Hypothetical case history describing the power played or pressures required to overthrow an unfriendly government.
POWER MOVES INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW
OF AN UNFRIENDLY GOVERNMENT

HISTORICAL RECORD
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NOTE

The following hypothetical case history describing the power plays or pressures required to overthrow an unfriendly government should not be construed as related to any particular country or set of actual circumstances. It is intended only as an example of how various operational techniques may be employed in a closely integrated concerted manner to achieve a definite objective, as well as some of the adversities which might be expected to develop during the conduct of an operation.
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POWER MOVES INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW
-OF AN UNFRIENDLY GOVERNMENT-

TARGET

An unfriendly government is controlled covertly by the Communists and represents a threat to the security and welfare of the U.S. Government.

DESCRIPTION OF THE TARGET

Population: About 3,500,000. Some 2,000,000 are peasants or otherwise non-politically conscious; about 1,000,000 are politically conscious but apathetic towards change; 200,000 are roughly in active support of the Communist controlled government; about 300,000 are passively in opposition; and only about 5,000 are willing to "do" something about a change.

Armed Forces: After some ten years of Communist penetration and influence, the armed forces have been effectively neutralized as an opposition factor. The President of the country is a strong-willed leader who is capable of exercising personal control over the armed forces and is in complete sympathy with the Communist apparatus which controls the country. The armed forces consist of a small, semi-mechanized army of 7,000, poorly equipped and trained. The U.S. Army has provided a training mission in the country for the past five years. A territorial guard system exists for mobilizing national guard type units in an emergency. There is no navy of consequence. The air force has a distinct pro-American attitude; it numbers about 700 men and 36 aircraft. The estimated mobilization strength at D plus ten is 10,000 men.

Security: The Communist controlled police force and special intelligence services are superior to any other in the entire region. They have demonstrated their effectiveness in the past by exposing and subduing over thirty attempted coups against the government. At the start of this operation they have developed security measures slightly short of denied area conditions, which permits freedom of speech and movement - but under surveillance. The national police force, numbering about 3,000 men, has been favored over the armed forces in receiving arms and equipment.

Paramilitary: The oldest and most concentrated effort of the Communists has been in the labor field where they have maintained control for almost ten years. Using unionism as a cover, there is evidence that the Communists have attempted to organize and train elements in partisan type warfare. Recent intelligence reveals many arms caches throughout the country and supports an estimated strength of about 20,000 armed and trained partisans.
Economic: The country is primarily agricultural, with one basic commodity and one secondary commodity, which together form the basic economic structure. Both commodities are marketed almost exclusively in the United States. Almost all manufactured products are imported from the United States. Thus the economy of this country is completely tied to the United States. The Communist government in recent years has exploited this situation fully and succeeded in expropriating large tracts of American owned agricultural property. The obvious intention is to nationalize all means of production and re-orient the country's economy to Europe - possibly to Eastern Europe.

Subversive: The International Communist Party has developed a base of operations of serious proportions in the target country. From this sanctuary, the Communists have been able to direct subversive operations in neighboring countries as well as in all other countries of the community of nations to which it belongs. There exists a real danger that if not checked in the immediate future the Communists will be able to subvert neighboring countries, thus forming a new Communist bloc which would be a threat to the safety and welfare of the United States.

DESCRIPTION OF FRIENDLY ASSETS: (Before Operations)

General: The 2,000,000 non-political element of the population, although subjected to constant Communist pressure, is a neutral segment of the population. The 300,000 individuals believed to be passively opposed to the target regime are the greatest latent force for the stimulation of passive resistance and later active opposition to the Communists. This segment of the society, once stimulated, could be expected to influence the second largest segment of roughly one million politically conscious but apathetic individuals. The core of about 5,000, who are believed to be willing to take active part against the Communists, is the greatest potential catalyst notwithstanding its present disorganization and lack of leadership. Geographically, the bulk of anti-Communists are located in the capital city, in the principal port and in the rural provinces northwest of the capital.

Intelligence: There are no high level penetrations or formal intelligence assets in existence. The Station has a small number of witting informants and numerous contacts in the anti-Communist elements which have not been exploited thus far. The principal agent, in exile, and his second or deputy p/a claim numerous contacts and agents, but these have not been exploited or formalized to date. Thus, at the outset, there is a serious dearth of intelligence assets.

Psy-War: Within the target city there is a small group of anti-Communist students who have been carrying out certain psy-war activities and, although responsive to Station influence, thus far remain outside the latter's control and do not constitute a formal asset.
They number about 150 and have excellent contact with all identifiable anti-Communist elements in the target country. They publish an anti-Communist weekly tabloid and conduct periodic radio programs. This group is completely overt and not fully identified to date. Loosely affiliated with this group are student groups in exile in two bordering countries which conduct similar anti-Communist propaganda directed at the target regime. The press in general and several radio stations are at the moment completely independent. These organs are extremely cautious in editorial content in order to avoid government restrictions, but in general follow a clearly anti-Communist policy line.

**Paramilitary:** At the outset of this problem there are no clearly defined paramilitary assets within the target area. There are about 300 aggressive individuals in exile in neighboring countries who have not been clearly identified to date but who may be considered as potential paramilitary assets and would respond to the leadership of the deputy p/a. These men represent a cross section of outcasts, some political, some criminal and some ideological. Many of these exiles had been involved in previous attempts to overthrow the Communist regime. In general their morale is low and their degree of preparation practically zero. Nevertheless this group is an excellent potential paramilitary factor.

**ANALYSIS**

**General:** From the foregoing, certain essential factors appear evident, namely: The numerical advantage, population-wise, is on the friendly side; the organizational and disciplinary aspects are unquestionably on the side of the target or the enemy-to-be; the economic controls are within the grasp of friendly forces; the armed strength is preponderantly in favor of the enemy; the press in general is independent, thus favorably inclined towards anti-Communism.

**Operational Assets:** Although there are advantages and disadvantages present in major proportions, the most serious deficiency is in the almost complete absence of real, tangible, controlled operational assets upon which to base a sound operational program. Thus, all assets must be regarded as potential and subject to assessment only after a period of development.

**Target's Vulnerabilities:** The Communist minority in a predominantly Catholic country is maintained in power only through its penetration of the sources of power in the government and not by popular acclaim. The keystone of this power is believed to be the President who alone controls the Army. The second vulnerable point is the economic dependence on the United States as a market for its produce and the source for finished products.
Conclusion: Although the target is vulnerable to popular opposition and the Communist control of the sources of power is chiefly manifested in its control over the President, the numerically larger anti-Communist element is thoroughly disunited and lacking in cohesion. Also, all operational assets are only potential, and do not exist as tangible, controlled operational assets. The economic control over the country rests within friendly hands. Due to the numerous attempts against the target regime and the open denunciation of its Communitic character, the element of surprise is practically non-existent from the beginning of this operation.

**STRAFEOY**

Discussion: The principal advantage in friendly hands is economic control. However, to reduce the government to such serious economic straits as to force its capitulation would require actions which would be identified as strictly American economic interference in the affairs of a smaller nation, hence thoroughly reprehensible as related to the foreign relations of the United States in this area.

The same reason which precludes economic strangulation applies to direct or overt military action or pressure. Although direct military action would not need to be on a large scale, any application of this force or threat to do so would only incur the severest antagonism of all friendly small nations and expose our government to propaganda attacks of the Kremlin. Such unilateral or even multilateral use of force is therefore discarded.

The elimination of the two most positive means of removing the Communists from this target country leaves only covert/clandestine procedures for consideration and imposes the condition of plausible denial.

Strategy: The application of covert/clandestine procedures requires the basic recognition that the enemy possesses predominant strength in organized, disciplined numbers and arms plus the advantage of governmental powers. To offset these formidable, real advantages enjoyed by the target, it is necessary that a program be developed which would encompass a series of pressure or power plays on an ever-increasing plane of intensity, which somewhere along the way should provide the appropriate combination of factors to dispose of the incumbent President, and suffice to exploit this situation by expelling the Communists while being prepared to consolidate all gains as rapidly as possible. These power maneuvers should permit the exercise of ranging from a "fool's mate" to a "scholar's mate" to the most difficult end pressures possible or necessary to satisfactorily conclude the operation. The program should envision the easiest to the hardest means, the shortest length of time to the longest time necessary, and above all, it should be designed to achieve ultimate success once committed. In essence, the strategy for this operation should be
based upon the imponderable factor of uncertainty as to how much effort or what particular technique or combination of techniques would be required to achieve the objective. Therefore to avoid a piecemeal trial-and-error approach, a program of action should be adopted which would concentrate the entire gamut of maneuvers in the shortest possible period in order to derive the maximum, pragmatic effect of each maneuver upon the next, thus developing and sustaining tension until further resistance to the pressure becomes intolerable and the enemy succumbs to the anti-Communist forces thus created. The overthrow must be complete and thorough in order to remove all danger of an early counter-attack which would undo the efforts and possibly result in an even more severe and serious situation than originally existed. Complete success must be ensured.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

THE PROGRAM

General: Having established the basic strategy for the operation it becomes immediately apparent that the techniques and procedures employed to fulfill this concept of conduct must be equally unorthodox. If pressure is to be developed and sustained against the target in order to create tension, then it also follows that the operation must be pursued on a "top operational priority" basis throughout. The preponderant strength and advantages of the target both physical and disciplinary are so formidable that only through the employment of the highest form of covert/clandestine techniques in the maximum degree of integration will it become possible to realize the technical or professional superiority required to overcome the target. Thus, in essence, the weapon to be used must be a psychological one. The intelligence collection must contribute to the psychological analysis of the target. The propaganda employed must contribute to the audio and visual stimulation of the audience at which it is directed. The employment of paramilitary factors or forces must constitute the psychophysical element of creating physical conditions as required in order to stimulate the desired psychological reaction of the target audience or individuals. All effort toward defection of key target individuals must be consistent with the foregoing factors in order to culminate in action at the apex of psychological timing.

Timing: At the outset of an operation of this nature with nothing but potential assets on hand and no certainty as to exactly how much effort may be required, it would be unrealistic to establish a rigid performance schedule in terms of deadlines. Nevertheless, it is important to have certain factors present and in line as the program develops or else suffer the consequences of having one aspect
ready and others far from being developed at the time required. Also, it is important to recognize that the premature development of certain factors might prejudice the timing of the operations thereby losing their effectiveness. Upon consideration of the psychological temperament of the people in this hypothetical situation, it will be assumed, as in most nationalities, that they are capable of being highly aroused under proper stimulation but are not capable of sustaining this state of mind for any extended period of time. This assumption, when weighed against the strategic concept for the conduct of this operation, logically dictates the restriction that the anti-Communist population should not be aroused prematurely and that the tension not be extended too long. This timing factor, added to the predictable time required to develop specific assets under normal conditions, permits the reasonable conclusion that the operation could be launched and brought to a state of readiness within about six months. However, in order to retain maximum flexibility to adjust to events and unforeseen circumstances it is considered more elastic if the six month period is not written into a tight schedule but rather that the period be divided into stages of development without regard to the exact time required to achieve the objectives of each stage. In this manner, by setting limited objectives by stages, it is possible to ensure the orderly development of the program and guard against premature or abortive action.

