Reference(s): See Enclosure F.

1. **Purpose.** This instruction provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) guidance for planning and conducting military information support operations (MISO) across the range of military operations.

2. **Cancellation.** CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05D, 8 November 2007 and CJCSI 3110.05D-1, 8 November 2007 are cancelled.

3. **Applicability.** This instruction applies to the Services, combatant commands, and other Department of Defense (DOD) activities and agencies, and the Joint Staff (JS). Contracts for the development and conduct of information activities designed to influence the perceptions and subsequent behavior of selected foreign audiences will be managed consistent with this instruction.

4. **Policy.** In accordance with (IAW) reference a, MISO replaces the term psychological operations (PSYOP). This instruction provides strategic direction for inclusion of MISO to support the full range of military operations including military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; major operations and campaigns; and as an integrated information activity within the DOD’s overall contribution to United States Government (USG) communication strategies.

5. **Definitions.**

   a. **MISO.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals.

b. Civil Authority Information Support (CAIS). MISO capabilities used to conduct public information dissemination activities to support national security or disaster relief operations within the UNITED STATES and its territories, in support of a lead federal USG agency.

6. **Responsibilities.** Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and Military Service Chiefs are responsible for incorporating MISO into their planning as outlined in the references listed in Enclosure F.

7. **Summary of Changes.** This revision replaces the term PSYOP with MISO, merges and updates information previously contained in CJCSI 3110.05D and CJCSI 3110.05D-1, provides guidance on product attribution, and revises the pre-approved MISO programs by adding Stability Operations and Security Cooperation.

8. **Releasability.** NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. This instruction is approved for limited release. DOD components (to include the combatant commands) and other federal agencies may obtain copies of this instruction through controlled Internet access from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives or through the SIPRNET at: https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/. JS activities may also access or obtain copies of this instruction from the JS-DSE.

9. **Effective Date.** This instruction is effective upon receipt.

Enclosure(s):

A -- MISO Policy and Planning Guidance
B -- MISO Approval Process and Authorities
C -- Methods of Attribution
D -- Command and Control of MIS Forces
E -- Pre-approved MISO Programs
F -- References
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ENCLOSURE A

MISO POLICY AND PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. General. This instruction supplements and clarifies existing DOD MISO policy and planning guidance, and complies with all directive requirements outlined in the references cited in Enclosure F.

2. Employment. MISO provides the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), CCDR, joint force commander (JFC), and, when directed, Chief of U.S. diplomatic mission, with a unique capability to support the full range of military operations. This includes foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, military engagement, steady-state operations, security cooperation and deterrence, crisis response and limited contingency operations, and major operations and campaigns including declared war.

   a. The Purpose of MISO. The purpose of MISO is to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behavior of selected foreign audiences as part of approved MISO programs in support of USG policy and military objectives, plans, and operations.

   b. MISO and Interagency Coordination. DOD MISO should be coordinated with the Interagency and, where appropriate, with coalition partners, to ensure operations are mutually-supportive and complementary.

   c. MISO and the Covert Action Statute. This instruction does not authorize the CCDR to conduct or provide support to covert action. All MISO conducted by DOD should be in a manner consistent with 50 USC § 413b and the terms of Enclosure C of this instruction.

3. Implementing Instructions.

   a. General. All activities that fall within the scope and definition of MISO, regardless of the organization conducting those activities, are governed by this instruction. MISO activities conducted by ad-hoc or other organizations could be detrimental to the overall mission if not properly coordinated and executed. MISO must be executed under an approved MISO program and subject to the MISO review and approval process. The JFC’s MISO staff activity, or Joint Military Information Support Task Force (JMISTF) when established, oversees all MISO within the joint operations area to ensure proper coordination of operations and continuity of messages.
b. **MISO Approval.** In order to maximize support and ensure continuity of message, MISO programs must be centrally developed, approved, and coordinated. However, in order to be effective, the execution of MISO must be decentralized. To ensure timeliness and appropriateness of messages to the audience and local environment, MISO should be approved at the lowest authorized level of command. Enclosure B details the MISO approval process and authorities.

