELATED PERS/EQUIP (e.g. BEANS, BULLETS, ETC.)	NO	NO

¹ UNLESS AN EXCEPTION IS GRANTED


2
3
4
5

Figure M-1. Deployment Order Matrix

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE M

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER



...APPLICABLE AGENCIES/DIA/CIA/ETC...

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

...SERVICES CHIEFS...

...REMAINING CINCS...

...INTEL AGENCIES...

...OTHER APPLICABLE AGENCIES...

...RELATED COALITION COMMANDS/GOVERNMENTS/AGENCIES...

...AMEMBASSY/MILREP/LIAISON???

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION AS MUCH AS REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE!!!

PROPER ORDER: WHITE HOUSE, CABINET-LEVEL, SERVICE CHIEFS, REMAINING CINCS, OTHERS

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

¹ AIG 8790 can be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION, ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//

AMPN/DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ALERTING
OF FORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

4. () USCINCCENT PREPARE TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

5. () USCINCENTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE
CREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS STATED ABOVE.

6. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS GUIDANCE (OPSEC, DECEPTION, AND
ELECTRONIC WARFARE). SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
9. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
10. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
 - A () PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 2900OIZ NOV_____.
 - B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
 - C. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.
 - D. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.
 - E. () DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.
 - F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.
12. () TRANSPORTATION FUNDING.
13. () THE USE OF JOPES (POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND ADP) IS DIRECTED. (XXXX) AND (XXXX) TPFDDs HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. ALL TPFDD COORDINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE NEWSGROUP XXXXX.XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX.

14. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

15. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

16. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25.

17. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

18. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/


19. () STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, SERVICES, AND DEFENSE AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE HERE//

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE M

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER



...APPLICABLE AGENCIES/DIA/CIA/ETC...

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

...SERVICES CHIEFS...

...REMAINING CINCS...

...INTEL AGENCIES...

...OTHER APPLICABLE AGENCIES...

...RELATED COALITION COMMANDS/GOVERNMENTS/AGENCIES...

...AMEMBASSY/MILREP/LIAISON???

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION AS MUCH AS REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE!!!

PROPER ORDER: WHITE HOUSE, CABINET-LEVEL, SERVICE CHIEFS, REMAINING CINCS, OTHERS

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

¹ AIG 8790 can be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV____-/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV____/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV____/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDERS ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION, ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/DEPLOYORD/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS A DEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HAS AUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO BLUELAND IN
ANTICIPATION (OR SUPPORT) OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDERS OR, IF REQUIRED,
WRITE A SHORT, CONCISE MISSION STATEMENT.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

4. () USCINCCENT. BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED IN
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES OUTSIDE OF
BLUELAND IS WITHHELD PENDING NCA DECISION.

5. () USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
PROVIDE AIR REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

6. () COMACC. AS A RESOURCE MANAGER AND WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF THE FORCES FOR OWNING AND GAINING COMMAND,
SOURCE THE FORCES LISTED BELOW TO MEET USCINCXXX
REQUIREMENTS.

7. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS (OPSEC, DECEPTION, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE). SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

10. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

11. (U) DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE REQUIREMENT. USCINCXXX, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, SERVICES, AND AGENCIES, WILL VALIDATE THE FIRST SEVEN DAYS OF DEPLOYMENT FLOW FOR UNIT SOURCING TO MEET THE NCA-APPROVED COA (AT LEVEL-4 DETAIL) WITHIN 72 HOURS OF DDHHMMZMMYY. TIMELINE AND INTERIM MILESTONES WILL BE DETERMINED BY USCINCXX. SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL SOURCE AND VERIFY UNITS TO ASSIST USCINCXX TO MEET ESTABLISHED MILESTONES.

12. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. () C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV____.

B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

C. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND/OR MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

D. () RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

E. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

13. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

14. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

15. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

16. () DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT (*NOTE: COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE THEIR DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT PER THE FOLLOWING FORMAT. THIS DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT WILL INCLUDED IN DEPLOYMENT ORDERS RELEASED BY THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER.*)

A. () CONCEPT OF DEPLOYMENT. THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. PIDS (197SK) (DEPLOYMENT) AND (197RP) (REDEPLOYMENT) WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION. GCCS NEWSGROUP "(SUPPORTED CINC DESIGNATED NEWSGROUP)" WILL BE USED TO FORMALLY COORDINATE TPFDD DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION. TPFDDs WILL BE DEVELOPED USING PROCEDURES DOCUMENTED IN THE STANDARD TPFDD LOI LISTED ON TH US(CINC)COM JOPES HOMEPAGE. (IDENTIFY LOCATION OF CINC/AOR-SPECIFIC AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS TO STANDARD TPFDD LOI AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION)//

B. () APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT. (IN COORDINATION WITH USTRANSCOM, IDENTIFY TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION, STRATEGIC LIFT SHOULD BE APPORTIONED AMONG SUPPORTED COMMAND COMPONENTS IN TERMS OF MAUNDER OF PERSONNEL AND SHORT TONS, PER COMPONENT, PER DAY, FOR BOTH AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT MODES FOR THEIR USE IN DEVELOPING SUPPORTING TPFDDs. WHEN SUPPORTING MULTI-PHASED OPERATIONS, APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED FOR EACH PHASE OF THE OPERATION SUPPORTED.)

C. () PROPOSED FREQUENCY/REQUIREMENT CHANNELS.)IDENTIFY PLANNED OR OPERATING FREQUENCY AND /OR REQUIREMENTS CHANNELS ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION, SPECIFY

AUTHORIZED APOES AND APODS AND QUANTITY OF PERSONNEL AND CARGO SUPPORTED BY DAY FOR EACH CHANNEL.)

D. DEPLOYMENT PRIORITIES. (SPECIFY FORCES OR CAPABILITIES HAVING PRIORITY FOR DEPLOYMENT MAY BE IDENTIFIED IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC FORCE REQUIRED DELIVERY DATES (RDDS) OR SPECIFIC DATES WHEN FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED IN THEATER. WHEN SUPPORTING MULTI-PHASED OPERATIONS, PRIORITIES SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED FOR EACH PHASE OF THE OPERATION SUPPORTED.)

E. () AUTHORIZED PORTS. (SPECIFY AERIAL AND SEA PORTS AUTHORIZED FOR USE DURING THE OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE APOES AND APODS DESIGNATED FOR CHANNEL MOVEMENTS IF NOT IDENTIFIED EARLIER.)//

F. PROPOSED AIRBRIDGE/SEALANES. (IN COORDINATION WITH USTRANSCOM, ANNOUNCE PLANNED AIR AND SEA ROUTES AND BEDDOWN LOCATIONS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION. INCLUDE STANDUP AND OPERATING RESPONSIBILITIES REQUIRED OF SUPPORTED COMMAND COMPONENTS.)

G. () TPFDD DEVELOPMENT /VALIDATION TIMELINES. (IDENTIFY SUSPENSES FOR DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING TPFDD REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS: SUPPORTED COMMAND COMPONENT ENTRY OF INITIAL TPFDD RECORDS; SUPPORTING COMMAND SOURCING OF TPFDD RECORDS; SUPPORTED COMMAND COMPONENT VALIDATION; CINC VALIDATION; USTRANSCOM TCC ENTRY OF SCHEDULE/MANIFESTING.)

H. () LIAISON. (IDENTIFY LIAISON PLANNED/REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE OPERATION SUCH AS USTC/AMC/ MTMC/ MSC. IDENTIFY CENTRAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS AND JOINT RECEPTION, STATING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION (RSOI) FOR THE SUPPORTED COMMAND IF REQUIRED, E.G., JOINT MOVEMENT CENTER, SUPPORTED COMMAND JOPES SUPPORT ELEMENT (JSE), SUPPORTED COMMAND CRISIS ACTION TEAM.)

17. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25.

19. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

21. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

22. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

23. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.


24. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE HERE//

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE M

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS REDEPLOYMENT ORDER



...APPLICABLE AGENCIES/DIA/CIA/ETC...

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

...SERVICES CHIEFS...

...REMAINING CINCS...

...INTEL AGENCIES...

...OTHER APPLICABLE AGENCIES...

...RELATED COALITION COMMANDS/GOVERNMENTS/AGENCIES...

...AMEMBASSY/MILREP/LIAISON???

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION AS MUCH AS REALISTICALLY POSSIBLE!!!

PROPER ORDER: WHITE HOUSE, CABINET-LEVEL, SERVICE CHIEFS, REMAINING CINCS, OTHERS

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

¹ AIG 8790 can be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

NARR/CJCS WARNING ORDER, COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION, ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/() THIS IS A REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR
REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION
BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REDUCED THREAT IN THE
AOR PERMIT THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US
FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () REDEPLOY FORCES RETURNING TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING
COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS ACCORDING TO THE
TIMETABLE DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT. MAINTAIN A DEFENSIVE
COMBAT POSTURE FOR PHASED DRAWDOWN.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

4. () USCINCCENT. REDEPLOY FORCES TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING
COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.
PROVIDE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THE CASE OF
USCINCSTRAT, STRATEGIC FORCES WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR MAIN
OPERATING BASE (MOB) TO PREPARE FOR OPLAN FORCE GENERATION IN
SUPPORT OF THE SIOP.

5. () USCINCEUR, USCINCFJCOM, USCINCPAC, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSTRAT, AND USCINCSpace. BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE REDEPLOYING FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE.
6. () USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE AIR REFUELING AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. TAKE ACTION AS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH AIR BRIDGE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT. ENSURE MAXIMUM USE OF ORGANIC STRATEGIC AIRLIFT. PRESENT CRAF AUTHORITIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.
7. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS (OPSEC, DECEPTION, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE). SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
8. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
9. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.
10. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
11. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
 - A. () R-DAY, L-HOUR, 250001Z FEB ____.
 - B. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
 - C. () RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
 - D. () UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

E. () KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

F. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

12. () AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

13. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

14. () FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

15. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILY SITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25.

16. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES SUBMIT AND REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE (USCENTCOM) STANDING TPFDD LOI. (197SK) AND (197RP) TPFDDs HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. All TPFDD COORDINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE (CENTCOM.JOPES.OPERATIONS) NEWSGROUP.

17. () CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.// GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

19. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND Supporting commanders RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO STATE THAT THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S) THAT THE GAINING COMMANDER WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ARE TERMINATED AND THAT REDEPLOYING FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED BACK (NORMALLY AT THE AOR BOUNDARY) TO THE PROVIDING COMMANDER(S) WHO WILL EXERCISE THEIR ORIGINALLY AUTHORIZED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE
HERE//

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ENCLOSURE N

CJCS EXECUTE ORDER

1. Purpose. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by the Chairman to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement an NCA decision. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
2. When Issued. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued upon decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an EXECUTE ORDER would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an EXECUTE ORDER may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.
3. How Issued. Normally, the EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by Defense Message Service (DMS). If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or GCCS Newsgroups may be used initially to pass the EXECUTE ORDER, with immediate follow-up DMS message to confirm the orders and keep all crisis participants informed.
4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders and agencies. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
5. Contents
 - a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER, DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, DEPLOYMENT ORDER, or REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. Under these circumstances, the EXECUTE ORDER need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.

b. In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the EXECUTE ORDER must pass all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, and ALERT ORDER. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the EXECUTE ORDER will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER and may include the information listed in the following subparagraphs. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the EXECUTE ORDER will normally be very time-sensitive.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the EXECUTE ORDER are:

(1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the EXECUTE ORDER.

(2) Situation. A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by US military forces. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished.

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces approved by the NCA through the Chairman. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander or agency (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required. Designation of supported and supporting commands and agencies in below paragraph 5c(6), Command and Signal, automatically incorporates normal mission tasking.

(b) Major Combat Forces. A listing of the major combat forces approved for the operation. Tasks will be listed for major combat forces and subordinate units as required.

(c) Information Operations Guidance (OPSEC, Deception, and Electronic Warfare).

(d) PSYOP Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(c).

(e) Force Protection Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(d). For the actual order, only the words provided in Enclosure I, Appendix A, paragraph 12H, need apply.

(f) Civil Affairs Guidance. If execution is directed without A WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(h).

(g) Intelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(e).

(h) Counterintelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Enclosure I, subparagraph 5.c.(4)(f).

(i) Coordinating Instructions

1. C-day and L-hour for deployments.
2. Target date and time for execution.
3. Estimated duration of the operation. Circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations.
4. DEFCON or deployability posture.
5. Operational constraints, including any special ROE to include anti-terrorist/force protection issues applicable to this specific operation.
6. Release of SIOP-committed forces.
7. Unit combat readiness criteria.
8. Authorization for direct liaison between commands.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.
2. Allocation of strategic lift resources.
3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource.
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

- (b) Force activity designator (FAD), if warranted.
- (c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.
- (d) Personnel deployment criteria.
- (e) Reporting instructions.
- (f) Classification and declassification guidance, if required.
- (g) Known logistic constraints.
- (h) Public affairs guidance.
- (i) Historical support guidance.
- (j) Combat camera guidance.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Any specific guidance on the use or release of CJCS-controlled C2 assets contained in the Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE).