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT:

Stage One: Objectives -

a. Determine staff requirements, procuring and assigning personnel to specific tasks.

b. Conduct field and headquarters assessment of friendly assets.

c. Conduct field and headquarters assessment of enemy capabilities.

d. Determine communications requirements.

e. Prepare detailed operational plans for Stage Two.

Stage Two: Objectives - (D-7)

a. Establish field installations.

b. Initiate preliminary psychological conditioning of target.

c. Develop tactical and psychological intelligence collection system.
d. Initiate defection activities.

e. Commence monitoring target's military commo circuits.

f. Initiate formalization of and training of paramilitary forces.

g. Commence implementation of communications plans.

h. Establish control over friendly propaganda assets propagating themes to discredit the target regime and encourage patience and hope among anti-Communists.

i. Initiate action toward establishment of a clandestine radio.

j. Develop psychological pressures in border countries against target regime.

k. Prepare logistical and air support plans.

l. Prepare detailed operational plans for Stage Three.

Stage Three: Objectives - (About D-75)

a. Complete paramilitary cadre training and commence expansion into teams.

b. Establish clandestine radio facilities and prepare programming.

c. Exploit friendly propaganda media to develop antagonism against target regime, fan passive will to resist.

d. Employ psychological economic pressure, develop internal economic pressures.

e. Stimulate international opinion among Western nations against target regime, accentuate psychological pressures from border countries.

f. Develop distribution and organizational procedures within friendly psy-war media.

g. Develop and propagate a political philosophy for the anti-Communists - something to be FOR.
h. Implement a psychological action in a third country placing blame on target regime - diversion.

i. Confine defection prospects to most likely key individuals and concentrate upon their defection - in place.

j. Implement preliminary phase of logistical/air support plans.

k. Continue communications agent R/O training.

l. Prepare detailed operational plans for Stage Four.

**Stage Four: Objectives** (About D-26)

a. Deploy partisan organizers and sabotage teams.

b. Organize shock teams and special squads.

c. Assign agent R/O's to units and establish commo plans and systems.

d. Activate arms infiltration plan.

e. Develop fighter/bomber contingency capability.

f. Activate clandestine radio program.

g. Prepare radio intrusion/deception plans against target's military communications system.

h. Exploit psy-war media to accentuate divisionist activity, stimulate fear rumors, develop symbol of resistance, invoke religious disapproval of Communist regime, incite passive resistance.

i. Execute an extensive, pre-planned character assassination plot against key persons in target regime.

j. Implement pre-arranged regional international conference to condemn Communist domination of target country.

k. Prepare advance depots for air support in final phase.

l. Finalize defection commitments and attempt a bloodless coup d'état.
m. Prepare plans for a provisional government to replace target regime.

n. Prepare final plans in detail for an all-out showdown of strength and determination, Stage Five.

Stage Five: Objectives - (D Day to V Day)

a. Assuming target has not capitulated and force is required, then the prepared sabotage plan would be implemented; special squads would carry out elimination of key target personnel assignments.

b. Simultaneously with above, air supply drops would be completed to partisan teams not otherwise supplied.

c. Upon completion of initial air supply to partisans the shock teams would be in place on respective targets and initiate attack plans.

d. The clandestine radio would cover the above physical acts by initiating its prepared notional broadcasts, denoting great strength and reporting enemy defections, etc.

e. The planned elimination of the target's communications system of landlines by the sabotage teams should force reliance on the military radio system which would then result in the activation of the intrusion/deception radio unit in anticipation of destroying or deceiving this military system.

f. The psy-war media would implement its tactical psy-war teams and carry out assigned tasks.

g. Intelligence collection efforts would be concentrated on tactical and psychological intelligence.

h. Defection plan for forcing an internal coup d'etat would be pressed with greatest effort aided by all the internal and external pressures set in motion at this time.

i. Air striking power would be readied for deployment against tactical and strategical targets of greatest psycho-physical impact.

j. External, international propaganda in friendly Western nations would be accentuated in favor of anti-Communist forces.
k. A cease-fire ultimatum would be in readiness for broadcast at the appropriate psychological moment coincident with the internal coup d'état by defection elements.

l. The provisional government plan would be held in readiness for immediate implementation.

m. Above forces and pressures would be steadily increased until the target regime is forced to collapse internally and the anti-Communist forces are able to seize the power of government.

Stage Six: Objective - (V + 1)

a. Implement provisional government plan seizing all authority and control.

b. Implement immediate round up of all dangerous Communists and collaborators, instituting strict security measures throughout.

c. Grant amnesty to all political prisoners held by Communist regime.

d. Proclaim restoration of rights and freedoms of the individual and the institution of full democratic principles of government at the earliest possible moment.

e. Collect documentary evidence of the Communist control over former regime.

f. Initiate proceedings to install long range high level intelligence and psy-war assets in the new government, with the objective of preventing a return of Communist control or penetration of the new government or a possible counter-attack.

g. Terminate special operations.

**ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONS**

Staff Headquarters: Having established the strategic concept for guidance of the operation and formulated a program interpreting the concept in terms of specific courses of action, it is essential to design the staff organization in such a manner as to provide the best support possible with the minimum number of individuals and the most effective means of control and direction. Accordingly, it is
manifest that the operation should be controlled outside the Station of the target country and that all stations which would have any major part in the support of the operation in neighboring or nearby countries should be organized as a regional command to ensure maximum priority and coordination of effort for the duration of the special operation. Thus, in essence, a special task force approach is considered necessary and desirable. The headquarters of the task force should be located in the most convenient place outside of the Agency, under a cover, but within the continental limits of the United States. As this field headquarters would direct the regional command of field stations concerned in the operation, its cover should permit its proper function in this regard, and its location should provide the best possible means of communication and travel with respect to the regional command. The composition of the Staff headquarters should be as follows:

Chief of Project
Chief of Operations
Pay-war Section
Paramilitary Section
Intelligence Section
Air Section
Operational Research Section
Security Section
Support Section (including Personnel, Finance, Logistics and Administration)
Communications Sections

Field Organization: All field stations assigned to the regional command would constitute component elements and be responsible for the conduct of operations specifically assigned to the respective stations. Owing to the third country concept involved, in which operations are developed or based in other countries for employment in or at a given target country, there would be certain special operations which would be directed exclusively by the task force headquarters outside the control of the local stations. The entire regional command would thus constitute an operational area subdivided by the areas of responsibility of the respective field stations within which special independent operations of an inter-intra country nature might be conducted all under the control of the task force or regional command headquarters located outside of the region concerned. This system permits tight compartmentation within and among operations and a high degree of direct control by the responsible staff headquarters.

Cover Organization: It was assumed above that previous operational effort had developed a p/a among the exiles who in turn had a deputy p/a of some stature among the paramilitary exiles. This is
a reasonable assumption, but if not present at the outset of the operation it is certainly reasonable to assume that such persons could be found and developed to p/a status. Therefore, a cover organization should be devised which would permit covert sponsorship of their cause thereby enabling development of the mechanics and assets required to launch the operation. In this instance it is assumed that the p/a is satisfied with a simple explanation that a large group of American businessmen engaged in combatting Communism wherever possible, and who desire anonymity, have taken a great interest in the target country and are willing to provide the technical and financial help necessary to overthrow the target regime. This group, hereinafter referred to only as "Group," has professional personnel and resources at its disposal to support the p/a and his deputy without any strings attached. A compatible partnership might be developed wherein the p/a and deputy would provide the indigenous requirements of such an undertaking.

It is further assumed that the above cover story is adopted and a partnership is thus formed. For the sake of terminology, this partnership shall be called the "Council" and the p/a and his deputy shall be called the "Exile Committee" as the counterpart to the "Group." With this beginning, an entire dual structure may be formed with Case Officers being assigned to specific tasks involving the Exile Committee as advisors, technicians or instructors, all allegedly employed by the Group and using pseudonyms. The Council provides the meeting ground for broad plans and decisions and permits the Staff to exercise its influence under the guise of the Group. In this manner, plausible denial becomes possible and no inference of official connections should be permitted to seep into the relationship. It is important to spell out a definite set of principles and negotiate terms of agreement with the Exile Committee before actually commencing field operations. Further, it is important that the Exile Committee be kept compartmented from all operations not involving its personnel and that the Committee agree to and exercise strict compartmentation within and among its own operations.

**Independent Operations:** To avoid reliance on one basket containing all the eggs, and to achieve maximum compartmentation of operations, it is desirable to develop unilaterally as many separate mechanisms or assets as possible through the field stations. This is particularly desirable in the case of defection operations. Therefore all potential assets which have not been identified as involved or controlled by the Exile Committee should constitute independent operations.

**Establishment of Operations:** Having carefully noted the established strategic concept and the proposed program providing the course of action contemplated for this operation, by projecting same against
DIAGRAMMATIC OUTLINES OF ORGANIZATIONS:
Regional Command Structure

INFORMATION CHANNELS
SECRET
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

TASK FORCE HQS

GROUP

COUNCIL

EXILE COMMITTEE

AMERICAN
STATION A
STATION B
STATION C
STATION/TARGET

CUTOUTS

INDIGENOUS
EXILES IN A
EXILES IN B
EXILES IN C
TARGET ASSETS

P/A's

P/A, TASK 1
P/A, TASK 2
P/A, TASK 3
ETC.

ETC.

TASK 1, CASE OFFICER

TASK 2, " "

TASK 3, " "

ETC.
the assessment of potential friendly assets it is possible to conclude what mechanisms or assets are required and from what indigenous source these assets might be expected to be developed. These indigenous resources would undoubtedly include both those affiliated in some manner with the Exile Committee and those previously developed by the field stations. In any event it would be possible to define each mechanism in terms of a particular p/a, purpose, objective, requirements, estimated cost, responsible staff officer, and American cut-out. For any desired mechanism which does not have readily identifiable, potential, indigenous personnel available at the moment, it should be established as a requirement to be met. Each mechanism should be identified in the foregoing manner, classified as a "Task" and given a serial designation for reference purposes, i.e., T-1, T-2, etc. If certain assets are already established as approved projects and are required to support this special operation, the Task Force Headquarters should have authority to re-define such assets or projects in terms of specific tasks as above. This system provides an easy method of clearly defining all mechanisms or functions required to support the operation as well as providing means of budget forecasting, disbursing and accounting for funds, compartmentation, definition of responsibility and exercise of control and other advantages. The following may provide examples of some specific tasks which would be required to support this operation:

T-1: Develop internal psychological intelligence collection net.

T-2: Develop external, tactical intelligence net into target country.

T-3: Establish paramilitary field headquarters in Country A.

T-4: Establish covert paramilitary cadre training school in Country B.

T-5: Establish covert agent R/O training school in Country B.

T-6: Develop psy-war teams in target country.

T-7: Develop external psy-war teams in Country A directed at target country. (Also separate task for Country C.)