c. **Specialized Staff Support to Military Information Support (MIS) Forces.** Because of their unique nature and mission, MIS forces require specialized support from the JFC staff. Some examples include legal counsel, contracting support, funding for commercial audio, visual, audio-visual, web-based design and web-site maintenance, opinion polling, and other related forms of media dissemination tools and assets, all-source intelligence support related to target audience (TA) analysis and collection of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness (MOE) indicators, and specialized frequency allocation for MISO transmitters. A detailed explanation of MISO-unique support requirements is found in reference b.

d. **Obtaining a MISO Capability.** Early integration in operational planning and flow of forces is essential for effective MISO. When a CCDR requires MIS forces to conduct operations, he must submit a request for forces (RFF) through the JS using the Global Force Management process, IAW reference c. Requests should address detailed operational capabilities required and include any limitation on the number of personnel, force tracking number, destination, earliest and latest arrival date, deployment duration, mission justification, and any special requirements such as specialized training or equipment.

   (1) Steady-state operation RFFs should be submitted to the JS as early as possible before the anticipated requirement, to allow for sufficient coordination, approval, site surveys, and deployment of personnel. When possible, an RFF for MIS forces will be included in a consolidated combatant command RFF to facilitate coordination and ensure the deployment of MIS forces meets the combatant command timeline requirements.

   (2) The JS will validate MIS force requirements and assign the appropriate joint force provider. The priority for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) MIS forces will be to support special operations forces and, when required, deploy for contingency response, until relieved by other MIS forces.

e. **MISO Support to Exercises and Planning.** For personnel to support exercises, submit requirements IAW reference c. For assistance in conducting MISO assessments or planning efforts not tied to a specific named operation,
CCDRs will submit requests directly to USSOCOM or the appropriate Service IAW priorities for support found in paragraph 3.d.(2) above.
ENCLOSURE B

MISO APPROVAL PROCESS AND AUTHORITIES

1. **MISO Program Approval.** Prior to conducting MISO, CCDRs must have their MISO programs approved. CCDRs will submit MISO programs to the JS as stand-alone documents or as part of a theater campaign plan (TCP) or other plan. MISO programs contain, at a minimum, a listing of the proposed MISO objectives, TAs, themes to stress, themes to avoid, proposed means of dissemination, and a general concept of operations, to include planned methods of attribution and a concept for assessment.

   a. **Exceptions.** Approval for execution of MISO programs in Enclosure E, when conducted as part of approved CCDR operations, is delegated to CCDRs, IAW reference d.

   b. **Steady-state Operations.** CCDR steady-state MISO programs should be submitted for approval as part of the TCP when it enters the Joint Planning and Execution Community review process. However, if they are not submitted as part of a TCP, stand-alone steady-state MISO programs must be thoroughly integrated with the overall TCP to maximize the MISO value to other efforts and to eliminate the potential for conflicting messages and activities. Combatant commands will submit stand-alone MISO programs to the JS for review and coordination. JS will forward the MISO programs to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD (SO/LIC)) for review, interagency coordination, and approval at the appropriate Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. Once the program is approved, the JS will forward the approval to the appropriate combatant command.

   c. **Contingencies and Declared War.** CCDRs may submit their MISO programs as part of their overall plan. As with steady-state programs, MISO planners should review strategic guidance to ensure MISO programs remain consistent with overarching national goals and objectives. If the CCDR perceives a need to begin MISO prior to approval and execution of the plan, he can submit a MISO program IAW stand-alone program procedures outlined in paragraph 1.b. above. The JS reviews all plans and forwards them to OSD for appropriate review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. OASD (SO/LIC) conducts the required OSD review and interagency staffing for the MISO portions of OPLANs; the SecDef normally approves the MISO program as part of the CCDR’s plan. Approval of the program, execution authorities, and other MISO guidance are issued to the CCDR in the execute order (EXORD).
d. Changes to Approved Programs. Regardless of the particular situation and the delegation of approval authority, all MISO actions, products, and messages must comply with the approved MISO program. Changes to the original approved objectives, themes, or TAs must be forwarded through the JS for approval, following the same procedures for a stand-alone MISO program as outlined in paragraph 1.b. above.