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commands and agencies and coordination instructions.

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

B. () EXECUTE BY 1 DEC ____.

C. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.

D. () ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

E. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

F. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

G. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.

12. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

13. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES SUBMIT AND REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE (USCENTCOM) STANDING TPFDD LOI. (197SK) AND (197RP) TPFDDs HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. All TPFDD COORDINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE (CENTCOM.JOPES.OPERATIONS) NEWSGROUP.

14. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25

15. () MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.

16. () CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER. REVIEW AND UPDATE CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TO THE SUPPORTING COMMANDS, SERVICES, AND SERVICE COMPONENTS.

17. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

18. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

19. () HISTORICAL SUPPORT GUIDANCE. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION OF THIS OPERATION REQUIRED. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

21. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

22. () STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

ANKLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE HERE//

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE N

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS EXECUTE ORDER
(WARNING Order, PLANNING Order, or ALERT Order previously issued)

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//

DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
WASHINGTON DC

CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

DISTR: SJS-N/CJCS:PA/J1/J3/J4/J5/J6/J6Z/J7/J8/NMCC:DDO/

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
COMMARFOREUR
COMMARFORSOUTH

USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL// ¹

REF/B/MSG/USCINCCENT/242100ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//

REF/C/ORDER/CJCS/261000ZNOV___//

REF/D/ORDER/CJCS/261001ZNOV___//

REF/E/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV___// ¹

REF/F/ORDER/USCINCCENT/301000ZONOV___//

NARR/REFS A THROUGH F: CJCS WARNING ORDER, USCINCCENT
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER,

ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

¹ If time has precluded prior issuance of these references by the Chairman, refer to instructions for preparation of WARNING and ALERT ORDERS to ensure consideration of all relevant aspects of the operations to be conducted.

CJCS PLANNING ORDER, CJCS ALERT ORDER, USCINCCENT ALERT
ORDER//

NARR/() THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES HAS DIRECTED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION

1. () IN RESPONSE TO YELLOWLAND INCURSIONS IN ORANGELAND, THE
GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND. THE NCA HAS
AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 1 CONTAINED IN REF B IS
APPROVED.

4. () MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A.

5. () INFORMATION OPERATIONS GUIDANCE (OPSEC, DECEPTION, AND
ELECTRONIC WARFARE). SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT
ORDER.

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT
ORDER.

7. () ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS
WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

8. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR
ALERT ORDER.

9. () INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR
ALERT ORDER.

10. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. () AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDERS.

B. () EXECUTE BY 1 DEC ____.

C. () ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.

D. () ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

E. () ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION: THE THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY X IS (SPECIFY CINC's THREAT LEVEL). SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES ARE AWARE OF THREAT LEVELS SET BY (SUPPORTING COMMANDER) THROUGHOUT (SUPPORTING COMMANDER's) AOR. SUPPORTING COMMANDERS/ SERVICES ENSURE FORCES COMPLETE (SUPPORTING COMMANDER's) REQUIRED PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING, TO INCLUDE ANTITERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING. (SUPPORTING COMMANDER) ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND AS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

F. () USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

G. () DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. () FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.

12. () PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

13. () THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTING COMMANDS AND AGENCIES SUBMIT AND REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE (USCENTCOM) STANDING TPFDD LOI. (197SK) AND (197RP) TPFDD'S HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS. All TPFDD COORDINATION WILL OCCUR IN THE (CENTCOM.JOPES.OPERATIONS) NEWSGROUP.

14. () REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN CJCSM 3150.05. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.25

15. () MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.

16. () CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER. REVIEW AND UPDATE CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TO THE SUPPORTING COMMANDS, SERVICES, AND SERVICE COMPONENTS.

17. () KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

18. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

19. () HISTORICAL SUPPORT GUIDANCE. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION OF THIS OPERATION REQUIRED. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. () COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

21. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

22. () STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

ANKLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE HERE//

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE N

SUPPORTED COMMANDER EXECUTE ORDER

1. Purpose. The supported commander EXECUTE ORDER may be issued by the respective supported commander in response to a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The purpose of the supported commander EXECUTE ORDER is to direct component execution of an OPORD based on an NCA decision and to provide any supporting commander with amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance. Authority for issue derives from the original CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

2. When Issued

a. Amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance for the supported commander may have to be passed to components based on updated situation and operational requirements.

b. Generally, most of the guidance necessary for execution may already have been passed to the supported command components by previously issued CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, or EXECUTE ORDERS in which components were information addressees or by the supported commander OPORD, which listed components as action addressees. In this case, the EXECUTE ORDER may need to contain only the authority to execute and the actual date and time for the execution. However, the order can be used to provide amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance from the supported commander to his component commanders regarding any additional essential guidance that may be critical for execution.

3. How Issued. Normally, the supported commander's EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by record communication with IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time sensitive, voice communication or GCCS Newsgroups may be used initially to pass the supported commander's EXECUTE ORDER, with immediate follow-up record communication to confirm oral or GCCS orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addresses. The supported commander's EXECUTE ORDER will be addressed to supported command components, with information copies to the addressees on the original CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

5. Contents. Major paragraphs and items of information are as follows:

a. Authority. A statement indicating authority for issuance of CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

b. Situation. An update of the latest politico-military situation.

c. Mission. A refined statement of the tasks to be accomplished.

d. Execution

(1) Courses of Action. Deployment and employment approved. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a component commander.

(2) Major Combat Forces. An updated list of major combat forces approved for the operation.

(3) Information Operations Guidance (OPSEC, Deception, and Electronic Warfare). Direct implementation of Information Operations measures specified in the applicable OPOD.

(4) PSYOP Guidance

(5) Force Protection Guidance/Combating Terrorism

(6) Civil Affairs Guidance

(7) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) C-day and L-hour for deployments or redeployments.

(b) Date and time for execution.

(c) Estimated length of operation.

(d) Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) or deployability posture.

(e) Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation.

(f) Unit combat readiness criteria.

(g) Authorization for direct liaison between component commands.

e. Administration and Logistics

- (1) Transportation, as follows:
 - (a) Lift allocation for intratheater movement.
 - (b) Priority for lift (intratheater).
- (2) Reporting instructions.
- (3) Public affairs guidance.

f. Combined Information Dominance and Sharing

- (1) Communications guidance.
- (2) Command relationships. JFC-directed internal transfer of forces with the designated authority the receiving component may exercise (i.e., TACON, OPCON); authority of functional entities (e.g., Joint Force Air Component Commander, Joint Target Coordination Boards); internal support relationships between components when forces from one component must perform actions at the direction of another component (one of the specific support relationships in Joint Pub 0-2 (Mutual, General, Direct, or Close) must be identified as well as any limitations on the authority of the supported component commander to exercise “general-direction” of the supporting effort (see Joint Pub 0-2 for details).
- (3) Information sharing with foreign entities must be clearly outlined and justified, providing details of: specific data elements to be shared with specific foreign entities; specific conditions under which each data element will be shared; specific data element contents that will not be shared with specific foreign entities; and specific or potential ramifications to information dominance/warfighting capabilities if information is not shared; specifics on policies and mechanics for information dispersal, information acceptance, and information security.

6. Sample Supported Commander EXECUTE ORDER. See Appendix C.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE N

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR SUPPORTED COMMANDER EXECUTE ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL/CCJ3//

TO: COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA

USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//

COMUSNAVCENT

COMUSMARCENT CAMP PENDELTON CA

SOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

INFO USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/CCJ6
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

CJCS WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//

CDRJCS MACDILL AFB FL

JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT//

AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___//

REF/B/ORDER/USCINCCENT/272323ZNOV___//

ORDTYP/EXORD///

NARR/() REF A IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. REF B IS OPOD FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () IN RESPONSE TO GOB REQUEST, THE NCA HAVE APPROVED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () SEE USCINCCENT OPOD.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () COURSE OF ACTION. EXECUTE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX-

4. () MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. SEE USCINCCENT OPOD.

5. () OPSEC GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPOD.

6. () PSYOP GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPOD.

7. () ANTITERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

8. () CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

9. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. () AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

B. () C-DAY AND L-HOUR.

C. () D-DAY AND H-HOUR.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. () AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

11. () AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE
HERE//

ENCLOSURE O
SAMPLE OPERATION ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO

USCINCSO MIAMI FL

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL

USCINCSSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL

DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

CSA WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6

CSAF WASHINGTON DC

CMC WASHINGTON DC

CDRUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA FT BELVOIR VA
NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD
CIA WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-OPF/G-OPD//
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
COMMARFORLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
COMMARFORPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT//

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS//

REF/A/DOC/CJCS/211742ZNOV____//

REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV____//

NARR/JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (FY), CJCS ALERT ORDER//

ORDTYP/OPORD/USCINCCENT.XXX//

MAP/1015/BLUELAND//

MAP/1020/ORANGELAND//

NARR/SCALE 1:100,000//

TIMEZONE/Z//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES	/UNITLOC	/CMNTS
/USCINCCENT	/MACDILL AFB, FL	
/USCINCJFCOM	/NORFOLK VA	
/USCINCEUR	/VAIHINGEN, GE	
/USCINCPAC	/CAMP SMITH, HI	
/USCINCTRANS	/SCOTT AFB, IL	/2 TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQ, 6 KC-10
/USCINCSTRAT	/OFFUTT AFB, NE	2 RC-135
/CINCFOR	/FT MCPHERSON, GA	

/NSA/CSS

/HQ USCENTCOM FWD /-

/(JTF 1000)

/HQ USARCENT (MINUS)

/1 ARMOR BDE (PLUS)

/INF BDE (M) (PLUS)

/1 PSYOP CO

/HQ USCENAF (MINUS)

/1 FW

/1 RESCUE WG

/1 RECON SQ

/4 E-3A (AWACS)

/HQ USNAVCENT (MINUS)

/SUPPORTING FORCES

/COMSUPNAVFOR

/CTG 60.1 (CVBG)

/15 MEF

/MPS

/VP SQDN (P-3)//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. () INTERNAL SECURITY STABILITY IN AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF _____.

A. () ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT SITREP AND DIN. YELLOWLAND SUPPORTS INTERNAL INSURGENT ACTIVITY.

B. () FRIENDLY FORCES. GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, GOVERNMENT OF ORANGELAND.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. () WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO _____.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH SHOW-OF-FORCE AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, SIMULTANEOUSLY INTRODUCE ARMY AND MARINE FORCES INTO BLUELAND TO AID BLUELAND FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. CONTINUE BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES AND ADVANCE ON ____.

4. () FIRST TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSARCENT. ON ORDER OF JTF BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF FORCES OUTLINED IN TASK ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND BE PREPARED TO _____.

5. () SECOND TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSCENTAF. PROVIDE FORCES OUTLINED IN TASK ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF ASSIGNED FORCES TO BABA AIR BASE TO CLOSE NLT ____.

6. () THIRD TASKING ASSIGNMENT USCINCEUR. CHOP CTF 60 TO JTF BLUEBEARD. ON ORDER FROM CJTF BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF MEF OUTLINED IN _____.

7. () FOURTH TASKING ASSIGNMENT USTRANSCOM. PROVIDE AIRLIFT ASSETS TO MEET FORCE LIFT REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED ____.

8. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. SEE ALERT ORDER CJCS 270300Z NOV ___ AS AMENDED HEREIN.

A. () THIS OPORD EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.

B. () DIRLAUTH FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH INFO CJCS AND _____.

C. () REPORTS WILL BE _____.

D. () ANTICIPATED TIME OF EXECUTION (D-DAY) IS ____.

E. () ROE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY OUTLINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

F. () ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION. THE TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL IN COUNTRY IS TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL. SUPPORTED CINC HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) RESPONSIBILITY. SUPPORTING CINC/SERVICE WILL COORDINATE PREDEPLOYMENT AT MEASURES WITH SUPPORTED CINC AND ENSURE DEPLOYING FORCES COMPLETE REQUIRED TRAINING FOR THAT AOR, TO INCLUDE AT AWARENESS TRAINING AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT THREAT LEVEL AND THREATCON. THE SUPPORTED CINC WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL TERRORIST AWARENESS TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN AOR.

G. () DIRECT COORDINATION WITH USTRANSCOM AUTHORIZED TO UPDATE TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENT INFORMATION. KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS ADVISED. MOVEMENT SCHEDULE FROM USTRANSCOM DUE 290400Z NOV __.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. () IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX AS AMENDED HEREIN.

10. () MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION. USTRANSCOM AIRLIFT WILL BE UTILIZED AS A BASIS FOR NEO FOLLOWED BY SEA EVACUATION UTILIZING CTF 60 SHIPPING WHEN ____.

11. () PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PER APPENDIX F AND INSTRUCTIONS PER COORDINATION WITH USCINCCENT/PA.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

12. () USCINCCENT IS SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

13. () CTF 60 IS ON-THE-SCENE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND WILL EXERCISE OPCON OF (SPECIFY FORCES) UNTIL HQ USCENCOM FWD (JTF BLUEBEARD) IS ACTIVATED.

14. () COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS OUTLINED IN APPENDIX J,
USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

15. () COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE PER APPENDIX K, USCINCCENT
OPLAN XXXX AS AMENDED HEREIN. DEDICATED HF VOICE AND
TELETYPE LINK WILL BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN JTF BLUEBEARD AND
AMEMBASSY, BLUELAND, USING ____.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE
HERE//

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ENCLOSURE P

SAMPLE COMMANDER'S EVALUATION REQUEST

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA

TO: CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CINCARLANT FT MCPHERSON GA
(ETC.)

INFO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
(ETC.)

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCJFCOM//

SUBJ/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST ()//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL//

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//

NARR/() THIS IS A USCINCJFCOM COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST//

RMKS/1. () TASKING. REQUEST THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES EVALUATE AND SUBMIT THEIR RESPECTIVE REQUIREMENTS AND PROPOSALS FOR CARRYING OUT THE COURSES OF ACTION IDENTIFIED IN REF A. SUSPENSE FOR RESPONDING IS NOT LATER THAN 230200Z JUN _____. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BELOW.

2. () SITUATION. HOSTILITIES ARE UNDER WAY IN FOUR SEPARATE AREAS OF ORANGELAND, INCLUDING THE CAPITAL AND OTHER MAJOR URBAN CENTERS. LEFTIST INSURGENT FORCES HAVE MOUNTED A STRONG PSYOP CAMPAIGN AND ARE EXPLOITING WIDESPREAD ANTIGOVERNMENT FEELING TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT. MASS UPRISINGS BY SYMPATHETIC DISSIDENTS ARE ALSO IMMINENT UNLESS

3. () FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. THE MAIN AIR AND SEA ACCESSES TO ORANGELAND ARE ISOLATED, INOPERABLE BECAUSE OF DAMAGE, OR UNDER INSURGENT CONTROL. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE SEVERELY DISRUPTED AND RAIL AND HIGHWAY NETWORKS IN THE INTERIOR ARE CUT. THE APPROACHING RAINY SEASON

4. () ENEMY CAPABILITIES. TOTAL EFFECTIVE INSURGENT STRENGTH IS ESTIMATED AT 2,000 TO 2,500, LIMITED TO LIGHT ARMAMENT BUT WELL TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOBILE (COMMANDEERED CIVILIAN VEHICLES). INSURGENT-LED IRREGULAR AUXILIARIES REPORTEDLY NUMBER ANOTHER

5. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. () GENERAL. TO MINIMIZE FURTHER CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION, US MILITARY ACTION WILL BE DESIGNED TO END HOSTILITIES SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL INSURGENT AREAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IS FOR A RAPID SURGE OF FORCE APPLICATION FROM THE OUTSET, WITH SUFFICIENT FORCES COMMITTED WITHIN THE INITIAL 6-HOUR PERIOD TO SAFEGUARD THREATENED US NATIONALS, SUPPRESS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN THE FOUR CRITICAL POPULATION CENTERS, AND PREVENT...

B. () COURSE OF ACTION PLANNING PARAMETERS

(1) () COURSE OF ACTION ONE: EMPLOY A JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE TASK FORCE. MAJOR ARMY TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF A TWO-BRIGADE FORCE (UP TO SIX MANEUVER BATTALIONS), WITH APPROPRIATE ACCOMPANYING COMBAT SUPPORT, TO BE INTRODUCED BY

AIR, PLUS FOLLOW-ON SERVICE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. MAJOR AIR FORCE TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF UP TO ...

(2) () COURSE OF ACTION TWO: EMPLOY A MARINE LANDING FORCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS, SURFACE AND AIR SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THE MAJOR MARINE TACTICAL CONTINGENT WILL CONSIST OF UP TO ...

(3) () COURSE OF ACTION THREE: EMPLOY A JOINT ARMY-NAVY-MARINE-AIR FORCE TASK FORCE, WITH COORDINATED AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS INTRODUCTION OF GROUND ELEMENTS. MAJOR TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF ...

6. () OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. BLUELAND IS EXPECTED TO ABROGATE EXISTING TREATIES GRANTING US STAGING, BASING, AND MARITIME PRIVILEGES. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DENIED BY PINKLAND AND ...

7. () OBJECTIVE. THIS REPORT PROVIDES AMPLIFYING GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPING COURSE OF ACTION EVALUATIONS BY COMPONENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS HAVING A ROLE IN PROJECTED OPERATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CURRENT ORANGELAND CRISIS.

8. () REMARKS. FORCE AS SHOWN IN JOPES DATA BASE, PLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS XXXXA, XXXXB, AND XXXXC.//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE HERE//

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ENCLOSURE Q

SAMPLE OPREP-1 COMPONENT'S EVALUATION RESPONSE

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
TO: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
INFO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
(ETC.)

C L A S S I F I C A T I O N

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/GENADMIN/CINCUSAFE//

SUBJ/CINCUSAFE COMPONENT EVALUATION RESPONSE ()//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ___/-/NOTAL//

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//

REF/B/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST/USCINCEUR/
220100ZAUG___/-/NOTAL//

AMPN/USCINCEUR EVALUATION REQUEST//

REF/C/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST/USCINCJFCOM/
221503ZNOV___/-/ NOTAL//

AMPN/USCINCJFCOM COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST//

RMKS/1. () COURSE OF ACTION. RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION ONE AS THE MOST RAPID WAY OF BRINGING US MILITARY FORCES TO BEAR IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA IN TIME TO PREVENT COURSE OF ACTION THREE REQUIRES TOO LONG A TIME FOR SURFACE DEPLOYMENT COURSE OF ACTION TWO DOES NOT INVOLVE USAFE.

2. () OBJECTIVE. THIS REPORT PROVIDES EVALUATION AND INFORMATION ON MAJOR FORCES FOR COURSES OF ACTION OUTLINED IN REFERENCED USCINCEUR REQUEST.

3. () REMARKS

A. () FORCES AS LISTED IN JOPES DATA BASE OPLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS XXXXA, XXXXB, AND XXXXC.

B. () BARE-BASE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AT PALM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WILL RESULT IN 4- TO 6-HOUR DELAY IN ACHIEVING INITIAL
___//

DECL/PROVIDE APPROPRIATE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS AND DATE
HERE//

ENCLOSURE R

Hold for Future Use

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ENCLOSURE S

PROTECTION OF MOVEMENT INFORMATION

1. Definitions. The following definitions apply to movement of forces identified in JOPES plans through a TPFDD. These definitions are necessary to provide guidance on the proper security of plans and TPFDD data elements.

a. Movement Data. Movement data consists of those essential elements of information to schedule lift, obtain transportation assets, manage movement of forces and report in-transit visibility of movements and associated forces (people, equipment, and supplies). As a minimum movement data must describe what forces are planned to move or actual loads, where the movement segment is planned to begin/end or actual movement location, and when the movement is planned to occur or actual time of movement. (NOTE: All three groups of data must be present to be considered movement data).

b. Aggregation. Movement data elements that can be grouped to show multiple sequential segments of a force movement from origin to POE to POD/destination are considered to be aggregated. Additionally, movement data elements for multiple movements from either POE to POD or POD to destination that reflect a flow of force movements into or within a supported commander's AOR are considered aggregated.

c. Execution. Execution for a force movement is initiated when a force is directed to accomplish movement by competent authority. Subsequent direction by the supported commander to supporting commanders (lift providers) normally begins the movement process that includes transportation planning, scheduling of lift, and movement of forces and transportation assets. Movement begins when forces depart the origin or POE on a transportation asset.

2. OPLAN Security. Security for OPLANs falls into two broad categories, information security and operations security. Information security addresses the proper classification of deployment plans and associated data elements while operations security is focused on the proper protection of unclassified movement data, especially when aggregated in automated information systems.

3. Information Security Classification Guidance

a. General. Information security markings in OPLANs will conform to the requirements of Chapter IV, DoD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program; Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, Security Controls in the Dissemination of Intelligence Information (For Official Use

Only); and DCID 1/19, Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems (UNCLASSIFIED), as amplified below.

b. Classification Markings on Plan Elements. See CJCSM 3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance.

c. Control Markings. See CJCSM 3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance.

d. Paragraph and Subparagrph Markings. See CJCSM 3122.03 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II Planning Formats and Guidance.

e. Unit Maintained Deployment Data. Generic unit data maintained at the unit level for the purpose of supporting deployment operations is considered UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY if not associated with an OPLAN. Unit deployment data in a TPFDD for an OPLAN is classified in accordance with the supported commander's classification guidance.

f. JOPES OPLAN Data Classification. JOPES data will normally be at its highest classification during initial deliberate or time-sensitive planning phases. Each supported command will publish specific classification guidance before the initiation of any planning activities against a specific OPLAN ID. This guidance can be by message or supplemental TPFDD Instructions.

g. JOPES TPFDD Data Element Classification. The TPFDD is classified at the same level as the OPLAN using the classification guidance issued by the supported commander. If in doubt, treat TPFDD information as classified information. Contact the TPFDD validation authority for clarification of TPFDD information classification if there is any question on the level of classification.

h. The following movement data, in singular or aggregated form, becomes UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY at execution for the purpose of transportation planning, scheduling, obtaining transportation assets, managing movements, reporting movement status and visibility of in-transit cargo/passengers. All other JOPES data remains classified at the level specified by the supported commander unless specifically released as UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY by the supported commander.

Non-JOPES movements are addressed in applicable regulations.

ULN Number (ULN) ¹

Unit Identification (UIC)

Unit Type Code (UTC)
Service Codes (SVC)
Non-Baseline Extension (load POCs)
Mission Number (MSN #)
Point of Departure/Departure Day ²
Point of Arrival/Arrival Day ³
Scheduled and Actual (Arrival and Departure)
Total Short Tons (STONS) – Bulk, Oversize, Outsize
Total Measurement Tons (MTONS)
Total Square Feet (SQ FT)
Transportation Control Number (TCN)
Number of Pieces
Length Width Height
Cargo Category Codes
Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)
Personnel Requiring Transportation (PAX)
Manifest/Nomenclature
Name, SSN, and Grade ⁴

i. Actual destination locations are normally released at execution as UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY unless the supported commander requires a higher classification level to protect actual destination locations.

(1) A destination location that the supported commander desires to maintain as classified can be protected by using an alias entry in the TPFDD or in unclassified DTS AIS and released as UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

¹ ULN is comprised of the five-character Force Requirement Number (FRN) along with the fragmentation and insert codes that are each one character.

² Origin (RLD), POE (ALD), POD (LAD), Intermediate Location (ILOC)

³ POE (ALD), POD (EAD/LAD), Intermediate Location (ILOC)

⁴ Not resident JOPEs TPFDD data but collected during the movement manifesting process.

(a) The supported commander defines procedures for the use of alias names and reference to actual destination locations in the OPLAN/OPORD and coordinates movement of TPFDD forces to alias destination locations.

(b) Supported commanders can create alias destination names for use in the TPFDD and movement AIS by contacting the Joint Staff J33 to register a new GEOLOC as outlined in CJCSM 3150.15 Standard Specified Geographic Location File Request or by using an existing GEOLOC.

(2) Future systems and procedures should allow for the display of an actual destination and an alias destination that can be passed to unclassified Defense Transportation System (DTS) Automated Information Systems (AIS) as UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

4. Release of OPLAN Information

a. CJCSI 5714.01A, Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information, provides guidance concerning the release of OPLAN information.

b. Conflicts between procedural guidance contained herein and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement should be resolved by the supported commander through the CJCS.

c. Conflicts that arise between procedural provisions in this document and CJCSI 3100.01A Joint Strategic Planning System, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Pub 0-2, or the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the provisions of those documents have precedence.

5. Operations Security of Movement Data

a. People and organizations associated with military operations have a responsibility to protect planning and movement data so that they do not inadvertently jeopardize execution of a military operation or force protection for units supporting an operation. Operations security is focused on the protection of unclassified information to enhance the commander's success in a military operation and maximize force protection. The following JOPES operations security procedures are implemented to meet these objectives.

b. Unclassified movement data is UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Appropriate markings must be displayed to ensure proper handling. Guidance for handling UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY data is found in DoD Regulation 5200.1-R.

c. Lift providers release to commercial carriers only the minimum unclassified movement data necessary to obtain and schedule transportation assets, manifest cargo/passengers, and provide for asset tracking through the carrier's system.

d. UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY movement data must not be displayed in a generally accessible, unclassified medium without approval from the supported commander. Normally, systems and data are protected via access controls to ensure only those authorized have access to movement data.

e. Aggregated movement data must be protected to a greater degree than movement data in a non-aggregated format. Aggregated movement data in DTS AIS must use access controls (e.g. passwords, voice recognition, retinal scans, etc.) to limit accessibility to authorized users IAW DoD Directive 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems (AIS), 21 March 1988. In addition, defined technical measures to enhance the security of aggregated movement data systems should be implemented to the maximum extent practical.

f. Due diligence requires personnel to use prudent measures to preclude unauthorized access to movement data. To accomplish mission related activities, electronic transmission (voice, data or facsimile) of UNCLASSIFIED / FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY aggregated movement data should be by approved secure communications systems whenever practical.