T-8: Develop clandestine radio team for Country B (and separate tasks for teams using overt facilities in Countries A, B and C).
T-9: Develop clandestine radio facilities in Country B (and a separate task for an emergency facility of Location X).

T-10: Develop radio monitoring team for intrusion/deception of target's military channels, Country B.

T-11: Develop plan for convoking an international anti-Communist conference in a nearby country outside of regional command.

T-12: Develop fighter/bomber contingency capability for basing in Country B.

T-13: Develop independent defection plan for target country.

T-14: Develop an indigenous creative writing staff for production of propaganda material.

**TACTICAL PLANNING**

**GENERAL TACTICS:**

Proceeding from the foregoing developments and attempting to translate the concept of strategy in terms of tactics, the latter may be defined broadly as follows:

**Defection:** It must be assumed that the Exile Committee, being composed of known conspirators, would have little if any opportunity of attempting the defection of the President or key personalities around him. Therefore a special effort should be made to establish separate contact for this purpose. The Task designed for this purpose would have the broad mission of defecting the President if possible; if not, to organize a clique around the President which could be defected in place to be ready to establish an internal coup d'état at the right moment. In addition to this separate defection effort, every possible means of exploiting the Exile Committee's opportunities for defecting military units should be carried out on a continuous systematic basis. The defection of the President and his means of power, the armed forces, should constitute the first and most important tactical objective. Success in defecting these elements could mean the difference between a bloodless coup and a prolonged civil war.

**Division:** The target's greatest strength lies in its unity of purpose, discipline and control of the powers of government.
If defection fails (and of course full reliance should not be placed on its success), every possible means must be employed to create divisions within the Communist ranks, between the Communists and the President, as well as between the ruling regime and the public. This activity should be conducted simultaneously with the defection plan as its success would have a definite pragmatic effect upon the susceptibility of key individuals to defection. Divisionist operations should be pursued with great energy and resourcefulness in order to weaken and divide the enemy in event greater pressures must be applied later to capitulate the target government. Divisionary techniques are largely psy-war functions and should include the entire gamut on an ever increasing plane of intensity, avoiding sporadic fits and starts, which contribute very little individually. These techniques should be applied against the entire spectrum of society, religion, education, labor, economics, government, diplomatic, military, ideology, national and international.

Deception: It was assumed as a condition that the target was aware of present and past efforts to overthrow the government and if the Exile leaders are such in fact they too must be known to the target regime as conspirators. Under these conditions and for normal reasons of protection, careful attention must be applied to the problem of creating as much deception as possible in order either to divert or to deceive the target of the true facts. In most cases there is usually more than one self-styled leader of the opposition either in the country or in exile. Thus, if such a person could be identified it would be possible to use him and his following as decoys for the activities of the Exile Committee. It is assumed for the purpose of this problem that such a would-be leader could be developed as the notional threat to the target regime. In this manner it would be possible to channel deception as to intentions and make certain the target receives it by employing other channels known either as doubled or outright target channels. This and other techniques should be employed to deceive the enemy as to the true nature of the opposition and its intentions. A specific plan of action should be prepared to deceive the enemy during the attack period which would deliberately create, propaganda-wise, a completely notional situation alleging great strength of friendly forces while depicting large losses and defection of enemy forces. This notional propaganda would have to be sustained until sufficient acceptable truth could be injected to provide substance in favor of the friendly forces.
Diversions: Although the deception technique mentioned above regarding the development of an artificial leader or front movement to screen the real anti-Communist movement also constitutes a diversionary operation, there are other techniques which may be employed which would provide clear diversion of the target enemy from the actual source of support for the operation, vis. the United States. Aside from the importance of diverting or deceiving the enemy it is also of considerable importance to deceive or cast doubt as to the identity of the actual strength behind the revolutionary movement. The audience in this instance would be other friendly powers or Western countries who would find serious objection if it became known that the United States covertly supported the overthrow of a small foreign government despite its Communist character. Further, there is a psychological advantage to be gained if the anti-Communist population can recognize the support of other nations for their cause. This can be accomplished by several means, but mainly through involving as many third countries as possible in some identifiable operation concerning the movement against the target regime.

Destruction: Whereas the strategic concept makes allowance for every possible means short of bloodshed to accomplish the objective of overthrowing the Communist regime, nevertheless the condition imposed in the concept of ensuring success once committed to action also imposes the necessity of planning and preparing for the ultimate destruction of the target by aggressive action should this be required. The assessment in this instance clearly defined the target regime and the Communists as being firmly entrenched after ten years and surviving over thirty attempts to dislodge them. The President has been depicted as a strong-willed leader completely in sympathy with the Communists and in full control of the armed forces. These significant factors justify forcing the conclusion that despite the best efforts to defect, divide or otherwise eliminate the problem, in the end only real, tangible pressure in terms of force of arms may suffice to gain the objective. Therefore a plan of destruction should be prepared and developed throughout the operation which should be in readiness after all other means fail, to commit total sabotage and engage in open partisan warfare. This final plan of action should be designed for complete success regardless of the length of time involved or the reverses suffered in doing so.
APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUES

DEFECTION:

Coup d'etat by Defection: Consistent with the strategic concept, an operation should be planned to assign the most mature, experienced, professional senior officer available and to prepare him thoroughly for the task of entering the target country completely independent of the field station, less communications, with the objective of devoting the necessary time and effort to establish a system for defection. His optimum mission would be to organize clandestinely a small clique of influential army officers whom he had defected in place, so as to gain control over one or more regiments in the capital city and thereby effect a bloodless coup d'etat. A possibly second optimum mission, although recognized as most improbable, would be to establish the defection of the President, in place, and through him move against the Communists gradually but thoroughly and thereby remove the real menace to security and obliquely attain the objective. The Case Officer should be properly documented and provided with a plausible cover story. He should be authorized the fullest use of funds to accomplish his mission and to infer that he is personally backed by very influential and powerful anonymous individuals and/or organizations. He should be given the fullest support possible and authorized to confirm and employ any or all assets within the target country which he may require to fulfill his mission. It should be expected that he would employ every known technique and be capable of exercising unusual resourcefulness and ingenuity in carrying out his mission. Although full support would be given to this Case Officer, at the same time it is assumed that the Exile Committee would have definite capabilities of this nature. Therefore a second defection effort should be made, working through the contacts and agents within this exile organization, to determine the possibilities of developing defectors in place who could later be incorporated in joint action with the independent defection plan or become capable of achieving the same objectives as the latter. The task force headquarters intelligence section would provide the clearing house for defection targets in order to avoid or minimize the danger of both elements trying to defect the same persons. Every effort should be made to seek out special personalities who by virtue of their position or past relationship with the President or other key target individuals might possess particular influence which would aid in achieving the desired defections. In summary, every conceivable effort should be made through all means and resources to achieve a bloodless coup d'etat short of direct, official, U. S. intervention.
PARTISAN WARFARE:

General: Consistent with the above rationale on destruction, simultaneous with the expenditure of effort on defection, diversionary activities, deception and diversionary maneuvers, as outlined in the program, a plan of action should be developed toward the establishment of a partisan or paramilitary capability. Before considering the specific elements required in a partisan organization, it is well to reexamine the given characteristics of the target. It was assumed that 5,000 individuals could be classified as willing to "do something" 300,000, although unorganized, as opposed to Communism, and about a million politically conscious people as apathetic and not particularly in favor of Communism. If the enemy's maximum estimated strength including non-combatant civilians could be safely considered as less than 200,000, then it is reasonable to presume that numerically the anti-Communists were far superior and only needed organization, discipline and arms to turn the tide in a partisan war. However, as the main strength of the enemy lies in his control of the armed forces, and defection should not be relied upon completely, it is important to give first consideration to this greatest source of enemy opposition.

Partisan Organization: It is assumed that the army has one large garrison in each state and that there are eight states in the target country including the capital which would normally have the largest military installations. It is also assumed that the largest single concentration of anti-Communists is in the capital, therefore it should be the main target of all effort. However, to avoid the dangers of a counterattack in force from the nearby states, and to gain the psychological impact of a nation-wide uprising, thus tying down the garrisons all over the country, an overall plan should be devised. A compartmented plan by states or garrisons would have the added advantage of providing support to the capital city from whatever garrisons are defeated. It must be assumed therefore that a carefully planned partisan attack coupled with a prearranged defection in place of key elements within, garrison by garrison, must meet with success in one or more garrisons if ultimate success is to be attained. Therefore, the general partisan plan should be by garrisons, with the greatest emphasis being placed on the garrisons of the capital city.

Essential Elements of Partisan Organization: The following elements should be developed according to the respective garrisons as targets of concentration:

Organisers: Trained leaders capable of entering a garrison area who, through the locally identified friendly elements, would
attempt to organize cells for pre-designated purposes as required for each respective target. They should also be qualified to provide instruction in weapons and partisan warfare.

Saboteurs: Trained sabotage leaders should be prepared to enter garrison areas "black" if necessary, to carry out predetermined sabotage operations.

Shock Teams: Leader-type personnel should be selected and trained to organize and lead commando style attacks on certain selected garrison targets to supplement internal partisan forces. Each team should have its own radio message center section.

Tactical Psy-war Teams: For each target garrison a separate tactical psy-war team should be formed capable of handling press and radio facilities as well as conducting leaflet, mural and rumor campaigns under attack conditions.

Tactical and Psych. Intelligence Nets: A separate net should be developed for each target garrison to provide the tactical and psychological intelligence required to support local operations and properly to inform command headquarters.

Blocking Teams: Leaders should be trained to organize specific blockade forces to isolate certain target garrisons by erecting road and/or railroad blocks between garrisons or points of likely reinforcement.

Radio Message Center: A radio operator and cryptographic team should be selected and trained to serve within each target garrison complex as the clandestine message center for proper coordination of the above elements.