2. MISO Product and Action Approval. Once the MISO programs have been approved, the approval process for each series of products and related actions is a staff process belonging to the designated commander. MISO approval authority should be delegated to the lowest practical level authorized by OSD. Command involvement is the key factor in creating a responsive and timely approval process that meets operational requirements while still ensuring continuity of message and compliance with established policy. IAW references d and e, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) approved the following MISO approval guidance:

a. Steady-state Operations. Product and action approval authority is delegated to the CCDR IAW Enclosure C, with authorization to sub-delegate to a subordinate component or JFC, unless otherwise restricted. However, the authority to disseminate MISO products requires U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission (COM) (or his designated representative) concurrence for each targeted country. In the case of regional products such as websites, the CCDR shall coordinate through the JS with the applicable regional office in OSD for concurrence from the appropriate Department of State regional bureau.

b. Contingencies, Major Combat Operations, and Declared War

(1) The CCDR has execution and approval authority for MISO products and actions in support of SecDef-approved missions or operations IAW Enclosure C. The CCDR may sub-delegate that authority to a subordinate component or JFC, unless otherwise restricted.

(2) When the CCDR determines it is required to support ongoing operations, the CCDR is authorized to sub-delegate approval of tactical MISO products to O-6 level commanders. Products are limited to printed products, audio products, video products, and novelty items that will be disseminated within the Commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) and where United States or host nation (HN) responsibility for the product is disclosed in the content of the product or readily apparent from the method of dissemination. All products will remain within the scope of approved MISO programs. Sub-delegation will be limited to those commanders with MIS personnel assigned or attached in order to ensure proper coordination of products and continuity of messages.
(3) The commander’s product approval process must be short and as streamlined as possible to facilitate timely review, revision, approval, production, and dissemination. Although coordination of MISO with other staff elements and organizations is critical in maximizing MISO effectiveness, the coordination process must not be so cumbersome as to prevent timely execution of operations.

c. **MISO in Support of Combined or Multinational Operations.** A Combined JMISTF may be established to support combined or multinational military operations, as well as operations involving international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The product and activity approval process will follow the procedures as outlined in the operations plan issued by the combined or multinational headquarters.

3. **Approved Means of Dissemination.** The following are approved means of disseminating MISO products:

   a. Face-to-face;

   b. Audio-Visual (e.g. television programs and television commercials);

   c. Audio (e.g. radio announcements and loudspeaker broadcasts);

   d. Telephonic (e.g. voicemail, telephone messages, text messages, and facsimiles);

   e. Visual (e.g. posters, billboards, newspapers and magazines (including advertisements in commercially available publications), handbills, leaflets, comic books, and novelty items such as school supplies, sports equipment, and t-shirts);

   f. Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences. Combatant commands may use websites for MISO purposes IAW reference f;

   g. Interactive Internet Activities (IIA). Combatant commands may use IIA for MISO purposes IAW reference g; and

   h. Additional means of dissemination may be requested and included as part of the program or orders approval process as outlined previously.
ENCLOSURE C

METHODS OF ATTRIBUTION

1. In general, MISO products and activities should be attributed to the United States or a concurring partner nation (PN). For U.S. attribution, DOD should openly acknowledge U.S. involvement in the content of the product, e.g., in the initial phase of engaging in online exchanges, or U.S. involvement should be obvious through the means of dissemination such as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops. Alternatives are:

   a. Concurring PN or organization attribution. This method allows MISO products and activities developed by DOD in support of concurring PN or non-commercial organizations (such as international or non-governmental organizations) to be attributed to the partner. Both the partner and the appropriate COM must agree to this attribution method before it is used. This method of attribution is only authorized for products and activities targeting audiences that are in the concurring PN or within geographic areas where the partner organization is reasonably expected to operate and within subjects or topics that relate directly to the partner organization mission. MISO using concurring PN or organization attribution (and for which the USG role is not otherwise apparent or acknowledged publicly) is authorized for MISO that are traditional military activities as that term is used in 50 USC § 413b.