6. Although DTS AIS are protected, they require continuous upgrades. In the long term, CINCs will include, where appropriate, protection measures for DTS AIS in their Integrated Priority Lists, Joint Monthly Readiness Reviews, and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments. Services will continue to explore emerging protection technologies to incorporate in service feeder systems and plan to program resources accordingly.

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ENCLOSURE T

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT FORMATS

1. The CINC normally will provide his staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders and appropriate combat support agencies with pertinent initial planning guidance to permit work to begin on developing the CINC's Strategic Concept. The staffs use this guidance to begin work on developing the Staff Estimates that will be used to form the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.
2. Typical data provided in preliminary guidance will usually include characteristics of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, the mission statement, assumptions, special weapons, political and psychological considerations, tentative COAs, and a proposed planning schedule.
3. The example formats contained in Appendixes A through F to this enclosure may be useful in developing the CINC's Planning Directive, Staff Estimates, and COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE used in the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process.

Appendixes:

- A--Planning Directive
- B--Personnel Estimate
- C--Intelligence Estimate
- D--Logistic Estimate
- E--Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Estimate
- F—Commander's Estimate of the Situation

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE T

PLANNING DIRECTIVE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Copy Number _____
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue

Message Reference/Number (Date-time Group)

PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR (Plan designation)

REFERENCES: a. () Maps or charts

b. () Pertinent documents

1. () Mission

a. () Write a clear and concise statement of the mission for the command.

b. () A paragraph should list the tasks, including:

(1) () Those assigned by higher headquarters.

(2) () Those deduced or implied tasks that must be described to convey a clear understanding of the overall mission.

c. () If the analysis of the mission or task(s) has not progressed to the point where it can be formally stated, present the commander's best estimate of the mission.

2. () Commander's Analysis

a. () This paragraph contains the commander's analysis of the mission and, in broad terms, how the mission is to be carried out.

b. () Outline, in broad terms, the phasing of the operation.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

3. () Assumptions

a. () State assumptions necessary to continue planning. They will be treated as facts by subordinate commands.

b. () The list is not final; assumptions may be added or dropped during planning.

4. () Forces Apportioned. Give information on the type and availability of major combat forces.

a. () Assigned forces.

b. () Augmenting forces.

5. () Proposed Courses of Action

a. () List courses of action (COAs) to be considered by the staff. Include those tentative COAs that were suggested by the commander in the planning guidance, as well as those proposed by the J-5 for consideration.

b. () Any of these COAs may be discarded and/or refined and new ones identified and proposed as the planning process continues.

6. () Guidance

a. () Nuclear and Chemical Defense Weapons.

(1) () Include a brief statement by the commander that outlines the conditions under which nuclear and chemical defense weapons might be used.

(2) () If their encounter or use is considered a reasonable possibility, include preliminary estimates of allocations, priorities, and restraints.

b. () Political Considerations

(1) () Include guidance from higher authority.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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(2) () List Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or basing rights that affect the operation.

c. () Mobility Resources.

(1) () Identify strategic or tactical lift assets apportioned for planning.

(2) () Highlight priorities or constraints for transportation assets.

d. () Supporting and Subordinate Commands and Agencies. Give preliminary information about support from adjacent and lower echelons.

e. () Command and Control. State the command and control organization selected by the commander.

f. () Other. Include guidance that the commander determines to be necessary.

7. () Tasks

a. () Delineate staff responsibilities to begin development of staff estimates.

b. () Outline Coordinating Instructions

(1) () Adjacent and subordinate command and agency coordination required.

(2) () Uni-Service, common, and cross-coordination required.

8. () Administration

a. () Planning Schedule

(1) () Planning conferences scheduled.

(2) () Basic Plan completion suspense.

(3) () Annex completion suspense.

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- (4) () Other milestone events determined necessary.
- b. () Interstaff Liaison Instructions
- c. () Coordination
 - (1) () Action officer designation.
 - (2) () Reports known or anticipated.

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE T

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters¹
Place of Issue
Date-time Group

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NUMBER _____²

REFERENCES: a. () Maps and charts.

b. () Other pertinent documents.

1. () Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. () Situation and Considerations

a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting personnel activities.

b. () Enemy Forces

(1) () Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

(2) () Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate with specific emphasis on their impact on personnel matters.

c. () Friendly Forces

¹ When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

² Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

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(1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the operation proposed.

d. () Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems, if any, that may affect the personnel situation.

e. () Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known problems that may affect the personnel situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the personnel situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain personnel assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate should be stated here.

g. () Special Features. List anything not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the personnel situation. For example, identify civil and indigenous labor resources available or essential to support military operations.

h. () Personnel Situation. State known or anticipated personnel problems that may influence selection of a specific COA.

3. () Personnel Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the personnel factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence and to isolate the personnel implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE of the situation.

a. () Analyze each COA from the personnel point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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b. () The personnel factors described in paragraph 2 establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these personnel factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, terrain, hydrography, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the personnel situation as it affects the COAs.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep personnel considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable personnel factors have been considered and to be the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. () Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA from the J-1's point of view.

b. () Use a work sheet similar to the one in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. () Conclusions

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a personnel standpoint.

b. () State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a personnel standpoint.

c. () Identify the major personnel deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations of methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-1

APPENDIXES: (By letter and title). Use appendixes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in

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the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Appendixes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

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Appendix B
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APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE T

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, issuing Headquarters¹
Place of Issue
Date-time Group

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _____²

REFERENCES: a. () Maps and charts.
b. () Other relevant documents.

1. () Mission. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. () Enemy Situation. State conditions that exist and indication of effects of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of operations, the enemy military situation, and the effect of these two factors on enemy capabilities.

a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss the effect of the physical characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation on military operations in the area.

(1) () Military Geography

(a) () Topography

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² Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

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1. () Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effects on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.

2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad enemy capabilities such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of weapons of mass destruction; amphibious, airborne, or airland forces; intelligence collection capability surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychological operations OPSEC and military deception; logistic support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.

3. () Effect on Friendly Course of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces' military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for enemy capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) () Hydrography

1. () Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) () Climate and Weather

1. () Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation in addition to effects on ground, air, and sea operations and equipment.

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2. () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Broadly discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on enemy capabilities.

3. () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Broadly discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on COAs for friendly forces.

(2) () Transportation

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) () Telecommunications

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(d) () Electromagnetic Battlespace (EMB). Discuss with the J-6 Spectrum Manager the frequency restrictions that may be imposed on Intelligence platforms due to frequency use in neighboring countries, host nation agreements, equipment limitations, and documented interference Reports within the AOR.

(e) () Discuss the EW deconfliction process that is used to identify and prioritize a compatible, coordinated listing of Protected, Guarded, and Taboo frequencies based on SIGINT, C3 and operational requirements.

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(4) () Politics

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) () Economics

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) () Sociology

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.

(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(7) () Science and Technology

(a) () Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

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(b) () Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) () Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. () Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Space, other Service)

(1) () Strength. State the number and size of enemy units committed and enemy reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear and CB weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths (which might be significant) are considered.

(2) () Composition. Outline the structure of enemy forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) () Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of enemy forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; ground, air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.

(4) () Availability of Reinforcements. Describe enemy reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, and WMD; terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy; and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.

(5) () Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known enemy activities in the area.

(6) () Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) () Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability (air, ground, and naval) that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and

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capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.

(8) () Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) () Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

(10) () Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) () Signals Intelligence. Describe the enemy intelligence-gathering capability to exploit communications systems and non-communications emitters.

(12) () Nuclear and CB Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear and CB weapons in the enemy inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, nuclear and CB employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(13) () Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant enemy strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.

(14) () Information Operations

(15) () Measurement and Signature Intelligence

c. () Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) () Guerrilla. Describe the enemy capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

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(2) () Psychological. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.

(3) () Subversion. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the area of operations.

(4) () Sabotage. Outline enemy organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the area of operations.

3. () Enemy Capabilities. List each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on the following: What the enemy can do; where they can do it; when they can start it and get it done; what strength they can devote to the task. In describing enemy capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the enemy's ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the WMD and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow:

a. () Ground Capabilities

(1) () The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(2) () The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(3) () The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
315th Airborne Div	Vic RESOGA	8 hrs after starting time
41st Motorized	Vic CARDINAL	6 hrs after starting time

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b. () Air Capabilities

(1) () Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day and 60 bomber sorties per day for 1 day, followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(2) () Using airfields in the vicinity of ____, the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of ____, ____, and ____ within 4 hours flying time.

c. () Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. () Space Capabilities

e. () WMD Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

(1) () Nuclear Capabilities

(2) () Biological Capabilities

(3) () Chemical Capabilities

(4) () Other Special Weapons Capabilities. Address special weapons such as RF, EMP, etc..

f. () CB Capabilities. The enemy can employ the CB agents ____, ____, and ____ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

g. () UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

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h. () Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement. Enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. () Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order probability of adoption by the enemy. Discuss enemy vulnerabilities. In this paragraph, examine the enemy capability by discussing the factors that favor or militate against their adoption by the enemy. When applicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of enemy vulnerabilities attendant to that capability; i.e., conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation that render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. For example, the following:

a. () Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area.

(1) () The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ()

(b) ()

(2) () The following factors militate the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) () Road and rail nets will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) () Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.

(3) () Exploitation of this capability will expose the enemy's west flank to counterattack.

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(4) () Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.

b. () Delay from present positions along the _____ River line....

(1) () The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) () There are several excellent natural barriers between the _____ River and the _____ Mountains.

(b) () The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.

(2) () The following factors militate the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ()

(b) ()

(3) () In the exploitation of this capability, the enemy's lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) () The following facts indicate exploitation of this capability:

(a) () Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.

(b) () Considerable troop movement and prepositioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.

5. () Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of enemy capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each enemy

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capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable.

a. () Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

- (1) () Defend in present locations with
- (2) () Delay from present positions along
- (3) () Reinforce the defense or delay with
- (4) () Conduct UW operations in the area

b. () Vulnerabilities

(1) () Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault

(2) () The enemy's air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector

(Signed) _____
J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact).

APPENDIXES: (By letter and title) Appendixes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the

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body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE T

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters¹
Place of Issue
Date-time Group

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NUMBER _____²

REFERENCES: a. () Maps and charts.
b. () Other pertinent documents.

1. () Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. () Situation and Conditions

a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistic activities.

b. () Enemy Forces

(1) () Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

(2) () Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the logistic situation. Address enemy abilities to interdict strategic sealift

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² Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

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and airlift, to attack and reduce the effectiveness of transportation nodes, and to attack pre-positioned stocks ashore and afloat, if applicable.

c. () Friendly Forces

(1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistic preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.

d. () Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems or constraints that may affect the logistic situation. Identify specialty and skill level shortages.

e () Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known command, control, and communications problems that may affect the logistic situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the logistic aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain logistic assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated.

g. () Special Features. Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the logistic situation may be stated here.

h. () Logistic Situation

(1) () Supply and Service Installations. Describe and give location of key supply and service installations that will be used to support the operation.

(2) () Supply. State availability of PWRS, authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and applicable supply

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responsibilities and policies. Identify existing supply constraints and controlled supply rates.

(3) () Transportation. List air, sea, and surface transportation availability, coordination, regulations, lift capability, responsibilities, and policies regarding supply.

(4) () Medical Services. Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.

(5) () Civil Engineering Support. List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting factors, and other appropriate considerations.

(6) () Host-Nation Support. Identify known or anticipated host nation support for military operations.

(7) () Miscellaneous. Include other logistic matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific COA. Include identity of known deficiencies of combat service support. Also, consider the requirement to meet minimum essential needs of civil populace for whom the commander may become responsible.

3. () Logistic Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the logistic requirements can be met and to isolate the logistic implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE of the situation.

a. () Analyze each COA from the logistic point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () For each COA under consideration, analyze the logistic factors described in paragraph 2. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the logistic situation as it affects the COAs.

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c. () Throughout the analysis, keep logistic considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision; it is intended to ensure that all applicable logistic factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. () List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA from the J-4's point of view.

b. () Use a work sheet similar to that used for the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. () Conclusions

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistic standpoint.

b. () State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.

c. () Identify the major logistic deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-4

APPENDIXES: By letter and title). Use appendixes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Appendixes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

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Appendix D
Enclosure T

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE T

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
COMPUTER (C4) SYSTEMS ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters¹
Place of Issue
Date-time Group

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS
ESTIMATE NUMBER _____²

REFERENCES: a. () Maps and charts.

b. () CJCSM 3220.01 Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic
Battlespace.

c. Other pertinent documents.

1. () Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the
commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. () Situation and Considerations

a. () Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the
AOR using Background Environment Information (BEI), intelligence estimates
and area studies, with emphasis on significant factors affecting C4 activities.
Special attention must be placed on Spectrum use and availability.

b. () Enemy Forces

¹ When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the
heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is
modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official
according to local policy.

² Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

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(1) () Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

(2) () Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the C4 situation.

(c) Friendly Forces

(1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) () Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and C4 preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed. C2W against enemy capabilities should be included.

d. () Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the C4 situation.

e. () Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems that may affect the C4 situation.

f. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the C4 aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain C4 assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated here.

g. () Special Features. State special features that are not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the C4 situation.

h. () Command, Control, and Communications, and Computer Situation. Consideration must be given to the Spectrum/Frequency availability in the AOR to ensure the use of line-of-sight communications (LOS), satellite communications (SATCOM), UHF, EHF and SHF SATCOM, air-to air communications, space and ground terminal assets, the DSCS Ground Mobile Segment, and DCS interface.

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- (1)¹ () C2 Communications.
- (2)¹ () Administrative Communications.
- (3)¹ () Communications Intelligence.
- (4)¹ () Communications Security.
- (5)¹ () Communications Support for Combat Operations.
 - (a) () Joint Tactical Air Operations.
 - (b) () Air-to-Ground Operations (CAS and BAI).
 - (c) () Naval Surface Fire Support Operations.
- (6)¹ () Communications Control and Aids for Supporting Arms.
- (7)¹ () Communications Requirements for Other Activities.

3. () Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the C4 factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to isolate the C4 implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE of the situation.

a. () Analyze each COA from a C4 point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () The C4 factors in paragraph 2 are the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, hydrography, time and

¹ Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.

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space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the C4 situation as it affects the COAs.

c. () Throughout the analysis, keep C4 foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. () Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. () As in the Commander's Estimate, list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from the J-6 point of view.

b. () Use a work sheet similar to the one in the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. () Conclusions

a. () State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a C4 standpoint.

b. () State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a C4 standpoint.

c. () Identify the major C4 deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J-6

APPENDIXES: (By letter and title.) Use appendixes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur

¹ Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.

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throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security, C4 systems protection (including identification of initial nodes), and communications planning.

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Appendix E
Enclosure T

APPENDIX F TO ENCLOSURE T

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

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Issuing Headquarters
Place
Date-time Group

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

REFERENCES: a. () Maps and charts.
b. () Other pertinent documents.

1. () Mission. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. () The Situation and Courses of Action

a. () Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze those factors that will influence the choice of a COA as well as those that affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider any of the following and other factors that are involved, include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption, if necessary), and deduce the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

(1) () Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(a) () Military Geography

1. () Topography. Consider factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics because they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, LOCs, avenues of approach, key terrain, nuclear and CB weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

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2. () Hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. () Climate and Weather. Determine and state extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations. Solar data (sunrise, sunset, and twilight) and lunar data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) () Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly COA.

(c) () Telecommunications

1. () Coordinate with the Spectrum Manager for frequency availability and restrictions that may be imposed on Signal and Intelligence platforms due to frequency use in neighboring countries, host nation agreements, equipment limitations and documented interference reports within the AOR.

2. () List radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) () Politics. Include such considerations in political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence selection of a COA. Neutrality or non-neutrality of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) () Economics. Include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity; the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, and foreign trade; and similar influences as they affect selection of a COA.

(f) () Sociology. Consider social conditions, which run a wide range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war, to health

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and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of a COA must be considered.

(g) () Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.

(2) () Relative Combat Power

(a) () Enemy Capabilities.¹ State the enemy capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

1. () Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing; aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates; and unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. () Composition. Include order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. () Location and Disposition. Indicate geographic location of enemy units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; ground, air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations.

¹ Obtained from the Intelligence Estimate of the Situation.

4. () Reinforcements. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; WMD; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. () Logistics. Summarize enemy ability to support the capabilities with which they have been credited and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistic means. Broadly speaking, it is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. () Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.

7. () Combat Efficiency. Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear.

(b) () Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the enemy when appraising the commander's own force. The descriptions of what to consider and the approach to the problem outlined in subparagraph 2a(2)(a) apply to the analysis of friendly forces.

(3) () Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.

b. () Own Courses of Action. State all practicable COA open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission.

3. () Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander's own COAs.

4. () Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander's COAs with respect to the governing factors.

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5. () Decision. Decide which COA promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission. Translate the COA selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) _____
Commander

APPENDIXES: (As required: by letter and title)

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ENCLOSURE U

REFERENCES

The documents listed herein provide additional guidance applicable to planning specific aspects of military operations. The references pertinent to each principal aspect of operations are grouped under appropriate headings.

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- c. CJCSI 5714.01A, 1 March 1999, "Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information."
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- e. MJCS-124-88, 4 August 1988, "Implementation of the DOD Law of Armed Conflict."
- f. JCS MOP 136, 22 July 1985, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Joint Staff in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System."
- g. Joint Pub 0-2, 24 February 1995, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
- h. Joint Pub 1-01, 5 July 2000, "Joint Doctrine Development Publications."
- i. Joint Pub 1-02, 23 March 1994, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as amended through 1 September 2000."
- j. Joint Pub 1-03, 10 January 1994, "Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions."
- k. Joint Pub 4-05, 22 June 1995, "Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning."
- l. Joint Admin Pub 1-1, 1 August 1992, "Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff."

m. CJCSI 3110.01B, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan" with supplemental instructions. See current version.

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q. DOD Directive 3025.14, 5 November 1990, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad (Short Title: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations)."

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b. Joint Pub 5-00.1, In Development, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning."

c. Joint Pub 5-00.2, 13 January 1999, "Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures."

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a. SM-842-61, 27 July 1961, "Military Support Appendix for CIA Global War Plan."

b. CJCSI 3110.02A, 18 June 1997, "Intelligence Planning Objectives, Guidance, and Tasks."

- c. MCM-136-91, 8 August 1991, "Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape within the Department of Defense."
- d. MCM-197-91, 2 December 1991, "Appendix A to National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) (Intelligence) FY 1994-1999."
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- i. DOD Directive 4600.4, 27 August 1979, "Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Countermeasures."
- j. DOD Directive 5105.21, 18 February 1997, "Defense Intelligence Agency."
- k. DOD Directive S-5200.17, 26 January 1965, "Security, Use and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence (COMINT)."
- l. The Defense Intelligence Plan.
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- p. STANAG 3277, 31 March 1978, "Air Reconnaissance Request/Task Form."
- q. STANAG 3377, 16 June 1980, "Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms."
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- cc. CJCSI 3120.05, 31 August 1995, "Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Supplemental Instruction to Joint Planning Document FY 1998 through 2003."
- dd. DOD Directive 5105.60, 11 October 1996, "National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)."

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- a. SM-103-84, 22 February 1984, "Counterintelligence Responsibilities."
- b. MCM-149-92, 26 October 1992, "Counterintelligence Guidance."
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j. DOD Directive 5240.1, 25 April 1988, "DOD Intelligence Activities."

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l. Joint Pub 2-01.2, 5 April 1994, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence (CI) Support of Operations."

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d. DOD Directive S-3115.7, 25 January 1973, "Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)."

e. DOD Directive 5100.20, 23 December 1971, "National Security Agency and the Central Security Service."

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- c. CJCSI 3121.01, "Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for US Forces."
- d. Joint Test Pub 3-0, 1 February 1995, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
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- f. Joint Pub 3-01.1, 4 November 1996, "Aerospace Defense of North America."
- g. Joint Pub 3-01.2, 1 April 1986, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations."
- h. Joint Pub 3-01.3, 23 August 2000, "Joint Doctrine for Defense Operations for Countering Air and Missile Threats."
- i. Joint Pub 3-02, 8 October 1992, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations."
- j. Joint Test Pub 3-02.1, 1 November 1989, "Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations."
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- n. Joint Pub 3-13, 9 October 1998, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations."
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- r. Joint Pub 3-53, 10 July 1996, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine."
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- u. DOD Directive S-3321.1, 26 July 1984, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War."
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- w. DOD Directive 5200.8, 25 April 1991, "Security of DOD Installations and Resources."
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- z. COMDTINST M3061.1, 7 June 1996, "Coast Guard Manpower and Mobilization Plan."

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- b. SM-85-84, 7 February 1984, "Force Module Implementation Plan."
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- c. CJCSI 3110.09, 15 November 1995, "Command and Control Warfare to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, JSCP FY-96."
- d. Joint Pub 3-12, 15 December 1995, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations."
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- f. MJCS 188-88, 22 November 1988, "Request for Rescission on JCS Directive MSG 7551."
- g. FM 101-31-1/FMFM 11-4/NWP 28-0-1 to AFP 200-31, 6 January 1986, "Staff Officers' Field Manual for Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures."
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- i. National Strategic Target List (NSTL), Appendix C to SIOP.
- j. NUWEP Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.

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- d. NUWEP Reconnaissance List.
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- g. Joint Pub 3-55, 14 April 1993, "Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Support for Joint Operations."

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GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC	Air Combat Command
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACF	air contingency force
ACL	allowable cabin load
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic
ACP	Allied Communications Publication
ACR	Armored Cavalry Regiment
AD	priority add-on; advanced deployability
ADMIN	administration
ADN	ACE DGZ number
ADP	automatic data processing; automated data processing
AEF	Air Expeditionary Forces
AEW	Air Expeditionary Wing
AFB	Air Force Base
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFP	Armed Forces Publication or Air Force Pamphlet
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AFSOC	US Air Force Special Operations Command
AFWA	Air Force Weather Agency
AIG	address indicator group
ALCON	all concerned
ALD	available-to-load date at POE; accounting line designator
AMC	Army Materiel Command; Air Mobility Command
AMEMB	American Embassy
AMOPS	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	aerial port commander
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
AR	Army Regulation
ARS	action reporting system
ARG	amphibious ready group
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
AT	antiterrorism
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network

AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BAI	battlefield air interdiction
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
BN	battalion
C2	command and control
C2W	command and control warfare
C3	command, control, and communications
C4	command, control, communications and computer System
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CANUS	Canada-US
CAO SOP	Standing Operating Procedures for Coordination of Atomic Operations
CAP	crisis action planning
CAPE	crisis action planning and execution
CAS	close air support
CAT	Crisis Action Team; category
CB	chemical-biological
CCA	Chairman's Contingency Capabilities Assessment
CCB	configuration control board
CDR	commander
CDRMTMC	Commander, Military Traffic Management Command
CDRUSELEMNORAD	Commander, US Element, NORAD
CE	command element
CEI	critical employment indicator
CG	Chairman's Guidance
CGUSAREUR	Commanding General, US Army Europe 7/A
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIN	cargo increment number
CINC	commander of a unified command; commander in chief
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSJFCOM	Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe
CIR	continuing intelligence requirement
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

CH-1

CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
CMC	Commandant, US Marine Corps
CNASP	Chairman's Net Assessment for Strategic Planning
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	course of action
COCOM	Combatant Command (command authority)
COGARD	Coast Guard
COMPACAF	Commander, Pacific Air Forces
COMAMC	Commander, Air Mobility Command
COMDT COGARD	Commandant, US Coast Guard
COMDTINST	Commandant, US Coast Guard Instruction
COMIDEASTFOR	Commander, Middle East Forces
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMMARFORLANT	Commander, Marine Forces, Atlantic
COMMARFORPAC	Commander, Marine Forces, Pacific
COMPACAF	Commander, Pacific Air Forces
COMSC	Commander, Military Sealift Command
COMSEC	communications security
COMSUPNAVFOR	Commander, Supporting Naval Forces
COMTAC	communications tactical
COMUSAFE	Commander, US Air Forces in Europe
COMUSARCENT	Commander, US Army Forces, Central Command
COMUSCENTAF	Commander, US Air Force, Central Command
COMUSMARCENT	Commander, US Marine Forces, Central Command
COMUSNAVCENT	Commander, US Navy, Central Command
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operational picture
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPG	Contingency Planning Guidance
CPR	Chairman's Program Review
CR	change request
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRB	Configuration Review Board
CRD	CINC's Required Delivery Date
CRITIC	critical intelligence communications
CS	combat support
CSA	Chief of Staff, US Army; Combat Support Agency
CSAF	Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CSC	Combat Support Center
CSOD	Command Systems Operation Division
CSP	cryptologic support package

CSR	controlled supply rate
CSS	combat service support; Central Security Service
CSSE	combat service support element
CT	counterterrorism
CTF	combined task force
CTP	commercial ticket program
CV	attack aircraft carrier
CVBG	aircraft carrier battle group
DA	Department of Army; data administrator; direct action
DBA	database administrator
DBMS	database management system
DCS	Defense Communications System; Defense Courier Service
DD	destroyer
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEP	deployed
DEPMEDS	Deployable Medical Systems
DET	detachment; detainee
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIN	Defense Intelligence Notice
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DIRNSA	Director, National Security Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLAR	Defense Logistics Agency Regulation
DML	Data Manipulation Language
DMS	Defense Message Service
DOCDIV	Documents Division
DOS	Department of State; days of supply
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPE	Defense Planning Estimate
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPRB	Defense Planning Resources Board
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN	Defense Switch Network (formerly AUTOVON)
DTG	date-time group
DTMR	Defense Traffic Management Regulations
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DTS	Defense Transportation System
EAD	earliest arrival date at POD
EA	electronic attack