The Target Garrison Complex: Consistent with the above tactical determination to concentrate all operational effort on a garrison-by-garrison basis, it is important to recognize that all garrisons do not merit the same effort or degree of organization. As an example, assume in this case that the terrain and land communications or rail and road systems would preclude the reinforcement of certain garrisons by others within a reasonable period of time. In such case it would be adequate simply to provide a locally organized partisan force to harass and contain the garrison, attempting its defection if possible for the psychological effect it would have on the target regime. In order to provide for the maximum support of the internal operations in the capital city, it would be advantageous to concentrate secondary defection efforts on the target garrisons nearest to the friendly base.
TARGET GARRISON COMPLEX

GARRISON

URBAN AREA

RURAL AREA

CLANDESTINE RADIO MESSAGE CENTER

ORGANIZER

BLOCKADE TEAMS

INTELLIGENCE TEAM

TACTICAL PSY-WAR TEAM

SABOTAGE TEAM

SHOCK TEAM

R/O
of operations. In addition to defection efforts on these garrisons particular attention should be devoted to the maximum development of partisan elements in the immediate area of these targets. Coupled with this effort should be the preparation of specific shock teams to initiate and support the attack from the outside. Accordingly, the organizational complex for each target garrison would constitute variations of the illustrative chart (page 22) which would apply particularly to the capital city garrisons and key border garrisons selected to support the capital operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:

General: The important mission of stimulating the unorganized, more or less apathetic majority of the people to political consciousness, then to passive resistance, and ultimately to aggressive action is the crux of the entire problem, providing internal defection of the key target person or a coup d'etat is not successful. Relatively few actions, if any, may be considered truly independent or self-sustaining. The attitude of the people is of vital importance throughout an operation. Even the successful defection of the President or a bloodless military coup d'etat would not have a lasting effect against a militant Communist minority unless sustained by an aroused anti-Communist majority. Consistent with the outline of the program adopted above, an ever-increasing tempo of psychological pressure must be developed and sustained, utilizing every technique of covert/clandestine psy-war: Controlled press, radio, leaflets, murals, rumors, character assassination plots, and, ultimately, tactical psy-war in support of partisan warfare. A deliberately calculated plan of action should be prepared at the beginning of the operation which would serve as a guide for themes to be employed so as to be able to gauge each effort as part of the whole and thus avoid premature, inflammatory arousal of the people as well as lags or drops in morale which might seriously prejudice the ultimate aim of being ready at the right time. Chart on Page 21 shows proposed scale of tension to be followed in the psy-war themes of this operation.

Clanstdine Radio: Due to the obviously sensational effect of a clandestine radio, it is important to time its entry close enough to the final phase to achieve the maximum impact and establish its status as the "voice of freedom" or the official voice of the anti-Communist forces. Further, delay in going on the air affords opportunity to develop press and leaflet media and other operational assets such as the psychological intelligence system, all of which contribute greatly to the effectiveness of the clandestine radio. Although the Exile Committee should have knowledge of the clandestine
radio and be asked to support it personnel-wise, the physical location of the station should be kept from the Committee if possible and the control over the program content should remain firmly in the hands of the Task Force Headquarters through the latter's case officer. A special feature of the program should consist of alleged operational broadcasts. Code names should be given to real and notional underground or partisan teams in order to provide personalized guidance in preparation for partisan warfare, when the clandestine radio might well prove to be the only effective means of communication between the alleged revolutionary headquarters and the partisan elements. The broadcast of these real and notional instructions should have the effect of alarming and harassing the enemy and contribute to the development of imaginary strength far beyond the facts.

Character Assassination Plot: Although the use of character assassination as a regular technique in the controlled press and clandestine radio should be fully exploited, in addition, to create the maximum impact, a special plot should be designed and targeted against one of the key individuals in the target regime. This may be done by selecting a target official, weaving an imaginary plot around the actual facts of his life, and developing a situation which would make it appear that he is involved in an international group which has designs for overthrow of the government. Once the pattern of action is determined, a series of blind cablegrams should be sent from a number of countries which would appear meaningless until they are all placed together. The cable pattern would indicate an international effort to smuggle arms into the target country and clearly pinpoint the target individual as the key person in the plot. It may be assumed that the target government, in its exercise of close surveillance, would see the cablegrams and be able to reconstruct the plot, thus casting considerable doubt on the target individual which might possibly result in his removal from office. The story should not be exploited in the independent press until it has leaked sufficiently from government sources. Success would depend largely on the individual official selected as the target. If it serves no other purpose, it should contribute to the divisionary efforts of the psy-war program by weakening or destroying the Presidents confidence in one of his key officials.

Diversionary Third Country Plot: Having established as a given premise that the Communists intend to or have used the target country as a base for operations into other countries, in view of the need for providing arms of a foreign make to arm the partisan underground, it is important to execute a diversionary psy-war plot in a third country. The importance in this instance could be two-fold: First, to highlight the danger of Communism in the target country to its
neighboring countries, thus stimulating opposition by third countries; and second, presuming Soviet-made rifles are to be used to arm the underground (because of their easy availability and for other reasons), exposure of these rifles in a third country would set the stage in such a manner as to preclude or provide advance discreditation to any subsequent exposure of such arms as might be captured from partisan supplies. With these conditions and objectives in mind a plot should be carefully planned and timed to precede the actual infiltration of the foreign arms to the partisan underground. In this instance, a third country is selected where indigenous assets exist, such as Country B, and, on the strictest need to know basis, a cache of these arms is buried in this country a short distance from the ocean beach. Immediately prior to this burial an article, planted in the press of another country outside the regional command but bordering on the same ocean as Country B reports the sighting of several unidentified submarines off its coast. Subsequent articles of a similar vein are planted in other adjacent countries, as well as in Country B, regarding sightings of unidentified submarines. One of these articles should cite an official American naval source as denying the presence of American submarines in these waters recently enough to be involved. In this manner press speculation will have been aroused over these sightings of submarines. At this moment a story is planted in Country B that a fisherman has taken a picture of such a submarine, which is prominently displayed together with the story. Being diligent, and participating in the plot, Country B publicly announces it will search the area in which the submarine was sighted and photographed. The cache of arms is thus discovered and openly displayed to the press and diplomatic corps by Country B. The evidence provided by the cache and the planted photograph should stimulate the desired responses, and the stage is thus set in the event any similar arms are uncovered by the target regime.

Symbolism: An important psychological gimmick is the creation of a symbol which should be as simple as possible to reproduce and which would clearly convey the thought of anti-Communism. The easiest approach to selection of such a symbol would be carefully to examine the historical background of the target country to determine whether there has been any one factor, thought or action, which, if portrayed by a symbol, would automatically establish a thought pattern of anti-Communism. In this instance let us assume that the National Congress of the target country at one time - prior to its succumbing to the control of the Communists - had passed Resolution "Number 33" which expressly denounced international Communism as a menace to the welfare of the country and as contrary to the traditions and religious principles of the people. It may be assumed that many well-informed persons would recognize the significance of "33" if used in a propaganda manner. However, in order to induce the anti-Communists, to adopt "33" as their symbol of defiance to the Communist regime, a well laid out plan of action should be made to serve this purpose. This may be accomplished
by conducting a silent, secret campaign through the controlled media developed in the target country. Over a period of two to three weeks no mention whatever is made of the meaning of the symbol, meanwhile an aggressive murals campaign is carried out by teams of students who paint the symbol in public places so conspicuously that public attention will be inescapable. After attention has been attained the controlled media, press and radio, would repeatedly explain the origin of the symbol and its present significance. It is assumed that the anti-government or seditious aspects of this effort would provoke the government to take repressive measures which would then help firmly to establish "33" as the symbol of opposition to Communism. Once established and popularised, the symbol should be kept alive through repeated mural campaigns, press, leaflets and the clandestine radio. By this action it is reasonable to assume that unorganized groups and individuals throughout the country would come to use the symbol, thus providing one of the most important psychological requirements - the organizing and arousing of a wave of resistance by the simple expedient of giving the people something to do individually, thereby committing them to the cause.

Convocation of an International Anti-Communist Conference: It is assumed that no international anti-Communist organization exists within the community of nations to which the target country belongs. It is also assumed that within each of these countries there are active or potentially active anti-Communist groups or organizations. By careful planning in advance it is possible to arrange for a particularly well known and recognized anti-Communist organization in one of the major countries to sponsor an international conference to consider and review the threat of international Communism to the entire community of nations concerned, with the objective of adopting a uniform course for unity of action against this common menace. Through this initial action it is relatively easy to enlist the support of all field stations concerned to covertly organize local delegations and arrange the financing as well as the program on a country by country basis. Care should be taken by each Station to avoid too many controlled agents being included in each delegation in order to avoid compromising other agents at the conference and giving a controlled appearance. Through the use of controlled agents it is possible to arrange for the conference to direct its attacks against the target regime, thereby bringing to bear the psychological impact of international condemnation by sister republics, serving to divide and intimidate the target, and encouraging free people within the target country to resist. An effort should be made to perpetuate the effects of the conference by encouraging the resolution that each delegation form in its country an anti-Communist Committee for the liberation of the target country, thus providing
a broad basis for continuing propaganda attacks from abroad. The respective field stations should covertly support the formation of these local committees, utilizing them as media for the dissemination of themes against the target regime.

**Tactical Psy-war Teams:** During the course of developing control and effectiveness of friendly psy-war assets or media in the target country and Countries A and C, attention should be devoted to the establishment of specific tactical psy-war teams for each target garrison. These teams should consist of about ten able-bodied, aggressive individuals possessing the capability of seizing local broadcast stations and printing presses in their assigned target area and converting them to support the partisan attack. They should be trained in the use of arms, attack and defense tactics as well as in their specialties in the propaganda field. They should accompany shock teams wherever such are to be employed. In other cases where the target garrisons would be attacked only by partisans in the immediate area, the tactical psy-war teams should be formed either from indigenous personnel in the area or those infiltrated prior to the attack. Once in possession of a local broadcast station, newspaper or other printing facilities, the team should make defensive preparations and immediately commence propagating inflammatory propaganda against the regime, using completely notional themes depicting great success, defection in other areas, etc.

**INTELLIGENCE:**

**Psychological Intelligence:** Utilizing existing sources, contacts, informants and official relations, each field station in the regional command, particularly the target station, should develop a rapid reporting system under the direction of the Task Force Headquarters whereby current overt and covert information may be reported on a daily basis. The purpose of this type of reporting is twofold: One, to monitor the target and the people on a daily basis, in a sense, to provide intimate details essential in psychoanalyzing the situation as a basis for operational decisions; and two, to provide the steady flow of intimate information required for the intensive psy-war program envisioned to keep material timely and accurate and to provide opportunities for exploitation by timely handling. In this instance it is assumed that the situation permits the use of daily diplomatic air mail, unescorted. All material would be forwarded to a cover diplomatic mailing address accessible to the Task Force Headquarters. Being subject to technical surveillance by the Communists, all information should be prepared as in the case of an international news service bulletin carrying a cover designation. These bulletins should not be classified even though they may contain information of a "confidential" nature if adequately disguised through the use of a code system.
All highly sensitive information classified "Secret" or above should either be cabled in code or sent by diplomatic courier in the normal manner for handling this type of information.

Tactical Intelligence: Aside from the development of a psychological intelligence reporting system, it is important that the field stations concerned, particularly the target station and the exile groups in Countries A and C, should initiate a field reconnaissance system to collect information on the order of battle of the enemy forces and physical data on all sabotage targets and garrisons or military installations. The planning data should, of course, be collected as early as possible in the operation. All sources or scouts should be in readiness during the attack to maintain a steady flow of tactical data on the enemy in order to guide the operation properly. This is essentially a matter of collecting low level, often visual, information. High level tactical information would have to be obtained from penetration agents developed during the course of defection operations mentioned above as it was assumed in this problem that there were no high level, formal assets available at the time the operation commenced.