   b. Delayed attribution. This method of attribution allows for disclosure after the actual dissemination of information has taken place, within a reasonable period of time. Delayed attribution may be used: to protect the security of the operation; to protect the identities of participating partners; or when reaching the TA cannot be accomplished if accompanied by immediate attribution. The combatant command will acknowledge its involvement as soon as operationally feasible and within a reasonable period of time after due consideration of operational and security requirements, as determined by the CCDR. Delayed attribution MISO requires USD(P) or designee approval (including a legal review by DOD General Counsel) if conducted outside the parameters described in paragraph 2. Requests for the use of delayed attribution must include a concept of operations, specific reasons why immediate attribution is not appropriate, linkages between MISO and associated military objectives, proposed duration of delay, including time or event triggers for ending the delay period, and public affairs guidance for the period of delay, inadvertent disclosure, and eventual attribution.

   c. Non-attribution. This method refers to the conduct of MISO for which there is no intention ever to attribute the activity. Non-attribution MISO
requires USD(P) or designee approval (including a legal review by DOD General Counsel) if conducted outside the parameters described in paragraph 2. Requests for non-attribution MISO must include a concept of operations, specific reasons why attribution is not appropriate, linkages between MISO and associated military objectives, and public affairs guidance for response to queries or inadvertent disclosure.

2. When MISO is conducted by military forces under the direction and control of a CCDR, the CCDR may approve using U.S. attribution or, subject to the restriction in paragraph 1.a., concurring PN, or organization attribution. The CCDR may also approve MISO with delayed or non-attribution if:

   a. The MISO activity relates to ongoing hostilities that involve U.S. forces;

   b. The MISO activity targets audiences that are in a country in which U.S. forces’ involvement in ongoing hostilities is apparent or acknowledged publicly; and

   c. The MISO activity is a traditional military activity as that term is used in 50 USC § 413b.

3. CCDRs are authorized to sub-delegate product approval authority for MISO for which the USG role is openly acknowledged or publicly apparent. CCDRs are authorized to delegate product approval authority only to their Deputies or to direct reporting subordinate commanders who are responsible for MISO activities:

   a. Using concurring PN or organization attribution (and for which the USG role is not otherwise apparent or acknowledged publicly) IAW 1.a. of this Enclosure; or

   b. Using delayed attribution or non-attribution IAW paragraph 2 of this Enclosure.

4. Request for MISO attribution or delegation outside the guidelines above will be submitted through the JS to USD(P) for review (including a legal review by DOD General Counsel), interagency coordination and deconfliction as necessary, and approval. USD(P) may delegate authority to the CCDR to approve additional products, series, and activities consistent with those previously approved by USD(P).
ENCLOSURE D

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF MIS FORCES

1. **Organization.** USSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) over special operations MIS forces. Effective 1 August 2011, all forces and Service components previously assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command reverted back to their respective Military Departments. USSOCOM remains the joint proponent for all MISO, including doctrine, combat development, and institutional training. The responsibilities outlined below are in addition to those found in reference b.

2. **MIS Force Requirements.** MISO staff planners must clearly articulate MISO requirements in terms of capability. This will enable the sourcing actions required of the applicable force providers.

3. **MISO Command and Control.**

   a. **Steady-state MISO.** When the SecDef approves the deployment of MIS personnel to perform steady-state activities, operational control (OPCON) of these forces is transferred to the supported CCDR through the deployment order process. The CCDR normally transfers OPCON of these forces to another component commander or to the commander of the theater special operations command. The CCDR may also decide to retain OPCON of MIS forces as a functional element working directly for the CCDR. MIS personnel coordinate MISO and obtain concurrence from the responsible U.S. COM as required by paragraph 2.a. of Enclosure B.

   b. **MISO in Contingencies and Declared War.**

      (1) Mission requirements will dictate the organizational structure of the MIS force and the functions it will perform. The force may include both Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve personnel as well as individuals from the various Military Services.