ECP	Engineering Change Proposals
ELINT	electronics intelligence
EMCON	emissions control
EP	electronic protection
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ES	electronic warfare support
EW	early warning; electronic warfare
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAD	force activity designator
FDBM	Functional Data Base Manager
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FF	frigate (Navy)
FM	force module(s); field manual; functional manager
FMFM	Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMID	force module identifier
FMP	force module packages
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
FRAG	fragmentation code
FRN	force requirement number
FS	fighter squadron
FSS	Fast Sealift Ship
FUNCPLAN	functional plan
FVT	force validation tool
FW	fighter wing
FWD	forward
FY	fiscal year
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCSS	Global Command and Support System
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GCE	ground combat element
GENTEXT	general text
GEOCODES	geographic location codes
GEOFILE	Standard Specified Geographic Location File
GEOLOC	Geographic Location Code
GISSO	GCCS Information System Security Officer
GMC	GCCS Management Center
GPR	GCCS problem report
GSA	General Services Administration
GSPR	global system problem report
GTAC	GCCS technical assistance center
GTN	Global Transportation Network

HAZMAT	hazardous material
HF	high frequency
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human resources intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ID	identification
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IO	Information Operations
IPC	initial planning conference
IPL	integrated priority list
IR	infrared; incident reports
ISSA	Inter-Service Support Agreement
IW	information warfare
JANAP	Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication
JAO	joint area of operations
JCCC	Joint Combat Camera Center
JCLL	Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JEPES	Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System
JFAST	Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC	joint force commander
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JLOTS	joint logistics over the shore
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JMRC	Joint Mobile Relay Center
JNOCC	JOPEs Network Operation Control Center
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPEsREP	JOPEs Reporting System
JPET	Joint Planning And Execution Toolkit
JPD	Joint Planning Document
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPOC	Joint Planning Orientation Course
JRC	Joint Reconnaissance Center
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSM	Joint Staff Manual
JSMAP	Joint Strategic Mobility Allocation Process

JSPD	Joint Strategic Planning Document
JSPDSA	Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analyses
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JSSC	Joint Staff Support Center
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JULLS	Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
KIA	killed in action
kt	kiloton(s)
LAD	latest arrival date at POD
LAN	local area network
LCE	Logistics Capability Estimator
LFM	Landing Force Manual
LOC	lines of communications
LOGSAFE	Logistic Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator
LOI	Letter of Instruction
LOTS	logistics Over-the-shore
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LSA	Logistics Sustainability Analysis
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MCC	Military Cooperation Committee
MCM	Military Committee Memorandum; Memorandum in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Multiple Command Manual
MCO	Marine Corps Order
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MFE	material feasibility estimator
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures
MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures
MJCS	Memorandum Issued in the Name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

MNC	Major NATO Command
MODLOC	miscellaneous operational details, local operations
MOP	memorandum of policy
MOPP	mission-oriented protective posture
MPF	Maritime Pre-Positioning Force
MPM	Medical Planning Module
MPS	Maritime Pre-Positioning Squadron
MRG	Movement Requirements Generator
MSC	Military Sealift Command; major subordinate command(s)
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTON	measurement ton(s)
MTW	Major Theater War
MUREP	munitions report
NAPCAP	NATO Allied Pre-Committed Civil Aircraft Program
NAS	Naval Air Station
NAT	nonair transportable (cargo)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVMEDCOMINST	Navy Medical Command Instruction
NAVSO	US Navy Forces Southern Command
NAVSUPINST	Navy Supply Instruction
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	National Defense Policy
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NIDS	National Military Command Center Information Display System
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NISP	Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Support Plan
NLT	not later than
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMSD	National Military Strategy Document
NPG	non-unit personnel generator
NRC	non-unit-related cargo
NRP	non-unit-related personnel
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA/CSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NSC	National Security Council
NSCS	National Security Council System
NSD	National Security Directive
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive

NSN	National Stock Number
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSTL	National Strategic Targets List
NSWTG	Naval Special Warfare Task Group
NTDS	Naval Tactical Data System
NUWEP	Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
NWP	Navy Warfare Publication
NWREP	Nuclear Weapons Report
OAR	CJCS OPLANs Assessment Report
OCJCS	Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OCEANCON	control of oceanographic information
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OCOPs	Outline Contingency Operation Plans (NATO)
OET	Office of Emergency Transportation
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
OPORD	operation order
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OPREP	operational report
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSF	DISA off site facility
OUT	outsize cargo
OVER	oversize cargo
PA	public affairs
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAO	Public Affairs Office; public affairs officer
PAR	Chairman's Preparedness Assessment Report
PAX	passengers
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PCRB	Problem/Change Request Review Board
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PER	Person Identification
PIC	Person Identification Code
PID	plan identification number
PIN	personnel increment number
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PC	Project Code
POC	point of contact

POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum oils, and lubricants
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POO	point of origin
POW	prisoner of war
PPAG	proposed public affairs guidance
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PR	problem report
PRI	priority
PROVORG	providing organization
PSC	Principal Subordinate Command
PSYOP	psychological operations
PW	prisoner of war
PWRS	pre-positioned war reserve stocks
RC	Reserve component
RDA	Requirements Development and Assessment
RDD	required delivery date (at destination)
RECON	reconnaissance
REPOL	reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants
REQID	requirement ID (collectively ULNs, CINs, and PINs)
RLD	ready-to-load date (at origin)
RO/RO	roll-on/roll-off
ROE	rules of engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
RQMT	requirement
RRF	ready reserve force; ready reserve fleet
RS	reconnaissance squadron
RSO&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SAAM	special assignment airlift mission
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SA/DBA	system administrator/database administrator
SAR	search and rescue
SAS	sealed authentication system
SATCOM	satellite communications
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SECTRANS	Secretary of Transportation
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan

SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP	situation report
SLOC	sea line of communications
SM	Secretary, Joint Staff, Memorandum
SO	special operations
SOCCENT	Special Operations Command, Central
SOD	Special Operations Division
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreements
SOP	standing operating procedures
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SPECAT	special category
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
SPTD CMD	supported command
SPTG CMD	supporting command
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program; SIOP Reconnaissance Plan
SSF	schedule status flag
SSN	attack submarine, nuclear
STANAG	Standard NATO Agreement
STON	short ton(s)
Svc	Service(s)
TACON	tactical control
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TALCE	tanker/airlift control element
TC-AIMS	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System
TCC	Transportation Component Command(s)
TDBM	technical database manager
TDD	target DGZ designator
TM	Technical Manual
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TP	Technical Publication
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
TPTRL	Time-Phased Transportation Requirements List
TSO	telecommunications service order
TSR	telecommunications service request
TSWG	technical support working group
TUCHA	Type Unit Characteristics File
TUDET	Type Unit Equipment Detail File

UCP	Unified Command Plan
UHF	ultra high frequency
UIC	unit identification code
ULC	unit level code
ULN	unit line number (FRN plus FRAG)
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
USAFE	US Air Force, Europe
USAFORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
USARCENT	US Army Central Command
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USCENTAF	US Central Command, Air Forces
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USCG	US Coast Guard
USCINCCENT	Commander in Chief, US Central Command
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, US European Command
USCINCJFCOM	Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command
USCINCPAC	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
USCINCSPACE	Commander in Chief, US Space Command
USCINCSTRAT	Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USDAO	United States Defense Attaché Office
USDP	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USDR&E	Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USERID	user identification
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USLO	US Liaison Officer
USMARCENT	United States Marine Central Command
USNAVCENT	United States Naval Forces Central Command
USNAVEUR	United States Navy, Europe
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
UW	unconventional warfare

VI	visual information
WASP	War Air Service Program
WMP	War and Mobilization Plan
WRM	war reserve material
WRS	war reserve stock
WWMCCS	World Wide Military Command and Control System

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PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acceptability. Operation plan evaluative review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action (COA) is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with domestic and international law, to include the law of war; and is militarily and politically supportable.

accompanying supplies. Unit supplies that deploy with forces.

accounting line designator. A five-character code consisting of the target DGZ designator (TDD) and the striking command suffix to indicate a specific nuclear strike by a specified weapon delivery system on a target objective to the OPLAN.

acoustic warfare. Action involving the use of underwater acoustic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the underwater acoustic spectrum and actions which retain friendly use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. There are three divisions within acoustic warfare:

1. acoustic warfare support measures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions in search for, intercept, locate, record and analyze radiated acoustic energy in water for purpose of exploiting such radiations. The use of acoustic warfare support measures involves no intentional underwater acoustic emission and is generally not detectable by the enemy.

2. acoustic warfare countermeasures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. Acoustic warfare countermeasures involve intentional under-water acoustic emissions for deception and jamming.

3. acoustic warfare counter-countermeasures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum despite the enemy's use of underwater acoustic warfare. Acoustic warfare counter-countermeasures involve anti-acoustic warfare support measures and anti-acoustic warfare countermeasures, and may not involve underwater acoustic emissions.

adequacy. Operation Plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned.

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation.

ALERT ORDER (CJCS). A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

allocation. In the general sense, distribution at execution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc.

allocation (air). The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task.

allocation (nuclear). The apportionment of specific numbers and types of nuclear weapons to a commander for a stated time period as a planning factor for use in the development of war plans. (Additional authority is required for the actual deployment of allocated weapons the locations desired by the commander to support the war plans. Expenditure of these weapons are not authorized until released by proper authority.)

allocation (transportation). Apportionment by designated authority of available transport capability to users.

allotment. The temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having combatant command (command authority).

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT.

Antiterrorism awareness. Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorism.

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc.

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment for planning the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.

appreciations. Personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions about another party's intentions, military capabilities, and activities used in planning and decision making.

a. **desired appreciations.** Adversary personal conclusions and official estimates, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions advantageous to friendly interests and objectives.

b. **harmful appreciations.** Adversary personal conclusions, official estimates, or assumptions, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions harmful to archives. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will remove the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System automated data processing files from its library of active plans. All material will be prepared for shipment to appropriate archive facilities in accordance with CJCSM 3122.01 and appropriate command directives. (See also Maintain and Retain). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

archive. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will remove the referenced plan and any associated JOPES automated data processing files from its library of active plans. All material will be prepared for shipment to the appropriate archive in accordance with CJCSM 3122.01 and appropriate command directives.

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their mission and protect their forces.

Armed Services Medical Regulating Office. A joint activity reporting directly to the Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command. The Department of Defense single manager for the regulation of movement of Uniformed Services patients. The Armed Services Medical Regulating Office authorizes transfers to medical treatment facilities of the Military Departments or the Department of Veterans Affairs and coordinates inter-theater and inside continental United States patient movement requirements with the appropriate transportation component commands of US Transportation Command. Also called ASMRO.

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities.

available-to-load date. A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation.

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, notional guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the NCA select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

cargo increment number. A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-cargo entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. (This term and definition are applicable only in the context of JOPES and cannot be referenced outside of JOPES.)

CINCs required delivery date. The original day relative to C-day, specified by the CINC for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival.

CINC's Strategic Concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC's Strategic Concept (CSC) is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC's decision and planning guidance for accomplishing JSCP or other CJCS taskings. The Chairman's approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an OPLAN or CONPLAN. Formerly called "the concept of operations."

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

civil reserve air fleet. A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a US entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense. These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities such as International Long Range and Short Range Cargo and Passenger sections, National (Domestic and Alaskan Sections) and Aeromedical Evacuation, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. Also called CRAF.

a. CRAF Stage I. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements. USTRANSCOM may authorize activation of this stage and assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage I.

b. CRAF Stage II. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that the air carriers will furnish to Department of Defense in a time of defense airlift emergency. USTRANSCOM, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, activates this stage and assumes mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage II.

c. CRAF Stage III. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources owned by a US entity or citizen that the air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense in a time of declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense. The aircraft in this stage are allocated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, AMC, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage III.

closure. In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

closure shortfall. The specified movement requirement or portion thereof that did not meet scheduling criteria and/or movement dates.

combatant command. A unified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (Armed Forces), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM.

Combatant Commander. A commander in chief of one of the combatant commands established by the President.

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

combined information dominance and sharing. The use of all information, both friendly and enemy, as a force multiplier during all phases of operation planning and execution.

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare is an application of information warfare in military operations and is a subset of information warfare. It applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. Command and control warfare is both offensive and defensive:

(1) command and control attack. To prevent effective command and control of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the adversary command and control system.

(2) command and control protection. To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly command and control system.

command, control, communications, and computer systems. Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control through all phases of the operational continuum. Also called C4 systems.

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation.

common-user transportation. Transportation and transportation services provided on a common basis for two or more Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, non-DOD agencies. Common-user assets are under the combatant command (command authority) of USCINCTRANS, excluding Service-unique assigned transportation assets.

Compliance. Operation plan evaluative review criterion. The determination of whether the plan complies with approved joint doctrine.