Strategic Intelligence: Both psychological and tactical intelligence provide low level information and, as indicated above, an effort should be made to develop relatively high level or strategic intelligence from the defection program. Once high level individuals are defected in place they automatically become excellent sources of information within high policy circles. In addition to this effort, the Exile Committee, with all of its presumed contacts inside as well as outside the target country, should be exploited fully for the development of high level sources. Every opportunity should be taken through field station contacts and official liaison arrangements to exploit the intelligence coverage of the target country by their respective host governments. In particular, Countries A, B, and C should provide some opportunity for augmenting high level intelligence coverage of the target regime.

COMMO DECEPTION:

Military Communications Intrusion/Deception Plan: Although the sabotage plan should make provision for sabotage of the target's military radio communications system in the event the defection plan fails in the local garrisons, consideration should also be given to a third plan in case of failure of the first two to obtain control or destroy the enemy's communications. Failure to control, destroy or otherwise interrupt the target's military communications system would have a very serious effect on the course of the partisan war as well as vitiating the plan for notional propaganda during the
attack. The notional propaganda mentioned above for the clandestine radio would be effective against the enemy only if he did not know or was in doubt as to the true state of affairs. Thus, if the land communication lines are destroyed by sabotage and he is forced to use his radio system exclusively to obtain information as to the true situation in all garrisons, and this system fails him, the enemy is unable to deny the false reports put out by the clandestine radio. Such a state of confusion and doubt should materially contribute to the enemy's decision to capitulate. This factor, although important psychologically, is no more important actually than military communications during an engagement; therefore, the two factors clearly demonstrate the importance of denying communications to the enemy during the attack phase. Accordingly a qualified radio monitoring team should be set up in operation in a safe place in the field as early as possible. The mission of this team should be over a period of months to learn and record every intimate detail of each station in the enemy's military communications system. In this manner complete familiarization may be attained with all procedures, schedules, habits, and key personalities or characteristics. Based upon this information it is possible to determine how many separate sets would be necessary for an effective interference plan. Assuming there is one station for each garrison, it would mean that about eight separate radio sets and operators would be required. The operators should be indigenous individuals or foreigners who speak the same language. By setting up these separate counter stations and drawing on the experience and knowledge gained by the monitoring team, it should be possible to have them in readiness for the attack phase, when it is assumed the enemy would resort to these channels for all communications pertaining to the military. The plan should provide for the counter stations to enter on the same frequencies as the enemy stations in order to engage in deceiving the enemy operators or harassing them so thoroughly that the system breaks down during the critical period.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SECTION:

General: The vast amount of detailed information required to support an operation of this nature necessitates the establishment of an Operational Research Section within the Task Force Headquarters. This staff should immediately commence with the collection from all available sources of all maps, statistical data, weather intelligence, geographical information, photographs, economic matter, road maps, railroad details, communications system and so on, which would be helpful if not vital to the entire range of planning. The Paramilitary Section would have many requirements for planning its operations and the sabotage plan alone would require a vast amount of detail of every description. It is important that full use be made of all available or readily procurable information before requests are made of the field
to use its covert facilities to obtain data. A vast amount of information on every country of the world is available in one place or another in the United States which would require very little effort to locate and bring together. This should be the duty of the Operational Research Section. A system should be employed to regulate and control all requests for information by the planning staffs to ensure the proper and most expeditious means of acquisition. All requests for information should be routed to the Operational Research Section where they should be analyzed to ascertain the best source for the information. This Section, after reviewing its own resources, would submit cable requests to the Main Headquarters for such information as it might be able to provide, and any data which it would be necessary to procure from field sources would be requested from the Intelligence Section in terms of specific EOI's (Essential Elements of Intelligence). In this manner the Intelligence Section would be able to assign the EOI's as required. Responses to EOI's would be routed to the Operational Research Section which would prepare all the information in the proper form for the originator of the request. Such a section can render extremely valuable service in the preparation and conduct of an operation as it provides the reference library, map collection files, photograph files, weather reports center, "Who's Who" or biographical files and other important services.

SABOTAGE PLAN:

General: To avoid bringing on severe government repressive measures prematurely, no violent or aggressive sabotage should be attempted until the situation warrants an all-out partisan effort. However, to be prepared to deliver the maximum impact on the enemy, it is necessary to plan and prepare months in advance for total sabotage. In this sense "total" is intended to mean the complete range of suitable targets for sabotage by small teams. The plan should include as targets in each garrison the following: All telephone, telegraph, teletype facilities, electric power sources or facilities, gasoline storage depots, military vehicles, railroad and highway bridges at selected sites, radio broadcast facilities and other facilities, the denial of which would seriously affect the enemy's capacity or will to continue the struggle against the anti-Communists. Each sabotage target should be carefully identified and planned for assignment to specific teams. Sabotage leaders should be selected early in the operation and trained in the techniques required to carry out their ultimate missions. These leaders in turn would recruit their teams from available indigenous paramilitary personnel or from the partisan forces within the target garrison area. Sabotage teams should be in readiness in the target area
prior to the attack by the partisan forces. They should be prepared to carry out their missions and then join the partisan forces which would follow up with their attack plan. The destruction of electric power and water facilities should await a specific signal, as it is important to have electric current to operate radio receivers to receive the clandestine radio's broadcasts, and the denial of water might well have a reverse effect on the population if not properly timed.

LOGISTICS PLAN:

General: From an evaluation of friendly resources it has been assumed that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 individuals would comprise the partisan force and bear arms. With this as a basis it is practical to establish a Table of Equipment for all the component elements involved. This TE should then be broken down in terms of delivery requirements: what equipment should be carried in by the sabotage and shock teams; what equipment could be infiltrated and cached for the partisan elements by target garrison; what equipment would have to be air dropped to the partisan elements beyond reach of land or sea infiltration facilities. Having arrived at this determination, the problems of movement or delivery should become clearly defined. Equipment for the above number would approximate 165 tons, including arms, ammunition, food and special paraphernalia. All of this equipment would be sterilized and of foreign manufacture wherever possible. After carefully studying the possibility of shipping this equipment into one of the third countries by sea, it is assumed that the absence of controlled maritime transport and dock handling as well as forward movement personnel renders this cheapest means very risky and dangerous to the success of the operation. This is particularly true when it is realized that the equipment must be moved through several bordering countries in order to accomplish final distribution. The equipment should also be broken down into specific team requirements and prepared in kit form for infiltration either by land, sea or air. From a consideration of the above factors it is assumed that the most secure and effective means of movement would be by air to the advance bases in the third countries involved. A separate logistic plan should be prepared for each partisan force on a target garrison basis. Dependence on air supply should be minimized at all costs and reserved for emergency or exceptional situations. Separate logistics plans should be prepared to support contingency planning for fighter/bomber requirements in the event air power is later required.

AIR SUPPORT PLAN:

General: Having arrived at the above decision that air support would be required to transport equipment to the advance bases, possibly
to supply partisan elements in the target area, to execute air leaflet drops and to provide a contingency capability for fighter/bombers, it is necessary to prepare an air support plan to meet all of these requirements or conditions. It is assumed that a safe rear base is available to fly cargo from the United States in unsterile, official aircraft. However, the movement from this rear base to advance bases should be accomplished in sterile aircraft only or by "black flights." This condition would also prevail in any overflights of the target country. Three C-47 type aircraft should be adequate for this purpose. The crews should be unwitting of any official support of the operation and employed under cover stories in a foreign country even though recruited in the United States. Foreign crews are preferable; however, it is assumed they were not available for this operation. Two types of sterile crews should be employed for maximum security: one for operating between safe rear base and forward bases; the second to operate only between forward or advance bases and the target country. It is assumed that Country A has secretly permitted "black flights" to land, and that Country C has not authorized such flights. Country B, which is not a border country but is within a short flying distance of the target country, is assumed to have authorized the establishment of an advance secret air base. With this arrangement it is possible to move equipment from the United States by unsterile aircraft to the safe rear base and to trans-ship by "black flight" to Country B for the establishment of an advance air depot and/or reshipment to Country A. There it would be distributed to paramilitary teams who would infiltrate the equipment or carry it into the target while making the attack. The ownership of the cargo aircraft should be made to appear as that of one of the principals in the Exile Committee. Fighter/bomber aircraft should be selected which are obsolescent by U. S. standards but superior to the types available in the target country. Foreign manufactured fighter aircraft would be preferred if possible to obtain. The P-47 type is assumed to be the most suitable and available a/c. For contingency planning only three are considered necessary on an operational basis, with three or more replacements in a reserve or standby status. The fighter pilots and crew chiefs should be employed ostensibly by the Exile Committee in a foreign country in the same manner as the sterile cargo crews. Again foreign pilots are preferred if available. Fighter a/c would be based in Country B after being thoroughly sterilized physically and administratively as pertaining to alleged ownership. The foregoing general description of air support should provide all the air requirements foreseeable in the planning stage and ensure the rapid logistical distribution of arms and material to the forward areas as well as provide a capability for air dropping if necessary.

(See Diagram of Air Support, page 34)
SECRET

DIAGRAM OF AIR SUPPORT

USA

UNSTERILE A/C

SAFE REAR BASE

UNSTERILE A/C

STERILE A/C

U.S. TERRITORY

STERILE A/C

FORWARD RECEIVING AIR FACILITY

COUNTRY 'A'
(Forward distribution by land infiltration)

COUNTRY 'B'

ADVANCE SECRET AIR BASE

COUNTRY

TARGET COUNTRY

OVERFLIGHTS

(CARGO FIGHTER A/C)
COMMUNICATIONS

General: The essential element in this operation is the communication system - the nerve system of the enemy and that of the friendly forces. This is essentially an over-all psychological operation and not a deliberately planned act of aggression or attempt to attain the overthrow of the target regime by sheer physical force. The strategy calls for the establishment of controlled psychological pressures, applied in an ever-increasing manner and combination until the target regime collapses or succumbs to the pressure. Thus a mental vise is to be created which would be capable of increasing the pressure or squeeze from psychological to psychophysical to outright physical destruction of the target regime's capacity to resist. It is therefore apparent that the friendly forces must enjoy the advantages of a superior communications system or nerve system in order to achieve the foregoing operational status. A third country operation involving four countries intimately, and undoubtedly several other countries in varying degree, immediately indicates the necessity for timely direction and coordination of the complex facets involved. While superior communications are essential for friendly forces during the pre-attack period, they are even more vital during the critical period of hostilities at which time it is essential to cripple or deny the enemy's communications as indicated in the above manner. The objective during this latter period should be to enjoy excellent communications while the enemy is denied communications. Therefore consideration of communications requirements must be the first and most thoroughly pursued objective in establishing this operation.