      (2) When a JMISTF is deployed to support operations, it is normally designated a separate functional component of the combatant command or JFC. The JMISTF is responsible for providing MISO support to the overall joint or combined operation at the theater and operational levels. It coordinates with each of the Military Service components, functional components, and staff elements to determine MISO support requirements. The JMISTF may also
work closely with the U.S. country team, other USG agencies and departments, coalition officials, and international organizations.

(3) MIS forces are normally OPCON to the supported combatant command. The CCDR or JFC may transfer OPCON of MIS forces to the components based on overall mission requirements and particular ground component requirements.

(4) For smaller contingencies a MIS element, such as a company, detachment, or team may be deployed in lieu of a JMISTF. One example would be the deployment of a MIS detachment headquarters to support a deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit conducting contingency operations (noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian relief, etc.). Functional and Military Service component commands request MISO support through the combatant command to the JS.

c. **MISO in Combined or Multinational Operations.** The SecDef may provide U.S. MIS forces for participation in combined or multinational military operations. U.S. MIS forces may remain under the OPCON of a U.S. commander, or, upon consideration and approval of the SecDef, may be assigned through transfer of authority procedures to a non-U.S. commander. OPCON of MIS forces will generally be the same as other U.S. forces participating in the operation. The SecDef will normally transfer OPCON of MIS forces to the supported CCDR in the EXORD and may authorize him to transfer OPCON to the JFC, to the senior U.S. military officer involved in the operation, or to a non-U.S. commander.

d. **MISO and CAIS.** MISO capabilities can be used to disseminate public information (not to conduct MISO) in support of designated lead Federal departments or agencies responding to natural disasters or security crises within the United States and its territories. The deployment of forces will be requested and approved in the same manner as any contingency operation. In conjunction with the deployment order, the JS will issue specific guidance for MIS forces, as well as the designated command and control (C2) authority for the mission-tailored CAIS component. During domestic crises, C2 of the MIS forces will normally be assigned to the designated JFC coordinating DOD assets under the lead Federal department or agency.
ENCLOSURE E

PRE-APPROVED MISO PROGRAMS

1. General: IAW reference d, CCDRs are authorized to execute the following MISO programs in support of SecDef-approved missions or operations and Unified Command Plan-directed activities. JS will review these programs annually to ensure they remain valid and seek USD(P) approval of any required revisions. These programs should be further developed prior to execution, including clear and observable MOE. MOE allow the commander to make timely adjustments to the MISO plan as required. CCDRs are authorized to use all current and emergent means of dissemination IAW published policies, programs, and plans.

2. Stability Operations.
   a. MISO Objectives.
      (1) Increase regional support and TA cooperation with U.S. policy objectives and military engagement IAW the TCP.
      (2) Reduce physical or moral support for violent extremist organizations.
      (3) Increase participation in institutions and process of good governance.
      (4) Increase compliance with international rule of law.
      (5) Increase participation in legitimate conflict resolution.
      (6) Decrease ethnic, religious, tribal, or cultural tensions or enmity.
      (7) Decrease tensions over competition for limited resources.
      (8) Increase compliance with international mandates for conflict termination or resolution.
   b. Themes to stress.
      (1) The United States is a credible, committed, and unbiased partner in promoting peaceful resolution to regional issues.
(2) The United States is committed to the cooperative advancement of human rights, economic prosperity, religious tolerance, and the alleviation of human suffering.

(3) The United States will act resolutely when regional stability, vital U.S. interests, or the sovereignty of allies and friends is threatened.


   a. MISO Objectives.

      (1) Increase professionalism and professional ethics within HN security forces.

      (2) Increase compliance of HN military forces with appropriate roles for the military in a democracy.

      (3) Increase HN public support for their security forces.

      (4) Increase acceptance of United States as a reliable, capable, and responsive security partner.

   b. Themes to Stress.