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign

plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Frequently, it is referred to as the commander's strategic concept.

concept plan. See Operation Plan.

controlled information. Information conveyed to an adversary in a deception operation to evoke desired appreciations. Information and indicators deliberately conveyed or denied to foreign targets to evoke invalid official estimates that result in foreign official actions advantageous to US interests and objectives.

conventional planning and execution. GCCS command and control application software and databases that are designed to support requirements relating to joint planning mobilization and deployment, including plan development, course of action development, execution planning, execution, movement monitoring sustainment, and redeployment from origin to destination.

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordination authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

counterdeception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations.

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT.

course of action. 1. A plan that would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased database of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this database will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order.

course of action development. The phase of JOPES within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized COAs and supporting databases.

cover (military). Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible, yet erroneous, explanation of the observable.

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a situation of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

crisis action planning. (1) The JOPES process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. (2) The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP.

critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment.

critical item list. Prioritized list, compiled from commander's composite critical item lists, identifying items and weapon systems that assist Services and Defense Logistics Agency in selecting systems for production surge planning.

critical sustainability items. Items described at National Stock Number level of detail, by Federal Supply Class, as part of the Logistic Factors File, that significantly affect the commander's ability to execute his operation plan.

deception means. Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means:

a. physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples: military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics, bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities.)

b. technical means. Military materiel resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles.

c. administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques designed to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary or other physical evidence to a foreign power.

Defense Planning Guidance. This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Also called DPG.

deliberate planning. The JOPES process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles and in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System.

Deployability Posture. The state or stage of a unit's preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows:

a. Normal Deployability Posture. The unit is conducting normal activities. Commanders are monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions are being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation are available.

b. Increased Deployability Posture. The unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel are recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Pre-deployment personnel actions are completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at CONUS or overseas installations are identified.

c. Advanced Deployability Posture. All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies are checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. The unit remains at home station. Movement requirements are confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra-CONUS transportation resources are identified, and initial movement schedules are completed by the Transportation Component Commands.

d. Marshalled Deployability Posture. The first increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies is marshalled at designated POEs but not loaded. Sufficient aircraft or sealift assets are positioned at, or en route to, the POE either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage crews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations will be positioned, as required.

e. Loaded Deployability Posture. All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies are loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to the designated objective area. Personnel are prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel are en route or available to meet projected ship loading schedules. Sufficient airlift is positioned and loaded at the POE to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations are positioned, as required.

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formulation for battle. 4. The

relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas.

deployment database. The JOPES database containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The database reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel.

deployment estimate. A report providing a consolidated (land, air, and sea) estimate for each COA. It also identifies significant transportation limitations, if applicable (late closures, maximum port workloads, insufficient strategic lift), and other difficulties (insufficient or inaccurate movement data, unsourced units, incomplete data, etc.).

deployment planning. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas.

deployment preparation order. An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units).

deterrent option. A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.)

direct liaison authorized. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement to keep the granting commander informed. It is a coordinating relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

diversion. 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical

reasons. A diversion order will not constitute a change of destination. 3. A rerouting of cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or destination or on a different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a dangerous area. A diversion may connect one channel to another or it may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the other side of the danger.

earliest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment or replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival data (LAD), it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. Also called EAD.

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Electronic attack includes (1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception and (2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). Also called EA.

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly, combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical action such as threat avoidance targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence both communications intelligence, and electronic intelligence. Also called ES.

emission control. The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while

minimizing, for operations security (OPSEC), detection by enemy sensors; to minimize mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or to execute a military deception plan. Also called EMCON.

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces and materiel in an area or theater of operations.

employment planning. Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders.

essential secrecy. The condition achieved from the denial of critical information to adversaries.

evacuation policy. 1. Command decision, indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients whom, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and designations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions.

execute order (CJCS). An order issued by the Chairman, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a NCA decision to initiate military operations.

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Crisis Action Planning process that provides for the translation of an approved COA into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete OPLAN or OPORD. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved OPLAN or other NCA-approved COA is adjusted, refined, and translated into an OPORD. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning.

external audience. All people who are not part of the internal audience of US military members and civilian employees and their immediate families. Part of

the concept of "Publics." Includes many varied subsets that may be referred to as "Audiences" or "Publics" feasibility.

feasibility. Operation plan evaluative review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources within the time frames contemplated by the plan..

filler personnel. Individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit or organization to its authorized strength.

force closure. The point in time when supported commander determines he has sufficient personnel and equipment resources in the assigned area of operations to carry out assigned tasks.

force list. A total list of forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces and other forces to be employed in support of the plan.

force module(s). Force modules are a planning and execution tool that provides a means of logically grouping records in the JOPES database to facilitate planning, analysis, and monitoring. Force modules may be OPLAN dependent to depict specific planning tasks or options, or may represent a particular force or unit and related support. Force module content and uses are virtually unlimited.

force module packages. Force modules with a specific functional orientation (e.g., air superiority, close-air support, reconnaissance, ground defense) that includes combat, associated combat support, and combat service support forces. Additionally, force module packages will contain sustainment in accordance with logistic policy contained in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Annex B.

force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

force requirement number. An alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify force entries in a given operation plan time-phased force and deployment data. Also called FRN.

functional plans. Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations or similar discreet tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the JSCP, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. CJCS review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required.

global command and control system. A collection of command and control Information Technology (IT) and IT management capabilities made available through a comprehensive, worldwide network of systems. GCCS provides the National Command Authorities, Joint Staff, combatant and functional unifies commands, Services Defense agencies, Joint Task force and their service components, and others with information processing, battlespace visualization, planning tools, collaboration, and dissemination capabilities necessary to conduct C2 of forces.

health service support. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include but are not limited to the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric medical food, and medical intelligence services.

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peace-time, times of crisis and emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations.

human resources intelligence. The intelligence information from human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT.

implementation. Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities.

implementation planning. Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the

national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to the combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of OPLANs and OPORDs to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions.

indications and warning. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear and non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events.

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversely information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems . Also called IO.

in-place force. 1. A NATO assigned force which, in peace-time, is principally stationed in the designated combat zone of the NATO Command to which it is committed. 2. Force within a CINC's area of responsibility and under his combatant command.

integrated priority list. A list of a CINC's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the CINC, adversely affect the capability of his forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the CINC's recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. Also called IPL.

intelligence system. Any formal or informal system to manage data gathering, obtain and process the data, interpret the data, and provide reasoned judgments to decisionmakers as a basis for action. The term is not limited to intelligence organizations or services but includes any system in all its parts that accomplishes the listed tasks.

intensive management. The continuous process by which the supported and supporting commanders, the Services, transportation component commands, and appropriate Defense agencies ensure that movement data in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time phased force and deployment data for the initial days of deployment and/or mobilization are current to support immediate execution.

internal audience. US military members and civilian employees and their immediate families. One of the audiences comprising the concept of "Publics." See also "external audience."

intertheater. Between theaters of operations or between CONUS and theaters of operations.

intratheater. Within a theater of operations.

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC.

joint operation planning. Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Joint operation planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, and operation orders (other than the SIOP) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support SecDef contingency planning guidance, strategic requirements in the NMS, and emerging crisis. As such, joint operation planning includes contingency planning, execution planning, and implementation planning. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the integrated joint conventional and nuclear command and control system used to support military operation planning, execution, and monitoring (including theater-level nuclear and chemical defense plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and underlying Global Command and Control System (GCCS) ADP support to provide senior-level decision makers and their staffs with enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations. JOPES policies, procedures, and ADP systems provide the mechanisms to submit movement requirements to USTRANSCOM for joint operations and exercises.

Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Those headquarters commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. JPEC usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, certain Service major commands (including the

Service wholesale logistics commands), unified and specified commands (and their Service component commands), subunified commands, Transportation Component Commands, JTFs (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies especially designated combat support agencies)e.g., DIA, DISA, DLA, DTRA, NIMA, AND NSA) as may be appropriate to a given scenario.

Joint Staff

a. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force.

b. Joint Staff. The staff under the Chairman, as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman, and subject to the authority, direction and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities.

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The primary means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

latest arrival date (LAD). A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by the planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations.

level of detail. Within the current joint planning and execution systems, movement characteristics are described at six distinct levels of detail. These levels are:

a. level I. Aggregated level. Expressed as total number of passengers and total short tons, total measurement tons, total square feet and/or total

thousands of barrels by unit line number (ULN), cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN).

b. level II. Summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and cargo summarized as follows: Bulk, oversized, outsized and non-air transportable STONS. Vehicular, non-self deployable aircraft and boats, and other MTONS in SQFT. Thousands of barrels of POL.

c. level III. Total passengers and cargo STONS, MTONS, SQFT, and thousands of barrels broken down by cargo category.

d. level IV. Detail expressed as number of passengers and individual dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of cargo by equipment type by ULN.

f. level V. Detail by priority of shipment. Expressed as total number of passengers by Service specialty code in deployment sequence by ULN individual weight (in pounds) and dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of equipment in deployment sequence by ULN.

g. level VI. Detail expressed for passengers by name and SSAN or for coalition forces and civilians by country national identification number; and for cargo by Transportation Control Number (TCN) . Non-Unit cargo includes FSN/NSN detail. Cargo can be nested. Cargo with TCNs that are nested are referred to as "secondary load". Example: 11 vehicles of the same type would be represented by 11 level VI records. These records would be summed to I in level IV record.

limited-access plan. The limited-access plan (like the close-hold plan) is an operation plan that has access restricted to individual GCCS USERIDs and terminal IDs. Unlike the close-hold plan, the limited-access plan can be distributed to more than one Joint Operation Planning and Execution System site.

limiting factor. A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc.

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area. b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct

of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere.

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.
- b. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.
- c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
- d. Acquisition or furnishing of services.

logistics sourcing. The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistics requirements.

logistic support. Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the CONUS-based and worldwide deployed forces.

maintain. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System automated data processing files active in accordance with applicable tasking documents describing the type and level of update or maintenance to be performed. General guidance is contained in JOPES, Volumes I and II. (See also archive and retain.)

major combat element. Those organizations and units described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that directly produce combat capability. The size of the element varies by Service, force capability, and the total number of such elements available. Examples are Army divisions and separate brigades, Air Force squadrons, Naval task forces, and Marine Expeditionary Forces.

major force. A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated combat service, combat service support, and sustainment increments. The major force is capable of sustained military-operations in response to plan employment requirements.

manifest. A document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination.

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.

materiel planning. Materiel planning is a subset of logistic planning and consists of a four-step process:

a. requirements definition. Requirements for significant items must be calculated at item level detail (i.e., national stock number) to support sustainability planning and analysis. Requirements include unit roundout, consumption and attrition replacement, safety stock, and the needs of allies.

b. apportionment. Items are apportioned to the combatant commanders based on a global scenario to avoid sourcing of items to multiple theaters. The basis for apportionment is the capability provided by unit stocks, host-nation support, theater pre-positioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and CONUS DOD stockpiles and available production. Item apportionment cannot exceed total capabilities.

c. sourcing. Sourcing is the matching of available capabilities on a given date against item requirements to support sustainability analysis and the identification of locations to support transportation planning. Sourcing of any item is done within the combatant commander's apportionment.

d. documentation. Sourced item requirements and corresponding shortfalls are major inputs to the combatant commander's sustainability analysis. Sourced-item requirements are translated into movement requirements and documented in the JOPES TPFDD for transportation feasibility analysis. Movement requirements for nonsignificant items are estimated in tonnage.

medical evacuees. Personnel who are wounded, injured, or ill and must be moved to or between medical facilities.

military deception. Actions executed to mislead foreign decision makers causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contributed to the originator's objectives.

a. strategic military deception. Military deception planned and executed by, and in support of, senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, policies, and operations.

b. operational military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations.

c. tactical military deception. Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception I planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception. Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems.

e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC). Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities.

military objectives. The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement NCA guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders.

military options. A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following; civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence-building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and PSYOP; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention campaigns; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare campaigns and operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to

suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries.

mobility analysis. An in-depth examination of all aspects of transportation planning in support of operation plan and operation order development.

mobility echelon. A subordinate element of a unit that is scheduled for deployment separately from the parent unit.

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up. Title 10 § 12304. Presidential order or any unit and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve to active duty (other than for training), for not more than 270 days, without consent of the members concerned, to augment the active force for any operational mission other than during war or national emergency. Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active duty under this authority at any one time.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000 for not longer than 24 months) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

movement schedule. A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship) that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment. Arrival and departure times at ports of embarkation, etc., are detailed to show a flow and work-load at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation.

multidiscipline counterintelligence. The process of determining the presence and nature of the total, all-source hostile intelligence threat to a given friendly target in order to provide a basis for countering or degrading the threat.

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA.

national emergency. A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources.

National Military Command System. The priority component of the global military command and control system designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities.

national objectives. The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.