Command Channels: The importance of being in close hourly contact with the Main Headquarters is paramount, and in order that Headquarters may be properly informed of every detail, all cables in the field should be addressed "information" to that Headquarters. The Task Force Headquarters should have an adequate teletype landline with the main Headquarters. The regional command concept implies that the control of all communications with subordinate field stations should be held by the Task Force Headquarters. This would include the safe rear air base once the latter became operational. Each field station should be provided with adequate radio operators and equipment to handle a very heavy volume of priority traffic. Aside from communications with the respective field stations, each component element of the field organization should have radio operators capable of handling command traffic with the Task Force Headquarters. This would apply to the following units: Paramilitary training camp, agent radio training school, partisan headquarters in exile, advance air base, clandestine radio facility in Country B, the reserve clandestine radio installation in a safe location and the military intrusion/deception team.
Indigenous Channels: As indicated above, a separate communications system should be established for the indigenous partisan organization controlled by the Task Force Headquarters. This may be accomplished by establishing a secret communications base station presumably in Country B. This base station should be operated entirely by American personnel, and could provide the facilities for the clandestine radio, the communications center for the advance air base and the military intrusion/deception team. All agent or indigenous radio operators trained and assigned as per above tactical plan could then be tied in and worked through this base station thereby providing the control feature. During the active period of operations the Task Force Headquarters should establish its own radio section to work the base station direct, relaying information-wise to the Main Headquarters via teletype.

Indigenous R/O's: It will be noted in the tactical plan above that certain R/O's were to be assigned to the target garrison complexes and others to the shock teams. This calls for the designation and specialization of two types of R/O's: one, the resident R/O, or clandestine operator who must be carefully selected and trained to live and operate clandestinely in the target garrison area in order to be able to provide a communications message center for all elements of the local partisan complex; two, the tactical R/O's, who need not be so carefully trained in clandestine procedures but must be capable of accompanying the shock team in the field. The resident R/O's provide the essential means for coordination of the actions of all elements in the target country. In addition they provide rapid transmission of current intelligence from the field. The tactical R/O's provide each shock team with its message center, thereby permitting proper coordination and control as well as information channels.

A special communications center should be established for the tactical partisan headquarters consisting of several of the best tactical operators and two American operators to handle traffic with the Group Headquarters (Task Force Headquarters.) This partisan headquarters can be given the illusion of having its own communications system with its indigenous operators by being tied in with the base station in such a manner that the latter would handle all traffic between the operators and the partisan headquarters as if it were their own system. At the same time the base station would relay all indigenous traffic direct to the Task Force Headquarters where, by using the three pads system, the latter could read all traffic and take whatever appropriate action was called for.
OPERATIONAL SECURITY

General: The two most vital functions of Security in this operation are: First, to preserve the controlling factor of "plausible denial" and second to protect the operation from the enemy or counterespionage. The preservation of plausible denial may be notional but all-prevailing, and every action or counter-action must be weighed for conformance thereto. It is assumed that denial in this instance is limited to retaining the official separation of the U.S. Government from all responsibility for the covert/underground support of the operations envisioned herein. Protection of the operation from the enemy would normally involve both security and counterespionage; however, owing to the peculiar characteristics of this operation, the two functions will be combined and termed "operational security." In this manner almost identical requirements for preserving denial and protecting the operation become concentrated on one staff element. A Security Officer supported by an adequate staff should be assigned to the operation during the planning phase and should be cognizant of all facets of the operation at all times. In this manner the Security Officer would be able to review all plans to ensure denial and protection, and should have authority to check on any phase of the operation to ensure that no weak or dangerous practices or situations exist. The Security Officer should be the conscience and the law, and his ability to contribute to the operational security of the over all effort would be in proportion to the extent that he is knowledgeable of proposed plans or actions before they are consummated. The following are examples of specific responsibilities of the Security Officer.

Cover: The cover plan for the operation should be established by the Security Officer who should then supervise its implementation. This plan, as mentioned above, would first involve the cover for the Task Force Headquarters, and second the cover for dealing with the Exile Committee. All ramifications of these covers must be checked constantly and many of the functions conducted by the Security Section, i.e., safe mail boxes, safe houses, couriers, telephones, vehicles, personal covers, protective surveillance in the United States, entries and departures of indigenous persons, et cetera.

Operations: One of the basic assumptions in this hypothetical case history was that the target enjoyed a relatively superior intelligence and security system which had successfully exposed or blocked more than thirty previous attempts to overthrow the government. Giving full weight to this assumption, it logically follows that very careful consideration should be provided for the security of all operations involving foreign and/or indigenous individuals. A rapid provisional security clearance procedure should be established
with the Main Headquarters, and all agent personnel should be provided with POC's prior to their becoming willing of their true roles. Compartmentalization should be practiced to the maximum degree consistent with effective conduct of operations. "Need to know" must be the rule applied in every instance. In addition to POC's and local investigation, all key agent personnel, from the Exile Committee to the partisan cadre leaders, should be polygraphed wherever they are situated. The use of the polygraph in this instance should be confined to examination of the individual's motivations and loyalty to the cause. Polygraphing may be accomplished by provision of a commercial cover for the team and arrangement for examinations to be conducted under the auspices of the Exile Committee.

The Partisan Headquarters should have a Group Advisor handling tactical intelligence, and in addition should establish a counterespionage section within the Partisan Force for the detection of Communist agents or sympathizers. The normal channel for reporting CE information would be to the Intelligence Section of the Task Force Headquarters, and the Security Officer should be kept fully informed of all developments and be the responsible officer for determination of security countermeasures to protect the operation.

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

GENERAL:

In view of the hypothetical nature of this case history, it would be impractical to try to give a play-by-play description of the unfolding of such an operation without striking an arbitrary, fictional position which would be of little value to the reader. However, to provide an example of the strategy and tactics, the following situation is conjectured, stage by stage, depicting perhaps the most serious difficulties and adversities likely to be encountered in such an operation.

STAGE ONE:

It is assumed that administrative delays have occurred in procuring and processing the staff, but that in general the objectives of this first stage have been met satisfactorily. The assessment of actual friendly assets presumably has established the validity of the original assumption that they were potential assets only and that the enemy's capabilities were as portrayed above. Having made the assessments and determined the communications requirements, the tasks could be defined and assigned, establishing the compartmented facets of the operations envisioned in the tactical plan.
STAGE TWO:

It is assumed that Stage Two has progressed as planned and that all tasks have been developed generally as contemplated. As this is the most tranquil period, to develop and perfect friendly assets it should be of several months duration. It is assumed that the target government has shown considerable sensitivity to the propaganda disseminated during this period, justifying the plan to keep it relatively mild and of a conditioning nature. The development of controls over the potential friendly propaganda assets in the target country has presumably opened the way to the establishment of covert contact with a number of anti-Communist elements, thus providing the opportunity for initiation of the organization of those elements into a pattern for a future partisan force. The logistic and air support plans are prepared at the end of this Stage, based upon developments to date. During this period no defection of high level targets would be attempted.

As an example of a possible untoward incident, it is assumed that the target regime, in keeping with its past vigilance and tirades against the anti-Communists, has prepared a "State Paper" alleging the exposure of the activities of its enemies. This Paper would constitute a propaganda blast in which all known past conspirators and their deeds are collected into a vast scheme of conspiring against the government. This round up of the target's file data would undoubtedly contain incriminations against some of the individuals working in the new operational organization conducted by this operation. It may even be assumed that one of the key persons working close to the Exile Committee has been defected by the Communists. Such a situation would not be too unexpected, and, owing to its occurrence this early in the operation, it should not be too difficult to rectify any security compromises which would be involved. An important point to realize and exploit in this circumstance is that the target's blast against its enemies, true or false, lends credence to the existence of opposition, and the greater the danger to the government is pictured, the more it should encourage the anti-Communist majority to participate in the opposition.

STAGE THREE:

It is assumed that the operation has survived the target's propaganda blast and has continued to progress as planned. Stage Three should begin the serious phase of the operations and should not be undertaken unless it is carefully analyzed and ultimate success is reasonably certain. The importance of caution in starting the activities for this period lies in the fact that the partisan underground should be in the process of organizing, the
cadre leaders would be completing their training, and the logistical plan would be implemented, placing arms and equipment in the hands of the partisans in exile for infiltration. Thus, certain forces will thereby become in motion and if not pursued in a planned manner, these forces would become capable of going ahead independently for better or worse. To reiterate, in Stage Two the anti-Communists have been led to expect something to be done, and the target regime, being overly sensitive to any opposition, has reacted vigorously in denouncing all known and imaginary opponents; therefore, if the plans for Stage Three are to be implemented, it should be thought of as lighting the match to the fuse. It is assumed that the gravity of the decision at this point in the operation has been fully recognized and the consequences weighed in favor of proceeding with the operation. The implementation of all the tasks designed and developed for this period should stimulate the field on both sides, resulting in considerable agitation. It is assumed that all tasks were carried out with reasonable success, except for the defection efforts. The effort to defect the President is assumed to have failed, and upon analysis of all prospective candidates, it is decided that only a small circle of high-level individuals show promise of favorable reaction. The next step during this period should be to eliminate all unlikely or doubtful individuals and concentrate on this small circle, selecting the most reliable and likely leader to handle the others. The elimination of the possibility of defecting the President leaves only the recourse of developing this small circle of high-level potential defectors to effect an internal military coup d'état either coincident with a partisan attack or independently.

**STAGE FOUR:**

As a consequence of the pressures developed in Stage Three, it could be assumed that the target regime would sense the rising tides and the force of the opposition taking place throughout the target country. This is reasonable to expect since it would be next to impossible to arouse a latent resistance attitude sufficiently to support partisan warfare without the target government becoming aware and sensing the danger. This situation, being practically unavoidable, should be the real test of the effectiveness of the clandestine techniques and procedures employed throughout the operation. If security has held and the internal partisan organization has been sufficiently clandestine to thwart the enemy's best efforts, any wholesale round up of anti-Communists or application of severe repressive measures should not seriously endanger the operation. Time would be an important factor and this period should be as short as operationally possible to reduce danger to a minimum.
To illustrate the most serious adversity likely to befall an operation of this nature, it is assumed that all tasks are completed as planned for this period except that, through the failure of a key internal organizer in the target city to practice tight clandestine security, his home is suddenly searched and most of the plans and identities of key partisan personnel are seized by the target government. In such an event it might be expected that the enemy would immediately round up not only those known or suspected, but, being aware of the magnitude of the threat, would also seize and detain everyone considered sufficiently anti-Communist to be even remotely dangerous. There are, however, physical limitations to the number of relatively innocent people who can be incarcerated in a given period. It is assumed that about three to four thousand persons are arrested in about five days' time. Such an 'expose' would presumably become almost immediately to the Task Force Headquarters. Full consequences of this compromise should be assessed at once and corrective measures applied wherever possible, to prevent the seizure of external teams on their way or in readiness to move to their respective target garrisons. This assessment should be as realistic and severe as the facts warrant and result in an analysis of debits and credits of all assets. In this instance it would result in the writing off of practically all organized partisan elements and recognizing that the only reliable remaining assets are the external ones which have not been committed prior to the debacle and those internal assets which had not been compromised due to compartmentation. The external assets would be:

Clandestine radio: The value of this facility should be unimpaired except for the reduction of the psychological intelligence system.

Shock Teams (with Tactical R/O's)

Sabotage Teams

Resident R/O's, assuming that they were not committed or compromised by the expose.

Military Intrusion/Deception Team.

Air Fighter/Bomber, Cargo Capability.

Partisan Headquarters.