      (1) Service in the security forces is an honorable task and is vital to national security and regional stability.

      (2) Continued military-to-military cooperation programs are essential to regional stability and build international confidence in a mutual commitment to peace.

      (3) Security forces are committed to protecting the people.

      (4) Security forces will continue to be successful in defeating threats to stability.

      (5) Security forces are (or should become) honest and impartial professionals who uphold the rule of law.


   a. MISO Objectives.

      (1) Reduce incidents of smuggling of illicit materials.
(2) Increase cooperation with United States and HN maritime interdiction operations.

(3) Decrease attacks on international maritime commerce and transportation.

(4) Reduce interference with United States and coalition operations, minimize casualties, and protect the force.

(5) Reduce the number of criminals transitioning from smuggling to other forms of criminal activity.

b. Themes to Stress.

(1) Actions taken by the United States and HN are in compliance with international law.

(2) Trafficking of people, illicit goods, and arms promotes instability and often funds terrorist operations.

(3) Transportation of narcotics, illegal arms, and human trade negatively affects regional stability and economic growth.

(4) Compliance with United States and HN instructions will ensure your safety.


a. MISO Objectives.

(1) Reduce interference with United States and coalition operations.

(2) Decrease effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation, and other forms of political warfare against United States and coalition forces.

(3) Increase support for United States and coalition forces to protect citizens and accomplish their mission.

(4) Increase compliance with evacuation procedures.

b. Themes to Stress.

(1) Forces are in country only to withdraw selected noncombatants.

(2) Forces will depart upon mission completion.
(3) United States and coalition forces will remain impartial.

(4) United States and coalition forces will maintain resolve to complete designated operations successfully.

(5) United States and coalition forces will defend themselves and personnel under their protection.

(6) United States and coalition forces are operating under international law.


   a. MISO Objectives.

      (1) Increase positive reception and cooperation with U.S. assistance to HN.

      (2) Increase compliance with humanitarian directives and procedures to promote public order, safety, and health of affected populations.

      (3) Increase support for civil-military efforts following natural and/or man-made disasters.

      (4) Decrease casualties from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

      (5) Increase reporting of IEDs, mines and UXO.

      (6) Increase public participation in preventive health measures and other activities designed to lower the spread or occurrence of disease.

      (7) Reduce the existence or emergence of calls for violence or resistance to United States and international humanitarian assistance efforts, or other hostile propaganda.

   b. Themes to Stress.

      (1) The presence of United States, international relief organizations, and supporting military forces is designed to alleviate human suffering, to provide or restore essential services and to promote public order and safety.
(2) Compliance with emergency directives will speed access to recovery supplies and services, increase public order and hasten recovery and reconstruction efforts.

(3) United States and international humanitarian assistance forces and leadership are not empowered to make relocation or repatriation decisions.

(4) The international humanitarian assistance forces and local authorities provide timely, accurate, and credible information.

(5) The United States is providing support at the request of the HN.

(6) Demining supports national post-conflict reconciliation efforts.

(7) IEDs, mines and UXO kill and maim indiscriminately.

(8) Report IEDs, mines and UXO to proper authorities.

(9) Do not interfere with national and combined humanitarian efforts.

(10) Assistance will be provided as quickly as possible within the limits of HN and U.S. capabilities.

(11) Lawlessness and criminal activity will result in apprehension and full prosecution under the law.

7. **Counterdrug**.

   a. **MISO Objectives**.

      (1) Reduce illicit crop cultivation.

      (2) Decrease flow of illicit drugs.

      (3) Increase support for counternarcotics agencies and their efforts.

      (4) Increase participation in alternative development programs.

      (5) Decrease activities that finance, protect, cultivate, process, or transport illegal drugs.

      (6) Reduce effectiveness of propaganda against United States and PN counterdrug efforts.

   b. **Themes to Stress**.
(1) Illegal drug production and trafficking increases local crime and addiction.

(2) Illegal drug production and trafficking hinders international investment.

(3) Illegal drug production and trafficking leads to increased corruption.