National Security Council. A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called NSC.

national security interest. The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from areas of danger overseas to safehavens or to the United States.

noncombatant evacuees. 1. US citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of all agencies of the US Government and their dependents, except as noted in 2a below. b. Military personnel of the US Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants. c. Dependents of members of the US Armed Forces. 2. US (and non-US) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of US Government agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated. b. Private US citizens and their dependents. c. Military personnel and dependents of members of the US Armed Forces outlined in 1c. above, short of an ordered evacuation. d. Designated aliens, including dependents of persons listed in 1a through 1c. above, as prescribed by the Department of State.

non-unit-related cargo lift estimate. Lift estimates for equipment and supplies requiring transportation to an area of operations, other than those identified as the equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply, military support for allies, and support for nonmilitary programs, such as civil relief).

non-unit-related personnel lift estimate. Lift estimates for personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit (e.g., filler personnel, replacements, temporary duty or temporary additional duty personnel; civilians; medical evacuees; and retrograde personnel).

nuclear planning and execution. GCCS application systems that support strategic and tactical nuclear planning, execution, termination, and reconstitution.

Nuclear Planning System. A system that consists of personnel directives and electronic data processing systems to directly support theater nuclear CINCs in developing, maintaining, and disseminating nuclear operation plans.

on-call. (1) A term used to signify that a prearranged concentration, air strike, or final protective fire may be called for. (2) Preplanned, identified force or materiel requirements without designated time-phase and destination

information. Such requests will be called forward upon order of competent authority.

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

operational continuum. The general states of peace, crisis, and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.

operational control. Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. This authority is normally exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Operational control is transferable within a command, but requires approval by the Secretary of Defense to transfer between commands. Also called OPCON.

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN).

a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an OPORD. An OPLAN identifies the

forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD as described in the JOPES manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.

b. Concept Plan (CONPLAN). An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and a TPFDD may or may not be prepared depending on the plan tasking and desires of the supported commander.

OPLAN/CONPLAN Evaluation Criteria. The four evaluation criteria are:

(a) Adequacy. Will the plan satisfy the tasking and accomplish the mission? Do planning assumptions provide guidance for development of the plan?

(b) Feasibility. Does the plan accomplish the assigned tasks with the resources that are available within the time frames contemplated within the plan?

(c) Acceptability. Is the plan proportional and worth the anticipated costs? Can the mission be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position? Is the plan militarily and politically supportable?

(d) Compliance. Does the plan comply with approved Joint doctrine?

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC.

operations security indicators. Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information.

operations security measures. Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about critical information. The following categories apply:

a. action control. The objective is to eliminate indicators or the vulnerability of actions to exploitation by adversary intelligence systems. Select what actions to undertake; decide whether or not to execute actions; and determine the "who," "when," "where," and "how" for actions necessary to accomplish tasks.

b. countermeasures. The objective is to disrupt effective adversary information gathering or prevent their recognition of indicators when collected materials are processed. Use diversions, camouflage, jamming, threats, police powers, and force against adversary information gathering and processing capabilities.

c. counteranalysis. The objective is to prevent accurate interpretations of indicators during adversary analysis of collected materials. This is done by confusing the adversary analyst through deception techniques such as covers.

operations security planning guidance. Guidance that serves as the blueprint for operations security planning by all functional elements throughout the organization. It defines the critical information that requires protection from adversary appreciations, taking into account friendly and adversary goals, estimated key adversary questions, probable adversary knowledge, desirable and harmful adversary appreciations, and pertinent intelligence system threats. It also should outline provisional operations security measures to ensure the requisite essential secrecy.

operations security vulnerability. A condition in which friendly actions provide operations security indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decision making.

organic. Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army,

Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy.

origin. Beginning point of a deployment, where unit or non-unit-related cargo or personnel are located.

personnel increment number. A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-related personnel entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data.

plan identification number. A command-unique four-digit number, followed by a suffix indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written, e.g. 1122-95. In JOPES database, a five-digit number representing the command unique four-digit identifier, followed by a one character alphabetic suffix indicating the OPLAN option, or a one-digit number numeric value indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written

plan information capability. This capability allows a supported command to enter and update key elements of information in an operation plan stored in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.

PLANNING ORDER (CJCS). An order issued by the Chairman to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander's estimate and will normally take the place of the CJCS ALERT ORDER. NCA approval of a selected COA is not required before issuing a CJCS PLANNING ORDER.

Port of debarkation. The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements it may or may not coincide with the destination.

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. May be a seaport or aerial port of embarkation from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin.

Preliminary Movement Schedule. A projection of the routing of movement requirements reflected in the time-phased force and deployment data, from origin to destination, including identification of origins, ports of embarkation ports of debarkation, and en route stops; associated time frames for arrival and departure at each location; type of lift assets required to accomplish the move; and cargo details by carrier. Schedules are sufficiently detailed to support

comparative analysis of requirements against capabilities and to develop location workloads for reception and onward movement.

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority. Provision of a public law that provides the President a means to activate not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission without a declaration of a national emergency. It further grants the President authority to extend the original 90 days for an additional 180 days in the interest of national security. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization.

procedure. A procedure begins with a specific documentable event that causes an activity to occur. The activity must produce a product that normally affects another external organization. Frequently, that product will be the event that causes another procedure to occur. It is important to recognize that a procedure determines "what" an organization must do at critical periods but does not direct "how" it will be done.

Psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP.

public. Concept that includes all audiences, both internal and external.

readiness planning. Operational planning required for peace-time operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to combatant commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning.

ready-to-load date. The day relative to C-day, in a time-phased force and deployment data when the unit, nonunit equipment and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on USTRANSCOM-provided transportation. Also called RLD.

replacements. Personnel required to take the place of others who depart a unit.

requirements capability. This capability provides a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System user the ability to identify, update, review, and delete data on forces and sustainment required to support an operation plan or course of action.

required delivery date. A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations.

restricted access plan. Operation plan with access to operation plan information extremely limited to specifically designated USERIDs and passwords during initial course of action development before the involvement of outside commands, agencies, CINCs, Services, or the Joint Staff.

resupply. See "non-unit-related cargo."

retain. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, and any associated JOPES automated data processing files in an inactive library or status. The plan and its associated files will not be maintained unless directed by follow-on guidance. (See also archive and maintain).

retrograde cargo. Cargo evacuated from a theater of operations.

retrograde personnel. Personnel evacuated from a theater of operations--may include medical patients, noncombatants, and civilians.

scheduled arrival data. The projected arrival date of a specified movement requirement at a specified location.

schedules. The carrier itinerary which may involve cargo and passenger.

scheduling and movement capability. The capability required by Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planners and operators to allow for review and update of scheduling and movement data before and during implementation of a deployment operation.

sealift readiness program. A standby contractual agreement between Military Sealift Command and US ship operators for voluntary provision of private ships for defense use. Call-up of ships may be authorized by joint approval of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation. Also called SRP.

selective release process. The process involving requesting, analyzing, and obtaining approval for release of weapons to obtain specific, limited damage on selected targets.

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a CINC for planning, that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission.

SIGINT direct service. A reporting procedure to provide signals intelligence (SIGINT) to a military commander or other authorized recipient in response to SIGINT requirements. The product may vary from recurring serialized reports produced by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service to instantaneous aperiodic reports provided to the command or other recipient, usually from a fixed SIGINT activity engaged in collection and processing.

SIGINT direct service activity. A signals intelligence (SIGINT) activity composed of collection and associated resources that normally performs in a direct service role under the SIGINT operational control of the Director, National Security Agency/ Chief, Central Security Service.

SIGINT direct support. The provision of signals intelligence (SIGINT) information to a military commander by a SIGINT direct support unit in response to SIGINT operational tasking levied by that commander.

SIGINT direct support unit. A signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit, usually mobile, designed to perform a SIGINT direct support role for a military commander under delegated authority from the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service.

SIGINT operational control. The authoritative direction of signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported.

SIGINT operational tasking. The authoritative operational direction of and direct levying of SIGINT information needs by a military commander on designated SIGINT resources. These requirements are directive, irrespective of

other priorities, and are conditioned only by the capability of those resources to produce such information. Operational tasking includes authority to deploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for which SIGINT operational tasking authority has been delegated.

staff estimates. Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander's estimate.

strategy determination. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action.

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command.

suitability. The determination that the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objectives, mission, or task if carried out successfully.

support. (1) The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (2) A unit which helps another in battle or a part of a unit that is held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. (3) An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat.

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation order in response to requirements of the Chairman.

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies, especially designated combat support agencies, as appropriate.

supporting forces. Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant Command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander.

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan.

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective.

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combat command.

target. (1) A geographic area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. (2) In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. (3) An area designated and numbered for future firing. (4) In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the target.

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a "list of targets" that may be maintained by an echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes.

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

terrorist threat conditions. (THREATCONS) A CJCS-approved program standardizing the Military Service's identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities. This program facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities. There are four THREATCONS above normal.

a. **THREATCON ALPHA.** This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures.

b. **THREATCON BRAVO.** This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

c. **THREATCON CHARLIE.** This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

d. **THREATCON DELTA.** This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized condition.

terrorist threat levels. (Threat Level) One word descriptors which summarize the DOD- or CINC-level intelligence analysis of the threat of terrorism to DOD personnel, facilities, material, and assets on a country-by-country basis. There are five Threat Levels: Critical, High, Medium, Low, and Negligible.

theater. The geographic area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility.

theater of operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separated and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.

theater of war. Defined by the NCA or the geographic combatant commander. The area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations.

threat identification and assessment. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function that provides timely warning of potential threats to US interests; intelligence collection requirements; the effects of environmental, physical, and health hazards, and cultural factors on friendly and enemy operations; and determines the enemy military posture and possible intentions.

throughput. The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or aircraft, or from the discharge from a ship or aircraft to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput.

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400Z and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements utilizing any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which particular operation commences.

e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

- f. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.
- g. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.
- h. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat CS and CSS forces begins in an operation.
- i. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selected Reserve callup (not more than 200,000).
- j. S-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).
- k. W-day. Declared by the NCA, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The JOPES database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan,. including:

- a. In-place units.
- b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.
- c. Routing of forces to be deployed.
- d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.
- e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.
- f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources.

time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). Appendix 1 to Annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and port of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data.

TPFDD maintenance. The deliberate planning process that requires a supported commander to incorporate changes to a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that occur after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution. TPFDD maintenance is conducted by the supported CINC in coordination with the supporting CINCs, Service components, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies as required. At designated intervals, changes to data in the TPFDD, including force structure, standard reference files, and Services' type unit characteristics file, are updated in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to ensure currency of deployment data. TPFDD maintenance may also be used to update the TPFDD for CJCS or Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan submission in lieu of refinement during the JOPES plan development phase.

TPFDD Refinement. For both global and regional operation plan development, the process consists of several discrete phases of time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These phases are Concept, Plan Development, and Review. The Plan Development Phase consists of several subphases: Forces, Logistics, and Transportation, with shortfall identification associated with each phase. The Plan Development phases are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics (non-unit-related personnel and sustainment) and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate overlapping of several refinement phases. The decision is made by the supported commander, unless otherwise directed by the Chairman. For global planning, refinement conferences are conducted by the Joint Staff in conjunction with USTRANSCOM. TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINCTRANS will normally host refinement conferences at the request of the Joint Staff or the supported commander.

transportation closure. The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation.

transportation feasibility. OPLANs/CONPLANs are considered transportation feasible when the capability to move forces, equipment, and supplies exists from the point of origin to the final destination according to the plan. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater left assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands, and restrictions. The analysis and assessment will include:

a. The supporting CINC will analyze deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI); and theater distribution of forces, equipment, and supplies to final destination.

b. Supporting CINCs will provide and assessment on movement of forces from point of origin to AOPE/SPOE.

c. USCINTRANS will assess the strategic leg of the TPFDD for transportation feasibility, indicating to the Chairman and supported CINC that movements arrive at POD consistent with the supported CINC's assessment of JRSOI and theater distribution.

d. Following analysis of all inputs, the supported CINC is responsible for declaring a plan end-to-end executable.

type unit. A type of organizational or functional entity established within the Armed Forces and uniquely identified by a five-character, alphanumeric code called a unit type code.

type unit characteristics file. A file that provides standard planning data and movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with type units.

unit designation list. A list of actual units by unit identification code designated to fulfill requirements of a force list.

unit identification code (UIC). A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces.

unit line number (ULN). A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a unit entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data.

unit type code (UTC). A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces.

USTRANSCOM coordinating instructions. Instructions that establish suspense dates for selected members of the joint planning and execution community to complete updates to the operation plan database. Instructions will ensure the target date movement requirements will be validated and available for scheduling.

validate. Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and USTRANSCOM that all the information records in a TPFDD not only are error-free for automation purposes but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs.

warning order. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow.

warning order (CJCS). (1) A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (2) A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman that initiates the development and evaluation of COAs by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. (3) A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.

wartime reserve modes (WARM). Characteristics and operating procedures of sensor, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that (a) will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but (b) could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance. WARM are deliberately held in reserve for wartime or emergency use and seldom, if ever, applied or intercepted before such use.

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