Logistical Support, assuming the compromise occurred prior to the full implementation of the arms infiltration plan and that most of the arms had been recovered.
The internal assets intact would be:

Defection candidates, as they should be completely compartmented from all other operations and handled in the most clandestine manner.

Psy-War media, although assumed eliminated or greatly reduced in the outlying garrisons, in the capital city, owing to the alertness of the field station and the indigenous personnel involved, it is reasonable to believe that most of the key personnel would be able to go into hiding.

Intelligence agents would be comparatively safe except for those identified in the partisan papers seized by the government.

The need for an immediate decision based upon the above analysis is apparent as each passing day after the exposure decreases the chances of recovery and strengthens the hand of the enemy. The Communist character of the enemy, if true to form, should be expected to manifest itself during the purge that follows the exposure. Thus barbaric tortures and brutality should be expected to be inflicted upon many completely innocent and highly respected indigenous persons. This oppressive action on the part of the enemy would undoubtedly create widespread fear and intense hatred of the target regime among all non-Communist people. The viciousness of the retaliation by the enemy indicates its desperation in the face of the development of a real threat by the operation. This should not, however, be construed as completely adverse despite the unfortunate consequences on the original plan. Compromise of the partisan plans should go far toward terrorizing the target regime, with the result that its counter measures would stimulate the intense antagonism of the non-Communists toward the target regime. The asset or advantage that is contained in the situation must be exploited promptly and effectively. Undue hesitance or delay at this juncture would definitely terminate the operation, leaving a more serious situation than before. Decision should be made at once to re-group, re-plan and accelerate the development of all remaining operational assets. The clandestine radio should become the voice of freedom and hope, and should continue the psychological pressure without a hint of despair. On the contrary, it should express unquestioned confidence and assurance that the Communists day of reckoning is drawing near.

STAGE FIVE:

It has been assumed that the non-Communists far outnumber the Communists and that the current wave of oppression has spread fear
and antagonism among the non-Communists. It is therefore concluded that many of the non-Communists would now fight if they had half a chance of survival. The opportunity to organize this majority into an effective partisan force through internal efforts is now considered lost as time and events no longer permit the employment of the clandestine procedures required. The only remaining means of accomplishing the establishment of a cohesive fighting front against the Communists is by means of direct, armed paramilitary effort cloaked under a powerful psychological campaign, completely notional in character. Once the shock troops are in actual control of a given area it is assumed that all non-Communist able-bodied men would join and support the cause.

The basic assumption as to the Armed Forces was that the Communists had penetrated the rank and file but that the real control over the army was held in the hands of the President through exertion of strong personal leadership. This implied that the Communist control and domination of the military was tenuous and not at all certain in a showdown with anti-Communists. It was further assumed that the Communists knew this weakness and had deliberately attempted to counterbalance the military strength by building up the national police and partisan labor forces under their control. The attempt to attack a well-organized, disciplined, heavily armed military force with paramilitary shock troops would be fatal were it not for the application of effective notional propaganda, excellent communications while denying the enemy communications, and the employment of superior fighter/bomber air power and air logistical support. When there is doubt as to the loyalty of the Armed Forces, the chances of success of the paramilitary effort become greater. It is presumed that throughout the early stages of this operation anti-Communist propaganda, internal and external, has had some effect on the military men as they would be the logical target of most of the psy-war effort. In addition to this psychological softening of the military, the defection efforts of both the independent operation and the Exile Committee should be expected to meet with certain success. The oppressive actions of the target regime against non-Communist civilians should be equally revolting to the non-Communist military men as the Communist efforts to penetrate and control their services. With this analysis it is assumed that the loyalty of the armed forces is in doubt and that therefore if a paramilitary attack could be made to appear serious and formidable there would be a very favorable possibility of forcing the defection or division of the non-Communist military.

In view of the situation described in Stage Four, it is presumed that the decision was made to attack, utilizing all available paramilitary personnel in exile and thus approximate the original tactical plan. The loss of the organizers and other key partisan personnel in
the interior would necessitate sending specially selected individuals from among those in exile to attempt contact with the remaining elements in each of the resistance centers. Their mission would be to assemble reception committees for air drops of arms and equipment which would follow in a few days. It is assumed that there has been sufficient indications from remaining intelligence sources to warrant expectation of a reasonable degree of success from this emergency air supply effort. To depict a realistic situation by adding adversity to an already serious position, it is presumed that after making some eighteen overflights in sterile aircraft not one correct reception signal had been observed. After a series of such failures, it is assumed that the pilots were ordered to release their supplies on the remaining drop zones whether or not the correct signal had been identified. The only action reports received on these blind air drops presumably were to the effect that the supplies had been turned in to the target authorities.

The above failure of the air supply effort could be interpreted either as an overestimate of the non-Communists willingness to fight or an underestimate of the enemy's effectiveness in wiping out all remnants of the partisan underground. Simultaneous with the air supply missions, the sabotage teams and resident R/O's would have been dispatched into the interior as advance preparations for the shock troops. Thus being committed, the power of decision would be gone regardless of the reason for the serious failure of the air supply attempts. To hold back the shock teams would be to accept dismal failure of the entire operation, whereas to commit them on schedule would be the last remaining chance to create sufficient pressure on the target regime to defect either the President or sufficient numbers of the military to enable ultimate victory. Meanwhile it is assumed that the independent operation had succeeded in defecting a key military person who had some degree of following, and that this person had reported that the President was greatly alarmed over the abortive air supply attempts. The report added that a serious outbreak of hostilities was needed by this defector to establish a coup d'etat internally. Under these conditions the order for the advance of the shock troops should be effected.

As originally planned, the shock troops would attack the garrisons nearest their jump-off point simultaneously with the execution of the sabotage assignments and the institution of the notional clandestine radio program. Owing to the apparent loss of internal partisan elements to support the attacks on the garrisons, tactics would have to be altered to meet this new situation. Instead of making a coordinated surprise attack on the garrisons, the shock troops would enter the garrison areas and maneuver for territory and position while attempting to recruit followers. In essence, the tactics would be strictly guerrilla warfare. Frontal attacks were to be avoided as
well as tests of strength at the enemy's choosing. It is assumed that seven shock teams out of the eight that were planned had advanced into the interior. Each team should number from 25 to 100, making a total of about 300 men. The enemy's forces in the attack area presumably number about 1,500, mostly infantry, with a few artillery batteries. The attack would be accompanied by the notable program of the clandestine radio, claiming that about 5,000 armed anti-Communists had attacked as the "Army of Freedom" and were advancing toward the capital city. The radio should make strong appeals for all non-Communists to join the cause against the Communist tyranny, to cut all telephone and telegraph wires, and otherwise take an active part in resistance against the government. The military intrusion/deception team would be already monitoring the enemy's military radio communications channels and would commence their intrusion, station by station, harassing and deceiving the enemy as soon as the land lines had been sufficiently destroyed to force complete reliance on the radio system.

One of the original assumptions was that the enemy's air force was decidedly pro-American. This advantage presumably would have been exploited fully during the buildup period both through propaganda and defection efforts. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that certain success should ensue, particularly during the attack period. Accordingly it is assumed that a number (say ten) of the enemy's air force pilots and crew members defected either to neutral countries or to those bordering countries identified with this operation or known to be unfriendly to the target regime. By quick action it should be possible to recruit certain of the key senior air defectors and exploit their defection on the clandestine radio. In this manner the air capabilities of the enemy would be still more reduced by actual inducement of further defections, with subsequent loss of aircraft or the development of such distrust among the remaining personnel as to render the enemy's air ineffective. Although a fighter/bomber potential capability of three F-17's should be in readiness for air attack, they should not be committed in this role early in the conflict except to demonstrate their presence over the capital city in order to allow for the possibility of achieving the maximum psychological effect short of actual fire power. It must be borne in mind that the basic strategy of this operation was not to resort to force alone as the means to achieve the objective, but to create the necessary pressures to force the issue in the desired manner. With the air superiority on the friendly side, in terms of pilots and types of aircraft, there would be great temptation under adverse conditions to launch immediate devastating air power strikes against the capital city. Undoubtedly full use of this one superior weapon would contribute greatly to the early termination of the conflict. However, the political consequences of such devastation might be so serious as to do as much harm as direct, overt military or economic intervention,
which was excluded from consideration in the original analysis. Thus the soundness of the strategy should not be forsaken for the immediate gain of the moment.

The Partisan Headquarters should be encouraged to devise and develop completely indigenous air support independent of the organization by the Task Force. It is assumed that two small sport model aircraft were procured locally and that indigenous pilots were available among the defectors or exiles. These aircraft should be as much in evidence as possible, and employed to carry out strikes with homemade bombs and strafing action, using submachine guns. The appearance of these aircraft in action would contribute to the plausibility requirement as well as to the tactical support of friendly forces in the field. Such indigenous aircraft could undertake the firing of gasoline storage tanks, strafing the enemy’s border garrisons, providing certain air supply support of isolated shock teams, as well as throwing out leaflets. The cargo aircraft would provide the bulk of the logistical air support, and, owing to the likely presence of anti-aircraft artillery over the capital city, they should be used for night leaflet missions over that target. It will be noted that the above comments as to the employment of air fire power in relation to the basic strategy applies to its employment on the capital city. The use of air fire power to support ground troops is in a different category and may be classified as air-to-ground tactical support. Its use should be avoided if possible for the reason advanced above. In this particular set of circumstances, however, with so little advantage over the enemy and the stake so high, it is assumed that the tactical employment of air fire power is authorized. This requires a definition of terms and delineation of authority. Before entering Stage Five, a senior paramilitary staff officer should be assigned responsibility for the conduct of tactical operations in the field. His authority should encompass all operational activities within the combat zone or the immediate area in which the shock troops are engaged. This authority should include the deployment of air fire power and air logistical support. The area outside the combat zone should be defined as "strategic" and all operations therein should be under the direct control of the Task Force Headquarters.

It is assumed that the President is confident of his military forces during the first twenty-four hours after the attack despite the notional broadcasts of the clandestine radio and its claims of initial successes. During this period it is unlikely that the shock teams, employing guerrilla tactics, would have had other than minor skirmishes with border patrols and/or small elements outside the garrisons. The notional claims should be sufficiently realistic to require verification by the enemy of the claims of the "Voice of Freedom."
If the sabotage of landlines of communication is incomplete, it may be expected that some will still be in order, or at least that intermittent service will be available to the enemy. Thus only partial confirmation will be possible after the first day. Further, the garrison commanders, knowing the claims of the "Voice of Freedom" would be inclined to hesitate before completely denying the existence of a threat to their superiors, and in most cases would want to play it safe by asking for reinforcements. Therefore the inability of the enemy completely to deny or confirm the false claims of the friendly radio and the probable call for reinforcements from the garrisons in the combat zone should be the beginning of frustration which should soon lead to utter confusion as the landlines are more effectively sabotaged and the military radio circuits are harassed and deceived. An obvious reaction of the enemy under these circumstances would be to dispatch heavy reinforcements into the disputed area to conduct mopping up operations. Alertness to this possibility by the station in the capital city should result in providing fairly reliable tactical intelligence on all troop movements. The deployment of fighter/bombers against such targets of opportunity should prove effective and possibly result in serious losses to the enemy. Unquestionably the tactical field commander would also make air strikes against the garrisons in the combat zone, thus reducing their effectiveness in dealing with the shock troops.