(4) Cultivation of legal crops will assist in building a productive future for your community and your nation.

(5) The United States is providing support at the request of the PN.

(6) Do not interfere with counterdrug operations.

(7) Illegal drug production and trafficking negatively affects regional stability and economic growth.


   a. MISO Objectives.

      (1) Reduce interference with United States and coalition deployment and initial staging.

      (2) Decrease the effectiveness of hostile propaganda and disinformation against United States and coalition forces.

      (3) Increase support from neighboring states, regional organizations, and international organizations for United States and coalition forces.

      (4) Deter adversary initiation of hostilities.

   b. Themes to Stress.

      (1) Do not interfere with United States and coalition military operations.

      (2) U.S. forces are present to maintain regional stability and confront a direct threat to the safety of regional populations.

      (3) United States and coalition forces will maintain resolve to complete designated operations successfully.
(4) Do not take any action that may be interpreted as hostile to United States and coalition forces.

(5) United States actions are in compliance with international law.

(6) United States and coalition partners are reliable, responsive, and capable security partners for the region.

(7) United States and coalition partners are committed to ensuring the security and stability of the region.

9. Counter Illicit Trafficking.

a. MISO Objectives.

(1) Reduce incidents of illicit trafficking of weapons, persons, and goods.

(2) Increase reporting of illicit trafficking to appropriate law enforcement agencies.

(3) Reduce popular support for illicit trafficking.

(4) Increase support for rule of law.

(5) Increase participation in the United States and PN/HN rewards programs.

b. Themes to Stress.

(1) Illicit trafficking of people, goods, and weapons promotes instability and may fund terrorist operations.

(2) Illicit trafficking of people, goods, and weapons negatively affects regional stability and economic growth.

(3) Illicit trafficking increases local crime.

(4) Illicit trafficking hinders international investment and hurts local economies.

(5) Illicit trafficking leads to increased corruption.

(6) Illicit trafficking of people, goods, and weapons reduces local safety and security.
10. **Themes to Avoid (for all programs).**

   a. Ultimatums with no intent or capability to respond in the event of noncompliance.

   b. Implications that the United States is infringing on sovereignty.

   c. Themes that favor a specific country, nationality, religion, tribe, ethnic group, or race at the potential perceived detriment of another.

   d. Messages that promote the legitimacy of organizations or governments committing illegal acts or violations of international or domestic law.

   e. Themes that have a negative impact on legitimate exercise of peaceful religious tenets.

   f. Themes that recall or reflect colonialism.

   g. Themes that imply an inherent moral, cultural, or ideological superiority of the United States to local audiences.

   h. Unfounded accusations of atrocities.

11. **Potential TA List.** This is an intentionally broad list of foreign organizations, groups, or individuals that could potentially be influenced. It is neither all-inclusive nor in priority order. The specific TAs will be limited based upon the particular MISO program being executed and will be refined during the MISO development process to identify those foreign TAs that could accomplish the desired attitudinal or behavioral response, in support of MISO and the supported commander’s objectives. Commanders are responsible for ensuring the TAs are limited to those determined to be relevant during planning and execution.

   a. Key military decision makers;

   b. Specific units, organizations, or military capabilities;

   c. Potential military recruits or conscripts;

   d. Families of current or potential military members;

   e. Key political decision makers;

   f. Opposition leadership, rank and file members;
g. Key social, cultural, and political communicators;

h. Voting population;

i. Rural population of a specific geographic area;

j. Urban population of a specific city;

k. Local populations providing ideological or physical support to disruptive elements;

l. Criminal leaders and elements;

m. Males or females of a select age group;

n. Educators and intellectuals;

o. Law enforcement personnel;

p. Students;

q. Business elite and professional organizations;

r. Workers of a specific industry;

s. Population affected by natural or manmade disaster; or

t. Civil populations in proximity to U.S. forces or operations.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
ENCLOSURE F

REFERENCES


f. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 3 August 2007, “Policy for Combatant Command (COCOM) Regional Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences.”

g. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 8 June 2007, “Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet Activities.”

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