The first two or possibly three days after the initial launching of the shock troops would be devoted to maneuvering and seizing undefended population centers. It is assumed that the local leaders of a small village a short distance inside the target country where there is a landing strip offer the opportunity of declaring the village the first liberated site. This should be fully exploited psychologically by announcing the establishment thereof as a provisional anti-Communist government and the alleged general headquarters of the partisan forces.

Actual control over the tactical situation should remain with the tactical commander, the senior paramilitary staff officer, who should remain at the base station in Country B where he can direct all activities by radio. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of non-Communists in the combat zone, once free from control by the enemy, would be willing to take up arms on the non-Communist side. The notional broadcasts of the "Voice of Freedom" should provide strong inducement to join the anti-Communists at the first opportunity, as it must be assumed that the average civilian in the area would have no means of confirming or denying the claims of the radio. Therefore by the fourth day the friendly forces should have increased their strength to approximately 800 men. This number, equipped with a high percentage of submachine guns, about fifty light machineguns and small mortars and rifles, together with an ample supply of hand grenades,
should provide a fairly effective striking force. The added advantages of good communications, mobility attained through air logistical support and the employment of guerrilla tactics against regular army troops should enable the friendly forces to concentrate on the garrisons in the area one at a time. This is particularly reasonable when uncontested air firepower support is assumed to be enjoyed by the friendly forces. The rationale for these tactics is that it is important to strike a hard blow at the enemy's forces as early as possible to confirm the notion of broadcasts and create the necessary psychological impact on the target leaders to convince them that their cause is lost.

In the capital city it is assumed that the President, true to his characterization as a strong leader, remains resolute and is strongly encouraged by the Communists who recognize they have everything at stake. Therefore, after the fifth day it is presumed that the failure of the friendly forces to strike a serious blow has given rise to an air of optimism which would seriously imperil the chance for success of an internal coup d'état. This situation should be sensed in the capital city by the defection case officer and carefully evaluated with the aid of the key defector to determine the probable outcome if the coup were started at this time. In order for the coup d'état to be successful against the Communist controlled government, it is most important to be assured of adequate, rapid consolidation of support from the army. If the army is still primarily loyal to the President, and the key defector lacks a strong following among the army leaders, any attempt at a coup would be short lived and probably disastrous to the outcome of the operation. Recognizing the foregoing circumstances and the approaching test of arms between the regular army and the partisan forces, it is presumed that the field staff officers have urged that an effective air strike be made at once against key targets in the capital city. The objective, of course, would be to deliver the obviously required telling blow to force a favorable atmosphere for the coup d'état.

After careful deliberation and consultation with the Main Headquarters, the Task Force Headquarters presumably would recommend that an exception be made to the basic strategy, or that the latter be interpreted to permit the application of air fire power against the capital on a carefully planned basis. It was assumed that the capital city had air defense artillery and that the decision had been made to restrict air tactics to "appearance" of air power without firing for effect. This situation, while probably a reasonable tactic in the early stage of the period of conflict, would soon lead to ridicule if prolonged, as the friendly aircraft would undoubtedly be subjected to ground-to-air fire. Their failure to return directed fire might be construed as weakness or incapacity. Therefore, after the fifth day
it is assumed that flak suppression was authorized in the capital city and later extended to include machinegun attacks on certain gasoline storage tanks. After about three days of repeated flak suppression attacks it is assumed that the situation is not materially changed and that the circumstances described as to the unpropitious timing for the coup d'état have made it entirely evident that more serious measures are required if the tide of the conflict is to be turned. Accordingly, it is assumed that the decision has been made by the Task Force Headquarters, with the concurrence of the Main Headquarters, to effect a bomb strike on a strategic target in the capital city. This target should be an important military one, the destruction of which would involve the minimum number of civilian casualties. It is therefore assumed that on about the ninth day a powder arsenal and supply depot, located in a cleared area near the center of the city, is partially destroyed on the first strike by friendly fighter/bombers.

By the ninth day it is assumed that friendly partisan ground forces, although in a precarious position in terms of conventional military evaluation, have increased in strength to about 1,200 irregulars. The enemy, also failing to strike a decisive military blow, and undoubtedly reinforced to about 4,500 troops in the combat zone, would be in a state of confusion because of the lack of reliable communications and the demoralization resulting from unremitting air attacks. These factors, plus the guerrilla tactics employed by the friendly ground forces, constant air attack on troop trains, pounding propaganda from the "Voice of Freedom" declaring victories and large-scale defections, should have a vital effect on the enemy's morale. This situation would be compounded by the issues involved and the established fact that the army was not completely pro-Communist in the beginning. The inability of the enemy rapidly to subdue the anti-Communist partisans should provide encouragement for many remaining anti-Communist elements outside the combat zone to rebel. Thus, despite initial failures to supply these groups by air, every effort should be made to establish contact and eventually effect air delivery of arms. It is assumed this was done so that by the tenth day two or three islands of armed resistance had been created in the interior of the target country. When all these factors are realized by the President and his immediate staff it is reasonable to conclude that by the eleventh day the pressure would be so great that further resistance would seem to be in vain. With the bulk of the best enemy troops out of the capital city locked in an ineffective engagement with an ever-increasing partisan force, unreliable communications, mounting resistance throughout the country, anti-Communist claims of mass defections and threats to march on the city, together with the bombing of the arsenal, the moment for the coup d'état should have arrived.
It was assumed that the independent defection effort was successful in producing only a relatively weak leader and a small clique of non-Communist officers. This weakness was assumed in order to indicate the degree of pressure that might be required to force defection or capitulation of such a strong leader as this hypothetical President, who presumably has already subdued numerous other attempts. In the above circumstances, described as ripe for a coup d'état, there is danger of some other clique of opportunists, realizing the inevitable fate of the President, stepping in to provide either a change in faces or in vested interests. It is assumed that such a situation existed in this instance and that the key defector believed himself too weak prestige-wise successfully to execute the coup without eliminating his competitors. The plan should then become one of a series of events in which the key defector with his following would induce the second strongest man in the target country to join with the defector to remove the President from office. By participating in this maneuver, the key defector should be able to join the subsequent military ruling body and bring some of his followers into it. It is assumed that this was done on the eleventh day, and, after the President had been removed by the palace coup d'état and the second man had declared himself ruler, he in turn would be attacked by the "Voice of Freedom" as representing merely a change in name and assertions that the new ruler by his association is as much of a pro-Communist as the deposed President.

Meanwhile the loss of the deposed President's influence over his troops should have a profound effect, and defections should occur en masse. The morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces would undoubtedly become very low as that of the partisan forces conversely became greatly heightened. This situation should be met with a change in tactics which would bring to bear the most concentrated firepower on the largest enemy troop concentration in preparation for a concerted attack with air support. Thus posed for an effective attack against supposedly stronger but relatively ineffective forces, full weight must be given to the psychology of the situation. The "Voice of Freedom" should exploit the downfall of the President and assert the unpopularity of his successor, reducing the issue to one of futility for the enemy. This should be followed quickly with the threat of an all-out attack on the enemy forces in the above manner and seizure of the capital city. Simultaneous with the latter action an ultimatum should be broadcast over the "Voice of Freedom" continuously for several hours, setting forth the conditions which must be met in order to establish a cease-fire. To confirm the unacceptability of the first coup, and to provide the key defector with needed further priming to effect his coup within a coup, the "Voice of Freedom" should demand the resignation of the military group, punctuating its words by warnings of further air raids to follow. Within an hour of this broadcast the same arsenal should be bombed for effect a second time.
The tightening of the vise by the above action should be sufficient to enable the key defector to effect his coup within the ruling military group and declare himself the head of the government. With the key defector in this position, it should then become a relatively easy matter to effect a cease-fire and a final political solution between two controlled agents.

STAGE SIX:

The actual peace negotiations should be handled by the Diplomatic Service as a matter of good offices. The armed forces created during this operation should constitute the necessary armed strength to compel compliance with consolidation orders. If the psychological propaganda employed up to this point has contained sufficient allowance to enable the army to save face, it should not be too difficult to enlist its cooperation in ridding the country of Communism and consolidating the breaches in order eventually to restore peace and democracy. The danger of the Communists rallying a counterattack should be borne in mind at all times; however, as the object of defecting the army was to gain its support, rapid follow-through in forming an anti-Communist government should remove this menace.

CONCLUSIONS

This attempt to provide a realistic case history of a hypothetical situation necessitated the adoption of many arbitrary assumptions. Therefore, any analysis of the case must proceed on the basis of dividing the assumptions into two classes: those which described the situation as being valid, and those which were made to describe actions or decisions as subject to examination. Leaving the examination of the latter assumptions to the reader, the conclusions shall be confined to those of intention in preparing this study.

The target was conjectured as difficult in order to provide an example of how to cope with such a situation in terms of progressive pressure. It is generally beyond the ability of any particular group of persons, regardless of their intellectual superiority, to determine definitely that the creation of this pressure or that combination of pressures would achieve a specific objective. The physical factors involved in any given situation may be determined with reasonable accuracy. Thus, military science is in fact a reasonably accurate subject. Psychic factors, on the other hand, require an application of the science of psychology, which is one of the youngest and most imprecise of all sciences. This characteristic of psychology accounts for the inability of the planning group to prepare precise plans for the achievement of the objective in this case. Given only the general
characteristics of the target, all the unknown factors make it practically impossible to plan for fulfillment of the objective by specific preparations for any one of the following actions:

Defection of the President through psychological appeals, bribery, character assassination or any other operation tailored specifically to him as an individual;

Democratic means or rousing the non-Communists to demand the removal of Communists from the government without force, using only moral suasion;

Defection of the army, thereby inducing removal of the President by military pressure or a coup d'état;

International pressure of non-Communist governments against the target country to persuade the President to turn against Communism;

Internal division, political instability or strife between the President and the Communist leaders to induce action against the Communists;

Peoples revolt, an armed uprising of all anti-Communists against Communism and/or the President.

The above are not exhaustive but are, in general, the most reasonable ways and means of effecting a change in government of a foreign country. Owing to the undeterminable factors set forth in the description of the target, the concept of strategy was devised to permit the achievement of the objective through any one of a series of pressure or power moves, thereby providing opportunity of doing it the easy way, while at the same time preparing for the hard way. The application of this strategy required alertness at all times to the danger of compromising the long-range preparations while attempting short-range pressures. It will be noted that deflection was tried by two different operations and that great care was exercised to avoid aborting the one vital element until circumstances were most propitious. Although the discussion of the operation did not specifically describe attempts to defect the President, it must be assumed that the deflection case officer had exhausted every means of doing so without success. The assumption that the President was a strong leader, completely in sympathy with Communists almost caused all prospects for his defection to be written off.